Chip-processing method could assist cryptography schemes to keep data secure | MIT News | Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Skip to content ↓
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Suggestions or feedback?
Browse By
Topics
View All
Explore:
Machine learning
Sustainability
Startups
Black holes
Classes and programs
Departments
View All
Explore:
Aeronautics and Astronautics
Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Architecture
Political Science
Mechanical Engineering
Centers, Labs, & Programs
View All
Explore:
Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL)
Picower Institute for Learning and Memory
Media Lab
Lincoln Laboratory
Schools
School of Architecture + Planning
School of Engineering
School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences
Sloan School of Management
School of Science
MIT Schwarzman College of Computing
View all news coverage of MIT in the media
Listen to audio content from MIT News
Subscribe to MIT newsletter
Close
Breadcrumb
MIT News
Chip-processing method could assist cryptography schemes to keep data secure
Chip-processing method could assist cryptography schemes to keep data secure
By enabling two chips to authenticate each other using a shared fingerprint, this technique can improve privacy and energy efficiency.
Adam Zewe
MIT News
Publication Date
February 20, 2026
Press Inquiries
Press Contact
Melanie
Grados
Email:
mgrados@mit.edu
Phone:
617-253-1682
MIT News Office
Media Download
Download Image
Caption
Each CMOS chip is slightly different due to microscopic, unavoidable variations during fabrication. These randomizations give each chip a unique identifier, known as a physical unclonable function (PUF). MIT researchers developed a matched PUF pair on two chips.
Credits
Image: Courtesy of the researchers; MIT News
*Terms of Use:
Images for download on the MIT News office website are made available to non-commercial entities, press and the general public under a
Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives license
You may not alter the images provided, other than to crop them to size. A credit line must be used when reproducing images; if one is not provided
below, credit the images to "MIT."
Close
Caption
MIT researchers developed a new fabrication technique that enables two chips to share a unique “fingerprint,” allowing one to directly authenticate the other without the need to store secret key information on a third-party server, eliminating security risks.
Credits
Image: iStock
Caption
Each CMOS chip is slightly different due to microscopic, unavoidable variations during fabrication. These randomizations give each chip a unique identifier, known as a physical unclonable function (PUF). MIT researchers developed a matched PUF pair on two chips.
Credits
Image: Courtesy of the researchers; MIT News
Just like each person has unique fingerprints, every CMOS chip has a distinctive “fingerprint” caused by tiny, random manufacturing variations. Engineers can leverage this unforgeable ID for authentication, to safeguard a device from attackers trying to steal private data.
But these cryptographic schemes typically require secret information about a chip’s fingerprint to be stored on a third-party server. This creates security vulnerabilities and requires additional memory and computation.
To overcome this limitation, MIT engineers developed a manufacturing method that enables secure, fingerprint-based authentication, without the need to store secret information outside the chip.
They split a specially designed chip during fabrication in such a way that each half has an identical, shared fingerprint that is unique to these two chips. Each chip can be used to directly authenticate the other. This low-cost fingerprint fabrication method is compatible with standard CMOS foundry processes and requires no special materials.
The technique could be useful in power-constrained electronic systems with non-interchangeable device pairs, like an ingestible sensor pill and its paired wearable patch that monitor gastrointestinal health conditions. Using a shared fingerprint, the pill and patch can authenticate each other without a device in between to mediate.
“The biggest advantage of this security method is that we don’t need to store any information. All the secrets will always remain safe inside the silicon. This can give a higher level of security. As long as you have this digital key, you can always unlock the door,” says Eunseok Lee, an electrical engineering and computer science (EECS) graduate student and lead author of a paper on this security method.
Lee is joined on the paper by EECS graduate students Jaehong Jung and Maitreyi Ashok; as well as co-senior authors Anantha Chandrakasan, MIT provost and the Vannevar Bush Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, and Ruonan Han, a professor of EECS and a member of the MIT Research Laboratory of Electronics. The research was recently presented at the IEEE International Solid-States Circuits Conference.
“Creation of shared encryption keys in trusted semiconductor foundries could help break the tradeoffs between being more secure and more convenient to use for protection of data transmission,” Han says. “This work, which is digital-based, is still a preliminary trial in this direction; we are exploring how more complex, analog-based secrecy can be duplicated — and only duplicated once.”
Leveraging variations
Even though they are intended to be identical, each CMOS chip is slightly different due to unavoidable microscopic variations during fabrication. These randomizations give each chip a unique identifier, known as a physical unclonable function (PUF), that is nearly impossible to replicate.
A chip’s PUF can be used to provide security just like the human fingerprint identification system on a laptop or door panel.
For authentication, a server sends a request to the device, which responds with a secret key based on its unique physical structure. If the key matches an expected value, the server authenticates the device.
But the PUF authentication data must be registered and stored in a server for access later, creating a potential security vulnerability.
“If we don’t need to store information on these unique randomizations, then the PUF becomes even more secure,” Lee says.
The researchers wanted to accomplish this by developing a matched PUF pair on two chips. One could authenticate the other directly, without the need to store PUF data on third-party servers.
As an analogy, consider a sheet of paper torn in half. The torn edges are random and unique, but the pieces have a shared randomness because they fit back together perfectly along the torn edge.
While CMOS chips aren’t torn in half like paper, many are fabricated at once on a silicon wafer which is diced to separate the individual chips.
By incorporating shared randomness at the edge of two chips before they are diced to separate them, the researchers could create a twin PUF that is unique to these two chips.
“We needed to find a way to do this before the chip leaves the foundry, for added security. Once the fabricated chip enters the supply chain, we won’t know what might happen to it,” Lee explains.
Sharing randomness
To create the twin PUF, the researchers change the properties of a set of transistors fabricated along the edge of two chips, using a process called gate oxide breakdown.
Essentially, they pump high voltage into a pair of transistors by shining light with a low-cost LED until the first transistor breaks down. Because of tiny manufacturing variations, each transistor has a slightly different breakdown time. The researchers can use this unique breakdown state as the basis for a PUF.
To enable a twin PUF, the MIT researchers fabricate two pairs of transistors along the edge of two chips before they are diced to separate them. By connecting the transistors with metal layers, they create paired structures that have correlated breakdown states. In this way, they enable a unique PUF to be shared by each pair of transistors.
After shining LED light to create the PUF, they dice the chips between the transistors so there is one pair on each device, giving each separate chip a shared PUF.
“In our case, transistor breakdown has not been modeled well in many of the simulations we had, so there was a lot of uncertainty about how the process would work. Figuring out all the steps, and the order they needed to happen, to generate this shared randomness is the novelty of this work,” Lee says.
After finetuning their PUF generation process, the researchers developed a prototype pair of twin PUF chips in which the randomization was matched with more than 98 percent reliability. This would ensure the generated PUF key matches consistently, enabling secure authentication.
Because they generated this twin PUF using circuit techniques and low-cost LEDs, the process would be easier to implement at scale than other methods that are more complicated or not compatible with standard CMOS fabrication.
“In the current design, shared randomness generated by transistor breakdown is immediately converted into digital data. Future versions could preserve this shared randomness directly within the transistors, strengthening security at the most fundamental physical level of the chip,” Lee says.
“There is a rapidly increasing demand for physical-layer security for edge devices, such as between medical sensors and devices on a body, which often operate under strict energy constraints. A twin-paired PUF approach enables secure communication between nodes without the burden of heavy protocol overhead, thereby delivering both energy efficiency and strong security. This initial demonstration paves the way for innovative advancements in secure hardware design,” Chandrakasan adds.
This work is funded by Lockheed Martin, the MIT School of Engineering MathWorks Fellowship, and the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies Fellowship.
Share
this news article on:
Reddit
Related Links
Terahertz Integrated Electronics Group
Energy-Efficient Circuits and Systems Group
Research Laboratory of Electronics
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
School of Engineering
MIT Schwarzman College of Computing
Related Topics
Research
Computer chips
Internet of things
Electronics
Sensors
Supply chains
Data
Computer science and technology
Research Laboratory of Electronics
Electrical engineering and computer science (EECS)
School of Engineering
MIT Schwarzman College of Computing
Related Articles
This tiny, tamper-proof ID tag can authenticate almost anything
Miniscule device could help preserve the battery life of tiny sensors
Cryptographic “tag of everything” could protect the supply chain
More MIT News
The power of “and” in energy and climate entrepreneurship
Greentown Labs CEO Georgina Campbell Flatter emphasizes the importance of collaboration in the entrepreneurship space, and the role that universities play in this landscape.
Read full story
MIT scientists build the world’s largest collection of Olympiad-level math problems, and open it to everyone
New dataset of 30,000-plus competition math problems from 47 countries gives AI researchers a harder test — and students worldwide a better training ground.
Read full story
Faces of MIT: Gabi Hott Soares
Through mentorship, enthusiasm, and a global perspective, Gabi Hott Soares supports student leaders at MIT.
Read full story
Three from MIT named 2026 Goldwater Scholars
Rising seniors Deeksha Kumaresh, Anna Liu, and Charlotte Myers are honored for their academic achievements.
Read full story
MIT takes top team honors in 86th Putnam Math Competition
The undergraduate team topped the scoreboard for sixth year in a row and also took the Elizabeth Lowell Putnam Prize again.
Read full story
New chip can protect wireless biomedical devices from quantum attacks
Ultra-efficient chip design enables extremely strong cryptography algorithms to run on energy-constrained edge devices.
Read full story
More news on MIT News homepage
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, USA
Recommended Links:
Visit
Map
(opens in new window)
Events
(opens in new window)
People
(opens in new window)
Careers
(opens in new window)
Contact
Social Media Hub
MIT on X
MIT on Facebook
MIT on YouTube
MIT on Instagram