CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Monism

CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Monism
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Monism
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(From the Greek
monos
, "one", "alone", "unique").
Monism is a
philosophical
term which, in its various meanings, is opposed to
Dualism
or Pluralism. Wherever pluralistic philosophy distinguishes a multiplicity of things, Monism denies that the manifoldness is real, and holds that the apparently many are phases, or phenomena, of a one. Wherever
dualistic
philosophy distinguishes between body and
soul
, matter and spirit, object and subject, matter and force, the system which denies such a distinction, reduces one term of the antithesis to the other, or merges both in a higher unity, is called Monism.
In metaphysics
The ancient
Hindu
philosophers
stated as a fundamental
truth
that the world of our sense-experience is all illusion (
maya
), that change, plurality, and
causation
are not real, that there is but one reality,
God
. This is metaphysical Monism of the
idealistic-spiritual
type, tending towards
mysticism
Among the early Greek
philosophers
, the Eleatics, starting, like the
Hindus
, with the conviction that sense-knowledge is untrustworthy, and reason alone reliable, reached the conclusion that change, plurality, and origination do not really exist, that Being is one, immutable, and eternal. They did not explicitly identify the one reality with
God
, and were not, so far as we
know
, inclined to
mysticism
. Their Monism, therefore, may be said to be of the
purely idealistic
type.
These two forms of metaphysical Monism recur frequently in the history of
philosophy
; for instance, the idealistic-spiritual type in
neo-Platonism
and in
Spinoza's
metaphysics
, and the purely idealistic type in the rational absolutism of
Hegel
Besides idealistic Monism there is Monism of the materialistic type, which proclaims that there is but one reality, namely, matter, whether matter be an agglomerate of atoms, a primitive, world-forming substance (see
ONIAN
CHOOL OF
HILOSOPHY
), or the so-called cosmic nebula out of which the world evolved.
There is another form of metaphysical Monism, represented in these days by Haeckel and his followers, which, though materialistic in its scope and tendency, professes to transcend the point of view of materialistic Monism and unite both matter and mind in a higher something. The weak point of all metaphysical Monism is its inability to explain how, if there is but one reality, and everything else is only apparent there can be any real changes in the world, or real relations among things. This difficulty is met in
dualistic
systems of
philosophy
by the
doctrine
of
matter
and form, or
potency and actuality
, which are the ultimate realities in the metaphysical order. Pluralism rejects the solution offered by scholastic
dualism
and strives, with but little success, to oppose to Monism its own theory of synechism or
panpsychism
(see
RAGMATISM
). The chief objection to materialistic Monism is that it stops short of the point where the real problem of
metaphysics
begins.
In theology
The term
Monism
is not much used in
theology
because of the confusion to which its use would lead.
Polytheism
, the
doctrine
that there are many gods, has for its opposite
Monotheism
, the
doctrine
that there is but one
God
. If the term Monism is employed in place of
Monotheism
, it may, of course, mean Theism, which is a
monotheistic
doctrine
, or it may mean
Pantheism
, which is opposed to theism. In this sense of the term, as a synonym for
Pantheism
, Monism maintains that there is no real distinction between
God and the universe
. Either
God
is indwelling in the
universe
as a part of it, not distinct from it (
pantheistic
Immanentism), or the
universe
does not exist at all as a reality (Acosmism), but only as a manifestation or phenomenon of
God
. These views are vigorously combated by Theism, not only on considerations of
logic
and philosophy, but also on considerations of
human
life
and conduct. For the
ethical
implications of
pantheism
are as detrimental to it as its shortcomings from the point of view of consistency and reasonableness. Theism does not deny that
God
is indwelling in the
universe
; but it does deny that He is comprised in the
universe
. Theism does not deny that the
universe
is a manifestation of
God
; but it does deny that the
universe
has no reality of its own. Theism is, therefore,
dualistic
: it holds that
God
is a reality distinct from the
universe
and independent of it, and that the
universe
is a reality distinct from
God
, though not independent of Him. From another point of view, theism is monistic; it maintains that there is but One Supreme Reality and that all other reality is derived from Him.
Monism
is not then an adequate equivalent of the term
Theism
In psychology
The central problem of rational
psychology
is the question of the relation between
soul
and body.
Scholastic
dualism
, following
Aristotle
, maintains, that man is one substance, composed of body and
soul
, which are respectively
matter
and form. The
soul
is the principle of life, energy, and perfection; the body is the principle of decay, potentiality, and imperfection. These two are not complete substances: their union is not accidental, as
Plato
thought, but substantial. They are, of course, really distinct, and even separable; yet they act on each other and react. The
soul
, even in its highest functions, needs the co-operation, at least extrinsic, of the body, and the body in all its vital functions is energized by the
soul
as the radical principle of those functions. They are not so much two in one as two forming one compound. In popular
imagination
this
dualism
may be exaggerated; in the mind of the extreme ascetic it sometimes is exaggerated to the point of placing a too sharp contrast between "the flesh" and "the spirit", "the beast" and "the angel", in us.
Psychological Monism tends to obliterate all distinction between body and
soul
. This it does in one of three ways.
(A) Monism of the materialistic type reduces the
soul
to matter or material conditions, and thus, in effect, denies that there is any distinction between
soul
and body. The
Stoics
described the
soul
as a part of the material world-substance; the
Epicureans
held that it is a compound of material atoms; modern
Materialism
knows no substantial
soul
except the nervous system; Cabanis, for instance, proclaims his materialism in the well-known Crude formula: "The brain digests impressions, and organically secretes thought."
Psychological
materialism, as metaphysical materialism, closes its eyes to those phenomena of the
soul
which it cannot explain, or even denies that such phenomena exist.
(B) Monism of the idealistic type takes an entirely opposite course. It reduces the body to mind or
mental
conditions. Some of the
neo-Platonists
held that all matter is non-existent, that our body is, therefore, an
error
on the part of our minds, and that the
soul
alone is the
personality
John
Scotus Eriugena
, influenced by the
neo-Platonists
, held the body to be a resultant from incorporeal qualities which the
soul
, by thinking them and synthesizing them, creates into a body for itself. In modern times, Berkeley included the human body in his general denial of the reality of matter, and maintained that there are no substances except the
soul
and
God
. The grounds for this
belief
are
epistemological
Psychological
Monism runs counter to common sense and experience. Historically, it is a reaction against materialism. To refute materialism it is not
necessary
to deny that the body is a reality. The unreflecting
dualism
of common sense and the scientific
dualism
which the
Scholastics
built on the facts of experience steer a safe and consistent course between the hasty generalization of the
Materialist
, who sees nothing but body, and the bold paradox of the Idealist, who recognizes no reality except mind.
(C) A third kind of
psychological
Monism goes by the name of psychophysical parallelism. It maintains two principles, the one negative and the other affirmative. First, it denies categorically that there is, or can be, any direct causal influence of the
soul
on the body or of the body on the
soul
: our thoughts cannot produce the movements of our muscles, neither can the action of light on the retina produce in us the "thought" of a colour. Secondly, it affirms in some shape or form that both the body and the
soul
are phases of something else, that this something evolves its activities along two parallel lines, the physical and the psychical, so that the thought, for instance, of moving my hand is synchronous with the motion of my hand, without one in any way influencing the other. This is the
doctrine
of Occasionalists who, like
Malebranche
, maintain that the union of the
soul
and body "consists in a mutual and natural correspondence of the thoughts of the
soul
with the processes of the brain, and of the emotions of the
soul
with the movements of the animal spirits" (Rech. de la Vérité, II, v). It is the
doctrine
of
Spinoza
, whose metaphysical Monism compelled him to hold that body and
soul
are merely aspects of the one substance,
God
, under the attributes extension and thought, but that they unfold their modes of activity in a manner preordained to correspondence (Eth., II, ii, schol.). Leibniz meets the difficulty in his own characteristic way by teaching that all
monads
are partly material and partly immaterial, and that among all
monads
and their activities there exists a pre-established harmony (see
EIBNIZ
ONAD
). In the so-called
Identitätsphilosophic
of some German Transcendentalists, such as Schelling, reality is mind in so far as it is active, and matter in so far as it is passive; mind and matter are, therefore, two harmonious, but independent, series of phases of reality. Fechner's view is similar: he holds that the reality pervading the whole
universe
is at once physical and psychical, that the physical is the "exterior" and the psychical the "interior", or "inner", side of reality, and that the body and
soul
in man are but one instance of a parellelism which prevails everywhere in nature. Paulsen ("Introd. to Phil.", tr. Thilly, 87 sqq.) holds that "two propositions are contained in the theory of parallelism: (I) Physical processes are never effects of psychical processes; (2) Psychical processes are never effects of physical processes." He adopts Fechner's
panpsychism
, maintaining that "everything corporeal points to something else, an inner, intelligible element, a being for itself, which is akin to what we experience within ourselves". Both the corporeal and the "inner" are parts of the universal system, which is the body of
God
, and, though they do not interact, they act in such a way that harmony results.
Herbert Spencer uses the word
parallelism
in a slightly different sense: the separate impressions of the senses and the stream of inner conscious states must be adjusted by the activity of the mind, if the two series are to be of any use to the developing or evolving animal or man; that is, there must be a parallelism between a certain physical evolution and the correlative psychical evolution" (Principles of Psych., n. 179), while both mind and matter are mere "symbols of some form of Power absolutely and forever unknown to us" (op. cit., n. 63). This
idea
finds favour among the evolutionists generally, and has one distinct advantage: it obviates the necessity of explaining many phenomena of mind which could not be accounted for by the principles of materialistic evolution. Thus, under the name "double-aspect theory" it is adopted by Clifford, Bain, Lewes, and Huxley. Among empirical
psychologists
parallelism has been found satisfactory as a "working hypothesis". Experience, it is maintained, tells us nothing of a substantial
soul
that acts on the body and is acted upon. It does tell us, however, that psychical states are apparently conditioned by bodily states, and that states of body apparently influence states of mind. For the purposes of
science
, conclude the empiricists, it is enough to maintain as an empirical formula that the two streams of activity are, so to speak, parallel, though never confluent. There is no need to ground the formula on any universal metaphysical theory, such as the pan-psychism of Fechner and Paulsen. It is enough that, as Wundt points out, the facts of experience establish a correspondence between physical and psychical, while the dissimilarity of the physical and the psychical precludes the possibility of one being the cause of the other. To all these parallelistic explanations of the relations between
soul
and body the
Scholastic
dualists take exception. First, the scholastics call attention to the verdict of experience. Up to a certain point, the facts of experience are capable of a parallelistic, as well as of a
dualistic
, explanation. But when we come to consider the unity of consciousness, which is a fact of experience, we find that the theory of parallelism breaks down, and the only explanation that holds is that of dualists, who maintain the substantiality of the
soul
. Secondly, if the parallelistic theory be
true
, what, ask the
Scholastic
dualists, becomes of the freedom of the will and moral responsibility? If our
mental
and bodily states are not to be referred to an immediate personal subject, but are considered phases or aspects of a universal substance, a cosmic
soul
, mind-stuff, or unknown "form of Power", it is not easy to see in what sense the will can be free, and man be held responsible for his
mental
or bodily acts.
In a minor sense the word
monism
is sometimes used in
psychology
to designate the
doctrine
that there is no real distinction between the
soul
and its faculties.
Psychological
dualism
holds that
soul
and body are distinct, though incomplete, substances. But how about the
soul
itself?
Plato's
doctrine
that it has three parts has had very little following in
philosophy
Aristotle
distinguished between the substance of the
soul
and its powers (
dynameis
), or faculties, and bequeathed to the
Schoolmen
the problem whether these faculties are really, or only notionally, distinct from the
soul
itself. Those who favour the real distinction are sometimes called pluralists in
psychology
, and their opponents, who say that the distinction is nominal or, at most, notional, are sometimes called
psychological
Monists. The question is decided by inferences from the facts of consciousness. Those who hold real distinction of function argue that this is sufficient ground for a real distinction of faculties.
In epistemology
As in
psychology
, Monism is used in various senses to signify, in a general way, the antithesis of
dualism
. The
Dualist
in
epistemology
agrees with the ordinary observer, who distinguishes both in theory and in practice between "things" and "thoughts". Common sense, or unreflecting consciousness, takes things generally to be what they seem. It acts on the conviction that the internal world of our thoughts corresponds with the external world of reality. The
philosophical
dualist questions the extent and accuracy of that correspondence; he learns from
psychology
that many instances of so-called immediate perception have in them a large share of interpretation, and are, in so far, referable to the activity of the mind. Nevertheless, he sees no reason to quarrel with the general verdict of common sense that there is a world of reality outside us, as well as a world of representation within us, and that the latter corresponds in a measure to the former. He distinguishes, therefore, between subject and object, between self and not-self, and holds that the external world exists. The Monist in one way or another eliminates the objective from the field of reality, obliterates the distinction between self and not-self, and denies that the external world is real. Sometimes he takes the ground of
idealism
, maintaining that thoughts are things, that the only reality is perception, or rather, that a thing is real only in the sense that it is perceived,
esse est percipi
. He scornfully rejects the view of naïve realism, refers with contempt to the copy-theory (the view that our thoughts represent things) and is rather proud of the fact that he is in conflict with common sense. Sometimes he is a solipsist, holding that self alone exists, that the existence of not-self is an illusion, and that the
belief
in the existence of other minds than our own is a vulgar
error
. Sometimes, finally, he is an acosmist: he denies that the external world exists except in so far as it is thought to exist: or he affirms that we create our own external world out of our own thoughts.
However, the classical forum of
epistemological
Monism at the present time is known as Absolutism. Its fundamental tenet is metaphysical monism of the purely idealistic type. It holds that both subject and object are merely phases of an abstract, unlimited, impersonal consciousness called the
Absolute
; that neither things nor thoughts have any reality apart from the
Absolute
. It teaches that the
universe
is a rational and systematic whole, consisting of an
intellectual
"ground" and multiform "appearances" of that ground, one appearance being what the Realist calls things, and another what the Realist calls thoughts. This is the
doctrine
of the
Hegelians
, from
Hegel
himself down to his latest representatives, Bradley and McTaggart. All these forms of
epistemological
Monism — namely,
idealism
, solipsism, acosmism, and absolutism — have, of course, metaphysical bearings, and sometimes rest on metaphysical foundations. Nevertheless, historically speaking, they are traceable to a
psychological
assumption which is, and always will be, the dividing line between
Dualism
and Monism in
epistemology
. The
Dualists
, in their analysis of the act of knowing, call attention to the fact that in every process of perception the object is immediately given. It seems like emphasizing the obvious to say so, yet it is precisely on this point that the whole question turns. What I perceive is not a sensation of whiteness but a white object. What I taste is not the sensation of sweetness but a sweet substance. No matter how much the activity of the mind may elaborate, synthesize, or reconstruct the data of sense-perception, the objective reference cannot be the result of any such subjective activity; for it is given originally in consciousness. On the contrary, the Monist starts with the idealistic assumption that what we perceive is the sensation. Whatever objective reference the sensation has in our consciousness is conferred on it by the activity of the mind. The objective is, therefore, reducible to the subjective; things are thoughts; we make our world. In the dualist's analysis there is immediate, presentative contact in consciousness between the subject and the object. In the Monist's account of the matter there is a chasm between subject and object which must be bridged over somehow. The problem of
Dualism
or Monism in
epistemology
depends, therefore, for solution on the question whether perception is presentative or representative; and the dualist, who holds the presentative theory, seems to have on his side the verdict of introspective
psychology
as well as the approval of common sense.
In recent Pragmatist contributions to
epistemology
there is presented a different view of
epistemological
Monism from that given in the preceeding paragraphs, and a solution is offered which differs entirely from that of traditional
dualism
. In William James's works, for instance, Monism is described as that species of Absolutism which "thinks that the all-form or collective-unit form is the only form that is rational", while opposed to it is Pluralism, that is, the
doctrine
that "the each-form is an eternal form of reality no less than it is the form of temporal appearance" (A Pluralistic Universe, 324 sqq.). The multitude of "each-forms" constitute, not a chaos, but a cosmos, because they are "inextricably interfused" into a system. The unity, however, which exists among the "each-forms" of reality is not an integral unity nor an articulate or organic, much less a
logical
, unity. It is a unity "of the strung-along type, the type of continuity, contiguity, or concatenation" (op. cit., 325). Into this unfinished
universe
, into this stream of successive experiences, the subject steps at a certain moment. By a process which belongs, not to
logic
, but to life, which exceeds
logic
, he connects up these experiences into a concatenated series. In other words, he strings the single beads on a string, not of thought, but of the practical needs and purposes of life. Thus the subject makes his own world, and, really, we are not any better off than if we accepted the verdict of the intellectualistic Idealist. We have merely put the practical reason in place of the theoretical: so far as the value of
knowledge
is concerned the antithesis between Monism and Pluralism is more apparent than real, and the latter is as far from the saneness of realistic
Dualism
as the former. It is
true
that the Pluralist admits, in a sense, the existence of the external world; but so also does the Absolutist. The trouble is that neither admits it in a sense which would save the distinction between subject and object. For the Pluralist as well as the Monist is entangled in the web of subjective
Idealism
as soon as he favours the
doctrine
that perception is representative, not presentative.
In cosmology
The central question is the origin of the
universe
. The early Ionian
philosophers
assigned, as the cause or principle (
arche
is the
Aristotelian
word) of the
universe
, a substance which is at once the material out of which the
universe
is made and the force by which it was made. As
Aristotle
says, they failed to distinguish between the material cause and the efficient cause. They were, therefore,
dynamists
and
hylozoists
. That is, they held matter to be of its
nature
active, and endowed with life. Without the aid of any extrinsic force, they said, the original substance, by a process of thickening and thinning, or by quenching and kindling, or in some other immanent way, gave rise to the
universe
as we now see it. This primitive cosmothetic Monism gradually gave way to a
dualistic
conception of the origin of the world. Tentatively at first, and then more decisively, the later Ionians introduced the notion of a primitive force, distinct from matter, which fashioned the
universe
out of the primordial substance. Anaxagoras it was, who, by clearly defining this force and describing it as mind (
nous
), earned the encomium of being the "first of the ancient
philosophers
who spoke sense".
Dualism
, thus introduced, withstood the onslaughts of materialistic
Atomism
and
Epicureanism
pantheistic
Stoicism
and emanationistic
neo-Platonism
. It was developed by
Socrates
Plato
, and
Aristotle
, who brought to their description of the world-forming process a higher notion of cosmothetic mind than the pre-Socratic
philosophers
possessed. It was left for the
Christian
philosophers
of Alexandria and their successors, the
Scholastics
of
medieval times
, to elaborate the
doctrine
of creation
ex nihilo
, and thus bring out more clearly the rôle played by the Divine Power and Will in the formation of the
universe
. The order, harmony, and purposiveness evident everywhere in nature are cited by the creationists as evidence to show that mind must have presided at the origination of things. Furthermore, the question of dynamism or mechanism hinges on the problem of the nature of matter. This phase of the question has been developed especially in post-Cartesian philosophy, some maintaining that matter is essentially inert and must, therefore, have acquired force and activity from without, while others as stoutly maintain that matter is by nature active and, consequently, may have developed its own force from within. Evolution of the thorough going type takes the latter view. It holds that in the primitive cosmic matter was contained "the power and potency" of all life and movement, in such a way that no external agent was required in order to bring it to actual existence. Here, as in the question of Theism,
Christian
philosophy is frankly
dualistic
, although it acknowledges that, since actuality antecedes potency by nature and, as a matter of fact, the world originated in time, while
God
is eternal, there was, before creation, but One Reality.
In ethics
The word
Monism
is very little used. In some German works it is employed to designate the
doctrine
that the moral law is autonomous.
Christian
ethics is essentially heteronomic: it teaches that all law, even
natural law
, emanates from
God
Kantian
ethics and Evolutionistic ethics hold that the moral law is either self-imposed or emanates from the moral sense which is a product of the struggle for existence. In both the
Kantian
and the Evolutionistic systems there is only one source of the power of moral discrimination and approval. For this reason the word
Monism
is here used in its generic sense. In English
philosophical
literature, however, the word has no such signification. In accounting for the origin of
evil
, a problem which, though it belongs to
metaphysics
, has important bearings on
ethical
questions, some
philosophers
have adopted a Dualistic
doctrine
and explained that
good
and
evil
originate from two distinct principles, the one supremely good, the other completely and absolutely
evil
. This was the
doctrine
of the ancient
Persians
, from whom it was borrowed by Manes, the founder of the
Manichean sect
. Opposed to this is the Monistic view, that
God
is indeed the cause of all that is good in the
universe
, and that
evil
is not to be assigned to any supreme cause distinct from
God
. Whatever explanation be given of the existence of
evil
in the world, it is maintained that a supreme principle of
evil
is utterly impossible and even inconceivable.
Contemporary monistic movements and schools
In current
philosophical
literature, whenever no special qualification is added, Monism generally means the modified materialistic monism of Haeckel. Modern materialistic Monism in
Germany
begins with Feuerbach, a disciple of
Hegel
. Feuerbach was followed by Vogt and Moleschott. To these succeeded Haeckel, who combines Darwinian evolution with a materialistic interpretation of
Spinoza
and Bruno. Haeckel's works, both in the original and in English translations, have had a wide circulation, their popularity being due rather to the superficial manner in which Haeckel disposes of the most serious questions of
metaphysics
than to any intrinsic excellence of content or method. Haeckel is honorary president of the Monistenbund (Society of Monists), founded at Jena in 1906, for the purpose of propagating the doctrines of Monism. The
society
is openly anti-Christian, and makes active
warfare
against the
Catholic
Church
. Its publications, "Der Monist" (a continuation of the "Freie Glocken" — first number, 1906), "Blätter des deutschen Monistenbunds" (first number, July, 1906), and various pamphlets (Flugblätter des Monistenbunds), are intended to be a campaign against
Christian
education
and the union of
Church and State
The group of writers in America who, under the editorship of Dr. Paul Carus, have been identified with the "Monist" (Chicago, monthly, first number, Jan., 1891) are not, apparently, actuated by the same animosity against
Christianity
. Nevertheless, they hold Haeckel's fundamental tenet that Monism as a system of
philosophy
transcends
Christianity
as a form of
belief
, and is the only rational synthesis of
science
and religion. "Religious progress no less than
scientific
progress", writes Carus, "is a process of growth as well as a cleansing from mythology. . . . Religion is the basis of ethics. . . . The ideal of religion is the same as that of
science
, it is a liberation of the mythological elements and its aim is to rest upon a concise but exhaustive statement of facts" (Monism, Its Scope and Import, 8, 9). This "concise but exhaustive statement of facts" is positive Monism, the
doctrine
, namely, that the whole of reality constitutes one inseparable and indivisible entirety. Monism is not the
doctrine
that one substance alone, whether it be mind or matter, exists: such a theory, says Dr. Carus, is best designated as Henism. True Monism "bears in mind that our words are abstracts representing parts or features of the One and All, and not separate existences" (op. cit., 7). This Monism is Positivistic, because its aim is "the systematisation of
knowledge
, that is, of a description of facts" (ibid.). "Radical free thought" is the motto of this
school
of Monism; at the same time, it disclaims all sympathy with destructive
Atheism
Agnosticism
Materialism
, and Negativism in general. Nevertheless, the untrained student of
philosophy
will be likely to be more profoundly influenced by the Monistic criticism of
Christianity
than by the constructive effort to put something in place of the
errors
referred to.
All Monism may be described as resulting from the tendency of the
human
mind
to discover unitary concepts under which to subsume the manifold of experience. So long as we are content to take and preserve the world of our experience as we find it, with all its manifoldness, variety, and fragmentation, we are in the condition of primitive man, and little better than brute animals. As soon as we begin to reflect on the data of the senses, we are led by an
instinct
of our rational nature to reduce manifold effects to the unity of a causal concept. This we first do in the scientific plane. Afterwards, carrying the process to a higher plane, we try to unify these under
philosophical
categories, such as
substance
and
accident
, matter and force, body and mind, subject and object. The history of
philosophy
, however, shows with unmistakable clearness that there is a limit to this unifying process in
philosophy
. If
Hegel
were right, and the formula, "The rational alone is real", were
true
, then we should expect to be able to compass all reality with the
mental
powers which we possess. But,
Christian
philosophy holds, the real extends beyond the domain of the (finite) rational. Reality eludes our attempt to compress it within the categories which we frame for it. Consequently,
Dualism
is often the final answer in
philosophy
; and Monism, which is not content with the partial synthesis of
Dualism
, but aims at an ideal completeness, often results in failure.
Dualism
leaves room for
faith
, and hands over to
faith
many of the problems which philosophy cannot solve. Monism leaves no room for
faith
. The only
mysticism
that is compatible with it is
rationalistic
, and very different from that "vision" in which, for the
Christian
mystic, all the limitations, imperfections, and other shortcomings of our feeble efforts are removed by the light of
faith
Sources
See works referred to under METAPHYSICS; also, VEITCH,
Dualism and Monism
(London, 1895): WARD,
Naturalism and Agnosticism
(2 vols., London, 1899); ROYCE,
The World and the Individual
(New York, 1901); BAKEWELL,
Pluralism and Monism
in
Philos. Rev.,
VII (1898), 355 sqq.; BOWEN,
Dualism, Materialism or Idealism in Princeton Rev.,
I (1878), 423 sqq.; GURNEY,
Monism in Mind,
VI (1881), 153 sqq.;
Articles in Monist
(1891-); ADICKES,
Kant contra Haeckel
(Berlin, 1901); GUTBERLET,
Der mechanische Monismus
(Paderborn, 1893); ENGERT,
Der naturalistiche Monismus Haeckels
(Berlin, 1907); DREWS,
Der Monismus
(Leipzig, 1908);
Articles
by KLINIKE in
Jahrbuch für Phil. u. Spek. Theol.
(1905, 1906); MALTESE,
Monismo e nichilismo
(2 vols., Vittoria, 1887); ABATE,
Il monismo nelle diverse forme
(Catania, 1893); HAECKEL,
Der Monismus als Band zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft,
tr, GILCHRIST (London, 1894); IDEM,
Die Welträthsel,
tr. McCABE (London, 1900). On Carus's School of Monism, besides
The Monist
(1891-) and
The Open Court
(pub. fortnightly, first number, Feb. 17, 1887), cf. CARUS,
Primer of Philosophy
(Chicago. 1896); IDEM,
Fundamental Problems
(Chicago, 1894); IDEM,
Monism, Its Scope and Import
(Chicago. 1891).
About this page
APA citation.
Turner, W.
(1911).
Monism.
In
The Catholic Encyclopedia.
New York: Robert Appleton Company.
MLA citation.
Turner, William.
"Monism."
The Catholic Encyclopedia.
Vol. 10.
New York: Robert Appleton Company,
1911.
.
Transcription.
This article was transcribed for New Advent by Douglas J. Potter.
Dedicated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ.
Ecclesiastical approbation.
Nihil Obstat.
October 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.
Imprimatur.
+John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.
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