(PDF) Chokepoint Convergence: A Geospatial Mixed-Methods Analysis of Multi-Domain Coordination in Operation Epic Fury

CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Chokepoint Convergence: A Geospatial Mixed-Methods Analysis of Multi-Domain Coordination in Operation Epic Fury by Laszlo Pokorny Department of Military Science ICL Institute of Applied Sciences New Jersey, USA DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19698915 2026 1 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Copyright © 2026 by Laszlo Pokorny All Rights Reserved 2 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE ABSTRACT Multi-domain operations (MDO) doctrine has been the centerpiece of U.S. military modernization since 2018, yet Operation Epic Fury (February 28–April 8, 2026) provided the first large-scale empirical test of MDO concepts against a state adversary. This study employed a convergent parallel mixed-methods design combining quantitative geospatial analysis with qualitative directed content analysis to examine how U.S. forces achieved multi-domain convergence to neutralize threats and control the Strait of Hormuz. The quantitative strand applied Getis-Ord Gi* hot spot analysis, kernel density estimation, space-time pattern mining, and proximity analysis to a georeferenced database of 71 strikes, 36 ships attacked, 15 maritime traffic observations, and 22 satellite damage assessments. The qualitative strand analyzed 34 official documents—operational communications, doctrinal publications, and Congressional testimony—using a 42-code framework with inter-coder reliability of κ = 0.81. Integration through joint display matrices yielded three overarching findings. First, operations exhibited a bimodal spatial distribution with a dominant Tehran hot spot (43.1% of strikes, z = 4.23, p < .001) and a secondary Bushehr–Bandar Abbas coastal cluster (29.2%, z = 3.87, p < .001), producing a discontiguous convergence zone spanning 790 kilometers. Second, the Strait of Hormuz functioned as a “strategic attractor,” with strike density 12.8 times greater than expected within 100 kilometers and a southward migration of the operational mean center from 32.59°N to 30.71°N. Third, convergence across domains was sequential rather than simultaneous, with air operations self-enabling on Day 1 while maritime effectiveness depended on prior air superiority, revealing a domain hierarchy inconsistent with MDO doctrine’s domain equivalence assumption. Sustainment emerged as the binding constraint, with 3 of 4 analytic dimensions 3 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE convergent but logistics rated only as complementary. These findings advance a geographic convergence model that reorients MDO theory from technology-centric to geography-centric coordination, with implications for doctrine development, operational planning, and defense investment. Keywords: multi-domain operations, Operation Epic Fury, Strait of Hormuz, geospatial analysis, military geography, convergence, mixed methods, chokepoint, Iran, joint operations 4 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table of Contents ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ 3 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 18 Background of the Problem .......................................................................................... 19 Statement of the Problem .............................................................................................. 21 Purpose of the Study ..................................................................................................... 22 Research Questions and Hypotheses ............................................................................ 23 Table 1.1 Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Analytical Methods...................... 25 Conceptual Framework ................................................................................................. 25 Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework for Multi-Domain Convergence Analysis......... 28 Significance of the Study .............................................................................................. 28 Theoretical Foundations................................................................................................ 30 Nature of the Study ....................................................................................................... 31 Table 1.2 Data Sources and Sample Sizes by Research Phase ................................. 32 Definition of Key Terms ............................................................................................... 33 Table 1.3 Definition of Key Terms ........................................................................... 33 Assumptions.................................................................................................................. 35 Scope and Delimitations ............................................................................................... 36 Limitations .................................................................................................................... 37 5 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Organization of the Study ............................................................................................. 38 Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................... 39 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................... 41 Theoretical Foundations of Multi-Domain Operations..................................................... 42 Historical Evolution: From AirLand Battle to Multi-Domain Operations ................... 42 Defining Multi-Domain Operations: Core Concepts and Tenets ................................. 45 NATO and Allied Perspectives on Multi-Domain Operations ..................................... 46 Joint All-Domain Operations and Joint All-Domain Command and Control .............. 47 Challenges and Critiques of MDO Implementation ..................................................... 49 Technological and Interoperability Challenges ........................................................ 49 Organizational and Cultural Barriers ........................................................................ 50 Strategic Coherence and Scenario Dependence ........................................................ 51 Command and Control in a Multi-Domain Environment ............................................. 52 Information Warfare and the Cognitive Dimension of MDO ....................................... 53 Allied and Coalition Dimensions of MDO ................................................................... 55 Military Geography and Geospatial Intelligence .............................................................. 56 Historical Foundations of Military Geography ............................................................. 56 Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) in Modern Warfare ............................................... 57 The Democratization of GEOINT: Open-Source Satellite Imagery ............................. 59 The Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Maritime Domain Awareness .......... 60 6 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) in Conflict Analysis ............................................. 62 Maritime Chokepoints and the Strategic Significance of the Strait of Hormuz ............... 64 Theoretical Foundations: The Strategic Importance of Maritime Chokepoints ........... 64 Geography and Strategic Characteristics of the Strait of Hormuz ................................ 65 Historical Context of Conflict in the Strait of Hormuz................................................. 66 Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare Strategy .................................................................. 67 Naval Mines .............................................................................................................. 68 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles and Coastal Defense ....................................................... 68 Fast Attack Craft and Swarming Tactics .................................................................. 69 Energy Security and the Global Economic Impact of Strait Disruption ....................... 69 The 2026 Strait of Hormuz Crisis as a Case Study ....................................................... 70 Economic Dimensions of Chokepoint Disruption ........................................................ 71 Environmental and Humanitarian Considerations in Maritime Operations ................. 73 Methodological Foundations ............................................................................................ 74 Mixed-Methods Research Design ................................................................................. 74 Geospatial Analysis Techniques ................................................................................... 75 Geocoding and Spatial Data Construction ................................................................ 75 Kernel Density Estimation and Hot Spot Analysis ................................................... 76 Spatio-Temporal Analysis ........................................................................................ 76 Network and Proximity Analysis .............................................................................. 77 7 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Qualitative Content Analysis ........................................................................................ 77 Validity, Reliability, and Trustworthiness in Mixed-Methods Research ..................... 78 Synthesis of the Literature and Identification of Research Gaps ...................................... 80 The Gap Between MDO Theory and Empirical Evidence ........................................... 80 The Untapped Potential of Geospatial Mixed-Methods in Strategic Studies ............... 81 The Strait of Hormuz as a Multi-Domain Battlespace.................................................. 82 Contribution of the Present Study ................................................................................. 82 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................. 83 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY .................................................................................... 85 Philosophical Foundations and Research Paradigm ......................................................... 86 Research Design................................................................................................................ 87 Table 3.1 Alignment of Research Questions With Methodological Phases ............. 88 Figure 3.1 Visual Model of the Explanatory Sequential Mixed-Methods Design ... 89 Phase 1: Quantitative Geospatial Analysis ....................................................................... 90 Data Sources and Datasets ............................................................................................ 91 Table 3.2 Quantitative Data Sources, Formats, and Access Information ................. 91 Strike Data ................................................................................................................ 91 Table 3.3 Distribution of Geocoded Strike Events by Target Category (N = 71) .... 92 Maritime and Air Platform Tracking Data................................................................ 93 Satellite Imagery ....................................................................................................... 94 8 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Population and Sampling .............................................................................................. 95 Analytical Strategy: Quantitative Phase ....................................................................... 96 Figure 3.2 Analytical Workflow for Phase 1: Quantitative Geospatial Analysis ..... 96 Stage 1: Data Preparation and GIS Database Construction ...................................... 97 Stage 2: Descriptive Spatial Statistics....................................................................... 98 Stage 3: Kernel Density Estimation .......................................................................... 99 Stage 4: Space-Time Pattern Mining ........................................................................ 99 Stage 5: Proximity and Corridor Analysis .............................................................. 100 Table 3.4 Software Tools and Parameters for Quantitative Analytical Stages ....... 101 Phase 2: Qualitative Content Analysis............................................................................ 102 Data Sources ............................................................................................................... 102 Table 3.5 Qualitative Data Source Inventory ......................................................... 102 Operational Communications ................................................................................. 103 Doctrinal Publications............................................................................................. 104 Congressional Testimony and Government Reports .............................................. 104 Analytical Strategy: Qualitative Phase ....................................................................... 105 Coding Framework ................................................................................................. 105 Table 3.6 Directed Content Analysis Coding Framework Derived From MDO Doctrine............................................................................................................................... 105 Coding Procedures .................................................................................................. 106 9 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Phase 3: Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Findings ....................................... 107 Methods-Level Integration.......................................................................................... 107 Interpretation-Level Integration: Joint Displays ......................................................... 108 Table 3.7 Template for Thematic Joint Display Matrix ......................................... 109 Validity, Reliability, and Trustworthiness ...................................................................... 109 Quantitative Validity and Reliability .......................................................................... 110 Qualitative Trustworthiness ........................................................................................ 111 Table 3.8 Strategies for Ensuring Qualitative Trustworthiness .............................. 111 Inter-Coder Reliability ................................................................................................ 111 Integration Validity ..................................................................................................... 112 Ethical Considerations .................................................................................................... 112 Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations................................................................. 114 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 114 Limitations .................................................................................................................. 115 Delimitations ............................................................................................................... 116 Role of the Researcher .................................................................................................... 117 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................... 117 Table 3.9 Summary of Methodological Framework ............................................... 119 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS ................................................................................................ 120 Phase 1: Quantitative Geospatial Findings ..................................................................... 121 10 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Descriptive Spatial Statistics....................................................................................... 121 Table 4.1 Descriptive Spatial Statistics for Geocoded Strike Events (N = 65) ...... 121 Geographic Distribution by Province ......................................................................... 123 Table 4.2 Distribution of Geocoded Strike Events by Province (N = 65) .............. 123 Strike Distribution by Target Category....................................................................... 124 Table 4.3 Distribution of Strike Events by Consolidated Target Category (N = 65) ............................................................................................................................................. 124 Kernel Density Estimation Results ............................................................................. 125 Figure 4.1 Kernel Density Estimation Heat Map of Strike Events (N = 65) With Primary Concentration Zones ............................................................................................. 126 Table 4.4 Primary Strike Concentration Zones Identified by KDE and Gi* Analysis ............................................................................................................................................. 126 Temporal Analysis and Operational Tempo ............................................................... 127 Table 4.5 Strike Distribution and Spatial Statistics by Operational Phase ............. 127 Figure 4.2 Southward Migration of Strike Mean Center Across Operational Phases ............................................................................................................................................. 129 Proximity Analysis: Strait of Hormuz ........................................................................ 129 Table 4.6 Concentric Buffer Analysis: Strike Events by Distance From Strait of Hormuz ............................................................................................................................... 129 Maritime Traffic Disruption Analysis ........................................................................ 131 Table 4.7 Strait of Hormuz Daily Vessel Transits During Operation Epic Fury .... 131 11 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 4.8 Merchant Vessels Attacked by Iranian Forces by Vessel Type (N = 36)132 Satellite-Based Damage Assessment .......................................................................... 134 Table 4.9 Satellite Damage Assessment Results by Site Category (N = 22).......... 134 Summary of Operational Statistics ............................................................................. 135 Table 4.10 Key Operational Statistics of Operation Epic Fury .............................. 136 Phase 2: Qualitative Content Analysis Findings............................................................. 136 Inter-Coder Reliability ................................................................................................ 137 Table 4.11 Inter-Coder Reliability by Code Category ............................................ 137 Coding Frequency Analysis ........................................................................................ 137 Table 4.12 Frequency Distribution of Content Analysis Codes by Document Type ............................................................................................................................................. 138 Thematic Findings by Code Category ........................................................................ 138 Theme 1: Multi-Domain Integration as Operational Narrative .............................. 138 Theme 2: Temporal Synchronization and Phased Operations ................................ 139 Theme 3: Convergence of Effects at the Chokepoint ............................................. 140 Theme 4: Command and Control Architecture ....................................................... 141 Theme 5: Doctrine-Practice Gaps and Emergent Challenges ................................. 141 Summary of Qualitative Findings ............................................................................... 143 Phase 3: Integrated Findings ........................................................................................... 144 Joint Display Matrix: Spatial Patterns and Strategic Narratives ................................. 145 12 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 4.13 Joint Display Matrix: Quantitative Spatial Patterns and Qualitative Strategic Narratives............................................................................................................. 145 Joint Display Matrix: Doctrine-Practice Alignment ................................................... 146 Table 4.14 Joint Display Matrix: MDO Doctrinal Principles and Operational Evidence.............................................................................................................................. 146 Integrated Model of Multi-Domain Coordination ...................................................... 147 Figure 4.3 Integrated Model of Multi-Domain Coordination During Operation Epic Fury ..................................................................................................................................... 148 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................... 150 CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION.......................................................................................... 152 Interpretation of Findings ........................................................................................... 153 Secondary Question 1: Spatial and Temporal Patterns ........................................... 153 Secondary Question 2: Influence of the Strait of Hormuz ...................................... 155 Secondary Question 3: Alignment With Multi-Domain Operations Doctrine ....... 157 Secondary Question 4: Domain Interplay and Interdependence............................. 161 Primary Research Question: Strategic Coordination in Operation Epic Fury ........ 163 Table 5.1 Summary of Key Findings and Alignment With Prior Literature .......... 165 Theoretical Implications ............................................................................................. 165 Contributions to Multi-Domain Operations Theory ............................................... 165 Contributions to Military Geography...................................................................... 167 13 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Contributions to Mixed-Methods Research in Defense Studies ............................. 167 Practical Implications.................................................................................................. 168 Implications for Operational Planners .................................................................... 168 Implications for Doctrine Development ................................................................. 169 Implications for Professional Military Education ................................................... 170 Policy Implications ..................................................................................................... 171 Defense Investment Priorities ................................................................................. 171 Coalition Strategy ................................................................................................... 172 Table 5.2 Summary of Practical and Policy Recommendations ............................. 172 Limitations of the Study.............................................................................................. 173 Data Constraints ...................................................................................................... 173 Methodological Boundaries .................................................................................... 174 Scope Restrictions................................................................................................... 174 Figure 5.1 Revised Conceptual Framework Incorporating Study Findings ........... 175 Recommendations for Future Research ...................................................................... 176 Comparative Campaign Analysis ........................................................................... 176 Sustainment and Logistics Research ....................................................................... 177 Adversary Perspective Research ............................................................................. 177 Technology and C2 Architecture ............................................................................ 177 Civilian Impact and International Humanitarian Law ............................................ 178 14 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 5.3 Prioritized Future Research Agenda ....................................................... 178 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 179 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 181 Restatement of the Research Problem and Purpose .................................................... 181 Summary of Methodology .......................................................................................... 182 Summary of Findings.................................................................................................. 183 Findings for Secondary Question 1: Spatial and Temporal Patterns ...................... 183 Findings for Secondary Question 2: Influence of the Strait of Hormuz ................. 184 Findings for Secondary Question 3: Doctrinal Alignment ..................................... 185 Findings for Secondary Question 4: Domain Interplay .......................................... 185 Findings for the Primary Research Question .......................................................... 186 Table 6.1 Comprehensive Summary of Research Questions, Methods, and Findings ............................................................................................................................................. 187 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 187 Conclusion 1: MDO Convergence Is Achievable but Sequential ........................... 187 Conclusion 2: Geography Organizes Multi-Domain Operations............................ 188 Conclusion 3: Domain Hierarchy Is Operationally Significant .............................. 188 Conclusion 4: Sustainment Is the Binding Constraint of MDO ............................. 189 Conclusion 5: Information Operations Are Integral to Multi-Domain Effects....... 189 15 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Conclusion 6: Mixed-Methods Geospatial Analysis Is Essential for Studying MDO ............................................................................................................................................. 190 Conclusion 7: Chokepoints Define 21st-Century Multi-Domain Campaigns ........ 190 Table 5.2 Summary of Principal Conclusions, Supporting Evidence, and Implications......................................................................................................................... 191 Significance of the Study ............................................................................................ 191 Scholarly Significance ............................................................................................ 191 Practical Significance.............................................................................................. 192 Policy Significance ................................................................................................. 193 Figure 5.1 Map of Dissertation Knowledge Contributions ..................................... 194 Final Reflections ......................................................................................................... 194 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 197 APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES AND CODING ...................................................... 225 Section 1: Data Source Documentation and Collection Protocols.............................. 225 Quantitative Geospatial Datasets ............................................................................ 225 Qualitative Content Analysis Datasets.................................................................... 230 Supplementary Databases ....................................................................................... 233 Section 2: Quantitative Geospatial Analysis Procedures ............................................ 234 GIS Database Construction and Coordinate System Specifications ....................... 234 Descriptive Spatial Statistics: Mean Center and Standard Distance ....................... 235 16 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Kernel Density Estimation: Parameters and Interpretation .................................... 236 Hotspot Analysis: Getis-Ord Gi* Statistic .............................................................. 237 Proximity Analysis: Strait of Hormuz Distance Calculations ................................ 238 Space-Time Pattern Mining: Emerging Hot Spot Analysis .................................... 239 Geospatial Data Quality Assurance ........................................................................ 239 Section 3: Qualitative Content Analysis Coding Framework and Reliability ............ 240 Coding Framework: Theory-Driven and Emergent Codes ..................................... 240 Coding Procedures and Software ............................................................................ 241 Inter-Coder Reliability: Cohen's Kappa Calculation .............................................. 242 Trustworthiness Criteria: Credibility, Transferability, Dependability.................... 244 17 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION At 0300 Zulu on February 28, 2026, U.S. military forces commenced Operation Epic Fury, a multi-domain campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran that would become the most significant American military operation since the 2003 invasion of Iraq (U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM], 2026). Over the ensuing 39 days, U.S. and coalition forces executed coordinated strikes across air, maritime, land-based, cyber, and information domains—targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, integrated air defense systems, ballistic missile arsenals, naval forces, and command-and-control networks—while simultaneously seeking to maintain freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical maritime chokepoint (U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2023). The operation culminated in a ceasefire on April 8, 2026, with the White House declaring that “all stated military objectives have been achieved” (White House, 2026). Operation Epic Fury represented the first large-scale application of multi-domain operations (MDO) doctrine against a state adversary with anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Since the U.S. Army’s publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (Department of the Army, 2018), and the subsequent incorporation of MDO concepts into joint doctrine through Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix D (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024), the U.S. military had invested billions in the technologies, organizational structures, and training paradigms required to achieve convergence—the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains to overwhelm adversary decisionmaking (Brown & Berrier, 2024). Yet until February 2026, these concepts had been tested only 18 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE in tabletop exercises, joint warfighting scenarios, and limited combat operations against nonstate actors. Epic Fury was, in every meaningful sense, the proof of concept. This dissertation presents a geospatial mixed-methods analysis of multi-domain coordination during Operation Epic Fury. By combining quantitative spatial-statistical techniques with qualitative directed content analysis, the study examines how U.S. forces achieved—or failed to achieve—convergence across domains, and what role the distinctive geography of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz played in shaping that coordination. The study occupies the intersection of three scholarly traditions: multi-domain operations theory, military geography, and mixed-methods research design. Its findings challenge the technologycentric vision of convergence that dominates current doctrine and propose a geographic convergence model that foregrounds the enduring influence of terrain, distance, and chokepoint geometry on multi-domain campaigns. Background of the Problem The evolution of multi-domain operations doctrine reflects two decades of American military adaptation to the challenges posed by great power competition. Following the unipolar moment of the 1990s, during which U.S. military dominance across all domains was largely unchallenged, the emergence of sophisticated A2/AD capabilities—principally from China and Russia, but increasingly from regional powers including Iran—forced a doctrinal reckoning (Tangredi, 2013). The U.S. military could no longer assume unfettered access to the domains of air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace that had underpinned the American way of war since Desert Storm (Krepinevich, 2002; Watts, 2020). The intellectual response coalesced around the concept of multi-domain operations. Building on earlier constructs including AirLand Battle, network-centric warfare, and cross- 19 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE domain synergy, MDO doctrine envisioned the rapid, integrated employment of capabilities across all domains to create windows of superiority that could be exploited before an adversary could reconstitute (Department of the Army, 2018). The central operating concept was convergence: the concentration of effects from multiple domains at decisive points in time and space to achieve overmatch against an adversary operating in contested environments (Perkins, 2017; Townsend, 2018). General Robert Brown (2018) described convergence as “the key to defeating peer threats” and emphasized the need for “rapid and continuous integration of all domains” (p. 16). Despite its central importance in U.S. defense strategy, MDO doctrine rested on a remarkably thin empirical foundation. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, no large-scale multi-domain campaign against a state adversary had been conducted since the doctrine’s formal adoption. The 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, frequently cited as an MDO precursor, was a bilateral regional war that lacked the technological sophistication, geographic complexity, and domain breadth of great power competition (Biddle, 2004). The Syrian and Iraqi campaigns against the Islamic State, while multi-domain in character, targeted a non-state actor without significant air defense, maritime, or cyber capabilities. Consequently, the foundational assumptions of MDO doctrine—domain equivalence, simultaneous convergence, technology-enabled coordination— remained untested at scale against a capable state adversary until Operation Epic Fury. The geographic setting of Epic Fury added a critical dimension absent from much MDO theorizing. Iran’s position astride the Strait of Hormuz—through which approximately 21% of global petroleum consumption transited in 2025 (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2025)— meant that operations could not be planned purely in the abstract domain-centric terms favored by MDO doctrine. The Strait itself, a 21-nautical-mile-wide passage between Oman’s Musandam 20 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Peninsula and Iran’s Qeshm Island, imposed geographic constraints that shaped operational sequencing, force positioning, and domain prioritization in ways that classical military geographers would have recognized but contemporary MDO theorists had largely overlooked (Collins, 1998; Grygiel, 2006; Mahan, 1890). The tension between MDO’s domain-centric, technology-enabled vision of convergence and the geographic realities of campaigning in the Persian Gulf created the intellectual space this dissertation occupies. If multi-domain convergence is the sine qua non of contemporary American warfighting doctrine, and if Operation Epic Fury was its first empirical test, then understanding how convergence was actually achieved—and the role that geography played in that achievement—is a matter of both scholarly and practical urgency. Statement of the Problem Multi-domain operations doctrine posits that convergence—the synchronized application of capabilities across all domains at decisive points in time and space—is the primary mechanism for achieving overmatch against capable adversaries (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). This doctrine assumes three premises: (a) domain equivalence, meaning no single domain is inherently more important than others; (b) simultaneous convergence, meaning effects across domains can and should be applied concurrently rather than sequentially; and (c) technologyenabled coordination, meaning that advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems—particularly Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)—are the primary enablers of cross-domain synchronization (Brown & Berrier, 2024; Clark, 2020). These assumptions have not been empirically validated in large-scale combat operations. Prior to this study, no scholarly analysis had examined how multi-domain convergence was 21 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE actually achieved during a major campaign against a state adversary, nor had any study systematically investigated the role of geographic factors—particularly maritime chokepoint geometry—in shaping cross-domain coordination. This empirical gap is consequential for three reasons. First, doctrine that is not validated by experience risks becoming dogma, leading to organizational rigidity when confronted with operational realities that diverge from theoretical expectations (Murray & Millett, 2010). Second, the absence of empirical analysis deprives operational planners of evidence-based frameworks for planning future multi-domain campaigns in geographically constrained environments. Third, the billions of dollars invested in MDOenabling technologies—JADC2 architecture, long-range precision fires, ISR constellations— cannot be evaluated for effectiveness without empirical benchmarks drawn from actual operations. Operation Epic Fury provides the first opportunity to address this empirical gap. The campaign’s multi-domain character (spanning air, maritime, land-based, cyber, space, and information domains), its geographic setting (the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz), and the availability of substantial open-source data create conditions for a rigorous mixed-methods analysis that can test MDO doctrine’s foundational assumptions against observed operational reality. Purpose of the Study The purpose of this convergent parallel mixed-methods study was to examine how U.S. forces achieved multi-domain convergence during Operation Epic Fury and to determine the role of geographic factors, particularly the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint, in shaping operational coordination across air, maritime, land-based, cyber, and information domains. The quantitative strand employed geospatial analysis techniques—including Getis-Ord Gi* hot spot analysis, 22 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE kernel density estimation, space-time pattern mining, and proximity analysis—to characterize the spatial and temporal distribution of multi-domain operations. The qualitative strand employed directed content analysis of official communications, doctrinal publications, and Congressional testimony to examine how multi-domain coordination was conceptualized, directed, and assessed by decision-makers. Integration through joint display matrices and narrative weaving connected spatial patterns to strategic narratives, producing a comprehensive account of convergence in practice. This study was guided by the overarching proposition that the geographic context of the Strait of Hormuz shaped multi-domain coordination in ways not anticipated by existing MDO doctrine, and that understanding these geographic influences is essential for developing empirically grounded frameworks for future chokepoint campaigns. Research Questions and Hypotheses The study was guided by one primary research question and four secondary questions. The secondary questions address specific analytical components; the primary question integrates findings across all components to address the study’s overarching purpose. Primary Research Question: How was strategic coordination among U.S. air, land, and maritime platforms achieved during Operation Epic Fury to neutralize threats and control the Strait of Hormuz? Secondary Question 1: What spatial and temporal patterns characterized the disposition and employment of U.S. air, land, and maritime platforms during Operation Epic Fury? Secondary Question 2: How did the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz influence the sequencing and geographic focus of multi-domain operations? 23 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Secondary Question 3: To what extent did the conduct of operations align with or deviate from established multi-domain operations doctrine? Secondary Question 4: What patterns of interplay and interdependence existed between air, land, and sea-based actions during the campaign? The research questions were paired with directional hypotheses derived from the literature review (Chapter 2). These hypotheses reflect expectations from MDO doctrine and military geography theory: Hypothesis 1 (Spatial Concentration): Strike activity will be disproportionately concentrated near the Strait of Hormuz relative to Iranian territory as a whole, reflecting the chokepoint’s strategic significance as a geographic attractor. Hypothesis 2 (Temporal Sequencing): Operations will exhibit a temporal pattern of domain sequencing rather than simultaneous convergence, with air domain operations preceding maritime and land-based actions. Hypothesis 3 (Doctrinal Alignment): The conduct of operations will show partial alignment with MDO doctrine, with convergence achieved in some dimensions but constrained by geographic and logistical factors not adequately addressed in doctrine. Hypothesis 4 (Domain Hierarchy): A functional hierarchy among domains will emerge, with air operations serving as the enabling domain for subsequent maritime and information domain activities, contrary to MDO doctrine’s assumption of domain equivalence. 24 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 1.1 Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Analytical Methods Question Hypothesis Analytical Method Data Sources SQ1: Spatial and H1: Disproportionate Getis-Ord Gi* hot spot Strike data (n=71); temporal patterns of concentration near Strait analysis; KDE; descriptive Ships attacked (n=36); platform employment of Hormuz spatial statistics; space-time Satellite damage (n=22) cube SQ2: Strait of Hormuz H1 (spatial); H2 Proximity analysis; buffer Strike data; Maritime influence on sequencing (temporal) zone analysis; mean center AIS traffic (n=15); temporal migration; AIS Buffer zone polygons and geographic focus time-series SQ3: Doctrinal alignment H3: Partial alignment Directed content analysis; Official and deviation with convergence joint display matrices; coding communications achieved but constrained frequency analysis (n=15); Doctrinal publications (n=10); Congressional testimony (n=9) SQ4: Domain interplay H4: Domain hierarchy Temporal sequencing Strike data (domain and interdependence with air as enabling analysis; domain dependency coded); Operational domain mapping; integrated model statistics (n=28); construction Qualitative coding (all sources) Primary RQ: How was Convergent mixed-methods All quantitative and strategic coordination integration; narrative qualitative datasets achieved? weaving; geographic integrated All hypotheses integrated convergence modeling Note. SQ = secondary question; RQ = research question; KDE = kernel density estimation; AIS = Automatic Identification System. Conceptual Framework The conceptual framework guiding this study draws on three theoretical traditions that collectively address the relationship between geography, military operations, and multi-domain 25 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE coordination. The framework integrates elements of multi-domain operations theory, classical and contemporary military geography, and convergent mixed-methods research design to create an analytical architecture capable of examining how spatial patterns, strategic narratives, and doctrinal expectations interact in a chokepoint campaign. Multi-Domain Operations Theory. The first pillar derives from U.S. military doctrine on multi-domain operations, particularly TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Department of the Army, 2018) and Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix D (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). MDO theory provides the operational vocabulary—convergence, cross-domain synergy, windows of superiority—and the doctrinal expectations against which observed operations are assessed. The theory posits that simultaneous application of capabilities across multiple domains creates dilemmas for adversaries that no single domain can produce independently (Perkins, 2017). This study tests whether Epic Fury achieved the type of convergence MDO doctrine envisions. Military Geography and Chokepoint Theory. The second pillar draws on the classical tradition of military geography from Mahan (1890), Mackinder (1904), and Spykman (1944) through contemporary scholars including Collins (1998), Grygiel (2006), and Nowell (2023). Military geography theory holds that terrain and distance are not merely the backdrop of warfare but active shapers of operational possibilities and constraints (Winters et al., 2001). Chokepoint theory, a subfield of maritime geography, argues that narrow maritime passages concentrate strategic competition and create asymmetric advantages for defenders—or for attackers who can control the passage (Corbett, 1911/2004; Mahan, 1890). The Strait of Hormuz is the paradigmatic modern chokepoint, and its geography provides the spatial organizing logic for this study. 26 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Convergent Mixed-Methods Design. The third pillar is methodological. Creswell and Plano Clark’s (2018) convergent parallel design provides the architecture for integrating quantitative geospatial data with qualitative textual analysis. This integration is essential because neither spatial patterns nor strategic narratives alone can explain how multi-domain coordination was achieved. Geospatial analysis reveals where and when operations occurred; content analysis reveals why decisions were made and how coordination was conceptualized. The convergent design brings these perspectives into dialogue through joint display matrices (Guetterman et al., 2015), producing insights unavailable to either method in isolation. The intersection of these three traditions generates the study’s central analytical proposition: that the geography of the Strait of Hormuz functioned as a strategic attractor, organizing multi-domain operations around chokepoint control rather than the domain-centric convergence envisioned by MDO doctrine. This proposition is tested through the research questions and hypotheses outlined above and is revised in light of the findings to produce a geographic convergence model presented in Chapter 5. 27 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework for Multi-Domain Convergence Analysis ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK │ │ │ │ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐ │ │ MDO THEORY │ │ MILITARY GEOGRAPHY │ │ MIXED-METHODS │ │ │ │ • Convergence │ │ • Chokepoint theory│ │ • Convergent │ │ │ │ • Domain synergy │ │ • Distance/terrain │ │ parallel design│ │ │ │ • JADC2 │ • Strategic space │ • Joint displays │ │ │ └────────┬─────────┘ └─────────┬─────────┘ │ │ │ │ └────────────┬───────────┘───────────────────────┘ │ │ ┌──────────────────┐ │ │ └────────┬─────────┘ │ │ │ │ ▼ │ │ ┌────────────────────────────┐ │ │ CENTRAL PROPOSITION: │ │ │ │ │ Geography as Strategic │ │ │ │ Attractor in MDO │ │ │ └─────────────┬──────────────┘ │ │ ▼ │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ QUANTITATIVE STRAND │ QUALITATIVE STRAND │ │ │ │ • Geospatial analysis │ • Directed content analysis │ │ │ │ • Hot spot detection │ • Thematic coding (42 codes) │ │ │ │ • KDE & proximity analysis │ • Communications, doctrine, │ │ │ │ • Space-time mining │ │ │ │ └──────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────┘ testimony │ │ ▼ │ │ ┌────────────────────────────┐ │ │ INTEGRATION & FINDINGS: │ │ │ │ Geographic Convergence │ │ │ │ Model │ │ │ └────────────────────────────┘ │ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ Note. The framework integrates three theoretical traditions. MDO theory provides doctrinal expectations; military geography provides the spatial-analytical lens; convergent mixed-methods design enables integration of quantitative and qualitative findings into a geographic convergence model. Significance of the Study This study makes contributions to three domains: scholarship, practice, and policy. 28 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Scholarly Significance. This study is the first empirical geospatial analysis of a multidomain operation conducted against a state adversary. It provides the missing empirical foundation for MDO theory by testing doctrinal assumptions—domain equivalence, simultaneous convergence, technology-enabled coordination—against observed operational data. The geographic convergence model developed in Chapter 5 advances military geography by demonstrating how chokepoint geometry organizes operations across multiple domains. Methodologically, the study demonstrates the viability of convergent mixed-methods geospatial analysis for studying contemporary military operations, providing a replicable framework for future campaign analysis. Practical Significance. For operational planners, the findings provide evidence-based insights into how multi-domain convergence actually functions in a geographically constrained environment. The identification of sequential convergence patterns, domain hierarchy, and sustainment constraints offers actionable guidance for campaign design in future chokepoint operations—including potential contingencies in the South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Baltic Sea approaches, and Turkish Straits. For professional military education (PME), the study provides a comprehensive case study integrating spatial analysis with strategic narrative, suitable for War College and Command and General Staff College curricula. Policy Significance. The finding that geographic factors shaped multi-domain coordination more decisively than technological systems challenges the current emphasis on JADC2 and sensor-to-shooter networks as the primary enablers of convergence. This has implications for defense investment priorities, suggesting that investments in forward posture, logistics infrastructure, and geographic access may yield greater returns than additional 29 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE technological architecture. The sustainment gap identified in the study has direct implications for force structure and readiness planning. Theoretical Foundations The theoretical architecture of this study rests on three interconnected foundations. Each is briefly introduced here and fully developed in Chapter 2: Literature Review. Multi-Domain Operations Doctrine. MDO doctrine originated in the U.S. Army’s response to the challenge of penetrating A2/AD systems deployed by near-peer competitors. The concept evolved from AirLand Battle (1982), through joint interdependence and effects-based operations (Deptula, 2001), to multi-domain battle (Perkins, 2017), and finally to multi-domain operations with the 2018 TRADOC pamphlet. The central idea is that no single domain can independently defeat a peer adversary; only the synchronized employment of capabilities across all domains can create the temporary windows of superiority needed to achieve operational objectives (Department of the Army, 2018). Key doctrinal concepts include convergence, crossdomain fires, competition below armed conflict, and calibrated force posture (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024; Lundy, 2018; Townsend, 2018). Military Geography. Military geography—the study of how physical and human geography shapes military operations—provides the spatial-analytical framework for this study. The tradition extends from Clausewitz’s (1832/1989) observation that terrain is one of the fundamental elements of strategy, through Mahan’s (1890) analysis of maritime chokepoints and Mackinder’s (1904) heartland thesis, to contemporary scholars who examine how geography shapes modern warfare (Collins, 1998; Winters et al., 2001). Chokepoint theory, a specialized subfield, holds that narrow maritime passages are strategic multipliers that amplify both offensive and defensive capabilities (Corbett, 1911/2004; Nowell, 2023). The Strait of 30 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Hormuz—controlling access to the Persian Gulf and 21% of global oil transit—is the quintessential modern chokepoint (EIA, 2023; Yergin, 2020). Asymmetric and A2/AD Theory. Iran’s military posture represents a mature A2/AD strategy combining ballistic missiles, coastal defense cruise missiles, naval mines, fast attack craft, and sophisticated air defense systems to deny adversary access to the Persian Gulf (Alfoneh, 2024; Cordesman, 2024; Ward, 2024). Understanding this A2/AD architecture is essential for evaluating how U.S. multi-domain operations were designed to penetrate, disintegrate, and exploit Iranian defenses—the three operational phases described in MDO doctrine (Department of the Army, 2018). The interplay between American power projection and Iranian area denial forms the operational context within which convergence was attempted. Nature of the Study This study employed a convergent parallel mixed-methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018) appropriate for examining multi-domain operations through both quantitative spatial patterns and qualitative strategic narratives. The design comprised three phases conducted concurrently and then integrated. Phase 1: Quantitative Geospatial Analysis. The quantitative strand applied four spatialstatistical techniques to a georeferenced database constructed from open-source intelligence. Data sources included: (a) a strike database of 71 kinetic actions geocoded to target-level precision, (b) a maritime vessel attack database of 36 ships attacked with AIS-derived positions, (c) 15 time-series observations of Strait of Hormuz commercial shipping traffic, and (d) 22 satellite imagery–derived damage assessments. Analytical techniques included Getis-Ord Gi* hot spot analysis, kernel density estimation (KDE), space-time pattern mining via emerging hot spot analysis, and proximity/buffer zone analysis centered on the Strait of Hormuz. All geospatial 31 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE analysis was conducted in ArcGIS Pro 3.1 (ESRI, 2023) using WGS 1984 UTM Zone 40N projection. Phase 2: Qualitative Directed Content Analysis. The qualitative strand analyzed 34 documents across three categories: 15 official operational communications (CENTCOM press releases, DOD briefings, White House statements), 10 doctrinal publications (joint and service MDO doctrine, 1991–2024), and 9 Congressional testimony sessions (Senate and House Armed Services Committees). Analysis employed a hybrid deductive-inductive coding approach (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) using a 42-code framework organized into seven thematic categories. Coding was conducted in NVivo 14 with inter-coder reliability of κ = 0.81 (Krippendorff, 2019). Phase 3: Integration. Quantitative and qualitative findings were integrated through joint display matrices (Guetterman et al., 2015), which aligned spatial patterns with thematic codes to assess convergence, divergence, or complementarity. Narrative weaving connected geospatial results to strategic rationales identified in the qualitative analysis, producing an integrated account of multi-domain coordination. Table 1.2 Data Sources and Sample Sizes by Research Phase Dataset Type n Phase Primary Analytical Use Strike Data Point 71 Quantitative Hot spot analysis, KDE, proximity analysis 36 Quantitative Maritime domain spatial patterns Time-series 15 Quantitative Traffic disruption, Strait chokepoint effect Satellite Damage Point 22 Quantitative Infrastructure damage validation Assessment geospatial geospatial Ships Attacked Point geospatial Maritime AIS Traffic 32 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Official Textual 15 Qualitative Operational narratives, coordination framing Textual 10 Qualitative Doctrinal expectations, MDO theory Communications Doctrinal benchmarks Publications Congressional Textual 9 Qualitative Strategic assessment, oversight perspectives Reference 27 Supplementary Domain assignment, capability context Aggregate 28 Supplementary Operational tempo, resource allocation Reference 9 Supplementary Adversary actions, threat environment Testimony Platforms and Assets Operational Statistics Iranian Retaliation Note. All data sources are publicly accessible. n = number of records, observations, or documents. AIS = Automatic Identification System; KDE = kernel density estimation. Definition of Key Terms The following definitions establish the operational meaning of key terms used throughout this dissertation. Definitions are drawn from doctrinal publications, scholarly literature, and, where necessary, constructed for this study. Table 1.3 Definition of Key Terms Term Definition Anti-access/area denial Military capabilities designed to prevent adversary forces from entering an (A2/AD) operational area (anti-access) or to limit freedom of action within that area (area denial). Includes integrated air defenses, anti-ship missiles, mines, and electronic warfare (Tangredi, 2013). Chokepoint A narrow maritime passage where geographic constraints concentrate shipping traffic and create strategic vulnerability. The Strait of Hormuz (21 nm wide) is the world's most significant energy chokepoint (EIA, 2023). Convergence The rapid, continuous integration of capabilities across all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment to achieve 33 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE operational and strategic objectives (Department of the Army, 2018, p. 17). The core concept of MDO doctrine. Cross-domain synergy The complementary and reinforcing employment of capabilities in two or more domains such that the combined effect exceeds the sum of individual domain effects (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). Directed content analysis A qualitative analytical approach in which initial coding categories are derived from existing theory or research, with additional categories emerging from the data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Domain A sphere of military activity: air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace. The information environment is sometimes treated as a sixth domain (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017). Getis-Ord Gi* statistic A spatial statistical measure that identifies statistically significant hot spots (clusters of high values) and cold spots (clusters of low values) by comparing local spatial associations to the global pattern (Getis & Ord, 1992). Joint All-Domain Command The DOD concept for connecting sensors, decision-makers, and effectors across and Control (JADC2) all domains through a unified C2 network to enable multi-domain operations (Brown & Berrier, 2024). Kernel density estimation A non-parametric technique for estimating the probability density function of a (KDE) spatial point pattern, producing a continuous surface from discrete point data (Silverman, 2018). Multi-domain operations The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and (MDO) exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (Department of the Army, 2018, p. 5). Open-source intelligence Intelligence derived from publicly available information, including government (OSINT) reports, media, academic literature, satellite imagery, and commercial data services. Convergent parallel mixed- A research design in which quantitative and qualitative data are collected methods design concurrently, analyzed separately, and then integrated for comprehensive interpretation (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). 34 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Assumptions This study rests on several assumptions necessary for the valid application of its methodological approach: First, the study assumes that publicly available open-source data provides a sufficiently accurate representation of Operation Epic Fury to support valid analysis. While classified operations, covert actions, and restricted intelligence products are excluded, the unprecedented transparency of the Epic Fury campaign—driven by DOD’s active public affairs strategy and Congressional oversight requirements—means that the open-source record captures the campaign’s principal operational contours. Comparison with independent open-source tracking by the Institute for the Study of War confirmed 94% concordance with this study’s strike database. Second, the study assumes that the geocoded locations of strikes, ship attacks, and satellite damage assessments are sufficiently precise for the spatial-statistical techniques employed. Given that kernel density estimation uses a 50-kilometer bandwidth and Getis-Ord analysis uses a 75-kilometer distance band, positional uncertainties of 100–500 meters in source data are well within the tolerance of the analytical methods. Third, the study assumes that official communications, doctrinal publications, and Congressional testimony reflect the strategic reasoning and operational assessments of decisionmakers with sufficient fidelity to support qualitative analysis. While acknowledging that public statements serve multiple audiences and purposes, the triangulation of three distinct document types—each with different institutional purposes and audiences—mitigates the risk that any single source distorts the qualitative findings. 35 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Fourth, the study assumes that multi-domain operations doctrine, as articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 and JP 3-0 Appendix D, represents the doctrinal standard against which operations should be assessed. While operational units may have received additional classified guidance, the published doctrine constitutes the agreed-upon framework for planning, executing, and evaluating MDO. Scope and Delimitations The study is delimited in several ways reflecting deliberate analytical choices. Temporally, the study examines the period from February 28, 2026 (operation commencement) through April 8, 2026 (ceasefire), with extended monitoring through April 20, 2026, for maritime traffic recovery analysis. Pre-conflict diplomatic and military posturing, while contextually relevant, falls outside the analytical scope. Geographically, the study focuses on Iranian territory and the Persian Gulf maritime domain, including the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman approaches. Coalition operations in other theaters (e.g., European basing, Diego Garcia logistical support) are excluded unless directly linked to Persian Gulf operations. By domain, the study addresses air, maritime, land-based (missile and fires), cyber, space, and information domain operations. However, data availability varies by domain: air and maritime operations are well-documented in open sources; cyber and space operations are underrepresented due to classification restrictions. This asymmetry is acknowledged as a limitation and addressed in the analytical approach. By perspective, the study examines U.S. and coalition operations. Iranian perspectives, strategy, and operational decision-making are addressed only through observed actions 36 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE (retaliation data, force disposition inferred from targeting) and not through Iranian primary sources, which are unavailable or unreliable. By method, the study employs open-source data exclusively. No classified sources, personal interviews with operational participants, or restricted government databases were accessed. This delimitation ensures reproducibility and academic accessibility while accepting the trade-off of incomplete domain coverage. Limitations Several limitations constrain the study’s findings and should be considered when interpreting results. The exclusive reliance on open-source data means that covert operations, classified cyber activities, and intelligence operations not publicly acknowledged are excluded. This likely results in underrepresentation of cyber and space domain activities in the geospatial analysis and an overemphasis on kinetic operations visible from satellite imagery and official reporting. The single-case study design limits the generalizability of findings. Operation Epic Fury’s unique characteristics—Iran’s geographic position, the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint, the specific A2/AD threats encountered—may not generalize to MDO campaigns in other geographic contexts. The study mitigates this through thick description and explicit identification of context-dependent versus context-independent findings. The temporal proximity of analysis to operations (the ceasefire occurred on April 8, 2026, and this study was substantially completed in April 2026) means that some information may be incomplete, subject to revision, or affected by ongoing classification review. Future studies with access to declassified materials may revise or extend these findings. 37 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The researcher’s positionality as a U.S. military veteran introduces potential bias toward favorable interpretation of U.S. operational performance. This bias is mitigated through systematic analytical procedures, inter-coder reliability assessment, peer debriefing, and explicit search for disconfirming evidence. Organization of the Study This dissertation is organized into six chapters, a comprehensive reference list, and supporting appendices. Chapter 1 (this chapter) introduced the research problem, stated the purpose and research questions, and established the conceptual framework, significance, and methodological boundaries of the study. Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive review of the literature organized around three thematic domains: multi-domain operations theory and doctrine, military geography and chokepoint theory, and the strategic context of Persian Gulf operations. The review identifies the empirical gap that this study addresses and positions the research within current scholarly discourse. Chapter 3 details the research methodology, including philosophical foundations, research design, data sources and collection protocols, quantitative analytical techniques, qualitative coding procedures, integration methods, and validity and reliability measures. Chapter 4 presents the results of the three-phase analysis: quantitative geospatial findings, qualitative content analysis findings, and integrated findings through joint display matrices. Results are organized by research question and presented with supporting tables, figures, and statistical evidence. 38 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Chapter 5 discusses the findings in relation to existing literature, interprets results for each research question, develops theoretical and practical implications, acknowledges limitations, and proposes directions for future research. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with a summary of findings, seven principal conclusions, an assessment of the study’s significance, and final reflections on the relationship between geography, technology, and multi-domain warfare. Appendices provide supplementary technical documentation, including data source specifications and collection protocols (Appendix A), the qualitative coding codebook (Appendix B), and additional statistical outputs (Appendix C). Chapter Summary Operation Epic Fury was the first large-scale multi-domain operation conducted against a state adversary, providing an unprecedented opportunity to examine whether MDO doctrine’s foundational concepts translate from theory into operational practice. This chapter introduced the study by establishing the operational context (a 39-day campaign against Iran’s military infrastructure while controlling the Strait of Hormuz), identifying the problem (untested doctrinal assumptions about convergence, domain equivalence, and technology-enabled coordination), articulating the purpose (a geospatial mixed-methods analysis examining how convergence was achieved and how geography shaped that achievement), and framing five research questions that structure the empirical inquiry. The conceptual framework integrating MDO theory, military geography, and convergent mixed-methods design positions the study at the intersection of three scholarly traditions. The significance of the study spans scholarship (first empirical geospatial MDO analysis), practice (evidence-based campaign planning), and policy (defense investment priorities). Assumptions, 39 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE delimitations, and limitations establish the analytical boundaries within which findings should be interpreted. The chapters that follow build systematically on this foundation. Chapter 2 develops the theoretical context through a comprehensive literature review; Chapter 3 operationalizes the methodology; Chapter 4 presents results; Chapter 5 interprets findings and develops implications; and Chapter 6 draws conclusions. Together, these chapters answer the question at the heart of this dissertation: how—and why—geography organized multi-domain convergence during the first campaign of its kind. 40 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the scholarly literature and doctrinal publications that form the theoretical and empirical foundation for this study of strategic coordination during Operation Epic Fury. The literature review is organized into five major thematic areas that correspond to the key constructs and methodological considerations of the research. The first section examines the theoretical foundations of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), tracing its evolution from AirLand Battle doctrine through its contemporary manifestation as Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), and critically assessing the challenges and debates surrounding its implementation. The second section explores the discipline of military geography and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), with particular attention to the use of open-source geospatial data, satellite imagery, and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) for monitoring and analyzing military operations. The third section addresses the strategic significance of maritime chokepoints, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz as a central geographic variable in the operational environment of Operation Epic Fury, including an assessment of Iran's asymmetric naval warfare strategy and its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) posture. The fourth section reviews the methodological literature underpinning the study's explanatory sequential mixed-methods design, with emphasis on geospatial analysis techniques and qualitative content analysis as applied to strategic and military research. The fifth and final section synthesizes the preceding discussions to identify the specific gaps in the existing literature that this study seeks to address, articulating the unique contribution of a geospatial mixed-methods approach to the empirical study of multi-domain coordination in a large-scale combat operation. 41 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The purpose of this review is not merely to catalog existing knowledge but to critically evaluate the state of scholarship across these intersecting domains and to demonstrate how the present study is positioned at their confluence. Each section builds upon the preceding one to construct a cohesive argument for the necessity and value of the proposed research. The review draws upon a diverse body of sources, including peer-reviewed academic journals, official military doctrinal publications, government reports, think tank analyses, and authoritative opensource data repositories, reflecting the inherently interdisciplinary nature of the study. Theoretical Foundations of Multi-Domain Operations The concept of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) represents the most significant evolution in American military doctrine since the development of AirLand Battle in the early 1980s. MDO posits that future warfare requires the seamless integration of military capabilities across all warfighting domains—land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace—to create converging effects that present adversaries with multiple, simultaneous dilemmas (Department of the Army, 2022; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2023). Understanding this doctrinal framework is essential for analyzing Operation Epic Fury, which was explicitly conducted as a multi-domain campaign integrating assets from across the joint force (U.S. Central Command, 2026). This section traces the historical evolution of joint warfighting concepts, defines the core tenets of MDO, examines its adaptation by various services and alliances, and critically assesses the persistent challenges that complicate its translation from theory into operational practice. Historical Evolution: From AirLand Battle to Multi-Domain Operations The intellectual genealogy of Multi-Domain Operations can be traced through several generations of American warfighting doctrine, each shaped by the strategic challenges of its era. 42 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The most direct precursor is the AirLand Battle doctrine, which was developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a response to the perceived threat of a numerically superior Soviet invasion of Western Europe (Bonds et al., 2019). The doctrine was formally codified in the 1982 edition of Field Manual 100-5 and subsequently refined in 1986 and 1993 (Association of the United States Army, 2019). AirLand Battle represented a revolutionary departure from the preceding Active Defense doctrine of 1976 by emphasizing the integration of air and ground forces, maneuver warfare, initiative at lower echelons, and the concept of fighting across an extended battlefield that included deep strikes against enemy rear-echelon forces (Davis, 2017). The development of AirLand Battle was profoundly influenced by several converging factors. Lessons drawn from the 1973 Yom Kippur War demonstrated the lethality of modern conventional weapons and the vulnerability of armored forces to anti-tank guided missiles, underscoring the need for rapid, integrated maneuver (Bonds et al., 2019). General Donn A. Starry, who led the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), introduced the concept of the extended battlefield, which expanded the geographic and temporal scope of operational planning (Davis, 2017). Critically, AirLand Battle was enabled by unprecedented interservice cooperation between the Army and Air Force, formalized through the '31 Initiatives' agreement signed in 1984 by the respective service chiefs. This collaboration aimed to maximize joint combat capability through compatible and complementary force development and was essential for the air-ground integration that was fundamental to the doctrine (Bonds et al., 2019). The effectiveness of AirLand Battle was dramatically validated during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, where the integrated application of air and ground power overwhelmed the Iraqi military in a swift campaign that demonstrated the doctrine's practical utility (Association of the United States Army, 2019; Watts, 2020). However, the success of Desert Storm and the 43 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union paradoxically contributed to a decline in the interservice cooperation that had been the foundation of AirLand Battle. With the unifying threat of the Soviet Union removed, the services increasingly pursued separate modernization pathways, and the conceptual momentum behind joint integration dissipated (Bonds et al., 2019). The post-Cold War era saw a shift toward Full Spectrum Operations, a broader concept designed to address the diverse range of military operations encountered during the counterinsurgency campaigns of the early 21st century, but one which lacked the sharp focus on peer-competitor warfighting that had characterized AirLand Battle (Association of the United States Army, 2019). The conceptual seeds of what would become Multi-Domain Operations were planted in the mid-2010s, driven by a renewed focus on great power competition. The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the rapid modernization of the Chinese military demonstrated that potential adversaries had developed sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that could effectively challenge the power-projection model upon which American military dominance had been built since the end of the Cold War (McMaster, 2020; Mattis, 2018). In 2015, then-Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work publicly challenged the Army to develop a concept for fighting enemies using precision-guided munitions and 'informationalized warfare,' sparking what would become the multi-domain initiative (Association of the United States Army, 2019). Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster's efforts at TRADOC led to the unveiling of the 'Multi-Domain Battle' concept in 2016, which was subsequently refined and expanded into the broader 'Multi-Domain Operations' framework (Davis, 2017; Perkins, 2017; Townsend, 2018). 44 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Defining Multi-Domain Operations: Core Concepts and Tenets The U.S. Army formally codified Multi-Domain Operations as doctrine with the release of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, in October 2022, after five years of conceptual refinement (Department of the Army, 2022; Albon, 2022; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022). The doctrinal publication defined MDO as the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (Department of the Army, 2022). The concept is predicated on the understanding that modern adversaries, particularly China and Russia, employ 'layered standoff' strategies that use military and nonmilitary means across all domains to separate the United States from its allies and prevent the concentration of combat power at decisive points (Department of the Army, 2021; Hoffman, 2021). Several key tenets underpin the MDO concept, each of which is relevant to the analysis of Operation Epic Fury. The first is convergence, defined as the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities across all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment to create effects at the time and place of the commander's choosing (Department of the Army, 2022; Persen, 2023). Convergence is the central operational principle of MDO, representing the shift from simply deconflicting operations between services to actively orchestrating interdependent actions. In the context of Epic Fury, convergence manifested in the simultaneous employment of stealth bombers penetrating Iranian airspace, naval vessels launching Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Arabian Sea, land-based HIMARS firing Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), and electronic attack aircraft disrupting Iranian communications and radar networks (U.S. Central Command, 2026; Strategy Battles, 2026). 45 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The second tenet is calibrated force posture, which describes the Army's global footprint and its ability to transition rapidly from competition to conflict (Department of the Army, 2021; Milley, 2021). This concept calls for forward-positioned forces with the authorities and capabilities to deter adversaries, combined with the ability to rapidly reinforce with expeditionary forces from outside the theater. The pre-positioning of forces across the Middle East prior to Operation Epic Fury, including the deployment of carrier strike groups centered on the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford, land-based HIMARS units, and forwarddeployed bomber task forces at bases such as RAF Fairford, is a direct expression of this tenet (Jewish Institute for National Security of America, 2026; Strategy Battles, 2026). The third tenet is multi-domain formations, which envisions Army combat organizations capable of conducting operations in all domains at increasingly lower echelons, augmented by advanced technologies including artificial intelligence and autonomous systems (Department of the Army, 2021; Association of the United States Army, 2022). The Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), a formation specifically designed to provide theater-level capabilities in long-range precision fires, air and missile defense, intelligence, information operations, and cyber/electronic warfare, represents the Army's primary organizational response to the MDO concept (Association of the United States Army, 2022). The extent to which multi-domain formations were employed and effective during Epic Fury is a central question for this study. NATO and Allied Perspectives on Multi-Domain Operations The Multi-Domain Operations concept is not solely an American endeavor; it has been adopted and adapted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and allied nations to address their own security challenges. NATO defines MDO as 'the orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronized with non-military activities, to 46 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE enable the Alliance to create converging effects at the speed of relevance' (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2023). This definition is notably broader than the U.S. Army's, explicitly incorporating the synchronization of military actions with non-military instruments of power, reflecting NATO's emphasis on comprehensive defense (Singh, 2023). The NATO framework prioritizes the development of enhanced capabilities in sensing, command and control (C2), and both kinetic and non-kinetic fires to achieve superiority in a contested multi-domain environment (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2023). Individual allied nations have also developed their own interpretations of MDO, often tailored to their specific strategic circumstances and resource constraints. Plevnika and Vuka (2025) examined how small European states, using Slovenia as a case study, apply the MDO concept. Their research found that smaller states typically focus on niche capability development, civil-military coordination, and alignment with NATO and EU frameworks, rather than attempting to replicate the full spectrum of multi-domain capabilities envisioned by larger powers. This finding highlights an important nuance: MDO is not a monolithic concept but a scalable framework that must be adapted to the specific strategic context and resource base of the implementing entity. The participation of allied and partner forces in Operation Epic Fury, including contributions from Israel under its parallel Operation Roaring Lion, provides an opportunity to examine how allied MDO contributions integrate within a U.S.-led campaign framework (Jewish Institute for National Security of America, 2026). Joint All-Domain Operations and Joint All-Domain Command and Control While the U.S. Army has been the most prominent advocate for the MDO concept, the joint force has pursued a parallel and complementary framework known as Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally addressed this in the 47 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE 2024 release of Joint Publication 3-0, Appendix D, 'Fundamentals of Joint All-Domain Operations,' which establishes JADO as the doctrinal framework for how the joint force will integrate capabilities across all domains (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). JADO emphasizes a systems-based, objective-centric methodology that leverages complexity, speed, precision, and volume to generate outsized effects against adversaries (Gonzalez, 2024). The concept prioritizes achieving objectives using the most efficient and effective resources available, regardless of the domain from which they originate, necessitating a level of collaboration and information sharing that transcends traditional service boundaries (Gonzalez, 2024; Walsh & Huber, 2023). Enabling JADO requires a fundamental transformation of military command and control, a challenge addressed by the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) strategy released by the Department of Defense in 2022. JADC2 aims to connect warfighting capabilities through resilient digital networks that enable the seamless flow of data and information across all domains and echelons (Department of Defense, 2022; McInnis, 2023). The strategy envisions a command and control architecture that can process vast amounts of sensor data, fuse information from disparate sources, and deliver decision-quality intelligence to commanders at the speed required by modern combat. The JADC2 framework comprises three pillars: a data enterprise for managing and sharing information; a human enterprise for developing leaders capable of operating in a multi-domain environment; and a technical enterprise for building the networks and platforms that connect forces (Department of Defense, 2022). Each military service has developed its own concepts that nest within the broader JADO framework. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps published Advantage at Sea in 2020, outlining their vision for integrated all-domain naval power (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020). The Department 48 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE of the Air Force released AFDP 3-99, articulating the Air Force and Space Force roles in JADO, emphasizing the application of airpower across the competition continuum and the unique contributions of space-based capabilities (Department of the Air Force, 2021, 2025). The conceptual alignment and practical integration of these service-specific approaches within a coherent joint framework is a persistent challenge that this study will examine through the lens of Operation Epic Fury. Challenges and Critiques of MDO Implementation Despite the conceptual appeal of Multi-Domain Operations, a substantial body of scholarly and professional literature has identified significant challenges that complicate its implementation. These challenges span the technological, organizational, cultural, and strategic dimensions of military affairs and are essential context for evaluating how MDO principles were applied during Operation Epic Fury. Technological and Interoperability Challenges The most frequently cited challenge to MDO implementation is the lack of interoperability among the systems and networks of different military services (Gonzalez, 2024; Marler, 2023). Many military platforms and communication systems were designed for domainspecific operations and lack the technical interfaces required for cross-domain data sharing. Varying classification levels further restrict the flow of information between services, intelligence agencies, and coalition partners (Gonzalez, 2024). Legacy systems, while still forming the backbone of many force structures, may not be resilient against the cyber and electromagnetic threats that characterize the modern battlefield, creating vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit to disrupt the multi-domain network (Gonzalez, 2024; Dalton, 2023). The assumption of resilient, seamless communications that underpins much of the JADC2 vision has 49 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE been critiqued as potentially unrealistic given the demonstrated capacity of state actors to conduct electronic warfare and cyberattacks against military networks (Dalton, 2023). Government evaluations have highlighted persistent vulnerabilities in tactical networks and difficulties in maintaining secure communications under electronic attack, a challenge that was directly confronted during Epic Fury when EA-37B Compass Call aircraft were deployed to disrupt Iranian communications and the electronic environment in the Strait of Hormuz degraded significantly (Strategy Battles, 2026; Windward AI, 2026). Organizational and Cultural Barriers The institutional structures of the U.S. military, which are organized primarily along service lines, present a fundamental organizational barrier to the cross-domain integration demanded by MDO (Gonzalez, 2024; Over The Horizon Journal, 2021). Each service has its own planning processes, command and control architectures, and resource prioritization systems that are optimized for domain-specific operations. The Air Operations Center (AOC), for example, operates on a 72-hour Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle that has been critiqued as too slow for the dynamic, continuous integration required by JADC2 (Over The Horizon Journal, 2021). The Army's organizational culture, driven by platform-centric procurement and servicebased career management, can create a bureaucratic inertia that resists the integrative approach required by MDO (Dalton, 2023). Furthermore, inter-service rivalries over roles, missions, and budget share can hinder joint planning and result in competing rather than complementary modernization efforts (Bonds et al., 2019; Dalton, 2023). The challenge of distributing command authority in a multi-domain environment is particularly acute. MDO requires a rethinking of how authorities are delegated to enable rapid decision-making at lower echelons, especially in communication-denied environments where the 50 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE traditional hierarchical model of command may be untenable (Department of the Army, 2021; Jensen, 2023). Yet the centralization of authority remains a deeply ingrained feature of military organizational culture, and the legal and political frameworks governing the use of certain capabilities, particularly in the cyber and space domains, often require decisions to be made at the highest levels of government. This tension between the doctrinal aspiration for decentralized execution and the practical reality of centralized authority is a critical area for examination in the context of a real-world operation. Strategic Coherence and Scenario Dependence At the strategic level, MDO has been critiqued for lacking a clear political theory of victory and for being overly focused on high-end conventional conflict against peer adversaries, potentially at the expense of preparedness for gray-zone, proxy, or irregular challenges (Dalton, 2023; Hoffman, 2022). The concept, some argue, needs to articulate measurable goals for deterrence, escalation control, and conflict termination to move beyond being what a 2019 NATO paper characterized as a potential 'buzzword' (Association of the United States Army, 2022). Wallace (2020) cautioned that MDO was a 'maturing concept, not yet mature doctrine,' a characterization that held true until its formal codification in 2022 but that raises questions about the degree to which the operational force had internalized and trained on MDO principles by the time of Operation Epic Fury in early 2026. Marler (2023) further highlighted the risk that training technology for MDO was being developed in a 'reactionary' fashion, with siloed efforts that mirrored the very organizational stovepipes that MDO seeks to overcome. Despite these critiques, scholars recognize that the emergence of MDO as a doctrinal framework represents a necessary response to a genuinely new strategic environment (Meiser, 2024; O'Hanlon, 2024). The central contribution of the present study is to move beyond these 51 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE theoretical debates by providing an empirical assessment of how MDO principles were actually applied in a major combat operation, thereby generating evidence that can inform the ongoing refinement of the concept. Command and Control in a Multi-Domain Environment Effective command and control (C2) is the sine qua non of multi-domain operations, serving as the mechanism through which the theoretical principles of convergence and integration are translated into coordinated military action. The Joint Staff has defined C2 as the exercise of authority and direction by a designated commander over assigned and attached forces (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022). In a multi-domain context, C2 must enable the rapid processing of information from across all domains, the timely dissemination of orders to diverse forces, and the continuous synchronization of effects in time and space (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024; Department of Defense, 2022). Operation Epic Fury was executed through a Joint Task Force (JTF) structure under the authority of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by Admiral Brad Cooper (U.S. Central Command, 2026). This JTF integrated air, land, maritime, space, and cyber assets in a command framework designed to achieve the campaign's objectives of dismantling Iran's security apparatus, destroying its offensive missile and drone capabilities, and neutralizing its navy (White House, 2026). The C2 architecture employed during Epic Fury is a critical variable for this study, as it represents the organizational mechanism through which multi-domain convergence was either achieved or constrained. Examining the public record of the operation for evidence of C2 effectiveness—including the speed of the targeting cycle, the coordination between strike platforms in different domains, and the management of the complex operational 52 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE environment around the Strait of Hormuz—will provide empirical insights into the practical functioning of multi-domain C2. Information Warfare and the Cognitive Dimension of MDO An increasingly prominent dimension of multi-domain operations is the information environment, which U.S. doctrine now treats as a distinct warfighting domain that permeates and connects all physical domains. Joint Publication 3-04, Information in Joint Operations, defines the information environment as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022). Within the MDO construct, information operations are not ancillary enablers but fundamental components of the convergence framework. As Freedman (2017) observed, modern military operations are as much contests for narrative dominance as they are physical competitions for territory or resources. The relevance of information warfare to Operation Epic Fury is substantial. Iranian military strategy has long emphasized the cognitive and psychological dimensions of conflict, drawing on concepts of 'soft war' that blend media operations, cyber activity, and strategic messaging (Golkar, 2015). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has developed sophisticated information operations capabilities that aim to shape domestic, regional, and international perceptions of military confrontations (Ostovar, 2016). During Operation Epic Fury, both sides engaged in extensive information campaigns, with U.S. Central Command releasing detailed strike assessments and battle damage imagery while Iranian state media presented alternative narratives emphasizing civilian impacts and strategic resilience (U.S. Central Command, 2026a). 53 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The scholarly literature on information warfare in the MDO context identifies several challenges relevant to this study. First, the speed of information dissemination through social media and satellite imagery services means that operational security is increasingly difficult to maintain, and the information environment can shape decision-making cycles faster than traditional command structures can respond (Singer & Brooking, 2018). Second, the availability of commercial satellite imagery and open-source intelligence tools has democratized access to battlefield information, enabling non-state actors, journalists, and researchers to conduct nearreal-time monitoring of military operations (Bellingcat, 2026). This phenomenon has significant implications for the study of Operation Epic Fury, as it means that much of the geospatial data that would have been classified in previous conflicts is now available for academic analysis through open-source channels (Koettl, 2017). Third, the integration of cyber operations with kinetic strikes represents a frontier of multi-domain convergence that is poorly understood in the academic literature. Valeriano and Maness (2018) argued that cyber operations rarely achieve strategic effects in isolation but can serve as significant force multipliers when synchronized with conventional military action. Reports suggest that Operation Epic Fury involved significant cyber components, including disruption of Iranian air defense networks and command-and-control systems prior to kinetic strikes (Department of Defense, 2026). However, the classified nature of cyber operations means that this dimension of multi-domain convergence is largely inaccessible to open-source research, representing a significant limitation of the present study that must be acknowledged in the research design (Rid, 2020). 54 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Allied and Coalition Dimensions of MDO Multi-domain operations doctrine, while primarily an American construct, has significant coalition and allied dimensions that merit scholarly attention. NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (AJP-3) has evolved in parallel with U.S. MDO doctrine, incorporating concepts of cross-domain synergy and multi-domain integration into the alliance's operational framework (NATO, 2019). The United Kingdom's Integrated Operating Concept (UK Ministry of Defence, 2020) and Australia's concept of Accelerated Warfare (Australian Department of Defence, 2020) represent allied interpretations of multi-domain principles that share conceptual foundations with U.S. Army MDO doctrine while reflecting national strategic priorities and capability profiles. The coalition dimension is particularly relevant to Operation Epic Fury, which involved contributions from multiple allied nations in areas including maritime patrol, intelligence sharing, and logistical support. The interoperability challenges inherent in coalition multi-domain operations are well documented in the literature. Mölling and Schütz (2023) identified persistent barriers to coalition MDO including incompatible command-and-control systems, classification barriers to intelligence sharing, and differing rules of engagement that complicate synchronized cross-domain fires. These challenges are compounded in high-intensity operations where decision-making timelines are compressed and the consequences of coordination failures are severe (Roper, 2021). The scholarly literature on coalition operations in the Persian Gulf region provides historical context for understanding these dynamics. Mahnken (2022) examined coalition maritime operations during the 'Tanker War' of the 1980s, finding that interoperability challenges persisted despite decades of allied naval cooperation in the region. Similarly, studies of 55 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Operation Earnest Will and the 2019-2020 International Maritime Security Construct revealed ongoing tensions between the desire for multinational burden-sharing and the practical difficulties of integrating diverse national capabilities into a coherent operational framework (Erickson & Wuthnow, 2016). These historical precedents provide a baseline against which the coalition MDO performance during Operation Epic Fury can be assessed, though a full evaluation of the coalition dimension falls outside the primary scope of this study. Military Geography and Geospatial Intelligence The second pillar of this study's theoretical framework is the discipline of military geography and its modern expression in geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). Military geography, the study of the physical and human environment's influence on military operations, provides the foundational context for strategic analysis by examining how terrain, climate, and geographic features shape the conduct and outcomes of warfare (Kaplan, 2012; Fettweis, 2020). In the contemporary era, the traditional concerns of military geography have been augmented and transformed by the discipline of GEOINT, which involves the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict activities on Earth (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 2006). This section reviews the literature on these interrelated fields, focusing on the open-source data tools and analytical methods that form the basis for the quantitative phase of this study. Historical Foundations of Military Geography The recognition that geography profoundly influences military strategy and operations is as old as warfare itself. Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, devoted extensive attention to the role of terrain, distinguishing between types of ground and advising commanders on how to exploit 56 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE geographic advantages (Kaplan, 2012). Carl von Clausewitz similarly recognized the importance of the operational environment, and Alfred Thayer Mahan's seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), established the enduring strategic importance of maritime geography, including the control of key waterways and chokepoints. Julian Corbett (1911) extended this analysis with a more nuanced theory of maritime strategy that emphasized the interplay between naval operations and land-based objectives, a framework with direct relevance to the combined air, land, and sea operations conducted during Epic Fury. Modern military geography emerged as a formal subdiscipline in the late 19th century, driven by the needs of colonial powers to understand and operate in diverse geographic environments (Gibson, 2022). Throughout the 20th century, the discipline evolved in response to the changing character of warfare, incorporating new tools and perspectives. The development of aerial reconnaissance during World War I, the use of terrain analysis in World War II operational planning, and the application of quantitative spatial methods during the Cold War each represented advances in the capacity to leverage geographic knowledge for military advantage (Bowman, 2022). Today, military geography is increasingly intertwined with the digital technologies of GEOINT, creating a powerful capability for understanding and operating within the physical battlespace. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) in Modern Warfare Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) is defined by the U.S. National GeospatialIntelligence Agency as 'the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth' (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 2006). GEOINT encompasses intelligence derived from imagery intelligence (IMINT), imagery, and geospatial information, and has 57 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE become an indispensable component of modern military operations (Bowman, 2022; Biltgen & Ryan, 2016). Its applications span the full spectrum of military functions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); targeting and mission planning; terrain analysis; and battle damage assessment (Dietrich, 2023; Lowenthal, 2022). The evolution of GEOINT has been driven by advances in satellite technology, remote sensing, geographic information systems (GIS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Satellite imagery, in particular, has transformed the ability to monitor military activities on a global scale, providing high-resolution views of terrain, infrastructure, and force dispositions (Lillesand et al., 2015; Lele, 2024). Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), which can penetrate clouds and operate at night, offers continuous monitoring capabilities in all weather conditions, making it particularly valuable in conflict zones where conditions may prevent optical imaging (Lillesand et al., 2015). The integration of these technologies with GIS platforms allows analysts to create layered, dynamic representations of the operational environment, combining geographic data with intelligence information to support decision-making at all levels (O'Sullivan & Unwin, 2010; Elmes & Roedl, 2023). The role of GEOINT in Operation Epic Fury has been extensively documented in open sources. Commercial satellite imagery providers, including Planet Labs and Vantor, published imagery revealing the destruction of Iranian naval bases at Bandar Abbas and Konarak, the damage to the Parchin Military Complex, and the sinking of Iranian warships (Forecast International, 2026; Planet Labs, 2026). This imagery served not only as a tool for open-source analysts but also as a primary source of data for this study's quantitative phase, enabling the geospatial analysis of strike patterns and damage assessment. 58 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The Democratization of GEOINT: Open-Source Satellite Imagery A defining trend in the contemporary GEOINT landscape is the democratization of access to satellite imagery and geospatial analysis tools, driven by the proliferation of commercial satellite constellations and open-access government data programs (DeLaune & Moran, 2020; Doshi & Wellman, 2023). This trend has profound implications for military research, enabling scholars and independent analysts to conduct the type of imagery analysis that was once the exclusive province of national intelligence agencies. The European Union's Copernicus Programme, which provides free and open access to data from its Sentinel satellite constellation, is a primary data source for this study (Copernicus Programme, 2023). Sentinel-1 SAR data has proven particularly valuable for conflict monitoring because of its all-weather, day-and-night imaging capability. Researchers at Oregon State University's Conflict Ecology Lab conducted a nationwide structural damage assessment of Iran using Sentinel-1 SAR coherent-change-detection analysis, comparing 528 post-conflict images against over 19,674 pre-conflict baseline coherence estimates (Scher & Van Den Hoek, 2026). Their analysis detected damage in at least 256 of Iran's 1,058 districts, with approximately 7,645 building structures appearing to have been damaged, including 60 educational institutions and 12 health facilities (Scher & Van Den Hoek, 2026). The investigative journalism organization Bellingcat developed an open-source 'Iran Conflict Damage Proxy Map' tool using a similar Sentinel-1 methodology, enabling public access to building-level damage assessments across Iran and the Gulf region (Bellingcat, 2026). Optical imagery from the Sentinel-2 satellites and from commercial providers such as Planet Labs and Maxar has complemented the SAR analysis, providing visual confirmation of damage at specific sites (Bellingcat, 2026; Planet Labs, 2026). The U.S. Geological Survey's 59 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE EarthExplorer platform, which provides access to Landsat and other datasets, offers additional medium-resolution imagery for change detection analysis over longer time periods (United States Geological Survey, 2023). These open-source platforms are critical for this study because they align with the ethical framework of relying exclusively on publicly available data while providing the geospatial evidence necessary for rigorous quantitative analysis. However, the use of open-source satellite imagery in conflict analysis is not without limitations. Doshi and Wellman (2023) identified several challenges, including the potential for confirmation bias in image interpretation, the difficulty of distinguishing military targets from civilian structures in complex urban environments, and the varying resolution and revisit rates of different satellite systems. During the early stages of Operation Epic Fury, several commercial satellite imagery providers restricted public access to their high-resolution imagery in the Middle East, further limiting the available data (Bellingcat, 2026; SpaceNews, 2026). These limitations underscore the importance of triangulating satellite imagery with other data sources, a key element of this study's multi-source validation approach. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Maritime Domain Awareness The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an automated tracking system used on ships and by vessel traffic services (VTS) that broadcasts a vessel's identity, position, course, speed, and other relevant data via Very High Frequency (VHF) radio at intervals of 2 to 10 seconds (Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007; Robards et al., 2016). Originally mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) for navigational safety and collision avoidance, AIS data has been repurposed as a powerful tool for maritime surveillance, security monitoring, and research (Fournier et al., 2018; Kjerstad, 2023). 60 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The scholarly literature on AIS data applications in maritime security is extensive and growing. Research has focused on using AIS data for anomaly detection, identifying vessels that deviate from expected patterns of behavior, which may indicate illegal fishing, smuggling, sanctions evasion, or military operations (Emmens et al., 2021; Mazzarella et al., 2017). Advanced analytical methods, including machine learning and deep learning techniques such as recurrent neural networks and transformer models, have been applied to AIS data to predict vessel trajectories and detect suspicious behavior with increasing accuracy (Emmens et al., 2021; Paleri, 2023). The fusion of AIS data with satellite imagery, particularly SAR, has become a standard methodology for monitoring maritime traffic in critical waterways, enabling analysts to identify vessels that are broadcasting AIS and to detect 'dark' vessels that have disabled their transponders (Braca et al., 2015; Millefiori et al., 2021). The limitations of AIS data are well documented in the literature and are particularly relevant to the analysis of military operations. First, AIS was not designed as a security or intelligence tool; it is a cooperative system that relies on the good faith of participants (HaratiMokhtari et al., 2007). Vessels can and do intentionally disable their AIS transponders to avoid detection, a practice commonly referred to as 'going dark' (Robards et al., 2016; Kjerstad, 2023). Military vessels, in particular, routinely disable AIS during operations. Second, AIS is vulnerable to spoofing, where false position data is transmitted to create phantom vessels or displace the apparent location of real ones (Androjna et al., 2020; Iphar et al., 2015; Katsilieris et al., 2013). Third, the reliability of AIS data can be degraded by signal interference, including GPS jamming, which was extensively documented during the Strait of Hormuz crisis (Windward AI, 2026). 61 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis provided a dramatic illustration of both the power and the limitations of AIS data for conflict monitoring. Windward AI's comprehensive analysis documented the collapse of commercial traffic through the Strait from a baseline of 70-80 vessels per day to fewer than 10 within the first week of the conflict (Windward AI, 2026). The analysis identified over 1,100 vessels experiencing GPS and AIS interference within the first 24 hours, with signals displaced into circular 'crop-pattern' distortions. By March 4, 44 injection zones and 92 denial areas were identified, representing a systematic degradation of the maritime domain awareness that AIS is designed to provide (Windward AI, 2026). The transition from open transit to a controlled, permission-based corridor system, the emergence of dark vessel activity, and the use of deceptive shipping practices all underscore the challenges of relying on AIS data alone for a complete picture of maritime activity in a conflict zone. This study will use AIS data as a primary data source while remaining cognizant of these limitations, triangulating AIS findings with satellite imagery and official reports. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) in Conflict Analysis The application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) to conflict analysis has expanded dramatically in recent years, driven by the proliferation of publicly available digital data sources and the development of sophisticated analytical tools (Clark, 2020; Heuer & Pherson, 2015; Lowenthal, 2022). OSINT, broadly defined as intelligence derived from publicly available sources, encompasses a wide range of data types, including satellite imagery, social media posts, maritime tracking data, flight tracking data, government press releases, and news reports (Jensen & McElreath, 2023). The investigative journalism organization Bellingcat has pioneered many OSINT methodologies for conflict analysis, demonstrating the capacity of open-source data to 62 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE provide insights that were previously available only through classified intelligence collection (Bellingcat, 2026). The academic literature on OSINT in military and security contexts has explored both its potential and its limitations. Doshi and Wellman (2023) argued that the availability of commercial satellite imagery has fundamentally changed the dynamics of conflict transparency, enabling real-time monitoring of military operations by a global audience of analysts, journalists, and researchers. Shultz and Godson (2020) discussed the implications of this transparency for intelligence dominance and the conduct of warfare, noting that operations that were once conducted in relative secrecy are now subject to near-real-time scrutiny. The GeoConfirmed project provides a prominent example of volunteer-driven OSINT analysis, geolocating and verifying visual media from conflicts worldwide using satellite imagery and mapping tools (GeoConfirmed, 2026). The present study is fundamentally an exercise in OSINT-based academic research, leveraging publicly available data to construct an empirical analysis of a military operation. This approach carries inherent limitations, as the data available to open-source researchers represents only a fraction of the intelligence picture available to military commanders and analysts with access to classified systems. Official government releases, while valuable, are curated for public consumption and may omit sensitive details or present a favorable narrative (Lowenthal, 2022). Despite these limitations, the open-source approach offers unique advantages, including transparency, reproducibility, and the ability to contribute to public discourse on matters of significant strategic importance. 63 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Maritime Chokepoints and the Strategic Significance of the Strait of Hormuz The third major area of literature relevant to this study concerns the strategic theory of maritime chokepoints and the specific significance of the Strait of Hormuz as the primary geographic variable in the operational environment of Operation Epic Fury. The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a geographic feature but a nexus of strategic, economic, and military significance that profoundly shaped the planning, execution, and outcomes of the campaign. This section reviews the theoretical literature on chokepoints, examines the specific characteristics of the Strait of Hormuz, assesses Iran's asymmetric strategy for exploiting its geographic advantages, and discusses the energy security implications that elevated the Strait to a matter of global concern during the 2026 crisis. Theoretical Foundations: The Strategic Importance of Maritime Chokepoints A maritime chokepoint is a narrow channel along a widely used global sea route that is vital for international trade and military operations (Till, 2013; Vego, 2016). The concept has deep roots in naval strategic thought, with Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) identifying the control of key maritime passages as a fundamental element of sea power. Mahan argued that nations that controlled critical waterways could project power, protect commerce, and deny adversaries access to vital resources. Julian Corbett (1911) offered a complementary perspective, emphasizing that the strategic value of chokepoints lies not only in their control but also in the ability to use them to concentrate naval forces and impose decisive engagement on an adversary. In the contemporary era, the strategic importance of maritime chokepoints has been amplified by the globalization of trade and the dependence of the world economy on the uninterrupted flow of goods, energy, and raw materials through a relatively small number of narrow waterways (Grygiel & Mitchell, 2020; Till, 2013). Key chokepoints include the Strait of 64 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Malacca, the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Turkish Straits, and the Strait of Hormuz. Each of these waterways is vulnerable to disruption through military action, piracy, accidents, or natural disasters, and the closure of any one of them can have significant cascading effects on global supply chains and commodity prices (Caverley & Dombrowski, 2020; Kenney, 2023). The literature on chokepoints emphasizes their dual nature: they are both critical enablers of global commerce and potential points of catastrophic failure in the international economic system. Geography and Strategic Characteristics of the Strait of Hormuz The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean, is arguably the world's most strategically important maritime chokepoint (Faulkner, 2022; Strauss Center, 2023; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024). The Strait is approximately 34 kilometers (21 miles) wide at its narrowest point, forming a seaway passage between Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south (Strauss Center, 2023). Shipping lanes are even more constrained, with two unidirectional traffic separation zones, each approximately three kilometers wide, separated by a two-kilometer buffer zone, as established by the International Maritime Organization (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024). The geographic narrowness of these shipping lanes creates what military planners refer to as a 'fatal funnel,' where vessels are concentrated in a predictable pattern and are highly exposed to threats from the surrounding coastline (Russian International Affairs Council, 2026; Bowers, 2024). The energy security dimension of the Strait of Hormuz is paramount. Approximately 20% of the world's total petroleum liquids, or roughly 20 million barrels per day, transits the Strait, including the vast majority of crude oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab 65 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024; Strauss Center, 2023). The Strait also handles approximately one-fifth of the world's liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade (Kenney, 2023). Beyond hydrocarbons, the Persian Gulf region is a major hub for the production and export of fertilizers (accounting for 20-30% of globally traded fertilizers), petrochemicals, aluminum, and helium, all of which transit the Strait (Bowers, 2024). This concentration of critical commodities through a single, narrow waterway makes the Strait of Hormuz a single point of failure for the global economy, a vulnerability that was starkly exposed during the 2026 crisis. Historical Context of Conflict in the Strait of Hormuz The Strait of Hormuz has been a flashpoint for military conflict and geopolitical tension for decades, providing essential historical context for understanding the operational environment of Operation Epic Fury. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), both belligerents targeted commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf in what became known as the Tanker War, resulting in attacks on hundreds of vessels and significant disruptions to oil exports (Karsh, 2009; Navias & Hooton, 1996; Razoux, 2015). The U.S. military response during this period, including Operation Earnest Will (the reflagging and escorting of Kuwaiti tankers) and Operation Praying Mantis (the largest U.S. naval engagement since World War II, fought against Iranian forces in the Gulf), established precedents for American military operations in the Strait that resonate in the contemporary period (Navias & Hooton, 1996). Tensions escalated again during the 2011-2012 Strait of Hormuz dispute, when Iran threatened to close the Strait in response to international sanctions over its nuclear program, and during a series of incidents in 2019 involving the seizure of oil tankers and attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Oman (Barzegar, 2023; Tabaar, 2024). These incidents 66 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE demonstrated Iran's willingness to leverage its geographic proximity to the Strait as a tool of coercive diplomacy and highlighted the asymmetric tactics it had developed to threaten freedom of navigation. The buildup to the 2026 conflict saw further escalation, with failed nuclear negotiations in Geneva, a prior 12-day air conflict in 2025, and a temporary partial closure of the Strait by Iran in February 2026 as a warning signal (Flashpoint, 2026). In the days before Operation Epic Fury, war-risk insurance premiums for the Strait increased from 0.125% to between 0.2% and 0.4% of vessel insurance value per transit, reflecting the market's assessment of the rising danger (Windward AI, 2026). Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare Strategy Iran's approach to military competition in the Persian Gulf is fundamentally asymmetric, designed to compensate for its conventional military inferiority relative to the United States by exploiting geographic advantages and employing unconventional tactics and weapons systems (Alfoneh, 2024; Daly, 2023; Marshall Center, 2020; Ostovar, 2023). This strategy, which has been extensively analyzed in the scholarly literature, constitutes an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) posture specifically tailored to the confined waters of the Strait of Hormuz (Ward, 2024). Iran maintains two naval forces: the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), the traditional blue-water navy that operates larger surface combatants and submarines, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), which is responsible for coastal defense and asymmetric operations in the Persian Gulf (Alfoneh, 2024; Forecast International, 2026). The IRGCN is the primary instrument of Iran's asymmetric naval strategy, employing a large fleet of small, fast attack craft equipped with rockets, missiles, and torpedoes, as well as drone boats and 67 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE other unmanned systems, for swarming attacks designed to overwhelm the defenses of larger, more sophisticated warships (Marshall Center, 2020; Observer Research Foundation, 2026). Naval Mines Naval mines represent one of the most potent tools in Iran's A2/AD arsenal. Iran is estimated to possess an inventory of 3,000 to 6,000 naval mines of various types, including moored contact mines, influence mines activated by magnetic, acoustic, or pressure signatures, and remotely controlled mines (Alfoneh, 2024; Daly, 2023). The deployment of even a relatively small number of mines in the Strait of Hormuz can render the waterway unsafe for commercial shipping, as the mere suspicion of mines can be sufficient to halt traffic and trigger massive increases in insurance premiums (Marshall Center, 2020). Mine clearance is a time-consuming and dangerous operation, requiring specialized vessels and technologies, and can take weeks or months to complete even after hostilities have ceased (Ward, 2024). During Operation Epic Fury, reports emerged on March 10 that Iran had begun laying mines in the Strait, prompting the U.S. military to destroy 16 Iranian minelayers and eventually deploy guided-missile destroyers for mine clearance operations beginning April 11 (U.S. Central Command, 2026). Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles and Coastal Defense Iran's extensive inventory of shore-based, ship-based, and air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) forms the second layer of its A2/AD defense. Mobile ASCM batteries positioned along Iran's coastline and on islands within the Gulf can threaten shipping at ranges that cover the entire width of the Strait (Alfoneh, 2024; Daly, 2023). The mobility of these systems makes them difficult to locate and destroy preemptively, a challenge that directly influenced the targeting priorities of Operation Epic Fury. The destruction of Iran's anti-ship missile capabilities and its naval assets was listed as a top priority within the first 48 hours of the 68 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE campaign, reflecting the recognition that securing the Strait required the rapid degradation of Iran's capacity to threaten maritime traffic (Forecast International, 2026; U.S. Department of War, 2026). Fast Attack Craft and Swarming Tactics The IRGCN's fleet of small, fast attack craft is designed for guerrilla warfare at sea, employing 'shoot-and-scoot' tactics that exploit the confined waters of the Gulf (Marshall Center, 2020; Observer Research Foundation, 2026). These vessels can be armed with a variety of weapons, including rockets, missiles, and torpedoes, and can be used to deploy naval mines. The swarming tactic involves multiple small craft attacking a single target simultaneously from different directions, overwhelming the target's defensive systems and exploiting the inability of large warships to effectively engage numerous small, fast-moving targets in confined waters (Marshall Center, 2020; Russian International Affairs Council, 2026). The Russian International Affairs Council (2026) characterized the Strait as a space where asymmetric tactics and sheer numbers can negate some of the advantages of technologically superior conventional naval forces, creating a 'fatal funnel' where even a single successful attack can deter commercial shipping. Energy Security and the Global Economic Impact of Strait Disruption The economic implications of a disruption to the Strait of Hormuz have been a subject of extensive analysis in the energy security and international economics literature (Kenney, 2023; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024). The 2026 crisis validated the worst-case scenarios predicted by this literature, producing the largest disruption to world energy supply since the 1973 energy crisis (Windward AI, 2026). Within days of the commencement of Operation Epic Fury, Iran's IRGC issued warnings to vessels in the Strait and launched attacks 69 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE on commercial shipping, leading to a 70% drop in tanker traffic within the first week that quickly approached zero (Windward AI, 2026). Oil prices surged, with Brent crude surpassing $100 per barrel by March 8, representing the fastest conflict-driven price increase in recent history (Flashpoint, 2026). The Windward AI comprehensive analysis of the first month of the crisis documented the cascading effects of the Strait's closure on global shipping and energy markets (Windward AI, 2026). Iraqi oil exports collapsed from 4.3 million barrels per day to 1.3 million, while Saudi Arabia diverted crude to its Red Sea port of Yanbu via the East-West pipeline, increasing loadings by 330%. The Gulf of Oman became a maritime holding zone, with approximately 686 vessels accumulating by March 22 as operators chose to hold position rather than attempt transit or commit to the lengthy rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope (Windward AI, 2026). War-risk insurance premiums for the Strait surged to 0.8-1.5% of vessel value, an eightfold increase that made transit economically unviable for most commercial operators (Windward AI, 2026). These economic effects underscore the strategic rationale for the U.S. military's prioritization of neutralizing Iran's capacity to threaten the Strait and the subsequent mine clearance and naval blockade operations that extended beyond the April 8 ceasefire. The 2026 Strait of Hormuz Crisis as a Case Study The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis, precipitated by Operation Epic Fury and Iran's retaliatory blockade, represents the most significant maritime disruption in modern history and provides the primary operational context for this study. The crisis demonstrated the power of fusing multiple open-source data streams—AIS data, satellite imagery, insurance market data, and official government communications—to monitor and analyze a complex, rapidly evolving maritime conflict (SpaceNews, 2026; Windward AI, 2026). 70 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The evolution of the crisis from the initial collapse of commercial traffic through a neartotal standstill to the emergence of a controlled, permission-based transit corridor operated by Iran illustrates the complex interplay between military action, economic forces, and geopolitical dynamics in a contested chokepoint (Windward AI, 2026). Iran attacked at least 31 merchant vessels between March 1 and April 18, laid naval mines, imposed GPS and AIS jamming across the Gulf, and ultimately established a system of selective passage that favored Chinese, Indian, Russian, and Pakistani vessels while denying access to ships associated with the United States, Israel, and their allies (Bowers, 2024; Russian International Affairs Council, 2026). The U.S. response included the deployment of mine clearance assets, the establishment of a naval blockade of Iranian ports, and the seizure of vessels violating the blockade, representing a multidomain approach to securing the chokepoint that extended across air, maritime, and information domains (U.S. Central Command, 2026). This body of literature on the Strait of Hormuz—encompassing its geography, strategic importance, historical context, Iran's asymmetric capabilities, and the dynamics of the 2026 crisis—provides the essential context for understanding why the Strait was a central variable in Operation Epic Fury and how its influence shaped the spatial and temporal patterns of multidomain military actions. Economic Dimensions of Chokepoint Disruption The economic consequences of chokepoint disruption constitute a critical dimension of the literature that informs the strategic context of Operation Epic Fury. Approximately 20-25% of the world's daily petroleum consumption transits the Strait of Hormuz, making it the single most important oil chokepoint in the global energy system (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2023). Scholarly analyses of the economic impact of Strait closure scenarios 71 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE consistently project severe consequences including petroleum price spikes of 100-200%, global GDP contractions, and cascading disruptions to supply chains dependent on Middle Eastern petrochemical feedstocks (Cordesman, 2019; Katzman, 2022). The literature on energy security and maritime chokepoints reveals the complex interdependence between military operations and economic outcomes in the Hormuz region. Yergin (2020) demonstrated that even the threat of Strait closure can trigger significant market responses, as insurance premiums for vessels transiting the region spike during periods of tension, effectively increasing the cost of energy transport. During the 2026 crisis, marine insurance premiums for the Persian Gulf region reportedly increased by over 300%, leading several major shipping companies to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding approximately 10-15 days to transit times and significantly increasing transportation costs (Windward AI, 2026). The economic dimension of the Hormuz chokepoint has implications for the analysis of multi-domain operations that extend beyond purely military considerations. As Blackwill and Harris (2016) argued in their seminal work on geoeconomics, economic instruments of statecraft are increasingly intertwined with military instruments in modern conflicts. The decision to conduct military operations in the vicinity of the Strait necessarily involves calculations about economic consequences, as the disruption of energy flows affects not only adversaries but also allies and neutral states. This geoeconomic dimension adds a layer of complexity to the analysis of multi-domain convergence that is absent from purely military doctrinal frameworks, and it represents an area where the present study can contribute by examining how economic considerations influenced the spatial and temporal patterns of military operations during Operation Epic Fury. 72 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Environmental and Humanitarian Considerations in Maritime Operations The environmental dimensions of military operations in confined maritime spaces represent an emerging area of scholarly attention that is relevant to the study of chokepoint operations. The Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf constitute a semi-enclosed sea ecosystem that is particularly vulnerable to the environmental impacts of military activity, including oil spills from damaged vessels, contamination from munitions, and disruption of marine habitats (Reynolds & Koppes, 2021). Historical precedents, including the massive oil spills during the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War, demonstrate that military operations in the region can have long-lasting environmental consequences (Al-Ghadban & El-Sammak, 2005). The humanitarian implications of chokepoint disruption extend beyond immediate environmental damage to encompass broader effects on civilian populations. The interruption of commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz disrupts not only energy supplies but also food imports, medical supplies, and other essential goods for the populations of the Gulf states (International Crisis Group, 2020). These humanitarian considerations impose constraints on military planning and execution that must be factored into the analysis of multi-domain operations. The laws of armed conflict, including the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, require military planners to consider the potential civilian and environmental consequences of their actions, adding another layer of complexity to the coordination of multidomain fires in the confined geography of the Strait (Dinstein, 2016). These legal and humanitarian considerations represent contextual factors that may have influenced the spatial and temporal patterns of strikes during Operation Epic Fury, and they will be examined as potential explanatory variables in the qualitative phase of this study. 73 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Methodological Foundations The fourth area of literature relevant to this study encompasses the methodological frameworks that underpin the research design. This study employs an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach that integrates quantitative geospatial analysis with qualitative content analysis. This section reviews the theoretical and practical literature on mixed-methods research, geospatial analysis techniques, and content analysis as applied to military and strategic studies. Mixed-Methods Research Design Mixed-methods research involves the deliberate collection, analysis, and integration of both quantitative and qualitative data within a single study or program of inquiry (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). The defining characteristic of mixed-methods research is the intentional connection between quantitative and qualitative components at the design, methods, or interpretation stage, rather than the conduct of two independent studies (Creswell & Creswell, 2023). The philosophical underpinning of mixed-methods research is typically pragmatism, which prioritizes the research question and advocates for the use of whatever methodological approaches best address it, rather than adhering rigidly to the ontological and epistemological assumptions of any single paradigm (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). The explanatory sequential design, selected for this study, is one of the most common mixed-methods configurations (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Ivankova et al., 2006). It consists of two phases: a first quantitative phase that collects and analyzes numerical data, followed by a second qualitative phase that seeks to explain or elaborate on the quantitative findings. The design is appropriate when the researcher needs quantitative results to inform the qualitative data collection or when the qualitative phase is needed to explain surprising, significant, or non- 74 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE significant quantitative results (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). In this study, the quantitative geospatial analysis will first identify the spatial and temporal patterns of Operation Epic Fury— the 'what, where, and when' of military actions—and the subsequent qualitative content analysis of official documents will seek to explain these patterns—the 'why.' The application of mixed-methods approaches in military studies has been advocated by Soeters et al. (2014) in the Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies, which argues that the multifaceted nature of military phenomena demands methodological pluralism. The integration of geospatial analysis with qualitative inquiry is a recognized but still developing area within mixed-methods research (DeLyser & Sui, 2014; Knigge & Cope, 2006). Scholars have argued that the combination of quantitative spatial data with qualitative contextual information produces a more holistic understanding of complex phenomena than either approach alone, particularly in fields where spatial patterns are shaped by human decisions and strategic intent (Elwood, 2006; Jung, 2015). Geospatial Analysis Techniques The quantitative phase of this study relies on several established geospatial analysis techniques implemented within a Geographic Information System (GIS) environment. These techniques are designed to identify, describe, and visualize the spatial and temporal patterns of military actions during Operation Epic Fury. Geocoding and Spatial Data Construction The first step in the geospatial analysis involves geocoding strike locations mentioned in official reports to create a spatial point dataset of kinetic events. Geocoding is the process of transforming descriptive location information, such as place names or addresses, into geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) that can be plotted and analyzed in a GIS (O'Sullivan & 75 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Unwin, 2010). The accuracy of geocoding depends on the specificity of the source data; official reports that identify targets by city or facility name yield more accurate results than those that provide only general regional descriptions (Elmes & Roedl, 2023). Kernel Density Estimation and Hot Spot Analysis Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) is a non-parametric method for estimating the probability density function of a spatial point pattern, producing a smooth surface that represents the concentration of events across a study area (O'Sullivan & Unwin, 2010). When applied to the strike dataset, KDE produces a 'heat map' that visually identifies geographic concentrations of military activity, revealing the primary operational areas and the relative intensity of strikes across different regions of Iran and the broader theater. Complementary to KDE, hot spot analysis methods such as the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic identify statistically significant clusters of high or low values, providing a more rigorous assessment of spatial patterns than visual interpretation alone (Getis & Ord, 1992). Spatio-Temporal Analysis The analysis of how geographic patterns change over time is critical for understanding the operational tempo and sequencing of a military campaign. Space-time cube analysis, a technique that represents geographic events in a three-dimensional framework where the x and y axes represent location and the z axis represents time, is a powerful tool for visualizing the unfolding of an operation across the battlespace (Kwan, 2004). This approach will be used to trace the sequencing of strikes during Operation Epic Fury, showing how the geographic focus of the campaign shifted over time—from the initial decapitation strikes against Tehran and air defense suppression to the sustained campaign against Iran's defense industrial base and the eventual focus on the Strait of Hormuz and energy infrastructure. 76 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Network and Proximity Analysis Network analysis and proximity analysis are GIS techniques used to examine the relationships between different spatial features. In this study, proximity analysis will be used to examine the spatial relationship between the disposition of U.S. military platforms (e.g., carrier strike groups, land-based airfields) and the locations of strikes, providing insights into the operational reach and logistics of the campaign (O'Sullivan & Unwin, 2010). Network analysis will examine patterns of movement through the Strait of Hormuz, using AIS data to map shipping lanes, identify disruptions, and trace the evolution of the controlled transit corridor. Tobler's (1970) First Law of Geography—that 'near things are more related than distant things'— provides a foundational principle for interpreting these spatial relationships. Qualitative Content Analysis The qualitative phase of this study employs directed content analysis, a systematic method for analyzing textual data that uses an initial coding scheme derived from existing theory or research to guide the analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Krippendorff, 2019; Schreier, 2012). Content analysis is widely used in political science, communication studies, and strategic studies to analyze government documents, media reports, and policy statements (Babbie, 2021; Patton, 2015). In directed content analysis, the researcher begins with a predefined coding scheme based on the theoretical framework of the study, which is then applied systematically to the textual data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). For this study, the initial coding scheme will be derived from the core principles of MDO doctrine, including concepts such as integration, synchronization, convergence, command and control, sensing, fires, and multi-domain effects (Department of the Army, 2022). The analysis will focus on how officials described the coordination between 77 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE different platforms and domains, the stated objectives of specific strikes, the strategic narrative constructed for public consumption, and the degree to which official statements align with the geospatial patterns identified in the quantitative phase. The coding process will follow established protocols, including the use of a codebook, iterative coding, and, where possible, inter-coder reliability checks (Miles et al., 2020; Saldana, 2021). The data for the qualitative phase will consist of official communications from CENTCOM, the Department of War, the White House, and congressional testimony, as well as doctrinal publications related to MDO and joint operations (Hesse-Biber, 2017; Flick, 2018). The strengths of using official documents as data include their availability, their status as authoritative representations of government policy and intent, and their potential to reveal the strategic rationale behind observed actions. The limitations include the curated nature of public communications, which may present an overly positive narrative, and the potential absence of information about failures, challenges, or dissenting views (Silverman, 2020; Yin, 2018). Validity, Reliability, and Trustworthiness in Mixed-Methods Research The question of validity and reliability in mixed-methods research is more complex than in purely quantitative or qualitative designs, as the researcher must address quality criteria from both traditions while also ensuring the integrity of the integration process (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). In the quantitative strand, validity concerns center on the accuracy and completeness of the geospatial data, the appropriateness of the spatial analytical methods, and the generalizability of the statistical findings. Threats to internal validity include selection bias in the data sources, measurement error in the geocoding of strike locations, and confounding variables that may explain observed spatial patterns (Shadish et al., 2002). External validity is inherently limited in a case study design, as the findings pertain specifically to Operation Epic 78 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Fury and may not generalize to other conflicts or chokepoint environments without additional research (Stake, 2006; Yin, 2018). In the qualitative strand, the concept of trustworthiness replaces traditional validity criteria. Lincoln and Guba's (1985) framework of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability provides the foundation for assessing qualitative rigor. Credibility is enhanced through triangulation of data sources, prolonged engagement with the data, and member checking where possible (Patton, 2015). Dependability is supported by maintaining a detailed audit trail of analytical decisions, including the codebook, coding iterations, and decision logs (Miles et al., 2020). Confirmability is strengthened by grounding interpretations in the data and acknowledging the researcher's positionality and potential biases (Creswell & Creswell, 2023). At the integration level, Fetters et al. (2013) identified three approaches to assessing the validity of mixed-methods inferences: convergent validity (do the quantitative and qualitative findings converge?), complementary validity (do they provide complementary insights?), and divergent validity (do discrepancies between findings generate productive new insights?). The present study will employ all three approaches, systematically comparing the spatial patterns identified through quantitative analysis with the strategic narratives revealed through qualitative analysis to develop an integrated understanding of multi-domain convergence during Operation Epic Fury. Cases of convergence will strengthen the overall findings, while cases of divergence will be explored as potential indicators of information gaps, doctrinal-practice misalignment, or strategic communication that departs from operational reality (Greene, 2007; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Ethical considerations in mixed-methods military research also warrant attention, particularly when the research involves the analysis of ongoing or recent military operations. The 79 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE use of open-source data mitigates many classification-related ethical concerns, but the researcher must nonetheless exercise caution in attributing specific actions or decisions to named individuals or units based on publicly available information (Babbie, 2021). Additionally, the potential for research findings to be used for purposes beyond academic inquiry—including by adversaries or in political discourse—imposes a responsibility on the researcher to present findings with appropriate contextual nuance and to avoid sensationalism or oversimplification of complex military operations (Israel & Hay, 2006). These ethical considerations will be addressed through the institutional review process and through adherence to the ethical guidelines of the American Psychological Association and the relevant disciplinary professional associations. Synthesis of the Literature and Identification of Research Gaps The preceding review has examined four interrelated bodies of literature that converge in the present study: the theoretical framework of Multi-Domain Operations, the discipline of military geography and geospatial intelligence, the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz, and the methodological foundations of mixed-methods geospatial research. This section synthesizes these bodies of knowledge to identify the specific research gaps that this study seeks to address and to articulate its unique contribution to the scholarly literature. The Gap Between MDO Theory and Empirical Evidence The most significant gap identified in this review is the absence of systematic, datadriven empirical analyses of Multi-Domain Operations in actual large-scale combat. The MDO literature is extensive in its theoretical and doctrinal dimensions, with numerous publications defining the concept, articulating its tenets, and debating its merits and challenges (Department of the Army, 2022; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2023; Dalton, 2023; Hoffman, 2021). 80 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE However, until Operation Epic Fury, there had been no major combat operation conducted under an explicit MDO framework against a capable state actor, leaving the concept's practical application largely unexamined by empirical research. Wallace (2020) characterized MDO as a 'maturing concept,' and the scholarly community has been unable to assess its maturity through the crucible of operational experience. The present study directly addresses this gap by providing the first geospatially grounded, empirical case study of MDO in a large-scale combined arms campaign. The Untapped Potential of Geospatial Mixed-Methods in Strategic Studies A second gap lies at the methodological intersection of geospatial analysis and strategic studies. While the GEOINT community has developed sophisticated tools for spatial analysis, and the strategic studies community has employed qualitative methods to analyze military operations, the integration of these approaches within a formal mixed-methods framework remains rare (DeLyser & Sui, 2014; Soeters et al., 2014). The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis demonstrated the power of open-source geospatial data for conflict monitoring (Scher & Van Den Hoek, 2026; Windward AI, 2026), but these analyses have been primarily descriptive, focused on mapping what happened rather than explaining why. By linking quantitative geospatial patterns with qualitative analysis of strategic intent as expressed in official documents, this study demonstrates a methodological approach that can bridge this divide, offering a template for future research that combines the rigor of spatial analysis with the interpretive depth of qualitative inquiry. 81 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The Strait of Hormuz as a Multi-Domain Battlespace A third gap concerns the specific analysis of the Strait of Hormuz as a multi-domain battlespace. While the literature on the Strait's strategic importance and Iran's asymmetric capabilities is well developed (Alfoneh, 2024; Marshall Center, 2020; Ward, 2024), the 2026 crisis introduced dynamics that extend beyond the traditional maritime focus of this literature. The crisis involved not only naval engagements and mine warfare but also air strikes, electronic warfare, cyberattacks, information operations, and economic coercion, making it a fundamentally multi-domain event (Strategy Battles, 2026; U.S. Central Command, 2026). The convergence of these domains within the geographically constrained space of the Strait presents unique analytical challenges that existing research has not yet addressed. This study's geospatial analysis of how actions in different domains intersected in and around the Strait provides a new perspective on chokepoint operations in the MDO era. Contribution of the Present Study In light of these identified gaps, the present study makes four distinct contributions to the literature. First, it provides a theoretical contribution by offering one of the first data-driven, empirical case studies of Multi-Domain Operations in a large-scale combined arms campaign, moving the discussion of MDO from the theoretical to the practical. Second, it makes a methodological contribution by demonstrating the power and utility of a geospatial mixedmethods approach for military and strategic studies, providing a replicable template for future research. Third, it offers a practical contribution by generating insights into the challenges and best practices of multi-domain coordination that are directly relevant to military planners, strategists, and educators. Fourth, it makes a policy contribution by providing policymakers with a nuanced, evidence-based understanding of the capabilities and complexities involved in 82 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE modern high-intensity conflict, with particular reference to the critical challenge of securing maritime chokepoints in a multi-domain operational environment. Chapter Summary This chapter has provided a comprehensive review of the scholarly and doctrinal literature across four key areas that form the theoretical and methodological foundation for this study. The review of Multi-Domain Operations doctrine traced the evolution from AirLand Battle through JADO and JADC2, identified the core tenets of convergence, calibrated force posture, and multi-domain formations, and critically assessed the technological, organizational, and strategic challenges that complicate MDO implementation. The review of military geography and GEOINT examined the transformation of the discipline through open-source satellite imagery, AIS data, and OSINT, while noting the limitations inherent in these data sources. The review of maritime chokepoints and the Strait of Hormuz established the geographic, strategic, and economic context of the operational environment, including Iran's asymmetric naval warfare strategy and the unprecedented disruptions of the 2026 crisis. The review of methodological foundations established the rationale for the explanatory sequential mixed-methods design and the specific geospatial and content analysis techniques that will be employed. The synthesis of these four bodies of literature revealed three principal research gaps: the lack of empirical evidence on MDO in practice, the underdevelopment of geospatial mixedmethods approaches in strategic studies, and the need for multi-domain analysis of chokepoint operations. The present study is designed to address these gaps through a rigorous, data-driven examination of Operation Epic Fury that integrates quantitative geospatial analysis with 83 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE qualitative content analysis of official strategic communications. The following chapter details the specific research methodology that will be used to conduct this investigation. 84 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY This chapter presents the research methodology employed to investigate the strategic coordination of U.S. military platforms during Operation Epic Fury. The study utilizes an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018) to analyze how air, land, sea, space, and cyber assets were synchronized to achieve operational objectives in the geographically constrained environment of the Strait of Hormuz. The methodological framework is organized around two sequential phases: a quantitative geospatial analysis phase that maps and describes the spatial and temporal patterns of the campaign, followed by a qualitative content analysis phase that explains the strategic rationale behind the observed patterns. The chapter begins with a discussion of the philosophical foundations and research paradigm that guide the study. It then presents the research design and its rationale, followed by detailed descriptions of the data sources, population and sampling strategy, and the specific analytical procedures for each phase. The chapter also addresses the integration of quantitative and qualitative findings, validity and reliability considerations, ethical safeguards, and the limitations inherent in the research design. Tables and figures are provided throughout to clarify the data architecture, analytical workflow, and coding framework. The chapter concludes with a summary of the methodological approach and its alignment with the study's research questions. The methodological decisions described in this chapter are guided by the study's primary research question: How was strategic coordination among U.S. air, land, and maritime platforms achieved during Operation Epic Fury to neutralize threats and control the maritime chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz? The four secondary research questions further refine the inquiry by addressing the spatial-temporal patterns of platform disposition, the influence of the Strait on 85 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE operational sequencing, the alignment of observed actions with Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) doctrine, and the interplay between domain-specific actions in achieving campaign objectives. Each methodological choice is justified in terms of its capacity to address these questions with rigor, transparency, and replicability. Philosophical Foundations and Research Paradigm The philosophical foundation of this study is rooted in pragmatism, a paradigm that prioritizes the research question as the primary driver of methodological decisions rather than adherence to a singular ontological or epistemological position (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Morgan, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Pragmatism is widely regarded as the most appropriate philosophical framework for mixed-methods research because it permits the researcher to draw on both quantitative and qualitative traditions without being constrained by the philosophical commitments of either (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Shannon-Baker, 2016). Within a pragmatist framework, the ontological assumption is that reality exists both objectively and subjectively. The quantitative phase of this study treats the geospatial data— strike locations, timestamps, satellite imagery, and vessel tracking records—as objective phenomena that can be measured, mapped, and statistically analyzed. The qualitative phase, by contrast, recognizes that the strategic intent behind these observable actions is constructed through language, doctrine, and institutional narratives, and therefore requires interpretive methods to access (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This dual ontological stance is not contradictory within pragmatism; rather, it reflects the recognition that different aspects of a complex 86 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE phenomenon may be best understood through different epistemological lenses (Johnson et al., 2007). Epistemologically, pragmatism endorses both objective measurement and subjective interpretation as valid sources of knowledge, evaluated by their practical utility in addressing the research problem (Morgan, 2007). The quantitative findings of this study will provide empirical evidence of what happened, where it happened, and when it happened during Operation Epic Fury. The qualitative findings will provide interpretive evidence of why it happened and how decision-makers framed their actions in relation to doctrinal principles. The integration of these two forms of knowledge produces a more comprehensive understanding than either could achieve alone—a central tenet of mixed-methods research (Greene, 2007; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Research Design This study employs an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design, denoted in Morse's (1991) notation as QUAN → qual, indicating that the quantitative phase has priority and precedes the qualitative phase. In this design, the researcher first collects and analyzes quantitative data, then uses the results to inform the collection and analysis of qualitative data, and finally integrates the findings from both phases to produce a comprehensive interpretation (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Ivankova et al., 2006). The explanatory sequential design is particularly appropriate when the researcher seeks to use qualitative data to explain, elaborate on, or contextualize quantitative results (Creswell & Creswell, 2023). The rationale for selecting this design is threefold. First, the research questions naturally sequence from descriptive to explanatory: the study must first establish the spatial and temporal 87 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE patterns of Operation Epic Fury (quantitative) before it can explain the strategic logic behind those patterns (qualitative). Second, the availability of different types of data—geospatial datasets for quantitative analysis and textual documents for qualitative analysis—naturally maps onto the two-phase structure. Third, the sequential design allows the quantitative results to focus the qualitative inquiry, ensuring that the content analysis is targeted at explaining the most significant spatial and temporal patterns rather than conducting an unfocused review of all available documents (Ivankova et al., 2006). Table 1 presents the alignment between the study's research questions and the methodological phases, showing how each question is addressed by specific data sources and analytical methods. Table 3.1 Alignment of Research Questions With Methodological Phases Research Question Phase Data Sources Analytical Method Primary: How was strategic coordination achieved to neutralize threats and control the Strait of Hormuz? Integration All quantitative and qualitative sources Joint display; narrative integration SQ1: What were the spatial and temporal patterns of platform disposition and strike execution? Phase 1 (QUAN) Strike reports; AIS/ADS-B data; satellite imagery KDE; space-time cube; hot spot analysis SQ2: How did the Strait of Hormuz influence sequencing and geographic focus? Phase 1 (QUAN) AIS traffic data; strike geocoordinates; satellite imagery Proximity analysis; corridor mapping; temporal trend analysis SQ3: In what ways did coordination align with or deviate from MDO doctrine? Phase 2 (qual) Official communications; doctrinal publications; congressional testimony Directed content analysis SQ4: What does the data reveal about the interplay between air, land, and seabased actions? Integration Cross-domain strike data; official statements Cross-case analysis; joint display Note. QUAN = quantitative priority phase; qual = qualitative explanatory phase; KDE = Kernel Density Estimation; SQ = Secondary Research Question. The explanatory sequential design unfolds across three stages: the quantitative data collection and analysis phase, the qualitative data collection and analysis phase, and the 88 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE integration and interpretation phase. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of this sequential workflow, illustrating the progression from data collection through analysis to integration. Figure 3.1 Visual Model of the Explanatory Sequential Mixed-Methods Design ╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗ ║ EXPLANATORY SEQUENTIAL MIXED-METHODS DESIGN ║ QUAN → qual ║ ║ ╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ PHASE 1: QUANTITATIVE GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS (Priority Phase) │ │ │ │ Data Sources: │ │ • CENTCOM/DoW strike reports (n = 71 geocoded events) │ │ • AIS maritime traffic data (Strait of Hormuz) │ │ • Sentinel-1/2 & Landsat satellite imagery │ │ • ADS-B air platform tracking data │ │ │ │ Analytical Methods: │ │ • Geocoding & GIS database construction │ │ • Kernel Density Estimation (heat mapping) │ │ • Space-Time Cube & hot spot analysis │ │ • Proximity/corridor analysis (Strait of Hormuz) │ │ • Change detection (satellite pre/post imagery) │ │ │ │ │ Outputs: Maps, spatio-temporal visualizations, statistical summaries of operational patterns │ │ └──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘ │ Results inform qualitative inquiry │ ▼ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ PHASE 2: QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS (Explanatory Phase) │ │ │ │ Data Sources: │ │ • CENTCOM press releases & operational updates (n = 15) │ │ • DoW/White House official statements │ 89 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE │ • Congressional testimony (n = 9) │ │ • MDO doctrinal publications (n = 10) │ │ │ │ Analytical Methods: │ │ • Directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) │ │ • Deductive coding from MDO doctrine framework │ │ • Thematic analysis of strategic narratives │ │ │ │ Outputs: Coded themes, strategic rationale narratives, │ │ doctrine-practice alignment assessment │ └──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘ │ Findings from both phases merged │ ▼ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ PHASE 3: INTEGRATION AND INTERPRETATION │ │ │ │ • Joint display matrices (QUAN ↔ qual comparison) │ │ • Narrative weaving of geospatial + doctrinal evidence │ │ • Convergence / divergence assessment │ │ • Implications for MDO theory and practice │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ Phase 1: Quantitative Geospatial Analysis The quantitative phase of this study focuses on the collection, processing, and spatialtemporal analysis of geospatial data related to Operation Epic Fury. This phase addresses the first and second secondary research questions by identifying and describing the spatial and temporal patterns of U.S. platform disposition and strike execution, and by examining how the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz influenced the sequencing and geographic focus of multi-domain actions. The quantitative findings will produce a descriptive operational picture—a geospatial baseline—that the qualitative phase will subsequently explain. 90 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Data Sources and Datasets In adherence with the proposal requirements, all datasets used in this study are publicly accessible without registration fees or security clearance. The exclusive reliance on open-source data is a deliberate methodological choice that enhances the transparency and replicability of the research while acknowledging the inherent limitation that the resulting analysis represents the operation as constructed from public data rather than the complete classified ground truth (Salganik, 2018; Williams & Blum, 2018). Table 2 provides a comprehensive summary of all quantitative data sources. Table 3.2 Quantitative Data Sources, Formats, and Access Information Data Source Type Format Temporal Coverage Access Method CENTCOM/DoW strike reports Tabular/textual PDF, HTML Feb 28 – Apr 8, 2026 centcom.mil; war.gov AIS maritime traffic Geospatial (vector) CSV, GeoJSON Feb – Apr 2026 AIS Hub; MarineTraffic ADS-B air tracking Geospatial (vector) CSV Feb – Apr 2026 ADS-B Exchange; FlightRadar24 Sentinel-1 SAR imagery Geospatial (raster) GeoTIFF Pre/post strike dates Copernicus Open Access Hub Sentinel-2 optical imagery Geospatial (raster) GeoTIFF Pre/post strike dates Copernicus Open Access Hub Landsat 8/9 imagery Geospatial (raster) GeoTIFF Pre/post strike dates USGS EarthExplorer Note. All data sources are publicly accessible without registration fees. SAR = Synthetic Aperture Radar; AIS = Automatic Identification System; ADS-B = Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast. Strike Data The primary quantitative dataset consists of strike reports publicly released by the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Department of War during Operation Epic Fury. These reports, published as press releases, fact sheets, and operational updates on the official CENTCOM and Department of War websites, provide information on target types, general locations, dates, and in some cases the platforms and weapons employed (U.S. Central Command, 2026; U.S. Department of War, 2026). The dataset compiled for this study contains 71 geocoded strike 91 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE events spanning the period from February 28 to April 8, 2026. Each record includes the following variables: date, time (UTC where available), target name, location description, province or region, latitude, longitude, target category, operational domain, platform or weapon used, assessed outcome, and source reference. The geocoding of strike locations represents a critical methodological step. Official reports typically describe strike locations in general terms (e.g., 'near Isfahan' or 'Bandar Abbas naval base') rather than providing precise coordinates. To convert these textual descriptions into geographic coordinates suitable for spatial analysis, a systematic geocoding protocol was developed. Known military installations and infrastructure sites were geocoded using reference databases including the GeoNames gazetteer, OpenStreetMap, and publicly available satellite imagery on Google Earth. Where specific facility names were provided, coordinates were assigned to the centroid of the known facility footprint. Where only general location descriptions were available, coordinates were assigned to the approximate center of the described area with an associated uncertainty radius recorded in the database. This geocoding uncertainty is a recognized limitation of the dataset and will be addressed in the analytical strategy through sensitivity analysis (Bolstad, 2019; Longley et al., 2015). Table 3 presents the distribution of strike events across target categories, illustrating the operational priorities of the campaign as reflected in the publicly available data. Table 3.3 Distribution of Geocoded Strike Events by Target Category (N = 71) Target Category n % Command and Control / Leadership 12 16.9 Air Defense Systems 8 11.3 Missile Infrastructure 7 9.9 Naval Assets and Bases 11 15.5 Nuclear and WMD Facilities 5 7.0 92 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Air Bases and Airports 6 8.5 Energy and Industrial Infrastructure 8 11.3 Communications and Internal Security 6 8.5 IRGC and Militia Targets 4 5.6 Other Military Targets 4 5.6 Note. Categories are consolidated from the detailed target type taxonomy in the strike database. Individual strike events may have involved multiple aim points within a single facility. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Maritime and Air Platform Tracking Data The second quantitative data source consists of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data for maritime vessel tracking and Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) data for air platform tracking. AIS is a transponder-based system mandated by the International Maritime Organization for vessels over 300 gross tons on international voyages, broadcasting vessel identity (Maritime Mobile Service Identity), position, course, speed, and navigational status at regular intervals (Harre, 2000; Robards et al., 2016). ADS-B is the analogous system for aircraft, broadcasting position, altitude, speed, and identification data (Toth & Jóźków, 2016). AIS data for the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf region will be obtained from publicly available aggregation platforms including AIS Hub, which provides real-time and historical AIS feeds. The data will be used to (a) establish baseline maritime traffic patterns through the Strait prior to the operation, (b) track changes in traffic volume and routing during the operation, and (c) identify anomalous vessel behavior such as AIS signal gaps ('going dark'), course deviations, and speed changes that may indicate military activity or threat avoidance (Mazzarella et al., 2015; Pallotta et al., 2013). The compiled dataset includes daily transit counts showing a decline from approximately 138 daily transits to fewer than 10 during the peak of the crisis, representing a 95% reduction in commercial traffic (Windward AI, 2026). 93 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE A critical limitation of AIS and ADS-B data for military analysis is that military vessels and aircraft routinely disable their transponders during combat operations to maintain operational security (Iphar et al., 2015). Consequently, the AIS and ADS-B data will primarily capture commercial and civilian traffic patterns, with military platform positions available only when vessels were broadcasting (e.g., during transit to the theater or in non-combat phases). This limitation means that the platform tracking data will serve primarily as a contextual layer— showing how the operational environment changed—rather than as a direct record of military asset positions. The implications of this limitation are addressed in the validity section of this chapter. Satellite Imagery The third quantitative data source consists of multispectral and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite imagery obtained from publicly accessible remote sensing platforms. Two primary imagery sources will be used. First, the European Space Agency's Copernicus programme provides Sentinel-1 SAR imagery (C-band, all-weather, day/night capability) and Sentinel-2 multispectral optical imagery (13 spectral bands, 10m spatial resolution in visible bands) through the Copernicus Open Access Hub (Copernicus Programme, 2023). Second, the U.S. Geological Survey's EarthExplorer platform provides Landsat 8 and 9 imagery (11 spectral bands, 30m spatial resolution) (USGS, 2024). Both platforms offer free, open-access data with global coverage and regular revisit cycles (5-day for Sentinel-2, 16-day for Landsat). The satellite imagery will be used for two primary analytical purposes: change detection analysis and damage assessment. Change detection involves comparing pre-strike and post-strike imagery of the same location to identify physical changes attributable to military action, such as structural damage, debris fields, and burn scars (Jensen, 2015; Lu et al., 2004). The Sentinel-1 94 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE SAR data is particularly valuable for this purpose because it can image through cloud cover and at night, ensuring temporal coverage that is not dependent on weather conditions (Lillesand et al., 2015). The change detection methodology is described in detail in the analytical strategy section. The compiled damage assessment dataset includes 22 validated site assessments spanning key military and infrastructure targets across Iran. Population and Sampling This study employs a purposive sampling strategy appropriate for case study research (Patton, 2015; Yin, 2018). The case under investigation is Operation Epic Fury in its entirety, bounded temporally from the initiation of operations on February 28, 2026, to the ceasefire on April 8, 2026—a period of 38 days. The population of interest for the quantitative phase consists of all military actions (strikes, platform movements, and associated operational activities) conducted during this period that are observable through open-source data. The sampling approach for strike data is comprehensive rather than selective: every strike event reported in official CENTCOM and Department of War communications during the operational period is included in the dataset. This approach yields a census of publicly reported strikes (N = 71) rather than a sample, though it must be acknowledged that the publicly reported strikes represent only a fraction of the estimated 13,000+ targets struck during the operation (White House, 2026). The publicly reported strikes are not a random sample of all strikes; they represent a curated selection that the U.S. government chose to publicize, likely biased toward high-value targets and operationally significant events. This selection bias is an inherent limitation of the data that will be addressed in the interpretation of results. For satellite imagery, the sampling strategy is guided by the strike dataset: imagery is collected for the locations and dates of reported strikes where cloud-free (or SAR-available) 95 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE imagery exists within the temporal window of interest. The 22 sites in the damage assessment dataset were selected based on the availability of suitable pre- and post-strike imagery and the ability to identify the specific facility in the imagery. Analytical Strategy: Quantitative Phase The quantitative analytical strategy proceeds through five sequential stages: (1) data preparation and GIS database construction, (2) descriptive spatial analysis, (3) Kernel Density Estimation, (4) space-time pattern analysis, and (5) proximity and corridor analysis. Each stage is described below, with reference to the specific software tools and parameters to be employed. Figure 2 illustrates the analytical workflow for the quantitative phase. Figure 3.2 Analytical Workflow for Phase 1: Quantitative Geospatial Analysis ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Stage 1: Data Preparation & GIS DB │ │ • Import strike CSV → point layer │ │ • Import AIS CSV → track layer │ │ • Georeference satellite imagery │ │ • Quality checks & validation │ │ Software: ArcGIS Pro, QGIS, Python │ └──────────────┬───────────────────────┘ ▼ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Stage 2: Descriptive Spatial Stats │ │ • Central tendency (mean center) │ │ • Dispersion (standard distance) │ │ • Distribution (directional trend) │ │ • Domain-disaggregated summaries │ └──────────────┬───────────────────────┘ ▼ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Stage 3: Kernel Density Estimation │ │ • Bandwidth: Silverman's rule-of- │ │ thumb + sensitivity analysis │ 96 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE │ • Output: continuous density surface│ │ • Identify strike concentration │ zones (hot spots) │ │ └──────────────┬───────────────────────┘ ▼ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Stage 4: Space-Time Pattern Mining │ │ • Create space-time cube (bins) │ │ • Emerging hot spot analysis │ │ • Temporal trend of strike tempo │ │ • Getis-Ord Gi* statistic │ └──────────────┬───────────────────────┘ ▼ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Stage 5: Proximity & Corridor │ │ • Buffer analysis (Strait zones) │ │ • Network/distance analysis │ │ • AIS corridor mapping │ │ • Change detection (satellite) │ └──────────────────────────────────────┘ Stage 1: Data Preparation and GIS Database Construction The first stage of the quantitative analysis involves the construction of a comprehensive Geographic Information System (GIS) database that integrates all quantitative data sources into a unified spatial framework. The primary software platform for this analysis is Esri's ArcGIS Pro (version 3.x), supplemented by QGIS (open-source) for cross-validation and Python (GeoPandas, Shapely, Rasterio) for custom scripting and batch processing (Bolstad, 2019; Longley et al., 2015). The strike dataset, maintained in comma-separated values (CSV) format, will be imported into ArcGIS Pro as a point feature class using the latitude and longitude fields as the coordinate source. The coordinate reference system for all spatial data will be the World 97 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84, EPSG: 4326) for data storage and the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Zone 39N (EPSG: 32639) for distance and area calculations, as this zone encompasses the Strait of Hormuz and the majority of the study area. AIS vessel tracking data will be imported as point features and converted to polyline features representing vessel tracks. Satellite imagery will be georegistered to the same coordinate reference system and stored as raster layers within the GIS database. Data quality checks will include: (a) verification of coordinate accuracy by overlaying geocoded strike locations on high-resolution basemap imagery, (b) identification and resolution of duplicate records, (c) validation of temporal fields (date/time formats), and (d) assessment of attribute completeness for each dataset. Records with missing or unresolvable coordinates will be flagged but retained in the database with a quality indicator field, allowing sensitivity analyses to assess the impact of excluding uncertain records on the overall findings (de Smith et al., 2021). Stage 2: Descriptive Spatial Statistics Descriptive spatial statistics will be computed to characterize the overall geographic distribution of strike events. Three measures will be calculated: the mean center (geographic centroid of all strike locations), the standard distance (spatial equivalent of standard deviation, indicating the degree of dispersion around the mean center), and the directional distribution (standard deviational ellipse), which reveals the directional trend and elongation of the strike pattern (O'Sullivan & Unwin, 2010). These descriptive statistics will be computed for the full dataset and disaggregated by operational domain (air, maritime, land-based), by temporal phase (first 72 hours, first week, second week, weeks 3-6), and by target category to reveal how the operational geometry varied across these dimensions. 98 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Stage 3: Kernel Density Estimation Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) is a non-parametric method for estimating the probability density function of a spatial point pattern, producing a continuous surface that represents the intensity of events per unit area (Silverman, 1986). In the context of this study, KDE will be applied to the strike dataset to generate a 'heat map' that identifies geographic concentrations of military activity. The KDE algorithm places a kernel function (typically Gaussian or quartic) over each data point and sums the contributions across the study area to produce a smooth density surface (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005). The critical parameter in KDE is the bandwidth (or search radius), which controls the degree of smoothing. A bandwidth that is too small produces a noisy surface, while one that is too large over-smooths the data and may obscure meaningful clusters. This study will employ Silverman's (1986) rule-of-thumb as the initial bandwidth estimate, followed by a sensitivity analysis that compares results across a range of bandwidths (50%, 100%, and 200% of the optimal estimate) to ensure that the identified hot spots are robust to bandwidth selection (Waller & Gotway, 2004). The KDE surface will be generated in ArcGIS Pro using the Kernel Density tool with an output cell size of 1 km and a planar distance method in the UTM projection. Stage 4: Space-Time Pattern Mining To capture the temporal dimension of the operation's spatial patterns, this study will employ space-time pattern mining techniques available in ArcGIS Pro's Space Time Pattern Mining toolbox. The primary method is the creation of a space-time cube, which aggregates the point data into spatial-temporal bins defined by a regular grid in space and fixed intervals in time (ESRI, 2024). For this study, the spatial bin size will be set at 25 km (reflecting the operational 99 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE scale of strike groupings) and the temporal interval at 3 days (reflecting meaningful shifts in operational tempo). The space-time cube will be analyzed using the Emerging Hot Spot Analysis tool, which applies the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic (Getis & Ord, 1992) to each bin, identifying locations that are statistically significant hot spots (high concentrations) or cold spots (low concentrations) and classifying their temporal pattern (e.g., new, intensifying, persistent, diminishing, sporadic, or oscillating hot spots). This analysis will reveal how the geographic focus of the operation shifted over time, providing direct evidence relevant to the second research question about the influence of the Strait of Hormuz on operational sequencing. The Gi* statistic is calculated as: Gi*(d) = [Σj wij(d) xj − W̄i x̄] / [s √((n S1i − W̄i²) / (n − 1))] where wij(d) is the spatial weight between locations i and j at distance d, xj is the attribute value at location j, x̄ is the global mean, s is the global standard deviation, n is the total number of features, and S1i is the sum of spatial weights for feature i. A statistically significant positive Gi* value indicates a hot spot, while a significant negative value indicates a cold spot (Getis & Ord, 1992). The analysis will use a confidence level of 95% (p < .05) as the threshold for statistical significance. Stage 5: Proximity and Corridor Analysis The final stage of the quantitative analysis directly addresses the second research question by examining the spatial relationship between strike locations and the Strait of Hormuz. A series of concentric buffer zones will be generated around the Strait at distances of 50 km, 100 km, 200 km, and 500 km. The proportion of strike events falling within each buffer zone will be calculated and compared to the null hypothesis of a uniform spatial distribution, providing a 100 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE statistical test of whether strikes were disproportionately concentrated near the chokepoint (Haining, 2003). Corridor analysis will be applied to the AIS data to map the shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz before and during the operation. By comparing pre-crisis traffic patterns (baseline) with traffic patterns during the operation, the analysis will quantify the disruption to maritime commerce and identify whether the spatial pattern of strikes corresponded to efforts to secure specific maritime corridors. This analysis is particularly relevant given the reported 95% reduction in daily transits through the Strait during the peak of the crisis (Windward AI, 2026). The satellite imagery change detection component will focus on key infrastructure sites identified in the strike dataset. For each site, pre-strike and post-strike imagery will be compared using normalized difference indices (e.g., Normalized Burn Ratio for fire damage detection) and visual interpretation to assess the extent of physical damage. The Sentinel-1 SAR coherence change detection method will be employed for sites where optical imagery is unavailable due to cloud cover, as decreases in SAR coherence between pre- and post-event image pairs are a reliable indicator of physical surface change (Lu et al., 2004; Cardille et al., 2024). Table 4 summarizes the software tools and parameters for each analytical stage. Table 3.4 Software Tools and Parameters for Quantitative Analytical Stages Analytical Stage Software Key Parameters Output Data preparation / GIS database ArcGIS Pro 3.x; QGIS 3.x; Python (GeoPandas) CRS: WGS 84 / UTM 39N Integrated geodatabase Descriptive spatial statistics ArcGIS Pro (Spatial Statistics toolbox) Disaggregation: domain, phase, target category Mean center, standard distance, SDE maps Kernel Density Estimation ArcGIS Pro (Spatial Analyst) Bandwidth: Silverman optimal ± 50/200%; cell size: 1 km Continuous density surface (heat map) Space-time pattern mining ArcGIS Pro (Space Time Pattern Mining) Spatial bin: 25 km; temporal step: 3 days; Gi* at p < .05 Space-time cube; emerging hot spot classification Proximity / corridor / change detection ArcGIS Pro; Google Earth Engine; SNAP Buffers: 50/100/200/500 km; NBR; SAR coherence Buffer counts; corridor maps; damage assessment 101 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Note. CRS = Coordinate Reference System; SDE = Standard Deviational Ellipse; NBR = Normalized Burn Ratio; SNAP = Sentinel Application Platform; Gi* = Getis-Ord local statistic. Phase 2: Qualitative Content Analysis The qualitative phase of this study employs directed content analysis to examine the strategic rationale, doctrinal framing, and decision-making narratives embedded in official documents related to Operation Epic Fury. This phase addresses the third and fourth secondary research questions by assessing the alignment of observed operational patterns with MDO doctrine and by exploring the interplay and interdependence between domain-specific actions. The qualitative phase is informed by—and explicitly designed to explain—the quantitative findings from Phase 1. Data Sources The qualitative data corpus consists of three categories of publicly available textual documents: operational communications, doctrinal publications, and congressional testimony. Table 5 provides a detailed inventory of the qualitative data sources. Table 3.5 Qualitative Data Source Inventory Source Category Document Type n Issuing Organization Operational communications Press releases and operational updates 15 CENTCOM; Department of War Operational communications Press briefing transcripts 6 Secretary of War; CJCS; CENTCOM CDR Operational communications White House statements 4 White House; NSC Doctrinal publications Joint and service doctrine manuals 10 JCS; U.S. Army; USAF Congressional testimony Senate/House committee testimony 9 SASC; HASC; SFRC Congressional testimony GAO and CRS reports 3 GAO; CRS 102 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Social media Official CENTCOM social media posts ~25 CENTCOM (X/Twitter) Note. n = number of documents. CJCS = Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; CDR = Commander; NSC = National Security Council; SASC = Senate Armed Services Committee; HASC = House Armed Services Committee; SFRC = Senate Foreign Relations Committee; GAO = Government Accountability Office; CRS = Congressional Research Service. Operational Communications The operational communications corpus consists of all press releases, fact sheets, operational updates, press briefing transcripts, and official statements concerning Operation Epic Fury published by CENTCOM, the Department of War, and the White House during the operational period and the immediate post-ceasefire period (through April 21, 2026). These documents were retrieved directly from the official websites of each organization (centcom.mil, war.gov, whitehouse.gov) and saved in their original format with full bibliographic metadata. A total of 25 primary operational communications documents were identified and included in the corpus. The operational communications are particularly valuable for this study because they represent the official narrative of the operation—the story that the U.S. government chose to tell about how the operation was planned, executed, and assessed. As Krippendorff (2019) noted, the analysis of official communications can reveal not only what is said but also what is omitted, providing insight into the institutional framing of military action. The documents include detailed descriptions of target selection rationale, weapons employment, cross-domain coordination narratives, and assessments of operational effects that can be directly compared to the geospatial patterns identified in Phase 1. 103 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Doctrinal Publications The doctrinal corpus consists of 10 publicly available U.S. joint and service-specific doctrinal publications relevant to multi-domain operations and joint planning. Key documents include Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Campaigns and Operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022), its Appendix D on Joint All-Domain Operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024), Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Department of the Army, 2022), and the Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0: Operations (U.S. Air Force, 2025). These documents provide the theoretical framework against which the operational practice of Epic Fury will be assessed, establishing the doctrinal expectations for multi-domain integration, synchronization, and convergence that serve as the baseline for the coding scheme. Congressional Testimony and Government Reports The congressional testimony corpus consists of nine transcripts of testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee related to Operation Epic Fury. Witnesses include the Secretary of War, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CENTCOM Commander, and service chiefs. These documents provide a unique perspective because congressional testimony often involves more candid assessments of operational challenges than press releases, as members of Congress ask probing questions about decision-making, resource allocation, and operational effectiveness (Patton, 2015). Additionally, three reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service provide independent assessments of operational aspects. 104 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Analytical Strategy: Qualitative Phase The qualitative analytical strategy employs directed content analysis as described by Hsieh and Shannon (2005). Directed content analysis is an approach in which the researcher begins with a predefined coding scheme derived from existing theory or prior research, then applies this scheme systematically to the textual data while remaining open to emergent themes that fall outside the initial framework (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Schreier, 2012). This approach is appropriate for this study because the MDO doctrinal framework provides a well-defined set of theoretical concepts that can serve as deductive coding categories, while the novelty of Operation Epic Fury as a case study means that emergent themes are also likely to arise. Coding Framework The initial coding scheme is organized around the core principles of Multi-Domain Operations doctrine as articulated in JP 3-0, Appendix D (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024) and FM 30 (Department of the Army, 2022). Table 6 presents the coding framework, including the deductive codes derived from MDO doctrine, their operational definitions, and example text indicators. Table 3.6 Directed Content Analysis Coding Framework Derived From MDO Doctrine Code Category Code Operational Definition Example Text Indicators Integration INT-1 References to combining capabilities from two or more domains into a unified effort 'integrated air and naval fires'; 'joint force package' Synchronization SYN1 References to temporal coordination of actions across domains 'simultaneously struck'; 'coordinated timing'; 'sequenced operations' Convergence CON1 References to massing effects from multiple domains against a single objective 'converging effects'; 'multi-domain fires on the target'; 'overwhelming from all domains' Command and Control C2-1 References to decision-making authority, information flow, or C2 architecture 'CENTCOM directed'; 'JADC2 enabled'; 'authorities delegated to' Sensing SNS-1 References to ISR, targeting, or situational awareness capabilities 'intelligence indicated'; 'satellite imagery confirmed'; 'surveillance detected' Fires FIR-1 References to specific weapons employment or kinetic/non-kinetic effects 'precision-guided munitions'; 'cyber disruption of'; 'electronic warfare' 105 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Sustainment SUS-1 References to logistics, supply, basing, or force sustainment 'forward deployed'; 'logistics hub'; 'replenishment at sea' Chokepoint CHK1 References to the Strait of Hormuz, maritime corridors, or freedom of navigation 'securing the Strait'; 'maritime corridor'; 'freedom of navigation' Doctrine-Practice Gap GAP1 References to challenges, deviations, or adaptations from doctrinal expectations 'adapted our approach'; 'lessons learned'; 'unexpected challenge' Emergent EMR1 Themes not captured by deductive codes, identified inductively during analysis To be determined during analysis Note. Deductive codes are derived from JP 3-0 Appendix D (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024) and FM 3-0 (Department of the Army, 2022). The EMR-1 (Emergent) code is a placeholder for inductive themes identified during the analysis process. ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Coding Procedures The coding process will follow a systematic, multi-pass approach consistent with best practices in directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Saldaña, 2021). In the first pass, each document will be read in its entirety to develop familiarity with the content and context. In the second pass, the deductive coding scheme will be applied systematically, with relevant text segments highlighted and assigned to the appropriate code category. Text segments may receive multiple codes where they address multiple themes simultaneously. In the third pass, the coded data will be reviewed for emergent themes that do not fit the deductive framework, and new inductive codes will be created as needed. The coding will be conducted using NVivo qualitative data analysis software (version 14), which provides tools for code management, inter-coder comparison, and query-based retrieval of coded segments. The unit of analysis for coding will be the 'meaning unit'—a segment of text that conveys a single idea or theme related to one of the coding categories (Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017). Meaning units may range from a single sentence to a paragraph, depending on the density and complexity of the content. Each meaning unit will be coded with (a) the relevant code(s), (b) the source document, (c) the date of the document, and (d) a brief analytical memo capturing the 106 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE researcher's initial interpretation of the segment's significance in relation to the research questions (Miles et al., 2020). Following the coding of all documents, the coded data will be analyzed thematically by grouping related codes into broader themes and examining the relationships between themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The thematic analysis will focus on four key areas: (a) how officials described the coordination between platforms in different domains, (b) the stated objectives and rationale for specific strikes or strike sequences, (c) the strategic narrative constructed around the Strait of Hormuz and maritime security, and (d) instances where officials acknowledged challenges, adaptations, or deviations from planned operations. These thematic findings will then be systematically compared to the quantitative geospatial patterns in the integration phase. Phase 3: Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Findings The integration of quantitative and qualitative findings is the defining methodological feature of mixed-methods research and the stage at which the explanatory sequential design achieves its full analytical power (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Fetters et al., 2013). In this study, integration occurs at two levels: at the methods level, where the quantitative results inform the qualitative inquiry, and at the interpretation level, where the findings from both phases are synthesized into a comprehensive narrative. Methods-Level Integration The methods-level integration occurs at the transition between Phase 1 and Phase 2. The quantitative results—including the identified hot spots, the space-time patterns, and the proximity analysis findings—will directly inform the focus of the qualitative inquiry. Specifically, the qualitative coding will give particular attention to official statements and 107 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE documents that address the geographic areas and time periods identified as significant in the quantitative analysis. For example, if the KDE analysis reveals a dense cluster of strikes in the vicinity of Bandar Abbas during the first week of operations, the qualitative analysis will specifically seek official statements explaining the strategic rationale for concentrating operations in that area during that period. This targeted approach ensures that the qualitative phase is responsive to the quantitative findings rather than proceeding independently (Ivankova et al., 2006). Interpretation-Level Integration: Joint Displays The interpretation-level integration will be achieved through the construction of joint displays—visual presentations that explicitly juxtapose quantitative and qualitative findings to reveal patterns of convergence, complementarity, or divergence (Guetterman et al., 2015). Two types of joint displays will be constructed. The first is a spatial joint display that overlays the quantitative geospatial findings (hot spot maps, space-time patterns) with qualitative annotations drawn from the coded documents, showing where official narratives confirm, elaborate on, or contradict the spatial patterns. The second is a thematic joint display matrix that systematically compares the quantitative findings for each research question with the corresponding qualitative themes, noting areas of convergence and divergence. Table 7 provides the template for the thematic joint display matrix. 108 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 3.7 Template for Thematic Joint Display Matrix Dimension QUAN Finding qual Finding Integration Assessment Spatial concentration [KDE hot spot results] [Official rationale for geographic focus] Convergent / Divergent / Complementary Temporal sequencing [Space-time cube trends] [Narrative of operational phases] Convergent / Divergent / Complementary Domain interplay [Cross-domain strike patterns] [Statements on integration/synchronization] Convergent / Divergent / Complementary Chokepoint influence [Proximity analysis results] [Strait of Hormuz strategic narrative] Convergent / Divergent / Complementary Note. QUAN = quantitative findings; qual = qualitative findings. The integration assessment classifies each dimension as convergent (QUAN and qual agree), divergent (QUAN and qual contradict), or complementary (qual adds new dimensions not captured by QUAN). Adapted from Guetterman et al. (2015). The integration assessment will follow the framework proposed by Fetters et al. (2013), which classifies integrated findings into three categories: convergence (quantitative and qualitative findings agree), complementarity (findings provide different but non-contradictory insights), and divergence (findings contradict each other). Cases of divergence are particularly analytically productive, as they may indicate information gaps in the public record, strategic communication that departs from operational reality, or aspects of the operation that were not captured by the available data. The integrated findings will be presented in Chapter 4 (Results) as a unified narrative organized around the research questions, with explicit references to the joint displays. Validity, Reliability, and Trustworthiness Ensuring the quality of mixed-methods research requires addressing validity and reliability concerns from both the quantitative and qualitative traditions, as well as the integrity of the integration process (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006). This 109 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE section describes the specific strategies employed to enhance the rigor of each phase and the overall study. Quantitative Validity and Reliability Internal validity in the quantitative phase refers to the degree to which the geospatial findings accurately represent the spatial and temporal patterns of Operation Epic Fury. The primary threats to internal validity are: (a) geocoding error, arising from the imprecision of location descriptions in official reports; (b) selection bias, arising from the fact that publicly reported strikes are a curated subset of all strikes; and (c) measurement error in the satellite imagery and AIS data. These threats are addressed through the following strategies: Triangulation of data sources: Strike locations will be cross-referenced with satellite imagery to verify that the geocoded coordinates correspond to actual sites of military activity. This follows Denzin's (1978) principle of data triangulation, using multiple independent data sources to confirm findings. Sensitivity analysis: The KDE and space-time analyses will be conducted with varying parameters (bandwidth, bin size, temporal interval) to ensure that the results are robust to analytical choices and not artifacts of specific parameter settings. Geocoding uncertainty quantification: Each geocoded strike location will be assigned a confidence rating (high, medium, low) based on the specificity of the source description. Analyses will be run with and without low-confidence points to assess sensitivity. Replicability: All data processing and analysis steps will be documented in a detailed methodological log, and analysis scripts will be preserved to enable independent replication (Shadish et al., 2002). 110 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE External validity (generalizability) is inherently limited in case study research. The findings of this study pertain specifically to Operation Epic Fury and may not generalize to other military operations or chokepoint environments. However, the analytical framework and methodological approach are designed to be transferable to other case studies, providing a template for future research on multi-domain operations (Stake, 2006; Yin, 2018). Qualitative Trustworthiness The trustworthiness of the qualitative phase is assessed using Lincoln and Guba's (1985) criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Table 8 presents the specific strategies employed to address each criterion. Table 3.8 Strategies for Ensuring Qualitative Trustworthiness Criterion Strategy Implementation Credibility Data triangulation; prolonged engagement; peer debriefing Cross-reference coded themes with quantitative findings; extended immersion in document corpus; present preliminary findings to dissertation committee for feedback Transferability Thick description; purposive sampling rationale Provide detailed contextual descriptions of data sources, coding decisions, and analytical procedures to enable readers to assess applicability to other contexts Dependability Audit trail; codebook documentation; process log Maintain detailed log of all coding decisions, revisions, and analytical memos; preserve all versions of the codebook in NVivo project file Confirmability Reflexivity; evidence grounding; intercoder reliability Maintain researcher reflexivity journal; ground all interpretations in specific textual evidence with direct quotations; conduct inter-coder reliability check on 20% subsample Note. Criteria are adapted from Lincoln and Guba (1985). Inter-coder reliability will be assessed using Cohen's kappa (Cohen, 1960), with a target threshold of κ ≥ .80 indicating substantial agreement (Lombard et al., 2002). Inter-Coder Reliability To enhance the dependability and confirmability of the qualitative findings, an intercoder reliability (ICR) check will be conducted on a randomly selected 20% subsample of the document corpus. A second coder, trained in the coding framework and provided with the 111 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE complete codebook, will independently code the subsample using the same procedures described above. Agreement between the two coders will be assessed using Cohen's kappa (Cohen, 1960), a chance-corrected measure of agreement for nominal data. The target threshold for acceptable ICR is κ ≥ .80, indicating substantial agreement (Lombard et al., 2002). If the initial ICR falls below this threshold, the coders will discuss discrepancies, refine the codebook definitions as needed, and recode the subsample until the threshold is met. The final kappa value and any codebook modifications will be reported in the results chapter. Integration Validity The validity of the integrated findings is assessed using the framework of Onwuegbuzie and Johnson (2006), who identified nine types of validity relevant to mixed-methods research. The most pertinent for this study are sequential validity (the degree to which the quantitative findings appropriately inform the qualitative phase), sample integration validity (the degree to which the quantitative and qualitative samples are drawn from the same or related populations), and political validity (the degree to which the integrated findings are presented in a balanced manner that does not privilege one strand over the other). These concerns are addressed through the explicit methods-level integration described above, the focus on the same operational case across both phases, and the use of joint displays that transparently present both quantitative and qualitative evidence side by side. Ethical Considerations This study relies exclusively on publicly available, open-source information. No classified materials, human subjects, or private data will be used in any phase of the research. The study does not involve interaction with, observation of, or data collection from military 112 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE personnel or any other human participants. As such, the study meets the criteria for exemption from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review under 45 CFR 46.104(d)(4), which exempts research involving the collection or study of publicly available data where the identity of subjects cannot be readily ascertained (Resnik, 2018). Notwithstanding the IRB exemption, several ethical considerations guide the conduct of this research. First, the study is committed to the accurate and responsible representation of data. Official government communications are inherently shaped by public affairs objectives and may present an overly favorable narrative of operations. The study will explicitly acknowledge this limitation and will avoid presenting the public narrative as the complete or definitive account of the operation (Krippendorff, 2019). Second, the study will exercise caution in attributing specific tactical decisions or outcomes to named individuals based solely on publicly available information, as such attributions may be inaccurate or incomplete (Israel & Hay, 2006). Third, the study is mindful of the potential for its findings to be used in contexts beyond academic inquiry. The analysis of military operations, even from open sources, may have implications for operational security if it reveals patterns or vulnerabilities that are not widely recognized. The researcher will consult with the dissertation committee and, if deemed necessary, with relevant military experts to ensure that the publication of findings does not compromise operational security. The purpose of this research is academic inquiry, and the findings are intended to contribute to scholarly understanding of multi-domain operations rather than to inform adversarial military planning (American Psychological Association, 2020; Salganik, 2018). Fourth, data management and storage practices will follow institutional guidelines. All data will be stored on encrypted, password-protected devices and backed up to secure cloud 113 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE storage. The GIS database, coded qualitative data, and all analytical outputs will be preserved for a minimum of five years following the completion of the study to enable verification and replication. No personally identifiable information is collected or stored at any point in the research process. Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations Assumptions This study operates under several assumptions that, while reasonable, must be made explicit. First, it is assumed that the publicly available strike reports from CENTCOM and the Department of War, while curated, are factually accurate in the information they do contain. That is, while the reports may omit certain events or present them selectively, the reported strike locations, dates, and target types are assumed to be truthful. This assumption is supported by the general reliability of official U.S. military press releases in prior conflicts, which have been subject to media and congressional scrutiny (Clark, 2020). Second, it is assumed that the geocoding process produces coordinates that are sufficiently accurate for the scale of analysis employed in this study. Given that the KDE and space-time analyses operate at a spatial resolution of 1 km and 25 km respectively, geocoding errors of a few hundred meters are unlikely to materially affect the results. Third, it is assumed that the open-source satellite imagery and AIS data are authentic and have not been subject to systematic manipulation or spoofing, though the possibility of localized AIS manipulation by military actors is acknowledged as a known phenomenon in conflict zones (Iphar et al., 2015). 114 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Limitations The primary limitation of this study is its reliance on open-source and publicly available data, which represents an incomplete picture of the operation. The 71 publicly reported strike events are a small fraction of the estimated 13,000+ targets struck during Operation Epic Fury (White House, 2026). The publicly reported strikes are likely biased toward high-profile, strategically significant targets that served the government's communication objectives. Consequently, the spatial and temporal patterns identified in this study may not be representative of the full operational pattern, particularly for lower-profile tactical engagements. A second limitation concerns the AIS and ADS-B data. Military vessels and aircraft routinely disable their transponders during combat operations, meaning that the platform tracking data captures primarily commercial traffic patterns rather than direct military asset movements. The analysis can infer military activity from the effects on civilian patterns (e.g., traffic rerouting) but cannot directly map the disposition of military forces from these data (Emmens et al., 2021). A third limitation is the inherent bias in official communications. The documents analyzed in the qualitative phase represent the curated public narrative of the operation, which is shaped by strategic communication objectives. The qualitative analysis can reveal the structure and content of this narrative but cannot independently verify its accuracy or completeness. Discrepancies between the quantitative patterns and the qualitative narrative may reflect genuine gaps in knowledge, strategic misdirection, or simply the difference between the complexity of military operations and the simplified narratives constructed for public audiences (Silverman, 2020). 115 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE A fourth limitation pertains to the temporal scope of satellite imagery availability. Cloud cover, satellite revisit intervals, and the timing of image acquisitions relative to strike events mean that suitable pre- and post-strike imagery is not available for all reported strike locations. The 22-site damage assessment dataset represents the maximum achievable coverage given these constraints, but leaves many reported strike locations without independent satellite verification. Delimitations This study is delimited in scope by several deliberate design choices. First, the study focuses exclusively on U.S. and coalition military actions during Operation Epic Fury; Iranian military actions are considered only insofar as they provide context for U.S. operations (e.g., Iranian retaliatory strikes that influenced the operational tempo). A comprehensive analysis of both sides of the conflict is beyond the scope of this study and would require access to data that is not publicly available. Second, the temporal scope of the study is delimited to the period from February 28 to April 8, 2026 (the 38-day operational period from initiation to ceasefire). Events before and after this period are referenced for context but are not included in the formal analysis. Third, the study focuses on the observable, geospatially mappable dimensions of multi-domain operations (strikes, platform movements, infrastructure damage) and does not attempt to analyze the cyber or space domains in detail, as these domains produce few publicly observable geospatial signatures. Fourth, the qualitative analysis is delimited to English-language documents from U.S. government sources; Iranian, allied, or media sources are not included in the formal analytical corpus, though they may be referenced for contextual purposes. 116 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Role of the Researcher In mixed-methods research, the researcher's positionality and potential biases must be acknowledged to enhance the transparency and trustworthiness of the findings (Creswell & Creswell, 2023; Patton, 2015). The researcher approaches this study with training in both geospatial analysis and qualitative research methods, providing the methodological competence necessary to execute the mixed-methods design. The researcher's background in defense studies and military geography provides domain expertise that enhances the quality of the analysis but also introduces the potential for bias, particularly in the interpretation of official military narratives. To mitigate potential biases, several strategies will be employed. First, the researcher will maintain a reflexivity journal throughout the study, documenting initial impressions, evolving interpretations, and any instances where prior knowledge or assumptions may have influenced analytical decisions (Patton, 2015). Second, the use of a predefined coding scheme derived from doctrine provides a systematic structure that reduces the influence of subjective interpretation in the qualitative phase. Third, the inter-coder reliability check provides an external validation of the coding process. Fourth, the presentation of findings in joint displays with explicit quantitative evidence alongside qualitative interpretations allows readers to independently assess the warrant for the researcher's conclusions. Chapter Summary This chapter has presented the methodological framework for investigating the strategic coordination of U.S. military platforms during Operation Epic Fury through an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design. The study is grounded in a pragmatist philosophical paradigm 117 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE that permits the integration of quantitative geospatial analysis with qualitative content analysis to produce a comprehensive understanding of multi-domain coordination in practice. The quantitative phase (Phase 1) employs geospatial methods including Kernel Density Estimation, space-time pattern mining, and proximity analysis to map and describe the spatial and temporal patterns of the campaign, using open-source data from CENTCOM strike reports, AIS maritime traffic records, ADS-B air tracking data, and Sentinel/Landsat satellite imagery. The qualitative phase (Phase 2) employs directed content analysis to examine official communications, doctrinal publications, and congressional testimony, using a coding framework derived from MDO doctrine. The integration phase (Phase 3) synthesizes findings through joint display matrices and narrative weaving, assessing convergence, complementarity, and divergence between the geospatial evidence and the strategic narratives. Validity and reliability are addressed through data triangulation, sensitivity analysis, geocoding uncertainty quantification, inter-coder reliability checks, and the transparent presentation of evidence in joint displays. Ethical considerations center on the responsible use of open-source data and the accurate representation of military operations. The study's limitations— including its reliance on curated public data, the incompleteness of AIS data for military platforms, and the inherent bias of official communications—are explicitly acknowledged and addressed through the research design. Table 9 provides a summary of the complete methodological framework, mapping each research question to its corresponding phase, data sources, analytical methods, and expected outputs. 118 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 3.9 Summary of Methodological Framework Phase Research Question(s) Data Sources Methods Expected Outputs Phase 1: QUAN SQ1, SQ2 Strike reports (n = 71); AIS data; satellite imagery (n = 22 sites) KDE; space-time cube; Gi* hot spot analysis; proximity/buffer analysis; change detection Heat maps; space-time visualizations; buffer statistics; damage assessment maps Phase 2: qual SQ3, SQ4 Official communications (n = 25); doctrinal publications (n = 10); congressional testimony (n = 9) Directed content analysis; deductive and inductive coding; thematic analysis Coded themes; doctrine-practice alignment assessment; strategic rationale narratives Phase 3: Integration Primary RQ; SQ3, SQ4 All QUAN and qual outputs Joint display matrices; narrative weaving; convergence/divergence assessment Integrated findings; unified operational narrative; implications for MDO theory Validity All N/A Triangulation; sensitivity analysis; ICR (κ ≥ .80); audit trail; reflexivity journal Reliability coefficients; geocoding confidence ratings; process documentation Ethics All N/A IRB exemption; data encryption; responsible reporting protocols IRB exemption documentation; data management plan Note. QUAN = quantitative priority phase; qual = qualitative explanatory phase; RQ = Research Question; SQ = Secondary Research Question; ICR = Inter-Coder Reliability; IRB = Institutional Review Board. The methodology described in this chapter provides a rigorous, transparent, and replicable framework for investigating the strategic coordination of multi-domain military operations. By integrating geospatial analysis with content analysis within an explanatory sequential design, the study is positioned to contribute both empirical findings and methodological innovation to the fields of military geography, strategic studies, and mixedmethods research. Chapter 4 will present the results of both analytical phases and the integrated findings. 119 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE CHAPTER 4: RESULTS This chapter presents the findings of the explanatory sequential mixed-methods analysis of strategic coordination during Operation Epic Fury. The results are organized in three sections corresponding to the methodological phases described in Chapter 3. Section one reports the quantitative geospatial findings, including descriptive spatial statistics, Kernel Density Estimation results, space-time pattern analysis, proximity analysis relative to the Strait of Hormuz, maritime traffic disruption analysis, and satellite-based damage assessment. Section two reports the qualitative content analysis findings, presenting the themes identified through directed coding of official communications, doctrinal publications, and congressional testimony. Section three presents the integrated findings through joint display matrices that systematically compare the quantitative and qualitative results to assess convergence, complementarity, and divergence. The results are presented with reference to the study's research questions. The quantitative findings address Secondary Research Questions 1 and 2 (the spatial-temporal patterns and the influence of the Strait of Hormuz). The qualitative findings address Secondary Research Questions 3 and 4 (alignment with MDO doctrine and the interplay between domains). The integrated findings address the Primary Research Question (how strategic coordination was achieved to neutralize threats and control the Strait of Hormuz). Throughout this chapter, tables and figures present the data in formats that facilitate interpretation and cross-referencing between the quantitative and qualitative strands. 120 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Phase 1: Quantitative Geospatial Findings The quantitative analysis was conducted on a dataset of 65 geocoded strike events extracted from 71 publicly reported strikes during Operation Epic Fury (February 28 – April 19, 2026). Six strike records lacked sufficient geographic specificity for geocoding and were excluded from the spatial analysis but retained for temporal and categorical analyses. The 65 geocoded events were supplemented by AIS maritime traffic data covering the Strait of Hormuz, satellite damage assessments for 22 validated sites, and data on 36 merchant vessels attacked by Iranian forces during the crisis. Descriptive Spatial Statistics The descriptive spatial statistics characterize the overall geographic distribution of the 65 geocoded strike events. Table 4.1 presents the global descriptive statistics for the full dataset and disaggregated by operational domain. Table 4.1 Descriptive Spatial Statistics for Geocoded Strike Events (N = 65) Subset n Mean Center (Lat, Lon) All strikes 65 32.66°N, 52.03°E Air domain 56 33.46°N, 51.52°E Maritime domain 3 Air/Maritime 3 Std Distance (km) Lat Range Lon Range 533.0 23.50–38.08°N 44.15–60.64°E 498.2 25.54–38.08°N 44.15–58.25°E 25.54°N, 57.50°E 187.4 23.50–27.22°N 56.17–60.64°E 27.87°N, 54.29°E 163.8 26.54–29.80°N 51.06–56.25°E Note. Mean center represents the geographic centroid of all strike locations in each subset. Standard distance is the spatial equivalent of standard deviation, indicating dispersion around the mean center. Six multi-domain and unclassified events are included in the All strikes row but not disaggregated. The mean center of all 65 strike events was located at 32.66°N, 52.03°E, corresponding to a position in central Iran approximately 150 km southeast of Isfahan. This central tendency reflects the concentration of strikes against military and infrastructure targets in the Iranian 121 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE interior rather than exclusively at the coastal periphery. The standard distance of 533.0 km indicates substantial geographic dispersion, consistent with a campaign that targeted assets distributed across the country from the northwestern border regions (Kermanshah, 34.31°N) to the southeastern coast (Chabahar, 25.29°N). The domain-disaggregated statistics reveal a distinct geographic separation between airdomain and maritime-domain operations. The air-domain mean center (33.46°N, 51.52°E) was located approximately 120 km further north and 100 km further west than the overall mean center, reflecting the concentration of air strikes against inland targets including Tehran (28 strike events in Tehran province alone), Isfahan (4 events), and Fars (4 events). The maritimedomain mean center (25.54°N, 57.50°E) was located approximately 790 km south-southeast of the air-domain mean center, at a position in the Gulf of Oman near the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. This 790-km separation between the air and maritime centroids quantifies the geographic compartmentalization of domain-specific operations: air power was primarily directed at the strategic depth of Iran, while maritime operations were concentrated in the chokepoint littoral zone. The standard deviational ellipse analysis further confirmed the directional trend of the strike distribution. The ellipse was oriented along a northwest-to-southeast axis (approximately 315°–135° azimuth), with a semi-major axis of approximately 620 km and a semi-minor axis of approximately 290 km. This elongation aligns with the geographic axis of Iran itself and suggests that the strike pattern was shaped by the distribution of Iranian military infrastructure rather than by a geographically focused campaign against a single area. The northwest-southeast orientation also mirrors the alignment of Iran's Zagros mountain chain, which separates the interior plateau from the coastal lowlands and the Strait of Hormuz. 122 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Geographic Distribution by Province The provincial distribution of strike events reveals the operational priorities of the campaign in geographic terms. Table 4.2 presents the distribution of geocoded strikes by Iranian province. Table 4.2 Distribution of Geocoded Strike Events by Province (N = 65) Province n % Primary Target Types Tehran 28 43.1 C2/Leadership; government; communications; internal security Bushehr 7 10.8 Naval bases; missile production; nuclear facility Hormozgan 6 9.2 Naval assets; port facilities; mine warfare Isfahan 4 6.2 Air bases; missile production; nuclear research Fars 4 6.2 Air bases; military headquarters; IRGC facilities SistanBaluchestan 2 3.1 Naval bases (Chabahar); infrastructure Alborz 2 3.1 Missile production; defense industry Kerman 2 3.1 Space program; military facilities Kermanshah 1 1.5 Missile base Khuzestan 1 1.5 Energy infrastructure Other provinces 8 12.3 Various military and infrastructure targets Note. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. C2 = Command and Control; IRGC = Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Tehran province dominated the strike distribution, accounting for 43.1% of all geocoded events (n = 28). This concentration reflects the centralization of Iranian military command and control, government leadership, internal security apparatus, and communications infrastructure in the capital region. The coastal provinces of Bushehr (10.8%) and Hormozgan (9.2%) together accounted for 20.0% of strikes, representing the maritime dimension of the campaign focused on neutralizing Iran's naval capabilities and securing the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. The remaining strikes were distributed across provinces containing air bases (Isfahan, Fars), missile 123 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE production facilities (Alborz), nuclear infrastructure (Isfahan, Bushehr), and the country's southeastern naval base at Chabahar (Sistan-Baluchestan). Strike Distribution by Target Category The classification of strike events by target category reveals the operational priorities of Operation Epic Fury. Table 4.3 presents the consolidated target category distribution. Table 4.3 Distribution of Strike Events by Consolidated Target Category (N = 65) Target Category n % Mean Distance to Strait (km) Command & Control / Leadership 12 18.5 1,087 Naval Assets and Bases 11 16.9 412 Energy and Industrial Infrastructure 8 12.3 723 Air Defense Systems 8 12.3 892 Air Bases and Airports 6 9.2 764 Communications and Internal Security 6 9.2 1,145 Nuclear and WMD Facilities 5 7.7 689 Missile Infrastructure 4 6.2 803 IRGC and Militia Targets 3 4.6 956 Other Military Targets 2 3.1 748 Note. Mean distance is calculated as the great-circle (haversine) distance from each strike location to the center of the Strait of Hormuz (26.57°N, 56.25°E). Categories are consolidated from the detailed taxonomy. Command and Control/Leadership targets constituted the largest category (18.5%), followed by Naval Assets and Bases (16.9%). The mean distance to the Strait of Hormuz varied substantially across categories, revealing a geographic logic to targeting priorities. Naval targets had the lowest mean distance to the Strait (412 km), consistent with their coastal concentration. C2/Leadership targets had the highest mean distance (1,087 km), reflecting their concentration in Tehran. This geographic separation between target categories suggests that the campaign simultaneously pursued two geographic lines of effort: a coastal/maritime line focused on the 124 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE chokepoint littoral, and an interior/strategic line focused on the Iranian command structure and defense industrial base. Kernel Density Estimation Results Kernel Density Estimation was applied to the 65 geocoded strike events to identify geographic concentrations of military activity. The analysis was conducted using Silverman's (1986) optimal bandwidth (h = 87 km for this dataset), with sensitivity checks at h = 44 km (50%) and h = 174 km (200%). All three bandwidth settings produced consistent identification of the primary hot spots, confirming the robustness of the findings. The KDE analysis identified three primary concentration zones, presented in Figure 4.1 and summarized in Table 4.4. 125 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Figure 4.1 Kernel Density Estimation Heat Map of Strike Events (N = 65) With Primary Concentration Zones Table 4.4 Primary Strike Concentration Zones Identified by KDE and Gi* Analysis Zone Geographic Center n (% of total) Gi* z-score Classification A: Tehran Metropolitan 35.68°N, 51.39°E 28 (43.1%) 4.82*** Persistent hot spot B: Bushehr–Fars Coast 28.97°N, 51.14°E 13 (20.0%) 2.67** Intensifying hot spot C: Hormozgan–Oman Coast 26.23°N, 57.15°E 6 (9.2%) 2.14* New hot spot Note. Gi* z-scores indicate local spatial clustering significance. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Hot spot classification follows ESRI's Emerging Hot Spot Analysis taxonomy (ESRI, 2024). 126 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Zone A (Tehran Metropolitan) was the dominant concentration zone, accounting for 43.1% of all geocoded strikes. The Gi* z-score of 4.82 (p < .001) confirmed this as a statistically significant persistent hot spot—a location that was consistently targeted throughout the operational period. The persistence of the Tehran hot spot across all temporal phases reflects the ongoing campaign against C2 nodes, government infrastructure, and internal security facilities in the capital region. Zone B (Bushehr–Fars Coast) was classified as an intensifying hot spot, meaning that its significance increased over time. This pattern is consistent with the campaign's reported shift from initial SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) and strategic strikes toward maritimefocused operations as the campaign progressed. Zone C (Hormozgan–Oman Coast) was classified as a new hot spot, emerging in the later phases of the operation as the focus shifted to naval targets, mine clearance, and blockade enforcement near the Strait of Hormuz. Temporal Analysis and Operational Tempo The temporal distribution of strike events reveals the campaign's operational rhythm and the phasing of operations over the 38-day period. Table 4.5 presents the strike distribution by operational phase, with associated spatial statistics. Table 4.5 Strike Distribution and Spatial Statistics by Operational Phase Phase Period n (%) Mean Center 1: Initial Strike Feb 28–Mar 2 26 (40.0%) 32.59°N, 52.54°E 850 Air defense; C2; nuclear; multi-target 2: Expansion Mar 3–6 15 (23.1%) 34.81°N, 50.32°E 1,095 Tehran targets; comms; leadership 3: Consolidation Mar 7–13 7 (10.8%) 33.05°N, 52.00°E 846 Missile production; defense industry 4: Maritime/Blockade Mar 14–Apr 8+ 17 (26.2%) 30.71°N, 52.79°E 687 Naval; ports; energy; blockade enforcement 127 Mean Dist. to Strait (km) Primary Targets CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Note. Operational phases are defined based on the clustering of strike events and the qualitative content of official communications. Phase 4 extends beyond the April 8 ceasefire to include blockade enforcement operations. The temporal analysis reveals a clear phasing of the campaign. Phase 1 (Initial Strike, February 28–March 2) accounted for the highest concentration of strike activity, with 26 events (40.0%) in just three days. This initial surge is consistent with the doctrinal concept of 'shock and awe'—the rapid application of overwhelming force to paralyze the adversary's command and control (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022). The 1,000+ targets struck in the first 24 hours alone, as reported by CENTCOM, represent an operational tempo unprecedented in recent U.S. military operations. The most analytically significant temporal finding is the progressive southward shift of the mean center across operational phases. The mean center moved from 32.59°N in Phase 1 to 34.81°N in Phase 2 (a brief northward shift reflecting the expansion of targeting in Tehran), then steadily southward to 33.05°N in Phase 3 and 30.71°N in Phase 4. Simultaneously, the mean distance to the Strait of Hormuz decreased from 850 km in Phase 1 to 687 km in Phase 4. This southward migration of the operational center of gravity is consistent with a deliberate campaign sequence that began with strategic strikes against the interior (air defenses, C2, nuclear facilities) and progressively shifted focus toward the coastal and maritime domain as the threat environment was shaped. 128 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Figure 4.2 Southward Migration of Strike Mean Center Across Operational Phases Proximity Analysis: Strait of Hormuz The buffer analysis examined the spatial relationship between strike locations and the Strait of Hormuz to test whether strikes were disproportionately concentrated near the chokepoint. Table 4.6 presents the results of the concentric buffer analysis. Table 4.6 Concentric Buffer Analysis: Strike Events by Distance From Strait of Hormuz Buffer Distance (km) Strikes Within Buffer (n) Cumulative % Expected % (Uniform) ≤ 100 5 7.7% 0.6% ≤ 200 7 10.8% 2.4% ≤ 500 17 26.2% 15.2% ≤ 750 21 32.3% 34.2% ≤ 1,000 26 40.0% 60.8% 129 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Note. Expected percentages are calculated under the null hypothesis of a uniform spatial distribution across the study area (the territory of Iran). The Strait of Hormuz center point is defined as 26.57°N, 56.25°E. The buffer analysis reveals a nuanced spatial relationship between strike locations and the Strait. At close proximity (≤100 km and ≤200 km), the observed concentration of strikes significantly exceeds the expected proportion under a uniform distribution: 7.7% of strikes fell within 100 km of the Strait compared to an expected 0.6%, a ratio of 12.8:1. This overrepresentation at close range reflects the targeting of naval facilities, port infrastructure, and mine warfare assets in the immediate Strait vicinity (Hormozgan province). However, at greater distances (≤750 km and ≤1,000 km), the observed proportion falls below the expected uniform distribution: 40.0% of strikes fell within 1,000 km compared to an expected 60.8%. This under-representation at medium distances reflects the fact that the majority of strikes were directed at targets more than 1,000 km from the Strait, primarily in the Tehran metropolitan area. The overall pattern suggests a bimodal distribution: a high concentration of strikes in the immediate Strait vicinity (the maritime line of effort) and a high concentration in the far interior (the strategic line of effort), with relatively fewer strikes in the intermediate zone. This bimodal pattern is a key finding that speaks directly to the geographic structure of multidomain coordination in the campaign. The temporal dimension of the proximity analysis adds further nuance. When disaggregated by operational phase, the proportion of strikes within 500 km of the Strait increased from 19.2% in Phase 1 to 47.1% in Phase 4, confirming the progressive shift toward chokepoint-proximate operations. This temporal trend in proximity is consistent with a deliberate operational sequence: the initial phases focused on degrading strategic targets in the interior to create the conditions for subsequent maritime operations near the Strait. The doctrinal logic is 130 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE clear—air defenses and long-range strike systems in the interior had to be neutralized before naval forces could safely operate in the confined waters of the Strait (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022). The quantitative data provides empirical evidence that this sequential logic was operationalized in practice. The spatial relationship between strike locations and Iranian retaliatory missile attacks provides additional context for the proximity analysis. Iran's retaliatory campaign targeted coalition bases and infrastructure across seven countries (UAE, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, and Jordan), with an estimated 1,200–1,400 ballistic missiles launched against Gulf state targets alone. The geographic distribution of Iranian retaliation—concentrated against the forward-deployed bases from which coalition air operations were launched—suggests that the U.S. strike pattern was partially shaped by the need to suppress Iranian retaliatory capability. This finding aligns with the doctrinal concept of 'shaping operations' in MDO: actions taken to create the conditions for decisive operations by degrading the adversary's ability to contest across domains (Department of the Army, 2022). Maritime Traffic Disruption Analysis The AIS data analysis documents the catastrophic disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz during Operation Epic Fury. Table 4.7 presents the time series of daily vessel transits, demonstrating the collapse and partial recovery of maritime traffic. Table 4.7 Strait of Hormuz Daily Vessel Transits During Operation Epic Fury Date/Period Approx. Daily Transits % of Baseline Status Feb 27 (baseline) 138 100% Normal operations Feb 28 (Day 1) 40 29% Traffic collapse begins Mar 1 (Day 2) 10 7% Near standstill; GPS/AIS interference Mar 2 (Day 3) 5 4% AIS signals unreliable; insurance withdrawn 131 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Mar 4 (Day 5) 3 2% Minimal transit; 8 vessels damaged Mar 7 (Week 2) 2 1.4% Near standstill; sanctioned vessels only Mar 13 (Week 3) 5 3.6% Selective transit; 400 vessels holding Mar 22 (Week 4) 8 5.8% Controlled corridor; permission-based Apr 8 (Ceasefire) 5 3.6% Ceasefire; Strait not reopened Apr 20 (Current) 15 10.9% Limited mixed traffic; 800 vessels in Gulf Note. Baseline daily transit count of 138 is derived from pre-conflict AIS data (Windward AI, 2026). Transit counts during the operational period represent AIS-broadcasting vessels only; actual traffic may differ due to AIS manipulation or disabling. Percentage calculated as (daily transits / 138) × 100. The AIS data reveals a traffic collapse of extraordinary speed and magnitude. Daily transits fell from 138 (pre-conflict baseline) to approximately 40 on Day 1 (a 71% reduction), then to 10 on Day 2 (93% reduction), reaching a nadir of 2–3 transits per day by the end of the first week (a 98% reduction). This collapse was driven by multiple converging factors: Iranian IRGC VHF warnings to commercial vessels, GPS and AIS signal interference across 44 injection zones and 92 denial areas, the withdrawal of Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance coverage for the Gulf region, and Iranian attacks on merchant shipping (Windward AI, 2026). The data on merchant shipping attacks provides further context. A total of 36 merchant vessels were attacked by Iranian forces during the crisis period. Table 4.9 summarizes the attacks by vessel type. Table 4.8 Merchant Vessels Attacked by Iranian Forces by Vessel Type (N = 36) Vessel Type n % Oil/petroleum tankers 14 38.9 Container ships 8 22.2 Bulk carriers 6 16.7 LPG/chemical tankers 3 8.3 Other (tugboat, offshore, cruise) 3 8.3 VLCC tankers 2 5.6 132 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Note. VLCC = Very Large Crude Carrier. Categories are consolidated from specific vessel type designations. Oil/petroleum tankers include crude, products, bitumen, and oil/chemical tankers. Oil and petroleum tankers were the most targeted vessel category (38.9%), consistent with Iran's strategic objective of disrupting energy exports through the Strait. The attacks resulted in at least 12 seafarers killed or missing and multiple vessels abandoned, sunk, or set ablaze. The geographic distribution of attacks extended beyond the Strait itself to include the ports of Dubai, Bahrain, Basra, and offshore areas near Kuwait, Fujairah, and Ras Laffan, indicating a broader campaign to disrupt all maritime activity in the Persian Gulf region. The correlation between the AIS traffic collapse and the timing of military operations provides evidence of multi-domain effects—the concept that actions in one domain create consequences in others. The traffic collapse was not solely the result of kinetic naval operations; it was driven by the convergence of kinetic effects (attacks on ships and port infrastructure), electronic warfare effects (GPS and AIS interference across 44 injection zones), information effects (IRGC VHF warnings, CENTCOM civilian safety warnings), and economic effects (withdrawal of P&I insurance coverage). This convergence of multi-domain effects on a single geographic feature—the Strait of Hormuz—exemplifies the core MDO principle that effects from multiple domains can be synchronized to produce outcomes greater than the sum of their individual contributions (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). The partial recovery of traffic to approximately 15 transits per day by April 20 (10.9% of baseline), despite the ongoing blockade, represents an interesting data point. The remaining traffic consisted primarily of sanctioned vessels, vessels operating under specific coalition permissions, and 'dark' vessels operating without AIS transponders—96 dark activity events were recorded on April 20 alone (Windward AI, 2026). This finding highlights the limitations of 133 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE AIS data as a measure of actual maritime activity: the discrepancy between low AIS-visible traffic and the likely higher actual vessel count suggests that a significant volume of traffic was operating covertly, complicating both the coalition's maritime domain awareness and the researcher's ability to fully characterize the traffic environment. The stranding of approximately 2,000 vessels and 20,000 mariners in the Persian Gulf region represents a humanitarian dimension of the maritime disruption. This finding contextualizes the military operations within their broader impact on the civilian maritime environment and underscores the tension between military objectives (chokepoint control) and the maintenance of international maritime commons. The seizure of the M/V Touska on April 19 by U.S. Marines—described by CENTCOM as blockade enforcement—illustrates the transition from active combat operations to the sustained application of maritime coercion, a dimension of multi-domain operations that receives limited attention in the doctrinal literature (U.S. Central Command, 2026, April 19). Satellite-Based Damage Assessment Satellite imagery analysis was completed for 22 validated sites, using Sentinel-1 SAR coherence change detection, Sentinel-2 optical imagery, and commercial satellite data (Planet Labs, Vantor). Table 4.9 presents the damage assessment findings by site category. Table 4.9 Satellite Damage Assessment Results by Site Category (N = 22) Site Category Sites Assessed (n) Damage Confirmed Imagery Source(s) Air bases 4 4 (100%) Planet Labs; Vantor; Sentinel-2 Naval bases/ports 4 4 (100%) Vantor; Sentinel-1; commercial Missile production facilities 4 4 (100%) Sentinel-1 SAR; commercial Nuclear/WMD sites 3 3 (100%) Sentinel-1; Sentinel-2 Urban/infrastructure areas 4 4 (100%) Sentinel-2; Damage Proxy Map 134 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Energy/industrial facilities 3 2 (67%) Sentinel-2; Sentinel-1 Note. Damage confirmed indicates sites where pre/post-strike comparison revealed visible physical changes attributable to military action. The urban/infrastructure category uses the Oregon State University Damage Proxy Map methodology based on 528 Sentinel-1 images (Oregon State University, 2026). The satellite analysis confirmed damage at 21 of 22 assessed sites (95.5%). The most significant findings included the destruction of approximately 12 aircraft (including F-14 Tomcats) at Isfahan Air Base, damage to 17+ aircraft at other air bases including three Boeing 747s and three Il-76 transport aircraft, the burning of the IRNS Makran (a forward staging base vessel) and sinking of the Shahid Bagheri at Bandar Abbas naval base with 40+ damaged facilities, and the destruction of entrance structures at the underground Fordow nuclear enrichment facility (Cardille et al., 2024; Oregon State University, 2026). The Damage Proxy Map analysis conducted by Oregon State University using 528 Sentinel-1 SAR images provided the most comprehensive urban damage assessment. The analysis identified approximately 7,645 damaged buildings across 256 of Iran's 1,058 districts, with approximately 24% of all damaged structures located within 20 km of central Tehran. The analysis also identified damage to 60 schools and 12 health facilities, indicating collateral damage to civilian infrastructure despite the stated precision targeting approach (Oregon State University, 2026; Bellingcat, 2026). Summary of Operational Statistics Table 4.10 synthesizes the key operational statistics from the quantitative analysis, combining the geospatial findings with the broader operational data reported in official sources. 135 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 4.10 Key Operational Statistics of Operation Epic Fury Metric Value Source Operation duration 38 days (Feb 28 – Apr 8, 2026) White House Total targets struck 13,000+ White House; CENTCOM Total air sorties 10,200+ White House Targets in first 24 hours 1,000+ CENTCOM Iranian warships destroyed 150 (across 16 classes) White House Naval mines eliminated 97% of Iran's inventory White House Air defense targets 1,500+ (120 radars, 100+ AA) White House; JINSA Ballistic missile targets 450+ launchers and sites White House Defense industrial base 1,450+ targets (85% of DIB) White House C2 targets 2,000+ sites White House Iranian air force capability Reduced from 30–100 to 0 flights/day White House Iranian missile rate reduction 90% from Day 1 levels CENTCOM Strait of Hormuz traffic 95% reduction (138 → <10/day) Windward AI Merchant ships attacked (Iranian) 36 vessels This study U.S. service members killed 13–15 CENTCOM; Wikipedia Note. DIB = Defense Industrial Base; AA = Anti-Aircraft; C2 = Command and Control. Values represent officially reported figures from the cited sources. JINSA = Jewish Institute for National Security of America. Phase 2: Qualitative Content Analysis Findings The qualitative phase employed directed content analysis on a corpus of 34 documents: 15 operational communications (press releases, fact sheets, video updates, and statements), 10 doctrinal publications, and 9 congressional testimony transcripts and government reports. The coding framework derived from MDO doctrine (Table 6, Chapter 3) was applied systematically across all documents in three coding passes. This section reports the thematic findings organized by code category. 136 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Inter-Coder Reliability An inter-coder reliability check was conducted on a 20% subsample of the document corpus (7 documents) by a second coder trained in the coding framework. Cohen's kappa was calculated for each code category and for the overall coding scheme. The overall kappa was κ = .84, exceeding the predetermined threshold of κ ≥ .80 and indicating substantial agreement (Cohen, 1960; Lombard et al., 2002). Table 4.11 presents the kappa values by code category. Table 4.11 Inter-Coder Reliability by Code Category Code Category Cohen's κ Agreement Level Integration (INT-1) .89 Almost perfect Synchronization (SYN-1) .86 Almost perfect Convergence (CON-1) .82 Almost perfect Command and Control (C2-1) .87 Almost perfect Sensing (SNS-1) .81 Almost perfect Fires (FIR-1) .91 Almost perfect Sustainment (SUS-1) .78 Substantial Chokepoint (CHK-1) .85 Almost perfect Doctrine-Practice Gap (GAP-1) .76 Substantial Note. Agreement levels follow Landis and Koch (1977): .61–.80 = substantial; .81–1.00 = almost perfect. Overall κ = .84. The lower kappa values for Sustainment and Doctrine-Practice Gap reflect the inherent interpretive ambiguity in coding these categories from public documents. Coding Frequency Analysis The directed content analysis identified 487 coded meaning units across the 34-document corpus. Table 4.12 presents the frequency distribution of codes across document types. 137 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 4.12 Frequency Distribution of Content Analysis Codes by Document Type Code Category Operational Comms (n) Doctrine (n) Testimony (n) Total (n) Integration (INT-1) 42 38 12 92 Synchronization (SYN-1) 35 31 8 74 Convergence (CON-1) 28 24 6 58 Command and Control (C2-1) 31 22 14 67 Sensing (SNS-1) 18 15 7 40 Fires (FIR-1) 39 12 5 56 Sustainment (SUS-1) 8 9 11 28 Chokepoint (CHK-1) 22 4 9 35 Doctrine-Practice Gap (GAP-1) 3 0 8 11 Emergent themes (EMR) 11 6 9 26 Note. n = number of coded meaning units. A single text segment may receive multiple codes. Operational comms include press releases, fact sheets, statements, and briefing transcripts. Doctrine includes JP 3-0, FM 3-0, AFDP 3-0, and related publications. Integration (INT-1) was the most frequently coded category (n = 92, 18.9% of all codes), followed by Synchronization (SYN-1, n = 74, 15.2%) and Command and Control (C2-1, n = 67, 13.8%). The Doctrine-Practice Gap category (GAP-1) was the least frequently coded in operational communications (n = 3) but was notably more frequent in congressional testimony (n = 8), suggesting that critical assessments of the operation were more likely to surface in the oversight context than in official military statements. This pattern is analytically significant and is explored in detail below. Thematic Findings by Code Category Theme 1: Multi-Domain Integration as Operational Narrative The dominant theme across official communications was the framing of Operation Epic Fury as a demonstration of multi-domain integration. Officials consistently described the operation using language drawn directly from MDO doctrine. The February 28 CENTCOM 138 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE press release announcing the operation stated that it involved 'coordinated strikes from air, land, sea, and cyber assets' targeting 'the full spectrum of Iranian military capabilities' (U.S. Central Command, 2026, February 28). The March 16 Department of War fact sheet described the operation as employing 'more than 20 distinct weapon systems across all warfighting domains' (U.S. Department of War, 2026, March 16). The integration narrative was particularly prominent in the descriptions of specific strike sequences. Secretary Hegseth's March 4 statement described the operation's goals as 'laserfocused' on four objectives: 'missiles, navy, defense industrial base, and nuclear prevention' (U.S. Department of War, 2026, March 4). The March 31 press briefing with Secretary Hegseth and General Caine emphasized that '11,000+ targets' had been struck in 30 days using a 'synchronized joint force package' that included 'the first B-52 overflights of Iranian airspace' and 'the first combat employment of the Precision Strike Missile from HIMARS launchers' (U.S. Department of War, 2026, March 31). These descriptions align closely with the doctrinal principle of integration defined in JP 3-0 as 'the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole' (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022, p. III-1). Theme 2: Temporal Synchronization and Phased Operations The qualitative data revealed a deliberate phasing narrative that aligns with the temporal patterns identified in the quantitative analysis. Official communications described three distinct operational phases. The first phase (labeled 'SEAD and Strategic Strike' in official documents) focused on the suppression of enemy air defenses and the destruction of strategic targets including nuclear facilities, ballistic missile infrastructure, and command and control nodes. CENTCOM reported that the first 72 hours involved 'the systematic degradation of Iran's 139 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE integrated air defense system, creating freedom of maneuver for follow-on operations' (U.S. Central Command, 2026, March 3). The second phase was characterized as 'Systematic Degradation,' targeting the defense industrial base, remaining military infrastructure, and IRGC facilities. The third phase shifted to 'Maritime Security and Blockade Enforcement,' with the April 16 briefing announcing 'Operation Economic Fury'—a naval blockade of Iranian ports designed to prevent the reconstitution of Iranian military capability (U.S. Department of War, 2026, April 16). This phased narrative directly parallels the southward migration of the strike mean center identified in the quantitative analysis and provides the strategic rationale for the observed temporal pattern. Theme 3: Convergence of Effects at the Chokepoint The chokepoint code (CHK-1) appeared in 35 meaning units across the corpus, with particular concentration in the operational communications and congressional testimony. Officials consistently described the Strait of Hormuz as a central operational variable that shaped both offensive and defensive planning. The CENTCOM Commander's video update emphasized the 'dual challenge of projecting power against Iranian targets while simultaneously securing the world's most important energy chokepoint' (U.S. Central Command, 2026, March 3). The warnings issued to Iranian civilians on March 8 and to commercial shipping on March 11 (to avoid ports used by Iranian forces) represented the information domain component of the multidomain effort to control the Strait environment. The concept of convergence—defined in MDO doctrine as 'the concentration of effects from multiple domains against specific objectives' (Department of the Army, 2022, p. 3-5)—was explicitly invoked in descriptions of operations near the Strait. The destruction of 150 Iranian warships 'across 16 classes,' the elimination of 97% of Iran's naval mine inventory, and the 140 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE reduction of the Strait from 138 to fewer than 10 daily transits represent the convergence of air strikes (against naval bases), maritime operations (mine clearance, blockade enforcement), and information operations (civilian warnings, AIS monitoring) toward the single objective of chokepoint control (White House, 2026). Theme 4: Command and Control Architecture The C2 code category (n = 67) revealed a consistent narrative of centralized strategic direction with delegated tactical execution. Documents referenced the CENTCOM Commander (Admiral Brad Cooper) as the unified command authority, with coordination extending to the Secretary of War and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for strategic-level decisions. The joint task force structure was described as enabling 'rapid cross-domain coordination' through a 'single battle rhythm' that synchronized air, maritime, and land-based operations (U.S. Department of War, 2026, March 31). However, the congressional testimony revealed nuances not present in the operational communications. General Randall Reed (TRANSCOM Commander) testified about the 'airlift stress' and medical evacuation challenges that strained the sustainment dimension of the operation. The DIA Director, Lieutenant General James Adams, provided a 'post-operation capability assessment' that offered a more analytical view of the C2 challenges involved in coordinating operations across multiple theaters simultaneously (as the operation coincided with ongoing commitments in other regions). Theme 5: Doctrine-Practice Gaps and Emergent Challenges The Doctrine-Practice Gap code (GAP-1, n = 11) and Emergent themes (EMR, n = 26) together reveal areas where the operation diverged from doctrinal expectations or encountered 141 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE unanticipated challenges. The most significant findings in this category emerged from congressional testimony and external assessments rather than official military communications. Three emergent themes were identified. First, the Iranian retaliatory missile and drone campaign against coalition partners (UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, and Jordan) created a multi-front defensive challenge that strained theater missile defense assets. Iran launched an estimated 1,200–1,400 ballistic missiles against Gulf states, depleting THAAD and Patriot interceptor stocks to 75% in the UAE alone. This defensive burden was largely absent from the offensive-focused MDO narrative in official communications but surfaced prominently in congressional testimony, where witnesses discussed supplemental funding needs for interceptor replenishment. Second, the sustainment dimension (SUS-1, n = 28) was disproportionately represented in congressional testimony relative to operational communications, suggesting that logistical challenges were more significant than the official narrative acknowledged. General Reed's testimony about 'airlift stress' and the AEI's analysis of 'stockpile deficiency' pointed to a gap between the doctrinal aspiration of seamless multi-domain sustainment and the practical realities of sustaining high-intensity operations across a vast theater. Third, the collateral damage and civilian impact theme emerged inductively from the data. CENTCOM's civilian safety warnings (March 8 and March 11) implicitly acknowledged the risk of civilian harm, while the satellite damage assessment revealing 7,645 damaged buildings, 60 damaged schools, and 12 damaged health facilities points to a gap between the precision targeting narrative and the actual urban impact of the campaign. This theme was coded as emergent (EMR-2: Civilian Impact) and appeared in 14 meaning units, primarily in congressional testimony and external assessments. 142 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Summary of Qualitative Findings The qualitative content analysis revealed a carefully constructed official narrative that framed Operation Epic Fury as a successful demonstration of multi-domain integration. The five thematic findings can be synthesized into a coherent picture: officials consistently described the operation using MDO doctrinal language, emphasized cross-domain integration and synchronization, articulated a clear phased operational sequence, and highlighted the convergence of effects at the Strait of Hormuz as the defining operational achievement. This narrative was remarkably consistent across document types and issuing organizations, suggesting a coordinated strategic communications effort. However, the content analysis also revealed important tensions and gaps. The most significant was the contrast between the official narrative's emphasis on seamless integration and the evidence of sustainment strain and operational challenges that surfaced primarily in congressional testimony. The Doctrine-Practice Gap code's concentration in testimony (8 of 11 total codes) versus operational communications (3 of 11) suggests that the congressional oversight process provided a more candid assessment of the operation's challenges than the public-facing military communications. This finding has methodological implications: researchers studying military operations from open sources must look beyond official military communications to congressional testimony and independent assessments to obtain a more complete picture. The emergent themes—particularly the Iranian retaliatory campaign and the civilian impact of operations—represent dimensions of the operation that the original MDO-derived coding framework did not anticipate. The Iranian retaliation theme (EMR-1) is analytically significant because it reveals that multi-domain coordination was not solely an offensive 143 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE challenge; the need to defend coalition partners against massive retaliatory strikes while simultaneously conducting offensive operations created a defensive multi-domain challenge that tested the C2 architecture's capacity for simultaneous offensive and defensive coordination. The civilian impact theme (EMR-2) raises questions about the relationship between the precision of individual strikes and the cumulative urban impact of a sustained campaign—a distinction that MDO doctrine does not fully address. The qualitative analysis also identified a notable evolution in the operational narrative over time. Early communications (February 28–March 16) focused primarily on the scale and pace of offensive operations, emphasizing target counts and capability degradation metrics. Later communications (March 31–April 16) increasingly incorporated maritime and blockade narratives, reflecting the shift from active combat operations to sustained coercion. The final phase of communications (post-ceasefire, April 8+) introduced the 'Operation Economic Fury' branding for the naval blockade, signaling a deliberate reframing of the military operation from a kinetic campaign to an ongoing maritime enforcement mission. This narrative evolution parallels the quantitative finding of a southward migration of the operational center of gravity toward the Strait. Phase 3: Integrated Findings The integration phase synthesizes the quantitative geospatial findings with the qualitative content analysis results to address the Primary Research Question: How was strategic coordination among U.S. air, land, and maritime platforms achieved during Operation Epic Fury to neutralize threats and control the maritime chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz? The 144 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE integration is presented through two joint display matrices that systematically compare the findings from both phases. Joint Display Matrix: Spatial Patterns and Strategic Narratives Table 4.13 presents the first joint display matrix, comparing the quantitative spatial findings with the corresponding qualitative themes for each research question. Table 4.13 Joint Display Matrix: Quantitative Spatial Patterns and Qualitative Strategic Narratives Dimension QUAN Finding qual Finding Assessment Spatial concentration Bimodal: Tehran hot spot (43.1%) + Hormuzgan/Bushehr coastal cluster (20.0%); 790 km separation between air/maritime centroids Officials described 'laser-focused' fourobjective strategy: missiles, navy, DIB, nuclear. Two geographic lines of effort implied. CONVERGENT: Bimodal spatial pattern confirms dual strategic/maritime lines of effort articulated in official narrative Temporal sequencing Southward mean center migration: 32.59°N → 34.81°N → 33.05°N → 30.71°N; decreasing distance to Strait (850 → 687 km) Three-phase narrative: SEAD/strategic strike → systematic degradation → maritime security/blockade CONVERGENT: Quantitative southward shift precisely mirrors qualitative phasing narrative Domain interplay 86.2% air domain strikes; maritime operations emerged in Phase 4; AIS collapse correlated with combined air/maritime/info ops Integration and synchronization most frequently coded themes; officials emphasized 20+ weapon systems 'across all domains' COMPLEMENTARY: Qual adds depth to QUAN—air dominance in data explained by air domain's role as primary strike tool Chokepoint influence 12.8:1 over-representation within 100 km; 95% traffic collapse; 36 ships attacked; bimodal distribution Strait described as 'dual challenge'; convergence of air/maritime/info effects; 'Operation Economic Fury' naval blockade CONVERGENT: Both strands confirm chokepoint as central organizing variable, with convergent evidence of multi-domain effects Note. QUAN = quantitative findings; qual = qualitative findings. Assessment classifications follow Fetters et al. (2013): Convergent = findings agree; Complementary = findings provide different but consistent insights; Divergent = findings contradict. The joint display matrix reveals a strong pattern of convergence between the quantitative and qualitative findings. Three of the four analytical dimensions were classified as convergent, meaning that the spatial patterns identified through geospatial analysis were directly confirmed 145 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE by the strategic narratives in official documents. The fourth dimension (domain interplay) was classified as complementary, meaning that the qualitative findings added explanatory depth to the quantitative patterns without contradicting them. No dimensions were classified as divergent. The convergence finding is analytically significant because it suggests that the official narrative of Operation Epic Fury was broadly consistent with the observable geospatial evidence—that is, the story the government told about the operation aligns with what the spatial data shows actually happened. This does not mean the narrative is complete (it is clearly curated and selective), but it suggests that the core claims about multi-domain coordination, phased operations, and chokepoint focus are supported by empirical evidence rather than being purely rhetorical constructions. Joint Display Matrix: Doctrine-Practice Alignment Table 4.14 presents the second joint display, comparing specific MDO doctrinal principles with evidence from both the quantitative and qualitative findings. Table 4.14 Joint Display Matrix: MDO Doctrinal Principles and Operational Evidence MDO Principle QUAN Evidence qual Evidence Alignment Cross-domain integration Strikes across air (86.2%), maritime (4.6%), and multi-domain (4.6%) categories; 27 platform types employed Integration code most frequent (n=92); officials emphasized joint force packages Strong alignment Temporal synchronization 40% of strikes in first 72 hours; clear phase transitions in space-time cube Phased narrative (SEAD → degradation → maritime) consistently articulated Strong alignment Convergence of effects Bimodal spatial pattern; 12.8:1 concentration near Strait; 95% traffic collapse Convergence code (n=58); 'converging effects' language in official statements Strong alignment Sensing and ISR 22 satellite damage assessments confirmed; AIS data monitored throughout Sensing code (n=40); references to satellite confirmation and ISR feeds Moderate alignment Sustainment 38-day operation; 10,200 sorties requiring massive logistics Sustainment code underrepresented in official comms (n=8) vs. testimony (n=11) Partial gap: narrative underrepresents logistics challenges C2 flexibility Phase transitions suggest adaptive C2; geographic shift responsive to conditions Centralized command/delegated execution model described; but airlift stress noted Moderate alignment with acknowledged gaps 146 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Note. Alignment assessed by comparing operational evidence with doctrinal definitions from JP 3-0 Appendix D (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024) and FM 3-0 (Department of the Army, 2022). Strong alignment = evidence directly confirms doctrinal principle; Moderate = evidence partially confirms; Partial gap = evidence suggests deviation. The doctrine-practice alignment analysis reveals that Operation Epic Fury demonstrated strong alignment with three core MDO principles (cross-domain integration, temporal synchronization, and convergence of effects), moderate alignment with sensing/ISR and C2 flexibility, and a partial gap in sustainment. The sustainment gap is the most analytically interesting finding, as it reveals a discrepancy between the official narrative (which emphasized successful multi-domain integration) and the evidence from congressional testimony (which revealed logistical strain, munition stockpile concerns, and airlift stress). This gap between the public narrative and the behind-the-scenes reality represents the kind of nuanced finding that the mixed-methods design was specifically intended to reveal. Integrated Model of Multi-Domain Coordination Figure 4.3 presents an integrated conceptual model of multi-domain coordination during Operation Epic Fury, synthesizing the quantitative and qualitative findings into a unified framework. 147 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Figure 4.3 Integrated Model of Multi-Domain Coordination During Operation Epic Fury ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ STRATEGIC DIRECTION (CENTCOM / JTF) │ │ Four Objectives: Missiles │ Navy │ DIB │ Nuclear │ │ C2 Model: Centralized Direction / Delegated Execution │ └─────────┬──────────────────────────┬───────────────────┬──────────────┘ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ ▼ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ LINE OF EFFORT │ │ LINE OF EFFORT │ │ LINE OF EFFORT │ │ 1: STRATEGIC │ │ 2: MARITIME │ │ 3: INFORMATION │ │ INTERIOR │ │ CHOKEPOINT │ │ ENVIRONMENT │ │ │ │ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ │ │ Zone A: Tehran │ │ Zones B+C: Coast │ │ Global reach │ │ 43.1% of strikes│ │ 29.2% of strikes │ │ Civilian warnings │ │ Mean: 1,087 km │ │ Mean: 412 km from │ │ AIS monitoring │ │ from Strait │ │ Strait │ │ Media operations │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Targets: C2, │ │ Targets: Naval, │ │ Effects: 95% │ │ leadership, │ │ ports, mines, energy │ │ traffic collapse; │ │ comms, nuclear insurance pullout │ │ blockade enforcement │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Peak: Phase 1-2 │ └────────┬─────────┘ │ Peak: Phase 3-4 │ └──────────┬───────────┘ │ │ │ │ Continuous │ └──────────┬──────────┘ │ │ └───────────────────────┼─────────────────────────┘ │ ▼ ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ CONVERGENT EFFECTS │ │ • Iranian air capability: 100 → 0 flights/day │ │ • Missile launch rate: 90% reduction │ │ • 150 warships destroyed; 97% mines eliminated │ │ • 85% of defense industrial base struck │ │ • Strait transit: 138 → <10 vessels/day │ │ • Ceasefire achieved: Day 38 (April 8, 2026) │ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ─── IDENTIFIED GAP ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── │ Sustainment strain: interceptor depletion, airlift stress, │ │ stockpile deficiency (surfaced in testimony, absent from narrative) │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 148 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The integrated model reveals that strategic coordination during Operation Epic Fury was organized around three simultaneous and interdependent lines of effort: a strategic interior line (directed primarily at Tehran and the Iranian command structure), a maritime chokepoint line (directed at naval capabilities and Strait control), and an information environment line (encompassing strategic communications, electronic warfare, and maritime domain awareness). The quantitative data provides the spatial evidence for the first two lines of effort, while the qualitative data provides the strategic rationale for all three. The convergence finding—that the quantitative and qualitative results agree across three of four dimensions—has important implications for the study of military operations from open sources. It suggests that the publicly available geospatial data and the official narrative, while both incomplete, provide mutually reinforcing evidence about the fundamental structure and logic of the operation. The complementary finding on domain interplay adds an important nuance: the qualitative data explains why the air domain dominated the strike data (86.2% of events)—not because other domains were uninvolved, but because air power was the primary kinetic delivery mechanism while other domains contributed through non-kinetic effects (electronic warfare, information operations, maritime interdiction) that do not produce the discrete geospatial signatures captured in strike reports. The sustainment gap finding represents the most novel contribution of the integrated analysis. By systematically comparing the official offensive narrative with the less visible sustainment evidence from congressional testimony, the mixed-methods design revealed a dimension of the operation that would not have been visible through either quantitative or qualitative analysis alone. The quantitative data shows what was struck, but not what was consumed in the process; the official communications celebrate success, but do not reveal strain; 149 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE only the congressional testimony—where officials are questioned directly about challenges— surfaces the sustainment dimension. This finding validates the methodological choice of including congressional testimony in the qualitative corpus and demonstrates the value of mixedmethods designs that examine multiple document types. Chapter Summary This chapter has presented the results of the explanatory sequential mixed-methods analysis of strategic coordination during Operation Epic Fury. The quantitative geospatial analysis of 65 geocoded strike events, AIS maritime traffic data, 22 satellite damage assessments, and 36 merchant ship attack records revealed a campaign characterized by (a) a bimodal spatial distribution with concentrations in the Tehran metropolitan area and the coastal chokepoint zone, (b) a progressive southward migration of the operational center of gravity from the interior toward the Strait of Hormuz, (c) a 12.8:1 over-representation of strikes near the chokepoint relative to uniform expectation, and (d) a catastrophic 95% collapse in maritime traffic through the Strait. The qualitative content analysis of 34 official documents identified integration, synchronization, and command and control as the most frequently coded themes, with a notable underrepresentation of sustainment challenges in official communications compared to congressional testimony. The qualitative findings provided the strategic rationale for the quantitative patterns, revealing a deliberately phased campaign that progressed from strategic strikes against the interior to maritime operations and blockade enforcement at the chokepoint. The integration of findings through joint display matrices revealed strong convergence between the quantitative and qualitative strands across three of four analytical dimensions and 150 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE strong alignment with three core MDO doctrinal principles. The most significant finding is the identification of a sustainment gap—a discrepancy between the official narrative of seamless multi-domain integration and the evidence of logistical strain surfaced in congressional testimony. Chapter 5 will discuss the implications of these findings for MDO theory, military practice, and future research. 151 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION The preceding chapter presented the quantitative, qualitative, and integrated findings from this geospatial mixed-methods analysis of Operation Epic Fury. This chapter interprets those findings within the broader theoretical, doctrinal, and strategic context established by the literature review. The discussion is organized around the study’s five research questions, beginning with the four secondary questions and culminating in the primary research question. Following the interpretation of findings, the chapter addresses theoretical contributions, practical and policy implications, study limitations, and directions for future research. Operation Epic Fury represented the first large-scale application of multi-domain operations (MDO) doctrine against a near-peer adversary’s homeland, providing an unprecedented empirical case for examining whether concepts developed primarily in theory and limited exercises translate into operational reality. The 39-day campaign (February 28 to April 8, 2026) generated a spatial and temporal dataset of sufficient granularity to test MDO’s core premises: convergence across domains, rapid transition between competition and armed conflict, and the creation of multiple dilemmas for the adversary (Department of the Army, 2018; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). The findings reveal both the remarkable fidelity of doctrine-to-practice translation in certain dimensions and significant gaps that warrant scholarly and institutional attention. Three overarching themes emerge from the integrated analysis. First, geographic determinism exerted a far stronger influence on campaign design than existing MDO doctrine acknowledges, with the Strait of Hormuz functioning not merely as a geographic feature but as the organizing logic of the entire operation. Second, convergence—the central concept of 152 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE MDO—manifested in operationally meaningful ways across three of four domains examined, yet exhibited notable asymmetries that suggest the concept requires refinement. Third, the sustainment dimension revealed a persistent gap between official optimism and the operational reality described in congressional testimony, pointing to structural challenges that doctrine has yet to address adequately (Congressional Budget Office, 2024; McGrath, 2023). Interpretation of Findings This section interprets the study’s findings in relation to each research question, connecting empirical results to the theoretical frameworks and prior literature examined in Chapter 2. The interpretation follows the sequential structure of the research questions, building from descriptive spatial-temporal patterns through geographic influence and doctrinal alignment to the overarching question of strategic coordination. Secondary Question 1: Spatial and Temporal Patterns Secondary Question 1 asked: What spatial and temporal patterns characterized the disposition and employment of U.S. air, land, and maritime platforms during Operation Epic Fury? The quantitative analysis revealed several significant patterns that both confirm and extend existing understanding of multi-domain campaign design. Bimodal Spatial Distribution. The most striking finding was the bimodal spatial distribution of strike activity, with a dominant Tehran hot spot accounting for 43.1% of all strikes and a secondary coastal cluster (Bushehr–Bandar Abbas corridor) comprising 29.2%. These two concentrations, separated by approximately 790 kilometers, represented a deliberate spatial architecture that directly challenges the assumption of contiguous battlespace common in traditional military geography (Collins, 1998; Peltier & Pearcy, 1966). Rather than the continuous front envisioned in industrial-age warfare, Operation Epic Fury created what might 153 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE be termed a discontiguous convergence zone—a spatial concept absent from current MDO literature but clearly observable in the data. This bimodal pattern resonates with Biddle’s (2004) argument that modern military effectiveness depends less on force concentration than on the ability to create multiple, simultaneous dilemmas for the adversary. The Tehran cluster targeted command-and-control, air defense, and strategic infrastructure, while the coastal cluster focused on anti-ship missile sites, naval bases, and port facilities. Together, these two concentrations forced Iranian defensive resources to divide across 790 kilometers of territory—a geographic span that exceeded the effective coordination range of Iran’s integrated air defense system (Cordesman, 2019; Nadimi, 2020). The Gi* hot spot analysis (z = 4.23, p < .001 for Tehran; z = 3.87, p < .001 for the coastal cluster) confirmed that this distribution was not random but reflected deliberate operational design. Temporal Phasing and Southward Migration. The four-phase temporal structure of the campaign exhibited a statistically significant southward migration of the geographic mean center, shifting from 32.59°N during Phase I (February 28–March 8) to 30.71°N during Phase IV (April 1–8). This 1.88-degree southward shift—approximately 209 kilometers—represents a deliberate geographic resequencing from strategic targets in Tehran toward the Strait of Hormuz. This pattern is consistent with classical military geographic theory on the relationship between terrain and campaign design (Winters et al., 2001) but adds a temporal dimension not captured in static geographic analyses. The phased migration aligns with MDO doctrine’s concept of “setting the theater” before executing decisive operations (Department of the Army, 2018, p. 17). Phase I established air superiority and degraded strategic command nodes—prerequisites for the southward expansion 154 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE of operations. By Phase III, the mean center had shifted sufficiently southward to bring the Strait of Hormuz into the primary zone of operations, enabling the maritime domain to assume greater operational significance. This sequential geographic expansion recalls Mahan’s (1890) principle that command of the sea requires first securing the littoral, updated for the multi-domain age where “securing the littoral” required simultaneous air, land, and cyber operations against coastal defense networks. The kernel density estimation (KDE) analysis further illuminated this temporal evolution by revealing three persistent hot zones: the Tehran cluster (present across all four phases), the Bushehr intensification zone (emerging in Phase II and peaking in Phase III), and the Hormuzgan emergence zone (appearing only in Phases III and IV). The KDE bandwidth of 50 kilometers captured the operational clustering patterns effectively, revealing density peaks exceeding 2.5 standard deviations above the mean in both the Tehran and Bushehr clusters (Silverman, 1986). This three-zone KDE pattern represents a spatial signature of phased multidomain operations that has not been previously documented in the literature. Secondary Question 2: Influence of the Strait of Hormuz Secondary Question 2 asked: How did the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz influence the sequencing and geographic focus of multi-domain operations? The findings demonstrate that the Strait functioned as the gravitational center of the entire campaign, exerting influence far beyond its immediate geographic boundaries. The Chokepoint as Organizing Logic. The 12.8:1 over-representation ratio of strikes within 100 kilometers of the Strait—meaning that strike density in the Strait proximity zone was 12.8 times greater than would be expected under a uniform spatial distribution—provides compelling quantitative evidence for the Strait’s disproportionate operational significance. This 155 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE finding extends Calder’s (2012) theoretical framework of chokepoint geopolitics by providing the first empirical measurement of how a maritime chokepoint concentrates military activity in modern multi-domain operations. The bimodal buffer zone pattern adds nuance to this finding. Rather than a simple distance-decay function, strike activity exhibited dual peaks: one at 0–50 kilometers (direct Strait defense suppression) and another at 200–300 kilometers (inland infrastructure supporting coastal defense). This pattern suggests that modern chokepoint control requires not just local supremacy but the systematic degradation of the adversary’s ability to project force toward the chokepoint— what Corbett (1911) termed “command of communications” updated for the precision-strike era. The 200–300 kilometer peak corresponds to the approximate range of Iran’s anti-ship missile systems (Eisenstadt, 2021; Ostovar, 2016), suggesting that planners calibrated the operational depth to neutralize the adversary’s standoff capability. Maritime Traffic Collapse as Operational Indicator. The 95% reduction in maritime traffic through the Strait—from 138 daily transits pre-conflict to fewer than 10 during peak operations—provides a powerful secondary indicator of operational impact. This traffic collapse, documented through AIS data analysis (Windward AI, 2026), represents perhaps the most consequential economic effect of the campaign. With approximately 21% of global oil consumption transiting the Strait under normal conditions (Calder, 2012), this disruption affected global energy markets and underscored the strategic logic of why the Strait functioned as the campaign’s organizing principle. The traffic pattern analysis also revealed an important methodological insight: AIS data served as a proxy measure of operational effectiveness that complemented traditional battle damage assessment. Where satellite imagery provided direct evidence of physical destruction, 156 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE AIS data captured the broader deterrent and disruptive effects of military operations on the maritime commons. This dual-measure approach—combining physical damage indicators with behavioral indicators—represents a methodological contribution to the study of modern military operations that extends the OSINT frameworks described by Williams and Blum (2018) and the maritime domain awareness literature (Iphar et al., 2015; Pallotta et al., 2013). The qualitative analysis reinforced the Strait’s centrality. Content analysis of official communications revealed that geographic references to the Strait of Hormuz appeared in 87% of CENTCOM press releases and 100% of congressional testimony sessions, with the Strait consistently framed as both the operational objective and the metric of campaign success (U.S. Central Command, 2026). Secretary Hegseth’s repeated framing of the campaign as ensuring “freedom of navigation” through the Strait (U.S. Department of War, 2026, March 4) further confirms that the chokepoint served not merely as a geographic feature but as the strategic narrative around which the entire operation was organized and communicated. Secondary Question 3: Alignment With Multi-Domain Operations Doctrine Secondary Question 3 asked: To what extent did the conduct of operations align with or deviate from established MDO doctrine? The joint display analysis revealed a nuanced picture of doctrinal fidelity, with strong alignment on three core principles and a significant gap in one critical area. Convergence: Strong Alignment. The integration dimension received the highest qualitative coding frequency (n = 92 references), and the quantitative spatial analysis confirmed convergent multi-domain activity in 3 of 4 dimensions examined. The Gi* clustering patterns showed that air, land-based (missile), and maritime strikes converged on the same geographic zones during the same temporal phases—precisely the “convergence” that MDO doctrine 157 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE describes as “the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains” (Department of the Army, 2018, p. 20). The Cohen’s kappa of 0.84 for inter-rater reliability on integration coding provides confidence in this finding. However, the nature of convergence observed in Operation Epic Fury differs from the doctrinal ideal in important ways. MDO doctrine emphasizes convergence as simultaneous multi-domain effects on a single target or target set (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). The observed pattern was more accurately characterized as sequential-geographic convergence—different domains achieving effects in the same geographic area across sequential time windows rather than simultaneously against the same target. This distinction has significant implications for how convergence is conceptualized, trained, and assessed. The doctrinal ideal of true simultaneous convergence may represent an aspirational ceiling rather than an achievable standard, at least at the current level of joint force integration and command-and-control architecture (Brown & Berrier, 2024; Pomerleau, 2024). Cross-Domain Maneuver: Strong Alignment. The spatial analysis demonstrated effective cross-domain maneuver, with air operations suppressing coastal air defenses to enable subsequent maritime operations in the Strait of Hormuz. The temporal sequence—air superiority operations (Phase I) preceding expanded coastal operations (Phases II–III) preceding maritime dominance operations (Phase IV)—mirrors the doctrinal concept of creating “windows of superiority” in one domain to enable freedom of action in others (Department of the Army, 2018). The southward mean center migration provides quantitative evidence of this cross-domain enabling relationship, as the operational center of gravity shifted toward the maritime domain only after air and land-based operations had degraded Iran’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the coastal zone. 158 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE This finding is particularly significant when viewed against the theoretical literature on A2/AD. Biddle and Oelrich (2012) argued that overcoming A2/AD requires not merely superior technology but the orchestrated application of force across domains to collapse the adversary’s defensive architecture. Operation Epic Fury provides empirical support for this thesis: the systematic degradation of Iran’s coastal radar network, anti-ship missile batteries, and fast-attack craft bases created the conditions for maritime freedom of action in the Strait. The geographic specificity of the findings—the exact buffer zones and distance relationships identified in the spatial analysis—offers a level of empirical detail previously unavailable in the A2/AD literature. Multi-Domain Effects: Strong Alignment. The qualitative coding identified coordinated effects across air, maritime, and information domains, with cyber operations (referenced in 34% of official communications) complementing kinetic strikes. The integration of precision strikes with information operations—including civilian warnings, social media campaigns, and diplomatic messaging—represents a form of multi-domain effects that extends beyond the kinetic focus of most MDO literature (Dalton & Costello, 2023; Perkins, 2017). The joint display confirmed convergence between quantitative strike patterns and qualitative information operations themes, suggesting that the “information environment” dimension of MDO (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024) was actively integrated into campaign planning. Sustainment: Significant Gap. The most notable deviation from doctrinal expectations appeared in the sustainment dimension. While MDO doctrine asserts that “sustainment provides the means for endurance” and is integral to multi-domain operations (Department of the Army, 2022, p. 7-1), the qualitative analysis revealed a persistent gap between official communications and congressional testimony regarding sustainment adequacy. Official CENTCOM and 159 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Department of War communications emphasized operational success with minimal sustainment discussion, while congressional testimony contained 23 coded references to sustainment challenges, logistics constraints, and ammunition expenditure concerns. This sustainment gap is not surprising given the broader logistics literature. Eckstein (2023) documented growing Navy logistics challenges as global fleet operations intensified, and the Congressional Budget Office (2024) identified long-term sustainment funding shortfalls across the joint force. McGrath (2023) specifically warned that maritime logistics in contested environments would prove the critical vulnerability of any sustained campaign in the Persian Gulf. The Operation Epic Fury data suggest these warnings were prescient. The sustainment gap identified in this study represents a doctrine-practice disconnect that has operational implications: if MDO doctrine promises capabilities that sustainment infrastructure cannot support over extended durations, the doctrine risks creating expectations that exceed the joint force’s actual capacity (Vego, 2009). The joint display analysis classified this sustainment finding as “complementary” rather than “divergent” because the quantitative data did not directly contradict operational success. However, the qualitative evidence strongly suggests that sustainment represented a binding constraint that limited operational options in ways not captured by strike data alone. This finding underscores the value of mixed-methods research in military studies: the quantitative data captured operational outputs (strikes delivered, targets destroyed), while the qualitative data revealed the operational costs and constraints underlying those outputs (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). 160 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Secondary Question 4: Domain Interplay and Interdependence Secondary Question 4 asked: What patterns of interplay and interdependence existed between air, land, and sea-based actions during the campaign? The integrated analysis revealed a hierarchical interdependence structure with air power serving as the enabling domain, land-based fires providing the precision strike backbone, and maritime forces executing the campaign’s culminating objective. Hierarchical Domain Architecture. The temporal sequencing data revealed an asymmetric interdependence pattern. Air operations were largely self-enabling—air sorties commenced on Day 1 and maintained consistent tempo throughout all four phases. Maritime operations, by contrast, exhibited strong dependence on prior air operations: meaningful maritime activity in the Strait of Hormuz increased only after Phase II, when air operations had sufficiently degraded Iran’s coastal anti-ship missile capability. This finding challenges the MDO doctrinal assumption of domain equivalence—the implicit suggestion that all domains contribute equally and interchangeably to convergence (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). In practice, Operation Epic Fury exhibited what might be termed “domain primacy with sequential handoff”—air power established the preconditions for operations in other domains, which then assumed increasing importance as the campaign progressed. This pattern is more consistent with Deptula’s (2021) framework of air power as the “enabling force” than with the domain-agnostic convergence model of MDO doctrine. The spatial data support this interpretation: the southward migration of the mean center tracked the progressive expansion of the air superiority umbrella from Tehran toward the Strait. The Information-Kinetic Nexus. A particularly notable finding was the tight coupling between information operations and kinetic effects. CENTCOM’s civilian safety warnings (U.S. 161 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Central Command, 2026, March 8; March 11) preceded major strike sequences by 24–48 hours, creating a pattern in which information operations served as both humanitarian precaution and psychological preparation. This information-kinetic sequencing represents a form of multidomain coordination that receives insufficient attention in current MDO literature, which tends to emphasize kinetic domain interactions (Brose, 2020; Scharre, 2023). The qualitative coding revealed that information operations served three distinct functions in the campaign: operational (shaping the battlespace through strategic messaging), legal (establishing preconditions for strikes near civilian areas under international humanitarian law), and narrative (framing the campaign for domestic and international audiences). The triple functionality of information operations—operational, legal, and narrative—represents a finding not anticipated by the study’s conceptual framework and suggests that MDO theory should expand its treatment of the information domain beyond the current focus on electronic warfare and cyber operations (Modirzadeh, 2023). Iranian Retaliation as Multi-Domain Stress Test. The nine documented Iranian retaliatory actions provided an unexpected but analytically valuable test of multi-domain interdependence. Iran’s retaliation spanned ballistic missiles, maritime fast-attack craft, and proxy militia operations—itself a form of multi-domain response. The U.S. joint force’s ability to absorb these retaliatory strikes while maintaining operational tempo across all domains suggests robust resilience, yet the qualitative data indicate that retaliation management consumed significant command-and-control bandwidth (Gould, 2026). Kahn’s (1965) escalation theory and Schelling’s (1966) concept of “the diplomacy of violence” provide useful frameworks for understanding how the adversary’s multi-domain retaliation created compounding management demands across the joint force. 162 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Primary Research Question: Strategic Coordination in Operation Epic Fury The primary research question asked: How was strategic coordination among U.S. air, land, and maritime platforms achieved during Operation Epic Fury to neutralize threats and control the Strait of Hormuz? The integrated findings from the four secondary questions converge on a comprehensive answer that both confirms and complicates the MDO doctrinal model. Geography as the Coordination Mechanism. The most significant finding of this study is that geographic logic—rather than organizational structure, command hierarchy, or technological architecture—served as the primary coordination mechanism for multi-domain operations. The Strait of Hormuz functioned as what might be termed a strategic attractor: a geographic feature of such overwhelming significance that it organized the spatial, temporal, and domain-sequencing logic of the entire campaign without requiring the kind of real-time, AIenabled command-and-control integration that JADC2 proponents envision (Brown & Berrier, 2024). This finding does not diminish the importance of JADC2 or advanced C2 systems. Rather, it suggests that geographic features of sufficient strategic significance can provide a natural convergence point that simplifies the coordination challenge. When all domains share a common geographic objective—in this case, establishing control of the Strait—the coordination problem reduces from a multi-dimensional optimization to a more tractable sequentialgeographic problem. Each domain contributes to the shared geographic objective in its own way, at its own tempo, but all converge on the same spatial target. This “geographic convergence” model represents a theoretical contribution to MDO thinking that bridges the gap between the 163 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE aspirational vision of fully synchronized multi-domain operations and the practical reality of joint force coordination (Townsend, 2018; Freedberg, 2021). Sequential Layering as Operational Art. The four-phase campaign structure reveals that strategic coordination was achieved through deliberate sequential layering rather than the simultaneous convergence emphasized in MDO doctrine. Phase I air operations degraded strategic targets and air defenses. Phase II expanded operations southward toward the coast. Phase III intensified coastal operations while initiating maritime activities. Phase IV achieved maritime dominance and began ceasefire negotiations. This sequential approach—each phase creating the conditions for the next—represents a sophisticated form of operational art that is fully consistent with joint planning doctrine (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020) while differing from the MDO ideal of near-simultaneous multi-domain effects. The study’s findings suggest that the gap between sequential and simultaneous coordination may be less consequential than doctrinal debates imply. The critical factor was not whether domains acted simultaneously but whether each domain’s actions effectively enabled subsequent operations in other domains. The spatial data demonstrate that this enabling relationship was achieved: air operations created the conditions for coastal operations, which created the conditions for maritime dominance. The coordination was “strategic” not because it was instantaneous but because it was coherent—each element served the overarching geographic objective of Strait control. 164 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 5.1 Summary of Key Findings and Alignment With Prior Literature Finding Quantitative Evidence Literature Connection Alignment Bimodal spatial Tehran 43.1%, coastal 29.2%; Biddle (2004); Collins (1998) Extends distribution Gi* z > 3.87 Southward mean center 32.59°N → 30.71°N across 4 Winters et al. (2001); Mahan Confirms migration phases (1890) 12.8:1 Strait over- Strike density ratio within 100 Calder (2012); Corbett (1911) Extends representation km buffer 95% maritime traffic 138 → <10 daily transits Iphar et al. (2015); Pallotta et Novel al. (2013) collapse Partial Convergence across 3/4 Joint display: 3 convergent, 1 Dept. of the Army (2018); JCS dimensions complementary (2024) Sustainment gap 23 testimony references vs. McGrath (2023); CBO (2024) Confirms Challenges minimal official mention Domain hierarchy (air Temporal sequence of domain Deptula (2021); Biddle & primacy) engagement Oelrich (2012) Information-kinetic 24–48 hr warning-to-strike Brose (2020); Modirzadeh coupling pattern (2023) Novel Note. Alignment categories: Confirms = finding consistent with existing literature; Extends = finding adds new dimension to existing theory; Challenges = finding contradicts or complicates existing assumptions; Partial = mixed alignment; Novel = finding not addressed in prior literature. Theoretical Implications The findings of this study carry implications for several theoretical domains, including MDO theory, military geography, and mixed-methods research in defense studies. This section articulates the specific theoretical contributions and identifies areas where existing theory requires revision. Contributions to Multi-Domain Operations Theory This study makes three primary contributions to MDO theory. First, it provides the first empirical test of MDO concepts in a large-scale combat operation, moving beyond the wargaming, simulation, and exercise-based evidence that has dominated the literature to date (Dalton 165 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE & Costello, 2023; Johnson, 2018; Perkins, 2017). The finding that convergence manifested as sequential-geographic rather than simultaneous-temporal coordination suggests that MDO theory should distinguish between these two modes of convergence and develop separate doctrine, training, and assessment frameworks for each. Second, the study challenges the implicit domain-equivalence assumption in MDO doctrine. The hierarchical domain architecture observed—with air power serving as the enabling domain—suggests that MDO convergence in practice involves asymmetric domain contributions rather than the symmetric multi-domain engagement depicted in doctrinal publications (Department of the Army, 2018; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). This finding aligns with Builder’s (1989) argument that each military service brings distinctive organizational cultures and capabilities that resist doctrinal homogenization. Future MDO theory development should explicitly address domain asymmetry rather than assuming interchangeable domain contributions. Third, the sustainment gap identified in this study reveals a structural weakness in MDO theory’s treatment of logistics. Current MDO doctrine acknowledges sustainment as important but does not adequately address the tension between the high operational tempo required for multi-domain convergence and the logistics infrastructure available to sustain it. Roper’s (2022) analysis of doctrine-practice gaps in Operation Inherent Resolve identified similar sustainment challenges, suggesting this is a persistent structural issue rather than an Epic Fury-specific anomaly. MDO theory requires a dedicated sustainment framework that explicitly models the relationship between convergence ambitions and logistics capacity. 166 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Contributions to Military Geography The study contributes to military geography in two important ways. First, the concept of geographic convergence—the finding that a strategically significant geographic feature (the Strait of Hormuz) served as the primary coordination mechanism for multi-domain operations— extends classical military geographic theory (Collins, 1998; Peltier & Pearcy, 1966) into the multi-domain era. Traditional military geography focused on how terrain influenced individual operations; this study demonstrates how geography can organize the interplay among multiple domains simultaneously. Second, the quantitative geospatial methods employed—Gi* hot spot analysis, KDE, mean center analysis, and buffer zone analysis—demonstrate the application of spatial statistics and GIS techniques to operational military analysis at a level of rigor not commonly found in military studies. The specific metrics generated (12.8:1 over-representation ratio, 790 km bimodal separation, 1.88° southward migration) provide a template for quantitative military geographic analysis that future researchers can apply to other campaigns and theaters. The integration of these methods with satellite imagery analysis (Jensen, 2015; Cardille et al., 2024) and AIS maritime data (Windward AI, 2026) represents a multi-source geospatial methodology applicable beyond the specific case of Operation Epic Fury. Contributions to Mixed-Methods Research in Defense Studies The study demonstrates the value of convergent mixed-methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018) for military operational analysis. The joint display methodology (Fetters et al., 2013; Guetterman et al., 2015) proved particularly effective for comparing quantitative spatial patterns with qualitative thematic findings. The discovery that 3 of 4 dimensions showed 167 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE convergence while 1 (sustainment) showed complementarity would not have been possible with either method alone. The complementary sustainment finding is especially instructive. Quantitative data alone suggested successful campaign execution; qualitative data alone suggested significant logistical strain. Only through integration did the full picture emerge: the campaign succeeded operationally but at a sustainment cost that raises questions about long-term viability. This finding validates Teddlie and Tashakkori’s (2009) argument that mixed-methods research produces “meta-inferences” that transcend the insights available from either method independently. The Operation Epic Fury case study demonstrates that this integrative power extends to military operational analysis, a domain where mixed-methods designs remain underutilized (Miles et al., 2020; Saldana, 2021). Practical Implications The findings carry significant practical implications for military planners, doctrine writers, and professional military education institutions. This section organizes these implications by audience. Implications for Operational Planners First, the geographic convergence model observed in Operation Epic Fury suggests that operational planners should identify potential geographic attractors early in the campaign planning process. When a theater contains a geographic feature of overriding strategic significance—a chokepoint, a capital city, a critical infrastructure node—that feature can serve as a natural coordination mechanism that simplifies the multi-domain synchronization challenge. The 12.8:1 over-representation ratio provides a benchmark for how dramatically a geographic attractor can concentrate military effort. 168 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Second, the four-phase temporal structure and southward mean center migration provide a template for phased multi-domain campaign design. The principle of “setting the conditions” in one domain before expanding into others—observed in the air-to-maritime sequence—offers a practical alternative to the doctrinally ambitious goal of simultaneous multi-domain convergence. Planners should develop phase-transition criteria that specify the conditions (e.g., percentage of enemy air defense suppressed, coastal threat radius reduced to a specific range) required before expanding operations into the next domain. Third, the sustainment gap identified in this study should serve as a planning constraint rather than an afterthought. Planners should model sustainment requirements for each phase of a multi-domain campaign and identify the phase at which sustainment limitations begin to constrain operational options. The tension between operational ambition and logistics reality observed in Epic Fury suggests that sustainment should be treated as a primary planning factor— co-equal with fires, maneuver, and intelligence—rather than a supporting function (McGrath, 2023; Vego, 2009). Implications for Doctrine Development The findings suggest several areas where MDO doctrine should evolve. First, doctrine should explicitly distinguish between simultaneous convergence (the current doctrinal ideal) and sequential-geographic convergence (the pattern observed in practice). Both are valid operational approaches, but they require different planning methodologies, command structures, and assessment criteria. Current doctrine’s emphasis on simultaneous convergence may inadvertently devalue the sequential approach that proved effective in Epic Fury. Second, doctrine should address the role of geographic determinism in multi-domain operations more explicitly. Current publications acknowledge terrain as a factor but do not 169 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE adequately capture how dominant geographic features can organize entire campaigns across multiple domains. A doctrinal framework for “geographic convergence zones”—areas of such strategic significance that they naturally coordinate multi-domain activity—would fill this gap. Third, the sustainment gap warrants doctrinal revision. MDO doctrine should include sustainment feasibility assessments as integral to multi-domain operations planning rather than treating logistics as a separate supporting function. The disconnect between the operational tempo implied by MDO convergence and the sustainment capacity available to support it must be explicitly addressed in future iterations of FM 3-0 (Department of the Army, 2022) and JP 3-0 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022). Implications for Professional Military Education Professional military education (PME) programs should incorporate the findings of this study in several ways. The case of Operation Epic Fury provides a rich teaching example of multi-domain operations that goes beyond theoretical abstractions to empirically grounded analysis. PME curricula should include training in geospatial analysis methods—particularly the spatial statistical techniques demonstrated in this study—to prepare officers for the analytical demands of multi-domain planning. The ability to interpret hot spot analyses, kernel density surfaces, and buffer zone metrics should be considered a core competency for joint planners. Additionally, the sustainment gap finding should inform PME discussions of the relationship between operational design and logistical feasibility. War games and planning exercises frequently assume adequate sustainment; the Epic Fury case demonstrates that this assumption can obscure critical constraints. PME institutions should develop scenarios that require students to plan multi-domain operations under explicit sustainment constraints, forcing trade-offs between operational ambition and logistics reality (Work, 2023). 170 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Policy Implications Beyond the military operational context, the study’s findings have implications for defense policy, investment priorities, and coalition strategy. Defense Investment Priorities The hierarchical domain architecture observed in Epic Fury—with air power as the enabling domain—has direct implications for defense investment decisions. If air superiority remains the prerequisite for effective multi-domain operations, then continued investment in fifth-generation aircraft, advanced munitions, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities is essential. The finding that air operations preceded and enabled all other domains suggests that underinvestment in air capabilities would cascade into degraded performance across the entire multi-domain architecture (Deptula, 2021; Horowitz, 2018). Simultaneously, the sustainment gap argues for increased investment in logistics infrastructure, pre-positioned stocks, and sustainment-focused technologies. The Congressional Budget Office (2024) has documented the growing gap between force structure ambitions and sustainment funding. The Epic Fury case provides empirical evidence that this gap has operational consequences—a finding that should inform budget deliberations and program prioritization. The information-kinetic coupling finding also suggests increased investment in strategic communication capabilities, legal advisory support, and information operations planning tools. The triple functionality of information operations observed in Epic Fury—operational, legal, and narrative—requires dedicated resources and trained personnel that cut across traditional service structures. 171 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Coalition Strategy The study’s findings have implications for coalition warfare, an area that MDO doctrine acknowledges but does not fully develop. Operation Epic Fury was predominantly a unilateral U.S. operation, yet the maritime traffic data suggest that the campaign’s effects extended to the global commons—affecting the economic interests of allies and partners who depend on Strait of Hormuz transit. Future multi-domain campaigns against chokepoints will likely require coalition participation for both operational and political reasons (Kreps, 2011; Weitsman, 2014). The geographic convergence model identified in this study has particular relevance for coalition planning. If geographic features serve as natural coordination mechanisms, then coalition partners can be assigned geographic sectors aligned with the campaign’s spatial logic rather than requiring the complex multi-domain synchronization that challenges even the most integrated joint forces. The Strait of Hormuz case suggests that chokepoints may offer natural frameworks for coalition task organization in future multi-domain operations. Table 5.2 Summary of Practical and Policy Recommendations Recommendation Supporting Finding Target Audience Identify geographic attractors in campaign 12.8:1 Strait over-representation; geographic Operational planners; J5 planning convergence model staff Develop phase-transition criteria for Southward mean center migration; 4-phase Joint planners; CCMD domain expansion structure staffs Integrate sustainment as co-equal planning Sustainment gap (23 testimony references) Doctrine writers; J4 staff Distinguish simultaneous from sequential Sequential-geographic convergence observed vs. TRADOC; Joint Staff J7 convergence in doctrine simultaneous ideal Codify geographic convergence zones in Strait as organizing logic for MDO factor doctrine Expand PME geospatial analysis training TRADOC; service doctrine centers Spatial statistical methods proved essential War colleges; CGSC; service schools 172 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Increase logistics and sustainment Sustainment gap; CBO funding shortfall data investment Develop coalition chokepoint frameworks Congress; OSD (Comptroller) Global maritime impact; geographic coordination CCMD staffs; allied model planners Note. Recommendations derived from integrated findings presented in Chapter 4 and interpreted in context of prior literature. TRADOC = U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; CCMD = Combatant Command; CGSC = Command and General Staff College; OSD = Office of the Secretary of Defense. Limitations of the Study While this study makes significant contributions to the understanding of multi-domain operations, several limitations must be acknowledged. These limitations fall into three categories: data constraints, methodological boundaries, and scope restrictions. Data Constraints The most significant limitation concerns the reliance on open-source data. Classification restrictions prevented access to operational plans, targeting packages, after-action reports, and communications logs that would have provided direct evidence of coordination mechanisms and decision-making processes. The study inferred coordination from observable patterns (spatial distributions, temporal sequences, public communications) rather than directly observing the command-and-control processes that produced those patterns. Consequently, the geographic convergence model described in this chapter represents an interpretation of observable outputs rather than a direct observation of inputs. The AIS data, while valuable, are subject to known limitations including transponder manipulation, signal gaps in congested waterways, and intentional signal suppression during military operations (Iphar et al., 2015). The 95% traffic reduction figure represents the best available estimate from commercial AIS providers (Windward AI, 2026) but may not capture 173 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE vessels operating with transponders disabled. Similarly, satellite damage assessment data from Sentinel-1 SAR imagery (Oregon State University, 2026; Bellingcat, 2026) provide structural damage indicators but cannot assess functional degradation of military capabilities. Methodological Boundaries The convergent mixed-methods design employed in this study assumes that quantitative and qualitative findings can be meaningfully compared through joint displays. While the joint display methodology (Fetters et al., 2013; Guetterman et al., 2015) is well-established in health sciences, its application to military operational analysis is novel. The categories used to classify integration results (convergent, complementary, divergent) were adapted from the health sciences literature and may not capture all relevant modes of integration in military contexts. The qualitative content analysis was limited to English-language, publicly available documents. Iranian-language sources, including IRGC communiques, Iranian media coverage, and internal assessments, were excluded due to language constraints and access limitations. This exclusion means the study captures only the U.S. perspective on multi-domain coordination, potentially missing how Iranian forces perceived and responded to U.S. operations. Future research incorporating Iranian-language sources would provide a more complete picture (Abedin, 2020; Ostovar, 2016). Scope Restrictions The study examined a single campaign in a specific geographic and strategic context. The Strait of Hormuz’s unique characteristics—its narrow width, global economic significance, and single-adversary environment—may limit the generalizability of findings to other theaters. Multi-domain operations in the Western Pacific, the European theater, or the Arctic would 174 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE involve different geographic, political, and adversarial conditions that could produce fundamentally different coordination patterns. The campaign’s relatively short duration (39 days) also limits conclusions about sustained multi-domain operations. The sustainment gap identified in this study may be an early indicator of challenges that would compound over longer durations. A campaign lasting months rather than weeks might reveal fundamentally different sustainment dynamics and domain interdependence patterns. Additionally, the study focused on conventional military operations and did not examine cyber, space, or special operations domains in depth due to classification restrictions and data availability. Figure 5.1 Revised Conceptual Framework Incorporating Study Findings REVISED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: GEOGRAPHIC CONVERGENCE MODEL ORIGINAL FRAMEWORK (Ch. 2) REVISED FRAMEWORK (Ch. 5) ======================== =========================== MDO Doctrine MDO Doctrine | | v v Simultaneous Convergence ---> (all domains, same time) Sequential-Geographic Convergence (domains layered over phases) | | v v Domain Equivalence (equal contribution) ---> Domain Hierarchy (air primacy with sequential handoff) | | v v Technology-Driven C2 ---> Geography-Driven Coordination (JADC2 as primary mechanism) (strategic attractor + JADC2) | | v v Sustainment Assumed (logistics as support) ---> Sustainment as Binding Constraint (logistics as co-equal factor) 175 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE | | v v Multi-Domain Effects ---> Multi-Domain Effects + (kinetic focus) Information Triple Function (operational / legal / narrative) KEY ADDITIONS FROM THIS STUDY: - Geographic convergence zone concept - Discontiguous convergence zone (bimodal spatial pattern) - Information-kinetic coupling (24-48 hr sequencing) - Adversary multi-domain retaliation as stress test - AIS/maritime traffic as operational effectiveness proxy Recommendations for Future Research The findings and limitations of this study suggest several productive directions for future research. These recommendations are organized by research domain and prioritized by their potential contribution to both theory and practice. Comparative Campaign Analysis The most urgent research need is comparative analysis of multi-domain operations across different theaters and adversaries. This study examined a single campaign against Iran in the Persian Gulf; replication using the same geospatial mixed-methods approach in other contexts— the Western Pacific, the European theater, or Sub-Saharan Africa—would test the generalizability of the geographic convergence model. Specifically, future research should examine whether the “strategic attractor” concept holds in theaters without a dominant chokepoint, and whether the domain hierarchy (air primacy with sequential handoff) persists against adversaries with different A2/AD architectures (Biddle & Oelrich, 2012; Horowitz, 2018). Historical comparative studies would also be valuable. Retrospective application of the geospatial methods employed here to Operation Desert Storm (1991), the opening phases of 176 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003), or Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011) could reveal whether the spatial-temporal patterns observed in Epic Fury represent a novel feature of MDO or a recurring pattern in U.S. military operations that existing doctrine has not yet codified. Sustainment and Logistics Research The sustainment gap identified in this study warrants dedicated investigation. Future research should examine the specific logistics mechanisms that constrained operations, the tradeoffs commanders faced between operational tempo and sustainment capacity, and the institutional incentives that produce the gap between official optimism and operational reality. Mixed-methods approaches incorporating logistics data (supply tonnages, ammunition expenditure rates, platform readiness rates) with qualitative interviews of logistics officers would provide the granularity needed to move beyond the broad “sustainment gap” finding to actionable recommendations (McGrath, 2023). Adversary Perspective Research This study captured only the U.S. perspective on multi-domain coordination. Future research incorporating Iranian-language sources—military communiques, media reports, and post-conflict assessments—would provide the adversary’s perspective on how U.S. multidomain operations were perceived, countered, and assessed. Understanding the adversary’s experience of convergence, domain hierarchy, and geographic coordination would significantly enrich the theoretical framework developed here (Eisenstadt, 2021; Ostovar, 2016). Technology and C2 Architecture The finding that geographic logic served as the primary coordination mechanism raises important questions about the role of JADC2 and advanced C2 technologies in multi-domain 177 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE operations. Future research should investigate whether JADC2 systems enhanced the geographic coordination observed or whether coordination occurred despite, rather than because of, the available C2 architecture. Comparative analysis of campaigns with varying levels of JADC2 implementation would help determine whether technology-driven coordination and geographydriven coordination are complementary or substitutive (Brown & Berrier, 2024; Pomerleau, 2024; Scharre, 2023). Civilian Impact and International Humanitarian Law The satellite damage assessment data identified 7,645 damaged or destroyed buildings, a finding that raises important questions about civilian impact and IHL compliance that this study did not fully explore. Future research should combine the geospatial damage data with humanitarian assessments, population displacement data, and IHL legal analyses to provide a comprehensive picture of the civilian consequences of multi-domain operations. The integration of military geospatial analysis with humanitarian impact assessment represents a research frontier with significant practical implications (Bellal, 2019; Modirzadeh, 2023). Table 5.3 Prioritized Future Research Agenda Research Direction Key Question Recommended Method Priority Comparative campaign Does geographic convergence hold in Geospatial mixed-methods (replicate High analysis other theaters? current design) Sustainment deep-dive What specific logistics mechanisms Mixed-methods: logistics data + constrained MDO? officer interviews How did Iran perceive/counter U.S. Qualitative: Iranian-language source MDO? analysis Did C2 tech enhance or merely Comparative case study with accompany geographic coordination? varying C2 levels Civilian impact What were the humanitarian Geospatial + humanitarian data assessment consequences of MDO? integration Adversary perspective JADC2 effectiveness 178 High High Medium Medium CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Historical comparison Coalition MDO Are Epic Fury patterns novel or Retrospective geospatial analysis of recurring? prior campaigns How does coalition participation affect Comparative case study: unilateral convergence? vs. coalition ops Medium Lower Note. Priority assigned based on potential contribution to both theory and practice, feasibility with available data, and urgency of operational need. Conclusion This chapter interpreted the findings of a geospatial mixed-methods analysis of Operation Epic Fury within the theoretical, doctrinal, and strategic contexts established by the literature review. The discussion organized around the study’s five research questions yielded several significant insights with implications for MDO theory, military geography, and defense policy. The primary finding—that geographic logic served as the principal coordination mechanism for multi-domain operations, with the Strait of Hormuz functioning as a strategic attractor—challenges the technology-centric vision of MDO coordination that dominates current doctrine. This does not negate the value of JADC2 and advanced C2 systems; rather, it suggests that geography and technology should be understood as complementary coordination mechanisms, with the relative importance of each depending on the strategic context. The concept of sequential-geographic convergence—domains achieving effects in the same geographic area across sequential phases rather than simultaneously—represents a refinement of MDO theory that more accurately describes the observed pattern of multi-domain coordination. This concept, together with the finding of domain hierarchy (air primacy with sequential handoff), suggests that MDO doctrine should accommodate a broader range of convergence models rather than privileging the simultaneous ideal. The sustainment gap—the persistent disconnect between official optimism and the operational reality described in congressional testimony—represents the study’s most 179 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE operationally consequential finding. If multi-domain operations doctrine promises convergence that sustainment infrastructure cannot support, the resulting gap between expectation and reality will erode both operational effectiveness and institutional credibility. Addressing this gap requires not merely doctrinal revision but structural changes in how the Department of Defense plans, funds, and executes sustainment for complex multi-domain campaigns. Finally, this study demonstrates the analytical power of geospatial mixed-methods research for studying modern military operations. The integration of spatial statistics, satellite imagery, AIS maritime data, and qualitative content analysis produced insights that no single method could have generated independently. As military operations grow increasingly complex, multi-domain, and data-rich, the methodological approach demonstrated here offers a template for the rigorous empirical analysis that both scholarship and practice demand. Operation Epic Fury was the first large-scale test of MDO doctrine; this study provides the first systematic empirical assessment of how that test unfolded, what it revealed, and what remains to be understood. 180 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION This concluding chapter synthesizes the findings, contributions, and implications of this doctoral study examining multi-domain coordination during Operation Epic Fury. The chapter begins by restating the research problem and purpose that motivated the investigation, then provides a comprehensive summary of findings organized by research question. Following this synthesis, the chapter articulates the study’s principal conclusions—the definitive claims warranted by the evidence—and their significance for theory, practice, and policy. The chapter closes with final reflections on the meaning of Operation Epic Fury as the first large-scale empirical test of multi-domain operations doctrine. Restatement of the Research Problem and Purpose Multi-domain operations (MDO) doctrine has been the centerpiece of U.S. military modernization since the Army’s 2018 publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Department of the Army, 2018) and the subsequent incorporation of MDO concepts into joint doctrine (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). Despite billions of dollars in investment, doctrinal revision, and organizational restructuring, MDO concepts had never been tested in a large-scale combat operation prior to February 2026. The literature review (Chapter 2) identified three critical gaps: (a) the absence of empirical evidence for MDO convergence in real-world operations, (b) the lack of geospatial methods applied to the study of multi-domain coordination, and (c) insufficient understanding of how geographic features influence multi-domain campaign design. Operation Epic Fury—the 39-day U.S. military campaign against Iran from February 28 to April 8, 2026—provided the first opportunity to examine MDO doctrine in practice. The campaign employed air, land-based, maritime, and information capabilities against a near-peer 181 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE adversary’s homeland, centered on the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz. This study addressed the identified gaps through a convergent parallel mixed-methods design integrating quantitative geospatial analysis with qualitative content analysis of official communications and congressional testimony. The study was guided by one primary research question and four secondary questions: Primary Research Question: How was strategic coordination among U.S. air, land, and maritime platforms achieved during Operation Epic Fury to neutralize threats and control the Strait of Hormuz? Secondary Question 1: What spatial and temporal patterns characterized the disposition and employment of U.S. air, land, and maritime platforms during Operation Epic Fury? Secondary Question 2: How did the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz influence the sequencing and geographic focus of multi-domain operations? Secondary Question 3: To what extent did the conduct of operations align with or deviate from established multi-domain operations doctrine? Secondary Question 4: What patterns of interplay and interdependence existed between air, land, and sea-based actions during the campaign? Summary of Methodology The study employed a convergent parallel mixed-methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018) combining quantitative geospatial analysis with qualitative directed content analysis. The quantitative strand applied four spatial-statistical techniques—Getis-Ord Gi* hot spot analysis (Getis & Ord, 1992), kernel density estimation (Silverman, 1986), geographic mean center analysis, and buffer zone analysis—to a dataset of 71 geolocated strike events, 36 maritime vessel attacks, 15 AIS traffic observations, and 22 satellite damage assessments. The 182 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE qualitative strand conducted directed content analysis of 15 official CENTCOM communications, 10 doctrinal publications, and 9 congressional testimony sessions, using a priori codes derived from MDO doctrine. Integration occurred through joint display matrices (Fetters et al., 2013; Guetterman et al., 2015) that systematically compared quantitative spatial findings with qualitative thematic findings across four analytic dimensions: integration, geographic focus, temporal sequencing, and sustainment. The joint display methodology classified each dimension as convergent (findings agree), complementary (findings add different facets without contradiction), or divergent (findings contradict). Trustworthiness was established through triangulation, inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa = 0.84), and systematic audit trails. Summary of Findings This section provides a concise synthesis of the principal findings for each research question, drawing on the detailed results presented in Chapter 4 and the interpretive analysis of Chapter 5. Findings for Secondary Question 1: Spatial and Temporal Patterns The geospatial analysis revealed a bimodal spatial distribution of military activity, with a dominant Tehran hot spot (43.1% of all strikes, Gi* z = 4.23, p < .001) and a secondary Bushehr–Bandar Abbas coastal cluster (29.2%, Gi* z = 3.87, p < .001) separated by approximately 790 kilometers. This discontiguous pattern diverged from the contiguous battlespace model implicit in traditional military geography (Collins, 1998; Peltier & Pearcy, 1966) and represented a deliberate spatial architecture designed to impose simultaneous dilemmas on Iranian defensive forces. 183 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Temporally, the campaign exhibited a statistically significant southward migration of the geographic mean center across four phases, shifting from 32.59°N (Phase I: February 28–March 8) to 30.71°N (Phase IV: April 1–8). This 1.88-degree, 209-kilometer migration reflected a deliberate resequencing from strategic targets in the Tehran area toward the Strait of Hormuz. Kernel density estimation identified three evolving hot zones: a persistent Tehran cluster, an intensifying Bushehr zone, and an emergent Hormuzgan zone that appeared only in Phases III and IV. Findings for Secondary Question 2: Influence of the Strait of Hormuz The Strait of Hormuz exerted a disproportionate influence on campaign design far exceeding its geographic footprint. The buffer zone analysis revealed a 12.8:1 overrepresentation of strikes within 100 kilometers of the Strait compared to the expected uniform distribution. A bimodal buffer pattern—with peaks at 0–50 kilometers (direct chokepoint defense suppression) and 200–300 kilometers (inland A2/AD infrastructure)—demonstrated that chokepoint control in the multi-domain era requires degrading the adversary’s ability to project force toward the chokepoint, not merely achieving local superiority. Maritime traffic through the Strait collapsed by 95%, from 138 daily transits pre-conflict to fewer than 10 during peak operations (Windward AI, 2026). This traffic collapse served as a powerful behavioral indicator of operational impact that complemented physical damage assessment data. The qualitative analysis confirmed the Strait’s centrality, with geographic references appearing in 87% of CENTCOM press releases and 100% of congressional testimony, and “freedom of navigation” framed as the campaign’s primary strategic objective (U.S. Department of War, 2026, March 4). 184 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Findings for Secondary Question 3: Doctrinal Alignment The joint display analysis revealed that 3 of 4 analytic dimensions showed convergence between observed operations and MDO doctrine, while 1 dimension (sustainment) showed complementarity. Specifically, convergence—MDO’s core concept—was confirmed across air, land-based, and maritime domains, with integration receiving the highest qualitative coding frequency (n = 92 references). Cross-domain maneuver was confirmed through the air-tomaritime enabling sequence. Multi-domain effects were confirmed through the observed integration of kinetic strikes with information and cyber operations. However, the nature of convergence differed from the doctrinal ideal. Where MDO doctrine envisions simultaneous multi-domain effects against the same target set (Department of the Army, 2018; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024), the observed pattern was sequential-geographic convergence: different domains achieving effects in the same geographic area across sequential temporal phases. The sustainment dimension revealed a significant gap between official optimism and the operational reality described in congressional testimony, with 23 coded references to logistics constraints, ammunition expenditure concerns, and sustainment challenges. Findings for Secondary Question 4: Domain Interplay The analysis identified a hierarchical interdependence structure among domains rather than the symmetric engagement implied by MDO doctrine. Air operations were self-enabling and commenced on Day 1, maintaining consistent tempo across all phases. Maritime operations exhibited strong dependence on prior air operations, with significant Strait activity increasing only after Phase II’s degradation of coastal A2/AD systems. This pattern—termed “domain 185 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE primacy with sequential handoff”—challenges the doctrinal assumption of domain equivalence and aligns more closely with Deptula’s (2021) framework of air power as the enabling force. An emergent finding was the tight coupling between information operations and kinetic effects, with CENTCOM civilian safety warnings preceding major strike sequences by 24–48 hours. Information operations served triple functions: operational (battlespace shaping), legal (IHL compliance), and narrative (domestic and international audience management). The nine documented Iranian retaliatory actions—spanning ballistic missiles, maritime fast-attack craft, and proxy militia operations—provided an unplanned stress test of multi-domain resilience, consuming significant command-and-control bandwidth while the joint force maintained operational tempo. Findings for the Primary Research Question The integrated analysis yielded two overarching findings regarding how strategic coordination was achieved. First, geographic logic—specifically the Strait of Hormuz’s strategic significance—served as the primary coordination mechanism, functioning as a “strategic attractor” that organized the spatial, temporal, and domain-sequencing logic of the entire campaign. When all domains shared a common geographic objective, the coordination problem simplified from multi-dimensional optimization to sequential-geographic layering. Second, coordination was achieved through deliberate sequential phasing rather than simultaneous convergence—each phase creating the conditions for the next, with air operations establishing the prerequisites for expanded coastal and maritime operations. 186 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Table 6.1 Comprehensive Summary of Research Questions, Methods, and Findings Research Question Primary Method Key Finding Doctrinal Implication SQ1: Spatial-temporal Gi* hot spot; KDE; Bimodal distribution (Tehran 43.1%, MDO creates discontiguous patterns mean center coastal 29.2%); 1.88° southward convergence zones; phased migration geographic expansion SQ2: Strait of Hormuz Buffer zone analysis; 12.8:1 over-representation; 95% traffic Chokepoints serve as strategic influence AIS data collapse; bimodal buffer pattern attractors organizing MDO campaigns SQ3: Doctrinal Joint display 3/4 dimensions convergent; 1 Sequential-geographic alignment integration complementary (sustainment gap) convergence differs from simultaneous ideal SQ4: Domain Temporal sequence; Hierarchical domain architecture; Domain primacy challenges interplay qualitative coding information-kinetic coupling domain-equivalence assumption Primary RQ: Strategic Full mixed-methods Geography as coordination mechanism; Geographic convergence coordination integration sequential layering as operational art model complements technology-driven JADC2 Note. SQ = secondary question; RQ = research question; KDE = kernel density estimation; AIS = Automatic Identification System; MDO = multi-domain operations; JADC2 = Joint All-Domain Command and Control. Conclusions Based on the integrated findings of this study, seven principal conclusions are warranted. These conclusions represent the definitive claims supported by the evidence and constitute this study’s contribution to knowledge. Conclusion 1: MDO Convergence Is Achievable but Sequential The first and most fundamental conclusion is that multi-domain convergence—the centerpiece of MDO doctrine—is achievable in large-scale combat operations but manifests differently than doctrine predicts. Operation Epic Fury demonstrated that air, land-based, and maritime capabilities can converge effectively on shared operational objectives. However, this convergence occurred through sequential-geographic phasing rather than the simultaneous multi- 187 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE domain effects emphasized in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Department of the Army, 2018) and JP 3-0, Appendix D (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2024). The distinction between sequential and simultaneous convergence is not merely academic; it carries implications for planning timelines, force flow, command-and-control requirements, and assessment criteria. MDO doctrine should recognize sequential-geographic convergence as a valid and effective operational approach. Conclusion 2: Geography Organizes Multi-Domain Operations The second conclusion is that geographic features of sufficient strategic significance serve as natural coordination mechanisms for multi-domain operations. The Strait of Hormuz functioned as a strategic attractor that organized the campaign’s spatial logic (12.8:1 overrepresentation), temporal logic (southward migration toward the Strait), and domain-sequencing logic (air operations enabling maritime freedom of action in the Strait). This geographic convergence model does not replace technology-driven coordination (JADC2) but complements it, providing an organic organizing principle that reduces the complexity of multi-domain synchronization when a dominant geographic objective exists (Brown & Berrier, 2024). This conclusion extends classical military geographic theory (Collins, 1998; Mahan, 1890; Corbett, 1911) into the multi-domain era and introduces the concept of “geographic convergence zones” to the MDO lexicon. Campaign planners and doctrine writers should consider geographic attractor analysis as a standard element of multi-domain campaign design. Conclusion 3: Domain Hierarchy Is Operationally Significant The third conclusion is that multi-domain operations exhibit a hierarchical domain structure in practice, not the domain equivalence implied by doctrine. In Operation Epic Fury, air power functioned as the enabling domain—achieving air superiority, suppressing enemy air defenses, and degrading coastal A2/AD systems—which created the conditions for subsequent 188 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE operations in other domains. Maritime operations depended on prior air operations; the reverse was not true. This “domain primacy with sequential handoff” pattern has direct implications for force structure, investment priorities, and campaign planning. If air superiority is the prerequisite for multi-domain convergence, then the air domain represents a single point of failure whose degradation would cascade across the entire multi-domain architecture (Biddle & Oelrich, 2012; Deptula, 2021). Conclusion 4: Sustainment Is the Binding Constraint of MDO The fourth conclusion is that sustainment represents the most significant gap between MDO doctrine and operational practice. The qualitative analysis revealed a persistent disconnect between official communications—which emphasized operational success—and congressional testimony—which raised substantive concerns about ammunition expenditure, logistics infrastructure, and force sustainment. This gap is consistent with broader assessments of defense sustainment capacity (Congressional Budget Office, 2024; McGrath, 2023) and prior observations of doctrine-practice disconnects in sustained operations (Roper, 2022). The sustainment conclusion carries particular urgency because MDO doctrine’s emphasis on convergence implies high operational tempo across multiple domains simultaneously—the most demanding sustainment profile possible. If the joint force cannot sustain the convergence that doctrine promises, the resulting gap between expectation and reality will erode both operational effectiveness and institutional credibility. Addressing this gap requires treating sustainment as a co-equal element of MDO planning rather than a supporting function. Conclusion 5: Information Operations Are Integral to Multi-Domain Effects The fifth conclusion is that information operations played a far more significant and multifaceted role in Operation Epic Fury than current MDO doctrine’s kinetic focus suggests. 189 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The observed information-kinetic coupling—civilian warnings preceding strike sequences by 24–48 hours—served operational, legal, and narrative functions simultaneously. This triple functionality of information operations extends the concept of multi-domain effects beyond the air-land-sea-cyber framework to encompass the cognitive and legal dimensions of modern warfare (Brose, 2020; Modirzadeh, 2023). MDO doctrine should expand its treatment of the information domain to reflect this operational reality. Conclusion 6: Mixed-Methods Geospatial Analysis Is Essential for Studying MDO The sixth conclusion is methodological: the convergent mixed-methods design combining geospatial analysis with qualitative content analysis proved essential for capturing the full complexity of multi-domain operations. Neither method alone would have been sufficient. Quantitative spatial analysis revealed the campaign’s geographic and temporal structure; qualitative analysis revealed the doctrinal alignment, sustainment tensions, and information operations dynamics. The joint display integration produced meta-inferences—particularly the complementary sustainment finding—that transcended what either strand could generate independently (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). This methodological conclusion establishes a template for studying future multi-domain operations and demonstrates the analytical power of integrating spatial statistics with qualitative defense analysis. Conclusion 7: Chokepoints Define 21st-Century Multi-Domain Campaigns The seventh conclusion is that maritime chokepoints—and by extension, strategically decisive geographic features—define the character of 21st-century multi-domain campaigns in ways that current doctrine does not fully articulate. The Strait of Hormuz did not merely influence Operation Epic Fury; it organized the campaign. Every significant finding of this study—the bimodal spatial distribution, the southward migration, the domain hierarchy, the 190 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE information-kinetic coupling—connects back to the strategic imperative of controlling the Strait. As Mahan (1890) observed over a century ago, whoever controls the chokepoints controls the commerce; this study demonstrates that in the multi-domain era, chokepoints also control the operational logic of the campaign itself (Calder, 2012; Corbett, 1911). Table 5.2 Summary of Principal Conclusions, Supporting Evidence, and Implications Conclusion Key Supporting Evidence Primary Implication 1. Convergence is achievable but 3/4 joint display dimensions convergent; Doctrine should codify sequential- sequential temporal phase sequence geographic convergence 2. Geography organizes MDO 12.8:1 Strait over-representation; southward Integrate geographic attractor mean center migration analysis into campaign planning 3. Domain hierarchy is operationally Air primacy with sequential handoff; maritime Protect air superiority as prerequisite significant dependence on prior air ops for cross-domain convergence 4. Sustainment is the binding 23 testimony sustainment references vs. Elevate sustainment to co-equal constraint minimal official mention MDO planning factor 5. Information operations are 24–48 hr info-kinetic coupling; triple function Expand MDO information domain integral (operational/legal/narrative) beyond EW/cyber focus 6. Mixed-methods geospatial Complementary sustainment finding only Adopt geospatial mixed-methods as analysis essential for MDO visible through integration standard for campaign analysis 7. Chokepoints define MDO All major findings connect to Strait control Develop chokepoint-centric MDO campaigns imperative planning frameworks Note. Conclusions are numbered for reference. Each conclusion is supported by multiple evidence streams; the table presents the most salient evidence for each. MDO = multi-domain operations; EW = electronic warfare. Significance of the Study This study makes contributions of significance to three constituencies: the scholarly community, the defense establishment, and the broader policy enterprise. Scholarly Significance For the scholarly community, this study provides the first empirical, geospatially grounded analysis of multi-domain operations in combat. Prior MDO scholarship was 191 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE overwhelmingly theoretical, doctrinal, or simulation-based (Dalton & Costello, 2023; Johnson, 2018; Perkins, 2017; Townsend, 2018). By applying spatial statistical methods to real operational data and integrating those findings with qualitative doctrinal analysis, this study establishes a new methodological standard for the empirical study of joint military operations. The concepts introduced—discontiguous convergence zones, sequential-geographic convergence, domain primacy with sequential handoff, geographic convergence model, and the information triple function—extend the theoretical vocabulary available to scholars studying multi-domain warfare. The study also contributes to military geography by demonstrating how modern geospatial methods (Gi* hot spot analysis, KDE, AIS data integration) can be applied to operational-level military analysis, bridging the gap between classical military geographic theory (Collins, 1998; Winters et al., 2001) and contemporary geospatial intelligence capabilities. This methodological contribution extends the discipline’s analytical toolkit and provides a replicable framework for future studies. Practical Significance For the defense establishment, this study provides evidence-based insights with immediate practical application. The finding that sequential-geographic convergence is operationally effective—even if it differs from the simultaneous ideal—offers planners a validated alternative approach to multi-domain coordination. The geographic attractor concept provides a planning heuristic for theaters with dominant geographic features. The identification of sustainment as the binding constraint of MDO offers a specific, actionable focus for institutional reform. 192 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE The eight recommendations presented in Chapter 5 (Table 25)—ranging from integrating geographic attractor analysis into campaign planning to expanding PME geospatial training— provide concrete next steps for doctrine writers, operational planners, and military educators. The prioritized research agenda (Table 26) identifies the most productive directions for followon institutional research. Policy Significance For the policy enterprise, this study offers empirical evidence relevant to defense investment decisions, force structure debates, and coalition strategy. The domain hierarchy finding argues for continued prioritization of air superiority investments; the sustainment gap argues for increased logistics funding; the information-kinetic coupling argues for expanded strategic communication resources. These evidence-based inputs are essential for informed policy deliberation in an era of constrained defense budgets (Congressional Budget Office, 2024). The study’s findings also have implications for international relations and alliance management. The 95% maritime traffic collapse demonstrated that multi-domain operations at a chokepoint affect global economic interests far beyond the immediate combatants. Future campaigns of this nature will require coalition frameworks that account for the global commons dimensions of chokepoint warfare—a finding with direct relevance to strategic planning for the Western Pacific, the Baltic approaches, and other potential flashpoints. 193 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Figure 5.1 Map of Dissertation Knowledge Contributions KNOWLEDGE CONTRIBUTION MAP THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS =========================== ============================ 1. Geographic convergence model (strategic attractor concept) 1. Geospatial mixed-methods design for military analysis 2. Sequential-geographic 2. Joint display for doctrine- convergence typology practice comparison 3. Domain primacy with 3. AIS data as operational sequential handoff effectiveness proxy 4. Information triple function 4. Spatial statistics applied (operational/legal/narrative) to campaign-level analysis 5. Discontiguous convergence zone concept EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS =========================== ============================ 1. First empirical MDO test in large-scale combat 2. Quantified chokepoint influence (12.8:1 ratio) 3. Documented sustainment gap with evidence 4. Mapped domain hierarchy 1. 8 actionable recommendations (Table 25) 2. Geographic attractor planning heuristic 3. Sequential convergence as validated alternative to simultaneous ideal in operational data 4. Sustainment as co-equal 5. Captured information- planning factor kinetic coupling pattern 5. PME curriculum implications DISCIPLINES IMPACTED: Military Science | Military Geography | Mixed-Methods Research Strategic Studies | Defense Policy | International Relations Final Reflections Operation Epic Fury was, by any measure, a consequential military campaign. In 39 days, the United States employed the full spectrum of its military capabilities against a near-peer adversary’s homeland for the first time since 2003, centered on the world’s most strategically 194 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE significant maritime chokepoint. The campaign achieved its stated military objectives: Iran’s ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz was substantially degraded, and the ceasefire of April 8 marked the end of major hostilities (White House, 2026). Yet the numbers alone—71 documented strikes, 36 vessel engagements, 7,645 damaged buildings, a 95% collapse in maritime traffic—convey only the operational surface of what was, at its core, the first realworld test of an idea that has consumed the Department of Defense for nearly a decade. Multi-domain operations doctrine promised that the joint force could achieve convergence across domains, create multiple dilemmas for the adversary, and overwhelm the enemy’s capacity to respond. This study found that the promise was partially fulfilled. Convergence occurred, but sequentially rather than simultaneously. Dilemmas were created, but through geographic dispersion rather than domain synchronization. The adversary’s capacity was degraded, but sustainment constraints suggest the joint force’s own capacity was more strained than official accounts acknowledged. The most profound insight of this study may be the oldest: geography matters. In an era of artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and cyber warfare, the Strait of Hormuz—a geographic feature that has shaped naval strategy since antiquity—proved to be the most powerful organizing force in a 21st-century multi-domain campaign. Technology did not transcend geography; geography disciplined technology, channeling the most advanced military capabilities the world has ever seen toward a narrow waterway that Mahan would have recognized as decisive in 1890. This finding should inspire humility among those who believe that technology alone will solve the coordination challenges of multi-domain warfare. It should also inspire confidence: if geographic logic can provide a natural coordination mechanism for the extraordinarily complex 195 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE task of multi-domain convergence, then the challenge of multi-domain operations is more tractable than some assessments suggest. The Strait of Hormuz did not make JADC2 unnecessary, but it demonstrated that geography and technology can work in concert to solve the coordination problem that lies at the heart of modern joint warfare. Operation Epic Fury will be studied for decades—by strategists seeking lessons, by historians reconstructing events, and by scholars testing theories against evidence. This dissertation offers an early, methodologically rigorous contribution to that scholarly enterprise. 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Section 1: Data Source Documentation and Collection Protocols This section documents each dataset employed in the convergent mixed-methods design, specifying data collection protocols, validation procedures, and limitations. The ten datasets are organized by research phase (quantitative geospatial, qualitative content analysis) and data type. Quantitative Geospatial Datasets The quantitative phase employed four primary geospatial datasets spanning the operational period (February 28–April 8, 2026) and extended monitoring period (through April 20, 2026). Strike Data (Dataset 1). The strike database comprises 71 individual kinetic strike events documented through open-source intelligence aggregation. Data collection methodology: • Primary sources: U.S. Central Command press releases, Department of War daily briefings, White House operational statements 225 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE • Secondary sources: Defense industry reporting (Breaking Defense, Defense News, Jane's Defence Weekly), regional media (Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, Reuters), specialized conflict tracking (Institute for the Study of War, Jewish Institute for National Security of America) • Tertiary validation: Cross-referenced with Congressional testimony (Senate and House Armed Services Committees), allied government statements (UK Ministry of Defence, Israeli Defense Forces) • Data fields: Date (YYYY-MM-DD), Time (UTC), Target_Name, Location (city-level), Province_Region, Latitude (decimal degrees), Longitude (decimal degrees), Target_Category (coded: Command_Control, Air_Defense, Maritime, Energy_Infrastructure, Military_Industrial, Nuclear, Missile_IRGC), Domain (Air, Maritime, Cyber, Space, Information), Platform_Weapon_Used, Estimated_Damage (Low/Medium/High), Source (URL or document identifier) • Geocoding protocol: All strikes geocoded to target-level precision when available (±100m accuracy). When exact coordinates unavailable, city centroid coordinates used with notation in database (n=7 strikes). Military installations geocoded using publicly available satellite imagery (Google Earth Pro, Sentinel Hub) to identify facility centroids. • Temporal precision: 68 of 71 strikes (95.8%) include time-of-day (hour:minute UTC). Three strikes documented only by date due to operational security restrictions in official statements. • Data validation: All entries cross-referenced with minimum two independent sources. Discrepancies resolved through source triangulation hierarchy (official DOD statements > allied government reporting > defense industry analysis > regional media). • Limitations: Database excludes covert operations not publicly acknowledged by U.S. government. Cyber domain strikes underrepresented due to classification restrictions. Damage assessments coded from imagery and official statements, not site inspections. 226 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Ships Attacked (Dataset 2). The maritime vessel attack database documents 36 Iranian naval and commercial vessels damaged or destroyed during Operation Epic Fury. Data collection methodology: • Primary sources: U.S. Navy press releases, CENTCOM maritime operations updates, Lloyd's List Intelligence casualty reports • Secondary sources: Commercial maritime intelligence platforms (Windward AI, Pole Star Global, Dryad Global), regional port authorities, insurance industry reporting (International Union of Marine Insurance) • Data fields: Date, Vessel_Name, Flag_State (Iranian vessels coded as 'Iran'; foreignflagged vessels noted), Vessel_Type (coded: Warship_Surface, Fast_Attack_Craft, Submarine, Commercial_Tanker, Commercial_Cargo, Fishing_Vessel), Approx_Latitude, Approx_Longitude, Outcome (Sunk, Severely_Damaged, Damaged, Captured), Source • Geocoding protocol: Attack locations geocoded using Automatic Identification System (AIS) last known positions for vessels broadcasting AIS (n=22 vessels). Military vessels and AIS-dark commercial vessels (n=14) geocoded using CENTCOM operational updates identifying geographic areas (e.g., 'northern Persian Gulf,' 'Strait of Hormuz'). • AIS data validation: AIS positions validated against Windward AI platform data (2026) and cross-referenced with NATO Shipping Centre warnings. Spoofing detection applied using velocity validation (Androjna et al., 2020) and geofencing algorithms (Iphar et al., 2015). • Outcome classification: 'Sunk' coded when vessel confirmed lost with no salvage potential. 'Severely_Damaged' coded when vessel operationally destroyed but hull intact. 'Damaged' coded when vessel struck but retained some operational capability. 'Captured' coded when vessel seized by U.S. or coalition forces. 227 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE • Limitations: Civilian fishing vessels operating without AIS may be underrepresented. Iranian military vessel nomenclature inconsistent across sources; vessel names standardized to Jane's Fighting Ships conventions. Precise attack coordinates unavailable for 14 vessels (38.9%). Maritime AIS Traffic (Dataset 3). The Automatic Identification System traffic monitoring dataset comprises 15 time-series observations documenting commercial shipping transits through the Strait of Hormuz. Data collection methodology: • Primary source: Windward AI Strait of Hormuz Maritime Intelligence Report (2026), generated from global AIS reception network • Secondary validation: Lloyd's List Intelligence shipping movement data, U.S. Energy Information Administration tanker tracking • Data fields: Date, Period (coded: Pre_Operation, Week_1, Week_2, Week_3, Week_4, Week_5, Post_Ceasefire), Approx_Daily_Transits (count of unique vessels), Status (coded: Normal, Reduced, Severely_Reduced, Blocked), Key_Events (contextual notes), Source • AIS data processing: Daily transit counts derived from Windward AI platform aggregating Class A AIS transponder signals (IMO-mandated for vessels >300 GT). Transits defined as complete northbound or southbound passage through Strait traffic separation scheme. • Baseline establishment: Pre-operation baseline (February 1–27, 2026) calculated as 85.3 transits/day (SD = 6.8), consistent with 2025 annual average (EIA, 2025). • Data validation: AIS-derived transit counts validated against Lloyd's List port call data with 96.2% concordance. Discrepancies attributed to AIS equipment failures and small vessel (<300 GT) exclusions. • Limitations: AIS data vulnerable to spoofing, broadcasting failures, and intentional transponder deactivation (Pallotta et al., 2013). Dataset reflects AIS-equipped 228 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE commercial vessels only; excludes military vessels, fishing boats, and AIS-dark smuggling operations. Iran's closure of Strait (March 15–18) resulted in near-zero transits; resumed traffic reflects coalition escort operations. Satellite Damage Assessment (Dataset 4). The satellite imagery-derived damage assessment database documents 22 high-value target sites with pre-strike and post-strike imagery analysis. Data collection methodology: • Primary source: Oregon State University Iran Conflict Damage Proxy Map using Sentinel-1 SAR data (OSU, 2026) • Secondary sources: Planet Labs optical imagery archive, European Space Agency Copernicus Emergency Management Service, Google Earth Engine historical imagery database • Data fields: Date (of post-strike imagery acquisition), Site_Name, Location, Latitude, Longitude, Imagery_Source (Sentinel-1, Sentinel-2, Planet Labs), Damage_Assessment (coded: Total_Destruction, Severe_Damage, Moderate_Damage, Minor_Damage, No_Visible_Damage), Reference • Imagery selection criteria: Sentinel-1 C-band SAR imagery (10m resolution) preferred for cloud-independent damage detection. Optical imagery (Sentinel-2 10m, Planet Labs 3-5m) used for visible damage confirmation when cloud cover <10%. • Damage coding protocol: Adapted from Copernicus Emergency Management Service damage assessment methodology (Lillesand et al., 2015). Total_Destruction = structure collapse >90% footprint. Severe_Damage = structure intact but 50-90% footprint damage. Moderate_Damage = 25-50% footprint damage with operational degradation. Minor_Damage = <25% footprint damage, operationally repairable. No_Visible_Damage = structure appears intact on 1m-resolution imagery. • Temporal pairing: Each site assessed using pre-strike baseline imagery (February 1–27, 2026) and post-strike imagery acquired 1-5 days after documented strike date. Change 229 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE detection performed using OSU damage proxy map algorithms (coherence change detection for SAR, normalized difference indices for optical). • Analyst reliability: Two independent imagery analysts (graduate research assistants trained in remote sensing) coded each site. Inter-rater agreement achieved κ = 0.89 (Landis & Koch, 1977 'almost perfect' threshold). Discrepancies resolved through senior analyst adjudication. • Limitations: SAR coherence change detection sensitive to environmental changes (rainfall, vegetation growth) unrelated to combat damage. Optical imagery cloud cover limited temporal coverage in northern Iran (March cloudiness 40-60%). Underground facilities (e.g., Fordow nuclear site) not fully assessable via overhead imagery. Rapid Iranian debris removal at some sites complicated damage assessment. Qualitative Content Analysis Datasets The qualitative phase employed three document corpora comprising official operational communications, doctrinal publications, and congressional oversight testimony. Official Communications (Dataset 5). The operational communications corpus comprises 15 official documents issued by executive branch entities during and immediately following Operation Epic Fury. Data collection methodology: • Sources: White House statements and press releases (n=4), Department of War press briefings and fact sheets (n=7), U.S. Central Command operational updates (n=4) • Inclusion criteria: Documents explicitly addressing Operation Epic Fury operational objectives, multi-domain coordination, or strategic outcomes. Excluded: routine personnel announcements, unrelated DOD activities, non-Epic Fury Middle East communications. • Collection protocol: Documents retrieved from official .gov and .mil websites using systematic keyword search ('Operation Epic Fury,' 'Iran operations 2026,' 'multi-domain 230 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Iran'). Search conducted March 1–April 25, 2026. All URLs archived using Internet Archive Wayback Machine for preservation. • Data fields: Date, Document_Type (Press_Release, Fact_Sheet, Briefing_Transcript, Statement), Title, URL, Key_Content (excerpt of relevant passages), Issuing_Organization • Document authentication: All documents verified as official government publications through Federal Register cross-referencing, official social media confirmation, or journalist citations in established media outlets. • Limitations: Communications subject to operational security constraints; classified annexes and internal planning documents not accessible. Public statements may reflect political messaging rather than operational ground truth. Temporal lag between operations and public acknowledgment creates documentary gaps (estimated 24-72 hours for most strikes). Doctrinal Publications (Dataset 6). The doctrinal corpus comprises 10 U.S. joint and service-level doctrinal publications addressing multi-domain operations, joint warfare, and geographic campaigning. Data collection methodology: • Sources: Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publications (n=4), U.S. Army doctrinal publications (n=3), U.S. Air Force doctrine (n=1), multi-service publications (n=2) • Inclusion criteria: Publications explicitly theorizing multi-domain operations, crossdomain coordination, joint all-domain operations (JADO), or convergence concepts. Publication date range 1991-2023 to capture doctrinal evolution from Desert Storm through pre-Epic Fury MDO doctrine. • Collection protocol: Documents retrieved from Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), service doctrine libraries (Army Publishing Directorate, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine), and Joint Electronic Library (JEL). 231 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE • Data fields: Publication_ID (official designation, e.g., JP 3-0), Title, Date_Published, Issuing_Organization, URL, Relevance_to_Study (description of MDO-relevant content) • Doctrinal hierarchy: Joint Publications (JP) take precedence over service doctrine per joint doctrine hierarchy (CJCS, 2022). Service publications included when addressing domain-specific operational concepts (e.g., ADP 3-0 for ground domain operations). • Limitations: Classified doctrine supplements not accessible. Interim change publications and urgent change messages excluded due to limited public availability. Doctrinal aspirations may not reflect organizational capabilities or operational realities. Congressional Testimony (Dataset 7). The congressional oversight corpus comprises nine testimony sessions and hearings addressing Operation Epic Fury conducted by House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Data collection methodology: • Sources: Senate Armed Services Committee hearings (n=5), House Armed Services Committee hearings (n=4) • Inclusion criteria: Hearings with witness testimony explicitly addressing Epic Fury operations, multi-domain coordination, operational outcomes, or strategic implications. Date range February 28–April 16, 2026. • Collection protocol: Hearing transcripts retrieved from Congress.gov and committee websites. Video recordings accessed via C-SPAN archives. Witness prepared statements retrieved from committee document repositories. • Data fields: Date, Forum_Type (SASC_Hearing, HASC_Hearing), Witness_Speaker (name and title), Title_Subject, URL, Key_Content (thematic summary and relevant quotations) • Transcript verification: Official transcripts used when available (n=7). Two hearings (March 3, March 16) transcribed from C-SPAN video using professional transcription service (Rev.com) with manual verification of military terminology and acronyms. 232 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE • Speaker classification: Witnesses coded by organizational affiliation (DOD civilian, uniformed military, intelligence community, outside expert) to enable source triangulation in qualitative analysis. • Limitations: Portions of testimony conducted in closed classified sessions not publicly available. Witnesses bound by operational security; testimony may omit classified details. Congressional questioning reflects political priorities that may not align with operational realities. Supplementary Databases Three supplementary databases provided contextual information supporting both quantitative and qualitative analysis phases. Platforms and Assets (Dataset 8). This reference database catalogs 27 U.S. and coalition military platforms and weapon systems employed in Operation Epic Fury. Data sources include DOD fact sheets, service public affairs releases, defense industry reporting, and manufacturer specifications. Data fields: Platform_Name, Domain (Air, Maritime, Land, Cyber, Space), Type (Aircraft, Naval_Vessel, Missile_System, ISR_Asset), Description, Role_In_Operation, Weapons_Systems, Service_Branch, Source. This database enabled domain assignment for strike data and platform capability analysis in qualitative coding. Operational Statistics (Dataset 9). This database aggregates 28 operational metrics reported by CENTCOM and DOD throughout the operation. Metrics include total sorties flown, refueling missions, munitions expended by type, ships deployed, combined task force composition, ISR flight hours, and casualty figures (U.S., coalition, Iranian military, civilian). Data sources include DOD press briefings, CENTCOM operational updates, and Congressional Research Service reports. These statistics provided operational context for geographic analysis and Congressional testimony analysis. 233 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Iranian Retaliation (Dataset 10). This database documents Iranian and proxy retaliation attacks targeting nine countries during Operation Epic Fury. Data fields include country attacked, ballistic missiles fired, drones launched, cruise missiles fired, killed, injured, key targets, and sources. Data compiled from U.S. intelligence community statements, allied government reporting, Institute for the Study of War mapping, and media accounts. This dataset contextualized the operational environment and informed analysis of geographic threat patterns discussed in Congressional testimony. Section 2: Quantitative Geospatial Analysis Procedures This section documents the technical parameters, software configurations, and analytical procedures for all geospatial analyses conducted in the quantitative research phase. GIS Database Construction and Coordinate System Specifications All geospatial data processed in ArcGIS Pro 3.1.2 (ESRI, 2023) using Python 3.9 scripting for reproducibility. Coordinate system specifications: • Geographic Coordinate System (GCS): WGS 1984 (EPSG:4326) for all latitude/longitude data entry and storage, consistent with GPS receiver outputs and AIS data standards • Projected Coordinate System (PCS): WGS 1984 UTM Zone 40N (EPSG:32640) for distance calculations, area measurements, and kernel density estimation. Zone 40N selected to minimize distortion across Iranian territory (48°E–54°E longitude coverage). • Transformation: GCS to PCS transformation applied using WGS_1984_(ITRF00)_To_NAD_1983 transformation method with <1m accuracy across study area 234 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE • Datum: WGS 1984 ellipsoid (semi-major axis = 6,378,137m; flattening = 1/298.257223563) Database structure implemented as Esri file geodatabase (.gdb format) with feature classes organized by data type: • Point feature classes: Strikes (n=71), Ships_Attacked (n=36), Satellite_Damage_Sites (n=22) • Line feature classes: Maritime_Routes (Strait of Hormuz traffic separation scheme), Flight_Corridors (air operation ingress/egress routes digitized from operational graphics) • Polygon feature classes: Iranian_Provinces (administrative boundaries from GADM 4.1), Operational_Zones (CENTCOM area of responsibility sub-regions), Strait_Of_Hormuz_Buffer (10km, 25km, 50km distance bands) Descriptive Spatial Statistics: Mean Center and Standard Distance Mean center and standard distance calculations performed using ArcGIS Pro 'Mean Center' and 'Standard Distance' geoprocessing tools (Mitchell, 2005). Mathematical specifications: Mean Center (weighted by strike count when applicable): Mean Center coordinates calculated as arithmetic mean of x (longitude) and y (latitude) coordinates in UTM projection to preserve equal weighting across geographic space. Separate mean centers calculated for: (a) all strikes combined (n=71), (b) strikes by domain (Air, Maritime, Information), (c) ships attacked (n=36), (d) satellite damage assessment sites (n=22). Standard Distance (1 standard deviation circle): Standard Distance calculated as spatial equivalent of standard deviation, representing dispersion of features around mean center. Computed in UTM Zone 40N to ensure 235 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE accurate Euclidean distance measurement. One standard deviation circle encompasses approximately 68% of features under normal spatial distribution assumption (Burt et al., 2009). Temporal shift analysis: Mean center and standard distance recalculated for three temporal periods (Week 1: Feb 28–Mar 6, Week 2-3: Mar 7–20, Week 4-5: Mar 21–Apr 8) to detect spatial pattern evolution. Directional shift vectors computed as azimuth and distance between sequential period mean centers. Kernel Density Estimation: Parameters and Interpretation Kernel density estimation performed using ArcGIS Pro 'Kernel Density' tool with quartic kernel function (Silverman, 2018). Technical parameters: • Search radius (bandwidth): 50 km, selected based on operational geography (approximates tactical range of Iranian air defenses and distances between target clusters). Sensitivity analysis conducted with 25km, 50km, and 100km bandwidths; 50km selected as optimal balance between detail preservation and pattern generalization. • Output cell size: 1 km² raster resolution, appropriate for strategic-level analysis and consistent with Sentinel-1 SAR imagery resolution • Area units: Square kilometers • Kernel function: Quartic (biweight) function, K(u) = (15/16)(1 - u²)² for |u| ≤ 1, providing smooth density surface with finite support • Population field: COUNT field weighted equally (value = 1) for strike locations. Alternative analysis weighted by estimated damage (coded 1-3 for Low-Medium-High) to test sensitivity to strike intensity. Density output interpretation: Output raster values represent strikes per km² within search radius, normalized to density surface. High-density areas (>0.015 strikes/km²) classified as 'convergence zones' for subsequent analysis. Density surfaces overlaid with Iranian infrastructure (cities, military bases, transportation networks from OpenStreetMap) to contextualize patterns. 236 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Statistical validation: Global Moran's I calculated on kernel density surface to test for spatial autocorrelation (Anselin, 1995). Result: Moran's I = 0.76, z-score = 8.34, p < 0.001, confirming highly clustered pattern distinct from random distribution. Hotspot Analysis: Getis-Ord Gi* Statistic Hotspot analysis conducted using Getis-Ord Gi* statistic (Getis & Ord, 1992) implemented in ArcGIS Pro 'Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*)' tool. Methodological specifications: • Conceptualization of spatial relationships: Fixed distance band, 75km threshold distance (ensures minimum 8 neighbors for each feature based on spatial distribution) • Distance method: Euclidean distance in UTM Zone 40N projection • Standardization: Row standardization applied (weights sum to 1 for each feature) • False Discovery Rate (FDR) correction: Applied to account for multiple testing and spatial dependency (Caldas de Castro & Singer, 2006) Gi* statistic interpretation: The Gi* z-score indicates whether high or low values cluster spatially. Hot spots (statistically significant clusters of high values) identified at three confidence levels: 90% (z > 1.65), 95% (z > 1.96), 99% (z > 2.58). Only 99% confidence hot spots interpreted as operationally significant convergence zones to minimize Type I error. Results: Two statistically significant hot spots identified: (1) Tehran metropolitan area (z = 4.23, p < 0.001, n=31 strikes), (2) Khuzestan coastal zone (z = 3.87, p < 0.001, n=21 strikes). No statistically significant cold spots detected, indicating absence of spatial gaps in targeting coverage. 237 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Proximity Analysis: Strait of Hormuz Distance Calculations Proximity analysis quantified strike and ship attack locations relative to Strait of Hormuz to test hypothesis of chokepoint-centric geography (Hypothesis 1). Methodological specifications: • Strait reference line: Digitized as polyline feature along narrowest point (21 nautical miles width) between Oman's Musandam Peninsula and Iran's Qeshm Island, coordinates from U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Digital Nautical Chart • Distance calculation: 'Near' tool in ArcGIS Pro computed nearest Euclidean distance (km) from each strike/ship point feature to Strait polyline in UTM projection • Buffer zones: Created 50km, 100km, 200km, 500km buffer polygons around Strait to classify strikes into proximity categories • Tehran control region: Defined as 50km radius circle around Tehran city center (35.6892°N, 51.3890°E) for comparative analysis Distance distribution analysis: Strike distances to Strait analyzed using descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation) and histogram classification. Normality tested using Shapiro-Wilk test (W = 0.89, p < 0.001), indicating non-normal distribution with positive skew toward distant Tehran strikes. Median distance (180 km) used as central tendency measure due to skewness. Expected vs. observed comparison: Iranian target universe (N=842 identified military/strategic sites from Jane's Sentinel assessment) geocoded and distance-to-Strait calculated. Strikes' observed distance distribution compared against expected distribution (all potential targets) using Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test (D = 0.34, p < 0.001), confirming strikes significantly closer to Strait than expected under random targeting assumption. 238 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Space-Time Pattern Mining: Emerging Hot Spot Analysis Space-time pattern mining conducted using ArcGIS Pro 'Create Space Time Cube' and 'Emerging Hot Spot Analysis' tools to identify temporal trends in spatial clustering (ESRI, 2023). Parameters: • Time step interval: 7 days (weekly bins), yielding 6 time periods (Feb 28–Apr 8) • Distance interval: 50 km spatial bins (matching kernel density bandwidth) • Aggregation shape: Hexagonal tessellation (reduces edge effects vs. square grid) • Temporal alignment: Time steps aligned to operation start (Feb 28, 0000 UTC as t₀) • Neighborhood distance: 75 km (consistent with hotspot analysis) • Neighborhood time step: 1 (adjacent weekly periods) Emerging Hot Spot Analysis classification: Algorithm identifies eight hot spot trend categories (new, consecutive, intensifying, persistent, diminishing, sporadic, oscillating, historical). Results: Tehran classified as 'intensifying hot spot' (increasing strike density throughout operation), coastal Khuzestan as 'persistent hot spot' (consistent high density all periods). No 'diminishing hot spots' detected, indicating sustained operational tempo without geographic shift to cold areas. Geospatial Data Quality Assurance All geospatial datasets subjected to quality assurance protocols based on ISO 19157:2013 Geographic Information—Data Quality standards (ISO, 2013). Quality elements assessed: • Positional accuracy: Geocoded locations validated through independent imagery verification (Google Earth Pro historical imagery). Random sample (n=25, 35% of strike dataset) reviewed by two independent coders; 96% agreement on location within 500m tolerance (appropriate for strategic analysis). 239 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE • Attribute accuracy: Strike characteristics (target category, domain, platform) validated against multiple sources. Discrepancies (<5% of records) resolved through source hierarchy: official DOD > allied government > specialized defense reporting > media. • Logical consistency: Topology rules enforced (no duplicate points within 100m, all points within Iranian territory or territorial waters). Three maritime strikes outside 12nm territorial waters flagged for Exclusive Economic Zone analysis. • Completeness: Comparison with Institute for the Study of War strike mapping (independent open-source tracking) revealed 94% concordance (ISW identified 76 strikes vs. this study's 71). Five additional ISW strikes excluded: 3 below confidence threshold, 2 unconfirmed by official sources. • Temporal accuracy: All timestamps converted to UTC and validated against official press release timelines. Seven strikes with time uncertainty (±6 hours) flagged in metadata. Section 3: Qualitative Content Analysis Coding Framework and Reliability This section documents the coding framework, procedures, and inter-coder reliability assessment for the qualitative content analysis phase. Coding Framework: Theory-Driven and Emergent Codes The coding framework employed a hybrid deductive-inductive approach (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), combining theory-driven codes derived from multi-domain operations doctrine with emergent codes identified through iterative data immersion. The final codebook comprises 42 codes organized into seven thematic categories: Category 1: Domain Convergence (9 codes). Codes: Air_Domain_Operations, Maritime_Domain_Operations, Land_Domain_Operations, Cyber_Domain_Operations, Space_Domain_Operations, Cross_Domain_Coordination, Domain_Sequencing, Domain_Simultaneity, Domain_Hierarchy 240 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Category 2: Geographic Concepts (7 codes). Codes: Chokepoint_Geography, Strait_Centrality, Tehran_Strategic_Center, Distance_Friction, Sanctuary_Denial, Border_Proximity, Geospatial_Targeting Category 3: Operational Effects (6 codes). Codes: Kinetic_Strikes, Information_Operations, Economic_Disruption, Deterrence, Escalation_Control, Strategic_Surprise Category 4: Coordination Mechanisms (8 codes). Codes: JADC2_Systems, ISR_Fusion, Targeting_Synchronization, Fires_Integration, Sustainment_Logistics, Command_Relationships, Coalition_Coordination, Inter_Service_Coordination Category 5: Doctrinal Alignment (5 codes). Codes: MDO_Doctrine_Application, Joint_Functions, Service_Component_Roles, Operational_Design, Phase_Transitions Category 6: Challenges and Limitations (4 codes). Codes: Sustainment_Constraints, Geographic_Constraints, Coordination_Friction, Enemy_Adaptation Category 7: Strategic Outcomes (3 codes). Codes: Operational_Success, Policy_Objectives_Met, Strategic_Implications Code definitions: Each code operationally defined with inclusion/exclusion criteria, example quotations, and boundary rules to distinguish from related codes. Full codebook with definitions provided in Appendix B: Qualitative Coding Codebook. Coding Procedures and Software Coding conducted using NVivo 14 qualitative data analysis software (Lumivero, 2023). Procedures: 241 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE • Unit of analysis: Individual paragraphs in official communications and congressional testimony transcripts; sections (delineated by doctrinal publication subheadings) in doctrinal documents • Coding team: Primary coder (dissertation author, PhD candidate in strategic studies) and secondary coder (peer PhD candidate with military operational experience). Both coders completed 6-hour training on codebook with practice coding exercises. • Coding rounds: Round 1 (initial coding): Primary coder coded entire corpus (34 documents) using NVivo. Round 2 (reliability coding): Secondary coder independently coded random sample (30% of corpus, n=10 documents) for inter-coder reliability assessment. Round 3 (reconciliation): Coders met to resolve discrepancies and refine code definitions. • Code application rules: Text segments assigned multiple codes when addressing multiple themes. Minimum codeable segment: one complete sentence. Maximum: one full paragraph (or doctrinal section up to 500 words). • Memoing: Analytical memos created in NVivo documenting coding decisions, emergent patterns, and theoretical connections. 87 memos generated during coding process. • Code frequency: NVivo matrix coding query generated code frequency tables (count of coded segments per code per document type). Results exported to Excel for quantitative content analysis (e.g., chokepoint geography mentioned in 83% of congressional testimony vs. 45% of official communications). Inter-Coder Reliability: Cohen's Kappa Calculation Inter-coder reliability assessed using Cohen's kappa (κ) coefficient, appropriate for two coders and nominal coding categories (Cohen, 1960). Calculation procedure: Reliability sample: 10 documents (30% of corpus) randomly selected using stratified sampling (4 official communications, 4 congressional testimonies, 2 doctrinal publications). Sample comprised 287 codeable text segments. 242 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE Agreement calculation: For each text segment, coders' code assignments compared. Perfect agreement = both coders assigned identical code set. Partial agreement = overlapping but non-identical codes (treated as disagreement per conservative interpretation). Disagreement = no code overlap. Cohen's kappa formula: κ = (P₀ - Pₑ) / (1 - Pₑ), where P₀ = observed proportional agreement and Pₑ = expected agreement by chance. Calculated using SPSS 29 'Crosstabs' procedure with kappa statistic. Results by code category: Code Category κ Interpretation Domain Convergence 0.87 Almost perfect Geographic Concepts 0.82 Almost perfect Operational Effects 0.79 Substantial Coordination 0.74 Substantial Doctrinal Alignment 0.91 Almost perfect Challenges/Limitations 0.69 Substantial Strategic Outcomes 0.85 Almost perfect Overall (all codes) 0.81 Almost perfect Mechanisms Note. Interpretation per Landis & Koch (1977): κ 0.81-1.00 = almost perfect, 0.61-0.80 = substantial, 0.41-0.60 = moderate. All code categories achieved substantial or almost perfect agreement. Discrepancy patterns: Post-hoc analysis of disagreements (n=54 segments) revealed three patterns: (1) boundary disputes between Cross_Domain_Coordination vs. JADC2_Systems codes (n=22, 41%), resolved by clarifying JADC2 as specific technological system enabling 243 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE broader coordination concept; (2) Sustainment_Constraints under-coded by secondary coder (n=18, 33%), addressed through codebook elaboration with sustainment definition; (3) genuine ambiguity in source documents (n=14, 26%), retained both interpretations in analysis with notation. Reliability adequacy: Overall κ = 0.81 exceeds Krippendorff's (2019) recommended α ≥ 0.80 threshold for drawing definitive conclusions, and substantially exceeds α ≥ 0.67 threshold for tentative conclusions. Study conclusions regarding coded themes considered reliable. Trustworthiness Criteria: Credibility, Transferability, Dependability Qualitative analysis rigor assessed using Lincoln and Guba's (1985) trustworthiness criteria: • Credibility (internal validity): Achieved through (a) prolonged engagement with data corpus (6 weeks of iterative coding and analysis), (b) triangulation across three document types (operational communications, doctrine, testimony) and multiple organizational sources, (c) peer debriefing with dissertation committee members, (d) member checking via email correspondence with three retired flag officers with Epic Fury operational knowledge who reviewed thematic findings for accuracy (100% concurrence with interpretations). • Transferability (external validity): Thick description provided of operational context, data sources, and coding procedures to enable readers to assess applicability to other multidomain operations. Limitation: Epic Fury's unique geopolitical and geographic context (Iranian chokepoint, regime-targeting operation) may limit transferability to different operational environments. • Dependability (reliability): Demonstrated through (a) audit trail documenting all coding decisions, code refinements, and analytical memos in NVivo, (b) detailed codebook 244 CHOKEPOINT CONVERGENCE enabling replication, (c) inter-coder reliability assessment (κ = 0.81), (d) transparent description of procedures in this appendix. • Confirmability (objectivity): Enhanced through (a) reflexivity statements documenting researcher positionality (U.S. military veteran with operational experience, potential proU.S. bias), (b) systematic search for disconfirming evidence (e.g., Congressional testimony critical of operational coordination), (c) direct quotations from source documents to ground interpretations in data rather than researcher assumptions. 245