Bringing emotion to work

1 BRINGING EMOTION TO WORK: EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE, EMPLOYEE RESISTANCE AND THE REINVENTION OF CHARACTER HUGHES, J. (PHD) DEPT OF SOCIOLOGY & COMMUNICATIONS BRUNEL UNIVERSITY

+441895265633 2 BRINGING EMOTION TO WORK: EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE, EMPLOYEE RESISTANCE AND THE REINVENTION OF CHARACTER ABSTRACT This article centrally examines the sociological significance of emotional intel ligence (EI) as a nascent managerial discourse. Through developing a three-way reading o f the writers Richard Sennett, Daniel Goleman, and George Ritzer, it is contended that EI can be understood to signal ‘new rules’ for work involving demands for workers to develo p moral character better attuned to the dynamics of the flexible workplace --- cha racter which is more ‘intelligent’, adaptive, and reflexive. Furthermore, it is argued that while EI appears in some important respects to open the scope for worker discretion, i t might also signal diminished scope for worker resistance. However, ultimately, the cas e of EI is used to problematise recent discussions of worker resistance --- to suggest the possibility of ‘resistant’ worker agency exercised through collusion with, as well as transgress ion of, corporate norms and practices. Key words: emotional intelligence; management con trol; moral character; resistance. 3 Introduction: Emotional Intelligence and The ‘New Rules’ for Work The rules for work are changing. We’re being judged by a new yardstick: not just how smart we are, or by our training or expertise, but also by how well we handl e ourselves and each other. This yardstick is increasingly applied in choosing who will be hired and who will not, who will be let go and who retained, who passed over and who promoted (Goleman 1998: 3). So begins Daniel Goleman’s Working With Emotional Intelligence (1998), the follow-up to his highly influential (1996) Emotional Intelligence: Why it can Ma tter More than IQi. On the basis of these and other texts, and his associated work as a high- profile corporate consultant, Goleman has established himself as the leading aut hority on emotional intelligence (henceforth EI), which, as he defines it, consists of a s et of core skills: namely, the intrapersonal competencies of knowing one’s emotions, managing emotions, motivating oneself; and the interpersonal competencies of recognising emotions in others and handling relationships (1996: 42). Such skills, Goleman suggests, are largely neglected by our contemporary education systems and by corporate trainin g programmes, and are not detected by conventional measures of ‘intelligence’ such as IQ, and yet, he suggests, they have come to be of fundamental importance both to per sonal and corporate success. The concept of EI has gained a great deal of currency within both lay and academic discourse. While a somewhat crude indicator, it is noteworthy that at t he time 4 of writing the internet-based book retailer, Amazon, lists over 2,500 titles dev oted to the topic. In particular, EI has become a prominent theme in the literature on human resource management, training, and leadership (see, for example, the extensive reviews un dertaken by Dulewicz & Higgs [2000; 2004]); and, indeed, EI has already begun to influenc e practices within these fields. A whole industry involved in the development of w orkplace assessment tools has rapidly adopted the concept. A range of existing measures o f personality and aptitude have been amended, or repackaged, in attempts to incorp orate some of the key principles involved in EI --- as a particularly telling example, the key practitioner journal Competence has recently been renamed Competence and Emotion al Intelligence. In the UK we are told by the Times Higher Educational Supplement 1 4th May 1999 that EI is ‘reshaping business school research programmes’ (cited in Finema n 2004: 727); and by The Guardian that any potential candidate for a FE college he adship should heed two words of advice ‘emotional intelligence’, since before long ‘… this buzz phrase will be inked on the blotters of every governors’ interview board in the se ctor’ (3rd October 2000: 46). Indeed, EI has found particularly fertile ground within the s phere of education: the Department for Education and Skills recently approved a pilot pro gramme which involves children in 250 UK primary schools learning key emotional skills as a central part of the curriculum; within the higher education sector also we are a sked to consider, for example, the prospect of The Emotionally Intelligent Lecturer (Mor tiboys 2002). Even by name, EI appears to mark a significant shift in attitudes towards emotio n in the workplace --- from a late-80s corporate zeitgeist in which emotions were regarded as a barrier to ‘clear-headed’ decision-making and a deviation from ‘intelligence’ 5 (Putnam and Mumby 1993), towards increasingly, an ethos in which the display, deployment and management of emotions --- how well we handle ourselves and each other --- has become emblematic of a new rationality and a new working skills ‘too lkit’. With this very real influence on the assessment and recruitment industry, their direct interventions through consultancy work, and their authoritative appeal to the te rm ‘intelligence’, writers on EI are indeed doing more than just signalling how the rul es for work are changing. But, as will be argued in this paper, such rules are not simp ly changing as a consequence of the discursive invention of EI. While Goleman views the rise of EI as resulting from recent scientific discovery (particularly the resea rch on brain functioning undertaken by Le Doux (1986, 1992)), its ascendancy as a managerial discourse can also be understood to relate to a much broader set of shifts withi n the workplace --- shifts in the control strategies pursued by organisations, shifts in the character of work, shifts in the demands made of employees, and, indeed, shifts in the demands that employees make on their workplacesii. Thus, this paper aims to loca te EI not so much as a discreet set of ideas which in themselves are transforming the workplace, but rather, as an explicit template of the kinds of behavioural/emoti onal characteristics that have more generally come to be championed within particular sectors of the workplace, often without any direct reference to the specific rubric of E Iiii. Accordingly, this paper centrally considers a number of questions: firstly, how might we account for the ascendancy of EI as a managerial discourse?; secondly, what is the sociological significance of EI?; and thirdly, to what extent does the rise of EI signal (rather than wholesale constitute) important changes in specific sectors of the workplace? Until recently, the subject of EI has on the whole escaped critical sociological attention, 6 (notable exceptions are Fineman 2000, 2004; Cullinane & Pye 2001; Hughes 2003). The subject has largely been discussed within the psychological literature, where de bates have centred on the concept’s empirical validity (see, for example, Sternberg and Kaufm an 1998; Davies et al. 1998; Schutte et al. 1998; Abraham 1999; Huy 1999); and over the measurement of EI or ‘EQ’ (Davies et al. 1998; Mayer et al. 1999; Ciarrochi et al. 2 000; Ashkanasy et al. 2002). Thus, this paper explores the merits of considering the rise of EI sociologically; particularly in terms of what this investigation might reveal ab out particular sectors of the present-day workplace --- the demands made of employee s, the ‘new rules of work’, and the extent to which EI embodies these. Consequently, the ri se of EI as a managerial discourse is examined within the context of long-term changes within the workplace, and, ultimately, the case of EI is used to address some of the mo re prominent recent debates within critical organisational studies, particularly th ose which address issues of subjectivity and resistance in the labour process. The discussion below begins with a commentary on the work of Richard Sennett, Daniel Goleman, and George Ritzer. This analysis is used as vehicle for the cent ral line of argument: in short, that EI can be understood to constitute a ‘reinvention’ and a ‘redefinition’ of character in the sense that Sennett uses this term, but one which attends to the short-termism and moral ambiguity of the post-Fordist, flexible workplace , and one that stresses individual discretion in the place of dogged justification and pre destination -- - the Weberian ‘iron cage’. Furthermore, it is suggested that under the guise of EI, character itself becomes ‘enchanted’: it comes to be understood as a commodity, a resource in which individuals and organisations can invest; it invites a neo-hum an relations customer service orientation to intra-organisational exchanges, such t hat even at 7 work we are compelled to operate simultaneously as consumers and producers. On t he basis of this analysis it is proposed that EI appears, at least ostensibly, to m ark a continuation of processes in which the control strategies pursued in contemporar y work organisations have come increasingly to involve the colonisation (Casey 1995) of workers’ affects and subjectivities (Hochschild 1983; Kunda 1992; Fineman 1993; Putnam & Mumby 1993; Grey 1996; Fineman & Sturdy 1997; Strangleman and Roberts 1999; Wilson 1999; Grugulis et al. 2000). As such, it would seem to offer at onc e greater worker discretion and a diminished scope for resistance. However, it is argued h ere that the case of EI also helps to problematise recent discussions of resistance and w orker agency. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of a relational conceptualisation of resistance, and through drawing upon the example of EI, aim s to illustrate how agency might be exercised through collusion with, as well as tran sgression of, corporate norms and practices. The focus in much of the discussion below is on the kinds of organisations that have figured prominently in debates about workplace resistance in recent literat ure --- the ‘culture managed’ service corporation, the ‘knowledge-intensive’ enterprise, the ‘customer-focused’ firm, and so forth. As a central part of the discussion, Grugulis et al.’s (2000) discussion of ‘Consultancy Co’ is utilised as a testing ground for how th e ‘new rules of work’ embodied in EI might be translated into practice. However, such organisations are by no means considered here as representative of the workplace as a whole, at best they constitute archetypes of the kinds of organisation in which the ‘new rules’ are most readily apparent. Indeed, at its current stage of development and articulation, the discourse of EI is likely to have much more significance for, for 8 example, the working life of a middle manager in a London-based consultancy firm , than say, a machine operator in a food processing plant. Moral character and the changing ‘rules of work’ In his highly penetrating (1998) text The Corrosion of Character, Richard Sennet t explores how the era of the post-Fordist flexible workplace has promoted a shift in the outlook of employees. Within this context, he proposes, the arrangement of work promotes an emphasis on short-termism which corrodes trust, loyalty, and genuine commitment. Social bonds in the workplace become weaker as fleeting ties of asso ciation have greater utility to employees than more stable and permanent connections. He writes: ‘Time’s arrow is broken; it has no trajectory in a continually reengineered, routine -hating, short-term political economy. People feel the lack of human relations and durabl e purposes’ (98). Thus, within modern institutional networks we are compelled to dev elop more opportunistic, superficial, and furtive orientations to work. The servility of a previous generation embodied in the work ethic ‘be loyal to your company’, respect t he boss, to surrender personal interests to those of the organisation, has been rep laced by an ethic of knowing ‘how to handle yourself’. The rules of work increasingly include ‘knowing how to play the game’, ‘CV-building’, ‘knowing the right time to jump ships’, where ‘failure to move is taken as a sign of failure’ (1998: 87), and so forth. For Sennett, the net consequence of this shift is a corrosion of moral character. Sennett contrasts the Weberian image of individual workers trapped in the ‘iron cage’ of rationality, seeking to gain power over themselves through endlessly toil ing to 9 prove their moral virtue, with the ephemeral and superficial engagement characte ristic of teamworking in the present-day workplace. He writes: ‘Teamwork is the work ethic which suits a flexible political economy … [it] is the group practice of demeanin g superficiality’ (1998: 99). In teamworking, Sennett argues, power struggles remain , but authority effectively disappears. Teamworking helps obscure domination: it creat es the illusion that no one has responsibility, and thus those in control are able to a ct without needing to justify themselves or their acts. This power without responsibility h e suggests, ‘… disorients employees; they may still feel driven to justify themselves, but now t here is no one higher up who responds. Calvin’s God has fled’ (1998: 109). Put simply, Senne tt is observing a long-term shift away from an ethic which emphasised long-termism, authority, dependence, obligation and predestination towards one which involves short- termism, an obfuscation of authority, an abhorrence of dependence, and the ficti on that we are in control of our own destinies. When transposed to life beyond the workp lace, particularly family life, Sennett argues, the dictum ‘no long term’ means, don’t commi t, don’t make sacrifices; when practiced within the home ‘… teamwork is destructive, marking an absence of authority and of firm guidance in raising children’ (1998: 2 5). The personal qualities of ‘good work’ no longer correspond to the qualities of ‘good character’ (1998: 21) Sennett does not wish to convey a nostalgic sentimentalism for the worldly asceticism of the old work ethic; this involved its own heavy burdens --- as Web er did so much to demonstrate. Rather, his argument is that this previous work ethic encom passed aspects of character, such as trust and loyalty, that remain important today, an d yet which do not find expression in the present-day workplace (1998: 99). Whilst fle xibility 10 might constitute an answer to the tyranny of routine, in its place it leaves ove rwhelming uncertainty and disengagement. We are left with the inexorable flux of a workpla ce which offers employees, no longer involved in the pursuit of self-justification, little in the way of narrative --- with only precarious, insecure, fractured identities: with no coherent sense of self, and with profound moral uncertainty. What’s immediately striking about considering the work of Sennett in relation to that of Goleman is that these writers share remarkably similar concerns. As an a rchetypal example of ‘Why [EI] matters now’ (Goleman 1998: 9), Goleman recounts his discussions with employees of a Californian start-up company within the biotechn ology industry who felt ‘… burned out and robbed of their private lives. And though everyo ne could talk via computer to everyone else, people felt that no one was truly list ening to them. People desperately felt the need for connection, for empathy, for open communication’ (1998: 9 my emphasis). Goleman’s statements here are strongly reminiscent of Sennett’s earlier-cited concern that ‘people feel the lack of human relations and durable purpose’. But where Sennett views this condition as the inev itable consequence of an oppressive social order characterised by flexibility and flux, Goleman views it as a defining concern for both labour and capital in the present-day bu siness environment. He continues: In the new stripped-down, every-job-counts business climate, these human realities will matter more than ever. Massive change is a constant; technical innovations, global competition, and the pressures of institutional investors ar e ever-escalating forces for flux … As business changes, so do the traits needed to 11 excel. Data tracking the talents of star performers over several decades reveal that two abilities that mattered relatively little for success in the 1970s have beco me crucially important in the 1990s: team building and adapting to change (1998: 9- - 10). Herein lies the most important distinction between the two authors. Where Sennett understands team-building and adapting to change as root causes of the c orrosion of moral character, Goleman views these as fundamentally important talents and a bilities crucial to success --- as skills to be developed; the stuff of ‘star performers’ at work. Where Sennett expounds the disastrous consequences of transposing to our family lives the endeavours of team-building and adapting to change, Goleman would suggest th at our capacity to handle such endeavours matters fundamentally to ‘success’ in all arenas of life, as much at home as at work. Goleman views our capacities for team-building and adapting to change as ultimately dependent upon the inter- and intra-personal competencies that exhibit an individual’s EI. Thus for Goleman, changes leading to the present-day organisation of work have not instrumented a corrosion of character, rather, they have intensified demands for ‘character’. It is worth once again quoting Goleman directly in this connection: There is an old-fashioned word for the body of skills that emotional intelligence represents: character… The bedrock of character is self-discipline; the virtuous life, as philosophers since Aristotle have observed, is based on se lf- control. A related keystone of character is being able to motivate and guide 12 oneself, whether in doing homework, finishing a job, or getting up in the mornin g. And, as we have seen, the ability to defer gratification and to control and chan nel one’s urges to act is a basic emotional skill, one that in a former day was called will (Goleman 1998: 285). If one were to read this passage from Goleman’s text in isolation, it would seem that he and Sennett share a common understanding of ‘character’ --- as involving sel f- denial, deferring gratification, discipline. But as one reads on, it becomes app arent that under the guise of EI, Goleman is offering a new version of character. For examp le, rather than simply advocating a return to the asceticism of old, Goleman is care ful to point out the dangers of ‘overcontrol’ (1998: 81). Indeed, a key aspect of the ‘competence’ of emotional self-control resides in an individual knowing when to exer cise control, in calculating the right degree of control, and in knowing how to expre ss self- control ‘appropriately’. So in this sense, EI constitutes a reinvention of character such that it is bett er aligned to a new organisation of work: character which encompasses a broad range of skills to be developed as a lifetime project, but character which, by definition , is ‘flexible’, ‘adaptable’, open to individual nuance and to the ever-present change of the global market placeiv. Moreover, EI perfectly accommodates the shunning of depen dence that Sennett identifies: it embodies the meritocratic ideal that we are in contr ol of our own destinies at work and beyond. Goleman states, for example, that IQ might, at best, contribute: ‘… about 20 percent to the factors that determine life success, which le aves 80 percent to other forces’ (1996: 34), implying that other individual attributes --- including, 13 of course, our EI --- will account for the other 80%. Neither here nor later in Goleman’s work is there any consideration of how structural inequalities might determine s uccess in life. Indeed, drawing upon Goleman’s much-cited statistic, some subsequent authors take the short conceptual step of proposing that EI itself accounts for 80% of succes s at work, at school, or in personal relationships (see, for example, Pool 1997). EI as the Enchantment of Character As Yiannis Gabriel (2001) has observed, given Sennett’s acutely pessimistic readin g of the flexible workplace, it is surprising that the societies in which this form o f work organisation is dominant, particularly North America, have not thus far collapse d. Gabriel suggests that the work of George Ritzer might help provide an explanation in thi s connection. In Enchanting a Disenchanted World, Ritzer develops the thesis that consumption has come to be an increasingly important source of identity, meaning and fulfilment. His thesis is that a process of ‘re-enchantment’ (later writers, particu larly Bryman [1995; 1999; 2004] have developed the complementary notion of ‘Disneyization’) has been extended to more and more arenas of social life, such that even the most abstemious and utilitarian institutions become transformed into ‘cathedra ls of consumption’. Thus, following Gabriel’s complementary analysis of the work of Ritzer and Sennett, it can be understood that through a process of ‘re-enchantment’ present -day managers help fill the vacuum of identity, meaning and achievement that arises f rom the discontents of the present-day flexible workplace. As such, modern institutional networks 14 become oriented more towards the ‘fantasising consumer’ than the ‘toiling worker’ (Gabriel 2001: 4). Processes of re-enchantment involve a proliferation of the means by which almost every human experience comes to involve opportunities for consumption: through architectural configurations; hyperbolic image and sign; festival and spectacle. Both the ‘private’ and ‘public’ domains of social life become replete with openings into the seductive fantasy world of commercial extravaganza. Such developments, Ritzer suggests, are indicative of an ‘implosion’ of the boundaries between previously more separate entities --- spheres of social life, institutions, arenas of consumptio n, and so forth. For example, the boundaries between shopping and fun; purchasing and gamb ling; touring and consuming; educational settings and shopping malls; all become de- differentiated in relation to processes of re-enchantment. In fact, one could extend Ritzer’s arguments to an even more fundamental level; such that the rise of EI might be understood as part of a more general implosion of the means of consumption and the means of production. Taken as an intellectual development within the managerial literature, EI can be understood as part of a broader neo-human relations movement which focuses attention on the emotional conditions of labour: how we feel at work; the extent to which our work is pleasurable and ent ertaining --- a focus on how well we handle each other. When applied in practice, such ide as invite an ‘emotional customer-service’ orientation to intra-organisational exchanges whereb y employees are increasingly compelled to act simultaneously as ‘consumers’ and ‘producers’ (Gabriel & Lang 1995; Du Gay 1996; Rosenthal et al. 1997; Sturdy 1998). 15 Consider, for example, the following quotation in which the management theorist Mike Bagshaw speculates on what implications EI might have for the future of work: The future role of the management trainer may not just be to codify and disseminate knowledge effectively but also to entertain … [T]he manager’s role becomes one of human psychologist and facilitator where he/she guides people to find their own learning and sense of purpose… [the manager would] ensure the knowledge is gained in an entertaining way that harmonises any conflict between an individual’s and the organisation’s goals. Training companies, consultants and business schools may be forced to compete on how pleasurable, innovative and entertaining their teaching methods are… (Bagshaw 2000: 181--2). Bagshaw’s arguments here, particularly those concerning training consultants and business schools, may point towards more than just a speculative future. Indeed, they directly echo Ritzer’s concerns about the advent of ‘shopping mall high schools’ which , he suggests, need to be ‘fun’ in order to attract their student-consumers, and, like malls, are: ‘… places to meet friends, pass the time, get out of the rain, or watch the pro menade. Shopping malls or their high school equivalents can be entertaining places to on lookers with no intention of buying anything’ (1999: 142 original emphasis). In as far as this reading is correct, we can understand the reinvention of character as also invol ving the enchantment of character. Under the guise of EI, ‘character’ becomes a deployable human resource, one which is consumed and developed: our intra-organisational ‘cli ents’ are encouraged to ‘enjoy the show’ put on by the training department; the core enter prise 16 of management becomes the service of group harmony and increasingly encompasses the role of identity consultant. So EI involves a number of facets: it involves the re-invention, the redefinitio n, the enchantment, of ‘character’, whilst simultaneously attending to the short-termis t reality of the post-Fordist workplace. It classifies as ‘intelligent’, and morally s peaking, ‘good’, knowing how to handle oneself and others --- knowing when to move jobs, and so forth; whilst commodifying aspects of ‘character’, particularly those which relat e to self-discipline/the management of affect, and stylistically redefining these as competencies/resources which should be deployed at the right times. Character is therefore no longer understood simply as an ethical domain, a domain of moral wo rth; it is not so much about adhering to rigid and absolute principles, it resides in in dividual discretion --- the how and when of our actions, their appropriateness to any par ticular context within the flow of social life. EI and the Colonisation of Affect Thus locating the rise of EI as a managerial discourse within some of the proces ses identified by Sennett and Ritzer also serves here to highlight how EI might be l inked to changes in the control strategies pursued in organisations. EI can be understood as intrinsically related to a broader, well-documented, trend involving the increas ing corporate ‘colonisation’ (Casey 1995) of worker subjectivity and affect through the adoption of normative control strategies (Hochschild 1983; Kunda 1992; Fineman 1 993; Putnam & Mumby 1993; Grey 1996; Fineman & Sturdy 1997; Strangleman and Roberts 17 1999; Wilson 1999; Grugulis et al. 2000). Even in the absence of any explicit ap peal to the concept of EI, demands for the individually-nuanced presentation and managem ent of affect, knowing how to handle oneself, have been shown to figure prominently in such control systems. Grugulis et al.’s (2000) analysis of ConsultancyCo is a particula rly useful illustration in this connection. Grugulis et al. explore how, as ConsultancyCo underwent rapid expansion, management aimed to institutionalise the simple, personal control of the foundin g owner through culture management techniques which included a range of practices: weeke nd outings (with invites extended to employees’ families); sports contests; mufti day s; a range of activities involving fancy dress; discos; and so on (2000: 102). They s uggest that participation in such ‘socials’ was only notionally voluntary: ‘… employees were expected to want to participate and to actively enjoy themselves when they did’ (2 000: 103). Such events, often held outside of ‘office hours’ effectively blurred, or to u se Ritzer’s language, imploded, the distinction not just between work time and non-wo rk time, but work activities and non-work activities --- between work and leisure ( 2000: 104). First on the list of principles/directives that make up ConsultancyCo’s ‘culture statement’ is the sentence: ‘Have fun and enjoy work’ (2000: 104). The list also inclu des ‘Always put the client first; make quality a part of everything we do; share knowl edge with others; work as a team; develop your full potential; make decisions; take o wnership and resolve problems; learn from mistakes without fear’ (2000: 104). It would seem that Bagshaw’s vision of the enchanted, EI, ‘entertaining office’ of the future has already 18 been realised. Indeed, in ConsultancyCo we can find examples of very real ‘Disneyization’: [ConsultancyCo’s] directors were clear about the type of behaviours required and enterprising in their efforts at seeking them out. Every year the company’s graduate open day was planned to coincide with Red Nose Day with the result that interested undergraduates arrived to find most of the office in fancy dress. Life sized versions of Mickey Mouse, bunny girls and teddy bears ran round the office, playing pranks and waving collection buckets at their colleagu es, while interviews would be conducted with the interviewers still in costume (2000 : 106). For employees at ConsultancyCo, the rules of work involved implicitly understanding ‘the ‘people’ way of doing things’ (2000: 111) --- knowing how to handle yourself and others was implicitly written into the employment contract. As the above quotation also helps to demonstrate, the recruitment team at ConsultancyCo activ ely sought out gregarious and energetic individuals who would be comfortable with participating in the organisation’s characteristic, highly-‘social’, agenda. Operating within Goleman’s framework of EI, such ‘desirable’ characteristics could easily be conceptually translated into those which are ‘intelligent’. Indeed, Goleman’s model of the emotionally intelligent male ‘pure type’, for example, refers t o individuals who are ‘… socially poised, outgoing and cheerful, not prone to fearfuln ess or worried rumination. They have a notable capacity for commitment to people or cau ses. 19 Their emotional life is rich, but appropriate; they are comfortable with themsel ves, others, and the social universe they live in’ (1996: 45). Other examples of the practice of ‘organisational fit’ (Kanter 1977) can be found, for example, in the work of Grey (1994, 1998); Nickson et al. (2001); and indeed , in the literature on emotional labour, including the classic work of Hochschild (1983). Robertson and Swan (2003: 845--6) recount the case of ‘Universal’ where, once again without any direct reference to notions of EI, prospective employees needed to demonstrate at interview ‘… not only their expertise but importantly their individua lity and strength of character’ (2003: 846 emphasis added). These authors found it diff icult to elucidate the ‘particular type’ that typified a consultant at Universal since dre ss codes, behaviours, and values varied significantly; nonetheless, successful candidates, like those at ConsultancyCo, had exhibited the characteristics which meant they were deemed to be ‘one of us’ (2003: 846). In this sense EI can be understood as an exemplar of a more general trend in which the rules of work involve implicit demands upon, and expectations of, emot ional and moral character: on the one hand the rules are that there are no rules, ‘just relax’, ‘be yourself’; but the absence of any explicit rules open up the possibilities for dif ferent kinds of control: employees are compelled to ‘fit in’, be ‘one of us’, and to do so in a manne r which is ‘appropriate’, ‘intelligent’. EI, Resistance and Employee Subjectivity 20 Grugulis et al. are keen to point out that the employees of ConsultancyCo were n ot ‘cultural dopes’. Senior management could not simply furnish the corporate culture w ith whichever values, emotions and behavioural characteristics it desired (Anthony 1 994; Grugulis et al. 2000: 98). There was, indeed, very real and tangible evidence of goodwill, a pleasant informality that was not merely rhetorical (2000: 98; 108). Employees were, on the whole, willing participants in ConsultancyCo’s social agenda. However, in p art, this might be explained by ConsultancyCo’s rigorous recruitment and selection poli cy. Furthermore, while the culture management techniques exemplified in the case of ConsultancyCo may appear to be in many ways similar to earlier corporate attempt s to steer the moral character of employees (such as those observed in Ford by Beynon [1973]), they differ from such attempts in their emphasis on ‘workplace participat ion to the exclusion of all else’ (2000: 99). Consequently, Grugulis et al. propose, it b ecomes more difficult for employees to sustain boundaries between home and work as mana gerial control is increasingly extended to encompass the totality of employees’ lives (20 00: 112). In this way, ConsultancyCo combines a substantial degree of discretion ove r work with increased regulation, particularly in the colonisation of employees’ ‘private’ activities (2000: 99, 100). Similarly, in the case of Universal, role ambiguity and autonomy over work loads on the one hand, was ultimately set against an elaborat e, and seemingly anomalous, performance management system on the other (Robertson and Swan 2003: 843; see also Scarbrough 1999; Lowendahl 1997). Employees at ConsultancyCo and Universal were compelled to live their emotional lives at work (Hughes 2003). Their identities, self-narratives, source s of meaning, were inextricably connected with their employment. Such present-day 21 techniques of ‘character formation’ (Grugulis et al. 2000: 99) through culture management might, therefore, involve the risk that employees are unable to devel op identities separate from the workplace. Indeed, such concerns have been expresse d directly regarding the institutional practice of EI. For example, Cullinane and Pye (2001) argue that EI involves a set of competencies that are understood to be expressiv e of an employee’s total identity, such that attempts to maintain a sense of self separate from the organisationally-imposed normative identity --- attempts to develop protective o uter- countenances, self-distancing strategies, and so forth --- carry the risk of app earing emotionally ‘unintelligent’, ‘incompetent, immature, misguided, stunted or even suffer ing from some form of personality disorder or neurosis’ (2001: 10) v. When understood as part of a more general shift in the control strategies employed by organisations, the rise of EI may thus signal a further move towards more totalizing regimes of organisational domination in which employee identity becom es effectively subsumed within the workplace and opportunities for resistance are g reatly limited. Such an interpretation would, indeed, find support in a well-establishe d body of sociological literature (for example, Ray 1986; Du Gay 1991, 1993; Deetz 1992; K unda 1992; Barley & Kunda 1992; Barker 1993, 1999; Willmott 1993; Casey 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999). However, more recently, particularly since Thompson and Ackroyd’s (1995) article, there has been somewhat of a resurgence of interest in exploring opportunities for resistance against such controls (Fleming and Sewell 2002); pa rtly through redefining resistance, and through looking for its new sites, forms and modalities (for example, Jermier et al. 1994; Edwards et al. 1995; Gabriel 1999, 2001; Knig hts and 22 McCabe 2000; Sturdy and Fineman 2001; Fleming and Sewell 2002; Fleming and Spice r 2003). Fleming and Sewell’s work is a particularly interesting case in point. These authors introduce the concept of ‘Svejkism’ a term derived from the leading characte r of Jaroslav Hasek’s (1973) novel, The Good Solider, Svejk, to refer to new modalities of resistance which can emerge even within regimes of enculturation as discussed ab ove. Fleming and Sewell first explore how traditional forms of resistance such as go- slows, working to rule, and union action more generally, have become less viable in rel ation to the ideological incorporation that has accompanied the shift towards the use of normative control strategies within organisations. Where traditional forms of corporate co ntrol involved a degree of mutual understanding between employees and employers along the lines of ‘OK, so we pay our workers a low wage but, in return, we turn a blind eye to petty pilfering and gold-bricking, up to a point’ (Fleming & Sewell 2002: 860, her e paraphrasing Mars 1982), under controls via commitment more than simple complian ce, such accommodation becomes less possible. They write, ‘One may expect exclamations such as: ‘Strike? Why do you want to strike? We’re all in this together. We’re all fri ends now. We’re part of a family!’ (2002: 860--861). Moreover, Fleming and Sewell suggest , any form of dissent against the inequality of capitalist labour process is likel y to be pathologised as an individual failing: ‘‘Are you stressed?’ ‘Do you have financial problems?’ ‘Do you suffer from anorexia?’ Thus, the question is invariably framed in t he same way: ‘What’s wrong with you?’’ (2002: 861). Here Fleming and Sewell’s arguments lend support to those of Cullinane and Pye (discussed earlier). Indeed , EI would seem to extend the possibility for the pathologisation of resistance and o pposition. 23 With its purported natural and social scientific underpinnings, EI makes claims to a scientific legitimacy and authority which may be harder to resist, harder to dis miss as mere ‘managerial rhetoric’ (Hughes 2003; Fineman 2004). Nonetheless, Fleming and Sewell propose, rather than marking an end to all possibilities for dissent and transgression, normative organisational control st rategies shift the sites of resistance such that they include the ‘contested terrain’ (Edward s 1979) of employee subjectivity itself (Fleming and Sewell 2002: 863). Even in the abse nce of an explicit ‘class consciousness’, employees might pursue a range of strategies of ‘scrimshanking’ and ‘flannelling’. Such activities might include an employee’s apparently wholehearted participation in, or affirmation of, organisational acts of ‘routinised enchantment’ (Bailey 1993 in Fleming & Sewell 2002: 868). A Svejk might seemingly embrace organisational initiatives aimed at enhancing quality and serv ice with such ostensible zeal --- for example, cramming the suggestion box full of not co mpletely useless offerings --- that management may be forced to question the wisdom of su ch measures themselves (2002: 868). Similarly, a Svejk might adopt an ironical disp osition, whereby, through the feigning of ignorance, she or he may seek to expose the shortcomings and banality of a managerial argument (2002: 868). We might also envisage such modes of resistance being employed in relation to the institutional practice of EI. Below, for example, Goleman describes the proc ess by which, through building on the competency of emotional self awareness, consultan ts working within the Lincoln motor company instituted a programme of ‘unlearning defensive habits of conversation’ (1998: 292): 24 The method is simple: Instead of arguing, the parties agree to mutually explore the assumptions that undergird their points of view. A classic example o f how people jump to conclusions is when you see someone yawn in a meeting, leap to the assumption that he is bored, and then skip to the more damaging overgeneralization that he doesn’t care about the meeting, anyone else’s thoughts, or the entire project… Once these hidden assumptions surface, they can be tested against reality by talking about them. For instance, we may discover the yawn was not from boredom but rather exhaustion due to getting up in the night with a cranky infant (1998: 292--3). On first sight, such a practice would appear to constitute an extension of managerial surveillance and control to the level of personal feeling, and a furt her dissolution of the boundaries between ‘private’ and ‘working’ life. But equally, such a practice opens up the possibilities for exposing tensions, cracks, and disharmon y in the ‘organisational family’ --- albeit in the service of the emotional honesty that has been solicited. Through the practice of emotionally intelligent ‘flannelling’ (Fleming an d Sewell 2002), employees would be presented with the opportunity to ‘start a fire’ of corporate infighting, to expose managerial failings, and to otherwise express di ssent through wholehearted participation in the culture management programme. And here in lies a significant point: in opening the doors to emotional honesty, such emotio nally intelligent workplaces may actually enhance the scope for new forms of resistanc e. As Gabriel (2001) has argued, we may need to rethink our guiding metaphor in rel ation to the present-day context of organisational controls. The iron cage of rationality , he 25 suggests, has increasingly been replaced with a ‘glass cage’ of total exposure (of o ur behaviour, our values, indeed, our emotions): to the gaze of management, consume rs, fellow employees. That the cage is glass draws upon Foucault’s image of the Panopt icon --- it invokes an acknowledgement of the bewildering array of surveillance techn iques and technologies deployed by modern management --- but the reference to glass al so serves to highlight the fragility of normative control systems. As Gabriel sugge sts, the bondage of continuous exposure, paradoxically, greatly enhances our capacities t o subvert and disrupt organisational practice. We are presented with opportunities to show up our ‘corporate parents’, he writes: ‘… a video camera surreptitiously smuggled into a sweat-shop can shatter a company’s image and undo the work of millions of dollars of advertising, a leaked internal memo can virtually demolish a corporate colossus, and a small band of environmental activists acting tactically in front of television c ameras can bring a multinational to its feet’ (2001: 10). Indeed, Grugulis et al. cite the ex ample of an employee who used the launch of a client’s web page as an opportunity to attack pu blicly both ConsultancyCo and the client corporation itself (2000: 110). Perhaps unsurp risingly, the employee was dismissed. Rethinking Resistance: The Case of EI As this example from Grugulis et al. also serves to demonstrate, while the scope for employee resistance and opposition might be considerably enhanced by the advent of the ‘glass cage’, such acts of sabotage are likely to be severely sanctioned. Where Flem ing and Sewell’s work is of particular value is in highlighting forms of resistance wh ich are 26 positioned in such a way that they escape detection, or provide management with no legitimate comeback. Following Kondo (1990) and Edwards et al. (1995) among othe rs, Fleming and Sewell are careful to avoid confining their definition of resistance only to conscious, heroic, formal, organised acts (2002: 862). They quite rightly wish t o avoid employing a transcendental arbiter by which to distinguish ‘legitimate’ or ‘real’ acts o f resistance from ‘false’ ones. This, in part, stems from an attempt to understand act s of resistance which do not stem directly from overt class struggle (2002: 863). Ind eed, it would be problematic to limit understandings of resistance solely to conscious a cts of opposition to capitalist authority. And equally, it is problematic to view resis tance as residing solely in the sphere of work. Resistance is not a zero-sum ‘object’, not a ‘thing’ as such, it is an aspect of power relationships, and not just those between employees and employers: it may also be found in the relationships between spouses; between teachers and students; betwe en parents and children. Even within the workplace itself, we may also encounter re sistance against domination from fellow employees --- horizontal resistance --- as well a s resistance of managerial domination. Indeed, managers themselves can also assume a subject position in relation to capital, and as such, be submitted to enculturat ion and surveillance (Watson 1994; Parker 1995; Du Gay 1996; Gabriel 1999). Moreover, resistance might not be the only source of employee agency. Following the work o f Edwards et al. (1995) Fleming and Sewell (2002), focus exclusively on how throug h transgression, albeit exercised through a seeming compliance with corporate norm s, employees are able to find any scope for agency. However, as the case of EI sugg ests, agency may be exercised even in a genuine, uncynical collusion with corporate pr actice. 27 EI might be deployed to draw attention to an employee’s negative emotional experie nces at work, the extent to which an employee is, say bullied by a peer, is unhappy, or neglected. As Fineman suggests, EI potentially ‘… challenges the dominant model of rationality in organizational effectiveness and, in doing so, exposes some of th e traditional organizational oppressions which have emotional underpinnings and consequences --- such as sexism, harassment, lack of compassion, prejudice and exploitation’ (2000: 112). In doing so, EI highlights a new form of rationality -- - emotions cannot be unchecked, they are new informants of our world, new ways of looking, new skills for the maintenance of self/other control. While the scope f or such philanthropical utility might be substantially restricted by, ultimately, the us e of EI in relation to a productivity agenda, it nonetheless serves to highlight the possib ilities for employee agency through means other than transgression. In this sense, the insti tutional practice of EI has the potential to allow for the legitimate expression of emoti onally- constituted, resistant feelings of workers, which themselves may arise from the very normative control system of which EI forms an integral part. Rather than ‘interrup tions to the flow of work’ (Sturdy and Fineman 2001: 137), such feelings might thus be expr essed as an integral part of work. On being invited to bring their emotions to work, employees thus might become more vulnerable, potentially more normatively incorporated, more open to emotion al surveillance, but also potentially more able to exercise agency through subscrib ing to the very same managerial rationality to which they are subject. That is to say, in t he name of ‘how I feel at work’, ‘how I am treated by others’ I am also able to make my own emotional demands on the workplace. And while my acts of resistance, or my lack of 28 involvement or participation might be pathologised as a personal failing, an incompetence, or worse, some psychological disorder, so also might be my ‘manager’s. Moreover, again returning to the arguments of Sennett, the organisational practi ce of teamworking can lead to a proliferation of de-layered roles, such that ‘real’ aut hority becomes obscured: the title ‘manager’ itself may no longer be an unequivocal or reli able indicator of positioning within an organisational control--command structure. An d even such structures themselves are not unambiguous. Modern institutional networks of the type to which Sennett refers involve highly complex chains of authority, or perh aps better, power balances, tensions, and struggles, which run both hierarchically a nd horizontally, not simply as part of structural designs to obfuscate authority, b ut as commercial responses to global market changes. The equation that enculturation, or normative control, is something that ‘managers do to employees’, and something that ‘employees resist against’ is in this sense problematic. While Sennett might be righ t to suggest that teamworking leads to a position whereby managers, perhaps we might say ‘real’ managers (though it would be problematic to do so), have power without responsibility, teamworking equally involves a profusion of management roles whi ch involve responsibility with relatively little ‘power’. Paradoxically, under the very managerial rhetoric of EI, a decline in organisational productivity might be con strued as an individual failing --- as residing in the personal deficiencies as a ‘people pe rson’ of even the most ‘senior’ of ‘managers’. The question remains however, of whether in their potential sanctioning of the emotional display of fear, anxiety, frustration, an ger, and so forth --- and in proscribing modes of emotional expression deemed as organisatio nally ‘appropriate’ --- EI-based control systems might effectively subsume resistant worke r 29 agency such that it is performative, but rarely transformative. To paraphrase Gr ugulis et al. (2000: 113) the institutional practice of EI is liable neither to release em ployees from alienating regulations, nor invariably deny employees any scope for agency --- i t might offer simultaneously greater freedoms in some respects, and greater tendencies t owards domination in others. Thus, this is definitely not to suggest that ‘the new rules of work’ enshrined explicitly in the discourse of EI might herald the demise of power inequalities and industrial conflict within the workplace. The extent to which EI might in practi ce be harnessed to serve the interests of both labour and capital remains to be seen. And it is this connection that Sennett’s portrayal of the contemporary workplace might be misleading. Sennett is somewhat equivocal on the persistence of industrial confl ict within the workplaces he describes, and ultimately his arguments appear to rest upon un itarist assumptions. For example, his conclusion that the ills of the modern capitalist workplace can only be addressed through mutual identification appears to be premised upon the notion that employers and labour can ultimately work as ‘partners, not rivals’ (Char les 1973: 263; Fox 1974: 256). Indeed, while authority might be obscured within the modern capitalist workplaces Sennett describes (and which have been the focus of this p aper) conflict and inequality nonetheless remainvi. Accordingly, some employees or man agers will inevitably have considerably more access to power resources than others and will thus be better positioned to arbitrate between what behaviours, displays, attrib utes, and so forth are understood to be emotionally ‘intelligent’ or ‘unintelligent’. Similarly, ther e remains a role for organised labour in the EI workplace: Sturdy and Fineman (200 1) illustrate, for example, how in the US and the UK, trade unions have endeavoured to 30 expose the ‘managerial causes’ of worker stress, and the moral tendency of managemen t to mask these by blaming individual employees for their emotional mismanagement (2001: 147)--- or, by analytic extension here, for their lack of ‘emotional intell igence’. Furthermore, from reading Sennett one gets the impression that the disenchanted flexible workplace is ubiquitous, from Ritzer that re-enchantment is endemic, an d from Gabriel that ‘glass cages’ have all but replaced iron cages. As suggested in the introduction to this paper, however, such trends are considerably more pervasive in some industrial sectors and some organisational forms than in others. There remains considerable debate as to the degree to which the flexible, normatively-controll ed workplace is widespread, and indeed whether such controls are actually replacing , or emerging as complimentary to, their bureaucratic counterparts (see, for example, Van Maanen and Kunda 1989; Kärreman and Alvesson 2004). Even within the workplaces described in this paper, EI is likely to have considerably more significance for some employees than for others: Goleman himself recognises that EI-based competencies matter most for those employees at the apex of organisations, whereas IQ and tec hnical skills are more important determinants of success at lower levels of the corpora te hierarchy (Goleman et al. 2002: 250). Conclusion In many ways, EI ostensibly looks to be ‘old wine in new bottles’ (Woodruffe 2000: 2 9); it echoes the rhetoric of managerial fads such as sensitivity training groups (T -groups), encounter groups, transactional analysis, corporate culture, and so forth. Indee d, Goleman 31 himself would be the first to recognise that the EI competencies he identifies h ave in fact been known and used for at least two decades (Goleman 2001: 51). Goleman stylist ically positions EI not so much as a solution, but as an explanation, ‘a fresh way to und erstand’ the traits that matter most (2001: 51). The real newness of EI resides in its ‘rhe torical force’ (Fineman 2000: 112), its authority, its scientific weight. The use of the t erm ‘intelligence’ itself implies an arbiter which is not negotiated --- a standard not just of performance at work but of a person in the totality, a measure based on ‘science’ no t on corporate policy. This authority, it has been argued, may make EI as a system of normative controls significantly harder to resist, and yet, simultaneously, EI m ay open up new possibilities for resistant worker agency since, it has been suggested, EI a t once combines greater emotional regulation with greater discretion over the display a nd management of emotionsvii. This paper has argued that the sociological significance of EI resides not simpl y in the concept itself, and in its specific applications, but also in the broader processes that it exemplifies. A parallel can be drawn here with Bryman’s (1999; 2004) distinctio n between Disneyfication (as both the spread of the Disney brand itself and the homogenisation of products produced under the Disney label) and Disneyization (a s the spread of the principles and practices exemplified by Disney). In the present di scussion, EI has been considered as both a specific managerial discourse and as an exempla r of ‘new rules of work’, rules which involve a range of processes reaching far beyond th e specific ideas related to EI. Such processes include (1) the ‘coming out’ (Fineman 2 000: 107; Hughes 2003) of emotions on an unprecedented scale within the workplace; (2 ) the resurrection of the idea that ‘good work’ equates to ‘good moral character’, partly 32 through a redefinition of character such that it attuned to the transient indefi nite flux of a flexible workplace; and in relation to this, (3) the emergence of the idea that the new rules of work involve the notion that there are no rules, there is just ‘appropria teness’, ‘intelligence’, ‘discretion’; but this apparent absence of rules is in fact premised upo n a proliferation of implicit norms and behavioural mores embodied in elaborate cult ure management systems. This paper has suggested that the case of EI serves to highlight the dialectical tensions inherent in normative control systems: between, on the on hand, the ced ing of certain constraints and, simultaneously, on the other, the expansion of new form s of control. Using the case of EI as an illustration, the paper has raised the possi bility of resistant employee agency exercised within such control contexts through an uncy nical collusion with managerial discourse, and of resistance itself as relational and multifaceted: as a simultaneously emotional, political, and rational phenomenon. Indeed, under the specific discourse of EI the emotional itself is rendered rational, em otions are deemed to matter not because it is morally or ethically right to consider them, but because they are what determine personal and corporate success. How well we are handled at work, even by our managers, becomes a matter of productivity not philanthropy, o f managerial competence, not simply of corporate policy. However, equally it has b een argued, in effectively authorising the expression of resistant worker feelings, EI presents the scope to subsume these within the very control system in response to which s uch feelings might be generated. Ultimately, the issues raised in this paper beg for empirical research into how the ‘rules of work’ exemplified in the discourse of EI are actuall y enacted, received, negotiated, deployed, and re-colonised within different kinds of 33 workplaces and by different parties; indeed, a core aim of this paper has been t o establish this as a problem for further sociological investigation. Finally, it has been argued that EI points towards an increasing focus upon specific kinds of emotional display and management as criteria for selection, re cruitment, development, and promotion. The case of EI thus lends support to the idea that r egimes of emotional control are becoming increasingly institutionalised and sophisticat ed (Sturdy and Fineman 2001: 135). However, beyond this, it has been suggested that the ‘new rules’ embedded in EI can also be understood as indicative of a response to the moral vacuity of the post-Fordist workplace: as embodying a reinvention of ‘charac ter’ as reflexive, ‘intelligent’ and as residing within the realm of individual discretion. Character, under this new guise, resides not so much in the adherence to absolut e moral principles, but in an individual’s performance in responding to the flow of workin g life. As such EI might be viewed as an archetype of how ‘character’ is being transformed, ‘enchanted’, rather than corroded, within some, but by no means all, sectors of the contemporary workplace. Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank the three anonymous referees and the editor of this j ournal for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. He would also like to thank Kahryn Hughes, Nick Jewson, David Ashton and Alan Felstead for their insight and advice. 34 Notes i This paper focuses on the work of Daniel Goleman because it constitutes the ‘ver sion’ of emotional intelligence that is most likely to be received and applied by prac titioners in the workplace. Goleman is by far the most popular and influential writer on the topic, but there is substantial critique of his work from others in the academic community, particularly regarding his claims concerning EI’s predictive value and its fixity/ capacity to be developed (see, for example, Mayer et al. 2000; Mayer & Cobb 2000; Hein 20 03). There is considerable debate over the very ‘competencies’ that could be said to cons titute emotional intelligence (Davies et al. 1998; Mayer et al. 1999; Ciarrochi et al. 2000; Ashkanasy et al. 2002); and over measuring these (Davies et al. 1998; Ashkanasy et al. 2002). Indeed, there is extensive debate concerning the conceptual validity of E I more generally (see, for example, Sternberg and Kaufman 1998; Davies et al. 1998; Sch utte et al. 1998; Abraham 1999; Huy 1999; Sternberg 2001). ii Elsewhere (Hughes 2003) I have explored the extent to which EI can be underst ood to constitute a proliferation of demands for emotional labour (Hochschild 1979; 198 3), and considered the rise of EI in relation to processes of informalisation (Wouters 1 977; 1986) and civilisation (Elias 2000). Here I wish to consider other analytical possibil ities and attend to a different, though complimentary, set of concerns. iii This is not to suggest that, by contrast, Goleman views the ‘new rules of work’ as arising solely from the impact of EI research. For example, in The New Leaders (Goleman et al. 2002), Goleman and his colleagues describe research into nearly 500 existing competence models from companies such as IBM, Lucent, PepsiCo, and Brit ish 35 Airways which revealed that (what he would recognise as) EI-based competencies consistently ‘emerged as the reason for [the] effectiveness’ of ‘star performers’ (2002: 250). In other words, Goleman and his colleagues are suggesting that, according to this research, many large corporations have already ‘realised for themselves’ the importa nce of emotional competencies, independent of any intervention from the EI consultan cy industry. iv As has been argued elsewhere (Hughes 2003), this apparent ‘relaxation’ of social sanctions on behaviour --- the emphasis of EI on individual discretion over the ‘p layful’ and ‘flexible’ deployment and expression of emotions --- does not, in fact, constitu te a decline in social demands for self-restraint, but rather, a change in the form t hat such demands take, and perhaps even an intensification of such demands. v Goleman, in fact, argues against the blurring of boundaries between ‘work life’ an d ‘private life’ which, he suggests, is itself indicative of poor emotional competence (1998: 287). His intention, he writes, is definitely not to advocate making the workpla ce a kind of nightmarish ‘emotional salon’ (1998: 287). Nonetheless, he never adequately resol ves the inherent conflict of on the one hand arguing in favour of keeping our emotio nal ‘private’ lives ‘separate’, whilst on the other drawing our attention toward the inevita ble influence of our emotional ‘private’ lives at work (Hughes 2003). vi It is not so much that Sennett is not aware of ‘new structures of power and con trol’ within the flexible workplace he describes (1998: 47), it is more that such stru ctures are understood to be obfuscated --- perhaps consequently, the industrial conflict ar ising from such structures does not figure prominently in his analysis: it is, that is to s ay, stylistically rendered as ‘invisible’. 36 vii Paradoxically, however, the more EI has moved from the realms of academia to the workplace, the more it has lost its acceptance by the scientific community. 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