Marc Champagne - Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Marc Champagne - Kwantlen Polytechnic University
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Marc Champagne
Kwantlen Polytechnic University
Philosophy
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York University
Philosophy
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Concordia University (Canada)
Philosophy
Alumnus
University of Helsinki
Theoretical Philosophy
Post-Doc
Université du Québec à Montréal
Philosophie
Alumnus
Université du Québec à Montréal
Sémiologie
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I am a Regular (Tenured) Faculty Member in the Department of Philosophy at Kwantlen Polytechnic University and a Senior Fellow with the Aristotle Foundation for Public Policy. I am also the Founder of Certified AI-Free Skills and Knowledge, a non-profit grassroots site that identifies and verifies courses where all graded work is done in person, offline, and on paper/orally: https://certifiedaifreeskillsandknowledge.org/
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Philosophy of Technology
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Epistemology
Philosophy of Signs (Semiotics)
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Philosophy of Technology by Marc Champagne
Needle in a needle stack: How AI causes semiotic inflation, which causes experiential devaluation
Digital Age in Semiotics and Communication, vol. 8 (2025), pp. 162–177.
While most discussions of generative AI center on issues such as algorithmic bias and disinformat...
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While most discussions of generative AI center on issues such as algorithmic bias and disinformation, we should also consider the quantitative sea change brought about by these technologies. Large language models can generate contents at a rate uncoupled from the human datasets they were trained on. Forecasts about such artificial outputs are difficult to make, but it seems clear that the word count and image/video bank of the internet will grow far beyond what humans can actually produce. Although this growth may seem benign, I worry that it results in a semiotic inflation capable of devaluing many human experiences. What connects quantitative and normative considerations is scarcity. The basic idea is simple: When you discover a diamond, you become rich. When you discover two diamonds, you become twice as rich. However, when you discover a stash of diamonds so large that diamonds outnumber gravel, you become poor and instantly make every diamond owner poorer too. Similarly, AI’s vast output risks devaluing experiences that are vital to human flourishing. Adopting a wide evolutionary vantage that gives weight to proven cultural adaptations, I suggest that some situations have natural sign-to-object ratios. Hence, being flooded with too many signs can go against the long-term interests of users. Critics of AI typically cling to features which computers allegedly cannot mimic. Semiotic inflation, however, enables us to accept the possibility of perfect AI counterfeits and still detect them en masse, via their negative experiential effects. Hardcoded features like Bitcoin’s 21 million token ceiling show that “[i]n contrast to the linguistic sign, the money sign cannot be reproduced in arbitrary quantity” (Bankov 2023: 117). Prompted by the rise of generative AI, we are about to realize that non-monetary signs also cannot be reproduced in arbitrary quantity. I thus draw parallels between healthy semiotic systems and the constraints governing viable monetary systems.
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Semiotic inflation allows perfect AI fakes, presenting a challenge in detection while also reflecting on their negative experiential impacts.
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The Virtual isn't Real
Disputatio, vol. 16, no. 72 (2024), pp. 37–67.
The suggestion that we might live in a giant computer simulation seems plausible in large part be...
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The suggestion that we might live in a giant computer simulation seems plausible in large part because the hypothetical sophistication of the hypothetical simulation can be increased to meet almost any objection. From an engineering standpoint, the technological increases required by this strategy may not always be feasible. Proceeding nevertheless from an idealization, David Chalmers argues that the virtual objects and worlds displayed in perfect and permanent computer simulations could be regarded as real because, on those terms (perfection and permanence), our own world could just as well be virtual. I counter that real reality, or RR, possesses (at least) five features that no VR simulation could ever reproduce: RR involves genuinely causal regularities, it is older than any machine, it will outlast any machine, it supports living bodies in ways that cannot be replaced, and thus belongs to an entirely different category than artifacts. These differences are especially robust, since they all grant the possibility of present-moment indistinguishability while halting any collapse or blurring of the virtual/real distinction.
"Responsibility" Plus "Gap" Equals "Problem"
Social Robots with AI: Prospects, Risks, and Responsible Methods, edited by Johanna Seibt, Peter Fazekas, and Oliver Santiago Quick, pp. 244–252. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2025.
Peter Königs recently argued that, while autonomous robots generate responsibility gaps, such gap...
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Peter Königs recently argued that, while autonomous robots generate responsibility gaps, such gaps need not be considered problematic. I argue that Königs' compromise dissolves under analysis since, on a proper understanding of what "responsibility" is and what "gap" (metaphorically) means, their joint endorsement must repel an attitude of indifference. So, just as "calamities that happen but don't bother anyone" makes no sense, the idea of "responsibility gaps that exist but leave citizens and ethicists unmoved" makes no sense.
A Comparative Defense of Self-initiated Prospective Moral Answerability for Autonomous Robot Harm
Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 29, no. 4 (2023), pp. 1–26.
As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-mak...
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As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke's (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments, we think the current debate space can be represented hierarchically, as answers to key questions. We use the resulting taxonomy of five stances to differentiate -- and defend -- what is known as the "blank check" proposal. According to this proposal, a person activating a robot could willingly make themselves answerable for whatever events ensue, even if those events stem from the robot's autonomous decision(s). This blank check solution was originally proposed in the context of automated warfare (Champagne & Tonkens 2015), but we extend it to cover all robots. We argue that, because moral answerability in the blank check is accepted voluntarily and before bad outcomes are known, it proves superior to alternative ways of assigning blame. We end by highlighting how, in addition to being just, this selfinitiated and prospective moral answerability for robot harm provides deterrence that the four other stances cannot match.
Bridging the Responsibility Gap in Automated Warfare
Philosophy and Technology, vol. 28, no. 1 (March 2015) pp. 125–137.
Sparrow argues that military robots capable of making their own decisions would be independent en...
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Sparrow argues that military robots capable of making their own decisions would be independent enough to allow us denial for their actions, yet too unlike us to be the targets of meaningful blame or praise—thereby fostering what Matthias has dubbed “the responsibility gap.” We agree with Sparrow that someone must be held responsible for all actions taken in a military conflict. That said, we think Sparrow overlooks the possibility of what we term “blank check” responsibility: A person of sufficiently high standing could accept responsibility for the actions of autonomous robotic devices—even if that person could not be causally linked to those actions besides this prior agreement. The basic intuition behind our proposal is that humans can impute relations even when no other form of contact can be established. The missed alternative we want to highlight, then, would consist in an exchange: Social prestige in the occupation of a given office would come at the price of signing away part of one's freedoms to a contingent and unpredictable future guided by another (in this case, artificial) agency.
The Mandatory Ontology of Robot Responsibility
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol. 30, no. 3 (2021), pp. 448–454.
Do we suddenly become justified in treating robots like humans by positing new notions like “arti...
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Do we suddenly become justified in treating robots like humans by positing new notions like “artificial moral agency” and “artificial moral responsibility”? I answer no. Or, to be more precise, I argue that such notions may become philosophically acceptable only after crucial metaphysical issues have been addressed. My main claim, in sum, is that “artificial moral responsibility” betokens moral responsibility to the same degree that a “fake orgasm” betokens an orgasm.
Robot Lives Matter? The Coming Issue that will Tear Liberalism Asunder
Forthcoming in The Palgrave Handbook of Classical Liberalism, edited by Leslie Marsh, Mikayla Novak, and Mark Pennington. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
The issue of whether to grant legal and moral rights to artificial intelligence and robots is poi...
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The issue of whether to grant legal and moral rights to artificial intelligence and robots is poised to become politically significant, as evidenced by recent legislation regarding “electronic persons” and prominent academics who frame the denial of such rights as analogous to past forms of discrimination. Moving away from the usual concern with AI and economic planning, this chapter explores how the blurring line between humans and machines enables new forms of attachment, manipulation, and social influence. These developments challenge classical liberal principles such as autonomy, rule of law, and limited government. A tension arises between judging entities by their physical nature versus their perceived characteristics. Evolved emotional responses favor the latter, potentially leading to widespread acceptance of robot rights regardless of metaphysical realities. This propensity, combined with social justice movements, risk destabilizing a longstanding political consensus. The chapter concludes by suggesting that classical liberalism presently lacks the conceptual resources to address these challenges.
Invasive Technologies and Endangered Experiences (book manuscript)
In this book, I use a mix of logical argumentation, phenomenological attention, and myth interpre...
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In this book, I use a mix of logical argumentation, phenomenological attention, and myth interpretation to champion caution in the face of uncritical consumption. If forced to choose, I would pick meaningful inefficiency over meaningless efficiency. Unfortunately, questioning technological development often gets dismissed as “Luddism.” As a philosopher trained to examine arguments on all sides of an issue, I do not find this lopsidedness helpful. Things would not turn out well for a driver if their car could not slow down, stop, or go in reverse. So, when it comes to technology, I aim to make those three moves respectable and feasible.
Diagrams and Alien Ways of Thinking
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 75 (2019), pp. 12–22.
The recent wave of data on exoplanets lends support to METI ventures (Messaging to Extra-Terrestr...
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The recent wave of data on exoplanets lends support to METI ventures (Messaging to Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence), insofar as the more exoplanets we find, the more likely it is that “exominds” await our messages. Yet, despite these astronomical advances, there are presently no well-confirmed tests against which to check the design of interstellar messages. In the meantime, the best we can do is distance ourselves from terracentric assumptions. There is no reason, for example, to assume that all inferential abilities are language-like. With that in mind, I argue that logical reasoning does not have to be couched in symbolic notation. In diagrammatic reasoning, inferences are underwritten, not by rules, but by transformations of self-same qualitative signs. I use the Existential Graphs of C. S. Peirce to show this. Since diagrams are less dependent on convention and might even be generalized to cover non-visual senses, I argue that METI researchers should add some form of diagrammatic representations to their repertoire. Doing so can shed light, not just on alien minds, but on the deepest structures of reasoning itself.
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The number of exoplanets supports the plausibility of civilizations using the Drake Equation framework.
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Other Stars, Other Planets, and Other Life: A Primer that Goes Two-thirds of the Way
Metascience, vol. 30, no. 1 (2021), pp. 153–156.
Thanks to advances in astronomical measurement and computer modeling, “now we know thousands of w...
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Thanks to advances in astronomical measurement and computer modeling, “now we know thousands of worlds” (Deacon 2020, 7). By contrast, “in 1990 all we could say was that one star, the Sun, out of hundreds of billions, definitely hosted planets” (ibid., 18). The word “definitely” does a lot of work here. Knowledge does not require, and indeed rarely attains, certainty, so we might rephrase the foregoing as “in 1990 all we could say with sufficient assurance was that one star, the Sun, out of hundreds of billions, hosted planets”. Yet, long before recent breakthroughs, many suspected that other planets orbited other stars...
Putting Aside One’s Natural Attitude — and Smartphone — to see what Matters More Clearly
Phaneroscopy and Phenomenology: A Neglected Chapter in the History of Ideas, edited by Mohammad Shafiei and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, pp. 25–55. Cham: Springer.
Peirce and Husserl both realized that our habits and habitual conceptions, though vital to the su...
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Peirce and Husserl both realized that our habits and habitual conceptions, though vital to the success of most activities, nevertheless occlude large portions of the experiential canvass. So, unless preparatory work puts us in the right mindset, we risk perceiving the world—not as it is—but rather as we expect it to be. While Peirce and Husserl were predominantly concerned with supplying a better observational basis for inquiries like science, semiotics, and mathematics, I draw on their phaneroscopic/phenomenological tools to combat the addictive and mind-narrowing effects of technology. I go over several examples to show how, when we (try to) rid ourselves of presuppositions and relax the pursuit of efficiency, we enable contemplative possibilities conducive to flourishing and the pursuit of meaning. My overall message is that, in an age when we increasingly depend on devices like Smartphones (and soon VR) to form flat and one-sided worldviews, re-establishing an unmediated contact with our everyday surroundings can have tangible existential benefits, nipping in the bud tyrannical trends as well as wasted lives.
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Phenomenology facilitates comfort within the mundane, revealing its significant contributions beyond original scientific goals.
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Philosophy of Mind by Marc Champagne
Can I Prevent you from Entering my Mind?
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, vol. 12, no. 1 (2013), pp. 145-162.
Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “though...
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Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive the boundary between self and other. However, I argue that (1) the idea of unearthing an exception to the Cartesian thesis is, on further reflection, not a realistic prospect and that (2) this casts doubt on the attempt to conjoin first-person phenomenology and third-person cognitive science in the service of philosophical debates.
Just Do It: Schopenhauer and Peirce on the Immediacy of Agency
Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 2014), pp. 209–232.
In response to the claim that our sense of will is illusory, some philosophers have called for a ...
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In response to the claim that our sense of will is illusory, some philosophers have called for a better understanding of the phenomenology of agency. Although I am broadly sympathetic with the tenor of this response, I question whether the positive-theoretic blueprint it promotes truly heralds a tenable undertaking. Marshaling a Schopenhauerian insight, I examine the possibility that agency might not be amenable to phenomenological description. Framing this thesis in terms of Charles S. Peirce’s semiotic framework, I suggest a way to integrate the idea of streaming experiences with that of bodily strivings, which, owing to their primitive structure, can never be represented.
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Experimental studies reveal retrospective inferences challenge the notion of mental causation in agency, suggesting introspective reliability issues.
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Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Iconicity Instead of Indexicality
Dialogue (Cambridge University Press), vol. 53, no. 1 (March 2014), pp. 135-182.
This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconic...
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This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. While a theorist like David Papineau is independently coming to something akin to iconicity, I think some of the awkwardness that plagues his account would be remedied by transitioning to a more inclusive philosophy of signs.
Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects
Springer
, 2018
It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by scie...
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It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy.
The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound.
Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.
Why it is impossible to explain the feel of orgasms or the taste of durian to a person who did not experience either
The American Journal of Semiotics, vol. 35, nos. 3–4 (2019), pp. 443–462.
I will be talking about the limits of cognitive science. I won’t be talking about contingent shor...
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I will be talking about the limits of cognitive science. I won’t be talking about contingent shortcomings that could perhaps be remedied with, say, more time, resources, or ingenuity. Rather, I will be concerned with limitations that are “baked into” the very enterprise. The main blind spot, I will argue, is consciousness—but not for the reasons typically given...
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Acknowledges that improvements in describing consciousness can't capture experiential quality due to inherent limitations.
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Can Pragmatists Believe in Qualia? The Founder of Pragmatism Certainly Did…
Cybernetics and Human Knowing, vol. 23, no. 2 (2016), pp. 39–49.
C. S. Peirce is often credited as a forerunner of the verificationist theory of meaning. In his e...
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C. S. Peirce is often credited as a forerunner of the verificationist theory of meaning. In his early pragmatist papers, Peirce did say that if we want to make our ideas clear(er), then we should look downstream to their actual and future effects. For many who work in philosophy of mind, this is enough to endorse functionalism and dismiss the whole topic of qualia. It complexifies matters, however, to consider that the term qualia was introduced by the founder of pragmatism himself. Peirce was adamant that only triadic relations can support language and cognition. Even so, he insisted on purely logical grounds that, when we analyze triadic signs all the way, we are left with a qualitative residue he called Firstness. Such an isolated relatum could never be studied experimentally. Yet, given that this primitive state can be confirmed by means of a formal or prescissive distinction, I believe the Peircean account can do justice to many of the intuitions that generate the so-called hard problem of consciousness. My goal, then, is to show that Peirce's semiotic commitment to qualia is compatible with his foundational statements about pragmatism.
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Peirce's semiotic theory asserts the qualitative aspect of consciousness eludes scientific measurement, challenging functionalist views.
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Choosing between the Long and Short Informational Routes to Psychological Explanation
Philosophical Psychology, vol. 26, no. 1 (February 2013), pp. 129-138.
Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential...
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Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential theories of Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland in information-theoretic terms. Dennett makes much of the fact that the morphological shorthand which emerges before a witness as she looks upon cohesive aggregates of matter commands some measure of predictive power. This, for him, speaks against eliminating recourse to an intentional vocabulary. By contrast, the eliminative materialism defended by Churchland does not gloss such informational compressibility as an explanatory desideratum, and thus regards the informational noise which accrues at higher levels of description as patently unacceptable. Yet, since it is unlikely, as Ross et al. (2007) have recently suggested, that anything remains once we subtract the appeal to patterns, I argue that the ubiquity of informational compression in scientific explanation seriously undermines the claim that talk of the mental could be eliminated.
Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission instead of Reification
Dialogue (Cambridge University Press), vol. 48, no. 1 (March 2009), pp. 145-183.
This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explana...
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This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explanatory gap" that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel's revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block's controversial claim that we should countenance a "phenomenal module" which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences.
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Prescission and the notion of tone offer a path to a satisfactory theoretical account of conscious experience.
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Some Semiotic Constraints on Metarepresentational Accounts of Consciousness
Proceedings of the Semiotic Society of America, ed. by John N. Deely and Leonard G. Sbrocchi, pp. 557-564. New York, Ottawa, and Toronto: Legas Press, 2009.
"Representation" is one of those Janus-faced terms that seems blatantly obvious when used in a ca...
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"Representation" is one of those Janus-faced terms that seems blatantly obvious when used in a casual or pre-theoretic manner, but which reveals itself far more slippery when attentively studied. Any allusion to "metarepresentation," it would then seem, only compounds these difficulties. Taking the metarepresentationalist framework in its roughest outline as our point of departure, we shall instead try to articulate four key "structural" features that appear binding for any such theory.
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