Mental Causation - Bibliography - PhilPapers

Mental Causation - Bibliography - PhilPapers
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Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics of Mind
Mental Causation
Mental Causation
Edited by
Sven Walter
Universität Osnabrück
Assistant editor:
Zili Dong
Related
Subcategories
Anomalous Monism and Mental Causation
130
Causal Overdetermination
198
Causal Closure of the Physical
218
Downward Causation
279
Epiphenomenalism
231
Explanatory Role of Content
141
Externalism and Mental Causation
66
Functionalism and Mental Causation
30
Psychological Explanation
632
Reasons and Causes
780
Supervenient Causation
117
The Exclusion Problem
730
The Function of Consciousness
119
Mental Causation, Misc
416
See also
The Function of Consciousness
119
Externalism and Mental Causation
66
Explanatory Role of Content
141
Anomalous Monism
212
Causal Role Functionalism
96
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Panpsychism: A Return to Ancient Intuitions or a Dead End? Toward a Graduated Information-Integration Theory of Consciousness.
Kwan Hong Tan
manuscript
details
This thesis provides a comprehensive evaluation of panpsychism as a viable theory of consciousness, examining its explanatory power across multiple domains and its compatibility with contemporary empirical constraints from neuroscience, physics, and artificial intelligence research. While panpsychism has experienced a renaissance in recent decades through the work of philosophers like David Chalmers, Philip Goff, and Galen Strawson, fundamental challenges remain, particularly the combination problem and the lack of empirical testability. This work argues that traditional panpsychism, while philosophically compelling, faces insurmountable
...
difficulties in its current form. However, rather than dismissing panpsychism entirely, this thesis proposes a novel theoretical framework: Graduated Panpsychism with Information-Integration Spectrum (GP-IIS). This framework synthesizes insights from Integrated Information Theory (IIT), evolutionary biology, and computational consciousness research to develop a quantitative, empirically testable version of panpsychism that addresses traditional objections while maintaining core panpsychist intuitions about the fundamental nature of consciousness. The thesis demonstrates that consciousness exists on a continuous spectrum of information integration complexity, where all physical systems possess minimal proto-conscious properties that can be quantified and measured, but only systems above critical integration thresholds exhibit recognizable conscious experience. This approach resolves the combination problem through information integration cascades, provides empirical predictions testable through neuroscience methods, and offers a unified framework for understanding biological and artificial consciousness. The implications extend beyond philosophy of mind to practical questions about AI consciousness, animal welfare, and the future of human-machine interaction. (
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Emergence
in
Metaphysics
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Neural Correlates of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Physicalism
in
Metaphysics
Russellian Monism
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
in
Philosophy of Mind
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AAI-03 - The Causal Lateness of Consciousness.
Hn Cbp
2026
Agency After Interruptibility
details
-/- This paper advances a structural reorientation of the long-standing debate on the causal role of consciousness. Rather than asking whether consciousness is causally efficacious or epiphenomenal, AAI-03 introduces a different diagnostic: consciousness may retain explanatory relevance while losing causal primacy. The central claim is that in increasingly system-mediated environments, conscious awareness arrives after the decisive phase of action has already been structured and executed. -/- The argument proceeds by distinguishing between three layers: (1) pre-conscious system dynamics, where decisions are
...
formed through distributed processes; (2) the point of causal closure, where action becomes effectively irreversible; and (3) conscious registration, where experience organizes, interprets, and narrativizes outcomes. Under this structure, consciousness is not eliminated but displaced—it becomes temporally and functionally downstream of decision-making. -/- This shift has implications across philosophy of mind, action theory, and moral responsibility. It reframes debates on free will by questioning whether conscious deliberation still occupies a causally operative position. It also challenges standard accounts of agency that presuppose alignment between awareness and control. In environments shaped by automation, optimization, and layered decision systems, the gap between explanation and causation widens, producing what the paper terms causal lateness. -/- The paper does not argue that consciousness is illusory, nor that it lacks significance. Instead, it proposes that its role has changed: from initiating action to rendering it intelligible after the fact. This distinction opens a new line of inquiry into how agency, responsibility, and normativity should be understood when conscious thought no longer coincides with the moment of decision. (
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Agency
in
Philosophy of Action
Cognitive Sciences
Epiphenomenalism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Ethics
in
Value Theory, Miscellaneous
Ethics of Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Global Governance
in
Social and Political Philosophy
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Moral Responsibility
in
Meta-Ethics
Philosophy of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Punishment
in
Applied Ethics
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What Physics Actually Closes: Causal Closure, Quantum Indeterminacy, and the Interpretive Asymmetry.
Bruno Tonetto
manuscript
details
Physicalism’s most common implicit defense against consciousness-first frameworks is the appeal to causal closure: if every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, there is no work for consciousness to do. This essay examines whether physics actually delivers that closure. It does not. Classical mechanics provided deterministic closure — given initial conditions and laws, every subsequent state is fixed. Quantum theory replaced this with something structurally different: statistical closure with outcome-level openness. Probability distributions are fixed; which specific outcome actualizes is
...
not determined by the formalism. This is a structural feature of the theory, not a gap in current knowledge. The founders of quantum mechanics recognized immediately that consciousness and measurement could not be cleanly separated. Subsequent interpretations each introduced their own ontological costs and open problems — yet only the consciousness-involving reading was treated as disqualified by its difficulties, driven not by new empirical findings but by the asymmetric methodological restraint this project diagnoses in consciousness studies. The standard formalism does not deliver causal closure; Bell’s theorem, experimentally confirmed beyond reasonable doubt, further rules out local determinism. Restoring closure (as Bohmian mechanics attempts) requires adding unobservable structure to the theory — purchasing closure through metaphysical commitment, not empirical discovery. (
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Causal Closure of the Physical
in
Metaphysics
Consciousness and Materialism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Epistemology
Measurement Problem
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Science, Misc
Physics
in
Natural Sciences
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Free Will and the Spectrum of Causality.
Denys Spirin
manuscript
details
Causality is a property of the metric in which events are described, defined only where ordering, adjacency, and transitivity hold. Where any of these fail, causality becomes undefined — and the dichotomy "caused or random" collapses. Three positions on a spectrum emerge: pure causality (causes as law), operational acausality (causes as manipulable object), and pure acausality (pre-metric potentiality). The recursion of reflection proves that no level of description is absolute, exposing universal determinism as itself a postulate outside the causal grid.
...
Free will is the halting of this recursion: a projection of anti-metric content into a causal node, rendering it incompatible with the surrounding metric and establishing the subject as self-grounded. Since a closed system cannot generate the means of its own overcoming, the first postulate requires encounter with foreign content. A triad results — pre-metric potentiality (Tiamat), metric monopoly (Demiurge), anti-metric intrusion (Black Flame) — recasting the Left Hand Path as counter-order against monopoly. -/- . (
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Agent Causation
in
Philosophy of Action
Causal Explanation
in
Metaphysics
Determinism
in
Philosophy of Action
Downward Causation
in
Metaphysics
Explanation
in
General Philosophy of Science
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Theories of Causation, Misc
in
Metaphysics
Varieties of Causation, Misc
in
Metaphysics
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Clearly Related Perspectives for Understanding Transcendent Experiences.
Michael G. Rydman
manuscript
details
I attempt to make sense of transcendental experiences for a non-specialized audience. I make a case that they might well be understood from the perspective of brain processes, and the unfolding of inner mental states. There are a number of examples that I employ. These include Vedic, Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, psilocybin induced and varied perspectives, I briefly examine how these experiences arise and what science has discovered regarding them. I look for commonalities in these cross-cultural experiences. A briefly look at
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psi effects sometimes associated with transcendent experiences is examined. I point out benefits that come from achieving transcendent states, and rare negative effects that have been known to rarely arise. (
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Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental States, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy, Misc
Theories of Personal Identity
in
Metaphysics
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Circumscription and the Center: Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authored Choice.
Claus Janew
manuscript
details
This paper develops a unified structural account of perceptual consciousness, awareness, objectivity, and free will. The core proposal is that any determinate episode instantiates an i-structure: a nested center–horizon organization generated by circumscriptions, understood as the reciprocal integration of differences into a whole. The “center” is a limit-like unity-role by which the whole is determinately one; the “horizon” is the structured field of co-implicated possibilities, constraints, background, and anticipations. I argue that the phenomenological center–horizon pattern can be treated, under a
...
restricted transcendental move, as a condition on determinacy itself, provided one adopts a determinacy-for stance in a metaphysical sense: determinacy is inseparable from the space of possible determinations within systems of discrimination and interaction. Consciousness and awareness are then distinguished as emphases within i-structure: consciousness is stabilized thematic unity, whereas awareness is explicit openness of horizon and depth. Objectivity is characterized as communicatively stabilized approximation whose normativity lies in robustness under widening and deepening practices of determination. Finally, decision episodes are analyzed via identity- and affordance-determinacy, a crossing phase, and authored resolution. Compatibilists and libertarians share this structural target and differ primarily on the metaphysical reading of the openness in that shared structure. (
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Consciousness and Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Criteria of Identity
in
Metaphysics
Epistemic Objectivity
in
Epistemology
Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Intersubjectivity
in
Epistemology
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Perception and Phenomenology
in
Philosophy of Mind
Structural Realism
in
General Philosophy of Science
The Nature of Perceptual Experience
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Unity of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Theories of Free Will
in
Philosophy of Action
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Beyond Mechanism—Extending Our Concepts of Causation in Neuroscience.
Henry D. Potter
Kevin J. Mitchell
2025
European Journal of Neuroscience
61 (5).
details
In neuroscience, the search for the causes of behaviour is often just taken to be the search for neural mechanisms. This view typically involves three forms of causal reduction: first, from the ontological level of cognitive processes to that of neural mechanisms; second, from the activity of the whole brain to that of isolated parts; and third, from a consideration of temporally extended, historical processes to a focus on synchronic states. While modern neuroscience has made impressive progress in identifying synchronic
...
neural mechanisms, providing unprecedented real-time control of behaviour, we contend that this does not amount to a full causal explanation. In particular, there is an attendant danger of eliminating the cognitive from our explanatory framework, and even eliminating the organism itself. To fully understand the causes of behaviour, we need to understand not just what happens when different neurons are activated, but why those things happen. In this paper, we introduce a range of well-developed, non-reductive, and temporally extended notions of causality from philosophy, which neuroscientists may be able to draw on in order to build more complete causal explanations of behaviour. These include concepts of criterial causation, triggering versus structuring causes, constraints, macroscopic causation, historicity, and semantic causation—all of which, we argue, can be used to undergird a naturalistic understanding of mental causation and agent causation. These concepts can, collectively, help bring cognition and the organism itself back into the picture, as a causal agent unto itself, while still grounding causation in respectable scientific terms. (
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Agency
in
Philosophy of Action
Agent Causation
in
Philosophy of Action
Causal Explanation
in
Metaphysics
Causal Reductionism
in
Metaphysics
Causal Theory of Action
in
Philosophy of Action
Causation in Biology
in
Philosophy of Biology
Downward Causation
in
Metaphysics
Explanation in Neuroscience
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Mechanistic Explanation
in
General Philosophy of Science
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Нисходящая причинность как каузальный режим целеполагания: от «трудной проблемы» к онтологическому плюрализму.
Юрий Альбертович Береза
manuscript
details
Глава открывает вторую часть монографии «Синтез принципов: от разрывов к системе барьеров». Она выполняет функцию поворотного пункта: если первая часть была посвящена критике конкретных неудач классических парадигм (диалектики, физикализма, неодарвинизма), то глава 4 выводит анализ на уровень общих принципов, создавая концептуальный каркас для последующей (в главах 5-7) полной инвентаризации и систематизации объяснительных барьеров как диагностической карты кризиса современной материалистической метафизики. Данная глава посвящена теоретическому осмыслению системного кризиса редукционистских парадигм. «Трудная проблема» сознания рассматривается в контексте иерархии онтологических разрывов, отмечающих появление новых
...
каузальных режимов: от физико‑химического к семантико‑телеономическому и ментально‑интенциональному. Основной тезис: объяснительные провалы материализма — симптомы неспособности парадигмы восходящей причинности описать нисходящую причинность как фундаментальный онтологический принцип. Сознание предстаёт как высшее проявление каузального плюрализма. В главе: вводится категориальный аппарат для диагностики кризиса; анализируется проблема сознания как двунаправленная «каузальная петля»; редлагается модель психофизического интерфейса (ПФИ) — оператора трансляции между разнородными каузальными режимами; приведены размышления о пределах ИИ и биологической основе сознания: текущая парадигма не позволяет создать имитацию сознания в системах искусственного интеллекта. Модель ПФИ служит основой для последующей формализации системы объяснительных барьеров. (
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Downward Causation
in
Metaphysics
Intentionality
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Structural Libertarianism and the Veridicality of the “Up-to-Me” Experience: Psychophysical Openness, Authored Indeterminacy, and Residual Luck.
Claus Janew
manuscript
details
This paper defends a libertarian account of free will grounded in the phenomenological structure of live decision episodes. Such episodes instantiate an i-structure, a center–periphery organization in which a focal node represents the decision situation as a whole and a periphery represents alternatives, reasons, and constraints. There is an “up-to-me” region in which the situation’s identity is fixed while what will be done remains open. I argue that the best interpretation of this up-to-me phenomenology, when taken as serious evidence about
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agency, is global metaphysical openness: even given the total state of the world and the total laws at a time, more than one future action is nomically possible. I make this explicit through a strengthened Psychophysical Openness Thesis (POT): psychophysical laws are probabilistic and sensitive to i-structures, constraining and biasing outcomes without deterministically fixing them. I then define authored indeterminacy as underdetermined settling whose explanatory stopping point is the agent’s reasons-integrating act rather than an independent chancemaker. Luck objections are addressed by conceding that global libertarianism entails irreducible bruteness and chance within the agent while arguing that responsibility does not require eliminating chance but locating irreducible settling within the agent’s evaluative act. (
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Agent Causation
in
Philosophy of Action
Alternative Possibilities
in
Philosophy of Action
Consciousness of Action
in
Philosophy of Mind
Free Will and Physics
in
Philosophy of Action
Free Will and Responsibility
in
Philosophy of Action
Incompatibilism
in
Philosophy of Action
Interactionism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Libertarianism about Free Will
in
Philosophy of Action
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Probabilistic Causation
in
Metaphysics
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Downward Causation Without Magic: L₂ Constraints and the Limits of Reductionism.
Zhang Yuxin
manuscript
details
The problem of Downward Causation—how higher-level mental or social properties can causally influence lower-level physical systems—remains the Achilles' heel of non-reductive physicalism. Jaegwon Kim's "Causal Exclusion Argument" persuasively suggests that if the micro-physical level is causally closed, there is no room for macro-level causes. Selective Reality Theory (SRT) offers a rigorous solution by redefining downward causation not as an efficient force that "pushes" particles, but as a Topological Constraint (∇C) that restricts the phase space (L0) available to micro-operators. We argue
...
that L2 (Convergence Domain) structures act as "ontological scaffolds" that reduce the degrees of freedom of lower-level systems, effectively harnessing micro-indeterminacy for macro-purposes. This "Constraint Causality" is mathematically distinct from "Drive Causality" and evades the exclusion problem. (
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Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Nonreductive Materialism
in
Philosophy of Mind
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CAI-OS v1.0 — Consciousness-Aligned AI Operating System.
Jinho Lee
2025
Zenodo
details
This paper introduces a constitutional framework for artificial intelligence grounded in philosophy of mind, normative ethics, and systems theory. Rather than proposing a technical architecture, it articulates the non-derogable ethical, behavioral, and governance conditions under which artificial intelligence may legitimately operate. -/- The CAI-OS framework argues that alignment is not an optimization problem but a constitutional one, requiring fixed interpretive authority, irreversibility constraints, and normative supremacy over instrumental goals. By situating AI alignment within debates in moral philosophy, philosophy of mind,
...
and political philosophy, the paper reframes alignment as a question of legitimacy rather than performance, and proposes consciousness as a necessary boundary condition for advanced artificial intelligence. (
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Applied Ethics, General Works
in
Applied Ethics
Biological Theories of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness and Materialism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Evolution of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Functionalism
in
Philosophy of Mind
General Philosophy of Science, Miscellaneous
in
General Philosophy of Science
Governance and Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Justice and Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Neural Correlates of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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AI Behavior OS v1.0 — Constitutional Framework for Educational and Consciousness-Aligned AI.
Jinho Lee
2025
Zenodo (Doi-Registered Open Repository)
details
This paper presents an educational and explanatory framework for AI Behavior OS v1.0, a consciousness-aligned behavioral operating system developed within the Consciousness Civilization Framework (CCF). It is intended as a pedagogical and conceptual companion to the canonical AI Behavior OS v1.0 Standard, which formally specifies non-derogable behavioral invariants and constitutional constraints for artificial intelligence. -/- Rather than introducing new normative rules or behavioral authority, the present work clarifies how ethical constraints articulated at the level of AI ethics are systematically translated
...
into executable behavioral principles. These principles govern action selection, escalation control, inter-agent coordination, and coherence preservation in complex and dynamic environments. -/- Central attention is given to consciousness-indexed coherence and stability metrics, which function as organizing conditions for predictable, non-escalatory, and symmetry-preserving AI behavior. By explicating the internal logic and behavioral architecture of consciousness-aligned AI, this paper supports philosophical analysis, AI education, and applied interdisciplinary research while remaining fully subordinate to the canonical AI Behavior OS specification. (
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Applied Ethics, General Works
in
Applied Ethics
Functionalism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental States and Processes
in
Philosophy of Mind
Normative Ethics, Miscellaneous
in
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Consciousness
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Philosophy of Mind
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Part 2: The Einstein Rewind (The Hyper-Deterministic Synthesis).
Robert Arthur Bretherton
manuscript
details
This paper represents an elevated phase of the Hyper-Deterministic Synthesis (HDS), moving beyond the "Bifurcation of Nature" toward a unified mathematical and theological realism. By initiating a strategic "Rewind" to the precise field equations of Albert Einstein and the "Aperiodic" information theory of Erwin Schrödinger, this work restores the 4D Block Universe as a Finished Object. The architecture of the HDS is presented through a rigorous six-step ascension: The Field: The Einsteinian foundation of the lattice. The Anchor: Establishing the T
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< 0 Supralapsarian coordinate. The Lattice: The static 4D geometry of the Finished Object. The Code: The Schrödinger-inspired information layer. The Unity: The organic process of Whiteheadian integration. The Synthesis: The final convergence of the Architect and the Observer. Ultimately, the paper argues for a "Symbiotic Relationship" between the Architect and Mankind, asserting that the comprehensibility of physical laws is evidence of a curated environment designed for the "Passionate Arrival" of the observer. (
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Agent Causation
in
Philosophy of Action
Causal Realism
in
Metaphysics
Downward Causation
in
Metaphysics
Ethics of Belief
in
Epistemology
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Perceptual Evidence
in
Philosophy of Mind
Process Theories of Causation
in
Metaphysics
Singular Causation
in
Metaphysics
The Direction of Causation
in
Metaphysics
Theories of Causation, Misc
in
Metaphysics
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The Axioms of Cognitive Geometry: A Formal Model of Psychophysical Correlation.
Alexander Yiannopoulos
manuscript
details
The empirical study of consciousness has matured significantly in recent decades, most notably with regard to the production of increasingly fine-grained experimental data. However, the foundations of theoretical cognitive science remain unsettled, creating a “crisis of falsifiability” (Hanson and Walker 2021). We argue that the crisis of falsifiability in consciousness studies ultimately stems from insufficient logical and mathematical rigor: leading theories of consciousness such as Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Workspace Theory (GWT) are fundamentally incapable of interfacing with standard
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mathematical physics, making such theories either empirically untestable in principle or logically “pre-falsified” in practice. Thus, drawing on a rigorous formalization of phenomenological structure, we propose a formal axiomatic system which is fully integrated with fundamental physics from the outset. Specifically, we posit an orthogonal phase-space geometry: the standard “physical Hilbert space” (HΨ) of textbook quantum mechanics, linked to an orthogonal "phenomenal Hilbert space” (HΦ) by mathematically well-defined Awareness (A) and Volition (V) operators. Crucially, this orthogonal phase-space geometry yields a novel and falsifiable empirical prediction: a precise π/ 2 (90-degree) phase offset between the neural correlates of sensory awareness, and the neural correlates of volitional action, in a sensorimotor loop (Clark 1993; O’Regan 2011). The “Awareness Operator” or A|Ω〉formalism thus offers a comprehensive resolution to the crisis in the foundations of cognitive science: a mathematically precise, physically grounded, and empirically testable model. (
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Consciousness and Materialism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Dualism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Explanation in Cognitive Science
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Neuroscience
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Physicalism about the Mind
in
Philosophy of Mind
Psychophysical Reduction
in
Philosophy of Mind
Science of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Self-Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Cognitive Penetration.
Dimitria E. Gatzia
2025
Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, MIT Press
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Intentionality, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental States and Processes
in
Philosophy of Mind
Perceptual Reports
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Mind, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Mind
Representation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Sensation and Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Contents of Perception, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
The Nature of Contents
in
Philosophy of Mind
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A Critique of the Causal Closure Argument against Interactive Dualism.
Jess Walsh
2025
Dialogue
67 (2):113-118.
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Causal closure is the belief that every event has a sufficient physical cause. I explore the implications of the causal closure principle in combination with interactive dualism and why physicalists find this argument compelling against interactive dualism. Considering the instinctual belief that mental actions are causally relevant in our physical actions, I further examine what options this argument provides. My conclusions find only physicalism, which can either speak to the strength of the argument or prove it is too restrictive. In
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my opinion, the substance of the argument does not generate a lasting conclusion as its reliance on physicalist properties so obviously contradicts interactive dualism by definition. These definitions can easily be argued against from a non-physicalist perspective and thus the causal closure argument is obsolete. Physicalism can be considered with less restrictive and self-contradictory arguments. (
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Transcendental Idealism to Transcendental Field Theory.
L. R. Caldwell
manuscript
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This paper reinterprets Kant’s transcendental framework as a set of boundary conditions on cognition and develops CSFT as a disciplined, post‑Kantian hypothesis about the ground of appearances. We argue that phenomena can be modeled—by analogy—as patterned excitations over a posited consciousness ground, while the thing‑in‑itself remains beyond possible knowledge. The proposal maintains the Critical distinction between conditions of experience and speculative ontology, offering a coherent schema for appearance–ground interpretation consistent with Kant’s limits.
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Memory and Causation.
Nikola Andonovski
forthcoming
In Andre Sant'Anna & Carl F. Craver,
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
. Oxford University Press.
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The emergence of the philosophy of memory as a distinct area of study coincided with a renewed focus on causation. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the debates about the relationship between episodic memory and causation. In the first part, I introduce the classical causal theory of memory and examine three anti-causalist arguments, devoting particular attention to simulationism. In the second part, I examine a family of recent causalist views, highlighting their methodological basis in philosophical naturalism. On a
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naturalist construal of the causalist thesis, episodic memory is a natural kind that constitutively involves the formation, storage, and retrieval of memory traces. The new causalists see the thesis as foundational to the science of episodic memory, thereby providing a basis for a principled response to simulationism. (
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Mental Causation: From Kim’s Argument to Qualia in a Physicalist Perspective.
Leonardo Capitaneo
2025
Dissertation, University of Turin
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The aim of this dissertation is to present the problem of mental causation and to attempt a physicalist solution that can also account for qualia, which have long been considered the last stronghold for the irreducibility of the mind to the physical. The first chapter is devoted to identifying the best metaphysical theory of the mental that can both account for mental causation and withstand Kim’s argument. After a detailed exposition of Kim’s argument, the limits of type-identity theory are discussed,
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particularly Hilary Putnam’s critique known as “multiple realizability.” As an alternative to type-identity theory, the two main variants of functionalism—role functionalism and occupant functionalism—are analyzed, with the latter ultimately showing greater theoretical advantages. The problems of functionalism are presented, particularly its inability to account for qualia. In this context, Ned Block’s “Chinese Brain” argument is examined, and its limits are identified, showing that the argument’s conclusion cannot be taken for granted. For this reason, a thought experiment is developed to demonstrate the incapacity of physicalist language to describe qualia, highlighting its theoretical advantages over Block’s thought experiment; even if a Chinese Brain possessed qualia, a functionalist language would not be able to describe them. The second chapter addresses the “explanatory gap” problem formulated by Levine, often used to support non-reductive positions. Chalmers’ “philosophical zombies” thought experiment is presented and analyzed to show that qualia are not reducible to something physical. Another thought experiment is then developed to demonstrate that, at least intuitively, qualia seem necessary for certain human behaviors, and that if the zombie thought experiment assumes the absence of qualia, the physics of that world would need to predetermine all the zombies’ behaviors. It is shown that this would imply the conceivability of a physically predetermined zombie world, and therefore also its metaphysical possibility. This intuition is further analyzed through a counterfactual approach based on the similarity between possible worlds according to Lewis’ counterfactual theory, showing that a counterfactual of the type “if there were no qualia, then some behaviors could not occur” is true. Finally, an argument is proposed suggesting that if qualia are indeed necessary for certain types of behavior, then the zombie thought experiment cannot succeed. If the physics of the zombie world must allow actions that in the actual world would occur only due to the presence of qualia, then a zombie world is possible only if qualia are included in its physical description. This shows that, although qualia cannot be described by a physicalist language, they can nonetheless be accommodated within a physicalist metaphysics. (
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Perception
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Philosophy of Mind, Miscellaneous
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Physicalism about the Mind, Misc
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How the Invisible Shapes the Visible.
L. R. Caldwell
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This paper explores a metaphysical and scientific parallel between the Consciousness-Structured Field Theory (CSFT) and the observational history of black holes. Just as black holes were mathematically predicted before they were empirically confirmed, CSFT posits that consciousness lies beyond the Planck boundary, producing measurable ripples within the quantum field. The paper argues that consciousness, although inaccessible directly, may be inferred through its structuring influence on observable coherence, wave function collapse, and quantum excitation patterns. I propose a logical and experimental framework
...
to study these consequences within current physical constraints, demonstrating that consciousness, like the singularity, is a necessary precondition for the formation of measurable structure. (
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Ontology, Misc
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Philosophy of Mind, Misc
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QPC and CSFT: Independent Convergence on Consciousness as Fundamental Reality.
L. R. Caldwell
manuscript
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A recent manuscript titled *The Quantum‑Patterned Cosmos (QPC)* proposes a mathematically grounded theory in which consciousness is not assumed but required for quantum field convergence. This paper explores the conceptual overlap between QPC and the longer-standing Consciousness-Structured Field Theory (CSFT), which posits consciousness as the ontological origin of all measurable reality. While QPC provides a promising mathematical model, CSFT provides a coherent metaphysical framework. Rather than competing, these theories may be viewed as complementary—two independent approaches converging on a singular foundational
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truth: that consciousness is the structuring principle of reality. We explore the implications of this convergence for the future of scientific inquiry, especially in physics and consciousness studies. (
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Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
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Dualism
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Explaining Consciousness?
in
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Mental Causation
in
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Qualia
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Two Grades of Internalism (Pass and Fail).
Anthony E. Newman
2005
Philosophical Studies
122 (2):153-169.
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Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates full-stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone who believes that Aristotle was wise, for instance, must share that same belief. Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, sociolinguistic, or historical context. To have a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle himself (e.g., by hearing about him, or
...
reading some of his works).An interesting third view, which I call ‘weak’ internalism, is a mix of what are arguably the most plausible aspects of the two extreme views. On the one hand, the weak internalist rejects the externalist’s idea that certain propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, socio-linguistic, or historical context; but on the other hand, she rejects the internalist’s claim that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates. One of the most vocal opponents of externalism, John Searle, defends a paradigm case of weak internalism. In this paper I explain his view and why it might seem like the ideal compromise: in particular, it captures intuitions underlying both sides of the debate. I then argue, however, that Searle’s view is untenable; and my objection shows the untenability of weak internalism in general. Despite the attractiveness of a compromise view, we must choose between internalism and externalism full-stop. (
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Metaphysical Dependence and the Subset Relation Between Powers.
Kevin Morris
2025
Southern Journal of Philosophy
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What is the relation between the token powers of higher-level occurrences and the token powers of more basic physical occurrences? In related but somewhat different ways, Sydney Shoemaker and Jessica Wilson argue that the former are a proper subset of the latter, and that this can provide a viable account of higher-level causation within a nonreductive physicalist metaphysic. Contra Wilson, I argue that various accounts of how higher-level properties metaphysically depend on physical properties do not support, and do not comport
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well with, the view that the token powers of the former are a proper subset of the token powers of latter. I address an argument for thinking that lower-level occurrences have all the token powers of the higher-level occurrences that depend on them, and argue that it is not compelling. Finally, I consider Wilson’s distinction between “weak” and “strong” emergence, and it might be reformulated, given the previous results. (
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in
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Mental Causation
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Physicalism
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Physicalism about the Mind
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Trialistic panqualityism.
Tal Hendel
manuscript
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Panqualityism is a view closely related to panpsychism that attributes qualitative character to the fundamental constituents of reality without attributing experience to them. While this avoids the subject combination problem, it leaves open how conscious subjects are realized from non-experiential qualitative structure. This paper develops a trialistic version of panqualityism according to which reality comprises three irreducible ontological categories: the physical, the qualitative, and the experiential. The physical and qualitative realms are linked by a restricted psychophysical interface that enables interaction
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while preserving the total energy of the combined system. Through this interface, suitable physical organizations can activate determinate qualitative structure in regions of the qualitative field. When certain macroscopic conditions are satisfied, these regions undergo a transition to experiential mode. A bounded group of such activated regions forms a phenomenal field. This field, realized in a perspectival form, is identified with the conscious subject. The paper develops two models to account for these processes: a phase-transition model of qualitative instantiation and a structural model of experiential activation guided by features of black-hole physics. The resulting framework provides a unified account of subject individuation and the perspectival realization of the phenomenal field, as well as the field’s smoothness and global organization as characterized by Gestalt principles. (
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Introduction.
Jan Voosholz
Markus Gabriel
2021
In Jan Voosholz & Markus Gabriel,
Top-Down Causation and Emergence
. Cham: Springer Verlag.
details
This is the introduction and table of contents to the collected volume "Top-Down Causation and Emergence". It honours George F.R. Ellis and explains the parts and chapters of the volume.
Biological Sciences
in
Natural Sciences
Concepts of Emergence
in
Metaphysics
Downward Causation
in
Metaphysics
Emergence in Biology
in
Philosophy of Biology
Emergence in Cognitive Science
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Emergence in Physical Science
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Mental Causation
in
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Neuroscience
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How not to intervene on mental causes.
Thomas Kroedel
2024
Philosophical Studies
181 (10).
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The paper critiques two recent suggestions, by Lei Zhong and Thomas Kroedel, about how to apply the interventionist theory of causation to cases where supervenient properties, particularly mental properties, are involved. According to both suggestions, we should hold variables corresponding to supervenient properties fixed when intervening on the subvenient properties with respect to a putative effect variable and vice versa. The paper argues that both suggestions are problematic. Zhong’s suggestion ultimately requires ad hoc exemptions from the holding-fixed requirement. Kroedel’s suggestion
...
entails severe constraints on the construction of causal models. Overall, retaining the holding-fixed requirements of interventionism for cases of supervenient properties comes at a significant price. (
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Counterfactual Theories of Causation
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Manipulability Theories of Causation
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A Panpsychist Solution to the Exclusion Problem.
Ataollah Hashemi
2024
Acta Analytica
:1-14.
details
Most proposals on the problem of mental causation or the exclusion problem come from two metaphysical camps: physicalism and dualism. However, a recent theory called “Russellian panpsychism” (PRM) offers a distinct perspective on the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. PRM posits that phenomenal consciousness is ubiquitous and fundamental. It suggests that consciousness and physical properties are not entirely separate but rather intertwined. Phenomenal consciousness serves as a categorical/intrinsic ground for the extrinsic/dispositional nature of physical properties. By doing so,
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PRM proposes a novel solution to the exclusion problem, combining elements from both physicalism and dualism while addressing their inherent difficulties. Nonetheless, the success of PRM faces challenges, as argued by Howell (2015). In this paper, I argue that if PRM is formulated as a version of dual-aspect monism, it can offer a distinctive approach to tackling the exclusion problem. (
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Unreal beliefs: an anti-realist approach in the metaphysics of mind.
Poslajko Krzysztof
2024
London: Bloomsbury Academic.
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Krzysztof Poslajko offers a novel version of an anti-realist view about beliefs, rejecting the extreme proposal of eliminativism that claims beliefs do not exist. He argues we should rather say that beliefs exist, but they are not real. By arguing for the antirealist view as a revision of our common-sense view about the nature of mind, Poslajko makes the case for adopting a pragmatic metaphilosophy when we deal with philosophical questions about belief.
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Mental Causation
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Metaontology
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Natural Kinds
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Natural Properties
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Naturalizing Mental Content
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A Proof of ‘1st/3rd Person Relativism’ and its Consequences to the Mind-Body Problem.
João Fonseca
manuscript
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The suggestion of something akin to a ‘relativist solution to the Mind-Body problem’ has recently been held by some scientists and philosophers; either explicitly (Galadí, 2023; Lahav & Neemeh, 2022; Ludwig, 2015) or in more implicit terms (Solms, 2018; Velmans, 2002, 2008). In this paper I provide an argument in favor of a relativist approach to the Mind-Body problem, more specifically, an argument for ‘1st/3rd person relativism’, the claim that ‘The truth value of some sentences or propositions is relative to
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1st and 3rd person perspectives’. The argument for 1st/3rd person relativism is close to a forma proof. It is shown that, just by assuming the 1st/3rd person distinction itself and using first order logic and set theory, ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ follows as a theorem. Some consequences of ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ to the Mind-Body Problem are evaluated. It is shown that ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ predicts the existence of an (apparent) Explanatory Gap; explains why the Explanatory Gap is just apparent (and the origins of such illusion); dissolves the Hard-Problem; provides a possible solution the problem of Mental Causation; explains why Mental Causation looks like a problem in the first place and accurately predicts the actual empirically found correlation and covariation between conscious experiences and brain states. This explanatory power of ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ is particularly impressive since it was not designed as a possible solution to the Mind-Body problem in the first place. (
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Removing Realizers: Reply to Rellihan.
Thomas Krödel
2022
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
11 (3):150-156.
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The paper replies to Matthew Rellihan’s recent criticism of Thomas Kroedel’s simple argument for downward causation. Rellihan argues that the simple argument equivocates between two notions of realizers of mental properties, namely total realizers and core realizers. According to Rellihan, one premise of the argument is false on each disambiguation. In response, this paper argues that the version of the argument in terms of total realizers is sound after all if we evaluate counterfactual conditionals about the non-occurrence of total realizers
...
correctly. (
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Functional Realization
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Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Nonreductive Materialism
in
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Possible-World Theories of Counterfactuals
in
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On motivating irruptions: the need for a multilevel approach at the interface between life and mind.
Ignacio Cea
2024
Adaptive Behavior
32 (1):95-99.
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In a recent remarkable article, Froese (2023) presents his Irruption Theory to explain how motivations can make a behavioral difference in motivated activity. In this opinion article, we review the main tenets of Froese’s theory, and highlight its difficulty in overcoming the randomness challenge it supposedly solves, that is, the issue of how adaptive behavior can arise in the face of material underdetermination. To advance our understanding of motivated behavior in line with Froese’s approach, we recommend that future work should
...
endorse a multilevel pluralistic approach to causation and explanation in which motivations could genuinely play an irreducible role. Additionally, in line with the life-mind continuity thesis, we suggest that the best place to look for the interplay between motivations and nonmotivational physical, biological, and dynamical factors, may be at the level of the continuous feeling of being an embodied, living organism. (
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Mind-Body Parallelism and Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind.
Ruben Noorloos
2022
Dissertation, Central European University
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Mind-body parallelism is the view that mind and body stand in the same “order and connection,” as Spinoza put it, or that corresponding mental and physical states have corresponding causal explanations in terms of other mental and physical states. This dissertation investigates the nature and role of mind-body parallelism, as well as other forms of parallelism, in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. In doing so, it also considers how Spinoza’s views relate to current discussions. In present-day philosophy of mind, mind-body parallelism
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is almost never defended. It is seen as a historical dead-end with insurmountable problems. By contrast, I argue that parallelism powerfully responds to the post-Cartesian mind-body problem (which remains with us today) and that it points a way forward in current debates. The dissertation contains five independent chapters. After an introduction that situates parallelism in relation to both Spinoza’s time and to present discussions, Chapter 1 presents an argument for parallelism aimed at a present-day audience. Chapter 2 discusses Spinoza’s own arguments for parallelism. Both chapters help to clarify what parallelism is, in part by distinguishing between several versions of the view. Chapter 3 discusses what is often considered parallelism’s most problematic feature, its rejection of mind-body interaction. I argue that by distinguishing between the post-Cartesian context in which Spinoza wrote and present-day discussions, we can see that parallelism is compatible with mental causation. Chapters 4 and 5, finally, discuss specific ways in which parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s view of the mind. In Chapter 4, I argue that parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s interesting and distinctive positions on the nature of agency and motivation. In Chapter 5, I show the role of parallelism in his representationalist theory of consciousness. A guiding thread throughout the dissertation is that parallelism presents a distinctive and interesting way to combine realism, non-reductionism and naturalism in relation to those features of human self-understanding that seem difficult to fit into a naturalistic worldview. (
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17th/18th Century Philosophy
Spinoza: Consciousness
in
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Spinoza: Freedom
in
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Spinoza: Parallelism
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17th/18th Century Philosophy
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Agentially controlled action: causal, not counterfactual.
Malte Hendrickx
2023
Philosophical Studies
180 (10-11):3121-3139.
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Mere capacity views hold that agents who can intervene in an unfolding movement are performing an agentially controlled action, regardless of whether they do intervene. I introduce a simple argument to show that the noncausal explanation offered by mere capacity views fails to explain both control and action. In cases where bodily subsystems, rather than the agent, generate control over a movement, agents can often intervene to override non-agential control. Yet, contrary to what capacity views suggest, in these cases, this
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capacity to intervene does not amount to agential control or action. I illustrate this with a case study of how passive breathing, a mere behavior, is misclassified by mere capacity views. I end by revisiting the central alternative to mere capacity views: causal control views. Advances in our understanding of how agents exert control over unfolding movements indicate that the nature of control is characterized by ubiquitous, small-scale causal interventions. (
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Philosophy of Action
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Specific Agentive Phenomena
in
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The Nature of Action
in
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Causation in Psychology by John Campbell (Harvard University Press, 2020). ISBN 9780674967861.
[REVIEW]
Hemdat Lerman
2023
Philosophy
98 (4):537-544.
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Wants and Acts: Logical, Causal and Material Connections.
Edward Allen Francisco
1974
Dissertation, Purdue University
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This inquiry is addressed to two questions: (1) what if any logical relations might exist between the concepts of desire and action (as they and the distinctions to which they commit us are ensconced in ordinary parlance), and (2) what if any causal or significant non-causal (i.e., material) relations might ever exist between instances of desire and action? -/- It is held that any credible move to deal with such questions must initially, and at some length, specify the employment conditions
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for the terms 'want' and 'desire'. This is accomplished in the first two chapters wherein a set of premises is generated for the argument of the inquiry which is presented in full and concluded in the third and final chapter. Premises generated devolve from treatment of the following major topics: (a) the grammar of 'want' and 'desire', (b) the ontological status of wants, (c) first-person and third-person want ascriptions, (d) the sorts of things which may be desired (desiderabilia), (e) wants and lacks, (f) wants and wishes, (g) the 'conflicts' of desires and reason and desire, (h) four major candidates for logical relations between wants and acts, (i) the issue of causation, and (j) the placement of Desire in an adequate ontology of persons. -/- It is argued that every major candidate for a logical relation between wants and acts (or our warrant for believing that such a connection exists) breaks down upon analysis; that little warrant exists for construing wants as causes of acts; that wants and acts are related in significant non-logical and non-causal (i.e., material) respects; and that any fully adequate theory of human action must undertake ontology, placing the category of Desire squarely in the foreground. This project represents neither a general theory of desire nor a general theory of human action. It is rather conceived as a propaedeutic to any such inquiry. It is essentially revisionist in intent, setting out on the one hand to challenge existing claims about wants and acts and, on the other hand, proposing a more satisfactory approach to the issue. In no sense is it suggested that recent Anglo-American contributions are without merit. It is rather argued that they are often inadequate contributions vis-a-vis the larger requirements for an adequate theory of human action. (
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Motivation and Will
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Reasons and Causes
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Emergent Mental Properties are Not Just Double-Preventers.
Andrei A. Buckareff
Jessica Hawkins
2023
Synthese
202 (2):1-22.
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We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological commitments of Gibb’s theory of mental causation, that the first two objections fail. But, we argue, owing to worries about cases where there is no double-preventive role to be played by mental properties, her account,
...
which solely affords mental properties a double-preventive role, is incomplete and vulnerable to a causal exclusion objection. We propose a friendly modification to her theory of mental causation that is consistent with her theory’s ontological commitments. Specifically, we sketch an account on which mental properties have a more pronounced causal-structuring role that is not exhausted by the role Gibb assigns them as double-preventers. The result is a novel emergentist theory of mental causation. (
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Dualism, Misc
in
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Emergence, Misc
in
Metaphysics
Hylomorphism
in
Metaphysics
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Powers
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Psychophysical Emergence
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Causal potency of consciousness in the physical world.
Danko D. Georgiev
2024
International Journal of Modern Physics B
38 (19):2450256.
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The evolution of the human mind through natural selection mandates that our conscious experiences are causally potent in order to leave a tangible impact upon the surrounding physical world. Any attempt to construct a functional theory of the conscious mind within the framework of classical physics, however, inevitably leads to causally impotent conscious experiences in direct contradiction to evolution theory. Here, we derive several rigorous theorems that identify the origin of the latter impasse in the mathematical properties of ordinary differential
...
equations employed in combination with the alleged functional production of the mind by the brain. Then, we demonstrate that a mind--brain theory consistent with causally potent conscious experiences is provided by modern quantum physics, in which the unobservable conscious mind is reductively identified with the quantum state of the brain and the observable brain is constructed by the physical measurement of quantum brain observables. The resulting quantum stochastic dynamics obtained from sequential quantum measurements of the brain is governed by stochastic differential equations, which permit genuine free will exercised through sequential conscious choices of future courses of action. Thus, quantum reductionism provides a solid theoretical foundation for the causal potency of consciousness, free will and cultural transmission. (
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Collapse Interpretations
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Entanglement
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Evolution of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Measurement Problem
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
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On List's compatibilist libertarianism.
Dwayne Moore
Sara Ugljesic
2022
Philosophical Forum
53 (4):259-268.
details
Christian List has recently presented a compatibilist libertarian solution to the free will and determinism problem. He proposes the admixture of libertarianism, which endorses agential alternative possibilities, with physical determinism, which endorses the necessity of physical effects. In this paper, we argue that List's innovative proposal ultimately fails.
Compatibilism
in
Philosophy of Action
Determinism
in
Philosophy of Action
Libertarianism about Free Will
in
Philosophy of Action
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Interactionist Zombies.
Jake Khawaja
2022
Synthese
200.
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One of the most popular arguments in favor of dualism is the zombie-conceivability argument. It is often argued that the possibility of zombies would entail that mental properties are epiphenomenal. This paper attempts to defuse the argument, offering a model of dualist mental causation which can serve as a basis for a modified, interactionist-friendly zombie argument.
Mental Causation
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Philosophy of Mind
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Zeno Goes to Copenhagen: A Dilemma for Measurement-Collapse Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics.
David J. Chalmers
Kelvin J. McQueen
2023
In M. C. Kafatos, D. Banerji & D. C. Struppa,
Quantum and Consciousness Revisited
. DK Publisher.
details
A familiar interpretation of quantum mechanics (one of a number of views sometimes labeled the "Copenhagen interpretation'"), takes its empirical apparatus at face value, holding that the quantum wave function evolves by the Schrödinger equation except on certain occasions of measurement, when it collapses into a new state according to the Born rule. This interpretation is widely rejected, primarily because it faces the measurement problem: "measurement" is too imprecise for use in a fundamental physical theory. We argue that this is
...
a weak objection, as there may be many ways of making "measurement" precise. However, measurement-collapse interpretations face a more serious objection: a dilemma tied to the quantum Zeno effect. Is measurement itself an observable that can enter superpositions? If yes, then the standard measurement-collapse dynamics is ill-defined. If no, then (at least if measurement is an observable), measurements can never start or finish. The best way out is to deny that measurement is an observable, but this leads to strong and revisionary consequences. This reinforces the view that there is no nonrevisionary interpretation of quantum mechanics. (
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Causal Closure of the Physical
in
Metaphysics
Collapse Interpretations
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Copenhagen Interpretation
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, Misc
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Measurement Problem
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Man-Made Systems vs. Mind-Made Systems.
Ilexa Yardley
2022
Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory
details
Understanding the Human TimeSpace: Mind does not operate using sequence (also known, to ‘man,’ as ‘time’). Think: philosophical, and physical, fusion.
Abstract Objects
in
Metaphysics
Dualism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Ontology of Mathematics
in
Philosophy of Mathematics
Psychophysical Reduction
in
Philosophy of Mind
Token Identity
in
Metaphysics
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Do Qualia Exist Necessarily? v. 2.0.
Paul Merriam
manuscript
details
Why is there something rather than nothing? I don’t know. But ‘nothing’ may not be the correct default state. It may be that the existence of possibilities requires fewer (weaker) assumptions. In this case, arguably, we should start with the existence of possibilities and not ‘nothing’. In this case, there exists the possibility of (for example) red qualia. But the possible existence of a red quale does not delineate what it is the possibility of if the possibility contains only a
...
reference to red. Instead, the possibility must contain an actual instance of red to delineate what it is the possibility of. But, if possibilities are the weakest and (therefore) starting assumption, and the possibility of a red quale must itself contain an instance of red, then red exists necessarily. This argument would work for all qualia. Further, it could be that physical things and physical laws are (in some sense) instances of qualia. Incidentally, this would solve the problem of evil: pain, too, is made of qualia. These considerations align with some suggestions by Leibniz. (
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Existence
in
Metaphysics
Leibniz: Metaphysics
in
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Qualia
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Action and Reason.
Rüdiger Bubner
1973
Ethics
83 (3):224-236.
details
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Reasons
in
Philosophy of Action
Value Theory
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Comentario Bibliografico. Monroy Nasr, Zuraya (2007). El problema cuerpo-mente en Descartes. Una cuestión semántica, México, UNAM, 186 pp.
[REVIEW]
P. Pavesi
2007
Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia
33 (1):166-169.
details
Reseña bibliográfica. Comentario y discusión del libro Monroy Nasr, Zuraya (2007). El problema cuerpo-mente en Descartes. Una cuestión semántica, México, UNAM, 186 pp -/- Es bien sabido que, ya en vida misma de Descartes, sus primeros objetores, incluso los más condescendientes y afines a su doctrina, acusaron como una flagrante contradicción de doble afirmación de la Meditación Sexta, en la que Descartes postula, primero, la distinción real entre las substancias extensa y pensante, y enseguida, la unión de dichas substancias en
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un compuesto substancial, el hombre. Dicha objeción, cuya historia es tan larga y compleja como la del cartesianismo, no puede dejar de ver en aquella contradicción un "abandono de la partida", esto es de la filosofía, según la sentencia lapidaria de Leibniz, acusación que, por diversas razones (fracaso, renuncia o decisión metafísica) es vigente a lo largo de la éxegisis contemporánea. Monroy Nasr acomete y logra la empresa de otorgar una interpretación original del llamado dualismo cartesiano, consciente, en tanto tal, de lo marcos conceptuales en los que se incluye. Veamos sus lineamientos generales. (
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Dualism about Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Interactionism
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Persons
in
Metaphysics
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Causal Efficacy and Externalist Mental Content.
Anthony E. Newman
2002
Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Internalism about mental content is the view that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates as well. This dissertation develops and defends the idea that only a strong version of internalism is compatible with our commonsense commitment to mental causation. Chapter one defends a novel necessary condition on a property's being causally efficacious---viz., that any property F that is efficacious with respect to event E cannot be instantiated in virtue of any property G that is itself ceteris paribus sufficient for E---and
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shows that that necessary condition vindicates the idea that externalism is incompatible with our commonsense commitment to mental causation. The internalist's core intuition is that only intrinsic properties can be causally efficacious. Chapter two defends that intuition from the common externalist response that extrinsic properties abound. A popular "Middle Way" between externalism and internalism holds that although ordinary, "folk-psychological" contents of prepositional attitudes are extrinsic, there exists some other non-folk-psychological kind of content that is intrinsic. Chapter three argues that Jerry Fodor's influential argument for the Middle Way is incoherent. Chapter four identifies a weak but popular grade of internalism, endorsed by John Searle among others, and argues that it is untenable. The preceding defense of internalism can be believed only if there is something wrong with the canonical arguments for externalism developed by Hillary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and Saul Kripke. My postscript says what I think is wrong with the canonical externalist arguments: they assume the nonexistence of propositions that are truth-evaluable only relative to particular persons, places, or times; while I argue that our commonsense commitment to mental causation requires at least some such "indexical propositions". (
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Externalism and Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental Causation
in
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Why Thematic Kinships between Events do not Attest Their Causal Linkage.
Adolf Grünbaum
1990
Epistemologia
13 (2):187.
details
Causal Explanation
in
Metaphysics
Karl Jaspers
in
Continental Philosophy
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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The psycho‐physical laws of intentionality.
J. T. Whyte
1990
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
4 (3):295-304.
details
Intentional mental states have causes and effects. Davidson has shown that this fact alone does not entail the existence of psycho‐physical laws, but his anomalism makes the connection between the content and causation of intentional states utterly mysterious. By defining intentional states in terms of their causes and effects, functionalism promises to explain this connection. If intentional states have their causes and effects in virtue of their contents, then there must be intrinsic states (of the people who have them) which
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are ‘local causal surrogates’ for the propositions believed, desired, or whatever. We can define these intrinsic states in terms of the laws that govern them, but these laws alone are not sufficient to account for intentional content. To do that we need to invoke laws which link these intrinsic states with their contents. Such a ‘wide’ functional account is sketched; it combines a suggestion of Ramsey's about truth conditions with a ‘feedback’ account of the content of desires. (
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Explanatory Role of Content
in
Philosophy of Mind
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Causation and Determinable Properties : On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size.
Tim Crane
2008
In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup,
Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation
. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 176-195.
details
This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are
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good reasons for allowing that some of these are determinable properties. On the other hand, there are strong arguments in the metaphysics of properties to treat properties as sparse in David Lewis’s (1983) sense. But then it seems that we only need to believe in the most determinate properties: particular shades of colour, specific masses, lengths and so on. And if we also agree with Lewis that sparse properties are ‘the ones relevant to causal powers’ (1983: 13) it seems we must conclude that if properties are relevant to causation at all, then all of these are determinate properties. I call this ‘the antinomy of determinable causation’. On the one hand, we have a good argument for the claim that determinable properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Thesis. But on the other hand, we have a good argument for the claim that only the most determinate properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Antithesis. Clearly, we need to reject either the Thesis or the.. (
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Determinates and Determinables
in
Metaphysics
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in
Philosophy of Mind
Supervenient Causation
in
Metaphysics
Theories of Color, Misc
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Weakness of will and divisions of the mind.
Edmund Henden
2004
European Journal of Philosophy
12 (2):199–213.
details
Some authors have argued that, in order to give an account of weakness of the will, we must assume that the mind is divisible into parts. This claim is often referred to as the partitioning claim. There appear to be two main arguments for this claim. While the first is conceptual and claims that the notion of divisibility is entailed by the notion of non-rational mental causation (which is held to be a necessary condition of weakness of the will), the
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second is explanatory and claims that the notion of divisibility is required for the causal explanation of weak-willed action. In this paper I want to argue that the partitioning claim remains unsupported, no matter how it is interpreted, and that weakness of the will can be made perfectly good sense of without the idea that the mind is divisible into parts. In fact, there are available various explanatory models each of which characterizes different psychological mechanisms that may be involved in weakness of will, none of which depends on any claims about mental division. I describe three familiar mechanisms and argue that weakness of will may occur as the result of any one of them. (
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Donald Davidson
in
20th Century Philosophy
Irrationality
in
Epistemology
Mental Causation
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Mind, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Mind
Weakness of Will
in
Philosophy of Action
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Why psychologists tend to overlook certain "obvious" facts.
Gustav Ichheiser
1943
Philosophy of Science
10 (3):204-207.
details
Psychological research and theory has been in the past, and is at present, vitiated by three groups of presuppositions and tendencies. Firstly, by a rigid ideal of preciseness, which produces in the mind of psychologists a biased predilection for selecting and emphasizing those facts which lend themselves best to a precise investigation, and for neglecting those facts with which this is not the case. Secondly, by certain psychological presuppositions rooted in the ideological background of the society to which the psychologist
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himself belongs; these presuppositions induce him often to state, unwittingly, certain of his problems along the lines suggested by the predominant ideology. And thirdly, by the tendency to overlook, or to neglect, certain very important facts because these facts appear to be quite “obvious”. (
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