1991 Soviet coup attempt - Wikipedia

1991 Soviet coup attempt - Wikipedia
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Soviet coup attempt of 1991
Failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev
Not to be confused with the
1993 Russian constitutional crisis
1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt
Part of the
end
of the
Cold War
, the
Revolutions of 1989
and later, the
dissolution of the Soviet Union
Clockwise from top left:
Memorial to three citizens killed defying the
GKChP
coup
Boris Yeltsin
, the
Russian president
, waving the newly adopted
national flag
Barricade on Smolenskaya Street that reads "Ban, dissolve, prosecute the
CPSU
!"
Pro-Yeltsin forces' barricades near Moscow's
White House
GKChP tanks on the
Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge
near
Red Square
Date
18–22
August 1991 (5 days)
Location
Moscow
Russian SFSR
Soviet Union
Result
Presidential victory; coup fails
Self-dissolution of the
GKChP
Failure of the proposed
New Union Treaty
Dissolution of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
and seizure of its banks and buildings by the
Russian SFSR
Restoration of
Estonian
and
Latvian
independence
Ukraine's declaration of independence
Belarus
' declaration of independence
Chechen Revolution
and
Declaration of Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic
Power shift continued towards republic elites,
Soviet president
left with effectively no authority
Dissolution of the Soviet Union
on 26
December 1991
Belligerents
State Committee on the State of Emergency
Taman Guards
Kantemir Division
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
KGB
Alpha Group
Vympel Group
Presidency of the Soviet Union
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
Supreme Soviet
Congress of People's Deputies
Council of Ministers
Soviet Military
Supporting
republics
Abkhazia
Azerbaijan
Byelorussia
Checheno-Ingushetia
Gagauzia
South Ossetia
Tajikistan
Tatarstan
Transnistria
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Supporting
republics
Armenia
Estonia
Georgia
Karakalpakstan
Kazakhstan
Kirghizia
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Nakhchivan
Ukraine
Interfront
Intermovement
IFWP
Yedinstvo
Unitate-Edinstvo
International Movement of Donbass
Communist Party of the RSFSR
Communist Party of Estonia (CPSU)
Communist Party of Latvia
Communist Party of Lithuania
Liberal Democratic Party
Pamyat
Russian National Unity
Russian nationalists
Pro-coup and anti-Yeltsin demonstrators and organizations
Russian liberals
Anti-coup and pro-Yeltsin demonstrators and organizations
Democratic Russia
Armenian Revolutionary Federation
Popular Front of Azerbaijan
Belarusian Popular Front
All-National Congress of the Chechen People
All-Tatar Public Center
People's Movement of Ukraine
UNA–UNSO
Sąjūdis
Popular Front of Latvia
Popular Front of Estonia
Diplomatic support
10
11
China
North Korea
Cuba
Yugoslavia
Serbia
Montenegro
Afghanistan
Iraq
Libya
PLO
12
Sudan
Diplomatic support
11
13
United States
United Kingdom
NATO
EEC
France
Germany
Israel
Czechoslovakia
Romania
Hungary
Poland
Bulgaria
Mongolia
Yugoslavia
Croatia
Slovenia
Afghan mujahideen
Holy See
Italy
Turkey
Japan
South Korea
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
Commanders and leaders
Gennady Yanayev
Sergey Akhromeyev
‡‡
Dmitry Yazov
Vladimir Kryuchkov
Valentin Pavlov
Boris Pugo
‡‡
Oleg Baklanov
Vasily Starodubtsev
Alexander Tizyakov
Nikolay Kruchina
‡‡
Mikhail Gorbachev
Boris Yeltsin
Alexander Rutskoy
Ruslan Khasbulatov
Ivan Silayev
Gennady Burbulis
Andrei Kozyrev
Viktor Barannikov
Konstantin Kobets
Gavriil Popov
Pavel Grachev
Anatoly Sobchak
Vladislav Ardzinba
Ayaz Mutallibov
Hasan Hasanov
Anatoly Malofeyev
Nikolai Dementey
Doku Zavgayev
Sergey Bekov
ru
Stepan Topal
Znaur Gassiev
Qahhor Mahkamov
Mintimer Shaimiev
Igor Smirnov
Saparmurat Niyazov
Islam Karimov
Levon Ter-Petrosyan
Edgar Savisaar
Zviad Gamsakhurdia
Dauletbay Shamshetov
ru
Nursultan Nazarbayev
Askar Akayev
Ivars Godmanis
Vytautas Landsbergis
Gediminas Vagnorius
Mircea Snegur
Valeriu Muravschi
Heydar Aliyev
Leonid Kravchuk
Valentin Kuptsov
Lembit Annus
Alfrēds Rubiks
Mykolas Burokevičius
Vladimir Zhirinovsky
Abulfaz Elchibey
Zianon Pazniak
Dzhokhar Dudayev
Fauziya Bayramova
Viacheslav Chornovil
Yuriy Shukhevych
Dainis Īvāns
Casualties and losses
3 died by
suicide
Boris Pugo
, the
Minister of Interior
Sergey Akhromeyev
, a military advisor to Gorbachev
Nikolay Kruchina
, the Administrator of Affairs of the
Central Committee of the CPSU
14
15
3 civilians killed on 21
August
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The
1991 Soviet coup attempt
, also known as the
August Coup
was a failed attempt by
hardliners
of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) to
forcibly seize control
of the country from
Mikhail Gorbachev
, who was
Soviet president
and
General Secretary of the CPSU
at the time. The coup leaders consisted of top military and civilian officials, including Vice President
Gennady Yanayev
, who together formed the
State Committee on the State of Emergency
Russian
ГКЧП
romanized
GKChP
). They opposed Gorbachev's
reform program
, were angry at the
loss of control over Eastern European states
and fearful of the
New Union Treaty
, which was on the verge of being signed by the
Soviet Union
(USSR). The treaty was to decentralize much of the
central Soviet government
's power and distribute it among its
fifteen republics
Boris Yeltsin
's demand for more autonomy to the republics opened a window for the plotters to organize the coup.
The GKChP hardliners dispatched
KGB
agents who detained Gorbachev at his
dacha
but failed to detain the recently elected
president
of
Russia
, Boris Yeltsin, who had been both an ally and critic of Gorbachev. The GKChP was poorly organized and met with effective resistance by both Yeltsin and a civilian campaign of
anti-authoritarian
protesters, mainly in
Moscow
16
The coup collapsed in two days, and Gorbachev returned to office while the plotters all lost their posts. Yeltsin subsequently became the dominant leader and Gorbachev lost much of his influence. The failed coup led to both the immediate collapse of the CPSU and the
dissolution of the USSR
four months later.
Following the capitulation of the GKChP, popularly referred to as the "Gang of Eight", both the Supreme Court of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
(RSFSR) and President Gorbachev described its actions as a coup attempt.
Background
edit
Since assuming power as
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
in 1985, Gorbachev had embarked on an ambitious reform program embodied in the twin concepts of
perestroika
(economic and political restructuring) and
glasnost
(openness).
17
These moves prompted resistance and suspicion on the part of hard-line members of the
nomenklatura
. The reforms also caused
nationalist
agitation on the part of the
Soviet Union
's non-
Russian
minorities to grow, and there were fears that some or all of the
union republics
might secede. In 1991, the Soviet Union was in a severe economic and political crisis. Scarcity of food, medicine, and other consumables was widespread,
18
people had to stand in long
lines
to buy even essential goods,
19
fuel stocks were as much as 50% lower than the estimated amount needed for the approaching winter, and inflation exceeded 300% per year, with factories lacking the cash needed to pay salaries.
20
In 1990,
Estonia
21
Latvia
22
Lithuania
23
and
Armenia
24
had already declared the restoration of their independence from the Soviet Union. In January 1991, a
violent attempt to return Lithuania to the Soviet Union by force
took place. About a week later,
a similar attempt
was engineered by local pro-Soviet forces to overthrow Latvian authorities.
Russia
declared its sovereignty
on 12
June 1990 and thereafter limited the application of Soviet laws, in particular those governing finance and the economy, on Russian territory. The
Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR
adopted laws that contradicted Soviet laws (the so-called
War of Laws
).
In the
unionwide referendum on 17 March 1991
, boycotted by the
Baltic states
Armenia
Georgia
, and
Moldova
, a
supermajority
of residents in the other republics expressed the desire to retain the renewed Soviet Union, with 77.85% voting in favor. Following negotiations, eight of the remaining nine republics (
Ukraine
abstaining) approved the
New Union Treaty
with some conditions. The treaty was to make the Soviet Union a federation of independent republics called the
Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics
, with a common president,
foreign policy
, and military.
Russia
Kazakhstan
and
Uzbekistan
were to sign the Treaty in Moscow on 20
August 1991.
25
26
British historian
Dan Stone
wrote the following about the plotters' motivation:
The coup was the last gasp of those who were astonished at and felt betrayed by the precipitous collapse of the
Soviet Union's empire
in
Eastern Europe
and the swift destruction of the
Warsaw Pact
and
Comecon
that followed. Many feared the consequences of Gorbachev's German policies above all, not just for leaving officers unemployed but for sacrificing gains achieved in the
Great Patriotic War
to German
revanchism
and
irredentism
– after all, this had been the Kremlin's greatest fear since the end of the war.
27
Preparation
edit
Planning
edit
The KGB began considering a coup in September 1990. Soviet politician
Alexander Yakovlev
began warning Gorbachev about the possibility of one after the
28th Party Congress
in June 1990.
On 11
December 1990,
KGB
Chairman
Vladimir Kryuchkov
made a "call for order" over the
Moscow Programme
television station.
28
That day, he asked two KGB officers
29
to prepare measures to be taken in the event a
state of emergency
was declared in the USSR. Later, Kryuchkov brought
Soviet Defense Minister
Dmitry Yazov
Central Control Commission
Chairman
Boris Pugo
Premier
Valentin Pavlov
, Vice President
Gennady Yanayev
, Soviet Defense Council deputy chief
Oleg Baklanov
, Gorbachev secretariat head
Valery Boldin
, and
CPSU Central Committee Secretary
Oleg Shenin
into the conspiracy.
30
31
When Kryuchkov complained about the Soviet Union's growing instability to the
Congress of People's Deputies
, Gorbachev attempted to appease him by issuing a presidential decree enhancing the powers of the KGB and appointing Pugo to the Cabinet as
Minister of Internal Affairs
. Foreign Secretary
Eduard Shevardnadze
resigned in protest and rejected an offered appointment as vice president, warning that "a dictatorship is coming." Gorbachev was forced to appoint Yanayev in his place.
32
Beginning with the
January Events
in
Lithuania
, members of Gorbachev's Cabinet hoped that he could be persuaded to declare a state of emergency and "restore order," and formed the
State Committee on the State of Emergency
(GKChP).
33
On 17
June 1991, Soviet premier Pavlov requested extraordinary powers from the
Supreme Soviet
. Several days later, Moscow Mayor
Gavriil Popov
informed U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union
Jack F. Matlock Jr.
that a coup against Gorbachev was being planned. When Matlock tried to warn him, Gorbachev falsely assumed that his own Cabinet was not involved and underestimated the risk of a coup.
33
Gorbachev reversed Pavlov's request for more powers and jokingly told his Cabinet "The coup is over," remaining oblivious to their plans.
34
On 23
July 1991, several party functionaries and literati published a piece in the hardline
Sovetskaya Rossiya
newspaper, entitled "
A Word to the People
", that called for decisive action to prevent calamity.
35
Six days later, on 29
July, Gorbachev,
Russian president
Boris Yeltsin
and
Kazakh president
Nursultan Nazarbayev
discussed the possibility of replacing hardliners such as Pavlov, Yazov, Kryuchkov and Pugo with more liberal figures,
36
with Nazarbayev as Prime Minister (in Pavlov's place). Kryuchkov, who had placed Gorbachev under close surveillance as Subject 110 several months earlier, eventually got wind of the conversation from an
electronic bug
planted by Gorbachev's bodyguard,
Vladimir Medvedev
37
38
Yeltsin also prepared for a coup by establishing a secret defense committee, ordering military and KGB commands to side with RSFSR authorities and establishing a "reserve government" about 70 kilometers from
Sverdlovsk
under Deputy Prime Minister
Oleg Lobov
Commencement
edit
On 4
August, Gorbachev went on holiday to his
dacha
in
Foros, Crimea
36
He planned to return to Moscow in time for the
New Union Treaty
signing on 20
August. On 15
August, the text of the draft treaty was published, which would have stripped the coup planners of much of their authority.
39
40
On 17
August, the members of the GKChP met at a
KGB
guesthouse in Moscow and studied the treaty document. Decisions were made to introduce a state of emergency from 19
August, to form a State Emergency Committee, and require Gorbachev to sign the relevant decrees or to resign and transfer powers to Vice President Yanayev.
36
They believed the pact would pave the way for the Soviet Union's breakup, and decided it was time to act. The next day, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin, and Soviet Deputy Defense Minister General
Valentin Varennikov
flew to Crimea for a meeting with Gorbachev. Yazov ordered General
Pavel Grachev
, commander of the
Soviet Airborne Forces
, to begin coordinating with KGB Deputy Chairmen Viktor Grushko and Genii Ageev to implement
martial law
At 4:32
pm on 18
August, the GKChP cut communications to Gorbachev's dacha, including
telephone landlines
and the
nuclear command and control
system.
36
Eight minutes later Lieutenant General Yuri Plekhanov, Head of the
Ninth Chief Directorate
of the KGB, allowed the group into Gorbachev's dacha. Gorbachev realized what was happening after discovering the telephone outages. Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov demanded that Gorbachev either declare a state of emergency or resign and name Yanayev as acting president to allow the members of the GKChP "to restore order" to the country.
31
41
42
33
Gorbachev has always claimed that he refused point-blank to accept the ultimatum.
41
43
Varennikov has insisted that Gorbachev said: "Damn you. Do what you want. But report my opinion!"
44
However, those present at the dacha at the time testified that Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov had been clearly disappointed and nervous after the meeting with Gorbachev.
41
Gorbachev is said to have insulted Varennikov by pretending to forget his name, and to have told his former trusted advisor Boldin "Shut up, you prick! How dare you give me lectures about the situation in the country!"
33
With Gorbachev's refusal, the conspirators ordered that he remain confined to the dacha. Additional KGB security guards were placed at the dacha gates with orders to stop anybody from leaving.
41
At 7:30
pm, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov flew to Moscow, accompanied by Plekhanov. His deputy, Vyacheslav Generalov, remained "on the farm" in Foros.
36
At 8:00
pm, Yanayev, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo and Soviet Supreme Soviet Chairman
Anatoly Lukyanov
gathered in the Kremlin cabinet of the Prime Minister, discussing and editing the documents of the State Emergency Committee.
36
At 10:15
pm, they were joined by Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin, Varennikov and Plekhanov. It was decided to publicly declare Gorbachev ill. Yanayev hesitated, but the others convinced him that leadership and responsibility would be collective.
36
At 11:25
pm, Yanayev signed a decree entrusting himself with presidential powers.
36
GKChP members ordered that 250,000 pairs of handcuffs from a factory in
Pskov
be sent to Moscow,
45
also ordering 300,000 arrest forms. Kryuchkov doubled the pay of all KGB personnel, called them back from holiday, and placed them on alert.
Lefortovo Prison
was emptied to receive prisoners.
37
The coup chronology
edit
Main article:
Timeline of the 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt
The members of the
GKChP
met in the
Kremlin
after Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov returned from Crimea. Yanayev (who had only just been persuaded to join the plot), Pavlov and Baklanov signed the so-called "Declaration of the Soviet Leadership", which declared a state of emergency in the entirety of the USSR and announced that the State Committee on the State of Emergency (Государственный Комитет по Чрезвычайному Положению, ГКЧП, or
Gosudarstvenniy Komitet po Chrezvichaynomu Polozheniyu
GKChP
) had been created "to manage the country and effectively maintain the regime of the state of emergency". The GKChP included the following members:
Gennady Yanayev
, Vice President
Valentin Pavlov
, Prime Minister
Vladimir Kryuchkov
, head of the
KGB
Dmitry Yazov
, Minister of Defence
Boris Pugo
, Minister of Interior
Oleg Baklanov
, First Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council under the President of the USSR
Vasily Starodubtsev
, Chairman of the Peasant Union
Alexander Tizyakov
, President of the Association of the State Enterprises and Objects of Industry, Transport, and Communications
42
46
Yanayev signed the decree naming himself acting Soviet President, using the pretense of Gorbachev's inability to perform presidential duties due to "illness".
47
However, Russian investigators later identified Kryuchkov as the key planner of the coup.
Yanayev later claimed that he had been forced to participate in the coup under the threat of arrest.
48
The eight aforementioned GKChP members became known as the "
Gang of Eight
".
The GKChP banned all Moscow newspapers except for nine party-controlled newspapers.
46
49
It also issued a populist declaration which stated that "the honour and dignity of the
Soviet man
must be restored."
46
Reactions to the coup in Soviet regions: Red - support for the coup plotters, Blue - resistance to the coup attempt, Gray - neutrality or no reaction
Monday 19 August
edit
Early hours
edit
At 1:00
am, Yanayev signed documents on the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), consisting of himself, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev. Included in the documents was the "Appeal to the Soviet people".
36
50
The GKChP members present signed GKChP Resolution No. 1, which introduced the following: a state of emergency "in certain areas of the USSR" lasting six months from 4:00
am Moscow time on 19
August; the prohibition of rallies, demonstrations and strikes; suspension of the activities of political parties, public organizations and mass movements that impede the normalization of the situation; and the allocation of up to 1,500 square metres (0.4 acres) of land to all interested city residents for personal use.
36
46
At 4:00
am, the Sevastopol regiment of
KGB border troops
surrounded Gorbachev's presidential dacha in Foros. By order of Soviet Air Defense Chief of Staff Colonel-General Igor Maltsev, two tractors blocked the runway on which the President's aircraft were located: a
Tu-134
jet and
Mi-8
helicopter.
51
Morning
edit
Starting at 6:00
am, all of the GKChP documents were broadcast over state radio and television.
36
The KGB immediately issued an arrest list that included newly elected Russian SFSR president
Boris Yeltsin
, his allies, and the leaders of the umbrella activist group
Democratic Russia
The Russian SFSR-controlled
Radio Rossii
and
Televidenie Rossii
, plus
Ekho Moskvy
, the only independent political radio station, were taken off the air. However, the latter station later resumed its broadcasts and became a source of reliable information during the coup. The
BBC World Service
and
Voice of America
were also able to provide continuous coverage. Gorbachev and his family heard the news from a BBC bulletin on a small
Sony
transistor radio
that had not been seized. For the next several days, he refused to take food from outside the dacha to avoid being
poisoned
, and took long outdoor strolls to refute reports of his ill health.
52
33
Under Yanayev's orders,
verification needed
units of the
Tamanskaya mechanized infantry
and
Kantemirovskaya armored division
rolled into Moscow, along with
airborne troops
. Around 4,000 soldiers, 350 tanks, 300 armoured personnel carriers and 420 trucks were sent to Moscow. Four
Russian SFSR people's deputies
were detained by the KGB at a
Soviet Army
base near the capital.
30
However, almost no other arrests were made by the KGB during the coup.
Ulysse Gosset
and Vladimir Federovski later alleged that the KGB was planning to carry out a much larger wave of arrests two weeks after the coup, after which it would have abolished almost all legislative and local administrative structures under a highly centralized
Council of Ministers
Yanayev instructed Foreign Minister
Alexander Bessmertnykh
to make a statement requesting formal
diplomatic recognition
from foreign governments and the
United Nations
The GKChP conspirators considered detaining Yeltsin upon his return from a visit to
Kazakhstan
on 17
August but failed when Yeltsin redirected his flight from
Chkalovsky Air Base
northeast of Moscow to
Vnukovo Airport
southwest of the city. Afterwards, they considered capturing him at his
dacha
near Moscow. The
KGB Alpha Group
surrounded his dacha with
Spetsnaz
, but for undisclosed reasons did not apprehend him. The commanding officer,
Viktor Karpukhin
, later alleged that he had received an order from Kryuchkov to arrest Yeltsin but disobeyed it, although his account has been questioned.
The failure to arrest Yeltsin proved fatal to the plotters' plans.
30
53
54
After the announcement of the coup at 6:30
am, Yeltsin began inviting prominent Russian officials to his dacha, including
Leningrad Mayor
Anatoly Sobchak
, Moscow Deputy Mayor Yury Luzhkov, Colonel-General
Konstantin Kobets
, RSFSR Prime Minister
Ivan Silayev
, RSFSR Vice President
Alexander Rutskoy
, and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman
Ruslan Khasbulatov
36
U.S. map of
Moscow
with 1980s street names
Yeltsin initially wanted to remain at the dacha and organize a rival government, but Kobets advised his group to travel to the
White House
, Russia's parliament building, to maintain communications with coup opponents. They arrived and occupied the building at 9:00
am. Together with Silayev and Khasbulatov, Yeltsin issued a declaration "To the Citizens of Russia" that condemned the GKChP's actions as a reactionary anti-constitutional coup. The military was urged not to take part in the coup, and local authorities were asked to follow laws from the RSFSR president rather than the GKChP. Although he initially avoided the measure to avoid sparking a
civil war
, Yeltsin also subsequently took command of all Soviet military and security forces in the RSFSR.
The joint declaration called for a
general strike
, with the demand to let Gorbachev address the people.
55
This declaration was distributed around Moscow in the form of
flyers
, and disseminated nationwide through
medium-wave radio
and
Usenet newsgroups
via the
RELCOM
computer network.
56
Izvestia
newspaper workers threatened to go on strike unless Yeltsin's proclamation was printed in the paper.
57
The GKChP relied on regional and local
soviets
, mostly still dominated by the Communist Party, to support the coup by forming emergency committees to repress dissidence. The
CPSU Secretariat
under Boldin sent coded telegrams to local party committees to assist the coup. Yeltsin's authorities later discovered that nearly 70 percent of the committees either backed it or attempted to remain neutral. Within the RSFSR, the
oblasts
of
Samara
Lipetsk
Tambov
Saratov
Orenburg
Irkutsk
, and
Tomsk
and the
krai
of
Altai
and
Krasnodar
all supported the coup and pressured
raikom
to do so as well, while only three oblasts aside from
Moscow
and
Leningrad
opposed it. However, some of the soviets faced internal resistance against emergency rule. The
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics
of
Tatarstan
Checheno-Ingushetia
, and
Abkhazia
all sided with the GKChP.
Soviet Armed Forces
officers seized control of city halls and government buildings around the country claiming to be in control, as well as television stations in the
Baltic states
58
The Soviet public was divided on the coup. A poll in the RSFSR by Mnenie on the morning of 19
August showed that 23.6 percent of Russians believed the GKChP could improve living standards, while 41.9 percent had no opinion. However, separate polls by
Interfax
showed that many Russians, including 71 percent of
Leningrad
residents, feared the return of mass repression. The GKChP enjoyed strong support in the
Russian-majority regions
of Estonia and
Transnistria
, while Yeltsin enjoyed strong support in
Sverdlovsk
and
Nizhny Novgorod
At 10:00
am, Rutskoy, Silayev, and Khasbulatov delivered a letter to Lukyanov demanding a medical exam of Gorbachev by the
World Health Organization
and a meeting between themselves, Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and Yanayev within 24 hours. Rutskoy later visited
Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow
, spiritual leader of the
Russian Orthodox Church
, and convinced him to declare support for Yeltsin. Meanwhile, in Leningrad, Military District Commander
Viktor Samsonov
ordered the formation of an emergency committee for the city, chaired by Leningrad First Secretary Boris Gidaspov, to circumvent Sobchak's democratically elected municipal government. Samsonov's troops were ultimately blocked by hundreds of thousands of demonstrators supported by the police, which forced
Leningrad Television
to broadcast a statement by Sobchak. Workers at the
Kirov Plant
went on strike in support of Yeltsin. Moscow First Secretary Yuri Prokofev attempted a similar maneuver in the capital but was rebuffed when Boris Nikolskii refused to accept the office of Mayor of Moscow.
At 11:00
am, RSFSR Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev
held a press conference for foreign journalists and diplomats, and gained the support of most of the West for Yeltsin.
Afternoon and evening
edit
That afternoon, Moscow citizens began gathering around the White House, erecting barricades around it.
55
In response, Yanayev declared a state of emergency in Moscow at 4:00
pm.
42
46
He declared at a 5:00
pm press conference that Gorbachev was "resting". He said: "Over these years he has got very tired and needs some time to get his health back." Yanayev's shaking hands led some people to think he was drunk, and his trembling voice and weak posture made his words unconvincing. Victoria E. Bonnell and Gregory Frieden noted that the press conference allowed spontaneous questioning from journalists who openly accused the GKChP of carrying out a coup, as well as the lack of censorship by news crews, who did not hide Yanayev's erratic motions the way they had with past leaders such as
Leonid Brezhnev
, making the coup leaders appear more incompetent to Soviet audiences.
59
Gorbachev's security detail managed to construct a makeshift
television antenna
so he and his family could watch the press conference.
42
After viewing the conference, Gorbachev expressed confidence that Yeltsin would be able to stop the coup. That night, his family smuggled out a
videotape
of Gorbachev condemning the coup.
Yanayev and the rest of the State Committee ordered the
Cabinet of Ministers
to alter the
five-year plan
of the time to relieve the housing shortage. All city dwellers were each given
1,000 square metres (
acre) to combat winter shortages by growing fruits and vegetables. Due to the illness of Valentin Pavlov, the duties of the Soviet head of the government were entrusted to First Deputy Prime Minister
Vitaly Doguzhiyev
60
36
Meanwhile, the Soviet forces carrying out the coup began to suffer from mass defections to the RSFSR as well as soldiers refusing to obey orders to shoot civilians. Yeltsin asked his followers not to harass the soldiers and offered amnesty for any military servicemen who defected to oppose the coup.
61
Major Evdokimov, chief of staff of a tank battalion of the
Tamanskaya Division
guarding the White House, declared his loyalty to the leadership of the
Russian SFSR
55
62
Yeltsin climbed one of the tanks and addressed the crowd. Unexpectedly, this episode was included in the state media's evening news.
63
Soviet Armed Forces officers loyal to the GKChP tried to prevent defections by confining soldiers to their barracks, but this only limited the availability of forces to carry out the coup.
64
Tuesday 20 August
edit
Tanks in
Red Square
At 8:00
am, the
Soviet General Staff
ordered that the
Cheget
briefcase controlling
Soviet nuclear weapons
be returned to Moscow. Although Gorbachev discovered that the GKChP's actions had cut off communications with the nuclear duty officers, the Cheget was returned to the capital by 2:00
pm. However,
Soviet Air Force
Commander-in-Chief
Yevgeny Shaposhnikov
opposed the coup and claimed in his memoirs that he and the commanders of the
Soviet Navy
and the
Strategic Rocket Forces
told Yazov that they would not follow orders for a nuclear launch. After the coup, Gorbachev refused to admit that he had lost control of the country's nuclear weapons.
33
At noon,
Moscow military district
commander General
Nikolai Kalinin
, whom Yanayev appointed
military commandant of Moscow
, declared a
curfew
in Moscow from 11:00
pm to 5:00
am, effective 20
August.
31
65
55
This was understood as a sign that an attack on the White House was imminent.
The defenders of the White House prepared themselves, most being unarmed. Evdokimov's tanks were moved from the White House in the evening.
42
66
The makeshift White House defense headquarters was headed by General
Konstantin Kobets
, a Russian SFSR
people's deputy
66
67
68
Outside,
Eduard Shevardnadze
Mstislav Rostropovich
, and
Yelena Bonner
delivered speeches in support of Yeltsin.
In the afternoon, Kryuchkov, Yazov and Pugo finally decided to attack the White House. This decision was supported by other GKChP members (with the exception of Pavlov, who had been sent to his dacha due to drunkenness). Kryuchkov's and Yazov's deputies, KGB general Gennady Ageyev and Army general
Vladislav Achalov
, planned the assault, codenamed "Operation Grom" (Thunder), which would gather elements of the
Alpha Group
and
Vympel
elite special forces units, supported by paratroopers, Moscow
OMON
Internal Troops
of the
ODON
, three tank companies and a helicopter squadron. Alpha Group commander General
Viktor Karpukhin
and other senior unit officers, together with Airborne deputy commander Gen.
Alexander Lebed
mingled with the crowds near the White House and assessed the possibility of such an operation. Afterwards, Karpukhin and Vympel commander Colonel Boris Beskov tried to convince Ageyev that the operation would result in bloodshed and should be cancelled.
30
31
36
69
Lebed, with the consent of his superior
Pavel Grachev
, returned to the White House and secretly informed the defense headquarters that the attack would begin at 2:00
am the following morning.
36
69
While the events were unfolding in the capital,
Estonia
's
Supreme Council
declared at 11:03
pm the full reinstatement of the independent status of the Republic of Estonia after 51 years.
State-controlled TASS dispatches from 20
August emphasize a hardline approach against crime, especially economic crimes and the
Russian mafia
, which the GKChP blamed on increasing trade with the West. Draft decrees were later discovered which would have allowed military and police patrols to shoot "
hooligans
," including pro-democracy demonstrators.
Wednesday 21 August
edit
At about 1:00
am, not far from the
White House
trolleybuses
and street cleaning machines were used to barricade a tunnel against arriving Taman Guards
infantry fighting vehicles
(IFVs), commanded by Captain
Sergey Surovikin
70
who years later rose to army general and commander of Russian forces in the
2022 invasion of Ukraine
71
Three men were killed in the ensuing clash: Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov, and Ilya Krichevsky; several others were wounded. Komar, a 22-year-old
Soviet-Afghan War
veteran, was shot and crushed trying to cover a moving IFV's observation slit. Usov, a 37-year-old economist, was killed by a stray bullet while coming to Komar's aid. The crowd set fire to an IFV and Krichevsky, a 28-year-old architect, was shot dead as the troops pulled back. The three men were posthumously awarded the title
Hero of the Soviet Union
42
67
72
73
According to journalist and democracy campaigner
Sergey Parkhomenko
, who was in the crowd defending the White House, "those deaths played a crucial role: both sides were so horrified that it brought a halt to everything."
74
Alpha Group and Vympel did not move to the White House as planned, and Yazov ordered the troops to pull out of Moscow. Reports also surfaced that Gorbachev had been placed under
house arrest
in Crimea.
75
76
During the final day of her family's exile,
Raisa Gorbacheva
suffered a minor
stroke
33
At 8:00
am, the troops began to leave Moscow.
36
Between 8:00 and 9:00
am, the GKChP members met in the
Defence Ministry
and, not knowing what to do, decided to send Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, Tizyakov,
Anatoly Lukyanov
, and Deputy
CPSU General Secretary
Vladimir Ivashko
to Crimea to meet Gorbachev,
36
who refused to meet them when they arrived.
At 10:00
am, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR opened in the White House, at which President Yeltsin spoke.
36
At 1:00
pm, the Soviet Cabinet of Ministers circulated a statement about its non-involvement in the putsch.
36
At 1:20
pm, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, Tizyakov, Lukyanov and CPSU Central Committee Deputy General Secretary Vladimir Ivashko left for the airport, getting stuck in a traffic jam created by the Taman Division armored vehicles returning to their base.
36
At 2:00
pm, the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat issued a statement demanding that the GKChP clarify the fate of the head of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev.
36
At 2:30
pm, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo signed the last GKChP order – a cypher telegram to the regional departments of internal affairs with a demand to strengthen the security of television and radio organizations and report on all violations of the GKChP Resolution on information control.
36
At 4:08
pm, the plane with the GKChP delegation landed in Crimea.
36
Around 4:00
pm, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, chaired by the heads of the chambers of the union parliament,
77
adopted a resolution in which it declared illegal the removal of the Soviet president from his duties and their transfer to the Vice President,
78
and in this vein demanded that Yanayev cancel the decrees and emergency orders based on them
79
as legally invalid from the moment they were signed.
80
At 4:52
pm, a group of Russian deputies and public figures led by RSFSR Vice President
Alexander Rutskoy
, as well as Soviet Security Council members Yevgeny Primakov and Vadim Bakatin, flew to Gorbachev's dacha in Foros. They were accompanied by 36 officers of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs armed with machine guns, under the command of RSFSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Andrei Dunaev.
36
Eight minutes later, at 5:00
pm, the GKChP delegation arrived at the presidential dacha. President Gorbachev refused to receive it and demanded that communication to the outside world be restored.
36
At the same time, Yanayev signed a decree dissolving the State Emergency Committee
81
82
and declaring all of its decisions invalid.
83
79
At 7:16
pm, the plane of the Russian delegation led by Rutskoy landed in Crimea.
36
At 8:00
pm, the
Soviet General Prosecutor's Office
initiated a criminal case into the attempted coup.
36
55
At 8:10
pm, Rutskoy and his delegation went to see Gorbachev. According to eyewitnesses, the meeting was cordial and joyful, allowing them to momentarily forget divisions between Soviet and Russian authorities.
36
From 9:40 to 10:10
pm, Gorbachev received Lukyanov and Ivashko in the presence of Rutskoy and Primakov, accusing the USSR Supreme Soviet Speaker of
treason
, and the party deputy of inaction during the putsch.
36
Around 10:00
pm, RSFSR Prosecutor General Valentin Stepankov signed an arrest warrant for the Emergency Committee members.
36
That day, the
Supreme Council
of the
Republic of Latvia
declared its sovereignty officially completed with a law passed by its deputies, confirming the independence restoration act of 4
May as an official act.
84
In
Estonia
, just a day after the restitution of the country's full independence, the
Tallinn TV Tower
was taken over by
Soviet Russian airborne troops
. But while television broadcasts were cut for a time, the radio signal was kept on the air after a handful of
Estonian Defence League
(the unified
paramilitary
forces of Estonia) members barricaded themselves in the tower's broadcasting studio.
85
That evening, as news from Moscow about the coup's failure reached Tallinn, the Russian paratroopers left the TV tower and the Estonian capital.
Thursday 22 August
edit
22 August 1991
At one minute past midnight, Gorbachev, his family and assistants flew to Moscow on Rutskoy's plane. The GKChP members were sent back on a different plane; only
Kryuchkov
flew in the presidential plane, under police custody (according to Rutskoy, "they [would] definitely not be shot down with him on board"). Upon arrival, Kryuchkov, Yazov and Tizyakov were arrested on the airfield, which was illegal under Soviet law as officials representing the central government could only be arrested and tried under Soviet law, which prevailed over the laws of the constituent republics.
86
36
At 2:00
am, when Gorbachev arrived at Moscow's
Vnukovo Airport
, television showed live footage of him walking down the
airstairs
wearing a knitted sweater. Later, he would be criticized for not going to the White House, but to rest at his dacha.
36
At 6:00
am, Soviet Vice President Yanayev was arrested in his office.
36
87
Boris Pugo and his wife died by suicide after being contacted by the RSFSR for a meeting over his role in the coup attempt.
88
Friday 23 August
edit
Pavlov, Starodubtsev, Baklanov, Boldin, and Shenin would all be taken into custody within the next 48 hours.
36
Aftermath
edit
Victims' place of death
Since several heads of the regional
executive committees
supported the GKChP, on 21
August 1991 the
Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR
adopted Decision No. 1626-1, which authorized Russian president
Boris Yeltsin
to appoint heads of regional administrations,
89
although the
Constitution of the Russian SFSR
did not empower the president with such authority. The Russian Supreme Soviet passed another decision the following day declaring the
old imperial colors
Russia's national flag;
90
it replaced the
Russian SFSR flag
two months later.
On the night of 24
August, the
Felix Dzerzhinsky
statue in front of the
KGB building at Dzerzhinskiy Square (Lubianka)
was dismantled, while thousands of Moscow citizens took part in the funeral of Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov and Ilya Krichevsky, the three citizens who had died in the tunnel incident. Gorbachev posthumously awarded them with the title of
Hero of the Soviet Union
. Yeltsin asked their relatives to forgive him for not being able to prevent their deaths.
36
End of the CPSU
edit
Gorbachev initially tried to defend the
CPSU
, proclaiming at a 22
August press conference that it still represented a "
progressive
force" despite its leaders' participation in the coup.
33
Gorbachev resigned as CPSU
general secretary
on
24
August.
91
36
Vladimir Ivashko
replaced him as acting General Secretary, but resigned on 29
August when the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR
suspended the activities of the party throughout the Soviet Union.
92
93
In a decree, Yeltsin ordered the transfer of the CPSU archives to the state archive authorities,
94
and
nationalized
all CPSU assets in the Russian SFSR
95
(these included not only party committee headquarters but also assets such as educational institutions and hotels).
citation needed
The party's
Central Committee
headquarters were handed over to the
Government of Moscow
33
On 6
November, Yeltsin issued a decree banning the party in Russia.
96
The Dissolution of the Soviet Union
edit
See also:
Belavezha Accords
and
Dissolution of the Soviet Union
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Estonia had declared re-independence on 20
August, Latvia the following day, while Lithuania had already done so on 11
March the previous year.
On 24
August 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev created the so-called "Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy" (Комитет по оперативному управлению народным хозяйством СССР), to replace the
USSR Cabinet of Ministers
97
headed by
Valentin Pavlov
, a GKChP member. Russian prime minister
Ivan Silayev
headed the committee.
That same day, Ukraine's
Verkhovna Rada
adopted the
Act of Independence of Ukraine
and called for a referendum on support of the Act of Independence.
On 25
August, the
Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian SSR
announced its
Declaration of Sovereignty
as a constitutional law.
98
99
On 28
August, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dismissed Prime Minister Pavlov
100
and entrusted the functions of the Soviet government to the Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy.
101
The next day, Supreme Soviet Chairman
Anatoly Lukyanov
was arrested.
36
On 27
August, the
Supreme Soviet of Moldova
declared the independence of Moldova from the Soviet Union
. The
Supreme Soviets of Azerbaijan
and
Kyrgyzstan
did the same on 30 and 31
August, respectively.
102
On 5
September, the
Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union
adopted Soviet Law No. 2392-1 "On the Authorities of the Soviet Union in the Transitional Period", replacing itself with the
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union
. Two new legislative chambers – the Soviet of the Union (Совет Союза) and the Soviet of Republics (Совет Республик) – replaced the
Soviet of the Union
and the
Soviet of Nationalities
(both elected by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies). The Soviet of the Union was to be formed by the popularly elected
USSR people's deputies
and would only consider issues concerning civil rights and freedoms and other issues which did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Soviet of Republics. Its decisions would have to be reviewed by the Soviet of Republics. The Soviet of Republics was to include 20 deputies from each union republic and one deputy to represent each
autonomous region
of each union republic (both Soviet people's deputies and
republics' people's deputies
) delegated by the legislatures of the union republic. Russia, with 52 delegates, was an exception. However, the delegation of each union republic was to have only one vote in the Soviet of Republics. The laws were to be first adopted by the Soviet of the Union and then by the Soviet of Republics, which would set procedures for the central government, approve the appointment of central ministers and consider inter-republic agreements.
103
Also created was the
Soviet State Council
(Государственный совет СССР), which included the
Soviet president
and the presidents of union republics. The "Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy" was replaced by the USSR Inter-republic Economic Committee (Межреспубликанский экономический комитет СССР),
103
also headed by
Ivan Silayev
On 6
September, the newly created Soviet State Council recognized the independence of
Estonia
Latvia
and
Lithuania
102
On 9
September, the
Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan
declared the independence of
Tajikistan
from the Soviet Union. Also in September, over 99% percent of voters in
Armenia
voted for independence of the republic in a
referendum
. The immediate aftermath of the vote was the
Armenian Supreme Soviet
's declaration of independence on 21
September. On
27 October, the
Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan
declared the independence of
Turkmenistan
from the Soviet Union. On 1
December, Ukraine held a
referendum
, in which more than 90% of residents supported the Act of Independence of Ukraine.
By November, the only Soviet Republics that had not declared independence were Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. That same month, seven republics (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) agreed to a new union treaty that would form a
confederation
called the Union of Sovereign States. However, this confederation never materialized.
On 8
December,
Boris Yeltsin
Leonid Kravchuk
and
Stanislav Shushkevich
– the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and
Belarus
(which had adopted the name in August 1991) – as well as the prime ministers of the three republics, met in
Minsk
, Belarus, to sign the
Belovezha Accords
. The accords declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist "as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality". It repudiated the
1922 union treaty
that established the Soviet Union and established the
Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) in the Union's place. On 12
December, the
Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR
ratified the accords and recalled the Russian deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Although this has been interpreted as the moment that Russia seceded from the union, Russia took the position that it was not possible to secede from a state that no longer existed. The lower chamber of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of the Union, was forced to halt its operations, as the departure of the Russian deputies left it without a quorum.
Doubts remained about the legitimacy of the 8
December accords, since only three republics took part. Thus, on 21
December in
Alma-Ata
, the
Alma-Ata Protocol
expanded the CIS to include
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Moldova
and the five republics of
Central Asia
. They also preemptively accepted Gorbachev's resignation. With 11 of the 12 remaining republics (all except
Georgia
) having agreed that the Union no longer existed, Gorbachev bowed to the inevitable and said he would resign as soon as the CIS became a reality (Georgia joined the CIS in 1993, only to withdraw in 2008 after
its war with Russia
; the three Baltic states were never a part of the commonwealth, instead joining both the
European Union
and
NATO
in 2004.)
On 24
December 1991, the Russian SFSR – now renamed the Russian Federation – with the concurrence of the other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, informed the
United Nations
that it would
inherit the Soviet Union's membership in the UN
– including the Soviet Union's permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council
104
No member state of the UN formally objected to this step. The legitimacy of this act has been
questioned by some legal scholars
as the Soviet Union itself was not constitutionally succeeded by the Russian Federation, but merely dissolved. Others argued that the international community had already established the precedent of recognizing the Soviet Union as the legal successor of the
Russian Empire
, and so recognizing
the Russian Federation
as the Soviet Union's
successor state
was valid.
On 25
December, Gorbachev announced his resignation as President of the Soviet Union. The red hammer and sickle flag of the Soviet Union was lowered from the Senate building in the
Kremlin
and replaced with the tricolour flag of Russia. The next day, 26 December, the
Soviet of Republics
, the upper chamber of the Supreme Soviet, formally voted the Soviet Union out of existence (the lower chamber, the Council of the Union, had been left without a quorum after the Russian deputies withdrew), thus ending the life of the world's first and oldest socialist state. All former Soviet embassies became Russian embassies, and Russia received all nuclear weapons located in other former republics by 1996. A
constitutional crisis
in late 1993 escalated into violence, and the new
Russian constitution
that came into force at the end of the year abolished the last vestiges of the
Soviet political system
Beginning of radical economic reforms in Russia
edit
See also:
Economic history of the Russian Federation
On 1
November 1991, the
RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies
issued Decision No. 1831-1 "On the Legal Support of the Economic Reform" whereby the Russian president (
Boris Yeltsin
) was granted the right to issue decrees required for economic reform even if they contravened existing laws. Such decrees entered into force if they were not repealed within 7 days by the
Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR
or its Presidium.
105
Five days later, Boris Yeltsin, in addition to his duties as president, assumed those of the prime minister.
Yegor Gaidar
became deputy prime minister and simultaneously economic and finance minister. On 15
November 1991, Boris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 213 "On the Liberalization of Foreign Economic Activity on the Territory of the RSFSR", whereby all Russian companies were allowed to import and export goods and acquire foreign currency (all foreign trade had previously been tightly controlled by the state).
105
Following the issuance of Decree No. 213, on 3 December 1991 Boris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 297 "On the Measures to Liberalize Prices", whereby from 2
January 1992, most previously existing
price controls
were abolished.
105
Trial of GKChP members
edit
The
GKChP
members and their accomplices were charged with
treason
in the form of a conspiracy aimed at capturing power. However, by January 1993, they had all been released from custody pending trial.
106
107
The trial in the Military Chamber of the
Russian Supreme Court
began on 14 April 1993.
108
On 23
February 1994, the
State Duma
declared
amnesty
for all GKChP members and their accomplices, along with the participants of the
October 1993 crisis
109
They all accepted the amnesty, except for General Varennikov, who demanded the continuation of the trial and who was finally acquitted on 11
August 1994.
36
The Russian
Procuracy
also wanted to charge former Deputy Defense Minister
Vladislav Achalov
, but the Russian Supreme Soviet refused to lift his immunity.
Additionally, the Procuracy refrained from charging numerous other individuals accused of complicity in the coup, including the Army Chief of Staff.
Commemoration of the civilians killed
edit
Soviet stamps commemorating (from left to right) Ilya Krichevsky, Dmitry Komar and Vladimir Usov
Thousands of people attended the funeral of Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky, and Vladimir Usov on 24
August 1991. Gorbachev posthumously made the three
Heroes of the Soviet Union
for their bravery in "blocking the way to those who wanted to strangle democracy.".
110
Parliamentary commission
edit
In 1991, a parliamentary commission tasked with investigating causes for the attempted coup was established under
Lev Ponomaryov
, but was dissolved in 1992 at
Ruslan Khasbulatov
's insistence.
Mysterious deaths of the participants of the coup
edit
On 24 August 1991, Sergey Akhromeyev was found dead in his office, serving as the Advisor to the president of USSR.
On 26 August, Nikolay Kruchina was found dead near his residence in the morning, having jumped from the window of his apartment a few hours prior. He served as the Managing Director of the Central Committee of the CPSU. His predecessor, Georgiy Pavlov, followed the same fate on 6 October of the same year.
On 17 October, former Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU Dmitriy Lisovolik was found dead, having also jumped from the window of his apartment.
111
Said deaths have faced extensive scrutiny by historians and contemporaries, who noted the similarities with which these people died.
International reactions
edit
Western Bloc and NATO countries
edit
George H. W. Bush
, left, is seen with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Bush condemned the coup and the actions of the "Gang of Eight".
Australia
Prime Minister of Australia
Bob Hawke
said that "The developments in the Soviet Union ... raise the question as to whether the purpose is to reverse the political and economic reforms which have been taking place. Australia does not want to see repression, persecution or vindictive actions against Gorbachev or those associated with him."
11
Canada
: Several government members quickly reacted to the coup;
Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney
huddled with top advisers over the toppling of Mikhail Gorbachev, but officials said the Prime Minister would likely react cautiously to the stunning development. Mulroney condemned the coup and suspended food aid and other assistance to the Soviet Union.
112
External Affairs Minister
Barbara McDougall
suggested on 20
August 1991 that "Canada could work with any Soviet junta that promises to carry on Gorbachev's legacy".
Lloyd Axworthy
and
Liberal
Leader
Jean Chretien
said Canada must join with other Western governments to back Russian President Boris Yeltsin, former Soviet Foreign Minister and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and others fighting for Soviet democracy." McDougall met with the
chargé d'affaires
of the
Soviet embassy
, Vasily Sredin.
113
As part of the
NORAD
defense network, the government acknowledged that any US-Soviet nuclear confrontation would directly impact Canada as well. Canadian leaders believed both the US and Canada would be treated as a single set of targets.
114
Israel
: Israeli officials said they hoped Gorbachev's attempted removal would not derail the
1991 Israeli-Palestinian peace conference in Madrid
(co-sponsored by the US and USSR) or slow
Soviet Jewish immigration
. The quasi-governmental
Jewish Agency
, which coordinated the massive flow of
Jews
arriving from the Soviet Union, called an emergency meeting to assess how the coup would affect Jewish immigration. "We are closely following what is happening in the Soviet Union with concern," Foreign Minister
David Levy
said. "One might say that this is an internal issue of the Soviet Union, but in the Soviet Union ... everything internal has an influence for the entire world."
11
The Soviet Union restored ties with Israel on 26
December 1991.
Japan
Prime Minister
Toshiki Kaifu
ordered the
Foreign Ministry
to analyze developments. Kaifu himself said that it was highly likely that the coup was unconstitutional. Chief Cabinet Secretary
Misoji Sakamoto
said, "I strongly hope that the leadership change will not influence the positive policies of Perestroika and new-thinking diplomacy."
11
In addition, Japanese aid and technical loans to the Soviet Union were frozen.
13
Japan left open the question of the coup's legitimacy; government spokesman Taizo Watanabe said that "[the Soviet government has] the right to decide whether it is constitutional or unconstitutional. Japan notably differed from western states by not announcing an outright condemnation of the coup. "
115
South Korea
President
Roh Tae-woo
welcomed the coup's collapse as a symbolic victory for the Soviet people. He said "It was a triumph of the courage and resolve of the Soviet citizens towards freedom and democracy."
13
United Kingdom
Prime Minister
John Major
met with his
cabinet
on 19
August to deal with the crisis and said "There seems little doubt that President Gorbachev has been removed from power by an unconstitutional seizure of power. There are constitutional ways of removing the president of the Soviet Union; they have not been used. I believe that the whole world has a very serious stake in the events currently taking place in the Soviet Union. The reform process there is of vital importance to the world and of most vital importance of course to the Soviet people themselves and I hope that is fully clear. There is a great deal of information we don't yet have, but I would like to make clear above all that we would expect the Soviet Union to respect and honor all the commitments that President Gorbachev has made on its behalf."
11
The British Government froze $80 million in economic aid to Moscow, while the
European Community
scheduled an emergency meeting to suspend a $1.5 billion aid program.
116
In a 1991 interview, Major said he thought that "there are many reasons why [the coup] failed and a great deal of time and trouble will be spent on analysing that later. There were, I think, a number of things that were significant. I don't think it was terribly well-handled from the point of view of those organising the coup. I think the enormous and unanimous condemnation of the rest of the world publicly of the coup was of immense encouragement to the people resisting it. That is not just my view; that is the view that has been expressed to me by Mr. Shevardnadze,
Mr. Yakovlev
, President Yeltsin and many others as well to whom I have spoken to the last 48 hours. The moral pressure from the West and the fact that we were prepared to state unequivocally that the coup was illegal and that we wanted the legal government restored, was of immense help in the Soviet Union. I think that did play a part."
United States
: During his vacation in
Walker's Point Estate
in
Kennebunkport, Maine
U.S. President
George H. W. Bush
made a blunt demand for Gorbachev's restoration to power and said the United States did not accept the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed new Soviet government. Bush rushed to the White House from his vacation home, receiving a letter from Kozyrev aboard
Air Force One
. He then issued a strongly-worded statement that followed a day of consultations with other Western alliance leaders amid a concerted effort to squeeze the new Soviet leadership by freezing economic aid programs. Bush decried the coup as a "misguided and illegitimate effort" that "bypasses both Soviet law and the will of the
Soviet peoples
." He called the overthrow "very disturbing" and put a hold on U.S. aid to the Soviet Union until the coup was ended.
11
116
The Bush statement, drafted after a series of meetings with top aides, was much more forceful than the President's initial reaction that morning in Maine. It was in keeping with a Western effort to apply both diplomatic and economic pressure on the Soviet officials seeking to gain control of the country. On 2
September, the United States re-recognized the independence of
Estonia
Latvia
and
Lithuania
when Bush delivered the press conference in Kennebunkport.
117
Secretary of State
James Baker
issued a statement warning "The whole world is watching. Legitimacy in 1991 flows not from the barrel of a gun but from the will of the people. History cannot be reversed. Sooner or later your effort will fail."
118
The coup also led several members of Congress such as
Sam Nunn
Les Aspin
, and
Richard Lugar
to become concerned about the security of
Soviet weapons of mass destruction
and the potential for
nuclear proliferation
in existing unstable conditions. Despite public opposition to further aid to the Soviet Union and ambivalence from the Bush administration, they oversaw the ratification of the
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991
, authorizing the
Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
and providing funding to
post-Soviet states
for the decommissioning of WMD stockpiles.
33
119
Former president
Ronald Reagan
said:
"I can't believe that the Soviet people will allow a reversal in the progress that they have recently made toward economic and political freedom. Based on my extensive meetings and conversations with him, I am convinced that President Gorbachev had the best interest of the Soviet people in mind. I have always felt that his opposition came from the communist bureaucracy, and I can only hope that enough progress was made that a movement toward democracy will be unstoppable."
11
Meanwhile,
CPUSA
Chairman
Gus Hall
supported the coup, causing division within an already shrinking party. The CPSU had broken ties with the CPUSA in 1989 over the latter's condemnation of Perestroika.
Denmark
Foreign Minister
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
said the process of change in the Soviet Union could not be reversed. In a statement, he said "So much has happened and so many people have been involved in the changes in Soviet Union that I cannot see a total reversal."
11
France
President
François Mitterrand
called on the new Soviet rulers to guarantee the
life and liberty
of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who was "Gorbachev's rival in the changing Soviet Union." Mitterrand added that "France attaches a high price to the life and liberty of Messrs. Gorbachev and Yeltsin being guaranteed by the new Moscow leaders. These will be judged by their acts, especially on the fashion in which the two high personalities in question will be treated."
11
After the coup ended, Mitterrand was criticized for his hesitant reaction; this may have helped right wing opposition parties win the
1993 French legislative election
120
Germany
Chancellor
Helmut Kohl
cut his Austrian vacation short and returned to
Bonn
for an emergency meeting. He said he was sure Moscow would withdraw its remaining 272,000 troops from the
former East Germany
on schedule.
121
Björn Engholm
, leader of Germany's opposition
Social Democratic Party
, urged member states of the
European Community
"to speak with one voice" on the situation and said, "the West should not exclude the possibility of imposing economic and political sanctions on the Soviet Union to avoid a jolt to the right, in Moscow."
11
Greece
: Greece described the situation in the Soviet Union as "alarming". The Greek left was divided- the Alliance of the Left and former Socialist Prime Minister
Andreas Papandreou
issued statements condemning the coup. However, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece condemned Gorbachev for dismantling the Soviet State and reestablishing Capitalism.
122
11
Italy
Prime Minister
Giulio Andreotti
released a statement saying, "I'm surprised, embittered and worried. We all know the difficulties that Gorbachev encountered. But I don't know how a new president, who, at least for now, doesn't have (Gorbachev's) prestige and international connections, can overcome the obstacles."
Achille Occhetto
, head of the
Democratic Party of the Left
, the direct heir of the
Italian Communist Party
, called the ouster of Gorbachev "a most dramatic event of world proportions (which) will have immense repercussions on international life. I am personally and strongly struck, not only for the incalculable burden of this event, but also for the fate of comrade Gorbachev."
11
Communist states
edit
A Soviet Stamp promoting Perestroika. For some Communist States, Gorbachev's reforms resulted in a drastic cutting of Soviet Aid. The coup's failure led to the abrupt end of any remaining Russian support for its former Communist allies.
Many but not all of states still officially
Marxist–Leninist
(not former Warsaw Pact members that had begun transitioning to a
multi-party system
) had supported the coup, while others left ambivalent or unofficial support and reversed their position when the coup failed.
Afghanistan
: The failure of the coup resulted in the removal of Soviet political and military officers that favored continued aid to the
People's Democratic Party
government in Afghanistan. At the time, the Afghan regime was still completely dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival in the ongoing
Afghan Civil War
. The last Soviet military assistance arrived in October, with all Russian aid being halted by
Boris Yeltsin
in January 1992. Yeltsin hoped to repatriate Soviet
prisoners of war
still being held by the
Mujahideen
and was not interested in protecting a 'Soviet Legacy'.
123
In the aftermath of the coup,
Mohammad Najibullah
came to resent the Soviets for abandoning him, writing to former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze "I didn't want to be president, you talked me into it, insisted on it, and promised support. Now you are throwing me and the Republic of Afghanistan to its fate." In the winter of 1992, newly independent
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
and
Turkmenistan
provided food aid to Mohammad Najibullah's of their own accord in an attempt to save the regime, also establishing contacts with the Mujahideen. The end of Soviet weapons deliveries caused the defection of militia leader
Abdul Rashid Dostum
from
Mohammad Najibullah
to
Ahmad Shah Massoud
, spelling the end of the DRA in April 1992.
124
Albania
: During the coup, Communist
Party of Labour of Albania
leader
Ramiz Alia
was still in power, having won the
1991 Albanian parliamentary election
. Encouraged by the coup's unraveling, three opposition parties demanded expedited reforms. The
1992 Albanian parliamentary election
resulted in a crushing defeat for the now-democratic
Socialist Party of Albania
, leading to Alia's resignation as president in favor of
Sali Berisha
120
Angola
: In December 1991, the ruling
MPLA
, in its party congress changed its ideology from Marxism–Leninism to
Social Democracy
and committed to multi-party democracy.
Angola–Russia relations
became less relevant to both countries after the coup. Angola's ability to enforce its rule on some of its territories diminished due to the end of Soviet weapons deliveries and departures of Cuban personnel.
123
China
: The Chinese government appeared to tacitly support the coup when it issued a statement saying the move was an internal affair of the Soviet Union and when the
Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) released no immediate comment. Confidential Chinese documents have indicated that China's hardline leaders strongly disapproved of Gorbachev's program of political liberalization, blaming him for "the loss of Eastern Europe to capitalism." Western scholarship has alleged that Beijing had foreknowledge of the planned coup. This hypothesis is supported by two events: firstly, General
Chi Haotian's
Moscow visit between August
5 and August
12 to see GKChP member
Dmitry Yazov
, and secondly, the rapid and mostly positive coverage of the coup in
Chinese media
, which ignored the activities of Boris Yeltsin. When the coup began, top CCP leaders had gathered to celebrate
paramount leader
Deng Xiaoping's
birthday. Upon hearing the news, CCP elder
Bo Yibo
cursed Gorbachev. Deng then said "The Soviet coup is a good thing but we must not visibly be pleased but only delighted at the bottom of our hearts." China pronounced a policy of non-interference but hoped 'stability' (i.e. a restoration of Communist rule) would return to the Soviet Union. Behind closed doors, the
Chinese Politburo
agreed the coup should be recognized as a 'Marxist' act and that
Sino-Soviet relations
should be strengthened. However, Deng also encouraged CCP General Secretary
Jiang Zemin
to be cautious because the coup could fail. The GKChP was also interested in resolving the
Sino-Soviet split
and improving
diplomatic relations
, dispatching Vice Foreign Affairs Minister
Alexander Belonogov
to
Beijing
to request full recognition and support.
Deng met with Belonogov and asked "what do you plan to do with Gorbachev" to measure the probability of the coup's success. After hesitating for a day, China was moments away from an official declaration of support for the GKChP when news of its end arrived. After the coup failed, Gorbachev suspended exchanges with China; allegedly the coup plotters attempted to flee to China, but this was flatly denied by both governments.
125
Several Chinese people said that a key difference between the Soviet coup leaders' failed attempts to use tanks to crush dissent in Moscow and the hardline Chinese leaders' successful use of tank-led
People's Liberation Army
forces during the
1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre
was that the Soviet people had a powerful leader like Russian president Boris Yeltsin to rally around, whereas the Chinese protesters did not. The Soviet coup collapsed in three days without any major violence by the Soviet Army against civilians in June 1989, the
People's Liberation Army
killed thousands of people to crush the democracy movement.
11
126
Fidel Castro at East Berlin 1972. Cuba relied upon the Soviet Union and throughout the Cold War was a steadfast ally. Castro systemically opposed Gorbachev's perestroika but he did not publicly support the August Coup in 1991.
Congo
: Congo was already moving away from Marxism–Leninism and had organized a democratic conference in June.
127
All references to Communism were removed from the Congolese Constitution in April 1992, yet former Soviet protégé
Denis Sassou Nguesso
would later regain power and rule
Congo
through to the present day.
Cuba
: On August
20, the Cuban Government issued a statement insisting on its neutrality, saying that the conflict was "not Cuba's to judge". In the same statement, Cuba also criticized the West for inciting divisions within the Soviet Union. A Western diplomat alleged that in private, Cuba's officials hoped the coup would succeed because the plotters would continue the
special Soviet relationship
with their country. In September 1991, three-quarters of Cuba's consumer goods came from the USSR, underlining the importance of Soviet events to Cuba's leaders.
128
As the Soviet coup unfolded, Cuban officials did not believe its leaders would prevail. While Gorbachev was in power,
Fidel Castro
never agreed with Perestroika and in July 1991 had reiterated his position that there would be no changes in Cuba, saying "In this revolution there will be no changes of name or ideas."
129
The end of Soviet assistance sparked the
Special Period
crisis that would last ten years.
North Korea
: As the coup began, newspapers published documents from the GKChP without comment or statements of support. Privately, the regime instructed its officials to support the coup to "defend Socialist achievements". North Korean diplomats were present in Moscow and kept informal contacts with Russians as events unfolded, including soldiers on the ground. By the end of the first day,
North Korea's embassy in Moscow
reported to
Pyongyang
that the coup would not succeed. At the time, there were changing attitudes in the north toward South Korea and a brief shootout at the
DMZ
border.
130
After the coup's failure, Vice President
Pak Song-chol
said "The invincible might of our own style of socialism is being highly demonstrated," and the "North is basically stable" in a reference to
Juche
131
Pyongyang would later blame Perestroika for the fall of the USSR, calling "Gorbachev's wrong anti-socialist policy" a "
revisionist
" one.
132
The end of Soviet assistance was a direct cause of the
Arduous March
that began in 1994.
Vietnam
: The coup came at a time when promised Soviet aid was being slowed and later halted. Vietnamese Communists decided to not embrace a multi-party system in Vietnam due to the experience of Perestroika. An unnamed official said that "Vietnam would probably not feel sorry to see [the end of the Soviet president's career] because Gorbachev has made many mistakes... too many compromises with the West. He has also made the position and the role of the Soviet Union in the world weaker." The official also said that Vietnam would benefit from a return to Communist rule in the Soviet Union. "These changes would also affect positively Vietnam's economy because the West would carry out a hard policy towards the Soviet Union, then the latter would look for trade relations with such countries as Vietnam and China."
115
After the coup, top Communist Party official Thai Ninh was asked by foreign press if Vietnam felt betrayed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin. He answered, "It's better to let the Soviet people decide that".
133
The failed coup prompted Vietnam to
normalize relations with China
in November, ending the
Sino-Vietnamese conflicts
of the 1980s. In a major political victory for China, Vietnam recognized the
State of Cambodia
(SOC). Increasingly,
Beijing
and
Hanoi
felt an ideological affinity with one another and a mutual desire to resist American-led
Peaceful Evolution
. Vietnam would look to
ASEAN
for new trading partners in the aftermath of the
Soviet dissolution
134
Yugoslavia
: The Coup was a profound event for all of Yugoslavia,
United Press International
reported reactions from ordinary Yugoslavs including economist Dragan Radic who said "Gorbachev has done a lot for world peace and helped replace hard-line communist regimes in the past few years.Yet, the West failed to support Gorbachev financially and economically and he was forced to step down because he could not feed the Soviet people." Officially, President
Slobodan Milošević
, in charge of
Serbia
, was silent. Unofficially, there were numerous interactions between Yugoslavia and the USSR leading up to the start of the coup. The violent
breakup of Yugoslavia
had begun the previous year. Political actors in both nations realized the similarities of their political situations. On the anti-communist side, separatists in the USSR were building relations with Yugoslavia's breakaway republics. At the end of July, Lithuania recognized Slovenia and in August, Georgia recognized Slovenia and Croatia's independence. On the side of hardliners, both nations had factions embracing a
red-brown coalition
between traditional communists and ultranationalists to maintain the territorial integrity of both the USSR and Yugoslavia. In the weeks leading up to the coup, conservatives in the USSR were using the precedence of Yugoslavia as an excuse to violently suppress uprisings of non-Russians. In fact, Yugoslavia may have been a major cause for the Gang of Eight to believe their actions were necessary to prevent the USSR's collapse. When Yugoslav Prime Minister
Ante Marković
visited Moscow in early August, Gorbachev pointed out the parallels between problems looming in both countries. Croatian president
Franjo Tuđman
claimed in October that "Communist Yugoslav Generals" had openly supported the coup and that they had received instructions from Moscow. The victory of the democrats in the USSR had major implications for Yugoslavia. Yeltsin knew that Milošević had secretly supported Soviet conservatives and relations between the two were dismal. By the time the USSR collapsed, the problem of Yugoslavia had become a part of the Russian political landscape. Yeltsin and liberal elites would publicly take an even-handed approach and encourage international cooperation to solve the crisis. In contrast, post-Soviet conservatives looked to create advantages for Russia by supporting Orthodox Serbs in their struggle to control the remaining Yugoslav nations. Sociology Professor Veljko Vujačić assessed the similarities and differences between the breakup of Yugoslavia and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both nations were multi-national Marxist–Leninist states with Slavic rulers facing major secessionist movements. In Serbia, patriotism was linked with statehood. Milošević told his nationalist followers that every generation of Serbs has had their own "
Kosovo battle
", dating back to the 14th century. In contrast, Russian nationalists including
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
drew a distinction between 'patriotic' Russian people and the 'oppressive' Russian state. Boris Yeltsin and his followers saw the USSR as an oppressor of Russia, thereby accelerating the mostly peaceful division of the former Soviet Union.
135
On 27
April 1992, Yugoslavia formally disintegrated and with it vanished any mention of Marxist–Leninism in its
Serbian and Montenegrin
successor state.
136
Former Warsaw Pact members
edit
The
Warsaw Pact
had dissolved in July, and its members had rapidly changed, with
Marxist–Leninist
pro-Soviet governments deposed or elected out of office. As a result, all criticized or expressed weary sentiments about events in Moscow. Some former Warsaw Pact members deployed armed forces to strategically important areas.
Bulgaria
President
Zhelyu Zhelev
stated that "Such anti-democratic methods can never lead to anything good neither for the Soviet Union, nor for Eastern Europe, nor for the democratic developments in the world."
11
Czechoslovakia
President
Václav Havel
warned that his nation could potentially face a "wave of refugees" crossing its
border
with the
Ukrainian SSR
. However, Havel said "It is not possible to reverse the changes that have already happened in the Soviet Union. We believe democracy will eventually prevail in the Soviet Union."
11
Interior Ministry spokesman Martin Fendrych said an unspecified number of additional troops had been moved to reinforce the Czechoslovak border with the Soviet Union.
11
Hungary
: Deputy Speaker of Parliament
Mátyás Szűrös
said, "Undoubtedly, the
Soviet economy
has collapsed but this has not been the result of Gorbachev's policy but of the paralyzing influence of conservatives," adding, "Suddenly, the likelihood of a civil war in the Soviet Union has increased."
11
Poland
: A statement released by the
president
Lech Wałęsa
, whose
Solidarity
union helped prompt the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, appealed for calm. "May unity and responsibility for our state gain the upper hand." The statement, read on Polish radio by spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski, continued, "The situation in the USSR is significant for our country. It can affect our bilateral relations. We want them to be friendly." But Wałęsa emphasized that Poland would keep its hard-won sovereignty while pursuing economic and political reforms.
11
Romania
Prime Minister
Petre Roman
said the coup was an attempt to re-establish hardline
communism
in the most
Stalinist
manner.
115
Other sovereign states
edit
El Salvador
: The end of the
Salvadoran Civil War
with the Communist
FMLN
was being negotiated.
President
Alfredo Cristiani
voiced concern that the coup could encourage the FMLN to end negotiations, or that Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union would be restored. Cuba had long been a supplier to the FMLN. Ernesto Altschul, Cristiani's deputy chief of staff, said, "Obviously, this can affect our situation." After the coup failed, the
Chapultepec Peace Accords
were signed in January 1992, ending twelve years of brutal conflict.
137
India
: As the coup was ongoing, Indian leaders indicated a degree of sympathy for Soviet hardliners.
Prime Minister
P. V. Narasimha Rao
said "Mr. Gorbachev's ouster was a warning to people who favored reforms without controls." Likewise, India's ambassador in Moscow remarked that Gorbachev had "brought about the disintegration of the [Communist] party".
Chief Minister of West Bengal
and
Communist Party of India (Marxist)
cofounder
Jyoti Basu
wholeheartedly endorsed the coup. When the coup failed, India's government changed course, celebrating "the reassertion of democratic values and a triumph for the will of the people." Despite official support for Yeltsin's victory, Indian politicians feared that a spill-over effect from the
dissolution of the Soviet Union
would encourage secessionist movements at home. The loss of an economic partner and ideological friend upset the Rao Administration and India's leftist movement, as the
Indian National Congress
felt it shared some of the CPSU's values. The
Christian Science Monitor
wrote that "India feels orphaned – ideologically, strategically, economically"
138
Iraq
Saddam Hussein
was a close ally of the Soviet Union until Gorbachev denounced the
invasion of Kuwait
that preceded the
Gulf War
, and relations between the two countries had grown tense. One Iraqi spokesman quoted by the official
Iraqi News Agency
said that "Iraq's right and steadfastness was one of the main reasons behind the fall [of Gorbachev]... because [Iraq] exposed [his] policy of treason and conspiracy. It is natural that we welcome such change like the states and people who were affected by the policies of the former regime." In other words, Hussein seemingly took credit for inspiring the coup. This position was echoed by the Jordanian Newspaper
Al Ra'i
11
115
Libya
: Government radio quoted leader
Muammar Gaddafi
praising the coup leaders for their "brave historical action."
115
Philippines
President
Corazon Aquino
expressed "grave concern" saying, "We hope that the progress toward world peace... achieved under the leadership of President Gorbachev will continue to be preserved and enhanced further."
11
South Africa
Foreign Minister
Pik Botha
said, "I very much hope that [Soviet developments] will neither give rise to large-scale turbulence within the Soviet Union itself or more widely in Europe, nor jeopardize the era of hard-won international cooperation upon which the world has embarked."
11
Supranational bodies and organizations
edit
Holy See
: While celebrating Mass in
Budapest
Pope John Paul II
said in scripted remarks that he hoped the Soviet Union's reforms would survive Gorbachev's fall. "I particularly appreciated the sincere desire that guided him and the lofty inspiration that animated him in the promotion of human rights and dignity, as well as in his commitment for the well-being of the country and of the international community. May the process initiated by him not fall into decline." The Pope also prayed for the Soviet Union itself, asking that "our prayers become even more intense to ask God that that great country may be spared further tragedy."
115
NATO
: The alliance held an emergency meeting in Brussels condemning the Soviet coup. "If indeed this coup did fail, it will be a great victory for the courageous Soviet people who have tasted freedom and who are not prepared to have it taken away from them," said United States Secretary of State
James A. Baker III
. Baker also stated, "[i]t will also, to some extent, be a victory, too, for the international community and for all those governments who reacted strongly to these events." NATO Secretary-General
Manfred Wörner
also said, "We should see how the situation in the Soviet Union develops. Our own plans will take into account what happens there."
11
139
Palestine Liberation Organization
: The Palestinian Liberation Organization was satisfied with the coup.
Yasser Abed Rabbo
, who was a member of the
PLO Executive Committee
, said he hoped the putsch "will permit resolution in the best interests of the Palestinians of the problem of Soviet Jews in Israel."
11
Subsequent fate of GKChP Gang of Eight
edit
Gennadiy Yanayev
, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, went on to head the Department of History and International Relations for the Russian International Academy of Tourism
140
and died in 2010.
Valentin Pavlov
, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, subsequently served as a financial expert for several banks and other financial institutions and became chairman of
Free Economic Society
141
dying in 2003.
Vladimir Kryuchkov
, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, died in 2007.
Dmitriy Yazov
, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, became adviser to the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Academy of General Staff;
142
he died in 2020.
Boris Pugo
died from a gunshot to the head on 22
August 1991. His death was ruled as a suicide.
143
Oleg Baklanov
, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, later served as chairman of the board of directors for "Rosobshchemash"; he died in 2021.
Vasiliy Starodubtsev
, freed from arrest in 1992 due to health complications, served as deputy to the
Federation Council of Russia
(1993–95), governor of
Tula Oblast
(1997–2005), and then member of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation
(since 2007)
144
until his death in 2011.
Alexander Tizyakov
, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, was later a member of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation
, founder of series of enterprises such as "Antal" (machine manufacturing), "Severnaya kazna" (insurance), "Vidikon" (
electric arc furnace
manufacturing) and "Fidelity" (
fast-moving consumer goods
production);
145
he died in 2019.
In popular media
edit
The Man Who Doesn't Return
is a drama film by
Sergey Snezhkin
in 1991.
Three Days (1992 film)
is a drama film by
Šarūnas Bartas
Three Days in August (1992 film)
is a co-production film between Russia and the United States by
Jan Jung
in 1992.
citation needed
Sergey Medvedev
's 2001
Channel One
film
Swan Lake
, commissioned by the
State Committee on the State of Emergency
146
Yeltsin: Three Days in August
Ельцин. Три дня в августе
) is a 2011 Russian film that
dramatizes
the coup.
The Event
(Событие) is a 2015 Russian
documentary
by
Sergei Loznitsa
that uses footage shot 19–24
August 1991 by
camera operators
of the Saint Petersburg Documentary film studio to tell the story of the coup as it unfolded in Leningrad.
Russia 1985–1999: TraumaZone
is a BBC documentary television series in 2022.
In "House Divided", a
season 4 episode of For All Mankind
, an
alternate history
TV series, the coup succeeds and Mikhail Gorbachev is overthrown.
See also
edit
Soviet Union portal
1990s portal
Politics portal
Dissolution of the Soviet Union
History of the Soviet Union
1993 Russian constitutional crisis
Wagner Group rebellion
State collapse
Swan Lake
January 6 United States Capitol attack
Notes and references
edit
under
house arrest
Russian
Августовский путч
romanized
Avgustovskiy Putch
lit.
August Putsch
Ольга Васильева, «Республики во время путча» в сб.статей: «Путч. Хроника тревожных дней».
// Издательство «Прогресс», 1991.
(in Russian)
. Accessed 14 June 2009.
Archived
17 June 2009.
Dunlop, John B. (1995).
The rise of Russia and the fall of the Soviet empire
(1st pbk. printing, with new postscript ed.).
Princeton, N.J.
Princeton University Press
ISBN
978-1-4008-2100-6
OCLC
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. 23 August 1991.
Archived
from the original on 9 November 2021
. Retrieved
9 November
2021
"World Report Extra: The Coup and Beyond : World View : Holding Out for Hammer and Sickle : There are still several orthodox Communist states in the world. Their reaction to the sudden fall – and return – of Mikhail Gorbachev : North Korea : Pyongyang's Odd Drama"
Los Angeles Times
. 23 August 1991.
Archived
from the original on 9 November 2021
. Retrieved
9 November
2021
"North Korea Tries to Block Any Effects of Failed Soviet Coup"
The New York Times
. 13 September 1991.
Archived
from the original on 9 November 2021
. Retrieved
4 December
2021
Mikheev, Vasily V. (1998).
"North Korean Regime and Russian Political Power"
The Journal of East Asian Affairs
12
(2):
553–
576.
JSTOR
23255885
Archived
from the original on 9 November 2021
. Retrieved
9 November
2021
"Vietnam Fears Effects Of Soviet Upheaval"
The Washington Post
. 9 September 1991.
Archived
from the original on 20 December 2020
. Retrieved
4 December
2021
Yeong, Mike (1992).
"New Thinking in Vietnamese Foreign Policy"
Contemporary Southeast Asia
14
(3):
257–
268.
JSTOR
25798159
Archived
from the original on 9 November 2021
. Retrieved
9 November
2021
"Why the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia Collapsed the Way They Did: Reexamining Russian and Serbian Nationalism"
. Wilson Center. 14 May 2003.
Archived
from the original on 14 November 2021
. Retrieved
4 December
2021
Cohen, Lenard J. (1994).
"Russia and the Balkans: Pan-Slavism, Partnership and Power"
International Journal
49
(4):
814–
845.
doi
10.1177/002070209404900405
JSTOR
40202977
S2CID
147158781
Archived
from the original on 14 November 2021
. Retrieved
14 November
2021
"World Reaction"
Tampa Bay Times
. 13 October 2005.
Archived
from the original on 31 March 2022
. Retrieved
31 March
2022
"Breakup of Soviet Union Leaves India Shaken"
Christian Science Monitor
. 7 October 1991.
Archived
from the original on 10 November 2021
. Retrieved
10 November
2021
"Nato's Response Covers All Bases"
Chicago Tribune
. 21 August 1991.
Archived
from the original on 11 November 2016
. Retrieved
10 November
2016
"Gennady Yanayev"
. 12 October 2010.
Archived
from the original on 8 March 2021
. Retrieved
4 April
2018
[2]
Archived
25 August 2024 at the
Wayback Machine
"LA Times", March 2015
Simon Saradzhyan
Coup Leader May Join Defense Team
, "The Moscow Times", March 2015
"AFTER THE COUP; Phone Call, Then a Suicide (Published 1991)"
. 24 August 1991
. Retrieved
6 August
2025
Rupert Cornwell
[3]
Archived
10 October 2017 at the
Wayback Machine
"Vasily Starodubtsev: Politician who tried to topple Gorbachev in 1991", March 2015
Vladimir Socor
[4]
Archived
2 April 2015 at the
Wayback Machine
"The Jamestown Foundation", March 2015
ЖЕЛЕЗНОВА, Мария (23 August 2001).
"ЛЕБЕДИНОЕ ОЗЕРО" ВЫСОХЛО Новый телесезон начался с юбилея ГКЧП — но без балета"
(in Russian).
Novaya Gazeta
. Archived from
the original
on 29 September 2018
. Retrieved
11 December
2023
Bibliography
edit
See also:
Bibliography of the Post Stalinist Soviet Union § Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Bloc
Bonnell, Victoria E.; Freidin, Gregory (1993).
"Televorot: The Role of Television Coverage in Russia's August 1991 Coup"
(PDF)
Slavic Review
52
(4):
810–
838.
doi
10.2307/2499653
ISSN
0037-6779
JSTOR
2499653
Breslauer, George W. (April 1992). "Reflections on the Anniversary of the August 1991 Coup".
Soviet Economy
(2):
164–
174.
doi
10.1080/08826994.1992.10641350
ISSN
0882-6994
Dunlop, John B. (2003).
"The August 1991 Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics"
(PDF)
Journal of Cold War Studies
(1):
94–
127.
doi
10.1162/152039703320996731
ISSN
1520-3972
Gibson, James L. (September 1997). "Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991: Collective Action, Rational Choice, and Democratic Values in the Former Soviet Union".
American Political Science Review
91
(3):
671–
684.
doi
10.2307/2952082
ISSN
0003-0554
JSTOR
2952082
Hamburg, Roger (1992). "After the Abortive Soviet Coup and 'What Is To Be Done?' The Post Soviet Military".
Journal of Political & Military Sociology
20
(2):
305–
322.
JSTOR
45294287
Kyriakodis, Harry G. (1991).
"The 1991 Soviet and 1917 Bolshewk Coups Compared: Causes, Consequences and Legality"
(PDF)
Russian History
18
1–
4):
317–
362.
doi
10.1163/187633191X00137
ISSN
0094-288X
Lepingwell, John W. R. (July 1992). "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup".
World Politics
44
(4):
539–
572.
doi
10.2307/2010487
ISSN
0043-8871
JSTOR
2010487
McNair, Brian (1996). "Reform and restructuring in the Soviet media before and after the August 1991 coup". In Eldridge, John; Eldridge, John Eric (eds.).
Getting the message: news, truth and power
. Communication and society (1. publ., repr ed.). London New York:
Routledge
. pp.
53–
72.
ISBN
978-0-415-07984-6
Matthee, Heinrich (1991).
"A Breakdown of Civil-Military Relations: The Soviet Coup of 1991"
(PDF)
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies
29
doi
10.5787/29-0-185
ISSN
2224-0020
Meyer, Stephen M. (1991). "How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: The Politicization of the Soviet Military".
International Security
16
(3):
5–
38.
doi
10.2307/2539087
JSTOR
2539087
Ōgushi, Atsushi (2008).
The demise of the Soviet Communist Party
. BASEES/Routledge series on Russian and East European studies. London; New York:
Routledge
ISBN
978-0-415-43439-3
OCLC
144769250
Saar, Andrus; Joe, Liivi (1992). "Polling, Under the Gun: Political Attitudes in Estonia, Surveyed at the Height of the Soviet Coup Attempt, August 1991".
Public Opinion Quarterly
56
(4): 519.
doi
10.1086/269341
Varney, Wendy; Martin, Brian (February 2000).
"Lessons from the 1991 Soviet coup"
Peace Research
32
(1):
52–
68.
JSTOR
23607685
Charles Vogt, William (December 1991).
The Soviet coup of August 1991: why it happened, and why it was doomed to fail
(PDF)
(MA thesis).
Naval Postgraduate School
Ziemele, Ineta
(2005).
State continuity and nationality: the Baltic States and Russia: past present and future as defined by international law
. Leiden; Boston:
M. Nijhoff
ISBN
978-90-04-14295-4
OCLC
57170584
Zlotnik, Marc (2003). "Yeltsin and Gorbachev: The Politics of Confrontation".
Journal of Cold War Studies
(1):
128–
164.
doi
10.1162/152039703320996740
ISSN
1520-3972
Primary sources
edit
Gorbačev, Michail
(1991).
The August Coup: The Truth and The Lessons
. New York, NY:
HarperCollins Publisher
ISBN
978-0-06-016890-2
Includes transcript of the videotaped statement made 19/20
August 1991 as his Foros dacha.
Bonnell, Victoria E.; Cooper, Ann; Freidin, Gregory, eds. (1994).
Russia at the Barricades: Eyewitness Accounts of the August 1991 Coup
. Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe
ISBN
978-1-56324-272-4
Includes the chronology of the coup, photos, and accounts from a broad cross-section of participants and eyewitnesses, including the editors.
External links
edit
Wikimedia Commons has media related to
1991 coup d'état attempt in the Soviet Union
The August Coup texts
Voices From An Attempted Soviet Coup.
first person accounts and documents from both sides of the barricades. Compiled and edited by Anya Chernyakhovskaya, Dr John Jirik and Nikolai Lamm.
IRC logs
: Transcript of internet chat from the time of the coup
TASS transmissions at the time of the coup
(captured from short-wave radio transmissions, contains decoding errors)
Andrew Coyne: Getting to the Roots of a Deserved Failure
The St. Petersburg Times
#696(63), 17 August 2001
The issue of
The St. Petersburg Times
devoted to the tenth anniversary of the coup attempt.
The Collapse of Stalinism
Chronology of the Coup The USSR in 1991: The Implosion of a Superpower by Dr Robert F. Miller
Moscow Coup, August 1991, Anonymous
: Memories of an anonymous Russian in Wiki Memory Archive
Personal account and photographs of historian Douglas Smith, an eyewitness to the coup
Vadim Anatov, a programmer for Relcom (the first public ISP in the USSR)
on
talking about the role of the Internet in resistance to the coup.
Adventures of the "Nuclear Briefcase": A Russian Document Analysis
Strategic Insights
, Volume III, Issue 9 (September 2004), by Mikhail Tsypkin
Map of Europe showing areas affected by Soviet Coup Attempt
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Conflicts in 1991
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1991 in the Soviet Union
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