Papers by Marc Kissel
Written in response to news coverage of sexual harassment. This is no longer online but wanted to... more Written in response to news coverage of sexual harassment. This is no longer online but wanted to share in case anyone is interested.
While anthropology is often concerned with the question of how humans make meaning in the world, ... more While anthropology is often concerned with the question of how humans make meaning in the world, paleoanthropologists tend to avoid questions of human dis-tinctiveness. This is not to say that there are not many hypotheses explaining human origins, only that there is a tendency to see the answer in terms of a specific evolutionary change. This research agenda is often couched in terms of the origins of 'behavioral modernity' as the key event making 'us' human. Here we present a brief overview of how researchers have used the concept of a 'symbol' to contextualize the debate. Then, we move to examining the archaeological record for indicators of when members of the human lineage began to produce and expand their cultural niche via symbolic means. Over the course of our evolution humans developed distinctive capacities to navigate social networks, live in complex communities, and interact with the biotic and abiotic world through symbol making. We propose that this process, in part, can be described as the evolution of human wisdom.
Richerson et al. provide a much needed roadmap for assessing
cultural group selection (CGS) theor... more Richerson et al. provide a much needed roadmap for assessing
cultural group selection (CGS) theory and for applying it to understanding
variation between contemporary human groups. However, the current
proposal lacks connection to relevant evidence from the human
evolutionary record and requires a better integration with contemporary evolutionary theory.
The mandibular fragments from Lothagam (KNM-LT 329) and Tabarin (KNM-TH 13150) were once consider... more The mandibular fragments from Lothagam (KNM-LT 329) and Tabarin (KNM-TH 13150) were once considered
plausible candidates for status as the earliest hominin (e.g., Kramer 1986; Ward and Hill 1987). Recent fieldwork,
though, has lessened the relevance of these fossils by recovering samples from horizons more than two million
years earlier. Yet despite the increase of comparative samples, these two mandibular fragments remain difficult
to diagnose. Here we consider the morphology and dental metrics of these two specimens in comparison to the
larger samples of Miocene and early Pliocene hominins recovered during the last fifteen years. We show, based on
molar size, that KNM-TH 13150 is consistent with the hypodigm of Ardipithecus, while the Lothagam mandible is
not consistent with Ardipithecus in its molar dimensions. These results have important biogeographic implications
and hint at a more complex Early Pliocene hominin phylogeny than previously appreciated
Posters by Marc Kissel
When humans gained the capacity for the complex
decision-making necessary for navigating social &... more When humans gained the capacity for the complex
decision-making necessary for navigating social & symbolic
networks is an open question, which requires a framework
for evaluating Pleistocene human communities. However,
there is still little known about the temporal and geographic
patterning of early human symbolic expression as it is rare
to see discussions of all the archaeological indicators of
modern human behavior in one place. Here, we report on a
database of archaeological evidence of when early humans
began to use complex technologies and produce objects
that may have symbolic meaning or non-utilitarian purposes.
This allows us to test how different populations of early
humans utilized symbolic objects.
Conference Presentations by Marc Kissel
The origins of warfare have been argued to extend far into our evolutionary history; however, the... more The origins of warfare have been argued to extend far into our evolutionary history; however, the actual skeletal evidence of interpersonal violence is quite sparse. Here, we report on the creation of a comprehensive database that contains data on skeletal remains of H. sapiens securely dated to before 10,000 cal B.C. We show that even with a very liberal definition of conflict those sites most often cited in the literature as evidence of “warfare” do not support the assertion of a violent past. This catalog of over 450 sites not only allows for the testing of how pervasive warfare was in the past, but it is the only known, global collection of the remains of modern humans. This database and its eventual online publication in a Wiki-format will provide an exceptional resource available to answer a wide range of anthropological questions.
Papers, Chapters, Monograph by Marc Kissel
Data from archaeology and paleoanthropology directly challenge
the validity of the basic assumpti... more Data from archaeology and paleoanthropology directly challenge
the validity of the basic assumptions of the CLASH model. By not
incorporating a “deep time” perspective, the hypothesis lacks the
evolutionary baseline the authors seek to infer in validating the model.
doi:10.1017/S0140525X16001023, e85. Begins on pg 21
Journal Articles by Marc Kissel
Worldwide there are substantial differences within and between countries in aggression and violen... more Worldwide there are substantial differences within and between countries in aggression and violence. Although there are various exceptions, a general rule is that aggression and violence increase as one moves closer to the equator, which suggests the important role of climate differences. While this pattern is robust, theoretical explanations for these large differences in aggression and violence within countries and around the world are lacking. Most extant explanations focus on the influence of average temperature as a factor that triggers aggression (The General Aggression Model), or the notion that warm temperature allows for more social interaction situations (Routine Activity Theory) in which aggression is likely to unfold. We propose a new model, CLimate, Aggression, and Self-control in Humans (CLASH), that helps us to understand differences within and between countries in aggression and violence in terms of differences in climate. Lower temperatures, and especially larger degrees of seasonal variation in climate, call for individuals and groups to adopt a slower life history strategy, a greater focus on the future (vs. present), and a stronger focus on self-control. The CLASH model further outlines that slow life strategy, future orientation, and strong self-control are important determinants of inhibiting aggression and violence. We also discuss how CLASH differs from other recently developed models that emphasize climate differences for understanding conflict. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and societal importance of climate in shaping individual and societal differences in aggression and violence.
Books by Marc Kissel
Emergent Warfare in Our Evolutionary Past, 2018
Why do we fight? Have we always been fighting one another? This book examines the origins and dev... more Why do we fight? Have we always been fighting one another? This book examines the origins and development of human forms of organized violence from an anthropological and archaeological perspective. Kim and Kissel argue that human warfare is qualitatively different from forms of lethal, intergroup violence seen elsewhere in the natural world, and that its emergence is intimately connected to how humans evolved and to the emergence of human nature itself.
Why do we fight? Have we always been fighting one another? This book examines the origins and dev... more Why do we fight? Have we always been fighting one another? This book examines the origins and development of human forms of organized violence from an anthropological and archaeological perspective. Kim and Kissel argue that human warfare is qualitatively different from forms of lethal, intergroup violence seen elsewhere in the natural world, and that its emergence is intimately connected to how humans evolved and to the emergence of human nature itself.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2017
The proportions of individuals involved in intergroup coalitional conflict, measured by war group... more The proportions of individuals involved in intergroup coalitional conflict, measured by war group size (W), conflict casualties (C), and overall group conflict deaths (G), have declined with respect to growing populations, implying that states are less violent than small-scale societies. We argue that these trends are better explained by scaling laws shared by both past and contemporary societies regardless of social organization, where group population (P) directly determines W and indirectly determines C and G. W is shown to be a power law function of P with scaling exponent X [demographic conflict investment (DCI)]. C is shown to be a power law function of W with scaling exponent Y [conflict lethality (CL)]. G is shown to be a power law function of P with scaling exponent Z [group conflict mortality (GCM)]. Results show that, while W/P and G/P decrease as expected with increasing P, C/W increases with growing W. Small-scale societies show higher but more variance in DCI and CL than contemporary states. We find no significant differences in DCI or CL between small-scale societies and contemporary states undergoing drafts or conflict, after accounting for variance and scale. We calculate relative measures of DCI and CL applicable to all societies that can be tracked over time for one or multiple actors. In light of the recent global emergence of populist, nationalist, and sectarian violence, our comparison-focused approach to DCI and CL will enable better models and analysis of the landscapes of violence in the 21st century. population scaling | war group size | conflict casualties | conflict investment | conflict lethality N umerous recent publications have addressed the long-term history of human violence to understand both its evolutionary significance (1–3) and how differing social institutions and organizational principles impact the frequency and severity of coali-tional violence or warfare (4, 5). It is variously argued that the modern world is less violent than what was the case for much of human prehistory (6–10) or alternatively, that the development of modern state institutions and economic forms has spurred increases in violence (11, 12). These debates focus largely around two variables: (i) the frequency with which conflicts occur and (ii) the proportion of any given social group (the unit from which a war group is drawn for purposes of this paper) that is engaged in violence and what proportions of those engaged or exposed are killed by violent acts. Ethnographic data suggest that, in small-scale societies, both participation in coalitional violence (proportional war group size) (Fig. 1) and the proportion of those killed are often higher than comparable rates observed in modern state conflict (5, 8). Some researchers consequently argue (i) that more individuals were exposed to violence in the past than at present (5) and (ii) that prehistoric violence was less constrained than modern violence, with fewer limits on the individuals and how many individuals were targeted and potentially killed (5, 6, 8). Prior studies have shown that both size and frequency of conflicts obey a log–log scaling law (13–15) and that population size and casualties follow a similar logarithmic relationship (16). These prior studies have focused only on periods of major or active conflict. Here, we expand on these results by examining the relationship between proportional participation in conflict [the ratio of war group size (W) to population (P)] and resulting deaths [overall group conflict deaths (G) as a proportion of war group size]. Notably, we find that, when modern states not actively engaged in conflict are included, a strong sublinear log–log relationship exists between population size and war group size, while casualties are driven by war group size and are not directly driven by population. The relationship between war group size and casualties is supralinear, suggesting that large populations (usually states) generate more casualties per combatant than in ethnographically observed small-scale societies or in historical states. Modeling Scaling Relationships Between Population, War Group Size, and Conflict Casualties or Deaths We propose that trends in size and proportions of both W and G are better explained by scaling relationships between P, W, G, and conflict casualties (C). In other words, we argue that population size is a significant driver of conflict investment, casualties , and deaths. By population (P), we mean the total number of individuals in the social unit (settlement, society, ethnic group, polity, city, kingdom, empire, state, or nation state) from which a war group is drawn and within which the casualties are generated. Decreasing proportions of W/P and G/P in more complex societies as opposed to small-scale societies might be the incidental product of the organizational needs and logistical constraints of different populations rather than the outcome of any measureable decrease in overall violence, increased investment in processes and institutions, and/or the " profitability of peace. " The scaling laws outlined here are analogous to allometric scaling properties observed in biological and social systems. For Significance Recent views on violence emphasize the decline in proportions of war groups and casualties to populations over time and conclude that past small-scale societies were more violent than contemporary states. In this paper, we argue that these trends are better explained through scaling relationships between population and war group size and between war group size and conflict casualties. We test these relationships and develop measures of conflict investment and lethality that are applicable to societies across space and time. When scaling is accounted for, we find no difference in conflict investment or lethality between small-scale and state societies. Given the lack of population data for past societies, we caution against using archaeological cases of episodic conflicts to measure past violence.
Uploads
Papers by Marc Kissel
cultural group selection (CGS) theory and for applying it to understanding
variation between contemporary human groups. However, the current
proposal lacks connection to relevant evidence from the human
evolutionary record and requires a better integration with contemporary evolutionary theory.
plausible candidates for status as the earliest hominin (e.g., Kramer 1986; Ward and Hill 1987). Recent fieldwork,
though, has lessened the relevance of these fossils by recovering samples from horizons more than two million
years earlier. Yet despite the increase of comparative samples, these two mandibular fragments remain difficult
to diagnose. Here we consider the morphology and dental metrics of these two specimens in comparison to the
larger samples of Miocene and early Pliocene hominins recovered during the last fifteen years. We show, based on
molar size, that KNM-TH 13150 is consistent with the hypodigm of Ardipithecus, while the Lothagam mandible is
not consistent with Ardipithecus in its molar dimensions. These results have important biogeographic implications
and hint at a more complex Early Pliocene hominin phylogeny than previously appreciated
Posters by Marc Kissel
decision-making necessary for navigating social & symbolic
networks is an open question, which requires a framework
for evaluating Pleistocene human communities. However,
there is still little known about the temporal and geographic
patterning of early human symbolic expression as it is rare
to see discussions of all the archaeological indicators of
modern human behavior in one place. Here, we report on a
database of archaeological evidence of when early humans
began to use complex technologies and produce objects
that may have symbolic meaning or non-utilitarian purposes.
This allows us to test how different populations of early
humans utilized symbolic objects.
Conference Presentations by Marc Kissel
Papers, Chapters, Monograph by Marc Kissel
the validity of the basic assumptions of the CLASH model. By not
incorporating a “deep time” perspective, the hypothesis lacks the
evolutionary baseline the authors seek to infer in validating the model.
doi:10.1017/S0140525X16001023, e85. Begins on pg 21
Journal Articles by Marc Kissel
Books by Marc Kissel