Books by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
RINDAS Series of Working Papers 38, Ryūkoku University, (ISBN 978-4-904945-80-3), 2022
A revised version in English of Yoshimizu 2015, Kumārila niyoru Shūkyō to shiteno Bukkyō Hihan (R... more A revised version in English of Yoshimizu 2015, Kumārila niyoru Shūkyō to shiteno Bukkyō Hihan (RINDAS Series of Working Papers 25), uploaded on https://rindas.ryukoku.ac.jp/publication
RINDAS Series of Working Paper Traditional Indian Thoughts 25, Ryūkoku University, 2015.
Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 25, Wien, 1997
[Excerpt from preface (Vorwort):] If by “organism” one means the systematic interconnection of th... more [Excerpt from preface (Vorwort):] If by “organism” one means the systematic interconnection of the parts of the body that work together for the sake of sustaining life, one could figuratively say that Prabhākara, in his theory of enjoinment (niyoga), is examining the “organism” of the authorless (apauruṣeya) Veda. In his view, the Veda is not simply an eternally static scripture but an active commandment-giver. The decree (codanā) of the Veda, that is, the fundamental injunction (vidhi) of a Vedic sacrifice (yajña), issues an enjoinment, which is transmitted into individual injunctions of the sacrifice, leading the hearer from one ritual act to another systematically. As a result of the regular performance of the sacrifice, the Veda is further preserved. Within the exercise of its ‘organism,’ the Veda uses the hearer’s activity.
In the first part of this work, I present an outline of the ‘organism’ of the authorless Veda presented in Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī. The second part consists of the translations of the selected parts of the Bṛhatī in which Prabhākara, following his commentary on Śabara’s Bhāṣya, expresses his ideas examined in the first part. Because Prabhākara does not usually present his thoughts in a systematic form, I have first systematically summarized the content of individual small sections in the content analysis. In the footnotes, I translated relevant commentaries of Śālikanātha. The topics of the relevant Sūtras can be indicated as follows; Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.1: the verb in an injunction and the force of actualization (bhāva); 2.1.5: decree (codanā) of the Veda; 2.1.6-8: principal and secondary ritual action; 2.2. 13 and 16: sacrificial action and its subsidiary (guṇa); 3.1.1-10: hierarchy of ritual elements; 4.1.1-3: benefiting a human being (puruṣārtha); 4.1.11-16 and 21-24: benefiting the sacrifice (kratvartha); 6.1.1-3: eligibility (adhikāra) to perform the sacrifice.
Papers by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
Gianni Pellegrini (ed.), Section of Philosophy. Select Papers from the Panel on Section of Philosophy at the 16th World Sanskrit Conference (28 June–2 July 2015) Bangkok, Thailand, pp. 56–82. Delhi: DK Publishers Distributors Pvt. Ltd. , 2025
On the Relata (sambandhin) of Inherence and Conjunction in the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha and its Com... more On the Relata (sambandhin) of Inherence and Conjunction in the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha and its Commentaries 17-26 Katsunori Hirano The akartṛtva of prakṛti and other misconceptions in Bhoja's Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary to the Yogasūtra 27-39 Paolo Magnone Nature and Development of Tarka in The Old School of Nyāya 40-55 Satyamurti Paramātman, meditation, and the jñānakarmasamuccayavāda 56-82 Kiyotaka Yoshimizu Abstracts 83-86 Paramātman, meditation, and the jñānakarmasamuccayavāda Kiyotaka Yoshimizu *‖ I‖ express‖ my‖ thanks‖ to‖ Professor‖ Takahiro‖ Katō‖ who‖ kindly‖ showed‖ me‖ his‖ unpublished‖ edition‖ of‖ Bhāskara's‖commentary‖on‖the‖third‖and‖fourth‖adhyāyas‖of‖the‖Brahmasūtra. 1 ‖Cf.‖Yoshimizu‖2015a:‖n.1;‖Yoshimizu‖2015b:‖n.‖33;‖Yoshimizu‖(forthcoming):‖Appendix. 2 ‖ TV‖ 288,16:‖ apunarāvṛttyātmaka-paramātmaprāptyavasthā-phala-vacanam.‖ ‚*These‖ are‖ Vedic+‖ passages‖ confirming‖ that‖ *the‖ cognition‖ of‖ the‖ self+‖ brings‖ about‖ the‖ attainment‖ of‖ the‖ supreme‖ self‖ without‖ deterioration‖ *into‖ transmigration+.‛‖ Here,‖ at‖ the‖ end‖ of‖ the‖ section‖ of‖ grammar‖ (vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa),‖ Kumārila‖ argues‖ about‖ the‖ double‖ relevance‖ (saṃyogapṛthaktva)‖ of‖ the‖ cognition‖ of‖ ātman‖ both‖ to‖ the‖ sacrifice‖(kratvartha)‖and‖to‖human‖being‖(puruṣārtha).‖Cf.‖Kurata‖1980;‖Harikai‖1990:‖140-145.
Kan Ishikawa (ed.), Aspects of the Literary Sources in South Asian Historical Studies, pp. 11–49. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko (the Oriental Library). https://toyo-bunko.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000665, 2024
The present paper presents the conservative arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas for restricting the eligi... more The present paper presents the conservative arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas for restricting the eligibility for kingship to one born in a Kṣatriya family and compares them with the more liberal views of Hindu jurists. Footnote 32 proposes a new hypothesis concerning Kumārila's chronological dates: He wrote the Aveṣṭi section of his Tantravārttika after Siṃhaviṣṇu had defeated the Kalabhras in Āndra and restored the Pallava dynasty (mid-6th century) and before he knew that Kadungon had defeated them in Tamil and restored the Pāndhya dynasty (late 6th century).
Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu (eds.), Burlesque of the Philosophers. Indian and Buddhist Studies in Memory of Helmut Krasser, pp. 895–918. Hamburg Buddhist Studies Series 19. B..., 2023
Introduction: The Vedānta claim of the unity of two Mīmāṃsās In all Vedānta schools, knowledge of... more Introduction: The Vedānta claim of the unity of two Mīmāṃsās In all Vedānta schools, knowledge of Mīmāṃsā exegesis was generally accepted as indispensable for understanding the Upaniṣad. Moreover, medieval Vedānta scholars, especially Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins, called Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta "Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā," 1 and even claimed that these two Mīmāṃsās form a single scholastic tradition (aikaśāstrya/śāstraekatva), 2 constituted by the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MmS) and Brahmasūtra (BS), being the first and the last part of an extensive treatise (śāstra) of exegesis. 3 Since the 1980s, Parpola (1981, 1994), * The present paper is an expanded English version of Yoshimizu (2016b). I abbre viate the Mīmāṃsāsūtra as MmS, and use MS for the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā.
Hiroko Matsuoka, Shinya Moriyama, and Tyler Neill (eds.), To the Heart of Truth: Felicitation Volume for Eli Franco on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, part II, pp. 759–806. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2023
7 TV 378,20-21: abhidhābhāvanāmāhur anyām eva liṅādayah. / arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyātes. ... more 7 TV 378,20-21: abhidhābhāvanāmāhur anyām eva liṅādayah. / arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyātes. u gamyate // 8 An exception is that Umbeka, whom Kamalaśīla mentions as "Uvveyaka" (Tattvasam. grahapañjikā [TSP] 982,18; Thrasher 1993: 158, n. 57), wrote a commentary, T .ī kā, on the Bhāvanāviveka (BhV), Man. d. anamiśra's early work. For the Prābhākara theory of niyoga discussed by Bhat. t. ajayanta in his Nyāyamañjarī, see Yoshimizu 2020-21. 9 Ono 2000: xi. Franco (2019) proposes that Prajñākaragupta's terminus ante quem should be assumed later than 810.
Journal of Indological Studies, 32 & 33, pp. 91–144. 2020–2021
18: evaṃ hi yasya kasyāpi pravarteta sa ājñayā/ na ceha bālonmattādivacanāt phalavarjitāt // "Thu... more 18: evaṃ hi yasya kasyāpi pravarteta sa ājñayā/ na ceha bālonmattādivacanāt phalavarjitāt // "Thus, indeed, under whosever command one may work, one never [works] unrewarded being ordered by a child, a madman, and so on in this world." 8 Cummins (2020: 205) summarizes Śālikanātha's innovation of the theory of niyoga in two points: (i) configuration of the apūrva as the object of obligation (kārya) distinguished from the physical action of a sacrifice; (ii) hierarchical incorporation of the concept of bhāvanā as subordinate to the apūrva. Both points are absent in what Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent expounds upon in NM II, 104-121. Concerning apūrva, Jayanta refers to Kumārila's concept of the temporal apūrva as a sort of potency (śakti) and points out that the Prābhākara opponent cannot resort to this concept in NM II, 126,10-14. Jayanta remarks that the opponent metaphorically calls niyoga "apūrva" and "dharma" in NM II, 126,12: bhavanto hy apūrvaśabdena dharmaśabdena ca niyogam evopacaranti. This remark may refer to Prabhākara's use of the term "apūrva" (Yoshimizu 1997: 96-99; Cummins 2020: 226-227) in the traditional sense of the non-temporal apūrva (i.e., unprecedented or unique form of a sacrifice; see footnote 41; Yoshimizu 2000). 9 In the Śabdaparīkṣā, how to interpret "svargakāmo yajeta" is discussed since NM II, 77,6. 10 NM II, 105,2-7. Cf. Aṣṭādhyāyī (A) 3.3.161: vidhi[-nimantraṇa-āmantraṇa-adhīṣṭa-saṃpraśna-prārthaneṣu] liṅ; 162: loṭ ca; 163: [praiṣa-atisarga-prāptakāleṣu] ktyāś ca. 11 NM II, 109,14-15: liṅartho hi niyogo vākyārthaḥ. sa eva dharmaḥ. sa ca na pramāṇāntaragamya iti.
Vincent Eltschinger, Brigit Kellner, Ethan Mills, and Isabelle Ratié (eds.), A Road Less Travelled. Felicitation Volume in Honor of John Taber, 505–542. Wien: Arbeitkreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2021
The present paper examines how Kumārila applies arthāpatti (propositional derivation), a means of... more The present paper examines how Kumārila applies arthāpatti (propositional derivation), a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) adopted by the Mīmāṃsā school, in the first book (adhyāya) of his exegetic work, the Tantravārttika. The examination leads to the conclusion: when Kumārila applies arthāpatti in postulating a Vedic statement (P) to resolve a puzzling issue (Q) found in the Veda and the Manusmṛti, he consistently demonstrates ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (anyathānupapatti), namely, that Q becomes inexplicable unless P is postulated. This reasoning deductively follows modus tollens, “¬P → ¬Q, Q; therefore P.” This conclusion disproves the view that Kumārila’s arthāpatti as a pramāṇa is a sort of ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE), which abductively proceeds in such a manner that “Q, P → Q; therefore, probably P.” In defending epic heroes against charges of misconduct, Kumārila mentions ‘arthāpatti of behavior’ (vyavahārārthāpatti), which follows the process of IBE. The reasoning, in this case, is nothing but the choice of one of the possible alternatives (vikalpas), and therefore should be distinguished from arthāpatti as a pramāṇa because it does not require ‘inexplicability otherwise.’
Birgit Kellner, Patrick McAllister, Horst Lasic, Sara McClintock (eds.), Reverberations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy. Proceedings of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference Heidelberg, August 26 to 30, 2014, pp. 529–547, 2020
Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā (PVSVṬ) 87,12-17: avinābhāvaśabdo 'py a[*darśanāt] sakalārthabhāk / n... more Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā (PVSVṬ) 87,12-17: avinābhāvaśabdo 'py a[*darśanāt] sakalārthabhāk / nānumāyogyasambandhapratipattiṃ karoti naḥ // yadi tāvad vinābhāvo na sa paścād viśiṣyate / tato 'sādhāraṇe 'py asti sa iti syād akāraṇaṃ // yo hy asādhāraṇo dharmaḥ sa tenaivātmasātkṛtaḥ / vinā na bhavatīty eva jñāto hetuḥ prasajyate // For an English translation, see K. Yoshimizu 2007a: 1080. 2
Malcolm Keating (ed.), Controversial Reasoning in Indian Philosophy: Major Texts and Arguments on Arthâpatti. Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 225-253, 2020
Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 45, issue 5, pp. 973–1012, 2017; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-017-9331-5.
Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by tho... more Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha) is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenagaṇi. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence (anvaya) of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence (vyatireka) of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected (yukta) with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities.
keywords: Dignāga, apoha, word, description, componential analysis, semantic field.
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 62(3), pp.1124‒1132，2014.
J.E.M. Houben, Julieta Rotaru, Michael Witzel (eds.), Vedic Śākhās: Past, Present, Future. Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora 9, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 307‒326, 2016.
Akira Saito (ed.), Buddhism and Debate: The Development of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Background in Terms of Religio-Philosophical History, Acta Asiatica 108, pp. 43‒62, 2015.
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 61(3)，pp. 1085‒1092, 2013.
─ 1085 ─ According to the jJAnakarmasamuccayavAda adopted by some VedAnta scholars, the liberatio... more ─ 1085 ─ According to the jJAnakarmasamuccayavAda adopted by some VedAnta scholars, the liberation from transmigration requires the combination (samuccaya) of cognition (jJAna) and action (karman) , that is to say, one needs not only to gain insight into the sameness of one's self with the brahman but also carry out one's duties such as Vedic sacrifices residing in a secular society. Among the authors of the commentary on the Manusmrti (Mn) , too, BhAruci (ca. 8th c.) and MedhAtithi (9th c.) frequently advocate this position when commenting on the life of the renouncer (parivrAjaka) in the sixth chapter of the Mn. 1)
François Voegeli, et. al. (eds.), Devadattīyam. Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume, Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 643–681, 2012.
Chikafumi Watanabe, et.al. (eds.), Saṁskṛta-sādhutā: Goodness of Sanskrit. Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar, New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, pp. 552–586, 2012.
This assertion seems to have become a standard view in the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila's time beca... more This assertion seems to have become a standard view in the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila's time because the opponents in the Vākyādhikaraṇa of his Ślokavārttika (ŚV) and in the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa (MmS 2.1.1-4) of the TV equally attack this view when beginning to criticise the theory of bhāvanā. 4 In the Vākyādhikaraṇa, however, Kumārila avoids determining which part of a finite verb is expressive of bhāvanā. 5 In the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa, Kumārila presents a complicated discourse in which he first attempts to refute the standard view, standing by an alternative one that bhāvanā is denoted by a whole finite verb. 6 vidyate). The ākhyātatva denotes the intentional bhāvanā (ārthī bhāvanā) activated by human beings, whereas the liṅtva particular to the optative mood of injunctions denotes the verbal bhāvanā (śābdī bhāvanā) issued by injunctions. Although Kumārila calls a finite verb "ākhyāta" without assuming "ākhyātatva" as a part of it, the idea of the denotation of bhāvanā by ākhyātatva may have been, as Kuroda Why on earth, however, is the meaning called bhāvanā, which is expressed as 'One should bring something into being,' proved to be denoted only by the suffix made separate from [verbal roots] such as √yaj?" (kathaṁ punar yajyādīn pṛthakkṛtya kevalapratyayavācya eva bhāvanārtho labhyate bhāvayed iti.) 5 After having presented three alternatives whereby bhāvanā is denoted either by a verbal suffix (pratyaya), a verbal root or a whole finite verb, Kumārila does not decide which is the most appropriate, noting that it is rewarded only with meager results (ŚV, Vākyādhikaraṇa, vv. 248-250; Kuroda 1980: 440).
Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 39, issue 4-5, Special issue on 14th World Sanskrit Conference, pp. 571–587, 2011.
In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevanc... more In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevance to the ontological issues between Brahmin realism about universals and Buddhist nominalism (or conceptualism). It is true that Kumārila makes efforts to secure the real existence of a generic property (jāti) denoted by a word by criticizing Dignāga, who declares that the real world consists of absolutely unique individuals (svalaks : an : a). The present paper, however, concentrates on the linguistic approaches Dignāga and Kumārila adopt to deny or to prove the existence of universals. It turns out that in spite of adopting contrasting approaches they equally distinguish between the semantic denotation of a word and its pragmatic reference to a thing in the physical world. From a purely semantic viewpoint, Dignāga considers the exclusion (apoha) of others by a word as the result of a conceptual accumulation of the sense-components accepted in the totality of worldly discourse. Among the three characteristics Dignāga held must be met by universals, Kumārila attaches special importance to their entire inherence in each individual (pratyekaparisamāpti / pratyekasamavāya). This is because he pragmatically pays attention to the use of a word in the discourse given in a particular context (prakaran : a) by analyzing a sentence into a topic and a comment.
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Books by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
In the first part of this work, I present an outline of the ‘organism’ of the authorless Veda presented in Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī. The second part consists of the translations of the selected parts of the Bṛhatī in which Prabhākara, following his commentary on Śabara’s Bhāṣya, expresses his ideas examined in the first part. Because Prabhākara does not usually present his thoughts in a systematic form, I have first systematically summarized the content of individual small sections in the content analysis. In the footnotes, I translated relevant commentaries of Śālikanātha. The topics of the relevant Sūtras can be indicated as follows; Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.1: the verb in an injunction and the force of actualization (bhāva); 2.1.5: decree (codanā) of the Veda; 2.1.6-8: principal and secondary ritual action; 2.2. 13 and 16: sacrificial action and its subsidiary (guṇa); 3.1.1-10: hierarchy of ritual elements; 4.1.1-3: benefiting a human being (puruṣārtha); 4.1.11-16 and 21-24: benefiting the sacrifice (kratvartha); 6.1.1-3: eligibility (adhikāra) to perform the sacrifice.
Papers by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
keywords: Dignāga, apoha, word, description, componential analysis, semantic field.