A Significant Public Law Ruling: Palestine Action Judgment
Source: http://www.rcpbml.org.uk/wwie-26/ww26-06/ww26-06-02.htm
Archived: 2026-04-23 17:24
A Significant Public Law Ruling: Palestine Action Judgment
Volume 56 Number 6, February 28,
2026
ARCHIVE
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A Significant Public Law
Ruling
Palestine Action Judgment
People welcoming the news outside the High Court, London,
February 13, 2026
Paul Heron, solicitor at the Public Interest Law Centre (PILC), has
published an analysis of the decision in the recent Palestine Action judgment.
He writes:
"The Court allowed a challenge to the Home Secretary's decision to
proscribe Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000, finding the move
unlawful and disproportionate. Yet", he says, "the victory, whilst
extremely important, is partial and potentially very fragile. Palestine Action
remains proscribed pending further order, and the Court accepted that a small
number of its actions fell within the statutory definition of terrorism."
Paul Heron points out that "terrorism" is, under the Terrorism Act
2000, defined broadly, as the use or threat of action designed to influence the
government for a political cause, involving serious violence or serious damage
to property.
"The Home Secretary," he writes, "reached an 'unchallenged
conclusion' that Palestine Action was concerned in terrorism. The claimant did
not dispute that some activities could fall within broad definition of section
1 [where terrorism is defined]. Instead, the challenge focused on whether
proscription, with its sweeping criminal consequences, was lawful and
proportionate.
"The proscription order, approved by Parliament and in force from 5
July 2025, made it a criminal offence to: Belong or profess to belong to
Palestine Action; Invite support for it; Express supportive opinions
recklessly; Organise or address meetings connected to it. Thus, the order
doesn't just ban specific acts of damage. They restrict people from organising,
speaking, and associating under a political banner."
Of a number of grounds for the challenge to proscribing Palestine Action,
the High Court considered four main grounds, ultimately ruling that the
proscription of Palestine Action was unlawful on two of them.
Paul Heron explains: "The first successful ground of challenge
concerned the Home Secretary's own policy on proscription. That policy states
that proscription requires both a belief that the organisation is concerned in
terrorism and that it is proportionate to proscribe. It also directs
consideration of factors such as the nature and scale of activity and the
threat posed to the UK.
"In deciding to ban the group, the Home Secretary argued that
proscription would make it easier to prosecute supporters and give the
authorities stronger powers to disrupt them. The Court said this went against
the purpose of the policy, which was meant to limit when proscription could be
used. It wasn't enough to say that a ban would be useful, there had to be clear
reasons why it was truly necessary.
"In effect, the executive was caught using proscription as a tool of
political convenience rather than necessity. The Court did not question
Parliament's broad terrorism framework. Instead, it insisted that if the
government promises restraint, it must demonstrate it."
The second successful ground was under the Human Rights Act 1998, and
concerns the issue of freedom of expression and association..
Paul Heron explains: "The Court rejected the argument that Palestine
Action's conduct was civil disobedience and confirmed that the HRA does
necessarily protect violent or non-peaceful protest. However it accepted that a
'very small number' of the group's activities amounted to terrorism as defined
in the Act.
"But the Court reframed the key issue. The interference to be justified
was not the restriction on criminal damage. It was the criminalisation of
peaceful protest and expression carried out under the Palestine Action
banner."
In other words, the proscribing of Palestine Action, the judgment says, still
seriously interferes with people's rights to free expression and protest under
Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
"The Court looked not just at the alleged offences," Paul Heron
explains, "but also at the wider impact of proscription. It recognised
that banning a group can create a 'chilling effect' meaning people may hold
back from taking part in lawful political protest or speech because they fear
being associated with a banned organisation or risking prosecution." This
of course has been the effect of proscribing Palestine Action, in particular
for the demand that the genocide in Palestine be ended, while the resistance
has grown and mass arrests have taken place.
"Most importantly," says Paul Heron, "the Court found that
the group's activities had not reached the level, seriousness, or sustained
scale that would justify treating it as a terrorist organisation. The Court
were of the view that ordinary criminal laws can already be used to prosecute
any specific unlawful acts, a full ban was not considered necessary or
proportionate."
Paul Heron affirms: "This distinction matters. Criminal law deals with
individual offences. Proscription changes the legal consequences of simply
being linked to a group, even in lawful activity."
In summing up, Heron offers a word of caution, in saying that "the
judgment is not a sweeping denunciation of executive power. The Court attached
'real weight' to the Home Secretary's responsibility for public safety. It
rejected a discrimination claim under Article 14. It did not disturb the
assessment that some conduct met the statutory terrorism definition." And
he underlines: "This is constitutional caution. The judiciary has drawn a
line, but a very thin one."
From a public lawyering perspective, three dynamics stand out.
"First, the elasticity of terrorism law. It is a shifting sand. The
statutory definition treats serious damage to property, when politically
motivated, in much the same way as violence against people. That breadth allows
militant protest to be recast as a matter of national security.
"Second, Government response intensified in the context of the Gaza war
protests. Direct action against arms companies and supply chains received
heightened scrutiny. Proscription indicated a shift toward treating such
protest activity as a matter of national security.
"Third, the judiciary as a contradictory arena. The Court accepted part
of the terrorism case but pushed back on its broader consequences. It upheld
the right to organise and protest, while leaving the underlying
counter-terrorism framework unchanged."
In dealing with the "chilling effect" of proscribing, the judgment
recognises that proscription does not merely punish organisers. It deters
students hosting meetings, trade unionists organising events, and activists
expressing solidarity.
Paul Heron concludes, in raising the issue from the perspective of the
peoples' movements: "But the big question remains: who defines terrorism,
and how expansively? The Terrorism Act endures. The executive may reconsider or
appeal. Parliament may legislate further. ... Litigation can expose overreach
and defend political campaigning but it operates within legal boundaries shaped
by the state and thus the establishment itself. Judgments like this can slow
the machinery of bad law occasionally. It does not challenge or dismantle
it."
Link to Full Issue of Workers'
Weekly
RCPB(ML) Home Page
Workers' Weekly Online
Archive
Volume 56 Number 6, February 28,
2026
ARCHIVE
HOME
JBCENTRE
SUBSCRIBE
A Significant Public Law
Ruling
Palestine Action Judgment
People welcoming the news outside the High Court, London,
February 13, 2026
Paul Heron, solicitor at the Public Interest Law Centre (PILC), has
published an analysis of the decision in the recent Palestine Action judgment.
He writes:
"The Court allowed a challenge to the Home Secretary's decision to
proscribe Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000, finding the move
unlawful and disproportionate. Yet", he says, "the victory, whilst
extremely important, is partial and potentially very fragile. Palestine Action
remains proscribed pending further order, and the Court accepted that a small
number of its actions fell within the statutory definition of terrorism."
Paul Heron points out that "terrorism" is, under the Terrorism Act
2000, defined broadly, as the use or threat of action designed to influence the
government for a political cause, involving serious violence or serious damage
to property.
"The Home Secretary," he writes, "reached an 'unchallenged
conclusion' that Palestine Action was concerned in terrorism. The claimant did
not dispute that some activities could fall within broad definition of section
1 [where terrorism is defined]. Instead, the challenge focused on whether
proscription, with its sweeping criminal consequences, was lawful and
proportionate.
"The proscription order, approved by Parliament and in force from 5
July 2025, made it a criminal offence to: Belong or profess to belong to
Palestine Action; Invite support for it; Express supportive opinions
recklessly; Organise or address meetings connected to it. Thus, the order
doesn't just ban specific acts of damage. They restrict people from organising,
speaking, and associating under a political banner."
Of a number of grounds for the challenge to proscribing Palestine Action,
the High Court considered four main grounds, ultimately ruling that the
proscription of Palestine Action was unlawful on two of them.
Paul Heron explains: "The first successful ground of challenge
concerned the Home Secretary's own policy on proscription. That policy states
that proscription requires both a belief that the organisation is concerned in
terrorism and that it is proportionate to proscribe. It also directs
consideration of factors such as the nature and scale of activity and the
threat posed to the UK.
"In deciding to ban the group, the Home Secretary argued that
proscription would make it easier to prosecute supporters and give the
authorities stronger powers to disrupt them. The Court said this went against
the purpose of the policy, which was meant to limit when proscription could be
used. It wasn't enough to say that a ban would be useful, there had to be clear
reasons why it was truly necessary.
"In effect, the executive was caught using proscription as a tool of
political convenience rather than necessity. The Court did not question
Parliament's broad terrorism framework. Instead, it insisted that if the
government promises restraint, it must demonstrate it."
The second successful ground was under the Human Rights Act 1998, and
concerns the issue of freedom of expression and association..
Paul Heron explains: "The Court rejected the argument that Palestine
Action's conduct was civil disobedience and confirmed that the HRA does
necessarily protect violent or non-peaceful protest. However it accepted that a
'very small number' of the group's activities amounted to terrorism as defined
in the Act.
"But the Court reframed the key issue. The interference to be justified
was not the restriction on criminal damage. It was the criminalisation of
peaceful protest and expression carried out under the Palestine Action
banner."
In other words, the proscribing of Palestine Action, the judgment says, still
seriously interferes with people's rights to free expression and protest under
Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
"The Court looked not just at the alleged offences," Paul Heron
explains, "but also at the wider impact of proscription. It recognised
that banning a group can create a 'chilling effect' meaning people may hold
back from taking part in lawful political protest or speech because they fear
being associated with a banned organisation or risking prosecution." This
of course has been the effect of proscribing Palestine Action, in particular
for the demand that the genocide in Palestine be ended, while the resistance
has grown and mass arrests have taken place.
"Most importantly," says Paul Heron, "the Court found that
the group's activities had not reached the level, seriousness, or sustained
scale that would justify treating it as a terrorist organisation. The Court
were of the view that ordinary criminal laws can already be used to prosecute
any specific unlawful acts, a full ban was not considered necessary or
proportionate."
Paul Heron affirms: "This distinction matters. Criminal law deals with
individual offences. Proscription changes the legal consequences of simply
being linked to a group, even in lawful activity."
In summing up, Heron offers a word of caution, in saying that "the
judgment is not a sweeping denunciation of executive power. The Court attached
'real weight' to the Home Secretary's responsibility for public safety. It
rejected a discrimination claim under Article 14. It did not disturb the
assessment that some conduct met the statutory terrorism definition." And
he underlines: "This is constitutional caution. The judiciary has drawn a
line, but a very thin one."
From a public lawyering perspective, three dynamics stand out.
"First, the elasticity of terrorism law. It is a shifting sand. The
statutory definition treats serious damage to property, when politically
motivated, in much the same way as violence against people. That breadth allows
militant protest to be recast as a matter of national security.
"Second, Government response intensified in the context of the Gaza war
protests. Direct action against arms companies and supply chains received
heightened scrutiny. Proscription indicated a shift toward treating such
protest activity as a matter of national security.
"Third, the judiciary as a contradictory arena. The Court accepted part
of the terrorism case but pushed back on its broader consequences. It upheld
the right to organise and protest, while leaving the underlying
counter-terrorism framework unchanged."
In dealing with the "chilling effect" of proscribing, the judgment
recognises that proscription does not merely punish organisers. It deters
students hosting meetings, trade unionists organising events, and activists
expressing solidarity.
Paul Heron concludes, in raising the issue from the perspective of the
peoples' movements: "But the big question remains: who defines terrorism,
and how expansively? The Terrorism Act endures. The executive may reconsider or
appeal. Parliament may legislate further. ... Litigation can expose overreach
and defend political campaigning but it operates within legal boundaries shaped
by the state and thus the establishment itself. Judgments like this can slow
the machinery of bad law occasionally. It does not challenge or dismantle
it."
Link to Full Issue of Workers'
Weekly
RCPB(ML) Home Page
Workers' Weekly Online
Archive