Chapter 4 Absolute Dialetheism Gregory S. Moss Abstract There are no consistent world views. ‘Absolute Dialetheism’ is the view that the world exists, but with the qualification that ‘the world exists,’ is a true contradiction. I briefly reconstruct Gabriel’s argument against the existence of the world, and I show how the question concerning the existence of the world can be motivated by situating it within problems that arise within Schelling’s philosophy. I begin by considering the ground of Gabriel’s relative concept of existence, as well as questions concerning the possibility of the world and the concept of truth that is operative in SFO. While Gabriel’s fields of sense ontology commits him to a form of relative dialetheism, his argument against the existence of the world precludes the possibility of accepting Absolute Dialetheism. I argue that successfully asserting the truth of the no world view depends upon accepting the truth of Absolute Dialetheism. I further explore two forms of Absolute Dialetheism: the conceptual and trans-conceptual varieties. Finally, by following a Hegelian line of reasoning, I develop an alternative concept of existence by exploring the self-predicative character of claims concerning Absolute existence. 4.1 Introduction There are no consistent world views. ‘Absolute Dialetheism’ is the view that the world exists, but with the qualification that ‘the world exists,’ is a true contradiction.1 I briefly reconstruct Gabriel’s argument against the existence of the world, and I show how the question concerning the existence of the world can be 1I first introduce the term “Absolute Dialetheism” in my recent book Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics: The Logic of Singularity. There I discuss various objections and alternatives to the view, as well as offer a more in-depth and nuanced discussion in its systematic and historical G. S. Moss (!) Department of Philosophy, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, SAR, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 J. Voosholz (ed.), Markus Gabriel’s New Realism, Synthese Library 492, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-69526-1_4 75 76 G. S. Moss motivated by situating it within problems that arise within Schelling’s philosophy. I begin by considering the ground of Gabriel’s relative concept of existence, as well as questions concerning the possibility of the world and the concept of truth that is operative in SFO. While Gabriel’s fields of sense ontology commits him to a form of relative dialetheism, his argument against the existence of the world precludes the possibility of accepting Absolute Dialetheism. I argue that successfully asserting the truth of the no world view depends upon accepting the truth of Absolute Dialetheism.2 I further explore two forms of Absolute Dialetheism: the conceptual and transconceptual varieties. Finally, by following a Hegelian line of reasoning, I develop an alternative concept of existence by exploring the self-predicative character of claims concerning Absolute existence. 4.2 Relative Dialetheism 4.2.1 Schelling and the Problem of the Existence of the World What is the main task of all philosophy? According to Schelling it is the problem of the existence of the world: The man task of all philosophy consists in solving the problem of the existence of the world. All philosophers have worked at this solution [ . . . ] He who wants to conjure up the spirit of philosophy must conjure it up here.3 In the same letter Schelling puts the problem otherwise: But I believe that the very transition from the non-finite to the finite is the problem of all philosophy, not only of one particular system.4 Schelling is clear: the task of all philosophy consists in solving the problem of the existence of the world, and this consists in an inquiry into how finitude arises out of infinitude. In order to glean insight into Gabriel’s response to Schelling’s question, we must first appreciate the perennial significance and meaning of the question. Because Schelling posits both the Ideal and the Real as principles of truth—principles in virtue of which the concept corresponds with its object—one can express Schelling’s problem of the existence of the world by employing either dimensions. As Gabriel points out, the term ‘Absolute’ is Hegelese for ‘world.’ “In Hegel’s language the problem of the world is the problem of the absolute.” See Gabriel, 2015, 227. 2 This article is a further elaboration of Part II, Ch. 9 of Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics (2020) and other themes discussed in “Transcending Everything” (2022). In those texts I offer a more thorough reconstruction of Gabriel’s SFO. For the sake of brevity, in this presentation I am assuming greater familiarity with the general contours of the SFO. 3 See Schelling’s Seventh Letter. Schelling, 1980, 177. 4 Ibid, 177. 4 Absolute Dialetheism 77 Idealist or Realist language. Given the context of our discourse, I will explicate the problem in an overtly Realist discourse, but this does not preclude expressing the problem just as exactly in the language of Idealism as I do in my recent work on Hegel’s Science of Logic.5 Because every being that exists in relationship with others can be said to be, each is an instance of the category of Being. Each is, and thereby falls within the highest genus of Being. Because Being contains all beings, there is no being outside Being to constrain it. It is Absolute for it is universal, and it is not relative to any other category either vertically or horizontally. Thus, Being is infinite. Not only is Being infinite, but Being only appears to provide the conditions of the identity of its members insofar as they exist as beings. To proclaim that ‘entity a is’ or ‘entity b is’ grasps them as instances of Being, but does not specify the difference between the instances ‘a’ and ‘b.’ To proclaim of both that each is does not differentiate a from b. As is obvious, relative concepts are undifferentiated too, e.g. the empirical concept of ‘animal’ does not differentiate particular animals from each other. Nonetheless, relative concepts stand in relation to differences and determinations that exist beyond them, both vertically and horizontally, while Being—as the all-inclusive genus—does not. ‘Gleichgültigkeit’ precisely expresses the Absolute identity of Being, for the Absolute has equal (gleich) applicability (gültig) to any and all differentiations whatever they may be. Accordingly, we can rephrase Schelling’s question about the relation of the infinite to the finite in terms of Being and beings: Given that Being is infinite, and is only a principle of identity, how can we account for the differences between the beings that fall within the highest genus? Or given the fact of Absolute Being, how can we account for the existence of beings that are relative to one another? In order to account for how it is possible for finite or relative beings to exist, one must account for the possibility of differences between beings. Following the luminous Edward Halper, I have called this problem ‘the problem of the missing difference.’6 The problem can be formulated quite simply. If Being were an absolute genus, then it would be predicated of all things, and would only provide the identity of each being as a being.7 Schelling’s assumption here is classical and usual goes undisputed: concepts (even Absolute ones) are not 5 Schelling is not the only Idealist concerned with the problem of the origin of finitude. Rather, Schelling is responding to the problem as it arises in Fichte’s efforts to account for the notI from a merely thetic I that is devoid of all difference and synthetic content. Accordingly, to explicate the full significance of this problem in the tradition would require an exegesis in explicitly Idealistic language. In fact, all of the Idealists—Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel—are concerned with this problem and each formulates it in their own way. For a brief discussion of this problem in Fichte’s philosophy see Ch. 1 of Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics. For a concise discussion of Hegel’s response to the problem see Part II, CH. 10 of Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics. 6 For a short yet precise discussion of this problem see Halper, 1993. For a more in-depth discussion on the problem of the missing difference and its significance and place in the history of Western philosophy, see my book Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics, in particular Part I, Ch. 5. 7 Schelling claims that “In the realm of the Absolute, none but analytical propositions are valid.” See Schelling’s Sixth Letter. Schelling, 1980, 173. 78 G. S. Moss self-differentiating.8 Since Being is only a principle of identity, the principle of difference could only come from the genus of non-being. But nothing exists in the genus of non-being. Thus, if difference could only have its origin in non-being, then no differences could exist. Since difference is a condition for finite beings, if there were no differences, then no finite beings would exist. Thus, in his Presentation of My System of Philosophy Schelling infers that “nothing considered in itself is finite” and in the Corollary proclaims that “from the standpoint of reason there is no finitude.”9 First, this leads to a patently false result, because beings do in fact exist. However, the result is not a consistent and false proposition, but rather a logical inconsistency: because there could not be any differences, there could not be any differences between ‘Being’ and ‘nothing.’ Thus, if Being were a genus, then Being would be nothing,10 which is a contradiction. If we cannot explain how it is possible for finite beings to be, then the world itself disappears.11 Given the preceding reflections, Schelling was clearly not wrong to identify the problem of the existence of the world with the question concerning the possibility of finitude. What is more, whatever other problems exist for philosophy, they can only exist for us because there is something that exists at all. Hence, Schelling was also certainly on point when he identified the problem of the existence of the world as the fundamental problem of philosophy. In his Philosophical Letters Schelling proclaims that No system can fill the gap between the non-finite and the finite.12 Or consider Religion and Philosophy, in which finitude comes to be via a leap’ [Sprung]: Mit einem Wort, vom Absoluten zum Wirklichen giebt es keinen stetigen Übergang, der Ursprung der Sinnenwelt ist nur als ein vollkommenes Abbrechen von der Absolutheit, durch einen Sprung, denkbar.13 Finally, in his Presentation, Schelling argues that the most fundamental mistake of philosophy is to believe that one could solve such a riddle: The most basic mistake of all philosophy is to {4:120} assume that absolute identity has actually stepped beyond itself and to attempt to make intelligible how this emergence occurs. Absolute identity has surely never ceased being identity, and everything that is is 8 For example, from “humanity” one cannot deduce particular human beings. Schelling, 2001a, 353. 10 Both Hegel and Heidegger argue that Being is nothing. Of course, each has a radically different understanding of this claim, and both deny that this requires the non-existence of the world. According to Heidegger in What is Metaphysics? “Pure Being and pure Nothing are therefore the same. This proposition of Hegel’s (Science of Logic, vol. I, Werke III, 74) is correct.” Heidegger, 1993, 108. 11 Schelling (2021b ) claims that philosophy makes the real world disappear. See Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 14. 12 Schelling, 1980, 177. 13 See Schelling’s Philosophie und Religion. Schelling, 2013, 34. 9 See 4 Absolute Dialetheism 79 considered in itself—not just the appearance of absolute identity, but {—} identity itself. Further, since it is the nature of philosophy to consider things as they are in themselves (§ 1), i.e., insofar as they are infinite and are absolute identity itself (§§ 14, 12), true philosophy consists in the demonstration that absolute identity (the infinite) has not stepped beyond itself and that everything that is, insofar as it is, is infinity it- self—a proposition that Spinoza alone of all previous philosophers acknowledged, even if he did not fully carry out its demonstration, nor express it clearly enough to avoid being misunderstood ever after.14 Schelling holds that the world exists, and in Ages of the World he argues that this is only possible if there is a contradiction: Everything else leaves the active in some sense open. Only the contradiction is absolutely not allowed not to act and is alone what drives, nay, what coerces action. Therefore, without the contradiction, there would be no movement, no life, and no progress. There would only be eternal stoppage, a deathly slumber of all forces. Were the first nature in harmony with itself, it would remain so. It would be constantly One and would never become Two. It would be an eternal rigidity without progress. The contradiction in the first nature is as certain as life is. As certainly as the being of knowledge consists in progression, it necessarily has as its first posit the positing of the contradiction. A transition from unity to contradiction is incomprehensible. For how should what is in itself one, whole, and perfect, be tempted, charmed, and enticed to emerge of out of this peace? [ . . . ].15 Schelling’s logic abides by the principle of non-contradiction.16 Since conceptual knowing cannot violate the principle of non-contradiction, and the world can only exist if there is a contradiction, the very fact of the world’s existence cannot be rendered conceptually intelligible.17 4.2.2 The No World View On the one hand, Gabriel is right to follow Schelling, for his no world view attempts to solve the problem of the existence of the world. On the other hand, he argues against Schelling, for he holds that the world does not exist. Gabriel’s argument 14 See Schelling, Presentation of My System of Philosophy, Explanation to Corollary 14. Schelling, 2001a, 353. 15 Schelling, 2000, 12. 16 See McGrath, 2015, 3. Presented at the 2015 meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America at the University of Georgia. See https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2015/papers/McGrath.pdf 17 For a more detailed discussion of Schelling’s approach to the origin of finitude and negation, see Moss, 2023, 20–25. 80 G. S. Moss against the world does not follow from the fact that it is inherently contradictory, for Gabriel’s SFO endorses a form of relative dialetheism: To be sure, I happily admit that fictional objects can be produced that inevitably invite contradictory imaginings. But this does not save the world, as Moss maintains as part of his attempt to move from my relative dialetheism, as he calls it, to an absolute dialetheism about the world.18 Gabriel supports a kind of Meinongianism,19 whereby as long as we are speaking meaningfully, “we cannot claim that something does not exist without thereby committing to its existence.”20 In other words, conceivability implies actuality.21 Since Gabriel contextualizes all existence claims, everything that exists only has being in relation to some field of sense. Since “absolute non-existence is impossible,”22 it follows that it is impossible for contradictions, or the objects and states of affairs they describe, to be absolutely non-existent.23 Since Gabriel’s SFO can accommodate contradictory objects, it is not merely the potentially contradictory features of the world in virtue of which it does not exist. His argument against the world is not from logical impossibility: “FOS does not provide any purely logical reasons against the existence of the world.”24 The world does not exist, but not because it violates a principle of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction. Instead, the grounds for denying the world’s existence are ontological and defeasible reasons. To exist is to appear in a field of sense, such that for every field there must be something that does not appear in it, but appears in another field.25 By definition the world is the field of all fields of sense, the unified totality in which everything appears. Since no field can exist unless there is something beyond it, the world cannot exist. This conclusion follows whether the world appears within itself or something else, for in either case the world must appear alongside other domains in which other objects appear. Most tersely: existence is relative to a context, and the world is not relative to any context whatever. Thus, the world does not exist.26 18 Gabriel, 2022, 78. And again, Gabriel claims that “there are some contradictions in fictional fields of sense.” Gabriel 2022, 153. 19 Gabriel, 2015, 178. Gabriel puts it more speculatively here: “if there is anything whatsoever, there has to be some object that does not exist.” Gabriel, 2015, 60. 20 Ibid, 180. 21 Ibid, 185. 22 Ibid, 178. 23 No contradiction absolutely exists, but they do exist relative to some field of sense. The round square does not exist as an object whose properties are studied by geometers. Nonetheless, since conceivability implies actuality, the ‘round square’ must exist in some field of sense, such as the field of contradictory objects. Gabriel’s view is a relative dialetheism such that every contradiction (or the states of affairs it describes) exists in some domain except for the contradiction that constitutes the existence of the world. 24 Gabriel, Ch. 2, 2022, 55. 25 Gabriel, 2015, 60. 26 Gabriel, 2015, 187–209. 4 Absolute Dialetheism 81 Gabriel’s argument deduces the non-existence of the world from the definition of existence, and it certainly does not beg the question.27 Because the world is the unified totality in which nothing is absent, I have no objections to Gabriel’s definition of the world, and I am sympathetic to his construal of the intended meaning of the concept. For this reason, if the world exists, the problem must lie with the concept of existence. 4.2.3 The Inductive Ground of Existence Gabriel gives more than one argument for the view that existence is a relative property. First, we consider his inductive argument: The no-world-view generalizes these insights beyond the frame of natural science and metamathematics by introducing a notion of relative existence, i.e. of appearance in a fos that differs from the notion that there is such a property of existence tout court.28 Given the Meinongian position that conceivability implies actuality, if one could quantify over everything, then one would be committed to the existence of the world. Since the world does not exist, one cannot quantify over everything.29 For this reason, any inductive generalization about the meaning of existence cannot proceed from some fields to all fields. Thus, it can only generalize from some fields to others. As an inductive generalization, “existence is appearance in a field of sense” is only true of some things. At best, Gabriel can infer that “as far as we know” existence is to appear in a field of sense—it can only be a local existence condition. If we apply these qualifications to the argument against the existence of the world, we can only conclude that the world cannot exist under some local existence condition(s). However, one is not justified to infer that the world cannot exist in any field of sense. As I put it in “Transcending Everything:”: “at best we can infer that, as far as we know, the world, which is a logically possible object, does not exist according to the local existence condition ‘appearing in a field of sense.’30 Thus, the world is not only a logical possible object, but it is also ontologically possible. But Gabriel infers that the world cannot exist: If in addition it is not an object, we have to come to the conclusion that it does not appear in a field of sense. Yet, this still implies that it cannot exist.31 27 In Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics, I was very sympathetic to Graham Priest’s worry that FOS ontology begged the question. However, in “Transcending Everything” I have decisively demonstrated that it is not viciously circular. See Moss, “Transcending Everything,” 172–176. 28 Gabriel, Ch. 2, 2022, 57. 29 See Gabriel, 2022, 64. 30 Moss, 2023, 179. 31 Gabriel, 2015, 205. 82 G. S. Moss It is true that the world “cannot exist,” but only relative to some local existence condition. Because the world can exist—it is both logically and ontologically possible—Gabriel’s claim that the world cannot exist appears unjustified—it is too strong. Indeed, he gives us good reason to doubt the existence of the unified totality—but it is not impossible. 4.2.4 The Problem of Truth in Fields of Sense Ontology Gabriel holds that a concept can be meaningful only if it has truth conditions, and a concept can have truth conditions only if it refers to something. Since the concept of the ‘world’ does not refer to anything at all, the concept of the ‘world’ does not have truth conditions and is thereby absolutely meaningless.32 Gabriel qualifies his Meinongianism: while conceivability implies actuality, this is only the case for those concepts and terms that can be meaningfully conceived. If the world could be meaningfully conceived, then it would exist. Because the concept of the world is meaningless, Gabriel’s claim that ‘the world does not exist’ is without meaning. Meta-metaphysical nihilism states that “we get mired in mere nonsense when we assume that the world exists.”33 This position is meaningless too, for in order to state the meaning of this position one must employ the concept of the world. As a consequence, Gabriel’s arguments against the existence of the world can neither be meaningful and none of Gabriel’s assertions about the world can be true. Although one might critique Gabriel on these grounds, they actually work in his favor. In Everything and Nothing Gabriel points out that the term ‘world’ is employed dialectically: The use of an apparently meaningful noun phrase “the world” in “the world is not my left hand” is purely dialectical, i.e., it takes place on a lower rung of the ladder, designed to lure in the metaphysician who believes herself to be in a cognitive, epistemic, or at least, semantic touch with the world as an object.34 Gabriel shows the non-existence of the world in virtue of failing to speak meaningfully about it.35 Thus, the self-refutation of his own view demonstrates that it is true. By my lights the no world view calls us to rethink both the concept of truth and what constitutes a fact. While Gabriel does not endorse an ineffable concept of truth in his FOS ontology, it certainly seems implied by his position on meaninglessness. It is true that the world does not exist, for this truth can be shown. Since this truth 32 Gabriel, 2015, 200–205. 2022, Ch. 4, 93. 34 Gabriel, 2022, Ch. 2, 66. 35 For a detailed analysis of the meaninglessness of the world, and its connection to mysticism, see my longer exegesis and analysis in Moss, 2023, 180–189. 33 Gabriel, 4 Absolute Dialetheism 83 cannot be truthfully asserted, but only truthfully shown, the truth that the world does not exist must be an ineffable truth or there is no truth to be shown at all. in Fields of Sense he is highly critical of appeals to ineffability as a strategy to preserve the truth. For example, Regarding Wittgenstein, Gabriel argues that he unfortunately thought that the existence of the world itself would remain a mystery, something mystical, not to be stated in language, but maybe experienced. But that is just to say that we can whistle it, where we cannot.36 Given that FOS ontology too requires that the truth of the no-world view remains a mystery, something “not to be stated in language but maybe experienced” we cannot whistle Gabriel’s view either. However, in Everything and Nothing,37 Gabriel’s explicitly dialectical strategy makes him appear more sympathetic to the ineffable view of truth than in Fields of Sense. Does FOS not demand a more charitable view of truth as a kind of revelation or disclosure, which is fundamentally ineffable?38 According to Fields of Sense, there are only facts “if something or other is true of an object.”39 However, since the world is not an object, there cannot be anything that is true of the world and for this reason there are no facts about it. Since there is no fact about the world, it cannot even be a fact that the world does not exist. But if the no world view contends that it is a fact that the world does not exist, then a different conception of facts ought to be introduced in order to account for the fact of the absence of the world. Either it is not a fact that the world does not exist or it is a fact, but this fact is such that there is something true, but it is not true of an object. As is evident, the concepts of truth and facts are interrelated, whereby a revision in the one appears to require a revision in the other. In virtue of the productive conversations with Graham Priest and myself, Gabriel has expressed his willingness to reconsider the meaninglessness of the concept of the world.40 However, if Gabriel really means to seriously reconsider the meaninglessness of the world, then he ought also to seriously consider Absolute Dialetheism, the view that the world exists, but with the qualification that ‘the world exists,’ is a true contradiction. If we can meaningfully speak about the world, then we can meaningfully assert it to be true that the world does not exist. And yet— if we entertain the possibility that it is meaningful to speak about the world, and conceivability implies actuality, then our very claim that the world does not exist implies that the world must exist. Thus, if we can meaningfully speak about the world, then the world must both exist and not exist. Let us not parse words: if the 36 Gabriel, 2015, 201. 2022, Ch. 2, 96. Gabriel even point out that “my view is actually somewhat closer to the apophatic tradition than Moss surmises.” 38 Indeed, like my own, Gabriel’s view of truth is itself a work in progress. In his conversation with Priest, Gabriel indicates as much: “Well I don’t know if my theory of truth is sufficiently developed yet. I tend to think that truth has to be truth everywhere. I’m very monadic about truth.” Gabriel, 2022, 154. 39 Gabriel, 2015, 46. 40 Gabriel, 2022, Ch. 4, 94. 37 Gabriel, 84 G. S. Moss assertion that ‘the world does not exist’ is true, then Absolute Dialetheism is true too. Absolute Dialetheism can truthfully assert what the SFO theorist cannot: the truth of the no world view. 4.3 Varieties of Absolute Dialetheism Given the defeasibility of SFO, I propose the exploration of Absolute Dialetheism as an alternative. Absolute Dialetheism is the view that the world exists, but with the qualification that the existence of the world is a true contradiction. In Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics, I introduce a basic typography of Absolute Dialetheism. Absolute Dialetheism can be divided into two species: the transconceptual and the conceptual. On the one hand, if the PNC governs all conceptual knowing, and the Absolute is contradictory, then the knowing of the Absolute must transcend all conceptual knowing. On the other hand, rather than deny that we can conceptually grasp the Absolute and transcend logic, one can attempt to reform the structure of logic and conceptuality itself. If one denies that the PNC governs all conceptual knowing, then one can assert the truth of the Absolute without transcending logic. Naturally, while these species of Absolute Dialetheism can be further divided, here it would be a distraction to develop a full typology of Absolute Dialetheism.41 What is more, here I do not intend to privilege one species over the other. Rather, I aim to show that both forms of Absolute Dialetheism have their own resources by which to challenge the no-world view. 4.3.1 The Trans-Conceptual Form of Absolute Dialetheism In addition to his inductive argument for the view that existence is a relative property, Gabriel also has a conceptual argument. For Gabriel a proper property “puts one into the position of distinguishing one object from another in a domain.”42 41 For instance, the conceptual form of Absolute Dialetheism can at least be divided into at least two further species. One can either adopt a formal paraconsistent logic that denies explosion, or one can think the Absolute by employing a non-formal logic. While one could appropriate Priest’s logic of paradox to pursue the former, one could appropriate and further develop Hegel’s logic to pursue the latter. The trans-conceptual variety can also be further divided into various kinds— from medieval mysticism (such as Cusanus) to Early German Romanticism (such as Schlegel). Speaking of Christ, Cusanus claims that “[ . . . ] of you we affirm contradictories as most true, since you are equally creator and creature, equally attracting and attracted, equally finite and infinite.” Cusanus, 1997, 276–277. Schlegel claims that “everything contradicts itself.” See Manfred Frank (2004) [1994], 213. While both would assert that the Absolute is contradictory, and transcends our capacity for conceptual knowledge, the trans-conceptual Absolute appears differently for each. For more on this basic typology of Absolute Dialetheism, see Moss, 2020, 239–247. 42 Gabriel, 2015, 49. 4 Absolute Dialetheism 85 As we noted in our discussion of Schelling and the problem of the world, the concept of Being does not differentiate between beings: “x is” and “y is” does not differentiate x from y. Not only does Being fail to differentiate its members from each other, but it is equally unable to differentiate any members outside of the class of being, for there is [by definition] nothing outside of the class of Being. Thus, Being is not a proper property. Being cannot be a proper property because it cannot differentiate the members of its own class. This argument succeeds because Gabriel assumes that Being is not self-differentiating. Indeed, this assumption is clearly laid out by Gabriel in other terms, when he claims at the outset of his argument against the world that as the unified totality, “this unified totality differs from each and every thing that is unified by it, and accordingly becomes an additional field of sense, the field of all fields.”43 The principle that unifies all fields is fundamentally different from the fields that are unified by it. What is precluded from the very beginning is absolute self-differentiation. If we assume the duality of principles as constitutive of thought, such that Being is not self-particularizing, there remains a chasm between Being and its particulars instances, beings. While Being would be instantiated in every being, it would not itself be one particular being among the others. Being would not differentiate the beings—it would not contain any determinate feature by which it could be differentiated as a determinate or particular being. Since Being is not a being, it excludes them: Heidegger does not claim to have discovered the ontological difference. Rather, the ontological difference is precisely the destiny of metaphysics; it is the metaphysical idea that being is not a being, where this means that there is a relation between being and beings. Yet, this turns being into a being, which is the basic move behind ontotheology.44 The claim that Being is not a being, transforms Being into a particular being. Insofar as it is a particular being, it excludes others, and exists in relation to them. Although we attempt to discover the unconditioned Absolute that exists without restriction, in every thought about unrestricted totality no unified totality appears. Since ‘Being’ can never be a being and the conceiving of Being always relativizes it, we have good reason to defend the view that to exist is to be relative to something else. The experience of Absolute thinking is constituted by the perpetual absconding of the Absolute. In one stroke we can simultaneously see the relativity of existence and the non-being of the world. This position is in deep resonance with Heidegger’s Country Path Conversations and Schelling’s Berlin lectures but is never explicitly drawn by either Heidegger or Schelling. Traditionally, philosophers have been worried that if the Absolute (or the world) does not exist, then nothing else can. However, the problem of onto-theology indicates that the reverse is true. What always appears in the place of Being is some being or being(s). In the experience of thinking, particular beings do not vanish— 43 Gabriel, 44 Gabriel, 2015, 189. 2015, 205. 86 G. S. Moss only Being vanishes. Gabriel awakens us from our dogmatic slumber: we cannot dogmatically assume the Absolute exists, for it does not even appear in thought. Having awoken from our dogmatic slumber, is there any recourse left to the friends of the absolute? Indeed, there is hope. Only, however, if we remember speculative Good Friday, according to which the death of the Absolute may only be a prelude to its resurrection. The experience of thinking that awakes us to the death of the absolute is the very same that awakens us to its resurrection. Through the failure to conceptualize the Absolute, the philosopher experiences the absence of the Absolute. However, what has disappeared is not the true Absolute—what has disappeared is a one-sided Absolute—an infinitude that excludes its own determinate particularity. In that very experience of the disappearance of the false infinite, the true infinite appears before us. In the failure to conceptualize the Absolute, we experience opposing and mutually exclusive concepts falling into a unity—Being falls into a being—the undifferentiated Being cannot be differentiated from any particular, relative, and differentiated being. In the experience of this indistinct Being, Being no longer appears as the finite other to distinction but encompasses its very negation. This experience of Being is an experience of the Absolute that is absolutely infinite for it no longer excludes its non-being but is constituted by its very negation. As Pseudo-Dionysius would have it: Thus, regarding the divine unity beyond being, they assert [ . . . ] its wholly belonging to the conceptual realm, the assertion of all things, the denial of all things, that which is beyond every assertion and every denial [ . . . ].45 We can hold the Absolute to be real because we encounter it in the revelation of the Absolute contradiction that is constitutive of the experience of Absolute thinking. Admittedly, on the trans-conceptual form of Absolute Dialetheism, this experience of the contradictory absolute does not successfully match any concept with an object. The contradiction is true not because the concept of contradiction corresponds with the Absolute, but because the contradiction is what discloses or reveals the existence of the Absolute. Nonetheless, it is an experience that would be impossible without concepts, for it is the attempt to conceive the Absolute which initiates the collapse of the concept into its opposite. We can experience the Absolute directly in the very vanishing of categories into their negations. Indeed, where the danger is greatest and the Absolute recedes from our conceptual grasp, the saving power arises: Being appears in the trans-conceptual experience of the self-negation of the conceptual thinking of being. The death of the absolute must die—and new life born therefrom. Note that while there may be trans-conceptual forms of Absolute Dialetheism that represent the experience of the Absolute non-methodologically, this form of trans-conceptual Absolute Dialetheism is deeply methodological. Indeed, the 45 Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987, 61. 4 Absolute Dialetheism 87 experience of the Absolute is not due to a chance encounter, or a stroke of luck. To the contrary—it is born from a careful attentiveness to the self-referential character of thought, and its consequences. By applying the concept to itself, the concept negates itself. Because it is true that the Absolute is absolute, the Absolute is not relative. If it is not relative, then it is other than the relative and is thereby relative. Hence, if the Absolute is Absolute, then it is not Absolute—it is relative. Through self-referential predication, the concept negates itself, and stands in contradiction with itself. The truth of the Absolute contradiction is experienced through the method of self-referential thinking, a totally exoteric method. Although the method is exoteric, the Absolute truth that is revealed is not: it remains ineffable. Exactly because all concepts fail, the concepts of the transconceptual theorist must also fail. Like the no-world view, for the trans-conceptual Absolute Dialetheist, the truth that the world exists is only something that can be shown via the self-negation of the trans-conceptual position itself. 4.3.2 The Conceptual Form of Absolute Dialetheism Having considered the trans-conceptual form of Absolute Dialetheism, we now turn to examine one form of the conceptual species of Absolute Dialetheism. Although Gabriel is right to argue against the existence of the world as a universal genus, not as a set, both the set and the genus have a common feature: each assumes that the universal is not sufficient for the differentiation of the particular. Just as membership in a set cannot differentiate each member that falls within the set, so the genus is not sufficient for differentiating the species. Just as Schelling before him, Gabriel’s concept of the proper property (as well as the concept of the genus and the set) assumes the duality of principles of identity and difference.46 Following Gabriel, we acquiesce that the world cannot exist if the term ‘world’ only signifies a relative totality. In Gabriel’s terms, although Being cannot be a proper or metaphysical property if the principles of identity and difference are 46 Despite their differences, Badiou and Gabriel both share a common premise that enables them to infer that the world does not exist. Gabriel argues that Badiou has mis-understood the world as the set of all sets. Instead, Gabriel takes the concept of the world to be the concept of the highest genus. Because both the genus and the set assume a difference between the principle of identity and difference, whereby neither the highest set nor the highest genus can differentiate itself, both are emboldened to infer the non-existence of the world only because they share this common position. Accordingly, irrespective of whether one begins with the concept of the world as a set or a genus, in each case one can infer the non-existence of the world, but only because of the fundamental assumption shared by both. For this reason, since the division of principles of identity and difference transcends the distinction between formal and non-formal ontology, once we recognize this common assumption that motivates their arguments, each can be classified as two species of arguments that belong to the same genus. Indeed, whether you conceive of concepts as abstractions, sets, or genera, the same qualification applies. For a further discussion, see Moss, 2020. 88 G. S. Moss assumed to be separate, there is good reason to think that in the case of Being the principles of identity and difference are not separate. In the following reflections, I argue that the concept of Being is self-differentiating and can thereby be successfully conceived as a special kind of proper (and metaphysical) property whereby the principles of identity and difference are not posited as separate principles. If we reflect upon the concept of the world, we shall discover that if the world exists, then it can only exist in itself (as a member of itself) and as a true contradiction. Although the following arguments are indeed hypothetical, they are possibilities that Gabriel has not yet conclusively refuted, and which ironically follow his own dialectical reflections on onto-theology as the destiny of metaphysics. Being not only includes all beings, but is the unity of all beings, insofar as it expresses that in virtue of which each being is a member of the totality of everything that exists. ‘Being,’ as the unified totality of all that is, is another name for ‘world.’ Our clue to uncovering the dialetheic character of the concept of the world can be discovered by reflecting upon the question ‘what is Being?’ The question itself demands a self-predicative answer. The self-predicative character of the question further implies existential implication. These features conclusively establish that if Being is, it exists in itself. In the case of Being, too, conceivability implies actuality, though in this case, it is the actuality of a true contradiction. Let us consider the kind of answer the question requires by thinking about what the question asks. The question ‘what is Being?’ asks the interlocutor to specify the being of Being. The questioner is investigating the predicate that would distinguish Being, what it is that would set Being apart from beings. Accordingly, the interlocutor ought to reply as follows: ‘Being is such and such.’ By replying in this manner, the interlocuter follows the logic of the question, for she specifies the predicate, the ‘what it is,’ that distinguishes Being. By predicating ‘such and such’ of Being, the interlocuter differentiates Being by the predicate ‘is such and such’ and specifies the being of Being. Because the predicate ‘is such and such’ must appeal to the being of Being, in order to answer the question ‘what is Being?’, one must predicate Being to itself. Thus, the question ‘what is Being?’ can only be answered in a self-predicative way. Being is universal, for it is what every being has in common in virtue of which it is a being. As such, self-predication in the case of Being would engender the selfpredication of a universal to itself. As we noted at the outset, ‘Being’ does not differentiate between any beings; to proclaim that a being is does not differentiate it from any other being that is. Not only does Being not introduce any differentiation into the genus of Being, but there is nothing outside of Being, for it contains everything. While the concept of the animal does not differentiate particular animals, the concept of an animal contains a difference by which animals can be differentiated from plants, which exist outside of the class of animals. Prima facie, unlike the class of animals, Being does not appear to introduce any differentiation by which beings could be distinguished from anything else. So, Being does not stand in any relationship of difference to any beings beyond it. Thus, the interlocuter would not be wrong to respond to the question about the being of Being with ‘Being is absolutely undifferentiated’ where 4 Absolute Dialetheism 89 ‘absolutely undifferentiated’ replaces the abstract form of the predicate ‘such and such.’ Once we acknowledge that Being is self-predicative, it becomes immediately evident that Being is also existentially implicative. By ‘existential implication’ I mean that the concept implies its own particular existence. The predicate ‘absolutely undifferentiated’ differentiates Being from all other beings. For all other beings are differentiated, while Being is absolutely undifferentiated. The predicate ‘is such and such’ differentiates Being from everything else: the predicate ‘absolutely undifferentiated’ differentiates Being from all relative and differentiated beings. Each being is a being—‘this’ or ‘that’ being—each is a particular being distinguished from and relative to the others. Because Being is different from all relative beings in virtue of its complete lack of differentiation, Being is one particular and relative being alongside others. Thus, if Being exists at all, qua unrestricted totality, Being must be a member of itself—it must exist ‘in itself.’ This is the meaning of ‘existential implication: the universal qua universal particularizes itself: Being qua Being particularizes itself into a relative and differentiated being. Because Being does differentiate itself, it can differentiate individuals—thus it can be successfully conceived as a ‘proper property’ of a unique order. Note that the preceding reflections follows Gabriel’s reflections on the destiny of metaphysics. Gabriel insightfully points out that if Being is not a being, then there is a relation of Being to beings which transforms Being into a being.47 Indeed, Gabriel’s line of reasoning is simply a terser version of the preceding reflections: if Being is the absolute and undifferentiated universal, then it must be a differentiated and particular being. However, from this it does not necessarily follow that Being does not exist. Rather, it may be that Being is that which is self-particularizing. As particular, it exists in a relationship of difference with other particulars. Indeed, one can read ‘self-particularization’ as ‘self-division.’ In the case of Being, is there really an absolute difference between the principle that unifies all fields and that which is unified by that principle? If Hegel is right that Being is a self-predicative and existentially implicative concept that divides itself, then we cannot simply discount the idea that Being is a proper property.48 Consider Hegel, who speaks of the Absolute as the power of self-division: The concept of God realizes itself most fully as this universal that determines and particularizes itself—it is this activity of dividing, of particularizing and determining itself, or positing a finitude, negating this—its own finitude and being identical with itself through its negation of this finitude. This is the concept as such, the concept of God.49 Although Schelling will deny that the transition from the infinite to the finite can be rendered intelligible, both Schelling and Hegel posit the Absolute as self- 47 Gabriel, 2015, 205. more on the self-predicative and existentially implicative features of Hegel’s doctrine of the concept, see Moss (2023). 49 Hegel, 1984, 324. 48 For 90 G. S. Moss dividing and self-particularizing.50 The dispute between Hegel and Schelling about the prospects for conceptually comprehending why there is anything may obscure a point of deep agreement between them that renders their disagreement meaningful, namely their commitment to the existence of the world as the self-dividing totality— der Reich Gottes. Because Being is existentially implicative, it is also self-contradictory. Because Being qua Being is absolutely undifferentiated (rather than being relatively undifferentiated) Being must be differentiated from all other differentiated and relative beings. Thus, it must be true that Being is absolutely undifferentiated, and that Being is differentiated, which is a contradiction. On the one hand, the complete absence of differentiation entails that there is no difference in Being whatsoever. On the other hand, Being is not undifferentiated, for it is differentiated from all other beings. What is more, Being is differentiated in virtue of its lack of differentiation. Insofar as Being is un-differentiated, there is no difference in Being in virtue of which one could distribute the mutually opposed predicates in a consistent way. Because Gabriel allows that contradictions can exist, on his own view there can be no a priori formal law that would exclude the possibility of a contradictory world. If the world exists in itself (which is the only way it can exist), then it exists as a true contradiction. If Gabriel is right that to exist means ‘to stand out,’ and the world stands out against nothing, one might be inclined to infer that the world does not exist. However, since the proposition ‘the world exists’ is a contradiction, it must stand out against itself. Thus, even on this conception of existence the world can exist. What is more, for Absolute Dialetheism, it is not only the existence of the world that is contradictory, but the existence of anything at all would appear to be contradictory too. Insofar as any particular being is said to be, the selfcontradictory concept of Being must be instantiated by anything that is. If Being is absolutely undifferentiated, then it cannot be differentiated from any relative and particular being. Thus, the un-differentiated must be indistinct from all distinguished beings.51 Thus, the contradiction said of Being must necessarily be distributed to 50 For Schelling the Absolute, considered “in itself” also “divides itself:” The being of the ground, as of that which exists, can only be | that which comes before all ground, thus, the absolute considered merely in itself, the non-ground. But, as proved, it cannot be this in any other way than in so far as it divides into two equally eternal beginnings, not that it can be both at once, but that it is in each in the same way, thus in each the whole, or its own being. But the non-ground divides itself into the two exactly equal beginnings, only so that the two, which could not exist simultaneously or be one in it as the non-ground, become one through love, that is, it divides itself only so that there may be life and love and personal existence. For love is neither in indifference nor where opposites are linked which require linkage for [their] Being, but rather (to repeat a phrase which has already been said) this is the secret of love, that it links such things of which each could exist for itself, yet does not and cannot exist without the other. Schelling, 2006, 69–70 [SW 406–408]. Unlike Hegel, however, Schelling denies that we can conceptually comprehend how the Absolute finitizes itself. 51 This dialectical argument can be found in multiple thinkers. For example, In Sermon 52 Meister Eckhart argues that “[ . . . ]Therefore God is free of all things, and therefore he is all things.” Eckhart, 1981, 201. In the Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, Kitaro 4 Absolute Dialetheism 91 everything in the genus of Being. As is evident, the lack of difference predicated of Being simultaneously illuminates the contradiction of the Absolute as well as the absolutely pervasive presence of contradiction in all beings. Since contradiction is a concept that applies to everything, it is an absolute category. Hegel calls it “Der Absolute Widerspruch [ . . . ].”52 Hegel remarks that contradiction—like identity, difference, and opposition—is an absolute principle: “All things are in themselves contradictory.”53 If everything is contradictory, then all the categories of the logic are too: “On the contrary, every determination, anything concrete, every concept, is essentially a unity of distinguished and distinguishable elements which, by virtue of the determinate, essential difference, pass over into elements which are contradictory.”54 If Being is self-predicative, it would be false to simply proclaim that Being is not a predicate. Hegel applies the self-predicative aspect of Being to resuscitate the ontological argument. As Hegel explicitly states, the Science of Logic advances an ontological argument for the existence of the Absolute: Of the concept, we have now first shown that it determines itself as objectivity. It should be obvious that this latter transition is essentially the same as the proof form the concept, that is to say, from the concept of God to his existence, that was formerly found in Metaphysics, or the so-called ontological proof.55 In Gabriel’s language, Hegel offers us nothing less than an ontological argument for the existence of the world. In respect to the Absolute, Hegel adopts Gabriel’s principle that conceivability implies actuality, for the Absolute is exactly that possibility which actualizes itself. Although Gabriel allows for self-containment generally, the Absolute is one place where he absolutely forbids it. However, if Hegel is right, the truth appears to be the other way around: if absolute totality exists, then it contains itself.56 Indeed, if a concept has absolute extension, it ought to apply to itself, otherwise it would only have relative extension. In the tradition, God is not only defined simply as Being, but also that Being whose essence is its existence. Although Schelling is critical of Hegel’s resuscitation Nishida invokes a similar argument: “I hold that when we express God, or the absolute, in logical terms we must speak in this way. Because God, or the absolute, stand to itself in the form of a contradictory identity—namely as its own absolute self-negation, or as possessing absolute self-negation within itself—it exists and expresses itself through itself. Because it is absolute nothingness, it is absolute being. It is because of this coincidence of absolute nothingness and absolute being that we can speak of the divine omniscience and omnipotence. Therefore I will say that because there is Buddha, there are sentient beings, and because there are sentient beings, there is Buddha. Or in Christian terms, because there is God the creator, there is the world of creatures, and because there is the world of creatures, there is God the creator.” See Nishida, 1993, 69. 52 Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik II, 2003, 66. 53 Hegel, 2015, 381. 54 Hegel, 2015, 384 55 See Hegel, 2015, 625. 56 ‘Being is not the only concept subject to self-referential predication. The concept of the concept and the truth of truth are self-predicative too. Many more examples can be adduced. 92 G. S. Moss of the ontological argument, both Schelling (at different points in his career) and Hegel, each in his own way, identify God with the world.57 In the context of the German Idealist conception of the Deity, Gabriel’s argument against the world can be understood as engendering a kind of atheism. Likewise, our defence of the existence of the world, understood in the light of the Idealist conception of the God-world relation, can also be understood as a defence of the existence of God, insofar as God is nothing other than Being—the all-encompassing and selfdeveloping reality. Indeed, for the Absolute Dialetheist, if God (qua Being) exists, that truth can only be articulated in the form of a contradiction.58 As is evident, this connection between the no-world view and the theological dimension of German Idealist metaphysics still requires a deeper investigation. While the concept of the Absolute is a concept of autonomous self-actualization, merely relative concepts, such as the empirical concept of 100 dollars, do not imply their own existence. Of course, the fact that it is possible that I have 100 dollars does not entail that I have 100 dollars. But it is otherwise with the Absolute. Since the question ‘what is Being?’ can only be answered in a self-predicative way, and this engenders existential implication, Being determines itself to be one particular being within the class of Being. On Hegel’s terms, every inquiry into the Absolute will discover that its concepts cannot do without self-predication and existential implication.59 Self-predication and existential implication are the conceptual structures by which Hegel’s concept of Absolute self-containment are developed. These reflection bear upon Hegel’s defence of the ontological argument against Kant. Because Being is undifferentiated, it does not add any additional conceptual content to the concept of 100 dollars. Accordingly, one can connect the idea that Being is not a predicate to its un-differentiated character. For this reason, one can plausibly argue that Being transcends the structure of predication. However, Hegel problematizes this view by revealing how undifferentiated Being conceptually differentiates itself. Unlike the 100 dollars, the Absolute reveals itself to be self-differentiating and self-predicating. For Hegel, while finite concepts engender a separation of the concept from being, the concept of the Absolute 57 Although this claim requires important qualifications and nuance, the pantheistic view of God can be found in both Schelling and Hegel without exerting much effort. See Schelling, 2006, 71– 72, in which he permits the description of his views as a kind of pantheism. Schelling is clear that all that exists is the will: “In the final and highest judgment, there is no other Being than will. Will is primal Being [Ur- sein] to which alone all predicates of Being apply: groundlessness, eternality, independence from time, self-affirmation.” See Schelling, 2006, 21. Hegel’s pantheism is different, since for him the world is the self-articulation of the concept, which he explicitly identifies with God. See Hegel, 1992, 145–146. 58 While Schelling clearly follows the PNC, I have argued that Hegel does endorse the truth of contradiction. See Moss, 2020, 274–282 and Moss, 2023, 155–157. 59 As Sainsbury points out in his discussion of the Liar Paradox, self-reference by itself does not always engender paradoxes. For example, I can talk about this sentence without engendering any paradox. But as concerns absolute concepts, the self-referential character of the concept engenders a contradiction. See Sainsbury, 2015, 137. 4 Absolute Dialetheism 93 demands conceiving Being as a predicate in which no such distinction can be tolerated.60 Gabriel does briefly reflect upon Hegel’s philosophy in Fields of Sense. Gabriel objects that Hegel never establishes that the concept is boundless.61 Gabriel is right that Hegel conceives of the concept as a conceptual agency. Against Hegel, Gabriel states that “the relevant self-referentiality of concepts does not spread out over totality by itself.” This may be true, but Gabriel ought to give an argument for this claim, since the concept of the Absolute appears to entail that it “spreads out over totality by itself.” Put tersely, Fields of Sense presupposes that Hegel is wrong. For this reason, a Hegelian concept of the Absolute continues to stand as an objection and alternative to the no-world view: The relevant self-referentiality of concepts does not spread out over totality by itself. It would, if we had reasons to think of totality as encompassed by a given actual thought no thinker we are acquainted with holds. But if such a form of idealism is the only way of solving the puzzles of the no-world view, the no-world view has the advantage of not being committed to the idea that totality is always already encompassed by some actual thought or concept.62 While the trans-conceptual form of Absolute Dialetheism can only show the truth of the world via the contradiction, the conceptual form of Absolute dialetheism expounded here can successfully assert the truth of the existence of the world. 4.4 Conclusion SFO ontology calls us to question our dogmatic commitments concerning Absolute existence. Gabriel’s SFO is a welcome Anstoß to re-examine our metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological commitments. It is my hope that Absolute Dialetheism may do the same for the SFO. On the one hand, while Gabriel cannot successfully assert the truth of the no-world view, he can successfully show it. The Absolute Dialetheist, on the contrary, can successfully assert the truth of no world view. If we can meaningfully speak about the world, then Absolute Dialetheism is true. On the other hand, if we cannot speak meaningfully about the world, then on the SFO the non-existence of the world remains an ineffable truth. Given that there 60 The ontological argument is salvaged via a logic of self-reference. Hegel writes: “This so called concept of a hundred dollars is however a false concept; [ . . . ] a hundred dollars is nothing selfreferring” Hegel, 2015, 64–65/21.75–21.76. 61 Gabriel, 2015, 288. As I have argued in Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics, I contend that Hegel means to establishes the boundlessness of the conceptual in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Here he performs an internal critique on the finitude of the concept, and thereby means to shows that conceptual knowing is Absolute. By means of the self-negation of the finite conception of the concept, the Phenomenology prepares the way for a pre-suppositional logic. For more on this view see Maker, 1994. 62 Gabriel, 2015, 228. 94 G. S. Moss are kinds of Absolute Dialetheism according to which the existence of the world remains ineffable, SFO ontology and Absolute Dialetheism stand at an ineffable impasse between views that cannot be successfully articulated, but only indicated or shown via their own unique paths of self-transcendence. References Cusanus. (1997). On the vision of god. In Classics of Western spirituality (H. Lawrence Bond, Trans.) (pp. 233–289). Mahwah. Eckhart, M. (1981). Sermon 52. In The essential sermons, commentaries, treatises, and defense (Translated by O. S. A. Edmund Colledge & B. McGinn, Trans.) (pp. 199–203). Paulist Press. Frank, M. (2004). Philosophical foundations of German romanticism (E. M. Zaibert, Trans.). SUNY. Gabriel, M. (2015). Fields of sense. Edinburgh University Press. Halper, E. (1993). Hegel and the problem of the differentia. In Form and reason: Essays in metaphysics (pp. 197–209). SUNY. Hegel, G. W. F. 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