(PDF) Experimental Philosophy

PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 ANNUAL REVIEWS Further Experimental Philosophy Click here for quick links to Annual Reviews content online, including: Joshua Knobe,1,2 Wesley Buckwalter,3 • Other articles in this volume Shaun Nichols,4 Philip Robbins,5 Hagop Sarkissian,6 • Top cited articles • Top downloaded articles and Tamler Sommers7 • Our comprehensive search Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org 1 Program in Cognitive Science, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8306; email:

by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. 2 Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8306 3 Department of Philosophy, City University of New York, Graduate Center, New York, New York 10016 4 Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721 5 Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri 65211 6 Department of Philosophy, City University of New York, Baruch College, New York, New York 10010 7 Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, Houston, Texas 77004 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012. 63:81–99 Keywords First published online as a Review in Advance on moral psychology, moral relativism, free will, consciousness, causation July 29, 2011 The Annual Review of Psychology is online at Abstract psych.annualreviews.org Experimental philosophy is a new interdisciplinary field that uses meth- This article’s doi: ods normally associated with psychology to investigate questions nor- 10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100350 mally associated with philosophy. The present review focuses on re- Copyright c 2012 by Annual Reviews. search in experimental philosophy on four central questions. First, why All rights reserved is it that people’s moral judgments appear to influence their intuitions 0066-4308/12/0110-0081$20.00 about seemingly nonmoral questions? Second, do people think that moral questions have objective answers, or do they see morality as fun- damentally relative? Third, do people believe in free will, and do they see free will as compatible with determinism? Fourth, how do people determine whether an entity is conscious? 81 PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 ing subjected to empirical testing and that the Contents approach as a whole is insufficiently attentive to psychological theories about how people’s INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 minds actually work (Stich 2001). MORALITY AND CONCEPT Experimental philosophy arose in part as APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 a reaction to these worries. Experimental Asymmetry in Folk Concepts . . . . . . . 83 philosophers pursue the traditional questions of Explanatory Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 philosophy (free will, the mind-body problem, Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 moral relativism), but they examine people’s in- MORAL OBJECTIVISM AND tuitions about these questions using the tools of MORAL RELATIVISM . . . . . . . . . . . 86 contemporary psychology. Claims about intu- Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 ition are tested in controlled experiments, and Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 results are subjected to the usual statistical anal- Framing of the Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 yses. Most importantly, the patterns observed Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Specific Moral Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 in people’s intuitions are explained in terms Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. of psychological processes, which are then ex- FREE WILL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 plored using all of the usual methods: mediation PHENOMENAL analysis, developmental research, reaction time CONSCIOUSNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 studies, patient studies, and so on. Two Dimensions of Mind . . . . . . . . . . 93 At this point, it may seem natural to ask: The Role of Embodiment . . . . . . . . . . 93 “How exactly is the project of experimental phi- Models and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . 95 losophy, thus defined, distinct from that of so- CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 cial psychology?” The best answer is that this is precisely the sort of question that experimental philosophers want to reject. A guiding theme of the experimental philosophy movement is that INTRODUCTION it is not helpful to maintain a rigid separation Contemporary work in philosophy is shot between the disciplines of philosophy and psy- through with appeals to intuition. When a chology. Experimental philosophers explore is- philosopher wants to understand the nature of sues that are central to traditional philosoph- knowledge or causation or free will, the usual ical concerns, but in practice many papers in approach is to begin by constructing a series of experimental philosophy are coauthored with imaginary cases designed to elicit prereflective psychologists, and many have been published judgments about the nature of these phenom- in psychology journals. Much as in psycholin- ena. These prereflective judgments are then guistics or experimental economics, what we see treated as important sources of evidence. This emerging is an interdisciplinary research pro- basic approach has been applied with great so- gram in which philosophers and psychologists phistication across a wide variety of different work closely together by combining the tools domains. once thought native to each field in the pur- Although this approach remains influen- suit of questions of renewed interest to both tial within the discipline of philosophy, it has disciplines. (For contrasting perspectives on inspired a growing ambivalence within the the more general nature of experimental phi- broader field of cognitive science. On the one losophy, see Alexander et al. 2009, Knobe & hand, work using this approach has helped to Nichols 2008, Nadelhoffer & Nahmias 2007, shape a number of successful scientific research Sosa 2007.) programs (Keil 1989, Rips et al. 2006, Xu 1997). Perhaps the best way to become acquainted On the other, there is a persistent worry that with the field of experimental philosophy is to the key claims made about intuition are not be- look in detail at the actual research findings. 82 Knobe et al. PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 To illustrate the substantive contributions of the environment.” The chairman of the board experimental philosophy, this review focuses answered, “I don’t care at all about helping on research programs in four specific domains. the environment. I just want to make as much Within each domain, recent work has involved a profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.” complex collaboration among philosophers and They started the new program. Sure enough, psychologists, and the resulting research draws the environment was helped. on insights from both disciplines. Though re- Did the chairman intentionally help the search in each of the domains is concerned with environment? a distinct substantive question, our hope is that, together, they will serve to illustrate the general (b) The vice president of a company went to approach that has been characteristic of the ex- the chairman of the board and said, “We are perimental philosophy movement as a whole. thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also harm MORALITY AND CONCEPT the environment.” The chairman of the board Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org APPLICATION answered, “I don’t care at all about harming by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. Moral deliberations about agents and actions the environment. I just want to make as much often begin with a series of questions. Did the profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.” agent act intentionally or accidentally? Did the They started the new program. Sure enough, agent know what would happen when choosing the environment was harmed. a particular course of action? Was the agent Did the chairman intentionally harm the causally responsible for the relevant outcome? environment? People’s answers to these questions frequently influence their moral judgments (Cushman Participants presented with these cases make 2008, Guglielmo et al. 2009). asymmetric intentionality judgments. Those However, one of the major findings in ex- who are given the help case typically say that perimental philosophy is that this influence can the chairman helped unintentionally, whereas also go in the opposite direction. Evaluative those who are given the harm case typically say judgments, and in particular moral judgments, that the chairman harmed intentionally. Yet it can themselves influence judgments about what seems that the only major difference between was done intentionally, what agents know, and the two cases lies in the moral status of the what agents cause. chairman’s action. A broad array of researchers have therefore concluded that the moral status Asymmetry in Folk Concepts of the chairman’s action is somehow affecting Perhaps the best-documented instance of intuitions regarding whether or not that action the impact of moral judgment on concept was performed intentionally (Malle 2006, application concerns the concept of intentional Nadelhoffer 2005, Nado 2008). action. This body of research shows that This effect has been replicated and extended people’s moral evaluations about a particular in a number of subsequent studies (Cushman action influence their judgments about whether & Mele 2008, Feltz & Cokely 2007, Mallon that action was performed intentionally. To 2008, Nadelhoffer 2005, Nichols & Ulatowski see this, consider the contrast between the 2007, Phelan & Sarkissian 2008). Such stud- following two vignettes (Knobe 2003): ies show that the effect arises with different vi- gnettes (Cushman & Mele 2008, Mallon 2008, (a) The vice president of a company went to Nadelhoffer 2005, Phelan & Sarkissian 2008), the chairman of the board and said, “We are in different cultures (Knobe & Burra 2006), and thinking of starting a new program. It will in children as young as 3 years old (Leslie et al. help us increase profits, and it will also help 2006, Pellizzoni et al. 2009). It has also been www.annualreviews.org • Experimental Philosophy 83 PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 shown that individual differences in moral judg- considered a cause of an event when that agent’s ment lead to corresponding differences in intu- action was first judged to be morally bad. For a itions about whether an action was performed simple example of this phenomenon (Knobe & intentionally (Ditto et al. 2009). Fraser 2008), consider the following vignette: It was originally thought that this asymme- try might be due entirely to certain aspects The receptionist in the philosophy depart- of the concept of intentional action. However, ment keeps her desk stocked with pens. The subsequent work indicates that the same basic administrative assistants are allowed to take effect arises for other concepts as well. Take the the pens, but faculty members are supposed to concept of knowledge. One can investigate the buy their own. The administrative assistants impact of moral judgments on ascriptions of this typically take the pens. Unfortunately, so do concept by simply giving participants the very the faculty members. The receptionist has re- same vignettes quoted above, but this time ask- peatedly emailed them reminders that only ad- ing a different question: ministrative assistants are allowed to take the Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org pens. On Monday morning, one of the admin- by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. Did the chairman know that the new program istrative assistants encounters Professor Smith would help [harm] the environment? walking past the receptionist’s desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs Faced with this latter question, participants to take an important message . . . but she has a show the same asymmetry, indicating greater problem. There are no pens left on her desk. agreement with the knowledge ascription in the harm case than in the help case (Beebe & Buckwalter 2010). Just as for the concept In this case of the missing pens, people typi- of intentional action, this effect of moral cally agree with the statement that the professor judgment on knowledge attribution has also caused the problem and disagree that the ad- been found in a wide variety of other scenarios ministrative assistant caused the problem. Yet (Beebe & Jensen 2011; Buckwalter 2011a,b). the only thing that is different about the actions Continuing research in this vein has shown of both characters is their moral status, suggest- impacts of moral judgment on people’s use of ing that moral judgments of the actions of the numerous other folk-psychological concepts: professor and the administrative assistant affect desiring (Tannenbaum et al. 2009), valuing participants’ judgments about the cause of the (Knobe & Roedder 2009), deciding (Pettit & pen shortage. Knobe 2009), weakness of will (May & Holton In short, moral considerations appear to 2011), and happiness (Phillips et al. 2011). At have a powerful and robust impact on the appli- this point, it is beginning to seem that the ef- cation of a wide variety of folk judgments that fect found for intentional action is really just one might have expected to be quite indepen- one symptom of a far more pervasive effect of dent of moral judgment. moral judgment on the way that people under- stand each other’s minds. But the impact of moral judgment does Explanatory Theories not seem to be confined to the domain of At this point, then, there is a considerable body folk psychology. Several studies indicate that of evidence indicating that moral judgments can moral considerations can also influence ordi- in some way influence intuitions about what ap- nary intuitions about causation (Alicke 2000, pear to be purely descriptive questions. The Buckwalter 2011b, Cushman et al. 2008, principal aim of continuing research on this Hitchcock & Knobe 2011, Roxborough & topic is therefore to go beyond simply show- Cumby 2009, Solan & Darley 2001). These ing that the effect arises and provide a broader studies show that an agent is more likely to be theory that can explain why it is arising. 84 Knobe et al. PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 Answers to this question fall into two broad on the questions under discussion here. Just groups. Distortion theories say that although like normal participants, they tended to say people have an entirely nonmoral understand- that the chairman harmed the environment in- ing of concepts such as intention, knowledge, tentionally but helped unintentionally (Young and causation, there is some additional cogni- et al. 2006). Such results cast doubt on the tive process that distorts people’s intuitions and view that asymmetric judgments can indeed be allows moral judgments to impact them (Adams explained by appeal to emotional response. & Steadman 2004, Alicke 2000, Ditto et al. To address the challenge of these neuropsy- 2009, Nadelhoffer 2006). By contrast, compe- chological data, defenders of distortion theories tence theories say that the impact of moral judg- have suggested that people’s judgments are be- ment revealed in these studies reflects people’s ing distorted, not by emotion, but by a desire fundamental way of making sense of the world to blame (Alicke 2008). This view holds that (Cushman & Mele 2008, Halpern & Hitchcock an immediate desire to blame the chairman for 2011, Knobe 2010, Phelan & Sarkissian 2009). the bad outcome induces posthoc attributions Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org According to this latter group of views, there is of intentionality (for instance) in an attempt to by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. no hidden nonmoral capacity that is distorted justify prior assessments of blameworthiness. by moral factors. Instead, asymmetric applica- However, this kind of explanation also does tion arises because morality informs a funda- not go unchallenged. A number of researchers mental part of what it means to correctly apply have argued that although the effects observed these folk psychological and causal concepts. in these cases seem to have some relation to Much of the recent experimental work on these morality, they do not have any special connec- topics is devoted to testing hypotheses derived tion to blame in particular. First, reaction time from specific views within either the distor- studies demonstrate that people generally make tion or competence theoretical framework. judgments of blame after they make judgments Although this has led to the development and regarding intentionality (Guglielmo & Malle profusion of theoretical proposals that invoke 2010), suggesting that people actually make the a wide variety of different cognitive processes, intentionality judgments before they have even no single view has emerged unchallenged. engaged in an assessment of blame. Second, Beginning with the former group, some studies involving the application of other folk have suggested that the impact of morality psychological concepts such as knowledge have arises because certain emotional or affective shown that the crucial asymmetry persists when processes distort the normal application of the desire to blame is diminished (Buckwalter these concepts (Malle 2006, Malle & Nelson 2011a, Schaffer & Knobe 2011). Finally, the ef- 2003, Nadelhoffer 2006). The proposal is that, fects seem to emerge even when one looks at in the above chairman vignettes for instance, cases in which there is no opportunity for moral when the agent’s action leads to harmful blame per se but only a tendency to conclude effects on the environment, this generates a that the agent violated some other sort of norm negative emotional reaction that leads people or incurred some other sort of cost (Machery to say that the agent intentionally harmed the 2008, Uttich & Lombrozo 2010). environment. To put this hypothesis to the Accordingly, some researchers have con- test, Young and colleagues (2006) conducted a cluded that it might be a mistake to understand study on patients with severe emotional deficits these effects as arising from any kind of distor- resulting from damage to the ventromedial tion. Instead, such theorists offer competence prefrontal cortex (VMPC). Although such theories, according to which moral judgment patients show highly unusual patterns of actually figures in people’s basic capacity for ap- judgment when presented with moral decisions plying the relevant concepts (Cushman & Mele that are thought to rely on emotion (Koenigs 2008, Halpern & Hitchcock 2011, Knobe 2010, et al. 2007), they showed no unusual behavior Phelan & Sarkissian 2009). A variety of such www.annualreviews.org • Experimental Philosophy 85 PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 theories have been proposed, but all of them sciences, research in experimental philosophy seek to explain the relevant effects without ap- will undoubtedly lead to the further develop- pealing to a distorting influence of blame. In- ment of distortion and competence theories deed, many of them assign no role to judgments in an attempt to explain the observed impact of blame at all; they focus rather on some other of evaluative judgment on the application of sort of judgment (a judgment that the agent has these different folk psychological and causal violated a norm, or incurred a cost, or simply concepts. done something wrong; Knobe 2010, Machery 2008, Uttich & Lombrozo 2010). For example, one hypothesis is that, independent of anything MORAL OBJECTIVISM AND about blame, people’s judgments about norm MORAL RELATIVISM violations can impact their counterfactual rea- Imagine two people having an argument. One soning and that counterfactual reasoning plays claims that billiards is an exciting game to play, an important role in the competence underlying and the other claims that, quite the contrary, Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org causal intuitions (Halpern & Hitchcock 2011). it is not. During the course of their argument by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. Yet this approach, too, has been met with each invokes many good reasons, each argues criticism. Researchers have used structural passionately and with conviction, yet at the end equation modeling to show that the impact of it all they remain in stalemate. In such a case, of condition on people’s causal judgments can we might conclude that there is no single fact sometimes be mediated by blame attribution of the matter—billiards is just exciting for some (Alicke et al. 2011). Although such an effect and dull for others. The whole question, one could in principle be compatible with a com- might say, is fundamentally relative. petence theory, it is not predicted by any of the Now suppose the two people move on to specific competence theories that have been another topic—Venus’s orbit. One claims that developed thus far. Venus orbits the sun faster than the Earth, while the other claims that it does not. Again, they ar- gue to stalemate, with no resolution. This case Summary seems different. Here, it seems correct to say Work in experimental philosophy has provided that there is a single right answer, and so one strong evidence for the claim that moral consid- of them must, in fact, be wrong. This second erations can impact the application of a number question might be said to be objective. of important folk concepts. However, although Now that we have at least a rough sense for a great deal of evidence has been amassed for these two categories, a question arises about and against theories attempting to understand the status of moral questions. Are moral ques- this general phenomenon, no consensus has tions entirely relative, like the question as to emerged. whether billiards is exciting? Or do moral ques- Despite the theoretical progress in pro- tions have objective answers, like the question viding explanations for the observed moral about the orbit of Venus? This issue has gener- asymmetry in concept application, the ques- ated tremendous controversy in the philosoph- tions that originally framed the debate continue ical literature, with some philosophers saying to occupy experimental philosophers: Could that moral questions are fundamentally relative morality really be at the core of how people (Dreier 1990; Harman 1975; Prinz 2007; Wong make sense of their world? Alternatively, could 1984, 2006) and others saying that moral ques- additional factors in association with moral tions are just as objective as the questions of considerations distort the normal application science (Shafer-Landau 2003, Smith 1994). of concepts such as intentionality, knowledge, Despite this continuing controversy about or causation, and if so, which factors? With the whether morality actually is relative or objec- aid of more advanced techniques in the social tive, researchers have shown a striking degree 86 Knobe et al. PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 of consensus about how ordinary people see a complex array of different variables, includ- the issue. Both philosophers and psychologists ing the subjects’ age and personality traits, the have suggested that ordinary folks take moral way they are asked about morality, and even the claims to be objectively true (e.g., Brink specific moral question at stake. 1989, Goodwin & Darley 2008, Mackie 1977, Nichols 2004a, Shafer-Landau 2003, Smith 1994). We refer to this as the thesis of folk Age moral objectivism. Studies suggest that young children are The thesis of folk moral objectivism has objectivists about morality (Nichols & Folds- played an important role in theoretical argu- Bennett 2003, Wainryb et al. 2004). As early as ments both in philosophy and in cognitive sci- the age of 5, children display greater intoler- ence. But is the thesis correct? Experimental ance of dissenting judgments or opinions when philosophers have conducted a range of stud- they concern moral matters as opposed to ies to put it to the test. In one early experiment other matters, such as matters of taste and fact; Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org (Nichols 2004a), all participants were given a indeed, children can be as objectivist about by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. vignette about two people who held opposite moral disagreements as they are about purely views on a moral question: factual disagreements (e.g., disagreement about whether pencils fall down or shoot up when you John and Fred are members of different cul- drop them) (Wainryb et al. 2004). Other work tures, and they are in an argument. John says, shows a striking difference between children’s “It’s okay to hit people just because you feel judgments about matters of taste and their like it,” and Fred says, “No, it is not okay to judgments about morality. When children hit people just because you feel like it.” are asked whether watermelon is “yummy for real” or just “yummy for some people,” they Participants were then asked to choose be- respond that watermelon is only yummy for tween three options: (a) It is okay to hit people some people; but when children are asked a just because you feel like it, so John is right and corresponding question about morality, they Fred is wrong. (b) It is not okay to hit people tend to reject the claim that certain actions are just because you feel like it, so Fred is right and “simply good for some people”; they say that John is wrong. (c) There is no fact of the mat- these actions are “good for real” (Nichols & ter about unqualified claims such as, “It’s okay Folds-Bennett 2003). to hit people just because you feel like it.” Dif- Although young children seem to consis- ferent cultures believe different things, and it is tently endorse objectivism, there appears to not absolutely true or false that it’s okay to hit be a strong tendency for people’s views to people just because you feel like it. change over the course of development. As in- The first two options seem to accord with dividuals enter adulthood, their commitment objectivism, whereas the third fits more with to moral objectivism sometimes falls away, and relativism. Just as one might predict, the ma- they come to respond more as relativists. Stud- jority of participants chose one of the first two ies on college-aged adults show sizable minori- options. So the results of this first study seemed ties of relativists (Nichols 2004a). Individuals to support the thesis. tend to embrace moral relativism in their late However, more recent work suggests an un- teens to early thirties, only to revert back to ob- expected and more complicated picture of folk jectivism as they grow older; indeed, it seems morality. It simply does not seem to be the the older one gets, the more objectivist one case that people in general show a strong and becomes (Beebe & Sackris 2010). It seems as robust tendency to endorse objectivist claims though a person’s commitment to moral objec- about morality. Instead, the experimental re- tivism is not fixed but instead ebbs and flows sults suggest that people’s responses depend on across the lifespan. www.annualreviews.org • Experimental Philosophy 87 PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 Personality away from objectivism and tend to think that the disagreeing individuals can both be Recent work has also shown that one’s meta- correct (Sarkissian et al. 2011). Thus, how ethical commitments might be related to other moral disagreement is framed can be an facets of one’s psychology—specifically, to important variable in gauging folk views about one’s personality traits. Some studies have sug- morality. gested a correlation between being high on the personality trait of being open to new experi- ence and embracing a form of moral relativism Specific Moral Issue (Feltz & Cokely 2008). Relatedly, relativists Finally, even though previous studies have score high on disjunctive thinking, which mea- found overall high mean levels of objectivism sures one’s ability to unpack alternative pos- about moral issues, a closer inspection of sibilities when problem solving (Goodwin & the pattern of results reveals a great deal of Darley 2010). Relativists also tend to be toler- variation according to the moral issue being ant of alternative points of view, as opposed to Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org considered. For example, even while Goodwin objectivists (Wright et al. 2008), and they were by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. & Darley (2008) found high mean levels of better able to explain these alternative points objectivism about moral issues, a number of of view (Goodwin & Darley 2010). Taken to- particular issues garnered extremely low scores gether, these studies suggest that whether one of objectivism; some moral transgressions (such is a moral objectivist will hinge upon a cluster as cheating on an exam or opening gunfire of related personality traits, such as one’s levels in a crowd) seemed to be deemed objectively of tolerance and one’s ability to imaginatively wrong, whereas other transgressions garnered engage with differing perspectives; the higher far lower scores of objectivism. In fact, some one scores on these traits, the less likely one is of the most highly charged and divisive moral to be an objectivist about morality. issues of recent times (such as abortion, assisted suicide, and stem cell research) yielded very relativistic responses. For these latter issues, Framing of the Issue individuals tended to allow that individuals A common feature of many of these studies with differing moral judgments might both be is that they use a disagreement task to probe correct. Further work is needed to understand people’s meta-ethical commitments. The what makes certain moral issues seem more method presents subjects with individuals who objective than others. have differing judgments on some moral matter and then ask whether these individuals can both be correct. Recent work has suggested Discussion that an important variable in these studies is At least at first glance, these experimental re- whether the individuals who have differing sults seem to spell trouble for the thesis of judgments belong to the same culture. If so, folk moral objectivism. After all, if participants then subjects seem to think that one of them had been asked a simple question about, say, must be wrong—that two individuals of the whether a certain English sentence was gram- same culture can’t disagree about a moral issue matically correct, we would have expected to without one of them being mistaken. However, find a strong and robust consensus, with almost people’s intuitions undergo a systematic shift as no variance in responses and very little impact of they begin considering individuals of radically subtle experimental manipulations. But that is different cultural backgrounds. As they come not what one finds in the case of questions about to think about individuals who are deeply moral objectivism. Instead, the experimental dissimilar—individuals with radically different results show powerful effects of both individ- cultures, values, or ways of life—people shift ual differences and experimental manipulation, 88 Knobe et al. PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 with certain people under certain circumstances To decide between these opposing explana- giving seemingly objectivist answers and other tions, it may be necessary to adopt new method- people under other circumstances giving seem- ologies that allow us to look not only at people’s ingly relativistic answers. How can we explain final conclusions but also at the psychological these results? processes that lead up to those conclusions. One hypothesis is that, despite what we see Such work could further illuminate the patterns in people’s explicit responses, the traditional of intuition observed in studies thus far. view in philosophy and psychology was actually right all along (see, e.g., Nichols 2004b). Perhaps people have a core capacity for under- FREE WILL standing morality—a capacity whose workings In 1924, Clarence Darrow defended Nathan we see coming out clearly in developmental Leopold and Richard Loeb for the kidnapping studies—and this core capacity yields an un- and murder of their 14-year-old schoolmate derstanding of morality as objective. Later on, Bobby Franks. Because the defendants had pled Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org people can develop explicit theories according guilty to the crime, Darrow’s task was to save by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. to which morality is relative. Nonetheless, it them from the death penalty. The challenge might be that these explicit theories override was finding a basis for mitigation. Leopold and a more immediate understanding of morality Loeb were rich, healthy, and well educated; that retains its objectivist core. they seemed to have every advantage young Alternatively, it might be thought that the men could have. So Darrow appealed to the experimental data correctly reveal the actual only mitigating factor that was available: the de- nature of people’s moral understanding. If so, terministic nature of the universe itself. “Your perhaps the best way to make sense of the re- Honor,” Darrow said during his famous 12- sults is to deny that there is a fact of the matter hour closing statement, “Why did they kill little as to whether people are moral objectivists Bobby Franks? Not for money, not for spite; not or moral relativists. On some occasions, and for hate . . . They killed him because they were with regard to some issues, people may give made that way. Because somewhere in the infi- objectivist responses, and on other occasions, nite processes that go to the making up of the and with regard to other issues, they may give boy or the man something slipped, and those relativist responses. There might then be no unfortunate lads sit here hated, despised, out- straightforward answer to the question, “Are casts, with the community shouting for their people moral objectivists?” The real question blood” (Darrow 1988). would be about which factors can draw people Darrow’s defense here touches on one of to one view or another. the oldest and most controversial questions of For example, looking across the studies philosophy. If a person’s actions are completely above, those responding as relativists seem to determined, can that person still be morally share certain features in common: They tend to responsible for what he or she is doing? be in their late teens to early thirties, are open This question, in various guises, has obsessed to new experiences, are willing to engage with philosophers since at least the time of the An- diverse ways of life, and are tolerant of people cient Greeks, and settling on an answer is just with opposite opinions. One possible hypothe- as difficult today as it was in fifth century B.C. sis would be that all of these different findings The absence of a satisfactory resolution after all are explained by a single underlying process. this time suggests that people’s intuitions about Specifically, it might be that there is a general free will are deeply conflicted. It seems that one effect whereby people become more inclined set of intuitions leads us to attribute free will to endorse relativism to the extent that they are and moral responsibility to agents who meet more inclined to open their minds to alternative appropriate conditions even if their actions are perspectives (Sarkissian et al. 2011). the result of deterministic processes, whereas www.annualreviews.org • Experimental Philosophy 89 PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 another pulls us toward withdrawing these at- These results suggest one possible explanation tributions once we recognize that the causes of for the intractability of this age-old problem. behavior do not originate ultimately within the When we consider the problem abstractly, agent. Experimental philosophers have sought one set of cognitive processes leads us to the to get at the psychological roots of the free will conclusion that determinism is incompatible debate by examining the underlying causes of with free and responsible action. But cases like this conflict. The aim is to arrive at a better the story about Bill trigger a different set of understanding of the factors that can draw processes that dispose us to assign blame and people’s intuitions toward one side or the other. responsibility for terrible crimes and worry less One such factor is emotional salience. Even about how they were caused. in cases where an agent’s behavior is entirely A related factor influencing free will judg- determined, people appear to be inclined to ments is psychological distance, the distance ascribe moral responsibility as long as the (either in space or time) between subjects and behavior elicits a strong emotional response. the event or object and events they are con- Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Thus, in one study (Nichols & Knobe 2007, sidering. Weigel (2011) asked participants to by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. p. 669), all participants were asked to imagine imagine hearing a lecture about a deterministic a deterministic universe: universe; participants were then asked if a mur- derer in this universe acted freely. Some par- Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which ev- ticipants were assigned to a condition in which erything that happens is completely caused by the lecture on determinism was taking place in whatever happened before it. This is true from a few days; others were assigned to a condi- the very beginning of the universe, so what tion in which the lecture was taking place in happened in the beginning of the universe a few years. This seemingly small manipulation caused what happened next, and so on right up had a significant effect. The results showed that until the present. For example one day John subjects were less inclined to say that this man decided to have French Fries at lunch. Like freely decided to kill when they imagined hear- everything else, this decision was completely ing about it at a more distant time. Research caused by what happened before it. So, if ev- on psychological distance suggests that greater erything in this universe was exactly the same distance triggers cognitive processes that deal up until John made his decision, then it had to with questions more abstractly, so these results happen that John would decide to have French lend support to the view that our conflicting in- Fries. tuitions on free will are the product of different cognitive processes (see also Roskies & Nichols Participants were then assigned to either a 2011). concrete high-affect condition or to an abstract Feltz & Cokely (2009) adopt the same basic low-affect condition. In the low-affect condi- framework in their studies, but with the fol- tion, participants were simply asked if people in lowing twist: The authors investigate whether Universe A could be fully morally responsible personality differences can affect intuitions on for their actions in this deterministic universe. free will. Specifically, Feltz & Cokely (2009) Here, a large majority (86%) of the subjects predicted that subjects who were high in per- answered “no.” In the high-affect condition, sonal trait extroversion would be more likely participants read about a specific man named to assign free will and moral responsibility to a Bill in Universe A who burns down his house, murderer in the deterministic scenario. The re- killing his wife and three children, so that he sults showed a significant correlation between can be with his secretary. Participants were extroversion and a willingness to attribute free then asked whether this specific man was fully will and responsibility for determined behavior. morally responsible for his behavior. In this These results may also support the emotional condition, 72% of the subjects answered “yes.” salience model because extroverted people, due 90 Knobe et al. PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 to their increased sensitivity to the social fea- universe, we find it less plausible to hold agents tures of a scenario, may consider concrete cases free and responsible when the causes of their ac- less abstractly (and so have a greater affective tions trace back beyond their control. A few im- response) than their introverted counterparts. portant questions remain, however. First, how Certainly, the results shed light on why philo- should we regard the intuitions generated in sophical reflection and debate alone have not high-affect cases? Should we view them as dis- led to more universal agreement about the free tortions of the folk concept of free will, or as will problem. reliable indicators of what we really believe? In the above studies, participants are asked Second, what, if anything, can experiments like to imagine a world where human behavior is these tell us about the accuracy of our intu- caused deterministically, but no detail is given itions? In other words, can experimental phi- about the nature of causes. Several studies have losophy shed light on the correct understanding shown, however, that the type of causal expla- of the relationship between free will and deter- nation can influence free will and responsibility minism? Following Nichols (2008), we may call Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org judgments. Nahmias and colleagues (2007) and these the descriptive and substantive questions, by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. Nahmias & Murray (2010) separated partici- respectively. pants into two conditions: In one condition, the The verdict on the descriptive question agents’ decision-making is described “in terms is mixed. Nichols and Knobe offer evidence of neuroscientific, mechanistic processes”; in suggesting that our judgments in the high- the other, decision-making is described “in affect cases are the result of a performance terms of psychological, intentional processes.” error due to the distorting influence of our They found that in both abstract and concrete emotions. They tentatively conclude that the cases, subjects found neuroscientific descrip- folk concept of responsibility is incompatible tions of decision-making to be more of a threat with the truth of determinism. Nahmias to freedom and responsibility than psycholog- and colleagues take the opposite view: The ical ones. Nahmias and colleagues offer their performance error, they argue, occurs when results as evidence that participants are prone people mistakenly assume that determinism to confuse determinism with fatalism, the view rules out effective deliberation. Weigel argues that our conscious desires and deliberations do for a middle position, holding that neither set not causally influence our behavior and destiny. of intuitions should be regarded as a distortion; Because this is a mistake—determinism does both reveal competencies with our concepts in not entail that our conscious deliberations are different contexts. More philosophical analysis causally impotent—the authors conclude that and experimental work are needed if we are to folk intuitions might be more unified in favor arrive at a confident resolution. of the view that we can be free and responsible Thus far, we have been discussing empiri- as long as our actions are determined in the cal questions about the psychological roots of right way. people’s intuitions about free will. Some re- The common ingredient in all of the above searchers, in addition, employ the results of studies is this: The more real and personal the these studies to address the substantive philo- case, the more prone we are to attribute free will sophical question of whether our beliefs in free and moral responsibility to agents even when will and moral responsibility are justified. The their behavior is determined. At one end of the key suggestion here is that a proper understand- spectrum, we might imagine someone deliber- ing of the nature and origins of our intuitions ately harming a family member or loved one. will enable us to explain away or debunk the Few of us would withhold blame due to theoret- widespread belief that people can be free and re- ical considerations about the deterministic na- sponsible. It will show us that people’s belief in ture of the universe. But when the case is more free will arises from a psychological source that abstract, involving strangers in another time or carries no warrant or justification and should www.annualreviews.org • Experimental Philosophy 91 PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 therefore be dismissed as misleading. Sommers that inducing disbelief in free will leads to (2007), for example, argues that our beliefs in an increase in aggression and a reduction in free will and moral responsibility are the prod- willingness to help. If the authors are correct, uct of adaptations formed in hunter-gatherer this may undermine the rationality of rejecting environments, and so there is no reason to think free will and moral responsibility, since the they reflect any kind of moral truth. Greene belief in the concepts would have important & Cohen (2004) argue that our responsibil- social functions (but see Nadelhoffer & Feltz ity judgments reflect a false but evolutionar- 2007, Sommers 2010). However, because the ily useful presupposition of a dualist agent-self. studies are designed to test for short-term And Ross & Shestowski (2003) present evidence rather than long-term effects, it is not clear how that our responsibility attributions are contam- worried free will skeptics should be about these inated by a “dispositional bias” that overrates results. the influence of stable character traits and un- derestimates the power of situational factors to Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org govern. All of the authors acknowledge the dif- PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. ficulty of overcoming these biases and beliefs given how deeply rooted they are in our psy- One of the oldest and thorniest questions in chologies. But like Darrow, they believe that philosophy is the “problem of other minds.” when the stakes are high—in theories of crim- How can we know that another entity has a inal justice, for example—we are obligated to mind? It seems clear that the person down the acknowledge the truth. hall is capable of beliefs, intentions, and emo- The first thing to note about such debunking tions, whereas the toaster in the kitchen is not strategies is that they assume a particular answer capable of thinking or feeling anything at all, to the descriptive question: namely, that most but what sorts of evidence can we use to tell the people regard free will and moral responsibility difference? as incompatible with an accurate naturalistic Just in the past few years, a number of re- understanding of human behavior. Otherwise, searchers in both psychology and experimen- there is no basis for claiming that our current tal philosophy have argued that this traditional attributions of free will would (or should) question needs to be reformulated (Gray et al. change once we reject our false beliefs. Second, 2007, Knobe & Prinz 2008, Robbins & Jack even granting these assumptions, we cannot yet 2006). These researchers have suggested that infer that the rational response is to reject our it might be a mistake to suppose that there is assignments of free will and moral responsibil- one unified process involved in attributing a ity. Further argument is needed to show that mind. Instead, they have suggested that there rejecting the belief in free will and moral re- might be fundamentally different processes sponsibility is preferable to revising our criteria involved in attributing distinct psychological for their application (Nichols 2007, Vargas capacities. 2007). For this, we need to take into account a In philosophy, it is common to distinguish wide range of factors, among them the practical between mental states that involve phenome- implications of retaining or rejecting these nal consciousness and those that do not (Block concepts. 1995). Take the difference between the men- Several recent studies have been developed tal state “feeling upset” and the mental state to explore these implications. Vohs & Schooler “knowing that 2 + 2 = 4.” The former state in- (2008) offer some evidence that denying free volves a certain kind of feeling or experience— will may lead people to behave immorally, by there is something that it is like to feel upset providing “the ultimate excuse to behave as at a particular time—whereas the latter does one likes.” Baumeister et al. (2009) expand not directly involve any feeling or experience. on these results with a study that suggests Philosophers mark this distinction by saying 92 Knobe et al. PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 that the former state involves phenomenal con- ments of moral considerability depend pref- sciousness whereas the latter does not. erentially upon judgments of the capacity for Recent work suggests that ordinary people conscious experience (see also Robbins 2008), also appreciate this distinction. Moreover, the whereas judgments of moral responsibility have work suggests that the judgment that an entity more to do with perception of a target’s capacity is capable of having states that involve phenom- for sophisticated cognition. enal consciousness (e.g., feeling upset) is driven The studies by Gray and colleagues provide by different cues than the judgment that an en- some evidence for this (Gray et al. 2007; see also tity is capable of having states that do not in- Waytz et al. 2010). In addition to ranking char- volve phenomenal consciousness (e.g., knowing acters on a range of mental capacities, partici- that 2 + 2 = 4). There might also be different pants in that study also ranked characters on two mechanisms that are activated by these different dimensions of moral status: (a) moral agency, or sets of cues. In short, this research has proposed the capacity to perform right or wrong actions the hypothesis that phenomenal consciousness and to be held accountable as such, and (b) moral Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org is special. patiency, or the capacity to receive such actions by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. and to be given due consideration on that basis. Correlational analysis of the data revealed that Two Dimensions of Mind these dimensions of morality were strongly pos- Initial evidence for the complexity of the folk itively correlated with different dimensions of conception of mind comes from an investiga- mind—capacities for cognition and capacities tion of mental-state attribution by Gray et al. for phenomenal consciousness, respectively. (2007). In a large-scale, online-survey-based For example, entities judged to be high on cog- study, participants provided ratings for a cast of nition and low on consciousness (like God) tend characters (e.g., a normal adult, a child, a dog, to be categorized more or less exclusively as a robot). Participants were presented with pairs moral agents, whereas experientially rich but of the characters and asked to rank them across cognitively impoverished entities (like infants) a wide range of capacities: memory, planning, tend to be categorized almost exclusively as fear, pain, pleasure, and so forth. moral patients (Gray & Wegner 2009, 2010). Interestingly, the results did not show a These studies of the relation between different single continuum whereby certain characters dimensions of mentality and morality provide scored high on all capacities while others further support for the idea that there is a deep scored low on all capacities. Instead, a factor rift between attributions of states that have phe- analysis revealed two distinct dimensions nomenal consciousness and those that do not. of mind—capacities for cognition, such as self-control and planning, and then, separately, capacities for phenomenal consciousness, such The Role of Embodiment as pain and fear. Some characters (e.g., a baby) If attributions of phenomenally conscious were rated relatively high on consciousness and mental states actually are deeply distinct from low on cognition; others (e.g., God) showed attributions of nonphenomenal states, it seems the opposite pattern. that these different sorts of attributions should These results do not directly show that peo- rely on different cues. A considerable body of ple think that there are two different kinds of research suggests that one main cue people use minds—cognitive minds and conscious minds. to determine whether an entity has nonphe- But they do suggest that there are separate cog- nomenal mental states is its behavior ( Johnson nitive capacities for attributing states that have 2003). (Indeed, people will even attribute be- phenomenal consciousness and those that do liefs and goals to pictures of little triangles on a not. This is precisely the suggestion of Robbins screen when these triangles are exhibiting the & Jack (2006), who also maintain that judg- right sorts of behaviors; see Heider & Simmel www.annualreviews.org • Experimental Philosophy 93 PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 1944.) But what cues do people use to determine the body plays a special role in attributions of whether an entity has states with phenomenal phenomenal consciousness. consciousness? One possible answer is that the This first argument has been a contro- main cue here is not a matter of exhibiting versial one. Subsequent work has shown that certain behaviors—that it is instead a matter of participants are willing to attribute certain having a biological body (Knobe 2011). kinds of apparently phenomenal states to A natural way to test this hypothesis is corporations (e.g., “McDonald’s is feeling to look at people’s intuitions about entities upset about the court’s recent ruling”) (Arico that do exhibit complex rational patterns of 2010). Cross-cultural studies show that the behavior but that do not have the right sorts of effect is significantly weaker in participants in bodies. For example, suppose that we look at Hong Kong than in participants in the United attributions of mental states to corporations. A States (Huebner et al. 2010). Finally, on a more corporation might show all the right patterns theoretical level, it has been suggested that the of behavior (gathering information, reacting difference between corporations and individu- Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org flexibly to achieve certain goals), but instead of als might have more to do with their differing by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. having a biological body composed of flesh and patterns of behavior than with any difference in blood, it is composed of far-flung committees their embodiment (Sytsma & Machery 2009a). and departments communicating with each However, additional evidence for the same other through emails and memoranda. The hypothesis has been found in studies of mental- key question now is what mental states people state attributions to artifacts, such as robots will attribute to an entity like this one. (Huebner 2010, Sytsma & Machery 2009b). In one recent study (Knobe & Prinz 2008), Like corporations, robots lack a biological participants were given a list of sentences as- body, so by hypothesis they should elicit a sim- cribing mental states to corporations. Some of ilar pattern of attribution. And this does indeed these sentences ascribed nonphenomenal men- appear to be the case. In one study (Huebner tal states: 2010), participants were given a brief vignette about a robot that behaves exactly like a hu- Acme Corporation believes that its profit mar- man being in every way and asked whether they gin will soon increase. agreed with the statements: He believes that triangles have three sides. Acme Corporation wants to change its corpo- rate image. He feels happy when he gets what he wants. Other sentences ascribed states that in- As predicted, participants were willing to volved phenomenal consciousness: attribute the nonphenomenal state (belief) but unwilling to attribute the state involving Acme Corporation is experiencing a sudden phenomenal consciousness (feeling happy). urge to pursue Internet advertising. Finally, the embodiment hypothesis ap- pears to find support in the results of the factor Acme Corporation is now experiencing great analysis described above (Gray et al. 2007). joy. Participants saw newborn babies as having ample capacity for phenomenal consciousness Participants tended to regard the ascription but little capacity for nonphenomenal states, of conscious states as linguistically anomalous, whereas they saw God as having the maximum whereas they had no qualms about ascriptions possible capacity for nonphenomenal states but of nonphenomenal states. This asymmetry little capacity for phenomenal consciousness. might be taken as evidence for the claim that This is exactly the result one would expect 94 Knobe et al. PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 if one assumes that complex behavior is the experimental philosophy of consciousness main cue for attributions of nonphenomenal has initiated a new way to investigate some states whereas embodiment is the main cue for fundamental philosophical questions about attributions of phenomenal consciousness. how people ordinarily attribute psychological capacities. Models and Mechanisms Thus, a diverse range of data suggests that the CONCLUSION attribution of phenomenal states is driven by This review has focused on four specific areas different cues from the attribution of nonphe- of research in experimental philosophy. Within nomenal states. What kinds of explanations are each of these areas, one finds the emergence available for this striking pattern of results? of an interdisciplinary conversation in which One proposal is that the findings reflect philosophers and psychologists work closely to- a deep difference in the mechanisms under- gether to address a set of questions that lie at Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org lying the attribution of mental states. In this the intersection of the two fields. by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. view, the capacity to attribute feelings to some- Although we discuss work in four major ar- thing rests on a functionally specialized mecha- eas, this is far from an exhaustive review. Ex- nism, at least partially distinct from the mecha- perimental philosophers have also investigated nism responsible for the attribution of thoughts cross-cultural differences in philosophical in- (Robbins & Jack 2006). tuitions (e.g., Machery et al. 2004, Weinberg An alternative view is that there is really et al. 2001), judgments about whether a person just one core mechanism that is responsible for truly knows something as opposed to merely be- the attribution of both nonphenomenal and lieving it (for a review, see Pinillos 2011), and phenomenal mental states. In this view, if an people’s ordinary conceptions of race (Glasgow entity is identified as an agent with goals and et al. 2009). The possibilities for productive thoughts, that will be sufficient to generate work in experimental philosophy are broad, and an inclination also to attribute feelings (Arico many of the topics explored by psychologists et al. 2011, Fiala et al. 2011). If that view is make contact with closely related philosophical right, then when people deny conscious states issues. Future work in experimental philosophy to something they regard as an agent, it should could take the same interdisciplinary approach be the case that at some deeper level, they really found in the four areas reviewed here and apply are inclined to attribute conscious states to the it to questions about causation, the self, reli- entity. A recent reaction time study provides gion, aesthetics, and elsewhere. some support for this—participants were This interdisciplinary approach of the significantly slower to deny conscious states to experimental philosophy movement has some- agents than to nonagents (Arico et al. 2011). If, times been characterized as a revolutionary new however, there are entities—such as groups— attack on the longstanding division between for which people really have no inclination the disciplines of philosophy and psychology to attribute conscious states, then the single (e.g., Appiah 2007, Lackman 2006). It seems to mechanism view must explain why people are us that this characterization is not quite right. willing to attribute ordinary nonphenomenal After all, philosophers have been concerned states such as goals and thoughts. One possi- with psychological questions for thousands of bility is that attributions of goals and thoughts years (think of the work of Plato and Aristotle), to groups are better interpreted as somehow and this fluid boundary between philoso- figurative rather than literal ascriptions of goals phy and psychology persisted up through and thoughts to groups (Phelan et al. 2011). the twentieth century (think of William It remains quite unclear which of these James). Perhaps then, the kind of interdisci- approaches is correct, but the advent of plinary collaboration one sees in experimental www.annualreviews.org • Experimental Philosophy 95 PS63CH04-Knobe ARI 31 October 2011 10:37 philosophy is best understood not as a radical more traditional conception of how philosophy break with the past, but rather as a return to a and psychology should relate and develop. 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Cult. 6:291–304 www.annualreviews.org • Experimental Philosophy 99 PS63-FrontMatter ARI 10 November 2011 9:52 Annual Review of Psychology Volume 63, 2012 Contents Prefatory Working Memory: Theories, Models, and Controversies Alan Baddeley p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Developmental Psychobiology by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. Learning to See Words Brian A. Wandell, Andreas M. Rauschecker, and Jason D. Yeatman p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p31 Memory Remembering in Conversations: The Social Sharing and Reshaping of Memories William Hirst and Gerald Echterhoff p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p55 Judgment and Decision Making Experimental Philosophy Joshua Knobe, Wesley Buckwalter, Shaun Nichols, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian, and Tamler Sommers p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p81 Brain Imaging/Cognitive Neuroscience Distributed Representations in Memory: Insights from Functional Brain Imaging Jesse Rissman and Anthony D. Wagner p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 101 Neuroscience of Learning Fear Extinction as a Model for Translational Neuroscience: Ten Years of Progress Mohammed R. Milad and Gregory J. Quirk p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 129 Comparative Psychology The Evolutionary Origins of Friendship Robert M. Seyfarth and Dorothy L. Cheney p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 153 Emotional, Social, and Personality Development Religion, Morality, Evolution Paul Bloom p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 179 vi PS63-FrontMatter ARI 10 November 2011 9:52 Adulthood and Aging Consequences of Age-Related Cognitive Declines Timothy Salthouse p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 201 Development in Societal Context Child Development in the Context of Disaster, War, and Terrorism: Pathways of Risk and Resilience Ann S. Masten and Angela J. Narayan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 227 Social Development, Social Personality, Social Motivation, Social Emotion Social Functionality of Human Emotion Paula M. Niedenthal and Markus Brauer p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 259 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Social Neuroscience by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. Mechanisms of Social Cognition Chris D. Frith and Uta Frith p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 287 Personality Processes Personality Processes: Mechanisms by Which Personality Traits “Get Outside the Skin” Sarah E. Hampson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 315 Work Attitudes Job Attitudes Timothy A. Judge and John D. Kammeyer-Mueller p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 341 The Individual Experience of Unemployment Connie R. Wanberg p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 369 Job/Work Analysis The Rise and Fall of Job Analysis and the Future of Work Analysis Juan I. Sanchez and Edward L. Levine p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 397 Education of Special Populations Rapid Automatized Naming (RAN) and Reading Fluency: Implications for Understanding and Treatment of Reading Disabilities Elizabeth S. Norton and Maryanne Wolf p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 427 Human Abilities Intelligence Ian J. Deary p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 453 Research Methodology Decoding Patterns of Human Brain Activity Frank Tong and Michael S. Pratte p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 483 Contents vii PS63-FrontMatter ARI 10 November 2011 9:52 Human Intracranial Recordings and Cognitive Neuroscience Roy Mukamel and Itzhak Fried p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 511 Sources of Method Bias in Social Science Research and Recommendations on How to Control It Philip M. Podsakoff, Scott B. MacKenzie, and Nathan P. Podsakoff p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 539 Neuroscience Methods Neuroethics: The Ethical, Legal, and Societal Impact of Neuroscience Martha J. Farah p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 571 Indexes Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:81-99. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 53–63 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 593 by University of British Columbia on 09/10/12. For personal use only. Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 53–63 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 598 Errata An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Psychology articles may be found at http://psych.AnnualReviews.org/errata.shtml viii Contents