Papers by Bernhard Obsieger
Language, Truth and Democracy
The study is motivated by the question of how pre-philosophical knowledge and the knowledge gaine... more The study is motivated by the question of how pre-philosophical knowledge and the knowledge gained through philosophizing are related to each other. The starting point is Plato's anamnesis theory, according to which the cognition of being corresponds to a recollection (anamnesis) of pre-existing knowledge in us. The investigation is based on Plato's dialogue between Socrates and Meno and reconstructs the origin of Meno's paradox, according to which man can neither search for what he knows nor for what he does not know. In response to this paradox, Socrates presents the anamnesis theory, in which he elucidates the relationship between pre-philosophical knowledge and philosophical inquiry. The answer to the question as to whether virtue can be taught, can be found in a further advancement of the anamnesis theory.
Phänomenologische Forschungen
Husserls Frage: "Kann ich mein Leben leben, ohne dass ich es wollen kann?" Um d... more Husserls Frage: "Kann ich mein Leben leben, ohne dass ich es wollen kann?" Um den Sinn von Husserls Frage zu verstehen und sie erçrtern zu kçnnen, ist es notwendig, zunächst die in ihr zur Sprache kommenden Phänomene kurz darzu-legen. Dabei soll das in Husserls Frage anklingende Paradox herausgestellt wer-den, indem gezeigt wird, worin die scheinbare Unmçglichkeit besteht, ein Le-ben zu leben, das der es Lebende nicht wollen kann. Anschließend soll dieses Paradox aufgelçst werden durch den Nachweis, warum und wie ein solches Le-ben dennoch mçglich ist. Schließlich sollen die Gründe eines solchen Lebens dargestellt werden, die in unserer Zeit nicht mehr nur Gründe seiner Mçglich-keit sind, sondern Gründe seiner Unvermeidlichkeit zu werden drohen, sofern uns die Mçglichkeit eines "Lebens, das ich wollen kann" ihrerseits fragwürdig geworden ist.
Phänomenologische Forschungen
Husserl discovered that the phenomenon of time cannot be analyzed in terms of objective temporali... more Husserl discovered that the phenomenon of time cannot be analyzed in terms of objective temporality. The intuitively given succession is not one of worldly objective time, but rather of the time of consciousness itself. Here it seems that the successive phases can exist together, such as they are given together in intuition. This poses the problem of how the time of consciousness can appear in its own course, that is, how to understand the relation between the time that appears and the process of its appearing. Can time perception be understood as a temporal self-perception of consciousness?
Quaestiones Disputatae
This paper aims to clarify the structure of temporality as it is originally experienced in time-c... more This paper aims to clarify the structure of temporality as it is originally experienced in time-consciousness. At a pre-refl ective level, timeconsciousness presents us with changing or unchanging worldly objects as persisting through time. However, time-consciousness is not simply a consciousness of worldly temporal events but, rather, a consciousness of these events as they appear in our experience. Accordingly, the phenomenal time that is experienced in time-consciousness consists in a correlative unity between two different temporal series: that of the appearing objects and that of their modes of appearance. This article concludes with an analysis of the "immanent" side of phenomenal temporality. Following Husserl, I argue that appearances or experiences have the same temporal structure as worldly events, and that this isomorphism makes it possible for worldly processes of change and persistence to present themselves to us as perceptual phenomena.
Temporalidad y presencia: ensayo sobre el aparecer del tiempo
Intentionality and Action, 2017
In this paper I present an outline of Husserl's ethics, drawing especially on the later manuscrip... more In this paper I present an outline of Husserl's ethics, drawing especially on the later manuscripts recently published in Husserliana XLII. I start with an exposition of Husserl's general understanding of the morality of actions. Against this background, I discuss what I believe to be Husserl's most original contribution to ethics, namely, his understanding of morality as a form of life. In his analyses of the ethical meaning of human existence, Husserl pays special attention to the different reasons for abandoning an ethical life. Insofar as these reasons concern the theoretical and practical foundations of such a life, they call into question the general convictions upon which the meaning and the possibility of this way of life depend. I try to point out why Husserl thinks that phenomenology is able to restore the legitimacy of these convictions, which are undermined by the modern naturalistic worldview. The morality of action Originally, following Brentano and Kant, Husserl assumed that ethics was principally concerned with the universal form of isolated actions. Accordingly, he believed that ethics must investigate the grounds and criteria for the moral correctness of actions and of their motivation. In view of this problem, Husserl establishes a parallelism between what is right in a logical and in a moral sense. There is always one action that is morally right, namely, that which is the best under the given circumstances. What makes an action better than another is the fact that it realizes a higher good. Therefore, the best action available is the one that realizes the highest available good, that is, the possibility of the highest value. This general criterion of ethical action, consisting in the demand of striving always for the realization of the highest possible value (which can very well be the sum or collection of different but compatible values), is what Husserl calls the categorical imperative. Despite the Kantian term, he takes this principle from Brentano, who proposed it as an alternative to Kant's supreme principle of moral action. 1 1 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre, 43, 129 ff., 237 ff. (On Husserl's attitude towards Kant's categorical imperative, cf. 414 ff.) Cf. also Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 36-40, and Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik, § 13.