(PDF) Educational Regime Complexity: Nested Governance and Multistakeholderism in the Fourth Industrial Revolution

CHAPTER 11 EDUCATIONAL REGIME COMPLExITy: NESTED Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) GOVERNANCE AND MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM IN THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION Tavis D. Jules1 ABSTRACT This chapter reviews the changing contours of education governance in today’s global environment in which governments participate in different educational agreements across various levels (supranational and global) or what is identified as the rise of “educational multistakeholderism.” Methodologically it draws up discursive evidence from previous studies in the form of a content analysis to show how the expansion of interna- tional regimes (institutions) into new issue areas, such as education, cre- ates an overlap between the elemental (core) regime and other regimes. In exploring how regime theory has been applied to comparative and Annual Review of Comparative and International Education 2017 International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 34, 139–158 Copyright © 2018 by Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1108/S1479-367920180000034014 139 140 TAVIS D. JULES international education, this chapter draws attention to how new regimes and institutions arise and coexist alongside two or more classes (civil soci- ety, nongovernmental, intergovernmental, businesses, and state) of actors and its consequences for education governance. It suggests that regime complex(es) in education, which aims to facilitate educational coopera- tion and are composed of assemblages from several other regimes, are responsible for governing, steering, and coordinating education govern- Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) ance activities through the use of agreements, treaties, global benchmarks, targets, and indicators. It concludes by suggesting that regimes and regime complex(es) in education are constituted by different types of multistake- holder governance. Keywords: Multistakeholderism; regimes; educational regime complex(es); educational multistakeholderism; Fourth Industrial Revolution Education governance is in crisis. The postindustrial, postrecessionary global economy is entering the era of the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” which expands upon the digital transformations that have categorized the third industrial revolution through the usage of cyber-physical systems that blur the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres (Jules, 2017; World Economic Forum, 2016).2 Today, education like security, terrorism, and trade is a transnational and multi-billion-dollar industry with untapped potential that is regulated and guarded by monitoring reports (UNESCO’s Annual Global Monitoring Report), rankings (the Times Higher Education World University Rankings), international assessments (the Programme for International Student Assessment; Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies; and Progress in International Reading Literacy Study), and trends reports (from the World Bank, the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, and the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]). As such, this chapter seeks to explore the complex “spaghetti bowl”3 (Bhagwati, 1995) of education governance – resulting from the multiple and concurrent participation by governments in different educa- tional agreements across various levels (supranational and global) in today’s multistakeholder governance environment. While multistakeholderism or multistakeholder governance can be issue- specific and synonymous with the governing of the ecosystems of the Internet (see Antonova, 2008; Malcolm, 2008); it has been expanded to account for the educational Regime Complexity 141 joint participation and management of resources by governments, business, and civil society. Thus, multistakeholderism is defined as “two or more classes of actors engaged in a common governance enterprise concerning issues they regard as public in nature, and characterized by polyarchic authority rela- tions constituted by procedural rules” (Raymond & DeNardis, 2015, p. 573). The changes ushered in by unfettered finalization in the postindustrial era has given rise to a four-dimensional chess game of education governance that is Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) concurrently transpiring vertically and horizontally through different “edu- cational brokers” (Jules & Jefferson, 2017) oscillating from the traditional (nation states) to the civic (civil society organizations) to the regional (supra- national institutions) to the global (such as “international knowledge banks”4 [Jones, 2007]). This has shepherded in the era of what I call “educational multistakeholderism” where new regimes and institutions arise and coexist alongside two or more classes (civil society, nongovernmental, intergovern- mental, businesses, and state) of actors. As such, in addressing one of the current trends in the field of Comparative and International Education (CIE), the rise of multistakeholderism in edu- cation, this chapter engages in theory-building rather than theory-testing since it aims to deepen our analytical understanding of what I term “edu- cational regime complex(es)” by detailing how they arise, their actors, and expectations. This chapter advances that regime complex(es) in education, which aim to facilitate educational cooperation, are composed of assem- blages from several other regimes that are both, directly and indirectly, related to education. In other words, educational regime complex(es) are responsible for governing, steering, and coordinating education governance activities through the use of agreements, treaties, global benchmarks, targets, and indicators. In this way, the chapter articulates that “education regime complexity” refers to assemblages in education that are constituted by inter- national regimes and supranational regimes (or “trans-regional regimes” [Jules, 2013]), which are nested, somewhat overlapping and parallel, but are not necessarily hierarchically ordered, since the focus is on coordination and interactive relationships around material and political substances, norms, and regulation. In exploring the implications of educational multistakeholderism for the field of CIE, methodologically it draws up discursive evidence from previ- ous studies in the form of a content analysis, to show how the expansion of international regimes (institutions) into new issue areas, such as educa- tion, creates an overlap between the elemental (core) regime and other regimes. This chapter, therefore, offers a theoretical perspective on edu- cational regimes by exploring the impact of the changing trajectories of 142 TAVIS D. JULES supranational, transregional, and global governance on national educational developments. The chapter has four sections. The first section provides a brief review of the emerging concept of “regime theory” (Krasner, 1983) found in the International Relations scholarship. The second section draws attention to the evolution and application of regime theory in CIE to study regional and global educational transformations by transnational actors (Jules, 2015; Parreira do Amaral, 2010; Tikly, 2016) and it concludes by advancing that the Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) new body of literature on “regime complex(es)” (Raustiala & Victor, 2004) or “regime complexity”5 holds promise in the field as an analytical framework for studying today’s multistakeholder educational environment. The third section, takes up the notion of multistakeholderism to draw attention to the catalytic events that trigger regime expansionism in education and their link to education governance. By applying this common analytic framework to cases in education and by searching for explicit parallels and differences in the incidence, causes, and prospects for multistakeholderism, I hope to contrib- ute to a deeper understanding of education governance. The fourth and con- cluding section, provides a roadmap to test my preliminary explanations and strategies. It examines the expansion of educational diplomacy in a changing global environment now dominated by the fourth industrial revolution. CONCEPTUALIZING REGIMES AS MODES OF GOVERNANCE Keohane and Nye (2001) in discussing interdependence in the International Relations literature, begin by arguing Interdependence affects world politics and the behavior of states; but governmental actions also influence patterns of interdependence. By creating or accepting procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity, governments regulate and control trans- national and interstate relations. We refer to these governing arrangements as interna- tional regimes. (p. 5, emphasis original) In this way, regimes are a complex set of governing rules and conven- tions that manage and coordinate the ‘‘institutionalized collective behavior’’ (Ruggie, 1975) of actors in an anarchic international system – the absence of superordinate power – that is driven by rule-governed behavior (Parreira do Amaral, 2010). Krasner (1983) later conceptualized a regime as a set of “prin- ciples, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area” (p. 1) to explain the behavior of educational Regime Complexity 143 actors in the international system or what has been described as the paradox of “cooperation under anarchy” (Oye, 1985). In this way: Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescription or proscriptions for actions. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and imple- menting collective choice. (Krasner, 1983, p. 2) Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) Thus, regimes are “arrangements peculiar to substantive issue-areas in international relations that are characterized by the condition of complex interdependence: neither hierarchy nor anarchy prevails and states really practice self-help” (Haas, 1993, p. 27). Keohane (1983), in distinguishing between agreements and regimes, notes that agreements are ad hoc “one- shot” arrangements, whereas the purpose of regimes is to facilitate agree- ments. Analogously, Jervis (1993) argues that regimes “[imply] not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of coopera- tion that is more than the following of short-run self-interest” (p. 173). In this way, regimes are convened not of their own accord, but are often envis- aged as “intervening variables standing between basic and causal variable and outcomes of behavior” (Krasner, 1983, p. 5). Keohane (1983) main- tains that Regime can make agreements easier if they provide frameworks for establishing legal liability (even if they are perfect); improve the quantity and quality of information avail- able to actors; or reduce other transactional costs, such as organization or making side- payments. (p. 154) On the other hand, young (1983) argues that there are three paths to regime formation: (1) spontaneous, in which regimes emerge from the converging expectations of actors; (2) negotiated, where regimes are formed based upon explicit agreements; and (3) imposed, where external actors force membership upon other actors. In this way, regimes can be differentiated based upon their function along a continuum ranging from specific and single-issue to diffuse and multi-issue (Puchala & Hopkins, 1983). Keohane (1983) notes that regimes are like contracts because they “involve actors with long-term objectives who seek to structure their relationships in stable and mutually beneficial ways” (p. 146) while establishing frameworks (reducing transactional costs) and coordinating actors’ expectations (improv- ing quality and quantity of information available to states) around issues that may arise within any given policy space. The peculiar characteristic of regimes, which are social institutions, is that they display “conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behavior and practice” (young, 1983, p. 94). 144 TAVIS D. JULES These two elements, behavior and practice, need not exist in parallelism for regimes to arise: “The occurrence of behavioral regularities sometimes gives rise to convergence of expectations, and vice versa” (young, 1993, p. 94). Thus, all regimes comprise of constellations that are social conventions, and as such, they accentuate that they are human artifacts, having no existence or meaning apart from the behavior of individuals or group of people (young, 1983). As social institutions, regimes constitute behavioral conventions that represent a Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) response to coordinated problems and situations, in which the pursuit of inter- est leads to socially describable outcomes. Regimes exist when “patterned state behavior results from joint rather than independent decision-making” (Stein, 1982, p. 301). Thus, regimes ascend because actors surrender independent decision-making in dealing with shared interests and common aversions. Regimes are structures that govern the behaviors of actors. Therefore, they are abundant in the international system, and they cover virtually every issue-area, including education. In the post-World War II years, “the rela- tions between entities, rather than the entities or organizations themselves, took on an increasing significance in world politics, and the sources of authority of international organizations became correspondingly blurred” (De Búrca, Keohane, & Sabel, 2014, pp. 4–5). As such, several international regimes setting rules, norms, and practices governing education, have been negotiated and implemented, commencing with the United Nations and its specialized agencies (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Education Scientific Fund, and the United Nations Children’s Fund) and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (transformed into the World Trade Organization). Moreover, the hollowing- out of national education systems with neo-corporatist management tech- niques under the guise of Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Samoff & Carrol, 2003) or “educational aid” (Klees, 2010), with the movement from government to governance in the late 1980s, has cemented the intensification of regimes in education as a hallmark of the global governance landscape. With the rise of additional actors or educational brokers ranging from global management firms and private equity investment firms such as consult- ant agencies, multinationals, and private corporations (e.g. McKinsey and Co, Pearson, Deloitte, Accenture, Cambridge Education, the Rand Corporation, and PriceWaterhouseCooper) or “merchants of education” (Verger, 2009), and philanthropic bodies (e.g., the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, and the Ford Foundation), coupled with older educa- tional actors, such as the state, aid donors, nongovernmental organizations, international nongovernmental organizations, and international knowledge educational Regime Complexity 145 banks has now made education governance a spaghetti bowl. Consisting mostly of an assortment of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral nested and overlapping educational agreements. FROM “REGIMES” TO “REGIME COMPLEX(ES)” IN Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION Today, education governance is a trinity of events that is causing it to be gated, regulated, and governed as new nonstate actors continue to infiltrate, recalibrate, and distort the educational policy environment. As Jules (2017) notes, education governance is gated in that the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has ushered in the transition toward servitization6 defined by the drive toward “product-as-a-service providers” (Probst, Frideres, Cambier, Ankeraa, & Lide, 2016); regulated by neoclassical philosophies that emphasize managerialism, corporatism, and neo-Taylorism in education, engendering a focus on competition, benchmarks, indicators, and assess- ments; and governed in that role of the nation states have been reduced to one of “coordination of coordination” (Dale, 2005) since nations are viewed as “clients” who receive “expert” advice from “external consultants” (donor agencies and international finance corporations). In CIE, Maroy (2009) asserts that “governance models” imply “theoretical and normative models serving as cognitive and normative references, especially for decision-makers, in defining ‘good ways to steer or govern’ the education system” (p. 76). However, education governance is now a hybrid of different systems of regu- latory control, mobilized by market forces, and involves civil, global, public, social, and coercive regulatory mechanisms (Levi-Faur, 2012; Jules, 2017). In light of the expanded role of newer actors in education, and coupled with the role of states and markets in proving education and making policy, several authors have used regime theory to reinterpret how institutions are dealing with challenges that education governance poses. Parreira do Amaral’s (2006, 2010) work on how the shifting trajectories of governance without government is transforming education policy, first applied regime theory as a heuristic instrument in CIE to analyze the cur- rent state of education policy making. In studying education governance, Parreira do Amaral (2010) employs regime theory to analyze the “constella- tions of actors, the degree of interdependence, and the nature of orienting premises of education policy” given “the complex set of rules and insti- tutions that education is enmeshed” (p. 58) within. In advocating for the 146 TAVIS D. JULES emergence of what he calls “international education regimes (IER)”, he sug- gests that their raison d’etre lies in “similarity of the orienting principles of educational reforms [found] worldwide” (p. 58). In this way, IERs are deeply entrenched in the behavior of actors and the changing institutional struc- tures that have evolved as education governance has been supplanted with new institutional forms of governance ranging from hierarchical steering to postbureaucratic coordination. Thus, within the postbureaucratic state, the Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) governance of education now operates across different scales, and it is driven by the promotion of a hybrid partnership model between different actors where policies “…among other features of the post-bureaucratic state – [are] initiated, monitored and evaluated by multiple actors (including non- state actors) as well as formulated with a set of measurable benchmarks, targets, and outcomes” (Steiner-Khamsi, 2008, p. 3). It is within this realm that Parreira do Amaral (2010) suggests that regime theory allows us to “clearly discern the different actors, processes, and cognitive elements involved in education policy” (pp. 66–67). Thus, regimes are viewed as existing of their accord since they focus on influencing global education governance through the organizing of their elemental institutions. However, an elemental regime can encompass several agreements, treaties, and conventions. In building on the work of Krasner (1983) and Parreira do Amaral (2010), Tikly (2017) sets out to establish that Education for All (EFA) is a global governance regime. EFA as a global gov- ernance regime is shaped “by the actions and demands of key donors, for example, in the establishment and development of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) as a means of channeling bilateral funding for education in support of EFA” (as cited in Tikly, 2017). In defining EFA as a governance regime as opposed to an IER, Tikly (2016) is advancing that EFA as an elemental regime, has hitherto arisen through “the convergence of key governmental and non-governmental institutions and networks at the global, regional, and national levels around a distinct series of international agreements, frame- work documents, protocols, and reports” (Tikly, 2016, p. 40). Moreover, Tikly (2017) highlights how other regimes, such as the EFA-FTI and actors such as funding donors, shape the global education governance process. Tikly (2017) identifies that EFA, as an elemental regime, is governed by (1) principles that forge its member’s commitment to the rational principle of investment in edu- cation; (2) norms that are driven by the ideational principles of doing good for the betterment and development of societies; (3) while its rules, that closely mirror its norms, articulates the prioritizing of agreed-upon rights and obli- gations of its membership; and (4) finally its decision-making procedures are mechanisms through which its members find consensus. educational Regime Complexity 147 Another set of research uses the concept of regime theory to suggest that regional configurations, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the European Union (EU), which govern educational projects and their ensuing education activities through the “coordination of relations of com- plex interdependence” (Jessop, 2000, p. 345) across noneconomic or func- tional spaces (education, health, transportation, and telecommunications) can be viewed as “educational transregional regimes” (Jules, 2012, 2015). As Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) such, transregional regimes in education are viewed as the functional mecha- nisms of regulatory coordinating entities that act as a multilevel governance framework that has emerged in response to gaps in the ability of national gov- ernments to control global, regional, and transnational economic processes. The sole purpose of a transregional regime is to create common regional poli- cies that benefit its member states. In other words, educational transregional regimes govern, coordinate, or steer education governance at the regional level. Thus, transregional regimes are “capsules in which rational actions take place” (Breslin, Higgott, & Rosamond, 2003, p. 7) by rational actors (both state and nonstate alike) who now function across multilevel policy systems. Given the spaghetti bowl of educational agreements that now binds nation states to each other and the international system, a new set of research has emerged in the field of International Relations that has potential applica- tion for unravelling and studying the complex nature of persuasive education governance. This new body of work focuses on the nested and overlapping aspects of different regimes and how they come to bear upon each other, or what has been called “regime complex(es)” (Keohane & Victor, 2011). In examining climate change, these authors theorize how a loosely coupled set of issue-specific regimes influence the adaptability, flexibility, and feasibility of international political commitments. Regime complex(es) are defined “as a network of three or more interna- tional regimes that relate to a common subject matter, exhibit overlapping membership, and generate substantive normative or operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effec- tively” (Orsini, Morin, & young, 2013, p. 29). Regime complex(es) are an “array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area” (Raustiala & Victor, 2004, p. 279) and regime com- plexity explores the difference between respective regimes and the potential outcomes that can arise for their interpretations of norms, rules, and proce- dures (Galbreath & Sauerteig, 2014). Orsini et al. (2013) argue that regime complex(es) involve a network of three or more international regimes who have overlapping membership and “generate substantive, normative, or oper- ative interactions” (p. 29). For these authors, regime complex(es) are defined 148 TAVIS D. JULES by six essential elements (definition, composition, issue areas overlap, interac- tion, membership, and recognition) that demarcate their ability to nonhierar- chically govern particular issue-areas. While regime complexity has addressed a number of issues in several thematic fields from environment and climate change (Keohane & Victor, 2011; Simonelli, 2016; Widerberg & Pattberg, 2016), trade (Alter & Meunier, 2006), food security (Margulis, 2013), peace- keeping (Brosig, 2017), and human trafficking (Gomez-Mera, 2016; Hafner- Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) Burton, 2009), its implications has not been theorized in the field of CIE. It should be noted that while not always the case, most regime are nested and regime complex(es) can be said to be overlapping. Regime complex(es) in education have emerged as overlapping occurs in the governance activities of the institutions and regimes involved. They, therefore, are configurations comprising of an institution within which state and nonstate actors interact. Therefore, regime complex(es) in educa- tion can be said to involve various entities (states, nonstate actors, substate units, international organizations, civil society organizations, private actors, public actors, and others) that are nonhierarchically linked to each other (De Búrca et al., 2014). An example of the movement toward an education regime complex is the global assessment regime. This regime complex has its heredity in the International Development Goals (IDG), a development regime, with seven-tangible targets launched in 1996 by the Development Assistance Committee under the banner of 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation. Among other things, the IDG targets set a goal of universal primary education. However, the role of education and development became intertwined against the backdrop of the Cold War and the releas- ing of the World Bank’s World Development Report in 1990 that called for economic reform to be accompanied by social policies (Hulme, 2007). IDG- regime came of age against the backdrop of the ascendancy of Reaganomics and Thatcherism as neoliberalism shifted the responsibility (and authority) for reducing poverty from the United Nations to the international financial institutions or international knowledge banks. The IDG-regime would then become influential in advancing educational issues at the World Conference on Education for All (EFA) in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990, under the patronage of UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, and the World Bank. Delegates from 155 countries, as well as representatives from some 150 governmental bodies agreed upon the Jomtien EFA-regime’s World Declaration on education for All that called the intensification of meeting basic learning needs and recognition that education is a fundamental human right for all. The framework for Action to Meet the Basic Learning Needs identifies that countries were supposed to strive to achieve: universal access educational Regime Complexity 149 to learning; a focus on equity; emphasis on learning outcomes; broadening the means and the scope of basic education; enhancing the environment for learning; and strengthening partnerships by 2000. However, these goals were not met and in 2000 the international community gathered in Dakar, Senegal, in which 1,100 participants from 164 countries representing different regimes agreed to the Dakar framework for Action and affirmed their commitment to achieving EFA by the year 2015 under six broadly defined education goals. Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) The Dakar EFA-regime, global developmental regimes (such as EFA-FTI and GATS) issue-specific regimes (on items such as security, health, and human rights) and supranational and transregional regimes (such as CARICOM and EU) that also hold some responsibility for education, sat side-by-side each other, and played a prominent role in negotiating and establishing the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The MDG is a regime complex with 21 targets and 60 indicators that was adopted by 189 countries in 2000. Unlike EFA-regimes (Jomtien and Dakar) that were education-focused, the MDG- regime complex had two goals (MDG 2 – Ensure that, by 2015, children eve- rywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling and MDG 3 – Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015) that directly related to education. In this way, the MDG-regime complex exhib- its overlapping tendencies across different agreements, whereas the IDG-regime and EFA-regimes are elemental regimes that are issue-specific. However, IDG- regime and EFA-regimes, which were issue-specific agreement covering multi- ple international commitments were not nested regimes (i.e. lacking hierarchy in influencing policy making) and exhibited some overlapping tendencies. In 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with 17 goals and 169 targets, replaced the MDG-regime complex. The SDG-regime complex with its multistakeholder approach had input from actors (the UN System Task Team, High Level Panel of Eminent Persons [HLP], Open Working Group on SDGs [SDGs OWG], and UNDG Consultations on the post-2015 development agenda) along with contributions from several other elemental regimes (such as the Global Partnership for Education [formerly FTI] and the Global Education First Initiative). While an EFA-regime is an example of a synergetic elemental regime that contains nondiverging relations, this is not always the case for regime complex(es). Moreover, the morphing of the MDG-regime complex into the SDG-regime complex is an example of overlapping regime that is based upon a narrowed approach to development with targets and benchmarks across several issue-areas. The SDG is a global development regime complex with 17 goals that incorporates one education- related goal (Goal 4 – Ensure inclusive and quality EFA and promote lifelong 150 TAVIS D. JULES learning), while at the same time providing a broad-based platform for coop- eration in other issue areas. In returning to the six elements of regime complex(es), MDG-regime com- plex and SDG-regime complex, all are composed of distinctive elemental regimes with implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. Second, these regime complex(es) are defined by the fact that they are composed of a variety of (state and nonstate) actors and consensus is gar- Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) nered around conventions, agreement, and treaties dealing with education. As Orsini et al. (2013) reminds us, regime complex(es) are demarked by diverg- ing and nondiverging relations as conflicts and redundancies are solved and synergies emerge. Third, the issue areas overlap of these regime complex(es) is the provision of basic EFA, to be achieved differently. In this case, the issue areas of education are differentiated by the fact that they deal “with in common negotiations and by the same, or closely coordinated, bureaucra- cies” (Keohane, 1984, p. 61) by focusing on a narrowly defined issue-area of global development. Fourth, regime complex(es) necessitate that an elemental regime has overlapping memberships that influence other processes, for exam- ple this is exhibited in the fact that the progress toward the MDG’s educa- tional goals was viewed as progress toward EFA’s targets, which was incorrect. Fifth, regime complex(es) are not automatically formed and, therefore, three or more elemental regimes must interact with at least one other regime “at the political and material levels when their subjects are perceived as intrinsically interconnected” (Orsini et al., 2013, p. 31). Both the MDG-regime complex and SDG-regime complex are comprised of several elemental regimes, such as the Dakar EFA-regime, that have overlapping priorities. Sixth, and finally, since regime complex(es) are not abstract, all involved, from policy makers to stakeholders, view “the simultaneous existence of elemental regimes as being actually, or at least potentially problematic for a regime complex to exist” (Orsini et al., 2013, p. 31). This sixth feature was present in the transition to the post-2015 development agenda after global consensus was reached that the goals and targets outlined in the MDG were not reachable by 2015. MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM COMETH – BUILDING EDUCATIONAL REGIME COMPLEXES THROUGH SOFT POWER There are three type of regimes, parallel, nested, and overlapping. Parallel regimes have no substantive or formal overlapping. However, as Raustiala educational Regime Complexity 151 and Victor (2004) argue, much of the previous studies have focused on the interactive nature of international institutions or nesting regimes – where one institution has hierarchical authority over others and can resolve any rule conflicts between them. On the other hand, overlapping regimes con- sist of multiple institutions overseeing a given issue-area but consensus is not restricted or subordinate to another. However, as global governance has evolved, there has been a slow shift from “nesting” to “overlapping” regimes. Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) As Alter and Meunier (2009) suggest, while nested regimes and overlapping regimes govern similar issues, the former is hierarchical while the latter is not. In this way, overlapping regimes are consequences of “regime-shifting” (Helfer, 2004) and “forum-shopping by targets” (Abbott, 2011) since incon- sistencies exists in the implementing and interoperating of global agreements as actors tend to cherry-pick selected policy elements. However, Abbott (2011) suggests, with the advent of regime complex(es), governance is now fragmented, complex, and decentralized as it is depend- ent upon transnational rule-making schemes, or what has been called “regu- latory standard-setting” (RSS; Abbott & Snidal, 2009a, 2009b). For Abbott and Snidal (2009a), RSS aim to govern regulations instead of coordinating externalities, and are, therefore, viewed as a new form of transnational regula- tion that can be managed and controlled by one or more actors as they seek to fill gaps in state and international regulation. Such new regulatory patterns allow different stakeholders to enter the governance landscape to advance a public good. This is evident in the rise of soft power in education – in the form of coordinated responses to perceived global problems, or what has been called “educational diplomacy” (Jules, 2016; Peterson, 2014). In this way, educational diplomacy has evolved beyond cultural exchanges and techni- cal knowledge transfer, and it now engenders collaboration and cooperation to facilitate technical assistance. This implies that educational regimes are at the center of normsetting educational politics in the form of government-to- government and government-to-nongovernmental exchange. As noted above, the shift from government to governance has brought about an epoch engen- dering the postbureaucratic – the amalgamation of an organic structure and the modalities of indirect and co-opted from of control – premised upon dis- course and agreement rather than authority and domination (Heckscher & Applegate, 1994; Iedema, 2003; Josserand, Teo, & Clegg, 2006). As Peterson (2014) notes, in an era of “accelerated global engagement, country-to-country educational diplomacy is being overtaken by institution-to-institution rela- tionships and a broad array of actors” (p. 3). Educational diplomacy strength- ens transnationalism since it has its own political-legal framework that ensures that government benefits from commitments made. 152 TAVIS D. JULES It is no longer possible to negotiate a new arrangement without consider- ing how it will affect already constituted agreements within existing regimes. Moreover, education governance is such a convoluted process involving numerous actors and institutions with far-reaching implications, given that the so-called “commercialization and privatization of education” is creating a “global education industry” (Verger, Lubienski, & Steiner-Khamsi, 2016) denominated by newer actors or educational brokers engaged in complex Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) governance relations. The growing progress toward transnational activities means that in education more decisions with day-to-day consequences for individuals and institutions are made by regime complex(es) as power has shifted from the nation state to regional and global configurations. It is within this context that educational cooperation or educational diplomacy is emerg- ing as a key facet of what I call the “educational multistakeholderism.” The concept of multistakeholderism has emerged as a way to discern the complex nature of global governance, and it has come to symbolize the linkages or actors working in networks and operating across borders to seek solutions to issue-areas. In this way, “groups of actors organized around specific common principles, values, visions, legal status, and organizational structures and that have a certain stake in a process or issue” (Kleinwächter, 2008, p. 537) consti- tute multistakeholderism. An example of educational multistakeholderism at the local level is public–private partnerships in education that are governed through policy and governance networks (Robertson, Mundy, Verger, & Menashy 2012; Verger, 2012). The onset of educational multistakeholderism has it ascendancy in the movement from “educational fundamentalism” (Jones, 2007) under the guise of loan conditionalities of international knowledge banks to “educa- tional multilateralism” (Mundy, 1998) through the mechanisms of coordina- tion to “educational regionalism” (Jules, 2015) premised upon cooperation. Educational rules and norms are navigated in today’s complex web of insti- tutional density, which has expanded drastically since the 1990s. Thus, multi- stakeholderism in education has its ascendancy in development projects and the growth of global networks constituted by civil society and private sector nongovernmental actors. However, cooperation in education brings complex- ity, given that much educational policy is focused on referring to the origins of the global reform rather than the country specific criteria needed for suc- cessful implementation. This becomes denser given the sheer complexity of education governance and the multiple sets of rules and institutions affecting it. Educational regime complex(es) are grounded in the new reality of educa- tional cooperation, thus generating new prospects for strategic actions that can be regulatory or operational. educational Regime Complexity 153 Thus, regimes and regime complex(es) in education are constituted by different types of multistakeholder governance, be it “(i) the types of actors involved; and (ii) the nature of authority relations between actors” (Raymond & DeNardis, 2015, p. 575). In order for education multistakeholder governance to arise, it must involve two or more classes of actors rather than three or more (state) parties or what has been defined as “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrange- Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) ments or by means of institutions” (Keohane, 1990, p. 731). Thus, educa- tional multistakeholder governance is polycentric in that (1) it is composed of multiple actor types arrangements where participate based “on the opera- tion of a dominant organization responsible for governing a particular issue” (Raymond & DeNardis, 2015, p. 579), such as an EFA-regime and (2) it based on processes of emulation or regulatory competition and policy diffusion and it closely resembles a regime complex with its “problematic interactions” (Orsini et al., 2013) across issue-specific regimes with overlapping membership and subject-matter between individual regimes, such as CARICOM or EU. The central argument is that educational regime complex(es) emerge grad- ually over time and are based on the interactions of their elemental regimes and institutions. That is, they are spontaneous institutions composed of a set of negotiated elemental institutions that are parts of functionally overlap- ping international institutions that affect each other’s operation. Educational regime complex(es) are multiactor-driven networks that converge around a perceived set of expectations, trajectories, and geometries in which resources (financial, human, and digital) are mobilized (in the form of technical or functional cooperation and capacity building) to foster change. In other words, educational regime complex(es) are assemblages (of institutions, pro- jects, practices, and mechanisms) that have emerged as responses to crises of national and global accumulation and seeks to mobilize, institutionalize, and govern new strategic relational forms. In this way, educational regime complex(es) are social structures embedded in today’s multistakeholder cul- ture that are shaped by the normative development or performances made within one elemental institution against the backdrop of larger institutions that form part of the regime complex in which actors seeks to overcome prob- lems through cooperation. CONCLUSION This chapter has suggested that movement by novel actors into new areas creates new regime complex(es) where they did not exist previously. Such 154 TAVIS D. JULES regime complex(es) have drastic consequences for the governance of edu- cational policy in that they no longer represent a static responsibility. We are now entering an era dominated by educational regime complex(es) that govern through “regulation by network” – horizontal and vertical networks. The MDG-regime and SDG-regime were not nested regimes since they were not issue-specific institutions, instead containing several multilateral mech- anisms and driven by multistakeholderism. In an era besieged by the global Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) coordination of educational agreements, regime theory provides scholars in CIE with a starting point to study how the multistakeholder educational environment, which is nested, somewhat overlapping, and parallel but is not necessarily hierarchically, orders regimes and regime complex(es) that coordinate the relationships around material and political substances, norms, and regulation of educational policy. As such, multistakeholderism is here to say in an era defined by the expansion of educational diplomacy in a changing global environment now dominated by the fourth industrial revolution. Thus, at the dawn of the so-called “fourth industrial revolution” that blends the physical with the cyber-physical, educational regimes – supra- national, transregional, or transnational –, are the only way to forward in today’s globally regulated policy environment. As we move away from the knowledge-based economic systems of globalization, education gov- ernance will be shaped by “disruptive innovation” (Christensen, 2013), the displacement of historical static systems, and the “Internet of Things” (Ashton, 2009),7 the movement away from human-to-human or human-to- computer interaction (Abu Mezied, 2016; Schwab, 2016). In this new era tailored around innovation, global educational priorities are undergoing profound shifts demarcated by new business models (public–private part- nerships), disruption of incumbents (arrival of nonstate actors), and the reshaping of educational delivery services and modes (in the form of open educational resources). As such, the changing geometries in educational cooperation are giving rise to different educational regime complex(ex) with the movement toward the fourth industrial revolution premised upon horizontal coordination that are now increasingly shaping the governance of national education system. In this new system premised upon networks, multistakeholderism is emerging to coordinate the transnational actions of different actors. educational Regime Complexity 155 NOTES 1. Aspects of this chapter draw upon Jules (2008). 2. Schwab (2016) suggests that the first industrial revolution, circa 1784, was driven my mechanized production and powered by water and steam power. The second industrial revolution, circa 1870, relied upon the division of labor and used electric power to facilitate mass production. The third industrial revolution, circa 1969, auto- mated production through electronics and information technology. Finally, the fourth Downloaded by Loyola University Chicago, Dr Tavis Jules At 16:05 31 January 2018 (PT) industrial revolution, circa impending, expands upon the digital revolution of the third industrial revolution by using cyber-physical systems that blur the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres. 3. The “spaghetti bowl” metaphor was first used by Bhagwati (1995) to conceptual- ize the overlapping nature of preferential trade agreement between different countries. 4. Such as the World Bank, the International Monterey Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and other United Nations related institutions. 5. Following Galbreath and Sauerteig (2014) regime complexity is viewed as the embedded overlap across agreements. 6. This term comes from the business world and it implies that manufactures are moving away from a transactional approach of making and selling of goods to a more relational approach based on providing product-centric services that are integrated within their products. REFERENCES Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2009a). The governance triangle: Regulatory standards institutions and the shadow of the state. In W. Mattli & N. Woods (Eds.), The politics of global regula- tion (pp. 44–48). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Abbott, K. 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