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The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC Andreas Konecny – Nicholas Sekunda (eds.) Oﬀprint Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Bibliograﬁsche Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbiblio- graﬁe; detaillierte bibliograﬁsche Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abruf bar. Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliograﬁe; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de. Frontispiz: Oxford Brygos Cup. Ashmolean Museum. Courtesy of Ashmolean Museum www.phoibos.at; oﬃ

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Printed in the EU: Prime Rate Kft., Megyeri út 53, H-1044 Budapest ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 (Druckausgabe) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-1 (E-book, PDF) A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Table of Contents Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Andreas Konecny The Road to Plataiai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Kings and Commanders Ian Macgregor Morris Xerxes: Ideology and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Josef Wiesehçfer Mardonios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Ian Macgregor Morris Pausanias, Best of Men: Politics, Propaganda, and Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Ian Macgregor Morris Aristeides the Just ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Strategy and Tactics Nicholas Sekunda Greek Logistics at Plataiaei and Strategical Planning during the Third Invasion of Greece (480 – 479 BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Andreas Konecny The Battle of Plataeiai. Topography and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Roel Konijnendijk – Paul M. Bardunias The Face of Battle at Plataiai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Robert Gaebel The Boiotian Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 After the Victory AndrÆs Patay-HorvÆth Commemorating the Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 Michael Jung Plataiai: Das Scheitern einer Heldenstadt im fünften Jahrhundert v. Chr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 5 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Preface 2022, in late August or early September, will be the 2, 500 th anniversary of a battle that shaped history. At Plataiai, on the north side of a mountain ridge, which separates Attika from Boiotia, the aspirations of the Achaimenid Empire to subdue the recalcitrant city states of Southern Greece were stymied. The largest political entity the world had hitherto seen, in possession of the mightiest military host of the time, was conquered by a feat of arms, which, until that day, none had dared believe possible. Like Admirals Yamamoto and Nagumo at the Battle of Midway, Mardonios, the Persian commander, blundered into a trap. The results were decisive, more so than even the outcome at Midway, which was a crucial turning point, but not the end, of the Paciﬁc War. Plataiai, how- ever, put the ﬁnal stop to Xerxes’ Greek campaign. Nevertheless, the trap that cost Mardonios his life and Xerxes his westernmost provinces, had not even been set up intentionally, like that into which Admiral Nimitz lured his opponents in the North Central Paciﬁc. It was sprung by utter chance, a result of disorganization within the Greek army and reckless blunder on the Per- sian side. The results were decisive. Never again would the King of Kings aspire to conquer Greece. Nor would he ever again successfully endanger the independence of Greece’s major poleis, nor hinder the emerging Greek political and artistic culture which would, in turn, develop into the seedbed of our current Western political systems and cultural environment. These results were achieved by the diﬀering ﬁghting methods and ﬁghting power of the respective opponents and by the diﬀering qualities of their respective commanders. The present volume assembles the con- tributions of several specialists in Greek and Achaimenid (military) history, aspiring to shed some new light on this much discussed and highly decisive event in European history. To the edi- tors, there remains only to express gratitude to all of them for their valuable contributions. Vienna and Gdańsk, January 2022 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Aristeides the Just ?* Ian Macgregor Morris But if you praise Pausanias or even Xanthippus, or you praise Leotychides, I praise Aristeides the one best man to come from holy Athens, since Leto conceived a hatred for Themistokles, A liar, an unjust man. 1 Timokreon of Rhodes Timokreon’s cutting satire presents a list of the great names of the war against Xerxes, names worthy of praise and remembrance. Before focussing his invective on the ﬁgure of Themistokles, he selects Aristeides as the one most worthy of eulogy. While the poet’s animosity was in all like- lihood personal, the arbitrary tone – “some may choose” – and his level of vitriol towards the hero of Salamis implies that the reputations of these ‘heroes’ were disputed even in the direct aftermath of the victories they secured. It also establishes the theme of the rivalry between Aris- teides and Themistokles, in which he often serves more as a foil for his rival, than a character in his own right. 2 The precise date of Timokreon’s text is unknown. Some suggest a composition before 477, arguing that the praise for Pausanias and Leotychidas must predate their disgrace; however, as I argue elsewhere in this volume, the timing, nature or prevalence of such ‘disgrace’ is by no means certain. Rather, I believe that this poem provides a telling insight into the bitterly con- tested memory of the recent conﬂict, and who was deserving of both praise and blame. 3 Each of the ﬁgures the Rhodian mentions was at some point accused of or associated with medism: the ostracism of both Aristeides and Xanthippos involved such a suspicion; while the two Spartan royals were similarly tainted. 4 Timokreon, who may well have been accused of medism himself, was operating in an atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia. This atmosphere was the context that produced the convoluted images of the Greek leaders of the war, and the legacies that deﬁned their reputations. Aristeides has emerged in a particularly positive light from this conﬂict of memory. Indeed, of all the Greek leaders of the resistance to Xerxes, only Leonidas and Aristeides appear ﬂawless. But such appearances can be deceptive. The dominant reputation of Aristeides in later ages is one of uncompromising justice and integrity, encapsulated in the oft repeated anecdote of his os- tracism: inscribing his own name on the pottery sherd at the request of a semi-literate citizen * I would like to thank Andrew Bayliss for his com- operates under the assumption that these ﬁgures were held ments and advice on an earlier draft of this chapter; and in a universal contempt. See also Stehle 1994; Scodel Andreas Konency for his patient suggestions and diligent 1983; Morgan 2015, 157–160; Zaccarini 2020, 7– 8. copy-editing. All translations are taken from the Loeb On Pausanias, see Macgregor Morris, “Pausanias, Best of editions, unless stated otherwise. Men”, this volume. 1 PMG 727; preserved in Plut. Them. 21, 2 –3; tr. 4 See McMullin 2001, 64– 66, on the role of medism McMullin 2001, 56. in ostracism. She does suggest (McMullin 2001, 62) that 2 Zaccarini 2020, 9: “Aristide sembra semmai rappre- Leotychidas was the only one “not tainted” by the charge; sentare un elemento funzionale a polarizzare il ritratto di but the enduring image of the Eurypontid king quite lit- Temistocle stesso”. erally sat astride his bribe carries suggestive connotations of 3 McMullin 2001 discusses the problem in detail, corruption by the ‘riches of the East’. See Powell 1989, and suggests (60) that Timokreon is mocking the eulogies 185, on the “journalistic” images propagated to discredit composed to commemorate the leading ﬁgures of the re- leading Spartans such as Leotychidas; and Morgan 2015, cent war. Robertson 1980 prefers a later date, dubbing the 133 –162, on the competing claims to the memory of the praise of ﬁgures such as Pausanias as “ironic”; but this still conﬂict. 133 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Ian Macgregor Morris who was sick of hearing Aristeides described as “The Just”. 5 While the tale, recorded only in much later sources, is surely apocryphal, it does suggest that his ﬂawless reputation was not uni- versally appreciated at the time. Herodotos introduces Aristeides with words that expand the praise in Timokreon, as “the best and most just man in Athens” – ἄριστον ἄνδρα – but adds that he had “come to believe” this through “an inquiry of his character” – implying both that he had undertaken active research and that he felt the need to stress that he had done so. 6 Both Hero- dotos and Timokreon clearly recognised that not all would share their opinion. Indeed, even in Plutarch’s generally laudatory account, there were many in Athens who feared that he might well medise. 7 Although a key historical ﬁgure in both the Persian Wars and the foundation of the Delian League, Aristeides has attracted remarkably little attention in modern scholarship. This results from the rather disparate nature of the ancient sources. The ﬁfth-century historians give us little actual detail. Despite the praise, in Herodotos he plays a relatively minor role: he suddenly ap- pears in the midst of the preparation for Salamis, raising questions as to precisely where he had been beforehand. 8 Explicitly laying aside their bitter rivalry, he warns Themistokles of the encir- clement of the Greek ﬂeet, who in turn suggests that Aristeides should inform the other generals himself, being the more trusted of the two. 9 However, it appears his reputation carried little weight, as the “majority did not believe him”. 10 Thus Aristeides’ ﬁrst appearance in Herodotos, while admirable and well intentioned, proves to be of little eﬀect. The other generals – that is, speciﬁcally non-Athenians – do not appear to appreciate, or perhaps care about, the supposedly contrasting reputations of the two men. It is the ﬁrst instance of a feature that emerges later in the Aristeides-tradition, in which his idealised reputation is very much an Athenian perspective. He appears next in the midst of the battle, capturing the island of Psyttaleia. Herodotos again feels the need to stress his excellence, repeating a similar formula – “ἀνδρὸς ἀρίστου” – be- fore recounting the deed. 11 Once again, the action, while worthy, plays no major role in the out- come of the battle. Herodotos mentions it only at the very end of his account of the battle, appearing a virtual afterthought to the narrative; and Aristeides is not mentioned among the “best” of the Greeks in the battle, a list also introduced with much the same terms. 12 Finally, Herodotos mentions Aristeides as commander of the Athenian contingent at Pla- taiai, but does not refer to him again in the text. 13 Throughout his account of the battle, actions and speeches are credited to “the Athenians” as a whole rather than to any individual. And while at various points Herodotos does refer to the activities of certain Athenian generals after Plataiai, such as Kimon and Xanthippos, Aristeides is notably absent. 5 Plut. Arist. 7, 5 – 6. In Cornelius Nepos’ much well with the claim that all exiles had been recalled the briefer account (1, 3 – 4), the act of inscription is not men- previous year; Figueira 1987, 291 n. 31, suggests he was tioned. returning from an embassy, possibly as proxenos of that city. 6 Hdt 8, 79, 1. Zaccarini 2020, 8, observes that Hero- See also Bury and Meiggs 1975, 176. Cornelius Nepos dotos employs “la tipica espressione che egli impiega (Arist. 2, 1) claims Aristeides took part in the battle quando riporta vicende incerte. In altre parole, Erodoto “although it was fought before his recall” – perhaps an prende posizione a proposito di una questione dibattuta”. attempt to deal with the ambiguity of Herodotos’ statement. 7 Plut. Arist. 8, 1. Meiggs 1972, 42, suggests that While we may dismiss his comment, it does reveal that the citation in the generally spurious “Letters of Themisto- ancient readers were also confused as to the chronology. kles” of a critique of Aristeides by Kallaischros may well 9 Hdt. 8, 80, 2. descend from a genuine source. Kallaischros supposedly 10 Hdt. 8, 81. termed Aristeides “a fox by deme and fox by nature” (tr. 1 1 Hdt. 8, 95. Meiggs 1972, 42); although as the father of Kritias, a 12 Hdt. 8, 93, 1: “ἄριστα … ἀνδρῶν”; indeed, the list leading member of the ‘Thirty Tyrants’, any quotation of the ‘best’ ﬁghters at the battle precedes any mention of attributed to him is problematic. The play on the word Aristeides’ action, implying that he was not worthy of fox – ἀλώπηξ – echoes the use of the animal to represent comparison with them. On the rather diﬀerent account medisers in Timokreon (PMG 729; Plut. Them. 21, 5; see of the ﬁghting on Psyttaleia in Aischylos, see Wallinga below). 2005, and below. Proietti 2015 considers pre-Herodotean 8 Cawkwell 2005, 93, wonders if this means he had memory of the battle. only just returned from exile on Aigina, which does not sit 13 Hdt. 9, 28, 6. 134 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Aristeides the Just ? Thus the Herodotean Aristeides appears somewhat unremarkable. The repeated insistence on his excellence implies that Herodotos thought it needed to be stressed, as if others were uncon- vinced; his contributions at Salamis were admirable, if not crucial; and while his command at Pla- taiai was a signiﬁcant role, that Herodotos declines to attribute any single action to him suggests that, for the historian at least, he achieved nothing out of the ordinary. As we will see, the con- trast with later accounts, and that of Plutarch in particular, is considerable. Thukydides provides very little detail indeed. Aristeides appears as part of the delegation sent to Sparta during the rebuilding of the walls of Athens, but plays a role quite secondary to that of Themistokles. However he is utterly absent from Thukydides’ brief account of the forma- tion of the so-called Delian League, although the historian does later refer to the “tribute as- sessed at the time of Aristeides” when citing the details of the Peace of Nikias of 421. 14 As in Herodotos’ account of Plataiai, all actions are undertaken collectively by “the Athenians”. Aris- teides’ assessment of the phoros appears in later tradition as his greatest achievement or, depen- dent on one’s perspective, crime. Thus his absence is very telling indeed. Other references in the late ﬁfth and fourth centuries suggest a shifting reputation. The co- medians Eupolis and Aristophanes reﬂect an idealised image, but do so in distinctly satirical terms. 15 They suggest a well-established portrait of Aristeides as overbearingly judgmental, a model of virtue that borders on the insuﬀerable. Perhaps Plutarch’s ostrakon anecdote reﬂects a longer tradition of resentment at such performances of virtue. 16 Nevertheless, Athenian philoso- phers and orators attest to the intrinsic power of this reputation in terms of Athenian identity. Plato provides some passing references in which Aristeides serves as an example of a good man; pseudo-Andokides uses him as an idealised opposite to highlight the crimes of Alkibiades; Aischines and Isokrates invoke him to admonish the Athenians of their own day; and De- mosthenes praises his virtuous poverty. 17 In each of these examples, Aristeides appears quite one- dimensional, an idealised portrait devoid of detail. It is in these texts, be they comedy or eulogy, that the label of the “Just” – a tendentious claim in Timokreon and Herodotos – emerges as his deﬁning feature. 18 In contrast the Athenaion Politeia presents a far more complex account, which reﬂects a number of traditions of Aristeides that are by no means entirely positive. 19 He is presented as a leader of the people alongside Themistokles: The latter [Themistokles] practising to be skilful in military pursuits, and the former [Aris- teides] in politics, and to excel his contemporaries in justice; hence the Athenians employed the one as general and the other as counsellor. 20 14 Thuk. 1, 96 f.; 5, 18, 5. See Figueira 2019; Zaccarini his achievements. 2020, 10 f. 17 Plato, Gorg. 526 a–b; Meno 94 a1. Ps-Andokides 1 5 Aristoph. Knights 1325: see Zaccarini 2020, 23 f.; 4, 11–12; Aischin. 3, 258; Isok. 8, 75; Dem. 3, 21; 23, Eupolis, Demes: see Torello 2008; Zaccarini 2020, 19 –23, 209. For a succinct analysis of the orators, see Zaccarini who remarks that in Eupolis Aristeides “si vanterebbe spu- 2020, 12 –14. doratamente di essere dikaios … compiacendosi di aver 18 See Piccirilli 1984, 137 f.; Tuci 2018, 247; and assecondato con entusiasmo la propria natura … È arduo Zaccarini 2020, 10. non leggere alcuna ironia in proclami così enfatici e auto- 19 Tuci 2018, 231, stresses that the portrayal is incon- celebrativi … decisamente sopra le righe se non patente- sistent, but appears quite original in comparison with the mente paradossale”. Tuci 2018, 247, remarks that these other extant sources: “La presentazione del politico ateni- representations “stabilisce quel cliché di « giusto » e di ese, che sembra essere non del tutto coerente, suscita inter- « moderato » che tanta fortuna avrà poi nel IV secolo, esse per l’originalità di alcuni tratti, che meritano oppor- ﬁno a raggiungere poi Plutarco”. tuna riﬂessione all’interno della tradizione su tale ﬁgura 16 Plut. Arist. 7, 1 claims that Aristeides was envied storica.” See Rhodes 1981, 283 –309, for a detailed con- and hated because of the epithet. Plutarch’s Life of Themis- sideration of the text; see also Hornblower 2011, 19 f. tokles (22, 1) provides a parallel in which the subject simi- 20 Ath. Pol. 23, 3. larly alienated the people through his continual boasting of 135 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Ian Macgregor Morris There is no mention of martial ability or achievement, of the action on Psyttaleia or the com- mand at Plataiai; rather his area of expertise is explicitly contrasted to that of Themistokles. The two co-operate in rebuilding the city walls, “although they were at variance with one another”. But then Aristeides takes the initiative: The secession of the Ionian states from the Lacedaemonian alliance was promoted by Aris- teides, who seized the opportunity when the Lacedaemonians were discredited because of Pau- sanias. Hence it was Aristeides who assessed the tributes of the allied states on the ﬁrst occasion, two years after the naval battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes, and who administered the oaths to the Ionians when they swore to have the same enemies and friends, ratifying their oaths by letting the lumps of iron sink to the bottom out at sea. 21 Aristeides is the prime mover – a suitably Aristotlean precept – in the establishing of Athenian hegemony. It is a deliberate strategy, quite diﬀerent from the accidental acquisition of empire we read in Thukydides. Moreover it represents a vision of empire that is attributed to one man. Perhaps the most astonishing detail is Aristeides’ suggestion for re-organising the Athenian state itself: Afterwards, now that the state was emboldened and much money had been collected, Aris- teides began to advise them to aim at the leadership, and to come down from their farms and live in the city, telling them that there would be food for all, some serving in the army and others as frontier-guards and others conducting the business of the community, and then by this method they would keep the leadership. 22 Athens would become a centre of power that draws all its resources from the allies. In leaving their farms, the citizens would cease to work for themselves, becoming part of an elite that con- trols (“army and frontier-guards”) and administers (“conducting the business”) the empire. Like the Spartiates of Lakedaimon, they would thrive on a parasitic relationship with a population sub- dued by force. Indeed the image is not only strongly reminiscent of Sparta, in which the citizen class do not work for themselves; but also of the Achaemenid Empire, in which the Persians are the only people not to pay tax. 23 In the Athenaion Politeia Aristeides appears as somewhat politically opaque. This may re- ﬂect the contrary sources the author drew upon, but it does also suggest a plausible pattern of fac- tions that shift over time. After 479 competing interests were seeking to capitalise on the opportunities aﬀorded by a sudden power vacuum across the Aegean, and alliances and enmities swiftly re-aligned. The Athenaion Politeia alludes to an early rivalry with Themistokles – “they were at variance with one another” – and at one point seems to present them as opposing leaders of the people and the gnorimoi, the “notables”; but both of these references appear to imply the situation before the war. 24 However, at several points in the post-war period the two men appear as working together as leaders of the demos, sharing a mutual rivalry with Kimon; and, far from representing the gnorimoi, later the author explicitly asserts that Aristeides had ﬁrst envisaged the democratic reforms completed by Ephialtes. 25 2 1 Ath. Pol. 23, 4– 5. teides and Themistokles originates in a “minoritario nella 22 Ath. Pol. 24, 1. tradizione”. 23 Rhodes 1981, 297, notes the Spartan parallel. An- 25 Ath. Pol. 41, 2. See Rhodes 1981, 313; Piccirilli drew Bayliss also highlighted an echo here of Plato’s “Guar- 1984; Rhodes 2010, 38. In contrast, Plutarch (Kim. 5, 4) dian Class” (personal corresp.). claims Aristeides deliberately promoted Kimon to counter 24 Ath. Pol. 23, 4; 28, 2. Rhodes 1981, 348 f., argues the power of Themistokles; although he does also pair that the latter example is one of opposing pairs. Tuci 2018, Aristeides with Ephialtes as examples of politicians who 233, suggests that the alleged collaboration between Aris- refused to enrich themselves at the public expense. 136 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Aristeides the Just ? Aristeides thus emerges as a key architect of both the democracy and the empire, two develop- ments which are presented as integral to one another, as the wealth of the latter enables full rea- lisation of the former. There is an implied disjuncture between vision and the later practice of hegemony, as the excesses of empire post-date Aristeides: Having taken this advice and won the empire, they treated the allies too masterfully … They also established a plentiful food-supply for the multitude, as Aristeides had proposed; for the combined proceeds of the tributes and the taxes and the allies served to feed more than twenty thousand men. 26 Similarly, his wish to reform the Areiopagos can be divorced from the actual laws of Ephialtes that weakened that council and represented a crucial step towards the establishing of the radical democracy. Nevertheless, Aristeides remains the instigator. His achievements can therefore be read in directly contrasting ways: the empowerment of the citizens and the realisation of Athe- nian hegemony versus the degradation of the ancestral institutions and the ‘tyranny’ of both the mob and the Empire. 27 While the idealising tone found in the orators does resonate through the Athenaion Poli- teia, it situates the excellence of Aristeides in speciﬁc actions that, unlike the exploits recounted by Herodotos, had deﬁnitive consequences for the Athenian state. Such a presentation, of course, is very much an Athenian perspective, perhaps unsurprisingly in a work dedicated to understand- ing the history of the Athenian constitution. The achievements of Aristeides, however, could be read in a very diﬀerent way. Pausanias the Traveller explicitly excluded Aristeides from his list of the “benefactors of Greece” due to his “imposition of tribute on the island Greeks”, adding that “before Aristeides all the Greeks were immune from tribute”. 28 The implication appears to be that the Athenian stood as the initiator of a pattern of extortion and repression that would be- come the bane of Greek political life. This negative tradition appears in a number of sources, especially, but not exclusively, non-Athenian writers. These reﬂect a sharp contrast between the strict sense of justice Aristeides displayed in domestic politics with his corrupt and speciﬁcally un- just treatment of the ‘allies’ – his adikia. 29 Nevertheless, the vibrant persistence of a laudatory im- age is attested in Cornelius Nepos’ brief biography of the ﬁrst-century BCE. For modern readers the later traditions of Aristeides are quite overshadowed by Plutarch’s account – although we should not forget that Pausanias’ comment shows that the negative tradi- tion persisted long after the biographer wrote. John Marincola convincingly shows how his gener- ally idealising portrait functions as a model for the political elites of his own time. 30 However, while Plutarch vigorously denies many speciﬁc allegations, the biography is far more than eulogy, balancing details from contrary sources and passing judgement on their veracity. Certain themes frame Plutarch’s presentation. Aristeides is explicitly described as living in poverty; as being intent on justice and incapable of deceit; as abhorring faction; and his entire ca- reer is marked by an opposition to Themistokles. 31 The account of his role in domestic politics is often frustratingly vague, serving to illustrate his character rather than his politics: thus Plut- arch refers to several occasions upon which various rivalries hindered his attempts to pass “neces- sary measures”, but provides no clue as to what these “measures” entailed. 32 The one unambiguous detail is the claim that Aristeides passed the law that established the democracy. 33 26 Ath. Pol. 24, 2 –3. Rhodes 1981, 301 f., observes 29 Zaccarini 2020, 16 f., reviews the ‘negative’ tradi- the lack of hostile language, implying no critique of Aris- tion. teides vision. 30 Marincola 2012, esp. 108 –110. 27 Tuci 2018, 234–241, discusses the competing 3 1 Plut. Arist. 2, 2. Rejects faction: 2, 5; 3, 3. Rivalry themes in the Athenaion Politeia. The notion of the radi- with Themistokles: 2, 1; 3, 1; 24, 4; 25, 7. See Marincola cal democracy as undermining “ancestral” laws is apparent 2012, 92 – 95. in Plut. Kim. 15, 1–2. 32 Plut. Arist. 3, 2 –3. 28 Paus. 8, 52, 2. 33 Plut. Arist. 22, 1. 137 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Ian Macgregor Morris This represents a direct contrast to the Athenaion Politeia, in which it is only a “vision”. How- ever, Plutarch also claims that Aristeides “favoured an aristocratic form of government”. 34 The reform is expressed as his recognition of the desire of the people; thus it is Aristeides’ sense of justice, not his ideological leanings, that lead him to be a key author of the Athenian political system. His involvement in the various engagements against the Persians and his dealings with the allies receive far greater elaboration, with Plutarch giving him a central role at Marathon, as well as at Salamis and Plataiai. 35 He repeatedly attributes speciﬁc actions to Aristeides that in other sources are the work of other individuals or ‘the Athenians’ as a whole. In each case, these are acts that either represent moments that the Athenians made the ‘right’ decision – to help an ally, promote unity – or when they outline their principles through speeches or in negotiations. 36 Moreover, Aristeides’ contributions, while echoing those described in Herodotos, play a more sig- niﬁcant role in the outcome. Thus his intervention on the eve of Salamis does indeed help to convince the allies to follow Themistokles’ plan; and his capture of Psyttaleia appears more cen- tral to the battle. 37 At Plataiai he plays a central role. He is speciﬁed as commander-in-chief of the Athenian contingent and sends to Delphi for the oracle that allows for the Greeks to select the ‘right’ loca- tion for battle. 38 He makes signiﬁcant contributions throughout the engagement, reinforcing be- leaguered allies, parleying with the enemy and directly supporting Pausanias. His prominence is emphasised when Alexander of Macedon, nominally allied to the Persians, requests to speak speci- ﬁcally with Aristeides. 39 Herodotos claims that Alexander was a proxenos of Athens, a role which involved a public decree; but those selected for the honour were the xenoi of an individual citizen beforehand, who would then propose them to the assembly. 40 Thus here Plutarch implies a per- sonal association that situates Aristeides in the elite networks of xeniai that enabled inter-state di- plomacy. Then in the battle’s aftermath it is Aristeides who soothes the bickering between Athenian and Spartan commanders, and thus prevents an escalation which, so Plutarch claims, could have ruined the Greek alliance and threatened the very victory itself. 41 Finally, it is he who 34 Plut. Arist. 2, 1. Similarly, at Kim. 10, 7, Plutarch than explicit statement. Thus at the council before Sala- insists Aristeides opposed Themistokles’ democratic poli- mis, his support for Themistokles’ plan appears to end the cies. discussion, as Plutarch then turns directly to the battle 35 The inclusion of Marathon highlights a key feature itself (Arist. 8, 6). In the account of Psyttaleia, Plutarch of Plutarch’s method: while in the Life of Aristeides, The- stresses the signiﬁcance both through the senior Persians mistokles also plays a signiﬁcant role at the battle, in the Aristeides captured, and in referring to a trophy erected to Life of Themistokles his alleged participation is not men- commemorate the action (Arist. 9, 1–2). In this way, the tioned. Such consistent contribution was essential to how accounts operate as an elaboration, rather than a rejection, Plutarch wished to paint Aristeides; but for Themistokles, of the tradition recorded in Herodotos. However, in his the very diﬀerent narrative trajectory made the battle less Life of Themistokles (12, 7), Aristeides does not convince relevant. the allied generals before deserters arrive conﬁrming the 36 Plut. Arist. 10, 4– 5: rejecting the Spartan proposal news, thus rendering his eﬀort less signiﬁcant. to send the civilians to Lakonia; 10, 6 – 8: either dispatches, 38 Plut. Arist. 11, 1: “στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ”. In or is a member, of the delegates sent to Sparta before Hdt. 9, 28, 6 he is mentioned as “general” (… ἐστρατήγεε Plataiai; 14, 3: volunteers to aid the Megarians; 15, 2: Alex- δ᾽ αὐτῶν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου), which does not ex- ander of Macedon asks speciﬁcally to speak with Aristeides; clude the possibility of such supreme command. However, 16, 2: the only Athenian commander who accepts Pausa- despite this power, Plutarch still depicts him on two occa- nias’ order to switch positions; 18, 5: risks himself to speak sions as having to convince the other Athenian comman- to the medising Thebans; 20, 1: brings calm to the bicker- ders (16, 2; 20, 1). On the oracle: 11, 3 – 8; cf. Marincola ing commanders, and helps them recognise the best course 2016 b. of action; 20, 3: agrees on behalf of the Athenians to give 39 Plut. Arist. 15, 2. the award for valour to the Plataians, notably the ﬁrst of 40 Hdt. 8, 136, 1. On xenia and proxenia see Herman the allies to do so; 21, 1: proposes the festival of Zeus 1987, 130 –142. On Alexander’s proxeny with Athens, see Eleutherios, and a continued alliance against the Persians; Wallace 1970, 199, who suggests that the oﬃcial connec- 24, 4: the allies approach Aristeides speciﬁcally to complain tion may have been renewed in the 480 s, meaning that an about the behaviour of Pausanias. association with Aristeides it by no means improbable. 37 Plutarch achieves this through implication, rather 4 1 Plut. Arist. 20, 1. 138 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Aristeides the Just ? proposes the decree that established a festival of Zeus Eleutherios – thus appropriately honouring the fallen – and a continued campaign against the Persians. 42 The pattern of placing Aristeides at the focus of action continues in the later part of the biography. Thus he is named as a commander alongside Kimon and is the individual the dis- gruntled allies approach to rid them of Pausanias and then appoint to assess the phoros. In most of these examples Plutarch is adding details to, rather than refuting, the earlier accounts. While such a conclusion does rest on the extant sources, which may not be entirely representative, it does generally hold true for the principle ﬁfth-century sources, Herodotos and Thukydides. On certain occasions Plutarch does directly refute certain details: thus he insists Aristeides’ conviction for the embezzlement of public funds was a political attack by Themistokles, and ar- gues that his conviction for accepting bribes did not occur at all. 43 Similarly he rejects the tradi- tion recorded in the later writing of Pausanias the Traveller, but no doubt current in Plutarch’s time, that no Greeks had paid phoros before Aristeides. Rather, he insists that under Spartan he- gemony all members had contributed to the war eﬀort, but now they wished to be assessed “equa- bly”. 44 Thus Aristeides’ assessment did not represent a revolutionary act of repression, but a correction of an unjust burden. Other details are re-framed so as to stress his virtue: his ostracism, far from being a stain on his reputation, becomes the scene which most validates it. The anecdote can certainly be read as a critique of democratic practice, as the views of the illiterate citizen are explicitly revealed to be based on ignorance and petty prejudice. 45 But Aristeides acquiesces to the wishes of the “boor- ish fellow” because his reverence for the laws of Athens, due process and the isegoria of his fellow citizens trumps all personal concern – a feature apparent in several of the anecdotes Plutarch re- cords. 46 In inscribing his own name upon the ostrakon, he is quite literally enabling the expres- sion of popular power. In a few instances, however, Plutarch does record moments in which Aristeides deviates from such an adherence to law. After he is accused of embezzlement, he allows other leading citi- zens to do much the same, only later to reveal them and thus highlight the hypocrisy of political life; and when he discovers a plot on the eve of Plataiai, he releases the suspects rather than bring them to trial, giving them the opportunity to prove their patriotism. 47 In both of these examples, the utility of the action perhaps outweighs the need for a strict legality. More problematic is the comment that Aristeides urged the Athenians to “rule with a stronger hand” when circumstances so demanded, and that they should place any responsibility for breaking the oaths on him alone. 48 Here Plutarch concedes to the judgement of Theophrastos, that while Aristeides was scrupulous in his dealings with Athenians, with the allies he was prepared to place the interests of his own city ﬁrst. It is a rare concession to the negative tradition in the biography, one which Plutarch clearly felt he could not omit. But he once more seeks to frame the detail as favourably as possible: ﬁrstly, Aristeides appears as willing to take on the responsibility for any injustice onto his own person, a signiﬁcant burden in a society for whom oaths were sacrosanct; and sec- ondly, as Plutarch goes on to illustrate at length, he himself never gained ﬁnancially from the do- minion Athens exerted, but lived out his life in poverty. 42 Plut. Arist. 21, 1. nity to once again highlight his “reputation” for refusing to 43 Plut. Arist. 4, 3; 26, 2 –3. avail himself of the “untold wealth” the Persians had left 44 Plut. Arist. 24, 1. behind. Piccirilli 1983, 173, makes the intriguing sugges- 45 Indeed, Plutarch repeatedly stresses that the entire tion that this anecdote reﬂects a distrust of Aristeides, practice of ostracism was driven by jealousy (Arist. 7, 2; whom, due to links with the Alkmaionids, was under a Them. 22, 3). suspicion of medising. Marincola 2012, 96 n. 14, notes 46 In a similar vein, Plutarch claims that after the that this parallels Pausanias’ display of self-restraint after battle of Marathon, Aristeides is delegated the task of Plataiai. guarding the prisoners, while the rest of the army hurry 47 Plut. Arist. 4, 3 – 5; 13, 1–3. On the plot, see Ru- oﬀ to defend Athens (Arist. 5, 4). Yet rather than appear as berto 2010, 17–21. sleight on his prowess – for surely the best soldiers would 48 Plut. Arist. 25, 1. be needed to save the city – the tale becomes an opportu- 139 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Ian Macgregor Morris Thus Plutarch’s Aristeides emerges as a nuanced ﬁgure. He insists, and amply illustrates, that the reputation for justice is fully deserved; and that the rare moments of deviance from those princi- ples were the wisest course of action and driven by a concern for the welfare of his city. These exceptions may be necessary responses to a rather diﬀerent vision of Aristeides that does not survive; but in carefully framing them, Plutarch is perhaps seeking to control the reading of such details. Like the Athenaion Politeia, Plutarch presents Aristeides as the key author of both the de- mocracy and Athenian hegemony. But he avoids the ambiguity of the earlier text by explicitly ex- onerating Aristeides of later malpractices: Perikles and later “the demagogues” dramatically increased the phoros to quite unmanageable levels; and then the latter distracted the people with “the distribution of public moneys” that they had so unfairly plundered. 49 Thus both the empire and the demos were corrupted precisely because later leaders failed to observe the diligent assess- ments Aristeides had made. Plutarch’s Aristeides represents the ‘ideal’ Athenian, the type of ﬁgure that brought about the ‘golden’ age of Athens. In this he is carefully balanced against the wily, unprincipled genius typiﬁed by Themistokles. In times of crisis the city may need such leaders, but they must be in some way contained, for otherwise they will wreak havoc in pursuit of their own glory. Such commanders require others to enable, communicate and balance their maverick style, to temper their excess with subtlety and restraint. Plutarch presents Aristeides as the second in command at every major victory of the Persian War, serving under precisely such a ﬁgure. At Marathon he was second in prestige, but “by adopting at that time the opinion of Miltiades … he did much to turn the scale in [the Greeks’] favour … he conﬁrmed Miltiades in the strength which comes from an unrestricted power”. 50 Similarly, at Salamis “when Themistocles was general with sole powers, he assisted him in every undertaking and counsel … [and] made his chiefest foe the most famous of men”. 51 Finally, he refused to conceal vital intelligence from Pausanias, “since it was on him that the supreme command devolved”. 52 In each case the relationship is identical: the overall commander is a deeply ﬂawed hero, whose rampant ambition will prove their undoing soon after the invader is defeated. Yet Aristeides chooses to conﬁrm that general in a position of absolute power, and thereby enables the general to complete his plan, thus making victory possi- ble. At each engagement he encourages the other oﬃcers – who are reluctant – to obey the over- all commander: persuading them at Marathon, advising them at Salamis, and castigating them at Plataiai. 53 The key to the Greek success in each of these battles was the principle of co-dependency be- tween leader and follower, promoting the unity necessary for victory. Such a sense of balance is evident throughout the Aristeides tradition, such as Herodotos’ scene in which Themistokles re- quests Aristeides to speak to the other generals, and the Athenaion Politeia’s claim that the Athe- nians “employed the one as general and the other as counsellor”. 54 In Plutarch this becomes a central theme: his biography may be formed with contemporary politics in mind, but in order to do this it carries an explanatory function. The hegemony of Athens rested as much upon the loyal, quiet dedication of men such as Aristeides as it did upon the destructive genius of Themis- tokles. It is in the balance between these two character types that the greatness of Athens was es- tablished. Actions Herodotos and Thukydides attribute collectively to “the Athenians” become embodied in the historical ﬁgure of Aristeides, a virtual personiﬁcation of the qualities that made Athens ‘great’. In Plutarch, his voice is that of Athens at its best, when the Athenians choose to do the ‘right’ thing. Such a virtue is precisely what Plutarch believes is lacking in his own day. 49 Plut. Arist. 24, 3. restricted to Aristeides: thus Plutarch has Themistokles do 50 Plut. Arist. 5, 2. much the same when he surrenders command to Eury- 51 Plut. Arist. 8, 1. biades, although this is done with a more explicit recogni- 52 Plut. Arist. 15, 4. tion of future hegemony. (Plut. Them. 7, 3). 53 Plut. Arist. 5, 2; 8, 6; 16, 2. Such behaviour is not 54 Hdt. 8, 80, 2; Ath. Pol. 23, 3. 140 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Aristeides the Just ? Within these idealising traditions, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd much detail about the historical ﬁgure that they claimed to present. But a few traces that are woven into the narratives are important, not least because the relation between popular memory and tradition lies in part in the pre-exist- ing knowledge of the contemporary audience. The key points of his career, such as his ostracism and assessment of the phoros, were too well known for writers to falsify entirely if they wished to retain any credibility whatsoever. 55 We should try to identify these traces not merely to recover the historical ﬁgure – perhaps an impossible task – but to understand the struggle for the control of memory that generated these traditions in the ﬁrst place. In the earlier sources there are no reliable details of his early life or rise to prominence, as tales of his poverty vie with the association with leading ﬁgures such as Kleisthenes. 56 Judged on his later oﬃces, scholars have estimated a birthdate of around 520 at the latest. 57 Plutarch’s stress on his role at Marathon implies an already established ﬁgure, although he appears to be combining the role Herodotos gives to the polemarch Kallimachos and the unnamed generals who surrender their command to Miltiades. That Aristeides is not mentioned need not prove his absence, considering the generally superﬂuous role Herodotos gives him later on; but certainly that if he was there, he achieved little of note. 58 However, it does appear that he was elected eponymous Archon soon after in 489/88 – one of the last times that oﬃce was decided by elec- tion rather than by lot – suggesting that he was by then a leading ﬁgure in the city’s politics. 59 Plutarch implies a link between his actions at the battle and his appointment, although this is surely part of his narrative strategy. All one can conclude is that Aristeides was a prominent en- ough ﬁgure to warrant the popular hostility of ostracism some ﬁve or six years later. Even if we dismiss the fanciful details of the later sources, the fact of his ostracism is highly signiﬁcant. Attested in Herodotos, it swiftly became central to his reputation, and the anecdotes are surely a conscious strategy to re-frame the entire process. Plutarch includes a number of tell- ing images: Aristeides does not reply to the illiterate citizen, but ﬁlls out the shard in silence. He does not dispute the man’s dismissive prejudice nor argue his innocence. Herodotos identiﬁes the principle of isegoria as central to the Athenian democracy, which embodies ﬁrst and foremost the equal right to free expression. 60 Aristeides enables the citizen to express that right, irrespec- tive of the consequences for himself; and thereby shows himself to be the very embodiment of that Athenian political ideology, beyond any divisions of gnorimoi and demos. Then as he departs Athens: He lifted up his hands to heaven and prayed – a prayer the opposite, as it seems, of that which Achilles made – that no crisis might overtake the Athenians which should compel the people to remember Aristeides. 61 Achilles had implored the gods to avenge his dishonour by aiding the Trojans in slaughtering his fellow Greeks. 62 Greek military leaders often fostered an association with Achilles – the “best of 55 On the “shared past” and “common knowledge” in ment Plutarch attributes to Demetrios of Phaleron (Arist. the polis, see Clarke 2008, 245 –251; on “historical fact[s] 5, 7). Piccirilli 1983, 175, makes the same suggestions, that were too well known to be ignored”, see Van Wees arguing that in light of suspicions of medism it is unlikely 2019, 39 – 46. Indeed, Plutarch (Them. 32, 3) dismisses he would have held such a post in the 480 s. If this were so, details in some accounts that “even an ordinary person it would represent a very diﬀerent career trajectory, and must know is fabricated”. For a more detailed discussion explain his absence from the events before his ostracism. of this principle, see Macgregor Morris, “Pausanias, Best of For a brief overview see Rhodes 1981, 280; Davies 1971, Men”, this volume. 48. 56 Plut Arist. 2, 1; Mor. 791A, 805F. 60 Hdt. 5, 78, 1; see Hansen 1991, 81– 84. In the 57 Davies 1971, 48 f. constitutional debate (Hdt. 3, 80, 6), Otanes uses the 58 Rhodes 1981, 280, considers the generalship at this term isonomia to deﬁne popular government; but as Han- point “at best doubtful”. Cf. Marincola 2012, 96. sen observes, this reﬂects general Greek, rather than speci- 59 Bicknell 1972 suggests that it was another Aris- ﬁcally Athenian practice. teides who was Archon in 489, and that our ﬁgure held a 61 Plut. Arist. 7, 6. minor archonship in the early 470 s. This follows an argu- 62 Homer, Il. 1, 407– 412. 141 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Ian Macgregor Morris the Achaeans” – in celebrating their own martial kudos: for example, the hero is key to the rheto- rical strategies developed by Pausanias. 63 But in inverting the association, Aristeides emerges as a very diﬀerent ﬁgure indeed. He subsumes his personal interests entirely to the well-being of the city and the principles upon which its laws are based, for such principles can only endure if they are re-inforced through such enactment. The image in Plutarch is explicitly Socratic; and while this is a retrospective theme in the biography, it may reﬂect the ways in which Aristeides pro- moted his own reputation. Indeed, we should not forget that the comedians made fun of Sok- rates too. 64 Aristeides’ noble stoicism conﬁrms the very reason for his exile: his acceptance of the “gen- eral will”, to borrow Rousseau’s concept, validates his justice. The popular resentment of his epithet ironically immortalises it. Rather than harangue his boorish critic, Aristeides found a far better response: if the citizen tired of references to the ‘justice of Aristeides’ beforehand, in the aftermath he would have been driven quite mad. If such images intensify his reputation, they also distract from the fact of the ostracism it- self. There is no mention of the forces behind his expulsion; there is no refutation of charges, be- cause no charges are recorded. Plutarch conspicuously avoids the question, preferring to dismiss the institution in its entirety. Clues do, however, lie on surviving ostraka that name Aristeides and seem to associate him with both Persia and Athens’ regional rival, Aigina. 65 These may re- ﬂect Aristeides’ position within elite networks beyond the city. It does appear that he was a pro- xenos for Aigina at a time that the two cities were in bitter conﬂict. 66 Then there is Alexander of Macedon, who, as we have seen, may well have been made proxenos of Athens during the 480 s thanks to his ties of xenia with Aristeides. 67 Both Aigina and Macedon had oﬀered earth and water to the Great King, and thus all asso- ciated with them were haunted by the vague, but damning, charge of medism. Later construc- tions of Greek identity that pretend an absolute binary opposition between Greek and barbarian cloud our sources, making it hard to determine precisely what constituted medism in the years between the two Persian invasions. It was certainly a serious charge, and it pervades the ostra- cisms of the 480 s, expressed through associations with either the Peisistratids, the Alkmaionids or Aigina, all of whom were cast as medisers. 68 Yet, beyond the standout examples of those who were actually in the Great King’s service, it often operated as a vague suspicion, an association 63 On Pausanias’ rhetorical strategies, see Macgregor Wallace 1970, 199, who suggests that the oﬃcial connec- Morris, “Pausanias, Best of Men”, this volume. tion may have been renewed in the 480 s, meaning that an 64 Beck 2014, 473 f., observes that “[i]n a way Aris- association with Aristeides it by no means improbable. tides’ just and moral behavior in the political sphere antici- Ties of xenia and proxenia were a long-standing part of pates Socrates’ ethical philosophy … it appears that Plut- an aristocratic practice that was integral to diplomacy; arch inserted the ﬁgure of Socrates into the Lives of but it was also fraught with potential dangers. Political Alcibiades, Aristides, Cato the Elder, Phocion, and Cato opponents sought to represent the ritualistic gift-giving – the Younger as a heuristic device to bring out in subtle and a central aspect of these relationships – as bribes; which, in usually negative ways the diﬀerent qualities of his protago- a sense they were, for a gift placed an obligation on the nists, who appear superﬁcially to share similar traits”. recipient; cf. Herman 1987, 73 – 78; Mitchell 1997, 181– 65 P 5978 (Lang 1990, no. 44) implies an association 186. Such foreign ties were grounds enough, in such a with Aigina; P 9945 (Lang 1990, no. 56), is restored to paranoid atmosphere, for suspicion and accusation. In read “Aristeides, brother of Datis/Dareios”; see Piccirilli, his own trial for bribery, Kimon vehemently denied being 1983. Roberston 1999, who reviews various reconstruc- the proxenos of rich foreigners, “to be courted and paid for tions, suggests that the medising associations postdate his their services” (Plut. Kim. 14, 3). Almost all the leading ostracism, and that P 9945 in fact suggests an association ﬁgures of the Greek resistance to Xerxes were at some point with a corrupt oﬃcial; but see Zaccarini 2020, 8 n. 8, who accused of receiving bribes that were, from their own per- considers this argument “un caso dubbio”. spectives, gifts. 66 Figueira 1985, 49, remarks that when “Athenians 68 Figueira 1988, 87: “In the campaign against Aris- and Aiginetans thought of each other, they thought primar- teides, Medism, impiety, and tyranny were served up in an ily of past violent encounters”. Cf. Figueira 1987, 301; improbable but highly eﬀective mixture”. See also McMul- Figueira 1988, 86 f. lin 2001, 63 – 65, who considers the overlaps between tyr- 67 Hdt. 8, 136, 1. On xenia and proxenia see Herman anny and medism in the rhetoric of ostracism. 1987, 130 –142. On Alexander’s proxeny with Athens, see 142 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Aristeides the Just ? that some found – or consciously chose to ﬁnd – questionable. The list of heroes in Timo- kreon’s poem were all suspected of medism, or represented as such; and in another piece he seems to delight in the stark reality that even the saviours of Greece dallied with the Great King at some point: So Timocreon was not the only one who swore oaths with the Medes, but there are other foul men; I am not the only bushy-tailed one, but there are also other foxes. 69 Plutarch presents this text as Timokreon’s schadenfreude at the demise of his old enemy. While this may be so, I suspect it also reﬂects a more general point, reminding one and all that medism was ubiquitous among even the most admired. It attests to the realisation that the traditional net- works of xeniai, mainstays of aristocratic life both within and beyond the Greek world, could quickly be transformed into a form of treason by the rantings of a demagogue and the swelling of popular prejudice. The pre-war rivalry between Aristeides and Themistokles, attested in all of the sources, has led to a general assumption that the latter encouraged, if not actively utilised, the process of ostra- cism as a political weapon. His plans for naval expansion were aimed, in the short term at least, against Aigina. This provides a probable context for Aristeides’ ostracism: as the proxenos of that polis he would have been the focus of any opposition and easy to taint with connotations of med- ism. 70 Perhaps this also provides insight into the theme of their rivalry; it was not so much a question of gnorimoi against the demos, but of competing factions that, before 480 at least, placed these two leaders against one another. It does appear that Aristeides had developed net- works of xeniai that underlay his political strategies, which presage the very diplomatic ﬁnesse which mark his post-war activities. Indeed, the probability that he spent his exile on Aigina sug- gests that he turned to his xenoi in his hour of need. 71 But the suspicion of medism remained precisely that: a suspicion. The recall of the exiles in 481/80 was driven by the fear they would otherwise serve Xerxes. 72 And it also suggests that most in Athens had never really believed that these men were medisers, for they surely would not welcome them back – let alone appoint them to high command – if they were still under such suspicion. The contributions of Aristeides at both Salamis and Plataiai remain uncertain. The ﬁfth- century sources do not suggest a central role at the former battle: Herodotos attests little more than a willing presence, while the Ephoran tradition recorded by Diodoros – which Flower ar- gues also originates in a ﬁfth century source – makes no mention of him, or the action on Psytta- 69 PMG 729; Plut. Them. 21, 5; tr. McMullin 2001, which would include Aigina. It is certainly tempting to 57. McMullin 2001, 61, also observes that Timokreon is associate this with Aristeides’ residence there during a perhaps the only surviving representative of a far more period of hostility with Athens; see Figueira 1987, who common perspective, of the many Greeks who had, for observes that the island may have been the ﬁrst port of one reason or another, accepted the friendship of the King. call for all exiles. In contrast Rhodes 1981, 282, observes 70 Rhodes 1981, 280. Tuci 2018, 232, and Zaccarini that this reading depends on a certain emendation of the 2020, 9, all quite correctly point out that there is no text, and that the law may have declared that exiles should explicit connection made in the ancient sources between remain within this sphere – that is, not go closer to Persian the osctracism and other contemporary developments, such territory. as Themistokles’ naval bill; however, as Piccirilli 1983 and 72 Plut. Arist. 8, 1, who adds that the Athenians feared Figueira 1988 both argue at length, the context is certainly Aristeides would “corrupt and pervert many of his fellow- plausible. citizens to the side of the Barbarian”. The concern is a 7 1 Figueira 1985, 63, argues that the Aiginetans reasonable one: they would provide a considerable pool “made much upholding of the rights of xenoi and of their of talent for the King, and leaving their supporters in justice in dealings themselves and foreigners”, suggesting Athens – of whom we can assume there would have been that he would have been welcome. Ath. Pol. 22, 8 states a good number – with split loyalties. See Figueira 1987, that after the recall a law was passed preventing ostracised 300, who also cites the claim in the Suda that the Persians individuals from living within a certain distance of Athens, did indeed attempt to bribe Aristeides while in exile. 143 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Ian Macgregor Morris leia whatsoever. 73 Cornelius Nepos claims that he took part, but that the only “brilliant exploit in his military career” was his command at Plataiai. 74 Aischylos recounts the capture of the is- land in some detail, but places it in the aftermath of the main battle: once “some god had given the glory to the Hellenes in the battle on the sea, on that same day …”. 75 No commander is men- tioned – indeed neither Aristeides nor Themistokles appear by name in the play – but the engage- ment is clearly secondary to the ‘main’ battle. Moreover, it is a communal action rather than the tactical vision of one commander: the Greeks, having defeated the Persians at sea, en masse leap from their ships and assail the Persian troops. At Salamis, therefore, the earliest writers appear to deny Aristeides the central role described by Plutarch. 76 His command at Plataiai is conﬁrmed in both Herodotos and the Ephoran tradition, but neither specify the position of commander-in-chief – στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ – alleged by Plut- arch. 77 However Plutarch’s assertion is somewhat undermined by his two later references to the “rest of the Athenian generals” and his “fellow-generals”, who require persuasion and “abundant exhortation and admonition” to follow his proposals; while in the Comparison of Aristeides and Cato the Elder, Plutarch describes him as being “one of only one of ten generals” at both Mara- thon and Plataiai. 78 In contrast, Herodotos refers to the Athenian strategoi as a cohesive group, performing actions Plutarch attributes to Aristeides alone, such as conversing with Alexander and agreeing to Pausanias’ tactics. 79 This shift from the collective to the individual, as we have seen, underlies much of Plutarch’s account. In the case of the generalship, it seems possible that he has done the same. Aristeides was the most famous of the Athenian strategoi at Plataiai, as Mil- tiades was at Marathon; and thus he alone is recorded by name by the historians. But this is not the same as the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, an appointment which entrusted a unique level of power to an individual, presumably due to his exceptional military leadership. Had Aristeides held such a post at Plataiai, the “fairest victory” as Herodotos calls it, then his legacy as a military hero would be apparent in the sources. However the lack of any such legacy, along with the col- lective tone of Herodotos’ account, implies otherwise. As the Athenaion Politeia attests, the skills of Aristeides were political, not martial. 80 In- deed, this was such a core feature of his reputation that it pervades even Plutarch’s account of the battle. Of the four main actions he attributes to Aristeides as an individual in the battle it- self, three are fundamentally diplomatic in nature: parleying with Alexander, convincing his fel- low strategoi to obey Pausanias, and declaiming to the Thebans; while the fourth involves dispatching troops to support the Megarians in response to the orders of Pausanias. 81 When the main Athenian contingent engage with the medising Greeks, the narrative switches to the collec- tive. Aristeides negotiates, connects and convinces in ways that are crucial for the success of the campaign; but he makes no tactical decisions. He is a diplomat and an administrator, but not a warrior. It would have been a curious decision to entrust such an individual with the supreme command of the Athenian contingent at such a pivotal engagement; but, as one of several com- manders, he could perhaps be very eﬀective indeed. It is in the aftermath of the war that Aristeides comes to the fore as “counsellor” to the peo- ple. Thukydides mentions him in the episode of rebuilding the walls, attesting to his diplomatic skills – a signiﬁcant reference considering his absence from much of that historian. 82 And in the 73 Flower 1998. tribution to the Greek victory” (103). 74 Corn. Nep. Arist. 2, 1–2. 77 Hdt. 9, 28, 6; Diod. 11, 29, 4; Plut. Arist. 11, 1. 75 Aisch. Pers. 445 – 471. Proietti 2015, who reviews 78 Plut. Arist. 16, 2; 20, 1; Comp Arist-Cato Maj. 2, 1. scholarship on the memory of the action on Psyttaleia, 79 Hdt. 9, 45 – 46, 1. argues that the encounter was far more signiﬁcant in Athe- 80 Ath. Pol. 23, 3. nian memory than the brief mention in Herodotos suggests. 8 1 Alexander of Macedon: 15, 2; convincing the 76 In contrast, Harrison 2000, 97, sees a “fanfare” – others: 16, 2 –3; Thebans: 18, 5; dispatching troops: 14, 3. equivalent to the trumpeting of Themistokles – in Aischy- 82 Thuk. 1, 90 – 92. See also Tuci 2018, 232 f. How- los. Wallinga 2005 provides a succinct summary of various ever, although Ath. Pol. 23, 4 records his involvement, interpretations, but concludes it was not a “weighty con- neither Diodoros (11, 39 – 40) nor Plutarch mention him 144 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Aristeides the Just ? shifting environment of the post-war Aegean, his xeniai provided networks through which a new geo-political order would be formed. In the Athenaion Politeia the hegemony of Athens and the creation of the League amounts to Aristeides’ “diplomatic masterpiece”; and the centrality of his name in both positive and negative traditions suggests that he was indeed the principle ﬁgure in- volved. 83 Our accounts of the Athenian hegemony present two very contrasting images: on the one hand, Herodotos and the Athenaion Politeia present a narrative “without veils”. 84 Here there is no sense of shame or apology, but the wily genius of Athens achieving through diplomacy a he- gemony that had evaded the Great King himself. Front and centre of this is Aristeides. In con- trast, Thukydides’ brief account places the initiative entirely on the allies, who implore the Athenians to save them from the brutality of Pausanias. 85 As I argue elsewhere in this volume, this version is very much part of the narrative developed to justify an Athenian hegemony that had become increasingly contested. Intriguingly, Plutarch seeks to combine the two versions. Thus while Aristeides remains the architect of hegemony through his “tact and diplomacy”, he nevertheless waits for the Ionians to make the approach, which they do because of his justice and fair treatment. It is only once they have sought his aid that he encourages their disobedience. 86 Aristeides wins an empire without any acts of violence; nor does he directly challenge, or even in- terfere with, Spartan command until invited to do so; his only action is to conduct himself in a just and amiable manner. This performance, however, is only possible because of the position of power that other Athenian generals had won. Thus the acquisition of hegemony appears as a re- sult of the co-ordinated actions of several ﬁgures: Themistokles and Kimon are singled out for their martial success – a quality not central to Aristeides, despite his command at Plataiai – but their successes merely provide the raw materials for Athenian power. 87 It is Aristeides who has the vision, or perhaps the networks, to realise it. The Allies are said to approach Aristeides speciﬁcally for protection, which Thukydides and Plutarch present simply as a rejection of Pausanias. However webs of loyalty and obligation stretched across the Greek world and these patterns were essential to inter-city diplomacy and aristocratic cultural practice. It is primarily Ionian Greeks that defect at ﬁrst, communities that had long-standing ties with Athens that would have been enacted through xeniai. In contrast, some other poleis had a quite diﬀerent reaction to the Spartan regent. Even after his supposed dis- grace Pausanias was still welcomed in a predominantly Doric polis such as Byzantion, and then the Aiolian settlement of Kolonai. 88 The struggle for hegemony in the Aegean operated on var- ious levels, and each of the leading ﬁgures sought to use their personal connections, which no doubt became increasingly strained in the changing political landscape of the 470 s. Timokreon’s attack on Themistokles is driven by the lapse of their xenia, and if the speciﬁcs of their quarrel are lost, the general context is clear. The poet refers to the “evil money” Themistokles received, the giving of favours to some and the betrayal of others, and ﬁnally a banquet: each part refers to the practices of guest friendship, from the exchange of euergesia – gifts or good deeds – to the ri- in this context: Plut. Them. 19 attributes the deception 86 Plut. Arist. 23, 1– 5. However, in his life of Kimon over the rebuilding to Themistokles alone, while it is not (6, 2 –3) Plutarch makes no mention of any such secretive mentioned at all in Plut. Arist. exchanges; rather, Aristeides and Kimon tell the Spartans 83 Tuci 2018, 233: “La fondazione della Lega Delio- quite directly to recall Pausanias. attica non può che essere il capolavoro diplomatico della 87 In Plut. Kim. 11, 2 –3 it is the leniency of Kimon to sagacia politica del solo Aristide: fu lui a saper sfruttare in the allies – allowing them to pay monies in place of provid- modo lungimirante il contesto politico, cioè la debolezza ing ships, in place of the “burdensome” punishments of della situazione di Pausania, strappando l’egemonia marit- other commanders – that creates the conditions for hege- tima agli Spartani, contro la loro volontà”. Cf. Zaccarini mony; as the allies become “softened” by a lack of military 2020, 6: “Aristide rappresenta indiscutibilmente un ele- service, so the Athenians are hardened by war under his mento fondamentale e paradigmatico nello studio della leadership and enriched by the phoros. This generates a formazione e della ricezione dell’impero ateniese”. very speciﬁc account of the growth of empire that is driven 84 Tuci 2018, 234: “quelle fonti che presentano senza by the energy of Kimon. veli l’iniziativa ateniese, anziché mascherarla dietro alle 88 On the Doric nature of Byzantion, see Hansen – richieste degli alleati” Nielsen 2004, no. 674. On Kolonai, Hansen – Nielsen 85 Thuk. 1, 95, 1–2; 1, 130, 2. 2004, no. 782. 145 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Ian Macgregor Morris tual dining that solidiﬁed the relationships. 89 Perhaps the friendship of Timokreon, sullied by his alleged medism, was no longer useful to the Athenian. In the bitter verse we ﬁnd an insight to shifting friendships, alliances and enmities. The Ionians who secretly approached Aristeides were either using, or seeking to initiate, ties of xeniai. He tells the Ionians that “to establish Athenian conﬁdence in them some overt act was needed” – a request for an act of euergesia; in re- sponse two individuals ram Pausanias’ ship, castigate him and chase him away. 90 Plutarch’s story may be apocryphal, but it implies a process of establishing trust through action, an essential ﬁrst step in creating such an association. The fact that he names the two men responsible suggests an established tradition, perhaps in their native cities, of the men who rid their islands of the tyran- nical Spartan and won the friendship of the great Aristeides. It is the pattern, rather than the de- tails, which suggest the process of diplomacy through a manipulation of relationships as key to winning hegemony. Once established, the hegemony was aﬃrmed through the creation of the so-called Delian League. The reputation of Aristeides was essential to presenting the imposition of the phoros as being fair and reasonable. Far from being unprecedented, the Greek communities of the eastern Aegean in particular had paid tax to the Persians; those levels may have been the basis of the as- sessments made. 91 Whether Aristeides personally carried out every assessment is less signiﬁcant than his role as a guarantor of just process. The reference to his assessments in the Peace of Ni- kias, over half a century later, implies that they were recognised as a fair standard even by some outside Athens. 92 Moreover, it suggests, as Plutarch claims, that the levels of phoros may well have increased over the years. Whatever the case, promoting the image of Aristeides as “the Just” became essential to justifying and maintaining hegemony, while disputing his reputation would be key to challenging Athenian power. And thus he was increasingly transformed into a one-dimensional image, entirely noble or utterly corrupt. Of his later years we have only passing references. His involvement, or lack thereof, in the ostracism of Themistokles imply he lived perhaps to the mid 460 s; but there is only scattered evi- dence of further political oﬃce. 93 A poetic anecdote has him in the audience at a performance of Aischylos’ Seven Against Thebes: at the line “[He] wishes to be, not to appear, the best”, the audience all eyes turned to the elderly statesman. 94 The scene both situates him at the very heart of Athenian cultural life as a respected public ﬁgure, and draws an implicit connection between the politician and a playwright also associated with the battles against the Persians. Later details attest his poverty, with claims that his children were supported at the public expense, although such claims are at best dubious. 95 Indeed, the entire motif of the impecunious citizen is some- what questionable, perhaps a little too reminiscent of the incorruptible philosopher. Perceptions 89 PMG 727; preserved in Plut. Them. 21, 2 –3. On years; while the tradition placing his death aboard on a practices of xenia see Herman 1987. Stehle 1994 identiﬁes public mission (Plut. Arist. 26, 1) implies continued diplo- powerful elements of sexual innuendo that serve to discre- matic activity. dit Themistokles entirely; such a reading would indeed 94 Aisch. Sept. 592. Aischylos’ use of the term ἄρισ- correspond to themes of betrayed ties of xenia, in that τος, whether chosen with Aristeides in mind or not, paral- the poem alludes to Themistokles prostituting his guest- lels Herodotos’ description of Aristeides. Plutarch relates friendship. the anecdote on two separate occasions with a signiﬁcant 90 Plut. Arist. 23, 4– 5. diﬀerence: at Mor. 186 b he quotes the line we are familiar 9 1 Rhodes 1992, 37. with; however at Plut. Arist 5, 3, he replaces ἄριστος with 92 Figueira 2019 reviews the tradition of the assess- δίκαιος. This shift perhaps represents a more general pat- ment in detail. That the six allied states named in the tern whereby the emphasis on the general excellence of Peace of Nikias were in all likelihood not part of the Aristeides found in the earlier tradition of Timokreon original assessment reveals that the role of Aristeides was and Herodotos is replaced by the focus on his ‘justice’ as a legitimising actor. McMullin 2001, 62, considers a evident from the late ﬁfth century onwards. In general, rather diﬀerent perspective, of cities forced to remain mem- the scene is perhaps a deliberate parallel to that of Themis- bers of the League, which could be “construed as a sort of tokles in the Olympic stadium (Plut. Them. 17, 2), in punishment” for those that had medised. which he is similarly an object of public admiration. 93 Bury – Meiggs 1975, 213, suggest Aristeides had 95 Davies 1971, 51 f. “the moral control of the sovereign Assembly” in his ﬁnal 146 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Aristeides the Just ? of wealth are by deﬁnition comparative – perhaps others ﬂaunted theirs to a greater degree – but the associations Plutarch alleges with leading aristocratic ﬁgures suggests that he was hardly insol- vent. The reputation for “justice” runs through the sources, be it as praise or as parody, to such a degree that one must conclude that it has some basis in how Aristeides presented himself, in his performance as a political ﬁgure. The condescending tone of his character in Eupolis’ play sug- gests that this was a stock image of the man, and Zaccarini’s suggestion that it was “autocostrui- to” rings true. 96 Here we have a ﬁgure whose political capital rested on a reputation that required continual re-performance. The few historical certainties of his career, such as his ostra- cism, were re-framed so as to embody, not undermine, that image. As with his supposed inter- vention on the eve of Salamis, these alleged performances had no impact whatsoever on the outcome of the events – the battle was won despite his little speech, he was ostracised in spite of his act of isegoria – but in the retelling his public persona was created. This persona was quite diﬀerent to the martial aura promoted by the other leaders of the Greek alliance. The theme of Aristeides’ reputation for virtue as contrasted with the violent aura of Themistokles is highlighted by both Plato and Plutarch. 97 Yet these contrasting legacies oper- ated in remarkably similar ways. In the circulation of what Leslie Kurke terms the “economy of kudos”, the achievements – and thus the excellence – of an individual needed to be (re-)per- formed, “broadcast publically” if they are to be remembered. 98 These were not merely grandiose statements aimed at posterity. As I argue in the case of Pausanias elsewhere in this volume, they were also crucial rhetorical weapons in the struggles within and between poleis in the shifting poli- tical environment created by the Greek victory. Kudos was traditionally a function of military and athletic success, a “talismanic quality” that reﬂected divine favour. 99 These were reinforced by long-standing forms of commemoration, especially the construction of monuments and the commissioning of epigrams and elegies. To compete with his rivals, Aristeides required a rather diﬀerent approach. His roles at Sala- mis and Plataiai clearly did not imbue him with the necessary kudos, as this was a quality re- vealed through victory, be it as a successful commander, or the award of the aristeion, the prize for valour. Instead, in the sources we ﬁnd traces of a form of self-promotion that re-frames every action and contribution as emanations of a virtue that enable the kudos of others. The repeated anecdotes of Aristeides’ virtue, often so very visual, operate in much the same way as the elegies of Simonides or the epigrams erected by Pausanias. If he could not claim the credit for the great military victories of his rivals, he could still present himself as integral to those victories; and his entire demeanour, the reputation for fairness, is woven into the narrative so that it becomes an es- sential part of the success of Athens. It is his selﬂess sense of justice and duty that allows him to facilitate the victories of others, thereby securing Greek freedom; and then those self-same quali- ties attract the allies. He achieves, through the very nature of his virtue, the hegemony that the violence of Xerxes and Pausanias could not attain. Even the setbacks of his career are retold in such a way so as to reinforce his reputation. It is a remarkably clever strategy: to insert oneself into key events, and rather than claim credit, to display an excellence that enables the general achievement; or to epitomise a tolerant magnanimity and devout respect for the will of the demos, with the wonderfully visual tale of in- scribing one’s own name. Such an approach, however, requires repeated re-performance to be- come embedded in the collective memory, and hence we have the pompous ﬁgure in the comedy of Eupolis. Indeed, Pausanias and Themistokles also allegedly provoked resentment through their repeated references to their achievements, a pattern that suggests such celebration was a 96 Zaccarini 2020, 21. Themistokles sneered at his reputation for justice (24, 4). 97 Plato Gorg. 519 a, 526 b. Plutarch insists that a 98 Kurke 1993, 144–149. name for virtue is preferable to the violent epithets sought 99 Benveniste 1973, 348; Kurke 1993, 132, 154. by “kings and tyrants” (Arist. 6, 1– 4), and also records that 147 A. Konecny – N. Sekunda, The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC (Phoibos Verlag, Wien 2022) ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 271- 4 | ISBN 978- 3- 85161- 272-5 (e-book) Ian Macgregor Morris common, indeed a necessary, part of post war political life. 100 Both Timokreon and Herodotos insist on Aristeides’ worth, suggesting that his claims for excellence date to the immediate after- math of the war; however Heorodotos’ actual account of the man does not verify the claim. Nevertheless, the strategy was broadly successful. The mocking satire of the comedians would only be eﬀective, would only be amusing, if it reﬂected how he had indeed presented himself. Some may have laughed, and Themistokles may have sneered. 101 But it remained a mainstay of Athenian political life, current enough to be repeated in the treaty negotiations with Sparta half a century after his death. Matteo Zaccarini refers to the “tyranny of the just” in describing the imbalance between the very diﬀerent reputations of Aristeides, whose sense of justice appears to have been somewhat Athenocentric. 102 The phrase resonates with his later reputation as it increasingly melded with perceptions of the Delian League and the Empire it became. But its roots lie in the legends and anecdotes that grew around the man himself, and which he very probably promoted. It is tempt- ing to dismiss the label of the ‘just’ as political cant, as a cynical performance of a far more sinis- ter political actor, which to a degree it is. But it is also an insight into a rather sophisticated public posture, a sleight of hand that bemuses the modern reader as much as it distracted the an- cient. This posture contributed to, perhaps coalesced into, portraits of the ideal citizen: a mode of behaviour that was fundamentally honest, dedicated to the isegoria of citizens – if not the al- lies – and that consistently placed the common interest above the ambition of the individual. In the later tradition Aristeides represented the qualities required to make a polis great. If these boasted qualities did indeed grow from his self-presentation, then, whether cynically or other- wise, we can say that Aristeides exerted a lasting impact on the ideological landscape of Athens. References Arslan 2017 M. 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