Books by Mart Kuldkepp
This book is a collection of opinion pieces that I wrote from February to December 2022, during t... more This book is a collection of opinion pieces that I wrote from February to December 2022, during the first nine months of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine. Many of them were posted as threads on Twitter, others were also published as separate pieces on blogs or in magazines. They are now being made available here in chronological order.
The topics covered include Nordic, Baltic and European security policy, Western responses to Russia’s war against Ukraine, political developments in Eastern Europe, and related subjects.
The main aim of this dissertation is to investigate how its two objects of research – Estonian No... more The main aim of this dissertation is to investigate how its two objects of research – Estonian Nordic identity and the World War I-era Estonian activist regionalism – were related to each other. More particularly, it is a study of how the idea of Estonia's Nordic identity took form in the context of early Estonian nationalism (Article I), what kind of political expression it found in the activities of Aleksander Kesküla and other Estonian activists during World War I (Article II), and finally, how this period of wartime “émigré intrigue” failed to be integrated into “official” Estonian foreign politics and diplomacy, emerging in 1917-18 (Article III).
In the articles included in the dissertation, these specific questions are given detailed answers. However, another and at least as important outcome of this study is the formulation of these questions themselves: the creation of a factual and interpretative basis for making them relevant and answerable. This is reflected in the fact that much of the overview article of this dissertation is allocated to a presentation of a unified theoretical framework, based on the articles, but is now more coherent and more easily applicable, making explicit the author's theoretical assumptions and facilitating research into similar issues in the future.
The methodological approach used in the dissertation is a combination of political and cultural history, which means that I suggest cultural explanations for political developments and – vice versa – political explanations for features of cultural identity. A novel contribution to the historical research is the attempt to understand the political activities of Aleksander Kesküla and other Estonian activists during World War I as expressions of a certain aspect of early Estonian nationalism – the Estonian Nordic identity. At the same time, this identity itself is understood as an important and integral feature of the Estonian nationalism as a political ideology and movement, which even in hindsight should not be discarded as simply a product of romanticism or wishful thinking.
Modern history papers by Mart Kuldkepp
To cite this paper: Kuldkepp, Mart (2022). The Estonian Swedish National Minority and the Estonia... more To cite this paper: Kuldkepp, Mart (2022). The Estonian Swedish National Minority and the Estonian Cultural Autonomy Law of 1925. Nationalities Papers, 50 (5), 923−941. DOI: 10.1017/nps.2021.86.
To cite this article: Mart Kuldkepp (2021): The political choices and outlooks of the Estonian Sw... more To cite this article: Mart Kuldkepp (2021): The political choices and outlooks of the Estonian Swedish national minority, 1917–1920, National Identities, DOI: 10.1080/14608944.2021.1873930
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2021.1873930
Eestlased ja „eestlase vaenlased“. Survemeetmed baltisakslaste ja nende poolehoidjate vastu Eesti... more Eestlased ja „eestlase vaenlased“. Survemeetmed baltisakslaste ja nende poolehoidjate vastu Eesti Vabadussõja ajal. In: Tõnu Tannberg (Toim.). Vabadussõja mitu palet. Sõda ja ühiskond aastatel 1918-1920 (365−421). Tartu: Rahvusarhiiv. (Acta et Commentationes Archivi Nationalis Estoniae; 3 (34)), 2019.
Scandinavica volume 58, issue 2 (2019), 2019
This article argues that the persistent revanchist feelings in Sweden vis-à-vis Russia over the l... more This article argues that the persistent revanchist feelings in Sweden vis-à-vis Russia over the loss of Finland in 1809 constitute a broad undercurrent in Sweden's otherwise peaceful modern history. The Franco-British attempts to draw Sweden into the Crimean War (1853-1856) against Russia are studied as an example of one such 'critical juncture' that brought Sweden very close to joining a war with the expectation of reconquering Finland. Facilitated by the development of the modern public sphere in Sweden, the war enthusiasm in the Swedish liberal press reflected a deeply-felt national humiliation over the defeat in 1809, but also linked to anxieties over the development of Finnish (Fennoman) nationalism and the possibilities of realising the goals of the Scandinavianist movement.
Emigration and Scandinavian Identity. In: Annika Lindskog, Jakob Stougaard-Nielsen (Ed.). Introdu... more Emigration and Scandinavian Identity. In: Annika Lindskog, Jakob Stougaard-Nielsen (Ed.). Introduction to Nordic Cultures (181−194). UCL Press.
Eesti Heal ja “Meie aeg”: Esimese maailmasõja aegne laagrikirjandus eesti sõjavangidele Saksamaal... more Eesti Heal ja “Meie aeg”: Esimese maailmasõja aegne laagrikirjandus eesti sõjavangidele Saksamaal. II. Akadeemia, 3, 2019, 473−486.
Eesti Heal ja „Meie aeg“: Esimese maailmasõja aegne laagrikirjandus eesti sõjavangidele Saksamaal... more Eesti Heal ja „Meie aeg“: Esimese maailmasõja aegne laagrikirjandus eesti sõjavangidele Saksamaal. I. Akadeemia, 2, 293−316.
Kuldkepp, Mart (2018). Eestlastest sõjavangide erikohtlemispoliitika Esimese maailmasõja aegsel S... more Kuldkepp, Mart (2018). Eestlastest sõjavangide erikohtlemispoliitika Esimese maailmasõja aegsel Saksamaal. Tuna. Ajalookultuuri ajakiri, 2, 60−74.
Hegemony, Liberation and Transnational Activism in World War I. - Lotte Løvholm (ed.). Museum of ... more Hegemony, Liberation and Transnational Activism in World War I. - Lotte Løvholm (ed.). Museum of Care, 2019, 43-48.
. Ajalooline Ajakiri, 1, 2018, 27−65
Norway. History.
Cathy Hartley (ed.). Western Europe 2018, Routledge, 2017, pp. 564-568
Viron ulkomaandelegaatio ja Suomi. Estlands utrikesdelegation och Finland
Viron ulkomaandelegaatio ja Suomi. Estlands utrikesdelegation och Finland. Nuorteva, Jussi; Happo... more Viron ulkomaandelegaatio ja Suomi. Estlands utrikesdelegation och Finland. Nuorteva, Jussi; Happonen, Päivi; Strömberg, John. Pro Finlandia. Suomen tie itsenäisyyteen 4. Näkökulma: Venäjä, Puola, Viro, Latvia ja Liettua (669−678). Edita Publishing.
Akadeemia 8, 2017, pp. 1427-1499
Eesti põhjamaise identiteedi ajaloost. Kõnnussaar, Tiia; Paaver, Triin; Parder, Mari-Liisa; Sutro... more Eesti põhjamaise identiteedi ajaloost. Kõnnussaar, Tiia; Paaver, Triin; Parder, Mari-Liisa; Sutrop, Margit; Veski, Liisi (Toim.). Eesti JA Põhjamaad - Eesti KUI Põhjamaa. Kõned, artiklid, esseed, Tallinn: EKSA, 2017, pp. 31-42.
Siwertz som aktivist: „Elders återsken” och första världskriget. Anna Forssberg, Per-Olof Mattson... more Siwertz som aktivist: „Elders återsken” och första världskriget. Anna Forssberg, Per-Olof Mattson (eds.). Sigfrid Siwertz. En författares uppgång och fall, Karlstad University Press, 2017, pp. 63-83.
Rahvusliku enesemääramise läbi Saksamaa külge: eestlased anneksionistliku Saksa poliitika sihtmär... more Rahvusliku enesemääramise läbi Saksamaa külge: eestlased anneksionistliku Saksa poliitika sihtmärgina 1918. aasta okupatsiooni eel. Tõnu-Andrus Tannberg (ed.). Esimene maailmasõda ja Eesti II. Eesti Ajalooarhiivi Toimetised. Rahvusarhiiv, 2016, pp. 369-433.
Unification with Germany through national self-determination: Estonians as a target of annexionist German policy before the 1918 German occupation
The dominant political force of Germany at the end of World War I was the Supreme Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, OHL), led by generals Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg. It sought unlimited rights for Germany to dictate peace terms, as well as extensive annexations in the East (known as the Siegfrieden). It thus stood in opposition to the more liberal Parliament, Government, and Foreign Office. Nevertheless, the OHL was well aware that in the actual political climate, as the rhetoric of national self-determination grew increasingly important, Germany
had to disguise its real intentions of hegemony and leave the impression that the people in occupied territories approved of Germany’s annexationist objectives.
Despite the fact that the OHL could count on the support of Baltic Ger-
mans in Estonia and Livonia, as they impatiently hoped for the invasion of German forces following the Russian October Revolution, it was necessary to at least leave the impression of involving also the indigenous peoples, Estonians and Latvians. Already in September 1917, a representative body was convened in Courland that expressed its wish to join Germany. Similar declarations were also obtained, more or less forcibly, from Riga and the Estonian islands Saaremaa and Hiiumaa, which had been occupied at the beginning of September.
It was necessary to acquire similar documents from unoccupied areas as well, in particular after the beginning of the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations in December 1917, with both the German and Soviet side competing over the alleged political sympathies of Estonians and Latvians. Even though the representatives of the Knighthoods, and in particular Eduard von Dellingshausen, the head of the Estonian Knighthood, had tried to leave the impression that the vast majority
of Estonians and Latvians were in favor of Germany, it was not enough. As early as November, OHL ordered declarations to be obtained from North Livonia and Estonia, asking for German invasion and the unification of the Baltic provinces with Germany. In return for this type of “self-determination” in a German sense, Estonians were offered the protection of private property, prevention of forcible colonization, equal taxes for all nationalities, cultural autonomy, and the right to
establish Estonian-language schools.
For Estonian nationalist politicians who had been successful in obtaining political autonomy for Estonia within its ethnographic boundaries from the Russian Provisional Government, these promises were, of course, not nearly enough. For this reason, as well as out of concerns for a possible Bolshevik revenge, and a fundamental mistrust of Baltic German propaganda, there were only a few Estonians who signed the declarations asking for a German invasion. A similar failure were Dellingshausen’s attempts to establish closer cooperation with Estonian politicians and officers who were not in principle against joining Germany but whose expectations for the extent of the intended autonomy went too far for OHL and Baltic Germans.
The unsuccessful attempts at increasing Estonian sympathies for Germany resulted in all Estonian non-Bolshevik political parties deciding to separate from Russia at the end of December 1917, but eschewing to apply for unification with Germany and declaring Estonia an independent neutral republic in the face of the expected German invasion.
Somewhat more open to reaching an agreement with Germany were the
politicians and intellectuals in Tartu, particularly the Tartu chapter of the Estonian Country Union (Maaliit) and most likely also the Estonian Democratic Party, which had lost its leader through Jaan Tõnisson traveling abroad. Two delegations from these Tartu circles were sent to Berlin to negotiate with German authorities. The first delegation got only as far as Tallinn, but the other one reached Berlin via Danzig (Gdańsk) and was able to present its requests through the Legation Councillor Richard Meyer. However, the relatively modest demands of this delegation (particularly the equal representation of Estonians and Germans in future local government institutions) were still far too audacious for German and Baltic German annexationists. Thus Meyer’s hope that Germany could mediate between Estonians and Baltic Germans and reconcile them in the land question was doomed to failure.
At the same time as the rise to prominence of the Ukrainian question at the beginning of February 1918 resulted in Leon Trotsky calling off the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations, the Bolsheviks in Tallinn declared the Baltic German ethnic group to be outlaws for having plotted together with German authorities, and some of its members were taken hostage to prevent the German invasion. The decree and the subsequent repressions have been interpreted as the result of the independence declarations of the Knighthoods, submitted to the Stockholm representative of Soviet Russia at the end of January. However, it seems that the main cause was the discovery of the OHL’s signature-gathering campaign. A whole range of new requests for help from Baltic Germans followed. As the self-determination strategy used in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations had lost its importance, the OHL began preparations to continue the invasion on the Eastern Front.
Meanwhile, Kurt Riezler, the German Legation Councillor in Stockholm,
was negotiating with Jaan Tõnisson, who had reached the Swedish capital at the end of January. Just like Meyer, Riezler favored accommodating the political goals of ethnic Estonians at the expense of Baltic German interests. This is why he recommended that Tõnisson be allowed to return to Estonia, and considered it necessary that in case of a German invasion a political declaration would be issued that would have included a guarantee that Estonians would not be discriminated against based on nationality and that their political interests would be respected up to the recognition of the Estonian Constituent Assembly. However, this initiative was unsuccessful due to the opposition of OHL and the Ober Ost military authorities which had at long last been given free reign in the East.
In conclusion, the ultimately pointless campaign for declarations and signatures bears witness to the hypocritical attitude of German authorities towards the question of national self-determination, which they saw solely as an instrument for fulfilling their own annexationist political plans. The probably relatively common hope among Estonians that they would be able to influence German policy—held by Tartu Country Union members, as well as by Jaan Tõnisson who negotiated with the German legation in Stockholm—was thus not realized. The self-determination venture preceding the occupation therefore prevented an orientation towards Germany that, following the October Revolution, could have replaced the primary foreign policy objectives of Estonian politicians: a democratic federalized Russia, or a Nordic-Baltic Union bringing together the small nations around the Baltic Rim. Instead, German policies contributed to the emergence of the idea of Estonian
independence and thus to the declaration of the Republic of Estonia on the eve of the occupation.
This article considers the history of Swedish attitudes towards Baltic independence during the sh... more This article considers the history of Swedish attitudes towards Baltic independence during the short twentieth century (1914–91), focusing primarily on the years when Baltic independence was gained (1918–20) and regained (1989–91). The former was characterized by Swedish skepticism towards the ability of the Baltic states to retain their independence long-term, considering the inevitable revival of Russian power. Sweden became one of the very few Western countries to officially recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states in the Soviet Union in the Second World War. During the Cold War, Sweden gained a reputation for its policy of activist internationalism and support for democratization in the Third World, but for security-related reasons it ignored breaches of human rights and deficit of democracy in its immediate neighborhood, the Soviet Union and the Baltic republics. However, in 1989–91 the unprecedented decline in Soviet influence, the value-based approach in international relations, feelings of guilt over previous pragmatism, and changes in domestic politics encouraged Sweden to support Baltic independence, and to take on the role of an active manager of the Baltic post-soviet transition.
Myten om “den gamla goda svensktiden” och dess betydelse för Estland, Aktuellt om Historia, 1, 20... more Myten om “den gamla goda svensktiden” och dess betydelse för Estland, Aktuellt om Historia, 1, 2016, pp. 53-66.
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Books by Mart Kuldkepp
The topics covered include Nordic, Baltic and European security policy, Western responses to Russia’s war against Ukraine, political developments in Eastern Europe, and related subjects.
In the articles included in the dissertation, these specific questions are given detailed answers. However, another and at least as important outcome of this study is the formulation of these questions themselves: the creation of a factual and interpretative basis for making them relevant and answerable. This is reflected in the fact that much of the overview article of this dissertation is allocated to a presentation of a unified theoretical framework, based on the articles, but is now more coherent and more easily applicable, making explicit the author's theoretical assumptions and facilitating research into similar issues in the future.
The methodological approach used in the dissertation is a combination of political and cultural history, which means that I suggest cultural explanations for political developments and – vice versa – political explanations for features of cultural identity. A novel contribution to the historical research is the attempt to understand the political activities of Aleksander Kesküla and other Estonian activists during World War I as expressions of a certain aspect of early Estonian nationalism – the Estonian Nordic identity. At the same time, this identity itself is understood as an important and integral feature of the Estonian nationalism as a political ideology and movement, which even in hindsight should not be discarded as simply a product of romanticism or wishful thinking.
Modern history papers by Mart Kuldkepp
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2021.1873930
Unification with Germany through national self-determination: Estonians as a target of annexionist German policy before the 1918 German occupation
The dominant political force of Germany at the end of World War I was the Supreme Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, OHL), led by generals Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg. It sought unlimited rights for Germany to dictate peace terms, as well as extensive annexations in the East (known as the Siegfrieden). It thus stood in opposition to the more liberal Parliament, Government, and Foreign Office. Nevertheless, the OHL was well aware that in the actual political climate, as the rhetoric of national self-determination grew increasingly important, Germany
had to disguise its real intentions of hegemony and leave the impression that the people in occupied territories approved of Germany’s annexationist objectives.
Despite the fact that the OHL could count on the support of Baltic Ger-
mans in Estonia and Livonia, as they impatiently hoped for the invasion of German forces following the Russian October Revolution, it was necessary to at least leave the impression of involving also the indigenous peoples, Estonians and Latvians. Already in September 1917, a representative body was convened in Courland that expressed its wish to join Germany. Similar declarations were also obtained, more or less forcibly, from Riga and the Estonian islands Saaremaa and Hiiumaa, which had been occupied at the beginning of September.
It was necessary to acquire similar documents from unoccupied areas as well, in particular after the beginning of the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations in December 1917, with both the German and Soviet side competing over the alleged political sympathies of Estonians and Latvians. Even though the representatives of the Knighthoods, and in particular Eduard von Dellingshausen, the head of the Estonian Knighthood, had tried to leave the impression that the vast majority
of Estonians and Latvians were in favor of Germany, it was not enough. As early as November, OHL ordered declarations to be obtained from North Livonia and Estonia, asking for German invasion and the unification of the Baltic provinces with Germany. In return for this type of “self-determination” in a German sense, Estonians were offered the protection of private property, prevention of forcible colonization, equal taxes for all nationalities, cultural autonomy, and the right to
establish Estonian-language schools.
For Estonian nationalist politicians who had been successful in obtaining political autonomy for Estonia within its ethnographic boundaries from the Russian Provisional Government, these promises were, of course, not nearly enough. For this reason, as well as out of concerns for a possible Bolshevik revenge, and a fundamental mistrust of Baltic German propaganda, there were only a few Estonians who signed the declarations asking for a German invasion. A similar failure were Dellingshausen’s attempts to establish closer cooperation with Estonian politicians and officers who were not in principle against joining Germany but whose expectations for the extent of the intended autonomy went too far for OHL and Baltic Germans.
The unsuccessful attempts at increasing Estonian sympathies for Germany resulted in all Estonian non-Bolshevik political parties deciding to separate from Russia at the end of December 1917, but eschewing to apply for unification with Germany and declaring Estonia an independent neutral republic in the face of the expected German invasion.
Somewhat more open to reaching an agreement with Germany were the
politicians and intellectuals in Tartu, particularly the Tartu chapter of the Estonian Country Union (Maaliit) and most likely also the Estonian Democratic Party, which had lost its leader through Jaan Tõnisson traveling abroad. Two delegations from these Tartu circles were sent to Berlin to negotiate with German authorities. The first delegation got only as far as Tallinn, but the other one reached Berlin via Danzig (Gdańsk) and was able to present its requests through the Legation Councillor Richard Meyer. However, the relatively modest demands of this delegation (particularly the equal representation of Estonians and Germans in future local government institutions) were still far too audacious for German and Baltic German annexationists. Thus Meyer’s hope that Germany could mediate between Estonians and Baltic Germans and reconcile them in the land question was doomed to failure.
At the same time as the rise to prominence of the Ukrainian question at the beginning of February 1918 resulted in Leon Trotsky calling off the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations, the Bolsheviks in Tallinn declared the Baltic German ethnic group to be outlaws for having plotted together with German authorities, and some of its members were taken hostage to prevent the German invasion. The decree and the subsequent repressions have been interpreted as the result of the independence declarations of the Knighthoods, submitted to the Stockholm representative of Soviet Russia at the end of January. However, it seems that the main cause was the discovery of the OHL’s signature-gathering campaign. A whole range of new requests for help from Baltic Germans followed. As the self-determination strategy used in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations had lost its importance, the OHL began preparations to continue the invasion on the Eastern Front.
Meanwhile, Kurt Riezler, the German Legation Councillor in Stockholm,
was negotiating with Jaan Tõnisson, who had reached the Swedish capital at the end of January. Just like Meyer, Riezler favored accommodating the political goals of ethnic Estonians at the expense of Baltic German interests. This is why he recommended that Tõnisson be allowed to return to Estonia, and considered it necessary that in case of a German invasion a political declaration would be issued that would have included a guarantee that Estonians would not be discriminated against based on nationality and that their political interests would be respected up to the recognition of the Estonian Constituent Assembly. However, this initiative was unsuccessful due to the opposition of OHL and the Ober Ost military authorities which had at long last been given free reign in the East.
In conclusion, the ultimately pointless campaign for declarations and signatures bears witness to the hypocritical attitude of German authorities towards the question of national self-determination, which they saw solely as an instrument for fulfilling their own annexationist political plans. The probably relatively common hope among Estonians that they would be able to influence German policy—held by Tartu Country Union members, as well as by Jaan Tõnisson who negotiated with the German legation in Stockholm—was thus not realized. The self-determination venture preceding the occupation therefore prevented an orientation towards Germany that, following the October Revolution, could have replaced the primary foreign policy objectives of Estonian politicians: a democratic federalized Russia, or a Nordic-Baltic Union bringing together the small nations around the Baltic Rim. Instead, German policies contributed to the emergence of the idea of Estonian
independence and thus to the declaration of the Republic of Estonia on the eve of the occupation.