First paper for a graduate seminar on panpsychism. (Course was offered as an undergraduate, undergraduate honors, and graduate seminar with different requirements. I took it my first semester as a graduate student. Syllabus listed in...

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First paper for a graduate seminar on panpsychism. (Course was offered as an undergraduate, undergraduate honors, and graduate seminar with different requirements. I took it my first semester as a graduate student. Syllabus listed in course section on my academia.edu page below). PHIL 693: Seminar in Philosophy: Contemporary Panpsychism. Spring 2014. Professor Emmett Holman.

ABSTRACT:

Philosophy and modern science have a peculiar relation to one another. On the one hand, the two have almost univocally worked in harmony, either dealing with the same phenomena in different ways, or aiding each other in developing accurate theoretical models, structures, and methods to help better understand the world around us. On the other hand, however, there seems to be a precarious division: the things that modern science currently deals with are generally thought to be very different kinds of things from those which philosophy deals with. Most think that its methods are exclusive to, or at the very least occupy, a different scope from those of philosophy. Even where this is not the case, the alarming increase in stratification and specialization within philosophy over the last few centuries has left us with more points of dissention than ever, consequently widening the gap, in many respects, with modern science even further. As Husserl remarks in his Cartesian Meditations:

"Instead of a serious discussion among conflicting theories that, in their very conflict, demonstrate the intimacy with which they belong together, the commonness of their underlying convictions, and an unswerving belief in a true philosophy, we have a pseudo-reporting and a pseudo-criticizing, a mere semblance of philosophizing seriously with and for one another…To be sure, we still have philosophical congresses. The philosophers meet but, unfortunately, not the philosophies."

Some speculate that the seeds of this problem were sown during the seventeenth century, with Descartes and his argument for the existence of the mind and body as separate substances: in a word, dualism. Indeed, few ideas have had such a radical influence on our current intellectual positions or been so deeply inculcated in our culture, as evidenced by the predominance of one opposing view known as materialism or physicalism, “the view that only the physical world is irreducibly real.”  Questions concerning whether the mind and body can and do interact, whether they are in fact separate, and the like have given rise to one of the most important dilemmas in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science: namely, the mind-body problem.

In turn, the focus of this paper will be to explore a few arguments from opponents and proponents of this problem. I will examine an argument against dualism concerning the type of relation required for a unity between mind and body, as presented by David Armstrong, and will then respond to this by examining the implications of an anti-physicalist argument developed by David Chalmers concerning conceivability, necessity, and entailment. I will argue that, while neither side is infallible to a host of problems, Chalmers’ conceivability argument, when combined with a theory of two-dimensional semantics, has the potential to undermine a large percentage of the less subtle arguments for physicalism.

PROMPT:

For your first paper, write an essay of 1500 to 2400 words (about 5 to 8 pages) on the question given below.  Your grade will be based on the accuracy (of course), coherence and clarity of what you say.  It will also be based on how careful and in-depth your exposition and discussion is.  Brilliance also counts.  The importance of carefulness and depth means you clearly cannot touch on everything we’ve read and discussed on these issues within the 5 to 8 page limit.  So you shouldn’t try to do so.  Still, all other things being equal, the more you draw from the better.

SETTING THE STAGE

So far in this course we have been looking at (what many see as) the standoff between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism.*  The arguments we have encountered on this can be placed into three categories: 1. Pro-physicalist/anti-dualist arguments designed to show that dualism is wrong and physicalism is right.  2. Blanket anti-physicalist arguments designed to show that all forms of physicalism are wrong, or at least seriously problematic (and hence that dualism is, or could be, right).  3. A couple of arguments designed to show that some specific version or other of physicalism is wrong (though in spirit these arguments have a lot in common with the blanket anti-physicalist arguments in category 2).  In category 1 we have the arguments given by David Armstrong .  In category 2 we have Descartes’ arguments, Thomas Nagel’s AWhat Is It Like...?@ argument (Nagel doesn’t definitively reject physicalism but he has serious misgivings), Peter Bieri’s explanatory gap argument (ditto my remarks on Nagel), Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, and David Chalmers’ zombie/conceivability argument.  In category 3 we have Objection 3 to Smart’s identity theory, and the inverted spectrum criticism of functionalism.

AND YOUR MISSION IS TO...

With all the foregoing in mind, do the following: Choose one (or more if you wish and space permits) argument from category 1 and one (or more if you wish and space permits) argument from category 2 and explain and critically discuss them.  You should include whichever argument in each category that you find to be most convincing.  If you wish (and again, space permits) you can also include an explanation and critical discussion of one or both of the arguments in category 3, but if you do so, be sure to explain the version(s) of physicalism that the argument(s) target(s).  For each argument you examine, indicate whether you think it succeeds or if the other side has an answer.  In doing this, you can, of course, draw from what Chalmers says about ‘Type A’, ‘B’ or ‘C’ physicalism if you find any of that to be useful.  Ditto his remarks in AFacing Up...@ about why he thinks the problem of consciousness is a ‘hard’ problem.  Overall, which sideBmainstream physicalism or mainstream dualismBdo you think has the better case?

* The significance of the term mainstream will become clear later in the course.  For now just take it to mean the versions of physicalism and dualism we have looked at so far.