(DOC) State Failure in Somalia

State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 1 State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats Piskunova Natalia Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO-University)

State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 2 Abstract The ongoing discussion on the role of the State as a safeguard of security in modern system of International Relations offers contrasting views on the problem of state failure. This paper presents an examination of the current political situation in a failed state of Somalia. From 1990 to 2010 political-territorial developments in Somalia challenged the established approaches to state formation; today it is relevant to examine the developing local trends of state-building under conditions of negative configuration of security. State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 3 State Failure in Post-Westphalia era: new trends or new threats? The present state of the art in the academic discipline of International Relations suggests challenges posed to the international system. These challenges are caused by the gradual modification of the role of the state in the chessfield of international affairs. The classic domain of state dominance – security - is now likely to come to the hands of new players. As a result, several regions of the world are defied by the abundance of de-facto cases of weak governance and state failure. Examples of failed states in various regions of the world demonstrate that failure of the State as a key player in contemporary international relations to carry out its duties in political process in most cases leads to humanitarian failure. There is a pressing need to scrutinize recent ongoing processes in a failed state in order to prevent humanitarian tragedies. Moreover, the examination of the factors that distort state rule is necessary in order to account for the new possible global threats that state failure\collapse may bring. This can demonstrate how the local poor governance and, eventually, state failure are transfered to a higher level of threat hierarchy (Rotberg 2004; Eizenstat, Porter, Weinstein, 2005; Clapham 1996). A preliminary hypothesis is that the modern security configuration in an underdeveloped region poses challenges to governance, which the states can not overcome. Poor governance, which results from this process, generates a sustained internal conflict within the states of the region. This provokes a spiral of internal violence, which may be viewed as a threat to the existence of states. State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 4 Approaching State Failure in Post-Westphalia conditions The phenomenon of State Failure has attracted attention of scholars of the International Relations discipline in the 1990s with the dissolution of the Yalta-Potsdam system and the end of the Cold War. In two decades since that pivotal moment in International Relations, the issue of a failed state remains unresolved. This poses a new challenge to scholars, given that the new system of International Relations emerging. In fact, the issue of state failure has been viewed as a local phenomenon with no significance to the global political development attached to it. However, an almost 20-year period of unsuccessful attempts to resolve, or to create a viable theoretical and practical framework to address this issue calls for a revision of state failure issue and its current trends. Previously, state failure has been addressed retrospectively from a historical perspective, where chronologies of failure were demonstrated. Various policy-implications were offered to address this problem; however, neither of them was implemented successfully (Yannis 2002). Today, several new approaches to this phenomenon are developing. One of the new approaches to analyzing state failure is offered by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and the World Peace Foundation. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance offers data for African governance 2000-2008, and presents a cumulative set of indices of governance performance in Africa, i.e. making a hierarchy of failed states and showing the areas of state failure. According to the authors of the Index, it …uniquely defines “good governance” as the delivery of key political goods, which we specify in terms of five categories, fifteen sub- categories, and fifty-eight sub-sub-categories. We argue that this definition is comprehensive and common to all countries. Good government means the State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 5 supply of those core political goods, whatever the culture and whatever else the government might undertake. The delivery of those core political goods can be measured with basic figures and statistics on poverty, infrastructure, the free and fairness of elections, the absence of war, and so on. Such statistics can be defined, operationalized, and measured in an objective way and, if done correctly, verified and reproduced by others. (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2008, p.40) As the authors of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance explain, “The Index is composed of fifty-seven separate markers capturing the performance of individual countries ” (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2008, p.20-21). The outcome of the calculations performed by the authors of the Index is presented in the form of a ranking chart for all African countries. The governance assessment criteria are then evaluated: “The essential political goods can be summarized and gathered under five categories: 1) Safety and Security; 2) Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption; 3) Participation and Human Rights; 4) Sustainable Economic Opportunity; 5) Human Development” (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2008, p.20). The authors of the Index stress, The Index of African Governance is unique … in a number of key ways. First, it is one of the few to measure “governance” broadly defined. Most other work focuses on components of good governance—peace and security, the rule of law, corruption, political participation, human rights, sustainable development, etc. (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2008, p.40) In parallel, the Fund for Peace organization, founded in 1957, presents annual Failed States Index, which covers governance performance in all countries of the world from 2005. This index demonstrates a mathematically-based approach to assessing state failure, based on a number of formulas, which allows calculating and visualizing the existing situation in terms of state failure, as well as the prospect of failure various State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 6 countries, and to observe the contrasting cases of countries with almost no potential of state failure. The calculation of the Index is based on assessing social, political and economic indicators of state failure: Social Indicators: I-1. Mounting Demographic Pressures; I-2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating complex Humanitarian Emergencies; I-3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia; I-4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight; Economic Indicators; I-5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines; I-6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline; Political Indicators; I-7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State; I-8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services; I-9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights; I-10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"; I-11. Rise of Factionalized Elites; I-12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors. (The Failed States Index, retrieved June 15 2009 from http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=323 ) As for 2008, the highest rank for State Failure was accredited to Somalia with a total of 114.2 score, and the lowest rank – to Norway with a total of 16.8 score. The ranking State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 7 allows visualizing the “red zone” countries with highest prospects for state failure (including 35 countries) and making comparisons between them on a series of indicators, mentioned above. However, there are certain drawbacks in this developing Index-based approach. Prime shortcoming seems to be the impossibility to use these indices for making an overview of failed states in a dynamic and\or regional perspective. The problem is that the number of analyzed country-cases in these indices varies from year to year, so the position and rating of a given country would be different each year. For example, the Failed State Index includes available data from 2005 to 2008, while the Index of African Governance contains data from 2000 to 2008, with reports and rankings for 2000, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 available. This carries a potential of misjudgment, partially acknowledged by the authors of the indices: “Scores for each country cannot be compared meaningfully year to year, but may unfortunately be interpreted in that way by those who do not fully understand the Index methodology” (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2008, p.34). Given these drawbacks, the Indices, however consistent, do not allow to assess State failure as a regional phenomenon. Another approach to state failure may be derived from the International Law discipline. In international legal terms, paradoxically, there is not any officially recognized term as “failed state”. However, there is a growing debate on whether it is possible to recognize any political and territorial unit a state, if it does not correspond with the basic UN provisions for the declaration of an independent State. In UN-tradition, a self-governing territory was recognized as an independent State if it could match certain criteria. Generally, an entity could be granted a status of an independent State if it proved State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 8 possession of a defined territory, permanent population, and effective government, capacity to enter into relations with other States, independence and sovereignty. Moreover, there exists an international practice of recognizing seceding entities/autonomies as newly-created States. From the perspective of modern international law, failed states pose a challenge to the established system of recognition of states as system units. Moreover, international legal system is not able to cope with this phenomena, as there is no mechanism of “denouncing” the state, or withdrawal of the status of the State from a given unit. This has been acknowledged by international relations scholars in 1996, when Jeffrey Herbst suggested applying a mechanism of “decertification” to de-facto failed states: “Decertification would be a strong signal that something has gone wrong in an African country, and that parts of the international community are no longer willing to continue the myth that every state is always exercising sovereign authority” (Herbst 1996/1997, p.142). In his opinion, this procedure would further a multidisciplinary approach, allowing to take into consideration structural factors, which have long been ignored in analyzing state failure: “Unfortunately, the international community, in its response to state failure in Africa, has refused to acknowledge the structural factors at work, despite mounting evidence that the loss of sovereign control is becoming a pattern in at least parts of Africa” (Herbst 1996/1997, p.125). There is a line of reasoning, which views state failure as a process, which is inherent in the global political system, and which contributes to state formation: “Depending on one’s understanding of ‘collapse’ and the political dynamics that give rise to it, it is indeed conceivable to regard collapse as part of processes of state reconfiguration and State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 9 formation” (Doornboos 2002, p.798). This, in its turn, calls for a question whether this reasoning applies to the failed state situation, visualized in case of former Somalia. The question is whether it is possible to regard the emerging self-proclaimed entities on the territory of the former Somalia as non-recognized States, and thus, actors of the international system with effective internal structure of government: “the right to be a State is dependent at least in the first instance upon the exercise of full governmental powers with respect to some area of territory” (Crawford 2007, p.46). In relation to security conditions these circumstances create a situation when it is hard to distinguish politically viable entities, which maintain the mechanisms of effective control and management of domestic and external security of self-proclaimed autonomies. This can be seen as a threat to the security environment of the African Horn: the whole system of political interactions exists under conditions of a partial power vacuum (since a structurally coherent national system player of Somalia de-facto does not exist). Another point is that in case of any failed state there is a collision of two fundamental principles of international law. On the one hand, the internationally-recognized principle (and a corresponding right) of self-determination provides an official opportunity for any territorial and political unit to proclaim independence and seek international recognition. In case of failing or failed states, where certain territorial units seek secession from a failing entity (or a ‘dissolving” state), in legal terms, The secession of a self-determination unit, where self-determination is forcibly prevented…will normally be reinforced by the principle of self- determination, so that the degree of effectiveness required as a precondition of State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 10 recognition will be much less extensive than in the case of secession (Crawford 2007, p.383). This presents another potential threat to regional security environment, as in conditions of territorial demise of a failed state there is a strong tendency for fragmentation, which leads to local spiral of violence and inter-ethnic clashes. On the other hand, international law protects the principle of territorial integrity of the state “at least so far as external use of force and intervention are concerned – though not to the point of providing a guarantee” (Crawford 2007, p.384). Another point is that actually possessing a formal ownership (or claim) of territory does not support the claims of self-proclaimed entities to be regarded as States, as only the effectiveness of governance is regarded as the criteria of State in its right: The requirement that a putative State have an effective government might be regarded as central to its claim to statehood. “Governance” or “effective government” is evidently a basis for the other central criterion of independence” (Crawford 2007, p.55). Territorial sovereignty is not ownership of but governing power with respect to territory (Crawford 2007, p.56) The right to be a State is dependent at least in the first instance upon the exercise of full governmental powers with respect to some area of territory”(Crawford 2007, p.46). As a result of this collision of two fundamental principles of international law, especially in case of failed states, there is no clear understanding of norms that are applicable in the State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 11 case of failed state and that “there is no longer one single test for secessionary independence” (Crawford 2007, p.384). In cases of countries, where civil strife continues, a notion of a “belligerent recognition” may be applicable: Where a secessionary movement had achieved a certain degree of governmental and military organization, issues of responsibility … impelled a certain de facto recognition of the situation even though the conflict was continuing. … By virtue of recognition of belligerency third States were entitled to maintain strict neutrality between the parties to the conflict and the insurgents achieved a separate though temporary status (Crawford 2007, p.380). In this sense, the phenomenon of state failure in conditions of emerging post-Westphalia system creates a certain window of opportunity for maintaining security at local levels: if the notion of a “belligerent recognition” is officially granted to warring local entities, which possess a viable level of territorial and political organization, it may arouse a certain degree of stabilization of political situation on ground. This may be seen as a small step towards progressing to peace negotiations. However, one notion on behalf of state failure in legal understanding should be made: It is necessary to distinguish unilateral secession of part of a State and the outright dissolution of the predecessor State as a whole. In the latter case there is, by definition, no predecessor State continuing in existence whose consent to any new arrangements can be sought. …The dissolution of a State may be initially triggered by the secession or attempted secession of one part of that State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 12 State. If the process goes beyond that and involves a general withdrawal of all or most of the territories concerned, and no substantial central or federal component remains behind, it may be evident that the predecessor State as a whole has ceased to exist (Crawford 2007, p.390-391). In case of a failed state of Somalia, there exist a number of self-proclaimed, diplomatically unrecognized units, some of which have been exercising a de-facto power in their territories for several decades. In particular, this is the case with Somaliland and Puntland, and to a lesser extent with Maakhir and Galmudug. To date, neither of these self-proclaimed self-determination units has been recognized internationally de-jure. Moreover, the situation with the exercise of power over the territories and, as a consequence, the maintenance of security, is largely dependent on the activisation of new sub-state actors within the general configuration of a “failed state” scheme. These sub- state actors in case of Somali are represented by the ethnic clans and networks, which may be considered patronate-based local elites. Trend 1: Patronate-based elites: internal actors within a Failed State configuration Elites are considered to be a personalized type of market and economy players. It is common knowledge that the role of elites in the development of a country is projected in economic sector, in political and social spheres. Elites exhibit their role as actors in a complex of intertwined economic, political and social interactions between citizens. Modern economic and political elites conduct activity in a new global configuration, produced by the emerging post-Westphalia world order. The present state of affairs suggests changes and challenges posed to the present international system – most State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 13 evidently, by the gradual decline of state as a key player in the chessfield of international affairs. The shift of focus is thus evident, as domestic economy, which is one of the classic domains of state prevalence now is likely to come to the hands of new players. Post-westphalian era creates a new framework of action for elites, as the role of the State as a key player on the market now has been decreased. The State as a player in the market gradually steps away from the intense market interactions in certain areas, and this gives way to the activisation of alternative players. In developed economies, this new configuration contributed to the expansion of the role of political and economic elites in post-Westphalia conditions, whereas in underdeveloped economies the situation is not so obvious. In underdeveloped economies, the structure of industries and markets is still largely dependant on the State as a regulator of economic transactions. These markets exist in conditions of traditional society, where the component of personal interaction may at times be more important than the rule of conduct, introduced by the State. Evidently, the type of economic and political elite in a given country depends largely on the regime type, which exists in it (see Schedler 2002; Spears 2002). The type and essence of regime predetermine the type of governance in the country, which, in its turn, influences the functioning of the country’s economy in general. In underdeveloped economies, major economic subjects - elites – conduct their economic activity under strong influence of the system of interactions, which is typical for traditional societies. In these traditional economies, patronate-based elites play the role of key economic and political actors on both the economic market and the political arena. Globalization increases elites’ competition and widens the prospects of modernization in these economies. The governments are induced to “maintain the “opening” of these State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 14 societies, develop the economy and thus limit the regulating capacity in a country” (Kaiser 1998, p.3). However, this entails a potential of fragmentation of a weak state, because, as Martin Doornboos noted, in many post-colonial African states “their survival as independent states would have come to a halt had it not been for the international recognition of their sovereignty” (Doornboos 2002, p.809; also see Jackson 1990). Originally Africa is associated with particular political and economic development mechanisms. The internal security configuration in Africa remains under strong influence of clientelism, which may be defined as dissemination of ethnic, religious, clan-based, family-based and other liaisons in the political sphere. Clientelism remains one of the basic principles of recruitment of elites in underdeveloped countries (such as Somalia and Ethiopia). Political and economic tradition still plays a foremost role in these societies. In countries of Africa in general the process of state-building has never been accomplished according to western standards. As a result, it is these countries where all mistakes and miscalculations of governance are most visible (see Zartman 1995). Studying elites as political and economic actors in Africa can be conducted within the framework of discussing personalized actors of intra-societal interaction. In Somalia, the analysis of elites is complicated, because a single economic subject may be represented in different elite strata. This results in constant internal uncertainty and hinders economic development. In underdeveloped societies polarized elites rest on the same social base, and this contributes to permanent instability in the political sphere. One of the key differences between western and oriental practices of creating intra-state political structure is visualized in the tradition of recruiting the ruling elite through political parties’ competition. Political parties in African societies are often formed on the State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 15 basis of “patron-client” relationship, which excludes the consideration of political platforms and manifestos of the parties. The political relations between parties are substituted by the vulnerable system of personal and often family- or relative-based relations between leaders and party members. In certain cases, this system is based on relationship between ethnical clans, local communities and religious groups, which are related neither with party policy, nor with party manifesto. Organizational structure in such societies is based on authoritarian principles. The key political leader (often an incumbent president) creates a ruling “presidency clan” – an informal network of professional politicians and businessmen, who hold key posts in the government. This structure rests on the system of personal relations between its members, which may be based on religious, ethnic, family unity, as well as on connection in business liaisons and common political interests. Internal security configuration in these countries is haunted by the problem of power distribution and means of adapting traditional institutions of regulating national economies to new formats. During the whole postcolonial period traditional economic and political institutions of these societies have been transforming in order to adapt to liberalized markets, fast-track democratization and structural transformation of political and economic systems of these countries. Nonetheless, political elites failed to deal with the focal problem of power transfer, which is crucial for maintaining the process of democratic liberalization and opening of national economies. Political elites were eventually substituted by alternative elites – that is, patronate-based elites, which were formed on the basis of clan relationships between different ethnic groups. State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 16 In Somalia, ethnic clans act as non-traditional non-state actors in the whole system of political controversies in this area (and even beyond the territory of former Somalia). Clans represent a type of an internal actor in the sub-state system, and they often perform their activities as mediators between local population, military bands and formations, economic enterprises and traditional general jurisdiction courts in form of court of sharia. As seen in Somalia, “clans are determined by patrilineal descent and membership can be as large as several hundred thousand members. Within the larger clan structure, smaller groups, known as diya-paying groups, also exist” (Coyne 2006, p.347). Also, clans in former Somalia represent a type of the emerging patronate-based elite. It is visible that political parties in many failing societies are often formed on the basis of “patron-client” relationship, which excludes the consideration of political platforms and manifestos of the parties. The political relations between parties are substituted by the vulnerable system of personal and often family- or relative-based relationships between leaders and party members. In certain cases, this system is based on relationship between ethnical clans, local communities and religious groups, which are related neither with party policy, nor with party manifesto (see Fortes and Evans- Pritchard 1940). Several decades after gaining independence from colonial powers it becomes clear that in majority of cases the first leaders of newly independent states did not realize that their states, in fact, were mere conglomerates of incohesive local communities with diverging schemes of subjection (power-sharing); neither had they considered the limits of available resources and possibilities (for detailed discussion see Austin 1984). Attempts to ruin patronate-client-based system of governance, which appears to be natural for State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 17 oriental societies, prove to be senseless, as they do not contribute to the dissemination of liberal market norms and principles. In this sense, colonialism, which induced the westernized system of governance and market interactions to African countries, failed to root these new systems into the basis of traditional-type governance, which was authentic to the colonized territory (Kreijen 2004, p.66). In modern conditions PBE (patronate-based elites) act as alternative elites, which substitute market-created elites. PBEs are based on deeply rooted interrelations between clans or ethnic groups in underdeveloped economies. The influence of PBE on development of economy in these countries can be both positive and negative. Moreover, the impact of PBE on economic development of underdeveloped countries is closely connected with political transformations in these states. In a failed state situation, PBE act as alternative elites, or alternative market players. PBEs use the status-quo of power vacuum and non-existence of state-imposed regulation to create new conditions for both economic and political market. Trend 2: Non-state actors in a failed state: a new threat? In the emerging system of International Relations the role of the non-state actors becomes significant. Some scholars believe in the positive impact of these actors in the process of state-building, whereas some critically object it. It is interesting to look at how this new trends is demonstrated in the region of the African Horn. In this region, since 1990s, various radicalist organizations have been widening and intensifying the scope of their activities. Historically, the African Horn countries have had a sustained relationship with the Islamic Middle East countries. However, in the State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 18 1990s the influence of radicalist organizations has widened as a result of emerging “power vacuum” in the region. Since 1990s, business groups from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Malaysia have been widening investment inflows into strategically important Ethiopian economy sectors – i.e. mining, metal and food industries. Alongside, these business groups were investing into construction of mosques, thus helping to introduce Islam in traditionally non-Islamic regions. After Ethiopia-Eritrea war in 1998-2000, both countries were exhausted financially, which created a demand for loans and direct investment from the Arab countries. As a consequence, the government of Ethiopia had to adapt its confessional policy. With increasing foreign investment inflow from the Arab countries, several Muslim organizations were revived or newly created. These included the “Supreme Council on Muslim affairs”, “Regional association of Muslim scholars” and others. At present, these organizations operate as a networked non-state actor on a substate level, aiming at widening the presence of Islamist organizations in all regions of the country. For instance, in Afaria region of Ethiopia (Afaria is situated close to Ethiopia-Somalia and Ethiopia-Kenya borders) there is a sustained standoff between tigrai-amhara organizations (Tigrai Liberation National Front and Afar Liberation Front). Other significant radicalist organizations include Al-Ittihad al-islamiyya, Islamic Front for Oromo Liberation, National Front for Liberation of Ogaden, Oromo Liberation Front and Muslim Brothers. These radical organizations aim at creating the “Islamic republic of Oromia” on the border region of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The government of Ethiopia has taken political, economic and military measures to weaken the activities of one of the most active radicalist organizations – the Oromo Liberation Front. However, State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 19 the government fails to resist the radical activities of the other Fronts, as these organizations have exhibited attempts to unite their efforts against it. The impact of radical and extremist organizations in the Horn of Africa is increasing. In general, it is exercised with several aims: 1. Consistent geographic expansion of the Islamized regions 2. Providing financial support to local radical Islamic organizations 3. Quick-track transformation of Muslim communities into extremist organizations in several regions 4. Incorporation of sharia-based law in Muslim communities to the detriment of state- imposed law 5. Lobbying Islamist activists in government These organizations act as substate actors with an aim to provoke the local radical Muslim communities to open violent standoff with other communities. Activities of these radical organizations are often well-coordinated: for example, they attempted to initiate clashes on the basis of religion in different regions of Ethiopia in 2002, and this activity was intended to be symbolically coincident with the Christian holiday of Captivation. Earlier, in 1999, the followers of the Oromo Liberation Front staged local clashes in the towns of Harar, Nazret and Addis-Abeba. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/258640.stm ). An international radicalist organization “Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya” has a history of involvement in the African Horn. This organization, which acts as an independent non- state actor in the region, coordinates its activities with the local extremist and radicalist State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 20 organizations (including fronts, supporting the activity of Oromo, Afar and Tigrai political groups) and with somalian military and political groupings. Alongside with “Al- Ittihad al-Islamiyya” organization, there are other non-state radicalist organizations, which aim at promoting extremism from their bases in Somalia, such as “Al-Majmaa al- Islam”, “Al-Sunna ba al-Djamaa”, “Ansar al-Sunna”. The activity of these organizations is a showing example of potential threats, which may be cast upon countries neighboring the former state of Somalia. It is reasonable to expect that in conditions of continuing civil war and political instability in the territories of former Somalia, the potential role and impact of the radicalized organizations will gradually increase. In its turn, this activisation of non-state actors in the form of violent radicalized organizations may contribute to the worsening of conditions not only in the failed state of Somalia, but in countries of the African Horn in general, thus enhancing the prospect of a regional failure. Trend 3: local perspectives of recent developments in Somalia As noted previously, in war-torn Somalia, the substitution of elites by clans in political sphere reveals the most acute political problems. In fact, this substitution has contributed to the process of state failure by creating a parochial mechanism of resource distribution: In Somali case, it was inability to accommodate conflicting interests, often articulated on a clan basis, and the instrumental use to which the state apparatus was put in the pursuit of this inter-clan violence, that caused the disintegration of the fragile system. For all its repressive qualities, the State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 21 Somali state had a relatively weak presence within the society, which meant that it could all the more easily collapse and be thrown off when inter-clan conflict and repression came to a head (Doornboos 2002, p.801). In Somalia, in 1991-1999 the patronate-based elites have been applying for international financial and humanitarian aid on behalf of the state of Somalia. International funds and agencies have provided the requested aid to these recipients; however, there was no outcome in terms of development of the country. As the United Nations Development Programme does not assess the Human Development Index for Somalia, it is difficult to consider exact data of aid inflow and redistribution of foreign aid between the leading clans in former Somalia. In 1991-1993 the recipients of international aid have distributed these resources between different clans according to the hierarchy of clans. The extensive scale of this ‘distribution’ is obvious, since the whole Somalian society is based on a hierarchy of ethnic clans. Practically the whole amount of international aid has gone to clans, which formed the patronate-based elites in Somalia. These elites used the power vacuum, which was created in conditions of state failure, to establish a scheme of acquiring international financial aid without providing any warrants. As credits and loans to Somalian agencies have thus been abstracted from any state guarantees, the investment climate in the country has deteriorated. Major international investors started to abandon the country and eventually the majority of international assets were withdrawn from Somalia. This led to the decrease of social spending and, as a result, the level of poverty soared. State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 22 The political configuration of state failure is largely triggered by the de-facto creation and development of independent proto-state units, which claimed authority over several territories of Somalia. This was partly endowed by the government of former Somali Republic in 1960, when “political affiliations quickly developed along clan-based lines… The majoritarian parliament created a set of incentives that led to constant struggles where clans would attempt to form coalitions and then create disputes among other clans in order to control a majority” (Coyne 2006, p.348). In 1991 the northern territories of Somalia (former British Somaliland) claimed independence of Somaliland. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072611.stm ) In 1998 in the north- eastern parts of Somalia the Majeerteen ethnic clan claimed independence for the autonomy of Puntland. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072611.stm ) In south-western Somalia the territories including Bay, Bakuul, Jubbada Dexe, Gedo, Shabeelaha Hoose, and Jubbada Hoose declared independence from Somalia and in 1998 the creation of independent Jubaland was declared. All these independent units were created by clans, or patronate-based elites, which also established limited markets for the exchange of goods and services on these territories. Some of these attempts were rather successful, and they were noted in the Report of the Secretary-General of the UN as prerequisites for “calm conditions” in the situation of a “chaos and anarchy” in the rest of the former Somalia (Report of the Secretary-General of the UN S/2001/1211 December 19, 2000, paragraph 34; Report of the Secretary-General of the UN S/2001/1201 October 25, 2002, paragraph 55). One of these successful attempts was exercised by Somaliland, which “while not recognized by any foreign government as a legitimate state … has remained stable with the creation of a constitution” (Coyne 2006, p.349). State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 23 An ongoing standoff between Somaliland and Puntland, fostered by competition for power and resources between patronate-based elites, results in the status-quo of non- recognition of neither of these units as states on the international arena. An ongoing territorial dispute, fostered by the struggle for power in the territories of the former state of Somalia, is actually developing as a full-scale war with new political entities emerging as a result of it (Conflict Barometer, 2007, p.31). This creates another inherent security threat for the regional system of inter-state interactions, as what is seen in these circumstances is in fact a “process of state-building which appears consistently to exacerbate instability and armed conflict” (Menkhaus 2002, p.18). Both sides claimed the provinces of Sanaag and Sool as part of their respective territory. The conflict started in 2003, when Puntland took control of Sool’s provincial capital, Las Anod. In April, both sides engaged in skirmishes in the province of Sanaag, which later declared its independence from Puntland as well as its allegiance to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, forming the autonomous entity of Maakhir. Another example may be drawn from other non-recognized proto-state units on the territory of former Somalia – the regions of Sanaag and Bari, where the Maakhir ethnic clan has declared autonomy over their territories in 2007. In Maakhir-controlled lands, the political and business markets exist as a result of constant conflict (and bargaining) between Somaliland and Puntland. However, the territory of south-eastern and southern Somalia, where the majority of population is concentrated, remains in political and economic chaos, sustained by the competition between patronate-based elites. In structural terms, this territory is a ‘vacuum of power’ territory, with no elements of sustained governance even in local communities. State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 24 In this way, patronate-based elites, which control the local markets and communities in view of an ongoing civil strife, prevent the inflow of investors to these territories and restrict normal business and political interactions with the international environment. Activisation of non-state actors, such as clans (patronate-based elites) and radicalized religious organizations in newly created proto-state units has contributed to the sustaining of a situation of a de-facto absence of a unified central government in Somalia for the last 10 years. The interim (Transitional) government tries to control parts of southern Somalia from its capital in Baidoa, however, it is not deemed legitimate by the majority of Somalians. In this situation of chaos, the future of security configuration in a failed state of Somalia remains an open question. However, at this stage it is evident that new developments, demonstrated by the Somalia case, show the rise of new actors and trends, which may have an ambiguous influence on the process of state-building in these territories. It is visible that the current condition of state failure remains a threat to the system of regional inter-state system, given the conditions of the emerging post- Westphalia order. Conclusions Despite a growing need to address the current trends of political and territorial development in situation of state failure, there is a lack of a multidisciplinary approach that would merge disperse views on state-building attempts under negative security conditions. As demonstrated in the case of former Somalia, self-proclaimed territorial and political entities may exhibit a potential of advancing to self-governance. However, these State Failure in modern system of International Relations: new trends, new threats 25 attempts are hindered by the negative conditions of security configuration, largely dependent on the ongoing civil strife. The show-case of Somalia reflects a growing need of a realistic assessment of the patterns of governance in the countries of the underdeveloped regions of the world and of widening the debate on the mechanisms of prediction of potential threats to sustained governance in modern conditions. Changes in the contemporary system of International Relations impose new challenges to the process of state-building under negative security conditions. The role of non-state actors, both internal and external, is intensified by the instability, caused by the continuing inter-clan war in territories of former state of Somalia. On internal (sub-state) level, the patronate-based elites attempt to get hold of the authority of the state in managing security in a failed state. On external level, the rise of the radicalized non- governmental organizations provokes additional violence and thus sustains chaos in a failed state. This ruins attempts of consolidating the self-proclaimed autonomies on the territories of former Somalia. These trends carry both positive and negative consequences not only for the failed state, but for the region in general. A positive consequence may be the development of new forms of statehood with patronate-based elites being the pioneers of the process. A negative consequence may be the intensification of activities of radicalized organizations, which may hinder the process of stabilization of political situation in this region. Finally, a situation of the complicated process of initial statebuilding in situation of a negative security environment of a failed state may be viewed as first and unique attempt to create states in modern configuration of the system of International Relations. 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