Papers by Federica Cacciatore
Contemporary Italian Politics, 2024
One of the main goals of the Italian National Resilience and
Recovery Plan (NRRP) is to modernize... more One of the main goals of the Italian National Resilience and
Recovery Plan (NRRP) is to modernize the economy and the public
sector, including the digitalization of public services. Among the
many interventions aimed at achieving this goal, the implementation
of a national system of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) is both
an ambitious and yet overdue objective, having been envisioned
for over a decade. Despite the existence of broad agreement on this
policy measure, its implementation has turned out to be more
challenging than expected, this for constitutional, political and
technical reasons. Adopting an interest groups perspective, the
aim of this article is to map the positions of the various actors
involved in the realization of EHRs in Italy, focusing on the implementation
phase of the NRRP, and comparing the two sub-phases
corresponding to the different governments in office, namely, the
Draghi government (May 2021 – September 2022) and the Meloni
government (since October 2022). Having developed a processtracing
analysis, we find that political claims and factors became
more salient in the second phase, especially as regards the role of
ICT companies in charge of implementing EHRs, despite substantial
continuity in terms of policy content.
Recovery Plan (NRRP) is to modernize the economy and the public
sector, including the digitalization of public services. Among the
many interventions aimed at achieving this goal, the implementation
of a national system of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) is both
an ambitious and yet overdue objective, having been envisioned
for over a decade. Despite the existence of broad agreement on this
policy measure, its implementation has turned out to be more
challenging than expected, this for constitutional, political and
technical reasons. Adopting an interest groups perspective, the
aim of this article is to map the positions of the various actors
involved in the realization of EHRs in Italy, focusing on the implementation
phase of the NRRP, and comparing the two sub-phases
corresponding to the different governments in office, namely, the
Draghi government (May 2021 – September 2022) and the Meloni
government (since October 2022). Having developed a processtracing
analysis, we find that political claims and factors became
more salient in the second phase, especially as regards the role of
ICT companies in charge of implementing EHRs, despite substantial
continuity in terms of policy content.
Do Economic Recovery Packages Open a Window of Opportunity for Corruption and Mismanagement? The Case of Italy in the Aftermath of the Covid-19 Pandemic
Public Organization Review, 2022
This paper explores the effects of the pandemic on corruption and mismanagement in Italy, a count... more This paper explores the effects of the pandemic on corruption and mismanagement in Italy, a country where the Covid-19 crisis is supposed to have significantly increased the risk of corruption. It proposes a novel operationalization of safeguards for accountability that are attached to the disbursement of recovery funds. Emergency law decrees and their implementing acts have been coded to assess whether the discretion in the allocation of recovery funds has been constrained by transparency requirements and enforcement provisions. Findings reveal that safeguards for accountability have been strengthened over time but that they have followed various patterns across recovery measures targeting businesses and people.
Fishing in troubled waters? Shared enforcement of the Common Fisheries Policy and accountability gaps
Law Enforcement by EU Authorities
Controlling EU Agencies, 2020
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the ... more People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website. • The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review. • The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal. If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
Gabriele Mazzantini 3.1. L'analisi d'impatto della regolamentazione sulla concorrenza. Una introd... more Gabriele Mazzantini 3.1. L'analisi d'impatto della regolamentazione sulla concorrenza. Una introduzione 3.2. Lo scenario internazionale 3.3. Il contesto nazionale 3.4. L'applicazione dell' AIRC in Italia. L' Antitrust 3.5. L'applicazione dell' AIRC in Italia. Le Autorità di regolazione 3.6. Conclusioni CAPITOLO QUARTO. Il sistema di governance delle attività di better regulation Sauro Angeletti 4.1. Premessa 4.2. La pianificazione 4.3. L'organizzazione 4.4. L'accountability 4.5. Verso la strutturazione di un compiuto ciclo di regolazione 4.6. Alcune considerazioni conclusive CAPITOLO QUINTO. La consultazione e la trasparenza del processo decisionale Carolina Raiola 5.1. Premessa 5.2. Le novità europee in tema di consultazione 5.3. Il contesto nazionale 5.4. Le autorità indipendenti 5.5. Conclusioni CAPITOLO SESTO. Attività e modelli di enforcement Federica Cacciatore 6.1. Premessa Indice 6.2. Il ruolo degli altri livelli di governo 6.3. L'attività di enforcement delle AI nel 2015 6.4. La diversificazione dei modelli di enforcement 6.5. Conclusioni CAPITOLO SETTIMO. Contributi giurisprudenziali alla qualità della regolazione Simona Morettini 7.1. Premessa 7.2. Il giudice amministrativo e gli strumenti di qualità della regolazione 7.3. La rilevanza dell' AIR nei pareri del Consiglio di Stato 7.4. La rilevanza dell' AIR nel sindacato giurisdizionale della Corte di Giustizia 7.5. Conclusioni: conferme e nuove tendenze interpretative Riferimenti bibliografici Indice degli autori Lista degli acronimi AEEGSI -Autorità per l'energia elettrica il gas e il sistema idrico AGCM -Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato AGCOM -Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni AI -Autorità indipendente / Autorità indipendenti AIR -Analisi di impatto della regolazione AIRC -Analisi di impatto sulla concorrenza ANAC -Autorità nazionale anticorruzione ANCI -Associazione nazionale dei comuni italiani ART -Autorità di regolazione dei trasporti AVCP -Autorità per la vigilanza sui contratti pubblici di lavori, servizi e forniture BCE -Banca centrale europea BdI -Banca d'Italia CAD -Codice dell'amministrazione digitale CE -Commissione europea CICR -Comitato Interministeriale per il Credito ed il Risparmio CIVIT -Commissione per la valutazione, la trasparenza e l'integrità delle amministrazioni pubbliche CMA -Competition and Markets Authority CONSOB -Commissione nazionale per le società e la borsa CONVIRI -Commissione nazionale di vigilanza sulle risorse idriche COVIP -Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensione DAGL -Dipartimento per gli affari giuridici e legislativi della Presidenza del consiglio dei ministri DFP -Dipartimento della funzione pubblica
This article contributes to the expanding body of literature on proactive transparency that is in... more This article contributes to the expanding body of literature on proactive transparency that is increasing worldwide in the context of the broader open government movement. Building on the institutional processualist approach, it develops a research framework that seeks to explain the dynamics of proactive transparency. In doing so, it unveils the concatenation of causal mechanisms triggered by the interaction between policy design and contextual features. The framework is applied to the Italian case, where the call for proactive disclosure of information has intensified to restore trust in government in a context marked by the intertwining of fiscal crisis and corruption scandals. In molti paesi le iniziative di open government sono diventate una politica di riforma amministrativa sostenuta da norme e apparati per perseguire, tra gli altri, l'obiettivo della trasparenza (Piotrowski 2017). Nella letteratura di scienza dell'amministrazione dedicata a questa politica prevale una definizione minima di trasparenza, intesa come accesso alle informazioni detenute dalle pubbliche amministrazioni, meno ambiziosa di altre nozioni che associano questo concetto a processi decisionali resi inclusivi dalla deliberazione, oppure resi prevedibili da procedure conosciute dagli interessati (Cucciniello, Porumbescu e Grimmelikhuijsen 2017; Schnell 2016). Il successo di questa definizione minima è congruente con l'impostazione di larga parte dei programmi di open government, in cui la trasparenza è stata declinata secondo la metafora della "casa di vetro": la principale preoccupazione dei governi è stata quella di abbattere le barriere all'accesso al patrimonio informativo delle pubbliche amministrazioni e non quella di rendere conoscibili le ragioni delle scelte pubbliche (Coglianese 2009). Un fattore che ha contribuito alla declinazione della trasparenza come accesso alle informazioni è stato la diffusione delle nuove tecnologie digitali, contestuale al lancio dei programmi di open government nel corso del XXI secolo (Meijer 2009). Grazie alle nuove tecnologie digitali, infatti, è diventato possibile rilasciare grandi quantità di informazioni immediatamente accessibili dagli utenti sui siti web istituzionali delle amministrazioni (Margetts 2009). Ciò ha posto le condizioni per l'affermazione delle forme di trasparenza "proattiva", caratterizzate dalla pubblicazione dei dati sui siti istituzionali (Ruijer 2016). Le richieste di accesso di singoli cittadini sono invece il presupposto per l'attivazione della trasparenza "reattiva", che si è diffusa prima della rivoluzione digitale e che, al suo interno, si divide a sua volta in due tipologie distinte dal valore, strumentale o intrinseco, assunto dalla trasparenza (Savino 2010). Nel caso dell'accesso procedimentale, la trasparenza reattiva assume valore strumentale nel senso che l'accesso ai documenti è garantito esclusivamente ai soggetti interessati che lo richiedono in funzione della partecipazione a uno specifico procedimento e della eventuale impugnazione del provvedimento finale. Nel caso dei Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), diffusi da decenni nel mondo anglosassone e diventati un fenomeno globale all'inizio del XXI secolo, la trasparenza viene invece riconosciuta come diritto a conoscere in funzione democratica . Ciò implica il venir meno delle restrizioni, in termini sia oggettivi sia soggettivi tipici dell'accesso procedimentale: fatto salvo il rispetto di alcuni limiti relativi alla tutela di interessi pubblici e privati, viene riconosciuto il diritto di accesso generalizzato all'intero universo delle informazioni detenute dalle pubbliche amministrazioni, prescindendo dalla sussistenza di un interesse qualificato rispetto a uno specifico procedimento.
When the EU takes the field. Innovative forms of regulatory enforcement in the fisheries sector
Journal of European Integration, 2021
One of the main weaknesses of the EU and causes of citizens’ disaffection is its alleged scarce e... more One of the main weaknesses of the EU and causes of citizens’ disaffection is its alleged scarce effectiveness in achieving its targets among various policy sectors. This, among other reasons, is due to member states’ (MS) lack of compliance or uneven implementation performance, which, in turn, results from the traditional share of tasks, according to which the EU institutions adopt policies, while the MS implement them and enforce them. After many and reiterated actions by the EU, aiming to foster better and more complete compliance to EU law through soft measures and incentives to MS, another trend is emerging, by which the EU is gradually taking on direct enforcement competences in a growing number of policy sectors. Moreover, the ways through which the EU is taking the field in the enforcement phase are many and diverse, ranging from direct full enforcement powers to differently shared and networked roles with the MS and the other actors involved. In such evolving governance, a crucial role is played by EU agencies, established ad hoc or attributed new tasks to deal with enforcement issues. Arguing that such verticalization of the enforcement powers is an expanding trend, we take the fisheries sector as a case study. Among the Common Fisheries Policy, indeed, this phenomenon is already gaining traction and displays a variety of new configurations of powers. We find that verticalized enforcement takes on different shapes, depending on the specific sub-phase of the enforcement process, In addition, we provide insights on how enforcement mechanisms of the Common Fisheries Policy work in practice.
An intrinsic wavefunction with a broken continuous symmetry can be rotated with no energy penalty... more An intrinsic wavefunction with a broken continuous symmetry can be rotated with no energy penalty leading to an infinite set of degenerate states known as a Goldstone manifold. In this work, we show that a dual representation of such manifold exists that is sampled by an infinite set of non-degenerate states. A proof that both representations are equivalent is provided. From the work of Peierls and Yoccoz (Proc. Phys. Soc. A 70, 381 (1957)), it is known that collective states with good symmetries can be obtained from the Goldstone manifold using a generator coordinate trial wavefunction. We show that an analogous generator coordinate can be used in the dual representation; we provide numerical evidence using an intrinsic wavefunction with particle number symmetry-breaking for the electronic structure of the Be atom and one with Ŝz symmetry-breaking for a H5 ring. We discuss how the dual representation can be used to evaluate expectation values of symmetry-projected states when the norm | Φ| P q |Φ | becomes very small.
European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2019
Enforcement of EU laws is crucial for the successful implementation of EU policies. However, how ... more Enforcement of EU laws is crucial for the successful implementation of EU policies. However, how should enforcement be organised? At which level, and by what type of institutions and what implications does the choice for a particular institutional strategy have in terms of legitimacy, organisation of controls and operation of enforcement? These questions have hardly been investigated but are highly relevant for researchers and society. The European Commission has been in search of ways to organise effective application, implementation and enforcement, which at this moment "remains a challenge". 1 This special issue focuses on the institutional innovations in the field of EU law enforcement. It aims at promoting research in the so far understudied field of enforcement of EU laws and policies. Its contributions address the questions ranging from how enforcement has been organised in EU policy fields and what we could learn for future design of enforcement institutions, with a special focus on the issues of effectiveness and the rule of law. It hopes to provide some food for thought and discussion for further research and implementation practice. Law enforcement has long been regarded an exclusive competence of the EU Member States. This has changed in recent years, partly because of major international crises and various non-compliance challenges at the national level. Today, nine EU enforcement authorities (EEAs) have received direct enforcement powers to monitor compliance with law, investigate and sanction for non-compliance. 2 These EEAs, including the Directorate-General for Competition, the European Central Bank and a number of EU
The political origins of transparency reform: insights from the Italian case
Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 2018
This research contributes to the expanding literature on the determinants of government transpare... more This research contributes to the expanding literature on the determinants of government transparency. It uncovers the dynamics of transparency in the Italian case, which shows an interesting reform trajectory: until the late 1980s no transparency provisions existed; since then, provisions have dramatically increased under the impulse of changing patterns of political competition. The analysis of the Italian case highlights that electoral uncertainty for incumbents is a double-edged sword for institutional reform: on the one hand, it incentivizes the adoption of ever-growing transparency provisions; on the other, it jeopardizes the implementation capacity of public agencies by leading to severe administrative burdens.
European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2019
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is one of the ever-increasing policy areas that have witnessed ... more The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is one of the ever-increasing policy areas that have witnessed the creation of forms of “networked enforcement”, meaning enforcement structures in which several national and EU authorities cooperate. Amongst those are a number of legal requirements and applications for sharing data on fisheries between national and European competent authorities. This form of networked enforcement casts some questions as regards the existence of corresponding accountability mechanisms, which serve to legitimate the enforcement activities in the CFP. The aim of this paper is to examine the networked enforcement mechanisms arising from the CFP, with a special focus on the data-sharing activities and the role of European Fisheries Control Agency as pivotal to the cooperation between national authorities, with a view to assessing the gaps of accountability arising from them, and analysing the possible alternative ways to provide the enforcement phase with legitimacy.
European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2019
Enforcement of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) has undergone a three-step pro... more Enforcement of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) has undergone a three-step process over time, leading it to a current networked configuration of powers and tasks between the EU and the national competent authorities (NCAs). In light of this, this paper has a twofold aim. First, it analyses the actual configuration of enforcement mechanisms in the ESFS, arguing that different patterns emerge across the three branches (banks, securities markets and insurance): as governance becomes more complex in terms of number of actors and functions, verticalisation of enforcement increases. Second, by taking into account the three Italian competent authorities, it assesses the concrete changes occurred both in organisation and in perceived effectiveness, through quantitative data and qualitative surveys. It therefore argues that the more institutionalised and verticalised is the enforcement governance, the less reluctant will NCAs be to transfer shares of their enforcing powers...
The American Review of Public Administration, 2020
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that a new and unforeseen threat easily outmatched politic... more The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that a new and unforeseen threat easily outmatched political-administrative systems currently in place. Our commentary on the Italian case contributes to the call for public administration scholars to incorporate crisis management into the main research agendas of the field. We focus on regulatory capacity that is needed to tackle the effects of COVID-19. Under crisis conditions of radical urgency and uncertainty, the Italian regulatory policy has been based on temporary, fast-track procedures. The latter have been regularly applied when Italian governments confront with natural disasters and prompt action is ensured by a repertoire of extraordinary measures running in parallel to burdensome ordinary procedures. We discuss the implications of this “two-track” approach for governance capacity and legitimacy. We also extrapolate existing trends and engage with projection of future developments.
Enforcement condiviso in contesti multilivello: Italia e Unione Europea nella Politica comune della pesca
Gli studi sull'efficacia della regolazione ormai comprendono tutte le fasi del ciclo di p... more Gli studi sull'efficacia della regolazione ormai comprendono tutte le fasi del ciclo di policymaking. Con riferimento alla regolazione europea, i principali nodi si manifestano nella fase implementativa, finora appannaggio delle amministrazioni nazionali. Per porvi rimedio, le istituzioni europee acquisiscono gradualmente poteri di enforcement diretto. Gli effetti del crescente fenomeno dell'enforcement condiviso fra amministrazioni nazionali ed europee sono ancora da valutare esaustivamente. Sorge, tuttavia, una questione preliminare riguardo agli eventuali effetti sui meccanismi di accountability democratica, come noto una tematica di profonda preoccupazione per le istituzioni e la governance europea. La PCP è un esempio della tendenza europea a guadagnare maggiori poteri di azione diretta nell'enforcement, senza, tuttavia, che i meccanismi di accountability abbiano subito modificazioni di conseguenza. Il paper considera i meccanismi di enforcement condiviso della PCP, per verificare se essi si fondino su adeguate procedure di accountability politica, evidenziando lacune riguardo alla legittimità con cui esso si realizza, nonché sul sistema europeo di protezione dei cittadini.
Modelli organizzativi regionali, ed attuazione dei nuovi statuti nelle Marche e in Toscana: un approccio politologico
When the EU takes the field. Innovative forms of regulatory enforcement in the fisheries sector
Journal of European Integration, 2021
One of the main weaknesses of the EU and causes of citizens’
disaffection is its alleged scarce e... more One of the main weaknesses of the EU and causes of citizens’
disaffection is its alleged scarce effectiveness in achieving its targets
among various policy sectors. This, among other reasons, is due to
member states’ (MS) lack of compliance or uneven implementation
performance, which, in turn, results from the traditional share of
tasks, according to which the EU institutions adopt policies, while
the MS implement them and enforce them. After many and reiterated
actions by the EU, aiming to foster better and more complete
compliance to EU law through soft measures and incentives to MS,
another trend is emerging, by which the EU is gradually taking on
direct enforcement competences in a growing number of policy
sectors. Moreover, the ways through which the EU is taking the field
in the enforcement phase are many and diverse, ranging from
direct full enforcement powers to differently shared and networked
roles with the MS and the other actors involved. In such evolving
governance, a crucial role is played by EU agencies, established ad
hoc or attributed new tasks to deal with enforcement issues.
Arguing that such verticalization of the enforcement powers is an
expanding trend, we take the fisheries sector as a case study.
Among the Common Fisheries Policy, indeed, this phenomenon is
already gaining traction and displays a variety of new configurations
of powers. We find that verticalized enforcement takes on
different shapes, depending on the specific sub-phase of the enforcement
process, In addition, we provide insights on how enforcement
mechanisms of the Common Fisheries Policy work in practice.
disaffection is its alleged scarce effectiveness in achieving its targets
among various policy sectors. This, among other reasons, is due to
member states’ (MS) lack of compliance or uneven implementation
performance, which, in turn, results from the traditional share of
tasks, according to which the EU institutions adopt policies, while
the MS implement them and enforce them. After many and reiterated
actions by the EU, aiming to foster better and more complete
compliance to EU law through soft measures and incentives to MS,
another trend is emerging, by which the EU is gradually taking on
direct enforcement competences in a growing number of policy
sectors. Moreover, the ways through which the EU is taking the field
in the enforcement phase are many and diverse, ranging from
direct full enforcement powers to differently shared and networked
roles with the MS and the other actors involved. In such evolving
governance, a crucial role is played by EU agencies, established ad
hoc or attributed new tasks to deal with enforcement issues.
Arguing that such verticalization of the enforcement powers is an
expanding trend, we take the fisheries sector as a case study.
Among the Common Fisheries Policy, indeed, this phenomenon is
already gaining traction and displays a variety of new configurations
of powers. We find that verticalized enforcement takes on
different shapes, depending on the specific sub-phase of the enforcement
process, In addition, we provide insights on how enforcement
mechanisms of the Common Fisheries Policy work in practice.
Public Administration and Creeping Crises: Insights from COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy
American Review of Public Administration, 2020
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that a new and unforeseen threat easily outmatched politic... more The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that a new and unforeseen threat easily outmatched political-administrative systems currently in place. Our commentary on the Italian case contributes to the call for public administration scholars to incorporate crisis management into the main research agendas of the field. We focus on regulatory capacity that is needed to tackle the effects of COVID-19. Under crisis conditions of radical urgency and uncertainty, the Italian regulatory policy has been based on temporary, fast-track procedures. The latter have been regularly applied when Italian governments confront with natural disasters and prompt action is ensured by a repertoire of extraordinary measures running in parallel to burdensome ordinary procedures. We discuss the implications of this “two-track” approach for governance capacity and legitimacy. We also extrapolate existing trends and engage with projection of future developments.
Introduction to the Symposium on Institutional Innovations in the Enforcement of EU Law and Policies
European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2019
Enforcement condiviso in contesti multilivello. Italia e Unione Europea nella Politica comune della pesca
Mercato concorrenza regole, 2019
Gli studi sull'efficacia della regolazione ormai comprendono tutte le fasi del ciclo di policymak... more Gli studi sull'efficacia della regolazione ormai comprendono tutte le fasi del ciclo di policymaking. Con riferimento alla regolazione europea, i principali nodi si manifestano nella fase implementativa, finora appannaggio delle amministrazioni nazionali. Per porvi rimedio, le istituzioni europee acquisiscono gradualmente poteri di enforcement diretto. Gli effetti del crescente fenomeno dell'enforcement condiviso fra amministrazioni nazionali ed europee sono ancora da valutare esaustivamente. Sorge, tuttavia, una questione preliminare riguardo agli eventuali effetti sui meccanismi di accountability democratica, come noto una tematica di profonda preoccupazione per le istituzioni e la governance europea. La PCP è un esempio della tendenza europea a guadagnare maggiori poteri di azione diretta nell'enforcement, senza, tuttavia, che i meccanismi di accountability abbiano subito modificazioni di conseguenza. Il paper considera i meccanismi di enforcement condiviso della PCP, per verificare se essi si fondino su adeguate procedure di accountability politica, evidenziando lacune riguardo alla legittimità con cui esso si realizza, nonché sul sistema europeo di protezione dei cittadini.
Patterns of Networked Enforcement in the European System of Financial Supervision: What is the New Role for the National Competent Authorities
European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2019
Enforcement of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) has undergone a
three-step pr... more Enforcement of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) has undergone a
three-step process over time, leading it to a current networked configuration of powers and
tasks between the EU and the national competent authorities (NCAs). In light of this, this
paper has a twofold aim. First, it analyses the actual configuration of enforcement
mechanisms in the ESFS, arguing that different patterns emerge across the three branches
(banks, securities markets and insurance): as governance becomes more complex in terms of
number of actors and functions, verticalisation of enforcement increases. Second, by taking
into account the three Italian competent authorities, it assesses the concrete changes
occurred both in organisation and in perceived effectiveness, through quantitative data and
qualitative surveys. It therefore argues that the more institutionalised and verticalised is the
enforcement governance, the less reluctant will NCAs be to transfer shares of their enforcing
powers to the EU level and to change their practices and organisational structures
concretely, according to harmonisation requirements by the European supervisory
authorities and the European Central Bank.
three-step process over time, leading it to a current networked configuration of powers and
tasks between the EU and the national competent authorities (NCAs). In light of this, this
paper has a twofold aim. First, it analyses the actual configuration of enforcement
mechanisms in the ESFS, arguing that different patterns emerge across the three branches
(banks, securities markets and insurance): as governance becomes more complex in terms of
number of actors and functions, verticalisation of enforcement increases. Second, by taking
into account the three Italian competent authorities, it assesses the concrete changes
occurred both in organisation and in perceived effectiveness, through quantitative data and
qualitative surveys. It therefore argues that the more institutionalised and verticalised is the
enforcement governance, the less reluctant will NCAs be to transfer shares of their enforcing
powers to the EU level and to change their practices and organisational structures
concretely, according to harmonisation requirements by the European supervisory
authorities and the European Central Bank.