Drafts by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
This paper offers a critical appraisal of moderate truth pluralism through metaphysics. The appra... more This paper offers a critical appraisal of moderate truth pluralism through metaphysics. The appraisal is offered in the context of the ongoing debate between strong and moderate truth pluralists. Both kinds of pluralist endorse conceptual truth monism: there is a single concept of truth, TRUTH. Moderate pluralists endorse a generic truth property to go with truth. Strong pluralists maintain that there is no such property. Both moderate pluralists and strong pluralists endorse a plurality of properties (correspondence, coherence, superassertibility, etc.) that are truth-relevant for specific domains. Moderate pluralists think of truth-relevance as grounding: within a given domain instances of the truth-relevant property of that domain ground instances of generic truth. Generic truth is a property in its own right but, if true, propositions pertaining to a given domain are true because they have the truth-grounding property of the domain. Strong pluralists think of truth-relevance as reduction: truth is not a property in its own right. Within a given domain being true simply reduces to being F, where F is the truth-reducing property of the domain. We investigate how key ideas from contemporary metaphysics bear on moderate pluralism. We support three comparative claims: (i) instances of domain-specific truth-relevant properties enjoy a greater degree of qualitative similarity than instances of generic truth, (ii) domain-specific truth-relevant properties are more natural than generic truth, and (iii) domain-specific truth-relevant properties are more fundamental than generic truth. On the basis of our considerations regarding metaphysics we offer a critical appraisal of moderate pluralism. First, we argue that, in dealing with problems and challenges, moderate pluralist responses must always make ineliminable reference to the plurality of quasi-truth properties—a constraint that moderate pluralists often violate. Second, from a metaphysical point of view the unity of truth is in a certain sense grounded by its plurality—something that moderate pluralists tend to forget. Third, moderate pluralists cannot take the connection between TRUTH, the concept, and the nature of the property of truth to be too intimate. The former betrays the richness of the latter.
Papers by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
Noûs, 2025
Is the epistemic norm governing assertion essential to assertion? Is the norm constitutive of the... more Is the epistemic norm governing assertion essential to assertion? Is the norm constitutive of the very nature of the speech act? Some say it cannot be so because assertion patterns very differently than playing games when it comes to breaking constitutive rules. You can break the rule of assertion in various ways and still assert, but you cannot break the rules of games in just that way and still assert. We should then conclude that the epistemic rule of assertion merely regulates assertion, so that assertion is not essentially a rule-governed kind. We show prominent arguments along these lines fall short, based on a better understanding of what it is to play a game. To evaluate arguments about the nature of asserting, one needs to know more about playing games.
Synthese, 2025
Do perceptual states necessarily constitute evidence epistemically supporting corresponding perce... more Do perceptual states necessarily constitute evidence epistemically supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs? Susanna Schellenberg thinks so. She argues that perceptual states, veridical or not, necessarily provide (or constitute) a kind of evidence (for the existence of the truth-maker) supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs. She uses "phenomenal evidence" as a label for this kind of evidence and calls her argument "The Phenomenal Evidence Argument." Having introduced her project, we offer a reconstruction of Schellenberg's argument (§II). A key premise has it that, necessarily, for items with a function, fulfillment of the function (the good case) is explanatorily and metaphysically prior to function failure (the bad case). We suggest that the etiological theory of functions renders this key premise plausible (§III). However, Schellenberg rejects the etiological theory of functions (§IV) and likewise the idea that the epistemic or warranting force of perceptual states is grounded in their being reliably linked to veridical perception (§V). But then what supports the key premise? Schellenberg argues that accurate perception is a part of the nature of perceptual capacities because the nature of perceptual capacities is explained in terms of their function, and their function is to represent accurately (§VI). We suggest that Schellenberg is committed to an understanding of priority which doesn't require any actual good cases-just possible ones (§VII). This reading, we argue, is too weak to support the key premise (§VIII). Given Schellenberg's commitments, it is not necessarily the case that perceptual states are evidence for a corresponding perceptual belief. Before concluding we discuss an overgeneralization objection to Schellenberg's argument (§IX).
Proceedings of the 17th Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology
This paper investigates the connection between truth and logic from a pluralist perspective. The ... more This paper investigates the connection between truth and logic from a pluralist perspective. The most prominent form of truth pluralism is domain-based: there are several ways of being true because different properties are truth-relevant for different domains. Does domain-based truth pluralism have any impact on logic? This issue is investigated from the perspective of two versions of domain-based truth pluralism: moderate pluralism and strong pluralism. According to moderate domain-based truth pluralism there is a single truth property-generic truth-that applies across all (truthapt) domains. However, within specific domains instances of generic truth are grounded by different properties-say, correspondence, coherence, or superassertibility. Strong domain-based pluralists hold that, within specific domains, a proposition's being true reduces to its corresponding, cohering, or being superassertible-and they reject the existence of a generic truth property that applies across all domains. This bulk of this paper offers critical and constructive discussion of an argument aimed to show that moderate domain-based truth pluralism implies domain-based logical pluralism. The last section provides a very brief outline of what a strong domain-based truth pluralist might say about the connection between truth and logic.
APA Studies on Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies, Vol. 23(2), 2024
Sections 1–3 provide a brief introduction to the emergence and consolidation of analytic philosop... more Sections 1–3 provide a brief introduction to the emergence and consolidation of analytic philosophy in Korea, as reflected by the training and works of individual philosophers as well as by research and publication trends and the areas covered by philosophy journals, societies, and associations. Section 4 distinguishes between three types of philosophy that might aptly be labeled “Asian analytic philosophy.” Section 5 offers some brief remarks concerning the value and significance of these types of philosophy.
The article is co-authored with Yeollim Bae, Jungkyun Kim, Young Sung Kim, and Seong Soo Park.
The full PDF for the special issue in which the article was published is available (open access) here: https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.apaonline.org/resource/collection/2EAF6689-4B0D-4CCB-9DC6-FB926D8FF530/AsianV23n2.pdf
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (3rd edition), edited by B. Roeber, E. Sosa, M. Steup & J. Turri. Wiley-Blackwell, 2024
What do we mean by our norm of assertion? We mean our social norm. We mean the rule(s) we embrace... more What do we mean by our norm of assertion? We mean our social norm. We mean the rule(s) we embrace and enforce, however mildly or strongly, requiring us to meet an epistemic threshold when asserting. Our thesis is that we do not require knowledge when asserting, for we do not even require truth. In the first section we discuss social norms and various proposals for our norm of assertion. Some require only true assertions. These proposals are factive. Some allow false assertions. Those are nonfactive. In the second we present and criticize Benton’s case for the knowledge norm. In the remaining sections we examine experimental evidence for and against factive norms of assertion. In the third we critically examine John Turri’s experiments in support of factive norms. In the fourth we provide experimental evidence from “unlucky assertions” against factive norms (drawing on work by Kneer, Reuter & Brössel, and Marsili & Wiegmann). In the fifth section we scuttle the factivist’s standard response, the excuse maneuver. We conclude by distinguishing optimal assertions from permissible assertions.
Inquiry, 2024
In his book Autonomous Knowledge J. Adam Carter argues that the possibility of radical cognitive ... more In his book Autonomous Knowledge J. Adam Carter argues that the possibility of radical cognitive enhancement shows the need for epistemology to be significantly updated. Reflection on the possibility of such enhancement shows that doxastic autonomy matters. If a belief fails to be autonomous, it cannot qualify as knowledge. Sects. 1-3 of this paper introduce the key components of Carter's autonomy framework and his considerations on the value of knowledge (including his proposed solution to the value problem, i.e. the challenge of accounting for why knowledge has greater value than any of its proper parts). Sects. 4-7 offer a critical appraisal of Carter's framework. We are not convinced that Carter has succeeded in showing that there is an autonomous belief condition on knowledge. In this paper, however, we shall not engage with this issue. Instead, for the sake of our critical discussion, we shall assume that autonomous belief is a condition on knowledge and engage Carter on a cluster of issues concerning axiology. The last chapter of Autonomous Knowledge is dedicated to the value of knowledge-in particular, to the task of accounting for why justified, true, autonomous, non-Gettiered belief (knowledge) possesses greater value than mere justified, true, non-Gettiered belief. We argue that Carter is committed to two forms of substantial pluralism about value: pluralism about knowledge-relevant final value and pluralism about knowledge-relevant fundamental (or non-derivative) value (Sect. 4). An additional key commitment is the thesis that autonomous beliefs possess final, derivative value due to a relationship they bear to finally valuable intellectual self-constitution. We scrutinize the metaphysical foundations of this key commitment and argue that it may be difficult for Carter to sustain it (Sect. 5). We then proceed to explore alternative ways of accommodating the idea of final value within Carter's framework (Sect. 6). We also explore a solution to the value problem that gives up on the idea that autonomous beliefs possess final value altogether and attributes instrumental value to them instead. This type of solution is briefly considered-and dismissedby Carter. Interestingly, as we shall argue, it may be the overall best path to take for someone who endorses the autonomous knowledge framework (Sect. 7).
Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Logic, 2024
In this chapter we assume a Tarski-style semantic conception of logical consequence and explore w... more In this chapter we assume a Tarski-style semantic conception of logical consequence and explore what sort of philosophical foundation is needed and can be provided for logical validity given this assumption. Our investigation takes a metaphysical conception of logic as background. According to this conception logic describes general features of reality. We adopt the Law of Excluded Middle as our lead example and offer a Tarskian explanation of why it qualifies as a logical truth. Looking at the details of this explanation we argue that it imposes a significant constraint on the nature of truth (bivalence) and the nature of reality (property-instantiation is determinate). We explore what reasons might be given for thinking that the truth-related constraint is met and draw on the works of Quine and Williamson to extract two abductive arguments in favour of bivalence. At the end of the chapter we switch direction. Starting from the assumption that reality has a certain nature (i.e. propertyinstantiation is determinate) arguments are given for both bivalence and the Law of Excluded Middle. On the resulting picture features of logic are reflective of features of truth as well as reality.
Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2025
Interest in epistemic entitlement as a distinctive notion in epistemology derives from the episte... more Interest in epistemic entitlement as a distinctive notion in epistemology derives from the epistemological projects of Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright. Burge contrasts entitlement and justification as distinct species of warrant, that property of belief that serves as a reliable route to true belief and knowledge. Wright contrasts entitlement and justification as two different types of grounds for a doxastic attitude. Justification for Wright is evidential support to believe a proposition. Entitlement for Wright is non-evidential support to trust a proposition. This entry first explicates Burge’s distinction before turning to Wright’s.
Metaphilosophy, 2022
Crispin Wright is widely known for having introduced epistemic entitlement as a response to certa... more Crispin Wright is widely known for having introduced epistemic entitlement as a response to certain sceptical challenges. Entitlement is a species of non-evidential warrant applicable to acceptance of anti-sceptical hypotheses and other ‘cornerstones’ for enquiry. The aim of this paper is to investigate a fundamental issue concerning entitlement: it appears to be quite generous, as it appears to apply indiscriminately to anti-scepticial hypotheses as well as a range of radically different—indeed, even incompatible—propositions. I argue that the generosity of entitlement is reflective of an underlying commitment to a form of epistemic relativism. This is a significant commitment that has not received due attention in the debate thus far. In addition I present an axiology that fits naturally within the framework of entitlement theory. This axiology helps the entitlement theorists address the pressing issue of how, given the absence of evidence, there can be anything epistemically good about acceptance of anti-sceptical hypotheses and other cornerstones for enquiry. Likewise, crucially, entitlement theorists need the proposed axiology—or something very much like it—in order for their envisioned response to scepticism to have a proper value-theoretic foundation. Lastly, I argue that the issues of generosity and epistemic relativism are rather deeply rooted: they surface at the level of value. I explain why.
Philosophical Studies, 2022
This paper is a contribution to a symposium on Kris McDaniel’s book *The Fragmentation of Being*.... more This paper is a contribution to a symposium on Kris McDaniel’s book *The Fragmentation of Being*. My long-standing interest in the debate concerning pluralism about truth has shaped my choice of focus. According to truth pluralism there are several ways of being true. Different properties are relevant to the truth of propositions concerning different domains. Thus, correspondence to reality might be the property relevant to the truth of propositions concerning the material world (e.g., <Mt. Everest is extended in space>) while coherence with the body of law might be the property relevant to the truth of legal propositions (e.g., <Bob's insider trading is illegal>). Below I discuss what I refer to as the "problem of mixed beings". The problem of mixed beings is a transposition of the problem of mixed compounds, a challenge faced by truth pluralists.
*Hvilken natur? – en antologi om naturbegrebet*, Anne Katrine Gjerløff, Karsten Elmose Vad & Anne-Mette Høeg Andersen (eds.). Biologiforbundet., 2021
Værdi-teorien er den del af filosofien, der søger at besvare spørgsmål vedrørende værdi. Denne ar... more Værdi-teorien er den del af filosofien, der søger at besvare spørgsmål vedrørende værdi. Denne artikel belyser natur ud fra en værdi-teoretisk vinkel. Artiklen har to udgangsunkter: Natur har værdi, og værdi er grundet i præferencer. Når naturgenopretning i visse områder opprioriteres på bekostning af landbrug, skyldes det således, at genoprettet natur indenfor det pågældende område er at foretrække fremfor landbrugslandskab. Men betegnelsen ”naturgenopretning” er tvetydig. Den bruges når natur – f.eks. en å eller skov –føres tilbage til en tidligere udgave af sig selv, men også når der skabes en kopi af et stykke natur, der er gået tabt eller blevet tilintetgjort. Forskellen mellem tilbageføring og kopiskabelse illustreres via to danske eksempler: Genslyngningen af Skjern Å og genskabelsen af Søborg Sø. Men hvorfor er distinktionen mellem tilbageføring og kopiskabelse relevant? Fordi der er en fundamental værdi-teoretisk forskel mellem dem. Kun tilbageføringsprojekter kan realisere originalværdi—en fundamental, vigtig slags værdi, som af principielle grunde ikke kan realiseres via kopiskabelse. Moralen er derfor simpel: Der skal værnes om naturen — for når originalværdi går tabt, er den tabt for evigt. Den kan den ikke genskabes.
To appear in N. J. L. L. Pedersen and L. Moretti (eds.): Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill Studies in Skepticism., 2021
To be included in *Non-Evidentialist Epistemology*, edited by L. Moretti and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (Brill)., 2021
This paper explores a certain kind of concessive, non-evidentialist response to scepticism. The d... more This paper explores a certain kind of concessive, non-evidentialist response to scepticism. The discussion is framed both at a general level and with a specific focus on mathematics. The general aim of the paper is to introduce and articulate a pluralist consequentialist form of concessive, non-evidentialist anti-scepticism. The view to be articulated is concessive and non-evidentialist because it grants that the sceptical challenge points to a genuine constraint on warrant for accepting cornerstone propositions (such as <There is an external world> or <Peano Arithmetic is satisfiable>): it has to be non-evidential in nature. In making this point the paper offers a detailed presentation of a scepticial argument in the context of mathematics. Satisfiability is an important mathematical property: if a given mathematical theory is satisfiable, there is a structure that satisfies its axioms. A satisfiable theory can thus be said to successfully delineate a subject-matter. An unsatisfiable theory, on the other hand, cannot. I argue that, just like <There is an external world> and other well-known anti-sceptical hypotheses are cornerstones for our thinking about the empirical world, the satisfiability proposition of a mathematical theory T (<T is satisfiable>) is a cornerstone for T-theorizing. Against this background, a mathematical sceptical argument is developed, transposing a familiar argument from mainstream epistemology and fitting the details to the mathematical case by drawing on Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. Having presented the mathematical sceptical argument, the remainder of the paper has a mostly general focus. I introduce a two fundamental, related challenges for concessive, non-evidentialist anti-sceptics. First, they must characterize a non-evidential notion of warrant that applies to cornerstone propositions (such as <There is an external world> and <T is satisfiable>). Second, they must answer the question: what is epistemically good about cornerstone acceptance? I address both of these questions by developing a pluralist consequentialist framework. The framework is explicitly axiological, making it apt for addressing the second question concerning value. However, it is likewise apt for addressing the first issue, due to the nature of positive epistemic standings such as warrant, rationality, and being underwritten by epistemic reasons. Such standings are positive standings with respect to epistemic goods. Thus, answering the question of value naturally provides answers to questions concerning warrant, rationality, and other positive epistemic standings.
To appear in K. Lai (ed.): Extending knowledge: reflections on epistemic agency and epistemic environment in East-West philosophy (Palgrave Macmillan)., 2021
It is undeniable that computer technology has had a major impact on how we engage in enquiry. We... more It is undeniable that computer technology has had a major impact on how we engage in enquiry. We use computer devices to store information that helps us in our daily lives—just think of the contacts on your phone and whatever calendar app you might use to keep track of your schedule. Furthermore, people enjoy easy and quick access to a wide range of reliable online resources such as Nature, Reuters, and Encyclopedia Britannica through their laptops or smartphones. Powerful search engines such as Google open up the door to swaths of information, enabling people easily to acquire a wide range of true beliefs through reliable means about all kinds of subject-matters. However, what is the status of such true beliefs? In particular, once beliefs cease to be occurrent, do we still have non-occurrent beliefs and, if true and reliably sustained, do they still qualify as knowledge? If they do, we would have cases of extended belief and knowledge, as these computer devices go beyond onboard capacities such as perception and memory. However, unlike our beliefs and desires, many information storing apps and resources do not have the capacity automatically to “update” their information in light of new information. Moreover, wouldn’t extended belief and knowledge lead to massive cognitive bloat—an unpalatable explosion of belief and knowledge completely detached from an ability naturally to recall the relevant information? It would seem so given the wide variety of storage repositories and devices (literally) at one’s fingertips (online journals, Dropbox, Google, stored telephone contacts). Doesn’t cognitive bloat threaten to undermine the notion of expertise? Is it really possible to become an expert on a given topic by simply and easily looking up information via one’s smartphone and saving it? And where, now, would we place cognitive effort—steps taken by individuals to commit details to memory, to apply knowledge, to deliberate and to assess and reflect? In “Extended Knowledge Overextended?”, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Jens Christian Bjerring offer a comprehensive discussion of extended belief and knowledge. They criticize two recent attempts to mitigate concerns about cognitive bloat by arguing that their effectiveness is contingent on the current state of technology—in particular, the fact that computer devices are currently external to us. However, if computer devices seamlessly integrated with our own onboard capacities—so-called neuromedia—become reality, it may be much more difficult to resist extended belief and knowledge and, with them, massive cognitive bloat.
Philosophical Issues, 2020
McDowell is getting at in passages like these?
Philosophia, 2020
Justin Remhof’s book Nietzsche’s Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects is an excellen... more Justin Remhof’s book Nietzsche’s Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects is an excellent, stimulating read. I would like to get clearer on the details of the kind of constructivist position presented in the book. I am curious about the exact nature and commitments of the view. More specifically, I am curious about three things. First, I’m wondering about how the notion of conceptualizability is to be understood. This is a modal notion but Nietzsche’s Constructivism does not give me a firm grip on it. Second, relatedly, central parts of Nietzsche’s Constructivism are dedicated to a discussion of the idea that material objects are constitutively dependent on social practices. Nietzsche’s Constructivism also classifies material objects as being socially constructed. I have a number of questions pertaining to these two claims. Third, the so-called paradox of knowability is a well-known objection to brands of anti-realism that are committed to the thesis that all truths are feasibly known. The paradox of knowability purports to show that this commitment implies that all truths are actually known—a seemingly much stronger and implausible thesis. As far as I can tell, the form of social constructivism presented in Nietzsche’s Constructivism faces a version of the paradox of knowability.
Philosophical Forum, 2020
According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. There is a single truth proper... more According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. There is a single truth property that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse, but instances of this property are grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. Moderate truth pluralists must answer two questions concerning logic: (Q1) Which logic governs inferences concerning each truth-apt domain considered separately? (Q2) Which logic governs inferences that involve several truth-apt domains? This paper has three objectives. The first objective is to present and explain the moderate pluralist's answers to (Q1) and (Q2). The second objective is to argue that there is a tension between these answers. The answer to (Q1) involves a commitment to a form of logical pluralism. However, reflection on the moderate truth pluralist's answer to (Q2) shows that they are committed to taking logic to be topic neutrality. This, in turn, forces a commitment to logical monism. It would seem that the moderate truth pluralist cannot have it both ways. The third objective is constructive in nature. I offer an account of what moderate truth pluralists should say about logic and how they might resolve the tension in their view. I suggest that, just like moderate truth pluralists distinguish truth proper and 'quasi-truth', they should endorse a distinction between logic proper and 'quasi-logic'. Quasi-truth is truth-like in the sense that instances of quasi-truth ground instances of truth. Quasi-logic is logic-like in the sense that it concerns arguments that are necessarily truth-preserving but are not generally so in a topic neutral way. I suggest that moderate truth pluralists should be monists about truth proper and logic proper but pluralists about quasi-truth and quasi-logic. This allows them to say that logic proper is topic neutral while still accommodating the idea, for different domains, different arguments may be necessarily truth-preserving.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2020
We review the "Entitlement" projects of Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright in light of recent work fr... more We review the "Entitlement" projects of Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright in light of recent work from and surrounding both philosophers. Our review dispels three misunderstandings. First, Burge and Wright are not involved in a common “entitlement” project. Second, though for both Wright and Burge entitlement is the new notion, “entitlement” is not some altogether third topic not clearly connected to the nature of knowledge or the encounter with skepticism. Third, entitlement vs. justification does not align with the externalism vs. internalism distinction.
Uploads
Drafts by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
Papers by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
The article is co-authored with Yeollim Bae, Jungkyun Kim, Young Sung Kim, and Seong Soo Park.
The full PDF for the special issue in which the article was published is available (open access) here: https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.apaonline.org/resource/collection/2EAF6689-4B0D-4CCB-9DC6-FB926D8FF530/AsianV23n2.pdf