(PDF) Cultural Domination: Philosophical Perspectives

Cultural Domination Cultural domination has received attention inside and outside of academia, but it remains under-explored in recent philosophical debate. To fill this gap, this book brings together ten original research contributions that engage the theme from a variety of different perspectives. They range from contributions to the philosophy of social science to advanced work in normative political philosophy. The diversity of approaches reflects the intellectual richness of the theme. Ideas of cultural domination not only raise complex conceptual and methodological questions that can challenge our understandings of domination or culture; such ideas can also play an important role both in explanations of salient social phenomena, such as social structures, and in an evaluation and critique of such phenomena. The diversity of styles of analysis, theoretical commitments, and normative frameworks across the chapters makes this book ideal for advanced undergraduate and graduate students looking for an entry point into this complex issue, as well as for scholars in philosophy, social science, and cultural studies interested in the current state of the art. Thomas M. Besch is Luojia Professor of Philosophy at the School of Philosophy at Wuhan University, and Honorary Associate at the School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry, University of Sydney. He published widely on ideas of public reason and justification, and related ideas of respect and equality, including a monograph on political liberalism, Über John Rawls’ politischen Liberalismus, and articles in journals like the Southern Journal of Philosophy, Philosophia, Social Theory and Practice, or The European Journal of Philosophy, among others. Harold Kincaid is a Senior Research Scholar in the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town. He is the author, editor, or co-editor of 15 books, most recently the Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Political Science. He has published widely on topics in the philosophy of science and social and behavioral sciences in journals such as Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and Philosophy of Social Science, among others. Tarun Menon is an Associate Professor in the School of Arts and Sciences, Azim Premji University, Bengaluru. His publications on the philosophy of science have appeared in journals such as Philosophy of Science and European Journal for Philosophy of Science, among others. Raphael van Riel holds the Chair for Theoretical Philosophy at the Institute for Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen. He has published on a variety of topics in the philosophy of science, metaphysics, and philosophy of language in journals such as Philosophy of Science, The Journal of Philosophy, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, and Synthese. Cultural Domination Philosophical Perspectives Edited by Thomas M. Besch, Harold Kincaid, Tarun Menon, and Raphael van Riel First published 2025 by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 and by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2025 selection and editorial matter, Thomas M. Besch, Harold Kincaid, Tarun Menon, and Raphael van Riel; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Thomas M. Besch, Harold Kincaid, Tarun Menon, and Raphael van Riel to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. ISBN: 978-1-032-77528-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-77527-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-48361-8 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003483618 Typeset in Sabon by SPi Technologies India Pvt Ltd (Straive) Contents Preface List of contributors Introduction to Cultural domination: philosophical perspectives vii viii 1 THOMAS M. BESCH, HAROLD KINCAID, TARUN MENON AND RAPHAEL VAN RIEL 1 Cultural and political domination: a groundwork analysis 18 MIRA BACHVAROVA AND MARGARET MOORE 2 Public justification, political values, and domination 37 THOMAS M. BESCH 3 The Nordic racial hygiene studies: science, reactivity and cultural domination 60 MARION GODMAN 4 Philosophy of science issues in cultural domination 78 HAROLD KINCAID 5 Culture as a form of structural domination 93 HEINER KOCH 6 Domination, culture, and identity in republican theory FRANK LOVETT 119 vi Contents 7 The causal structure of cultural domination 129 TARUN MENON 8 Settler colonialism and the cultural domination of Indigenous peoples 147 PAUL PATTON 9 On the relation between hegemony and domination 167 RAPHAEL VAN RIEL 10 The physiology of cultural domination: Racism, sexism, and telomeres 190 SHANNON SULLIVAN Index 208 Preface Cultural domination has many faces and occurs in many places – this much seems clear. But cultural domination is also philosophically vexing: once we reflect on its nature, or consider how best to account for it, things quickly become elusive. This volume is the outcome of a process of engaging the phenomenon that started in 2020. It struck us, the editors, as surprising that this complex theme did not play a key role in recent philosophical debate, even though some of its elements received much interest – e.g., ideas of domination, social power, the importance of cultural rights and opportunities, or the nature of social facts and social science. To explore matters further, we organized an online workshop in the fall of 2022 that brought together philosophers working on four different continents. At this point, we wish to express our gratitude to all participants for making this event possible – despite all the inconveniences that discussions across many different time zones caused. The volume is a result of this workshop. It brings together ten original current perspectives on cultural domination – perspectives that often differ greatly in their thematic focus, conceptual framework, method, or normative aims. The volume thereby samples the intellectual complexity and richness of the theme, and provides useful resources for further study or research. We also would like to thank Mohammad Wasim, Lukas Baumgarten, and Kai Ploemacher for their valuable assistance in formatting the manuscript. All remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the editors. Contributors Mira Bachvarova is an Associate Professor in the School of Leadership Studies at the University of New Brunswick in Fredericton, Canada. Her work in contemporary political theory explores citizenship, nondomination and legitimacy in multicultural societies. She has published in journals such as the Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, and the Journal of Global Ethics. Thomas M. Besch is Luojia Professor of Philosophy at Wuhan University and Honorary Associate at the School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry, University of Sydney. His research focuses on ideas of public reason and justification, political liberalism, and related ideas of discursive respect and discursive equality. He published widely on these themes, including a monograph on political liberalism, Über John Rawls’ politischen Liberalismus, and papers in journals like the Southern Journal of Philosophy, Philosophia, Theoria, Social Theory and Practice, or The European Journal of Philosophy, among others. Marion Godman is an Associate Professor at the Political Science department at Aarhus University and an Affiliated Scholar at the History and Philosophy of Science department at the University of Cambridge. Her work lies in philosophy of science and in political philosophy and increasingly tries to address concerns in both areas of her research. Her first research monograph, The Epistemology and Morality of Human Kinds (Routledge) was published in 2021 and argues that a historical kinds framework can address both emancipatory and epistemic aims of categorizing people. Harold Kincaid is a Senior Research Scholar in the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town and a long-time contributor to the philosophy of the social and behavioral sciences. He is the author, editor, or co-editor of 14 books in the field and numerous journal articles and book chapters. The most recent (2023) is the Handbook of the Contributors ix Philosophy of Political Science with Jeroen van Bouwel, where he has four chapters on various topics in empirical political science. Heiner Koch is a postdoc at the University of Passau, where he is working on a project on technology ethics. He recently finished his PhD on structural domination. In his research, he has a focus on the philosophy of social science, social metaphysics, technology ethics, and theories of power and domination. His more recent publications deal with debates on socialization (“Vergesellschaftung”) in Germany 1918–2024. Frank Lovett is a Professor of Political Science and Philosophy (by courtesy), and Director of Legal Studies at Washington University in St. Louis. His primary research concerns the role of freedom and domination in developing theories of justice, equality, and the rule of law, and he is the author most recently of The Well-Ordered Republic (2022). Tarun Menon is an Assistant Professor at the School of Arts and Sciences at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru. He works on the philosophy of the natural and social sciences, particularly on topics related to causation, explanation, and scientific inference. He also works on the intersection between philosophy of science and metaphysics, ethics, and political philosophy. His most recent published work has been focused on reformulating and defending the value-free ideal in science. Margaret Moore is Professor in the Political Studies department at Queen’s University, Canada, where she teaches political philosophy. She is the author of Who Should Own the World’s Natural Resources? (2019), A Political Theory of Territory (2015), Ethics of Nationalism (2001), and Foundations of Liberalism (1993). She has published in such journals as Journal of Political Philosophy, Political Theory, and American Journal of Political Science. Paul Patton is Hongyi Chair Professor of Philosophy at Wuhan University, Emeritus Professor of the University of New South Wales, and editor of the Journal of Social and Political Philosophy. He is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and has published widely on French poststructuralist philosophy and contemporary political philosophy, including the rights of colonized indigenous peoples. He is the author of Deleuze and the Political (Routledge, 2000), Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics (2010), editor of Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory (Routledge 1993), Deleuze: A Critical Reader (1996), and co-editor of Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2000). Raphael van Riel is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the Institute for Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen. In the past years, he held a x Contributors senior lecturer position at the Institute for Philosophy, University Duisburg-Essen, and directed the project “A Study in Explanatory Power” (funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, 2012–2022). He has published on various topics in philosophy of science, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and social ontology. His book The Concept of Reduction, published with Springer, came out in 2014. Together with Rebekka Hufendiek and Daniel James, he edited the volume “Social Functions in Philosophy” (Routledge 2020). Shannon Sullivan is a Professor of Philosophy and Health Psychology at The University of North Carolina at Charlotte (USA). She works at the intersections of continental philosophy (especially phenomenology, existentialism, psychoanalytic theory, and genealogical philosophy), feminist philosophy, critical philosophy of race, and American pragmatism. She has published numerous articles and is the author or editor of ten books, including Good White People: The Problem with MiddleClass White Anti-Racism (2014), The Physiology of Sexist and Racist Oppression (2015), White Privilege (2019), and Thinking the US South: Contemporary Philosophy from Southern Perspectives (2021). Introduction to Cultural domination Philosophical perspectives Thomas M. Besch, Harold Kincaid, Tarun Menon and Raphael van Riel Some candidate cases What is cultural domination? How should it be accounted for? What social phenomena instantiate it? These questions can implicate a wide array of issues – e.g., they range from questions about the conceptualization of domination, or of culture, or of the role of culture in domination, over questions about the nature of cultural transformation, to questions about the role of culture in the grounding of views of how the state should act, and to questions about the explanatory role of culture and social structure in understanding salient social phenomena. The contributors to this volume adopt different perspectives on the theme of cultural domination and advocate or explore different views on the topic. We preview their contributions in the section The Chapters, below. For now, we will provide the reader with a fix on the theme, or some of its contours. It is useful to begin with candidate cases of cultural domination (for now, we use the notion ‘domination’ in a non-technical, intuitive sense). A first case involves the political suppression of a minority language in an attempt to build a culturally unified nation-state: Case 1: Turkification. For most of the 20th century, the Turkish state has taken measures against the use of the Kurdish language both in public and in the private sphere – measures that have often been associated with a project of Turkification (Zeydanlıoğlu 2012). The use of Kurdish ‘as a mother tongue’ was prohibited in Turkey in the 1980s. This placed many people in disadvantageous positions – e.g., in school, court procedures, or when in contact with government officials – and it affected (or aimed to affect) Kurdish cultural identity. In cases like Case 1, we often can readily identify patterns of domination relations between individual agents – e.g., teachers and students, or legal DOI: 10.4324/9781003483618-1 2 Cultural Domination officials and defendants – where power agents, as dominators, exercise their power to suppress or eliminate (expressions of) the culture of power subjects, or dominatees. If we describe Case 1 in such terms, we describe it as instantiating an agent-on-agent, interpersonal form of domination of culture. In this sense, Case 1 marks a candidate case of cultural domination – in one sense of ‘cultural domination.’ Many other candidate cases of cultural domination are less clear-cut. Consider: Case 2: Java colonization. Java was a Dutch colony for most of the time from the mid-17th to the mid-20th century. The Dutch ruled from a distance through a system of indirect rule: they took over pre-existing local culture by making the local cultural elites do the ruling for them. When the Dutch colonized Java in the 17th century, they found a society with an extensive social hierarchy reinforced by elaborate cultural symbols and practices. At the top of the hierarchy were the priyayi, a group of nobles and aristocratic bureaucrats. Those below the priyayi had to crouch on the floor in all social interactions with them, use lower-class Javanese dialect, and wear clothes marking their inferior status; they were not allowed to use the prestigious ceremonial parasol of the ruling elite, and had to live in dwellings with architecture that marked their lower social position. The Dutch forced the elites to display the forms of cultural deference that they expected of their inferiors: e.g., they had to crouch before the seated Dutch at any meetings, speak high Javanese, not Dutch, and wear traditional clothes. More generally, the Dutch ruled by coopting local cultural power relations, which led to a substantial transfer of resources to them. Case 2, we take it, can be described as involving patterns of interpersonal domination: some agents, such as Dutch officials, dominated other agents, such as members of the local elites. But the elites retained their positions of relative power: the colonizers here used cultural power relations – which, we take it, in their own right instantiated a system of domination – as a tool, or resource: their use of local customs might have caused some changes in the local culture, but the colonizers aimed to exploit, not suppress or eliminate, that culture. The point: even granted that Case 2 involves interpersonal domination, it is not clear whether it involves domination of culture. Thus, does it involve another form of cultural domination altogether – say, perhaps some kind of domination by culture? Further questions arise when we consider a third candidate case of cultural domination: Introduction to Cultural domination 3 Case 3: Sanskritization. The caste system is a system of domination that is deeply entrenched in the Hindu social order. The system is not unchanging: caste groups of lower status are sometimes able to increase their social standing. Sanskritization (Srinivas 1956) is a mechanism of upward mobility in the caste hierarchy: it is a process in which lower caste communities adopt markers of the dominant Sanskritic culture associated with Brahmins and other higher castes. This can involve, e.g., changes in religious rituals to align them with Vedic orthodoxy, or changes in language and conceptual repertoire to incorporate vocabulary or concepts associated with Sanskrit traditions, or changes in norms governing marriage or food practices to imitate the norms of higher castes, and so forth. As Srinivas puts the point of such cultural transformations, “the best way of staking a claim to a higher position is to adopt the custom and way of life of a higher caste” (ibid, 483). And, he observes, in the long run, this tends to move lower-status caste groups in the direction of Brahminic culture, by percolating this culture through intermediary caste groups. Case 3 illustrates what seems to be an instance of cultural dominance: a high-status culture is being adopted at the cost of erasing lower-status cultural practices or traits. Does it also illustrate an instance of cultural domination? Many would agree that an encroachment of a dominant culture into the lives of marginalized groups involves a kind of domination – even if that culture is willingly adopted, as often seems to occur in processes of Sanskritization, which are often willingly initiated by lower caste communities. And while such processes can seem subversive of existing caste domination, at least when they raise the status of certain groups, they at the same time contribute to the entrenchment of Sanskritic culture and caste hierarchy. Yet if we are inclined to see Sanskritization as domination, its apparently voluntary and partly subversive character would make it rather unlike other forms of domination. This raises deeper questions about how domination could be construed in such cases. What are the differences between Case 3 and the other cases? Unlike Case 1, Case 3 would instantiate a form of cultural domination in which (presumptive) dominatees apparently willingly adopt (or abandon) certain cultural traits. And, like Case 1, but unlike Case 2, Case 3 would involve a form of domination that aims to suppress or eliminate certain cultural traits. Thus, Case 3 and Case 1, but perhaps not Case 2, would instantiate distinct forms of domination of culture. One upshot: prior to further argument, there can be different (candidate) forms of cultural domination, and more than one way in which domination and culture interact. Of course, candidate forms of cultural domination might relevantly differ from the three cases just 4 Cultural Domination considered, and they might raise different issues from the ones that just surfaced, as aptly demonstrated by the diverse contributions to this volume. Cultural domination talk: some varieties The complexity of the theme at hand echoes in the many ways in which we might speak of cultural domination. To sample varieties of cultural domination talk, start with statements of domination relations (‘Peter dominates Paul,’ ‘The state dominates the citizens,’ ‘Culture A dominates culture B,’ and so on). They have a form such as, R1 α ∆ β, where ‘α’ is the grammatical power agent, ‘β’ the grammatical power subject, and where ‘Δ’ refers to a domination relation (thus, ‘α’ and ‘β’ refer to the dominator(s) and dominatee(s), respectively). It is contested what kind of things ‘α’ or ‘β’ can or should refer to – prominent candidates include individual human agents, groups of such agents, social or political institutions, or social structure, widely conceived. It is also contested what kind of relations ‘Δ’ can or should refer to – prominent candidates include relationships of uncontrolled control, of unjust or illegitimate power, of power asymmetries that involve a denial of salient rights, opportunities, or resources, or that deny important moral, political, or other statuses. With this in mind: when cultural domination occurs, we conjecture, R1 instantiates in some way that relevantly implicates culture – ‘relevantly,’ as seen from a given evaluative perspective. (Below, we make this somewhat more specific.) Expectably, then, talk of cultural domination can take many forms, and convey different things – a point we shall now unpack. One respect in which such talk can differ, of course, is grammatical: when cultural domination is said to occur, culture might be referred to as what dominates, so be referred to as the grammatical power agent in a relation like R1, or it might be said to be what is dominated, so be referred to as a power subject in such a relation (or both: take claims like ‘Culture A dominates culture B’). (In passing: this raises issues about the role of culture, and of social structure more generally, in accounting for cultural domination – we touch on this in the next section.) But cultural domination talk can differ also in other, substantive ways: the label ‘cultural domination’ can be used to refer to relevantly different phenomena, and to express relevantly different views of the role of culture in domination relations. For instance, consider: (i) Culture as a domination resource. Domination might be said to be cultural where dominators relevantly utilize culture, or cultural things. Introduction to Cultural domination 5 (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) E.g., they might draw on cultural norms in the justification narratives by which they legitimize their power; they might exploit cultural status hierarchies to enlist culturally superior groups in the suppression of culturally inferior groups; or they might grant cultural rights, opportunities, or resources, only on the condition of subjection. E.g., consider Case 2, above: the case might be called a case of cultural domination in this sense in order to highlight that Dutch colonizers used cultural status hierarchies to back up their position as dominators. Domination as entailed by culture. Domination might be said to be cultural where cultural practices call for power configurations that, from the observer’s perspective, involve domination. E.g., cultural status hierarchies might involve the social or economic domination by culturally superior groups of culturally inferior groups. E.g., consider Case 3, above: given a suitable understanding of domination, we might say that Hindu caste hierarchies are a system of cultural domination in this sense, and that Sanskritization, while it is partly subversive of this system, at the same time reproduces, or validates it. Domination in the service of cultural dominance. Domination might be said to be cultural where dominators pursue aims of cultural dominance. E.g., the political domination of a minority culture, e.g., by criminalizing its cultural practices, or by limiting access to its places of worship, might serve an aim to ensure the social dominance of a majority culture. Revert to Case 1: if the domination of Kurdish cultural forms aims to ensure the dominance of another culture, it might be said to involve cultural domination in this sense. Cultural domination as cultural dominance. Cultural domination might be said to occur where cultural dominance occurs – e.g., where a culture or cultural traits are dominant with respect to other cultures or cultural traits, in the sense that the dominant culture or cultural traits persist or spread. Revert to Case 3: Sanskritization might be said to involve cultural domination in the sense, despite its apparently voluntary and partly subversive character. Cultural domination as domination justified on partisan cultural grounds. Domination might be said to be cultural where exercises of domination power are legitimized, or justified, on the basis of partisan cultural grounds that are relevantly rejected by relevant power subjects. Revert to Case 1: it might be said that Turkification, even if it is justifiable on the basis of salient cultural values, involves cultural domination in this sense if these values are relevantly rejected by the people coercively subjected to it. Domination relations as cultural objects. Domination might be said to be cultural where domination relations in their own right instantiate culture, or are cultural things. E.g., cultural norms might shape 6 Cultural Domination interactions between dominators and dominatees in a manner such that the corresponding domination relations in their own right become cultural objects, or gain cultural significance. Revert to Case 2: the case might be described as involving cultural domination in this sense insofar as the rule of the Dutch colonizers employed cultural forms that had cultural meaning and significance in that context. This list is not exhaustive: domination might be said to be ‘cultural’ in some sense other than the ones listed. Nor is it discrete: nothing rules out that social phenomena might instantiate cultural domination in more than one of these senses. Thus, this list does not map the conceptual space of cultural domination, but draws out some contours of cultural domination talk that help to fix ideas. What form such talk should take – what social phenomena should be recognized as instances of cultural domination, or on what grounds this should be done – is a different matter, and one the contributors to this volume often disagree about. Accordingly, for each entry on the above list, potentially contested questions arise: what, at bottom, does the relevant domination relation consist in? Who or what, at bottom, should be construed as its power agent(s) or power subject(s)? What role does culture have vis-à-vis these things, and what role should it have in accounting for them? This returns us to our conjecture that when cultural domination occurs, R1 instantiates in some way that relevantly implicates culture. We can now make this slightly more specific: where cultural domination occurs, culture, or cultural things, play a role in the individuation, description, explanation, evaluation, analysis, and so on, of domination relations, or associated domination phenomena, that, from a given evaluative perspective, is significant enough to warrant referring to these relations, or phenomena, not just as ones of domination, but of cultural domination. One upshot: if we disagree about what it takes for cultural things to play some such role, then we can disagree about what the label ‘cultural domination’ should refer to – even if we already agree about what domination is. And, as the contributions to this volume document, more than one view on the matter is on offer. Before we preview the contributions to this volume, we attend to three matters that, we believe, will later assist the reader in putting things in context. We will touch on the role of social structure in (accounting for) cultural domination (in the next section), spotlight some issues related to phenomena of cultural transformation (in the section Cultural domination, cultural transformation), and add a brief observation on the history of views of cultural domination (in the section Theorizing cultural domination: from legitimization to critical analysis). Of course, the contributions to this volume ultimately speak for themselves: they adopt different Introduction to Cultural domination 7 perspectives, present their own, often different frameworks, and focus on different themes and issues. Cultural domination and social structure One issue that repeatedly surfaces in this volume is the role of social structure in (accounting for) cultural domination. What role that should be is contested. We wish to point out upfront, however, that even if we approach things with certain individualist leanings (see below), we still have reason not to dismiss out of hand that social structure can be relevant in accounting for cultural domination. Start with ‘social structure’ and ‘culture.’ As to ‘social structure,’ the notion can have more than one meaning, but as it is generally used in this volume, it refers to non-individual, social entities, such as institutions, groups, organizations, and so on. Thus, by itself, a set of relations between individual agents will not constitute a social structure in this sense – or at least not when these relations are adequately described in terms that do not, in their own right, import social structural elements (e.g., consider the difference between ‘Paul tells Peter what to do’ and ‘Sergeant Paul tells Private Peter what to do’). At any rate: at least in clear cases, invoking social structure will involve recourse to social entities of the overall sort just referred to. As to ‘culture,’ social structure can show up in important ways in how culture is conceived. We can distinguish between narrow and wide accounts of culture. Narrow accounts do not, or not explicitly, evoke social structure: instead, they evoke individual beliefs, values, cultural schemas, and so on. By contrast, wide accounts do evoke social structure: while they refer to beliefs, values, cultural schemas, and so on, they also evoke social entities such as institutions, organizations, political authority, and social practices – construed as paradigms of social structure. Many of the contributions in this volume seem to work with a wide, social-structure-involving view of culture: this would make them non-individualist in a sense familiar from debates in the philosophy of social science. With this in mind: if we revert to R1, above, in conceptualizing cultural domination, it is natural to ask whether culture can play the part of power agent (‘α’), or of power subject (‘β’), or both, in a domination relationship (‘Δ’). And – especially, but not only, on a wide view of culture – parallel questions spring to mind about social structure: we can ask whether social structure can play the relevant parts in a domination relationship. Does this mean that culture, or social structure, can be the power agent or power subject in relationships of (cultural) domination? There is little agreement on the point. E.g., recent social and political philosophy has seen deep controversies about the role of social structure in 8 Cultural Domination social power relations, including domination relationships (Hayward 2018; Azmanova 2018; Lukes 2018, 2021; McNay 2020; Forst 2018; Lovett 2010, 2022, and Chapter 6). Prominent views – especially views that draw on republican ideas of freedom or non-domination (Pettit 1997, 2012) – often seem individualist in the sense that they construe domination interpersonally, as a relationship ultimately between human individuals (whether or not they also are individualist in the sense that just surfaced). Other views deny that an interpersonal reading of R1 accommodates all cases. E.g., for some, social structure can involve power relations that do not reduce to the agency of some individual human agent or group (Hayward 2018); others argue that social systems can instantiate forms of domination such that all human agents operating within these systems are power subjects (Azmanova 2018). Yet others claim that Western culture dominates non-Western culture in a manner best described as a kind of structural domination that does not require interpersonal domination relations (Galtung 1971). However, especially relevant now: even approaches that are individualist in reading R1 always interpersonally – that analyze or explain all domination in terms of interpersonal power relations – still can, and often do, reserve a significant role for social structure in accounting for domination relations: e.g., as an important background condition of, or resource for, real-life domination (Forst 2018). Thus, even when social structure does not come in as a ground-level category in accounting for (cultural) domination, it can still play an important role in understanding real-life (cultural) domination. A similar conclusion is suggested if we focus not on views of the nature of domination (or social power), but consider the cultural component of cultural domination. There is a strand in the empirical social science literature that aims to downplay or entirely eliminate social structure from accounts of culture – e.g., recall what we referred to as narrow views of culture, above (Van der Meer 2020). Such accounts of culture often emphasize individual learning and beliefs; and, as van Riel notes (Chapter 9), individual learning indeed is a plausible partial mechanism to explain cultural domination. But, it seems, such mechanisms will not render social structure entirely irrelevant. Rather, they entail that the role of social structure will be limited, or not the whole story, in understanding real-life cultural domination. Not least, the contributions to this volume, while they construe cultural domination in terms that accord with R1, sometimes disagree as to how the phenomenon maps onto R1’s dyadic schema. One view that sometimes surfaces is that the requirements of domination entail that culture cannot take the place of ‘α’ or of ‘β’ in R1. Roughly, the idea is that, conceptually, domination is interpersonal, or a relationship between individual agents, but that culture or social structure are not individual agents. This, it seems, Introduction to Cultural domination 9 reflects an interpersonal interpretation of R1. We have in effect noted that even if we are attracted to this interpretation, we might still take it that social structure can be relevant in understanding (cultural) domination. We now add another observation that points in the same overall direction. The two-fold claim that domination has the form of R1 and that R1 must be construed interpersonally is a conceptual claim. Arguendo, let us assume that this claim accords with whatever common sense notion of domination is in play where we speak of political domination as something that impugns freedom. Yet, bluntly put, conceptual claims that are compelling in one context need not be compelling in another. As Kincaid argues (Chapter 4), at least from the perspective of a naturalist philosophy of social science, the idea that domination is interpersonal need not constrain all successful explanations. Science, including social science, is not strongly constrained by our common sense concepts – e.g., consider theoretical physics. Accordingly, social research can use the notion ‘domination,’ flesh it out as it deems best for the research at hand, and be empirically successful. E.g., domination might be understood as something that instantiates as social structure that causes lower income for relevant groups (see the examples provided in Kincaid’s chapter). This might not accord with a common sense notion of domination, but as a claim in empirical social science, it can be coherent enough. (This raises the question whether the same concept of domination would be employed, or rather a different one: thus, can there be more than one concept of domination?) The upshot: it is contested what role social structure should play in understanding (cultural) domination. But even if we share certain individualist leanings, we have reason not to dismiss its importance altogether. Even where an interpersonal interpretation is attached to R1, social structure can still play a relevant role in understanding (cultural) domination. (For chapters that consider the role of social structure in understanding (cultural) domination: see especially Kincaid (Chapter 4), Koch (Chapter 5), van Riel (Chapter 9), and Lovett (Chapter 6).) Cultural domination, cultural transformation A second issue we want to draw attention to concerns a difference between cases like Case 1, above, where cultural change is imposed on cultural agents politically, or ‘from the outside,’ and cases more like Case 3, where cultural change seems motivated from ‘the inside,’ or occurs on the basis of apparently voluntary choices of cultural agents. To simplify, compare two hypothetical scenarios: CA The government aims to create a homogeneous culture, and to this end imposes on the citizens laws that prohibit the use of a 10 Cultural Domination CB minority language in schools. As a result, the minority language eventually vanishes. (A version of Case 1.) Children from a minority culture grow up preferring to speak the language of the majority culture, because it is what they are most exposed to in movies, TV, and music, and they associate it with various aspirational images. As a result, the minority language eventually vanishes. (A close relative of Case 3.) Both cases involve cultural change, or transformation. In CA, the change is a product of political imposition. But in CB, the change seems owed to the operation of cultural factors: it comes about because the children, as cultural agents, willingly adopt some cultural traits at the expense of other such traits. If so, then it would seem that cultural change in CB occurs within the domain of culture in a sense in which it does not occur in CA. We take it that CB illustrates a case of cultural dominance. Now, as we registered earlier, cultural dominance is sometimes referred to as cultural domination. We also noted, of course, that it is a different matter whether it should be referred to as such. But suppose we agree that CB is a promising candidate case of one kind of cultural domination. One matter the theme of cultural domination would invite us to explore, then, is whether cultural domination can occur in some manner that is not imposed on culture from the outside – that does not reduce to, e.g., political or economic forms of domination – but that is cultural in the strong sense that it occurs ‘from within’ culture, or in the domain of the cultural, in a way illustrated better by CB than CA. Among other things, this would ask us to consider what relationship there is between the cultural and other domains – e.g., the political, or the economic. It is not clear how such domains are best individuated or how they relate – and there is more than one possibility. E.g., maybe cultural norms, unlike political or economic norms, need not be tied to external sanctions, such as penalties, to ensure compliance. Or maybe culture is distinctively symbolic, so that strongly cultural forms of domination, if there are any, would have to be construed primarily in terms of the impact of cultural change on the symbolic representations of people – rather than on their political or economic relationships. Or maybe the cultural cannot be disentangled from the political or the economic, so that all forms of cultural domination also instantiate political or economic domination. And of course, there are other possibilities. The task of accounting for the nature and boundaries of the cultural is a task not only for philosophers. Social scientists – in particular, anthropologists – have long debated how best to understand the concept of culture. E.g., one long-debated issue is how cultures can be individuated without using static or essentialized conceptions of culture that cannot properly accommodate Introduction to Cultural domination 11 cultural change. As Bashkow puts this desideratum, views of culture must not “inappropriately posit stable and bounded ‘islands’ of cultural distinctiveness in an ever-changing world of transnational cultural ‘flows’” (Bashkow 2004, 443). If that is so, then accounting for cultural transformation as cultural domination should guard against static views of culture. Moreover, assuming that not all cultural transformation involves cultural domination, we would need to distinguish cultural transformations that do involve cultural domination from ones that do not. What is needed here, then, are tools to individuate cultures, and to describe or evaluate cultural dynamics. But what tools should we adopt? A related issue concerns the concept of culture – a matter that surfaced earlier already. It is contested whether this concept is explanatory, and one that can feature in causal explanations at that. Anthropologists often reject that culture is causally efficacious, and instead see it as something akin to a text to be interpreted. This bears on the analysis of cultural domination. Domination is often seen as manifesting causal patterns – e.g., patterns such that whatever plays the role of a power agent in a domination relation causes domination-relevant changes in power subjects, their options, or their environment. Yet if we cross this with the view that culture cannot be causally efficacious, it would follow that culture cannot be the power agent in domination relations – which from the outset limits how we can conceptualize real-life cases of cultural domination. Of course, our hands would not from the outset be tied in this way if we construe culture as something that can be causally efficacious – although this would invite other objections. How, then, should we construe culture for the purposes of an account of cultural domination? At any rate: as the above illustrates, the theme of cultural domination offers a site for a cross-pollination between philosophical views of the phenomenon and salient ideas in the social sciences. This need not be a oneway street. E.g., a philosophical account of the phenomenon might adopt a social scientific view of culture, such as the culture-as-text view referred to above, to then run with the consequences. The direction of influence might also go the other way: philosophical accounts of cultural domination that assume that culture is causally efficacious might inspire or support a social scientific model of the causal or explanatory role of culture. One aim of this volume, then, is to offer a site for such cross-pollination. Theorizing cultural domination: from legitimization to critical analysis Processes of cultural domination – construed in at least one of the senses listed earlier – have shaped human history. E.g., the Romanization of large parts of Europe, the spread of Confucianism and Legalism under Emperor 12 Cultural Domination Wu Di of Han, medieval Christianization, colonial practices, or the spread of Western culture during recent processes of globalization, involved cultural changes that often relevantly implicated forms of domination. But despite the tremendous historical impact of processes of cultural domination, efforts at a critical (rather than broadly affirmative) intellectual engagement of the phenomenon are relatively recent. Early theorizing about cultural domination seems preoccupied with efforts to legitimize it – to justify that it may or should occur. For instance, religious narratives that legitimized forms of cultural domination played a key role for the Spanish conquistadores. For Hegel, in turn, colonialism and the imposition of cultural change were prerequisites for the realization of freedom, construed as the self-determination of all human beings (Stone 2020). On his view, self-determination was to be realized only in a special, developmental state of society – a state that ‘oriental’ societies, unlike European societies, had not attained. Thus, ‘oriental’ societies, unlike their European counterparts, hindered the proper actualization of freedom. Colonization and the imposition of cultural change hence appeared as a means to the end of actualizing some good, i.e., freedom as self-determination. Structurally similar, affirmative views were endorsed by some Saint-Simonists, who had an impact on conceptions of colonialism in 19th-century France (Pilbeam 2013). By contrast, recent debates have seen efforts at a critical engagement of cultural domination that are intellectually more sophisticated than earlier, more affirmative views. These efforts draw on a diverse array of traditions. For instance, some authors in the Marxist tradition critically engage cultural domination with a focus on its role in the maintenance of economic conditions or relations: e.g., Du Bois (1945) and Fanon (1961) do so in relation to the context of colonialism. Other authors in this tradition critically engage cultural domination by conceptualizing it as hegemony: e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno (2002), Marcuse (1964), Bourdieu (1977), or Gramsci (1971), seminally focus on circumstances where a group’s own culture is a principal obstacle to the liberation of its members. Yet again others in this tradition construe cultural domination as hegemony, but not as a total or inescapable kind of hegemony: e.g., the Birmingham school foregrounds the potential of (sub)cultures to (also) be a site for social resistance, criticism, or for challenging domination relations. Other critical engagements of cultural domination – especially where it takes the form of a political imposition of (constraints on) cultural values, norms, or practices – form part of ongoing debates around ideas of multiculturalism, toleration, and conceptions of justice, including views of the importance of cultural rights, cultural opportunities, or cultural resources (Kymlicka 1996; McKinnon and Castiglione 2003; Forst 2003; McKinnon 2006; Ivison 2010; Sardoč 2022; for chapters that engage related themes: Introduction to Cultural domination 13 see Bachvarova and Moore (Chapter 1), Besch (Chapter 2), and Patton (Chapter 8). In such debates, too, there often is little agreement as to how (cultural) domination is best construed. As has surfaced already, for instance, it is contested whether domination should be construed in interpersonal terms, or whether some forms of domination are best seen as structural. But across many theoretical divides, there is wide agreement that people should not be subjected to (cultural) domination, all other things equal – even though authors often disagree as to what exactly constitutes such subjection, or what exactly is objectionable about it. Of course, there are many other important critical current perspectives on cultural domination – not just the ones just foregrounded. Accordingly, a diverse array of critical perspectives is represented in this volume. What we wish to give the reader on the way, then, is an appreciation of the complexity, and intellectual richness, of the theme in the current debate. The contributions to this volume enrich this debate from a variety of angles, by utilizing different and sometimes incompatible frameworks, and by arguing for different conclusions. The chapters With this, we turn to a preview of the chapters collected in this volume. We preview them here in alphabetical order – an ordering we adopt to avoid more artificial groupings. Most of the chapters engage in conceptual efforts, or seek to illuminate how phenomena of cultural domination can or should be conceptualized. Many of the chapters pursue normative aims, or invite normative conclusions – although the chapters can differ greatly in their focus, method, or in the tools they use. Not least, many of the chapters explore candidate cases of cultural domination, or related phenomena, to illuminate what cultural domination is. Thus, we invite readers to explore in their own right the diversity of approaches represented in this volume, their similarities or differences, and how they can inform an understanding of cultural domination. Bachvarova and Moore approach the concept of cultural domination from the vantage point of normative political theory, where the concept operates primarily to identify forms of injustice or illegitimacy in the political order. Their chapter focuses on two conceptions of domination – a social conception emerging from contemporary civic-republican thought, and an institutional conception emerging from the study of identity-based power in political regimes. The authors apply these conceptions to candidate examples of experiences of cultural domination, and identify different ways to interpret what exactly the object of cultural domination is, and who or what exactly it is that exercises domination. They conclude that, depending on these interpretations, some conceptions of cultural domination 14 Cultural Domination illuminate who the agents of domination are, but obscure the structures that enable them, and vice versa. They suggest that we should be mindful of this when designating forms of injustice as cultural domination and identifying their implications for political legitimacy. Besch engages the theme of cultural domination with a focus on Rawlstype political liberalism. In political liberalism, political power that accords with certain values of liberal public culture can be legitimate even if some citizens respectably reject these values. Does this mean that political liberalism permits such people to be dominated? Would this involve cultural domination? Besch offers a reading of public justification in political liberalism that foregrounds differences in the discursive standing of ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ people, and interprets these differences in domination-theoretic terms. His chapter suggests that political liberalism would subject the ‘unreasonable’ – a mixed group that also includes people who respectably reject things Rawls deems ‘reasonably’ non-rejectable – to discursive and political forms of domination, and this in a manner that invites a charge of cultural domination. Godman’s chapter argues that science can become a force for cultural dominance and thus is a topic ripe for scrutiny by philosophers of science and political philosophy alike. She reviews the case of the Nordic racial hygiene studies – a branch of physical anthropology in the northern Nordic region in the early 20th century. She argues that although it is highly likely that racist biases and ideological influences were affecting these researchers, this is not why we primarily should find fault with them. We should instead focus on condemning them for their negligent epistemic conduct that resulted in the moral transgression of cultural reactivity where their theories of racial hierarchies crowded out local knowledge about the group and its value. As such, scientists become a force for cultural domination. Kincaid’s chapter is divided into two parts. The first part outlines the philosophy of social science issues in studies of cultural domination and tries to provide a general framework for thinking about cultural domination. It looks at both just what cultural domination claims along with the larger philosophy of social science issues raised. The second section then applies the framework of the first section to some concrete empirical work that covers specific cases of cultural domination. It discusses a historical case of cultural domination in the colonialization of Java that really reflects general colonial strategies across colonizers and colonies. It also discusses more general and current social science explanations of cultural domination in racism. Koch argues that domination without masters exists and that the suitable term for this form of domination is ‘structural domination.’ Cultural domination is used as an example for the existence of structural domination. Afterwards, the use of ‘structural domination’ is discussed based on Introduction to Cultural domination 15 Carnap’s idea of explication. He concludes that using the term ‘structural domination’ for domination without masters is not a topic change because it is in line with established word use and also that this concept is fruitful for debates on freedom in political philosophy. Lovett addresses the role of culture in the conceptualization of cultural domination. His chapter considers a variety of ways in which we might think about cultural domination in the light of contemporary republican theory. The chapter argues that people can be dominated in their forms of cultural expression, and that culture can be an important instrument in facilitating the domination of some people by others. However, the chapter argues against expanding the conception of domination to include cases where impersonal cultural formations systemically disadvantage the members of certain groups. Menon’s chapter aims to develop a causal model that isolates specifically ‘cultural’ explanations of social behavior, as distinguished from explanations that appeal to other forms of physical or social constraint. This cultural causal model is then used as the basis for a characterization of a primarily cultural form of domination; that is, domination whose causal manifestation is visible entirely in the cultural sphere. This is done by identifying a causal signature characteristic of domination relations and describing the conditions under which that signature can be located in a cultural causal model. Since such a model excludes non-cultural explanatory factors, forms of domination visible within the model can be reasonably characterized as cultural. Patton focuses on colonialism, especially settler colonialism, as a privileged case for the study of cultural domination. His chapter argues that colonialism, like many familiar forms of individual domination, relies on a background of cultural values and beliefs about the superiority of colonizers. The chapter then examines the liberal argument for minority culture rights and the cultural provisions of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in order to show that these reflect a long history of specific forms of domination of Indigenous cultures by those of the colonizing peoples. Finally, the chapter suggests that unlike the domination of individuals, cultural domination in the colonial context tends toward the elimination of the colonized cultures and thereby the existence of the colonized peoples as distinct peoples. van Riel discusses the descriptive and critical value of conceptions of hegemony that emerged in the context of critical theory. Some conceptions of hegemony, in particular those that allow for hegemony to be realized in contexts where people are neither manipulated nor coerced into adopting a hegemonic view of culture, have come under attack. For instance, these conceptions are said to be misleading, to implicitly or explicitly rely on obscure notions of ‘real interests,’ or, relatedly, to be paternalistic. van Riel 16 Cultural Domination argues that these criticisms can be met, and that reasons to engage with problematic forms of power relations also provide reasons to engage with hegemony, where hegemony is construed as a close cousin of domination. A candidate explication of hegemony is provided, and its relation to what one may describe as ‘cultural domination’ – where individuals are ‘dominated’ by their own culture – is discussed. Sullivan’s chapter is situated in and extends the analyses of cultural domination provided by feminist philosophy and critical philosophy of race. The objectives of her chapter are two-fold: (1) to argue that cultural domination happens in and through effects on human physiology, thus challenging typical culture vs. biology dichotomies; and (2) to illustrate this claim through the example of male cultural domination of women, more specifically the effects of male cultural domination on women’s telomeres. The chapter focuses primarily on the U.S. and Western Europe. The research method is one that she successfully used in The Physiology of Sexist and Racist Oppression (2015), which combined theoretical analyses and empirical work using each to illuminate and criticize the other. References Azmanova, A. (2018). “Relational, Structural and Systemic Forms of Power: The ‘Right to Justification’ Confronting Three Types of Domination.” Journal of Political Power, 11(1), 68–78. Bashkow, I. (2004). “A Neo-Boasian Conception of Cultural Boundaries.” American Anthropologist, 106(3), 443–458. Bourdieu, P. (1977). “Sur le pouvoir symbolique.” Annales, 32(2), 405–411. Du Bois, W.E.B. (1945). Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Fanon, F. (1961). Les Damnés de la terre. Paris: Éditions Maspero. Forst, Rainer. (2003). Toleranz im Konflikt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Forst, Rainer. (2018). “Noumenal Power Revisited: Reply to Critics.” Journal of Political Power, 11(3), 294–321. Galtung, Johan. (1971). “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research, 8(2), 81–117. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Hayward, C. (2018). “On Structural Power.” Journal of Political Power, 11(1), 56–67. Horkheimer, M., and Theodor W. Adorno. (2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ivison, Duncan, ed. (2010). The Ashgate Research Companion to Multiculturalism. London: Ashgate. Kymlicka, Will. (1996). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovett, Frank. (2010). A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction to Cultural domination 17 Lovett, Frank. (2022). The Well-Ordered Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lukes, Steven. (2021). Power: A Radical View (3rd edition). London: Red Globe Press. Lukes, Steven. (2018). “Noumenal Power: Concept and Explanation.” Journal of Political Power, 11(1), 46–55. Marcuse, H. (1964). One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press. McKinnon C. and D. Castiglione, eds. (2003). The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies. Manchester: Manchester University Press. McKinnon, C. (2006). Toleration: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge. Pettit, Philip. (1997). Republicanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pettit, Philip. (2012). On the People’s Terms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pilbeam, P. (2013). Saint-Simonians in Nineteenth-Century France: From Free Love to Algeria. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan. Sardoč, Mitja, ed. (2022). The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Srinivas, M. N. (1956). “A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization.” The Far Eastern Quarterly, 15(4), 481–496. Stone, A. (2020). “Hegel and Colonialism.” Hegel Bulletin, 41(2), 247–270. Van der Meer, A. (2020). Performing Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Zeydanlıoğlu, Welat. (2012). “Turkey’s Kurdish Language Policy.” International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 2012(217), 99–125. Introduction to Cultural domination Azmanova, A. (2018). “Relational, Structural and Systemic Forms of Power: The ‘Right to Justification’ Confronting Three Types of Domination.” Journal of Political Power, 11(1), 68–78. Bashkow, I. (2004). “A Neo-Boasian Conception of Cultural Boundaries.” American Anthropologist, 106(3), 443–458. Bourdieu, P. (1977). “Sur le pouvoir symbolique.” Annales, 32(2), 405–411. Du Bois, W.E.B. (1945). Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Fanon, F. (1961). Les Damnés de la terre. Paris: Éditions Maspero. Forst, Rainer . (2003). Toleranz im Konflikt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Forst, Rainer . (2018). “Noumenal Power Revisited: Reply to Critics.” Journal of Political Power, 11(3), 294–321. Galtung, Johan . (1971). “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research, 8(2), 81–117. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Hayward, C. (2018). “On Structural Power.” Journal of Political Power, 11(1), 56–67. Horkheimer, M. , and Theodor W. Adorno . (2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ivison, Duncan , ed. (2010). The Ashgate Research Companion to Multiculturalism. London: Ashgate. Kymlicka, Will . (1996). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovett, Frank . (2010). A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovett, Frank . (2022). The Well-Ordered Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lukes, Steven . (2021). Power: A Radical View (3rd edition). London: Red Globe Press. Lukes, Steven . (2018). “Noumenal Power: Concept and Explanation.” Journal of Political Power, 11(1), 46–55. Marcuse, H. (1964). One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press. McKinnon C. and D. Castiglione , eds. (2003). The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies. Manchester: Manchester University Press. McKinnon, C. (2006). Toleration: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge. Pettit, Philip . (1997). Republicanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pettit, Philip . (2012). On the People’s Terms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pilbeam, P. (2013). Saint-Simonians in Nineteenth-Century France: From Free Love to Algeria. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan. Sardoč, Mitja , ed. (2022). The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Srinivas, M. N. (1956). “A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization.” The Far Eastern Quarterly, 15(4), 481–496. Stone, A. (2020). “Hegel and Colonialism.” Hegel Bulletin, 41(2), 247–270. Van der Meer, A. (2020). Performing Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Zeydanlıoğlu, Welat . (2012). “Turkey’s Kurdish Language Policy.” International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 2012(217), 99–125. Cultural and political domination Bachvarova, Mira . 2013. “Non-domination’s Role in Theorizing Global Justice.” Journal of Global Ethics 9: 173–185. Bou Nassif, Hicham . 2021. Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fraser, Nancy . 2003. “Recognition without ethics?” in The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies : Reasonable Tolerance, Catriona McKinnon , and Dario Castiglione , eds., Manchester University Press, 86–108. Laborde, Cecile . 2009. Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. List, Christian , and Laura Valentini . 2016. “Freedom as Independence.” Ethics 126: 1043–1074. List, Christian , and Philip Pettit . 2011. Group Agency: The Possibility, Design and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovett, Frank . 2010. A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovett, Frank , and Philip Pettit . 2018. “Preserving Republican Freedom.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 46: 363–383. Margalit, Avishai and Joseph Raz . 1990. “National self-determination.” Journal of Philosophy 87 (9): 439–461. McCammon, Christopher . 2018. “Domination.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/domination/ McGarry, John . 2024 forthcoming. Domination: Taking, Keeping and Losing Control Over Other Peoples. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miller, David . 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moore, Margaret . 2020. “Liberal Nationalism and the challenge of essentialism” in Gina Gustavsson and David Miller , eds., Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Patten, Alan . 2014. Equal Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pettit, Philip . 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pettit, Philip . 2001. A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pettit, Philip . 2005. “The Domination Complaint” in Political Exclusion and Domination, Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo , eds., New York University Press, 87–117. Pettit, Philip . 2010. “A Republican Law of People.” European Journal of Political Theory 9: 71–94. Pettit, Philip . 2012. On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pettit, Philip . 2014. Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Scheffler, Samuel . 2007. “Immigration and the Significance of Culture.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 35 (2): 93–125. Schuppert, Fabian . 2015. “Nondomination, non-alienation and social equality; towards a republican understanding of social equality.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (4): 440–455. Van Dam, Nikolaos . 2011. The Struggle for Power in Syria. London: IB Tauris. Wittgenstein, Ludwig . 1953. Philosophical Investigations, trans., G.E.M. Anscombe . Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Public justification, political values, and domination Besch, Thomas Martin . 1998. Über John Rawls’ politischen Liberalismus. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Besch, Thomas Martin . 2012. “Political liberalism, the internal conception, and the problem of public dogma.” Philosophy and Public Issues 2 (1): 153–177. Besch, Thomas Martin . 2013. “On Political Legitimacy, Reasonableness, and Perfectionism.” Public Reason 5 (1): 58–74. Besch, Thomas Martin . 2014. “On Discursive Respect.” Social Theory and Practice 40 (2): 207–231. Besch, Thomas Martin . 2019a. “On Justification, Idealization, and Discursive Purchase.” Philosophia 47 (3): 601–623. Besch, Thomas Martin . 2019b. “On Robust Discursive Equality.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 58 (3): 465–490. Besch, Thomas Martin . 2020. “On Actualist and Fundamental Public Justification in Political Liberalism.” Philosophia 48 (5):1777–1799. Besch, Thomas Martin . 2022. “Patterns of Justification: On Political Liberalism and the Primacy of Public Justification.” Journal of Social and Political Philosophy 1 (1): 47–63. Besch, Thomas Martin . 2024. “Discursive Equality and Public Reason.” In Beyond Classical Liberalism: Freedom and the Good, edited by James D. Rooney and Patrick Zoll . Routledge. Bohman, James . 2012. “Domination, Epistemic Injustice and Republican Epistemology,” Social Epistemology 26 (2): 175–187. Campos, Paul F. 1994. “Secular Fundamentalism.” Columbia Law Review 94 (6): 1814–1827. Catala, Amandine . 2015. “Democracy, Trust, and Epistemic Justice.” Monist 98 (4): 424–440. Claassen, Rutger , and Lisa Herzog . 2021. “Why economic agency matters: An account of structural domination in the economic realm.” European Journal of Political Theory 20 (3): 465–485. Congdon, M. 2017. “What’s Wrong With Epistemic Injustice?” In The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by Ian J. Kidd , José Medina , and Gaile Pohlhaus , 243–253. London: Routledge. Dieleman, Susan . 2015. “Epistemic justice and democratic legitimacy.” Hypatia 30 (4): 794–810. Dotson, Kristie . 2014. “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.” Social Epistemology 28 (2): 115–138. Forst, Rainer . 2013. “A Kantian Republican Conception of Justice as Nondomination.” In Republican Democracy, edited by Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink , 154–168. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Forst, Rainer . 2017a. Normativity and Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Forst, Rainer . 2017b. “Noumenal Alienation: Rousseau, Kant and Marx on the Dialectics of Self-Determination.” Kantian Review 22 (4): 523–551. Fricker, Miranda . 2007. Epistemic Injustice. New York: Oxford University Press. Fricker, Miranda . 2013. “Epistemic Justice as a Condition of Political Freedom?” Synthese 190: 1317–1332. Friedman, Marion . 2000. “John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People.” In The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls, edited by Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf , 13–33. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. Gädeke, Dorothea . 2021. “Who should fight domination? Individual responsibility and structural injustice.” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (2): 180–201. Hampton, Jean . 1989. “Should Political Philosophy Be Done Without Metaphysics?” Ethics 99 (4): 791–814. Hampton, Jean . 1993. “The Moral Commitments of Liberalism.” In The Idea of Democracy, edited by Daniel Copp , Jean Hampton , and John Roemer , 292–313. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hasan, Rafeeq . 2021. “Republicanism and Structural Domination.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102: 292–319. Larmore, Charles . 1990. “Political Liberalism.” Political Theory 18 (3): 339–360. Larmore, Charles . 1996. The Morals of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Larmore, Charles . 1999. “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism.” The Journal of Philosophy 96 (12): 599–625. Larmore, Charles . 2015. “Political Liberalism: Its Motivation and Goals.” In Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Vol. 1, edited by David Sobel , Peter Vallentyne , and Steven Wall , 63–88. New York: Oxford University Press. Macedo, Stephen . 1991. Liberal Virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McKinnon, Rachel . 2016. “Epistemic Injustice.” Philosophy Compass 11 (8): 437–446. Liveriero, Frederica . 2019. “The Social Bases of Self-Respect: Political Equality and Epistemic Justice.” Phenomenology and Mind 16: 90–101. Lovett, Frank . 2010. A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lukes, Steven . 2021. Power: A Radical View (3rd edition). London: Red Globe Press. Pettit, Philip . 1997. Republicanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pettit, Philip . 2012. On the People’s Terms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quong, Jonathan . 2011. Liberalism Without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rawls, John , and Erin Kelly . 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rawls, John . 2005. Political Liberalism. Expanded edition. New York: Columbia University Press. Thompson, Michael J. 2018. “The Two Faces of Domination in Republican Political Theory.” European Journal of Political Theory 17 (1): 44–64. The Nordic racial hygiene studies Broberg, G. , & Roll-Hansen, N. (2005). Eugenics and the Welfare State: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press. Campbell, Lori . (2021). “De/colonizing Minds: Indigeneity, Indigenous Feminisms, and Indigenization in Indigenous Women’s Voices: 20 Years on from Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s Decolonizing Methodologies.” In Indigenous Women’s Voices, edited by Jen Evans and Emma Lee . 1st edition. London [England]: Zed Books. Douglas, H. (2003). “The Moral Responsibilities of Scientists (Tensions between Autonomy and Responsibility).” American Philosophical Quarterly, 40(1), 59–68. Fanon, F. (2008). Black Skin, White Masks. Pluto Press: London. Feodoroff, Pauliina . (2021). “What Form Can Atonement Take?” In Indigenous Women’s Voices: 20 Years on from Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s Decolonizing Methodologies , edited by Jen Evans and Emma Lee . 1st edition. London [England]: Zed Books. Fracchia, J. , & Lewontin, R. C. (2005). “The Price of Metaphor.” History and Theory, 44(1), 14–29. Godman, M. (2020). The Epistemology and Morality of Human Kinds. Routledge. Godman, M. , & Marchionni, C. (2022). “What Should Scientists Do About (Harmful) Interactive Effects?” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 12(4), 63. Gould, S. J. (1996). Mismeasure of Man. WW Norton & Company. Hacking, I. (1995). “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds.” In Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate, edited by D. Sperber , D. Premack , and A. J. Premack . Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 351–394. Hacking, I. (1998). Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses. University of Virginia Press. Hagerman, M. (2015). Käraste Herman: Rasbiologen Herman Lundborgs gåta. Norstedts. Hagerman, M. (2017). “Rasbiologin och forskningsperspektiven: Genmäle till Andreaz Wasniowski.” Historisk Tidskrift (S), 137(3), 485–495. Harding, S. (2000). “Democratizing Philosophy of Science for Local Knowledge Movements: Issues and Challenges.” Gender, Technology and Development, 4(1), 1–23. Hietala, M. (2005). “From Race Hygiene to Sterilization: The Eugenics Movement in Finland.” In Eugenics and the Welfare State: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, edited by G. Broberg & N. Roll-Hansen . East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, pp. 214–277. Kaplan, J. M. , Pigliucci, M. , & Banta, J. A. (2015). “Gould on Morton, Redux: What Can the Debate Reveal About the Limits of Data?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 52, 22–31. Khaitan, T. (2015). A Theory of Discrimination Law. OUP Oxford. Kittay, Eva Feder . (1999). Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Domination. New York: Routledge. Koskinen, I. (2022). “Reactivity as a Tool in Emancipatory Activist Research.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 12(4), 65. Koskinen, I. , & Rolin, K. (2019). “Scientific/Intellectual Movements Remedying Epistemic Injustice: The Case of Indigenous Studies.” Philosophy of Science, 86(5), 1052–1063. Labba, E.A. (2023) Rcks will echo our sorrow: the forced displacement of the Northern Sami. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Laimann, J. (2020). “Capricious Kinds.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(3), 1043–1068. Lindskoug, I.-M. (2023). Sveriges koloniale tilstedeværelse i Sápmi - Et studie af hvordan samerne i Sverige er koloniserede, og hvorfor dette er forkert. (Trans. From Swedish: Sweden’s Colonization of Sapmi. A Study of How the Sami within Sweden Are Colonized and Why It Is Wrong). Master’s Thesis, Aarhus University. Luchetti, M. (2022). “The Quantification of Intelligence in Nineteenth-Century Craniology: An Epistemology of Measurement Perspective.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 12(4), 56. Marchionni, C. , Zahle, J. , & Godman, M. (2024). “Reactivity in the Human Sciences.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 14(8). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-02400571-y McCammon, Christopher . (2018). “Domination.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/domination/ Pettit, P. , & Goodin, R. (1986). “The Possibility of Special Duties.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16(4), 651–676. Rudas, S. (forthcoming). “Cultural Imperialism and Indigenous Self-Determination.” In: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: Critics and Legacy. Boucher, F. and Caron, J.F. (eds), Palgrave Macmillan. Reardon, J. , & TallBear, K. (2012). “‘Your DNA Is Our History’ Genomics, Anthropology, and the Construction of Whiteness as Property.” Current Anthropology, 53(S5), S233–S245. Richerson, P. J. , & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Rolin, K . (2020). “Trust in Science.” In The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy , edited by J. Simon . Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315542294 Smith, H. (1983). “Culpable Ignorance.” The Philosophical Review, 92(4), 543–571. Smith, Linda Tuhiwai . (1999). Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. London: Zed. Sverdlik, Steve (1993). “Pure Negligence.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 30, 137–149. Thiong'o, N. (1986). Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. London: James Curry. Young, Iris Marion . (1990 [2011]). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wasniowski, A. (2017a). “Maja Hagerman, Käraste Herman: Rasbiologen Herman Lundborgs Gåta.” Historisk Tidskrift (S), 137(1), 162–165. Wasniowski, A. (2017b). “Replik på Maja Hagermans Genmäle.” Historisk Tidskrift (S), 137(3), 496–501. Zahle, Julie . (2023). “Reactivity and Good Data in Qualitative Data Collection.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 13(1), 10. Philosophy of science issues in cultural domination Bosworth, W. (2022). “Social Power and Noncooperative Game Theory.” Theoretical Politics, pp. 1–18. Boyd, R. , & Richerson, P. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cleaver, E. (1999). Soul on Ice. New York: Delta. Desmond, M. , & Emirbayer, M. (2010). Racial Domination, Racial Progress. New York: McGraw-Hill. Fiske, S. T. , & Berdahl, J. (2007). “Social Power.” In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (pp. 678–692). The Guilford Press. Fox, R. , & King, B. (2002). Anthropology Beyond Culture. London: Routledge. Kincaid, H. (1996). Philosophical Foundations of the Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kincaid, H. (2014). “Dead Ends and Live Issues in the Individualism-Holism Debate,” in Zahle, J. and Collin, F. , eds., Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science. Springer. Kincaid, H. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science. New York: Oxford University Press. Kincaid, H. (1997). Individualism and the Unity of Science. Lantham, MD: Roman and Littlefield. Kincaid, H. (2005). “Contextualism, Explanation and the Social Sciences.” Philosophical Explorations, 7, 201–219. Kincaid, H. (2018). Debating the Reality of Race, Caste, and Ethnicity. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 48 (2), 139–167. Kincaid, H. (2021). “Mechanisms, Good and Bad.” Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, 36(2), 173–189. Lukes, S. (2021). Power: A Radical View. London: Bloomsbury. Menge, T. (2018). “The Role of Power in Social Explanation.” European Journal of Social Theory, 21(1), 22–38. Moss, L. (2002). What Genes Cannot Do. Cambridge: MIT Press. Pettit, P. (2012). On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risjord, M. (2012). “Models of Culture.” In Kincaid (2012), pp. 387–408. Sperber, D. (1996). Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach. London: Blackwell. van der Meer, A. (2020). Performing Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Weber, M. (2013). Economics and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wilson, M. (2008). Wandering Significance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, M. (1999). Groundless Belief. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wilson, J. (2012). The Declining Significance of Race. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Culture as a form of structural domination Archer, M. S. (1988). “Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Archer, M. S. , & Elder-Vass, D. (2012). “Cultural system or norm circles? An exchange.” European Journal of Social Theory, 15(1), 93–115. Artiga, M. (2012). “The limits of freedom as non-domination.” Revista internacional de filosofia, 13, 37–46. Bourdieu, P. (2001). Masculine Domination. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Bourdieu, P. , & Wacquant, L. (1999). “On the cunning of imperialist reason.” Theory, Culture & Society, 16(1), 41–58. Carnap, R. (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Castoriades, C. (1987). The Imaginary Institutions of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Cicerchia, L. (2022). “Structural domination in the labor market.” European Journal of Political Theory, 21(1), 4–24. Elster, J. (2000). Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fanon, F. (1963). The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Galtung, J. (1982). “Strukturelle Gewalt.” Beiträge zur Friedens-und Konfliktforschung. Hamburg: Rowohlt. Garcia, M. (2021). We Are Not Born Submissive: How Patriarchy Shapes Women’s Lives. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hahnel, R. (2021). Democratic Economic Planning. London: Routledge. Hamm, B. , & Smandych, R. C. (Eds.). (2005). Cultural Imperialism: Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural Domination. Peterborough: Broadview Press. Haslanger, S. (2004). “Oppressions: Racial and Other.” In Levine, M. and Pataki, T. (eds.) Racism, Philosophy, Mind: Philosophical Explanations of Racism and Its Implications, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 97–123. Hindriks, F. (2012). “But where is the university?” dialectica, 66(1), 93–113. Hohl, S. (2017). “Individuelle Verantwortung für kollektiv verursachte Übel.” In Individuelle Verantwortung für kollektiv verursachte Übel. Paderborn: Brill mentis. Irving, S. (2019). Hayek’s Market Republicanism: The Limits of Liberty. London: Routledge. Irving, S. (2020). “Hayek’s neo-Roman liberalism.” European Journal of Political Theory, 19(4), 553–570. Koch, H. (2020). “Social Dysfunctions.” Edited by Hufendiek, R. , James, D. and van Riel, R . Social Functions in Philosophy: Metaphysical, Normative, and Methodological Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 45–69. Koch, H. (2022). Strukturelle Herrschaft. Dissertation. Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften der Universität Duisburg–Essen. Krause, S. R. (2013). “Beyond non-domination: Agency, inequality and the meaning of freedom.” Philosophy & Social Criticism, 39(2), 187–208. Laclau, E. , & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso Books. Lewis, D. (1979). “Scorekeeping in a language game.” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, 339–359. Lovett, F. (2010). A general theory of domination and justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovett, F. (2018). “Non-domination.” Edited by Schmidtz, D. , & Pavel, C. E. The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 106–120. Lovett, F. (2022). The Well-Ordered Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lukes, S. (2005). Power: A Radical View. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. Mader, D. (2022). Herrschaft und Handlungsfähigkeit: Elemente einer kritischen Sozialtheorie. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag. Mau, S. (2023). Mute Compulsion: A Marxist Theory of the Economic Power of Capital. London: Verso Books. Mühlebach, D. (2022). “Tackling Verbal Derogation: Linguistic Meaning, Social Meaning, and Constructive Contestation.” Edited by Bordonaba-Plou, D. , Castro, V. F. & Torices, J. R. The Political Turn in Analytic Philosophy: Reflections on Social Injustice and Oppressions, Berlin: De Gruyter, 175–198. Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pettit, P. (2001). A theory of freedom: from the psychology to the politics of agency. USA: Oxford University Press. Pettit, P. (2012). On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plunkett, D. (2015). “Which concepts should we use? Metalinguistic negotiations and the methodology of philosophy.” Inquiry, 58(7–8), 828–874. Postone, M. (1993). Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rahman, K. S. (2017). “Democracy against Domination: Contesting Economic Power in Progressive and Neorepublican Political Theory.” Contemporary Political Theory, 16, 41–64. Rosen, M. (1996). On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. Rothkopf, D. (1997). “In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?” Foreign Policy, 107, 38–53. Smandych, R. (2005). “Cultural Imperialism and Its Critics: Rethinking Cultural Domination and Resistance.” Edited by Hamm, B. and Smandych, R . Cultural Imperialism: Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural Domination, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 3–17. Stahl, T. (2012). “Verdinglichung und Herrschaft.” Edited by Friesen, H. , Lotz, C. et al. Ding und Verdinglichung: Technik- und Sozialphilosophie nach Heidegger und der Kritischen Theorie, München: Wilhelm Fink, 299–324. Thompson, M. J. (2013). “Reconstructing Republican Freedom: A Critique of the NeoRepublican Concept of Freedom as Non-Domination.” Philosophy & Social Criticism, 39(3), 277–298. Tomlinson, J. (1991). Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction. London: Continuum. Van Riel, R. (2020). “In search of the missing mechanism. Functional explanation in social science.” Edited by Hufendiek, R. , James, D. and van Riel, R . Social Functions in Philosophy: Metaphysical, Normative, and Methodological Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 70–92. Von Redecker, E. (2018). Praxis und Revolution: eine Sozialtheorie radikalen Wandels. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag. Vrousalis, N. (2021). “The Capitalist Cage: Structural Domination and Collective Agency in the Market.” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 38(1), 40–54. Wartenberg, T. (1990). The Forms of Power: From Domination to Transformation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Young, I. M. (2010). Responsibility for Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Domination, culture, and identity in republican theory Coffee, Alan . (2012). “Mary Wollstonecraft, Freedom, and the Enduring Power of Social Domination.” European Journal of Political Theory, 12, 116–135. Fricker, Miranda . (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gädeke, Dorothea . (2020). “Does a Mugger Dominate? Episodic Power and the Structural Dimension of Domination.” Journal of Political Philosophy, 28, 199–221. Krause, Sharon R. (2013). “Beyond Non-domination: Agency, Inequality, and the Meaning of Freedom.” Philosophy and Social Criticism, 39, 1–22. Laborde, Cécile , & Maynor, John (Eds.). (2008). Republicanism and Political Theory. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing. Lovett, Frank . (2010). “Cultural Accommodation and Domination.” Political Theory, 38, 243–267. Lovett, Frank . (2020). The Well-Ordered Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovett, Frank , & Pettit, Philip . (2018). “Preserving Republican Freedom: A Reply to Simpson.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 46, 363–383. Pettit, Philip . (1997). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pettit, Philip . (2012). On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pettit, Philip . (2014). Just Freedom. New York: W.W. Norton. Skinner, Quentin . (1998). Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge University Press. Weber, Max . ([1919] 1946). “Politics as a Vocation.” Edited by Gerth, H.H. and Wright Mills, C . From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Young, Iris Marion . (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press. The causal structure of cultural domination Dretske, Fred . (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Cambridge: MIT Press. Fanon, Frantz . (1952). Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press. Geertz, Clifford . (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Haslanger, Sally . (2016). “What is a (social) structural explanation?“ Philosophical Studies, 173, 113–130. Hoel, Erik . (2017). “When the map is better than the territory.” Entropy, 19(5), 188. Lovett, Frank . (2010). A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nkrumah, Kwame . (1965). Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Thomas Nelson. Pearl, Judea . (2001). Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pettit, Philip . (2009). “The Domination Complaint.” Edited by Cortina, A. and García-Marzá, D. Public Reason and Applied Ethics: The Ways of Practical Reason in a Pluralist Society, 87–117. London: Routledge. Rogers, Alan R. (1988). “Does Biology Constrain Culture?“ American Anthropologist, 90(4), 819–831. Shapiro, Stewart . (1997). Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Woodward, James . (2004). Making Things Happen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Young, Iris Marion . (2011). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Settler colonialism and the cultural domination of Indigenous peoples Anaya, S. J. (2009). “The Right of Indigenous People to Self-Determination in the PostDeclaration Era.” Edited by Charters, C. & Stavenhagen, R. Making the Declaration Work: The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Copenhagen: IWGIA 184–198. Danley, J. R. (1991). “Liberalism, aboriginal rights, and cultural minorities.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20(2), 168–185. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. New York: International Publishers. Hohmann, Jesse (2018) “Ch.6 The UNDRIP and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Existence, Cultural Integrity and Identity, and Non-Assimilation: Articles 7(2), 8, and 43” Edited by Hohmann, J. , & Weller, M. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press 150–178. Hohmann, J. , & Weller, M. (2018). The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jackson, M. (2022). “The Definition of Apartheid in Customary International Law and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.” International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 71(4), 831–855. Kohn, M. , & Reddy, K. (2023). “Colonialism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/colonialism/ (accessed 10 June 2023 ). Kymlicka, W. (1989). Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon. Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. (2016). ‘Liberalism, Community and Culture 25 Years On’. Dve domovini • Two Homelands, 44, 67–76. Lovett, F. (2022). The Well-Ordered Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovett, F. , & Pettit, P. (2018). “Preserving Republican Freedom: A Reply to Simpson.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 46(4), 363–383. McCammon, C. (2018). “Domination.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/domination/ (accessed 10 June 2023 ). Moore, M. (2016). “Justice and Colonialism.” Philosophy Compass, 11(8), 447–461. Newcomb, S. T. (2011). “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Paradigm of Domination.” Griffith Law Review, 20(3), 578–607. Pettit, P. (2012). On the People’s Terms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pettit, P. (2014). Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World. New York: W. W. Norton. Pruim, S. (2014). “Ethnocide and Indigenous Peoples: Article 8 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” Adelaide Law Review, 35(2), 269–308. Re Southern Rhodesia (1919) AC 211. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). Retrieved from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1998/07/19980717%2006-33%20PM/English.pdf (accessed 10 December 2023 ). Stamatopoulou, E. (2011). “Taking Cultural Rights Seriously: The Vision of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” Edited by Allen, S. & Xanthaki, A . Reflections on the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, London: Bloomsbury, 387–412. Story, J. (1833). Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol 1. Hilliard: Gray and Company. Tomasi, J. (1995). “Kymlicka, liberalism and respect for aboriginal cultures.” Ethics, 105(3), 580–603. UN Resolution 1514 (XV) (1960). Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, adopted 14 December. Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/206145 (accessed 10 December 2023 ). UN Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970). Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (A/ 8082), adopted 24 October. Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/202170 (accessed 10 December 2023 ). UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1968), General Assembly resolution 41/128, 4 December. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/RTD_booklet_en.pdf (accessed 8 October 2022 ). UN International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/191217 (accessed 10 December 2023 ). UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) GA Res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/47/1. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (accessed 15 October 2022 ). Waldron, J. (1992). “Minority cultures and the cosmopolitan alternative.” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25(3), 751–792. Wartenberg, T. E. (1990). The Forms of Power: From Domination to Transformation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Williams, R. A. Jr (1990). “Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World.” Duke Law Journal, 1990(4), 660–704. Wolfe, P. (2006). “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” Journal of Genocide Research, 8(4), 387–409. Xanthaki, A. (2018). “Ch.10 Culture: Articles 11(1), 12, 13(1), 15, and 34” Edited by Hohmann, J. , & Weller, M. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press 273–298. On the relation between hegemony and domination Allport, G. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Althusser, L. (1971). Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. Translated by B. Brewster , London: New Left. Bourdieu, P. (1977). Sur le pouvoir symbolique. Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 32e Année(3), 405–411. Colpani, G. (2022). Two Theories of Hegemony: Stuart Hall and Ernesto Laclau in Conversation. Political Theory, 50(2), 221–246. De Giovanni, D. , Lamantia, F. , & Pezzino, M. (2018). Evolutionary Tax Evasion and Optimal Regulation. The University of Manchester Economics Discussion Paper Series 1814. Elster, J. (1983). Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Engels, F. (1893, July 14). Brief an Franz Mehring. Friedrich Engels Werke, Band 39, 76–101. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. Greenwald, A. , & Banaji, M. (1995). Implicit social cognition: attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102(1), 4. Hall, S. (1986). Gramsci’s relevance for the study of race and ethnicity, Journal of Communication Inquiry 10(2), 5–27. Horkheimer, M. , & Adorno, T. W. (1969). Dialektik der Aufklärung. Frankfurt: S. Fischer. Horkheimer, M. , & Adorno, T. W. (2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Jäger, S. , Roth, C. , Roussille, N. , & Schoefer, B. (2023). Worker beliefs about outside options. NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 29623. Koch, H. (2022). Strukturelle Herrschaft. Dissertation, Duisburg-Essen. Lovett, F. (2010). A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovett, F. (2022). The Well-Ordered Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press Laclau, E. (1977). Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: New Left. Lukes, S. (2005). Power: A Radical View. London: Palgrave McMillan. Marcuse, H. (1964). One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press. O'Keefe, D. J. (2016). Persuasion: Theory and Research. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. Payne, B. , & Gawronski, B. (2010). A history of implicit social cognition: Where is it coming from? Where is it now? Where is it going? Edited by Gawronski, B. & Payne, B . Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications. New York: Guilford Press, 1–17. Richerson, P. J. , & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rosen, M. (1996). On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Sperber, D. , & Claidière, N. (2008). Defining and explaining culture (comments on Richerson and Boyd, Not by genes alone). Biology and Philosophy, 23, 283–292. Taylor, C. (1985). Philosophy and the Human Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press. The physiology of cultural domination Apkan, N. (2019). “There Is No ‘Gay Gene.’ There Is No ‘Straight Gene.’ Sexuality Is Just Complex, Study Confirms.” Retrieved from https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/there-isno-gay-gene-there-is-no-straight-gene-sexuality-is-just-complex-study-confirms (accessed March 8, 2024 ). de Beauvoir, S. (2009). The Second Sex. Translated by C. Borde and S. MalovanyChevallier , New York: Random House. Breeze, C. E. , Beck, S. , Berndt, S. I. , & Franceschini, N. (2022). “The Missing Diversity in Human Epigenomic Studies.” Nature Genetics, 54, 737–739. Cacioppo, J. T. , & Berntson, G. G. (2011). “The Brain, Homeostasis, and Health: Balancing Demands of the Internal and External Milieu.” Edited by Friedman, H. S. The Oxford Handbook of Health Psychology, 121–137. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cartright, M. (2017). “Foot-Binding.” Retrieved from https://www.worldhistory.org/FootBinding (accessed March 8, 2024 ). Chae, D. H. , Wang, Y. , Martz, C. D. , Slopen, N. , Yip, T. , Adler, N.E. , Fuller-Rowell, T.E. , Lin, J. , Matthews, K.A. , Brody, G.H. , Spears, E.C. , Puterman, E. , and Epel, E.S. (2020). “Racial Discrimination and Telomere Shortening among African Americans: The Coronary Artery Risk Development in Young Adults (CARDIA) Study.” Health Psychology, 39(3), 209–219. Cummings, S. R. , & Stone, K. (1997). “Consequences of Foot Binding among Older Women in Beijing, China.” American Journal of Public Health, 87(10), 1677–1679. Dark Sky International . (n.d.) Retrieved from https://darksky.org/what-we-do/internationaldark-skyplaces/#:~:text=The%20International%20Dark%20Sky%20Places,lighting%20policies%20an d%20public%20education (accessed March 8, 2024 ). David, R. , & Collins, Jr., J. (2007). “Disparities in Infant Mortality: What’s Genetics Got to Do with It?” American Journal of Public Health 97(7), 236–244. Dewey, J. (1988). “Appendix 1: The Unfinished Introduction.” Edited by Boydston, J. Volume 1 of The Later Works: 1925–1953, 329–396. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, J. (2008). “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy.” Edited by Boydston, J . The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899–1924. Volume 10: 1916–1917, 3–48. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Dieleman, S. , Rondel, D. , & Voparil, C. J. (2017). Pragmatism and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dworkin, A. (1986). “Women in the Public Domain.” Edited by Pearsall, M. Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, 221–229. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing. Fausto-Sterling, A. (2005). “The Bare Bones of Sex: Part 1—Sex and Gender.” Signs, 30(2), 1491–1527. Forrester, S. , Jacobs, D. , Zmora, R. , Schreiner, P. , Roger, V. , & Kiefe, C. I. (2019). “Racial Differences in Weathering and Its Associations with Psychosocial Stress: The CARDIA Study.” SSM—Population Health, 7, 100319. Fuller-Rowell, T. E. , Curtis, D. S. , El-Sheikh, M. , Duke, A. M. , Ryff, C. D. , & Zgierska, A. E. (2017). “Racial Discrimination Mediates Race Differences in Sleep Problems: A Longitudinal Analysis.” Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 23(2), 165–173. Ganna, A. , Verweij, K. J. H. , Nivard, M. G. , Maier, R. , Wedow, R. , Busch, A. S. , Abdelaoui, A. , Guo, S. , Sathirapongsasuti, J. F. , Lichtenstein, P. , Lundström, S. , Långström, N. , Auton, A. , Harris, K. M. , Beecham, G. W. , Martin, E. R. , Sanders, A. R. , Perry, J. R. B. , Neale, B. M. , & Zietsch, B. P. (2019). “Large-scale GWAS reveals insights into the genetic architecture of same-sex sexual behavior.” Science 365 (6456). DOI: 10.1126/science.aat7693, https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aat7693 Geronimus, A. T. (1992). “The Weathering Hypothesis and the Health of African-American Women and Infants: Evidence and Speculations.” Ethnicity and Disease, 2(3), 207–221. Geronimus, A. T. , Hicken, M. , Keene, D. , & Bound, J. (2006). “‘Weathering’ and Age Patterns of Allostatic Load Scores Among Blacks and Whites in the United States.” American Journal of Public Health, 96(5), 826–833. Geronimus, A. T. , Hicken, M. T. , Pearson, J. A. , Seashols, S. J. , Brown, K. L. , & Cruz, T. D. (2010). “Do US Black Women Experience Stress-Related Accelerated Biological Aging? A Novel Theory and First Population-Based Text of Black-White Differences in Telomere Length.” Human Nature, 21(1), 19–38. Geronimus, A. T. , Pearson, J. A. , Linnenbringer, E. , Schulz, A. J. , Reyes, A. G. , Epel, E. S. , Lin, J. , Blackburn, E. H. (2015). “Race/Ethnicity, Poverty, Urban Stressors and Telomere Length in a Detroit Community-Based Sample.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 56(2), 199–224. Hooks, B. (1984). Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. Boston: South End Press. James, W. (1950). Principles of Psychology. Volume Two. Mineola: Dover Publications. Killgrove, K. (2015). “Here’s How Corsets Deformed the Skeletons Of Victorian Women.” Retrieved from www.forbes.com/sites/kristinakillgrove/2015/11/16/how-corsets-deformedthe-skeletons-of-victorian-women/?sh=597c2134799c (accessed March 8, 2024 ). Kingsbury, J. H. , Buxton, O. M. , & Emmons, K. M. (2013). “Sleep and its Relationship to Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Cardiovascular Disease.” Curr Cardiovascular Risk Rep, 7(5), 387–394. Lee, H. , & Hicken, M. T. (2016). “Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Health Implications of Black Respectability Politics.” Souls, 18(2–4), 421–445. Metabolomic Medicine . (n.d.) “Telomere Analysis: An Accurate Index of Aging and Disease.” Retrieved from https://www.metabolomicmedicine.com/english/telomere_analysis-na192.html (accessed March 8, 2024 ). Malabou, C. (2007). The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage. Translated by S. Miller , New York: Fordham University Press. Mills, C. (1997). The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Nadybal, S. M. , Collins, T. W. , & Grineski, S. E. (2020). “Light Pollution Inequities in the Continental United States: A Distributive Environmental Justice Analysis.” Environmental Research, 189, 1–12. National Institutes of Health . (2022). “First Complete Sequence of a Human Genome.” Retrieved from https://www.nih.gov/news-events/nih-research-matters/first-completesequence-human-genome (accessed March 8, 2024 ). Orchard Corset . (n.d.). “Waist Training Before & After Results.” Retrieved from https://www.orchardcorset.com/pages/waist-training-before-after (accessed March 8, 2024 ). Palmer, A. (2021). “A 19th Century Whalebone Corset.” ROM. Retrieved from https://www.rom.on.ca/en/collections-research/magazine/a-19th-century-whalebone-corset (accessed March 8, 2024 ). Prather, A. A. , Puterman, E. , Lin, J. , O'Donovan, A. , Krauss, J. , Tomiyama, A. J. , Epel, E.S. , Blackburn, E. H. (2011). “Shorter Leukocyte Telomere Length in Midlife Women with Poor Sleep Quality.” Journal of Aging Research, article ID 721390. Sapolsky, R. M. (2004). Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers. New York: Holt Paperbacks. Schutte, O. (1998). “Cultural Alterity: Cross-Cultural Communication and Feminist Theory in North-South Contexts.” Hypatia, 13(2), 53–72. Shammas, M. A. (2011). “Telomeres, Lifestyle, Cancer, and Aging.” Current Opinion in Clinical Nutrition and Metabolic Care, 14(1), 28–34. Smith, W. A. , Hung, M. , & Franklin, J. D. (2012). “Between Hope and Racial Battle Fatigue: African American Men and Race-Related Stress.” Journal of Black Masculinity, 2(1), 35–58. Sullivan, S. (2001). Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism, and Feminism. Indiana University Press. Sullivan, S. (2015). The Physiology of Sexist and Racist Oppression. Studies in Feminist Philosophy Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whale & Dolphin Conservation USA . (n.d.). “What Is Baleen?” Retrieved from https://us.whales.org/whales-dolphins/what-is-baleen (accessed March 8, 2024 ). Wilson, E. A. (2004). Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body. Durham: Duke University Press. Winters, M.-F. (2020). Black Fatigue: How Racism Erodes the Mind, Body, and Spirit. Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.