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Knowledge, Mental Language, and Free Will Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics Volume 3 Also available in the series: Volume 1: The Immateriality of the Human Mind, the Semantics of Analogy, and the Conceivability of God Volume 2: Categories, and What is Beyond Volume 3: Knowledge, Mental Language, and Free Will Volume 4: Mental Representation Volume 5: Universal Representation, and the Ontology of Individuation Volume 6: Medieval Skepticism, and the Claim to Metaphysical Knowledge Volume 7: Medieval Metaphysics, or is it "Just Semantics"? Volume 8: After God, with Reason Alone—Saikat Guha Commemorative Volume Volume 9: The Demonic Temptations of Medieval Nominalism Knowledge, Mental Language, and Free Will Edited by Gyula Klima and Alexander W. Hall Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics Volume 3 Knowledge, Mental Language, and Free Will Volume 3: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, Edited by Gyula Klima and Alexander W. Hall This book first published 2011 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2011 by Gyula Klima and Alexander W. Hall and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-3367-3, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-3367-7 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Alexander W. Hall Aquinas, Scientia and a Medieval Misconstruction of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics ...................................................................................... 5 Alexander W. Hall Representations, Concepts and Words: Peter of Ailly on Semantics and Psychology.......................................................................................... 19 Henrik Lagerlund Ockham on Supposition and Equivocation in Mental Language............... 47 Catarina Dutilh Novaes The Three-Stranded Cord: Calling a Truce in the War over God and Human Freedom ................................................................................. 65 Walter Redmond The Three-Stranded Cord (tr. Walter Redmond) ....................................... 83 Father Matías Blanco Appendix ................................................................................................. 103 Contributors............................................................................................. 105 INTRODUCTION* ALEXANDER W. HALL The Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics (PSMLM) collects original materials presented at sessions sponsored by the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics (SMLM). Founded by Gyula Klima (Director), Joshua Hochschild (Secretary), Jack Zupko and Jeffrey Brower in 2000 (joined in 2011 by Assistant Director, Alexander Hall) to recover the profound metaphysical insights of medieval thinkers for our own philosophical thought, the Society currently has over a hundred members on five continents. The Society’s maiden publication appeared online in 2001 and the decade that followed saw the release of eight more volumes. In 2011, PSMLM transitioned to print. Sharp-eyed readers of these volumes will note the replacement of our (lamentably copyrighted for commercial use) lions, who guarded the integrity of the body of an intellectual tradition thought to be dead, with the phoenixes that mark our rebirth. Friends of the lions will be happy to note that they remain at their post, protecting PSMLM’s online proceedings at http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/. The essays in this volume range across the medieval philosophical landscape, as they concern metaphysics, logic and natural philosophy. Alexander W. Hall discusses Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of per se predication as it occurs in the conclusion of scientific demonstrations, i.e., of arguments producing scientific knowledge in the strict sense. Henrik Lagerlund and Catarina Dutilh Novaes take up medieval studies of mental language. Works in this genre seek to discern what concepts are concepts of, the ontological status of concepts as entities, and how concepts stand for and represent things in the * These writings first appeared in volume three of the Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics (http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/), the colophon of which appears as an appendix to this book. The abstract of The Three-Stranded Cord: Calling a Truce in the War over God and Human Freedom contained in this introduction was prepared by the paper’s author, Walter Redmond. 2 Introduction world. Lastly, Walter Redmond comments on and translates the prologue to and first chapter of Father Matías Blanco’s The Three-Stranded Cord [Funiculus triplex], where Blanco attempts to reconcile human freedom with God’s causality and omniscience. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics considers the origin and nature of essential (rigidly designating) predicates. Aristotle believes we acquire knowledge of essential attributes via demonstration that treats the subject as the ontological ground of an attribute’s inherence. Essential attributes are thus said to belong per se to their subjects. Knowledge of per se belonging acquired through demonstration is termed ‘scientific’. Aristotle presents four types of per se belonging, not all of which seem to figure into his account of demonstration that produces scientific knowledge. In Aquinas, Scientia and a Medieval Misconstruction of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Alexander Hall contends: (1) that (without detriment to the overall accuracy of Aquinas’s account) Aquinas mistakes what types of per se belonging Aristotle deems relevant to scientific demonstration, owing to a misconstruction of the Greek in the Latin translation with which Aquinas worked; and (2) that W. D. Ross and Hugh Tredennick more faithfully represent Aristotle on this point. Peter of Ailly’s (1350-1420) writings were widely cited in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, serving in many respects to transmit scholastic thought into modern times. Yet, Peter was no mere commentator. Rather, Peter is a genuinely original thinker working within a tradition, trying to come to terms with some serious problems that his tradition’s theory of human thinking had come up against. Henrik Lagerlund’s Representations, Concepts and Words: Peter of Ailly on Semantics and Psychology presents a unified account of the views of Peter of Ailly as concerns the semantics and psychology of mental language, concluding with the insight that the most salient characteristic of Peter’s approach is his view of concepts as metaphysically simple mental entities which are indistinguishable from each other and which can only be individuated by their content. Medieval thinkers use the notion of supposition to distinguish the various ways that a term may stand for something within the context of a proposition. Ockham explicitly says that all the rules and principles of supposition theory stated by him hold equally for mental language, an admission that Catarina Dutilh Novaes contends, in Ockham on supposition Alexander W. Hall 3 and equivocation in mental language, provokes a series of tensions with other elements of Ockham’s system.1 The Schoolmen did much of their most interesting and original philosophizing in theology. An example is the dilemma in Renaissance Scholasticism on free will: how can we act freely if God causes and knows our actions? Basic issues are involved here: the antinomy between freedom and determination, modal semantics, tense logic, the logical status of counterfacts. Mexican Jesuits Matías Blanco (d. 1734) and Antonio Peralta (d. 1736) wrote books on the subject. Walter Redmond’s The Thee- Stranded Cord: Calling a Truce in the War over God and Human Freedom describes the “disjunctive” solution that Blanco advanced in his Funiculus triplex (The Three-Stranded Cord), published posthumously in Mexico in 1746. When someone is faced with choosing between B and C, conjectures Blanco, God does not actualize either, but rather their disjunction B-or-C. Blanco calls for a truce in the “war” among the contending schools so that they may consider his solution-- for he thinks it may indeed be acceptable to all. [Gran parte de la filosofía más interesante y original los escolásticos la hacían en la teología. Un buen ejemplo es el dilema en el Siglo de Oro sobre el libre albedrío: ¿cómo podemos actuar libremente si Dios causa y conoce nuestros actos? La discusión incluye varios temas fundamentales como la antinomia entre la libertad y la determinación, la semántica modal, la lógica temporal y la lógica de los estados de cosas contrafácticos. Los jesuitas mexicanos Matías Blanco (d. 1734) y Antonio Peralta (d. 1736) escribieron libros sobre la cuestión. Se describirá aquí la solución “disyuntiva” que Blanco propuso en su Funiculus triplex (La Cuerda de tres cabos), publicado póstumamente en México en 1746. Cuando alguien ha de eligir entre las alternativas B y C, barrunta Blanco, Dios no actualiza ni B ni C, sino su disyunción B-o-C. Blanco propone 1 The Author’s views regarding several themes developed in this paper have altered significantly since its publication. The Author’s current position on the matter of supposition and mental language in Ockham can be found in her forthcoming paper in the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: “Ockham on Supposition Theory, Mental Language, and Angelic Communication.” Likewise, the Author has published more generally on Ockham’s theory of suppposition since the article in this volume, including “An intensional interpretation of Ockham’s theory of supposition,” in the Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (3), 2008. 4 Introduction una tregua en la “guerra” entre las escuelas contrincantes para que consideren su solución—pues cree podría ser aceptable para todos.] AQUINAS, SCIENTIA AND A MEDIEVAL MISCONSTRUCTION OF ARISTOTLE’S POSTERIOR ANALYTICS * ALEXANDER W. HALL Aquinas’s understanding of what it means for a proposition to be unqualifiedly true emerges from his interpretation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, which introduces the notion of scientific knowledge, termed ‘scientia’ by the medievals. Scientific knowledge results from a syllogism whose subject term signifies either some class or an individual considered solely in terms of what pertains to it insofar as it is a member of some class. Accordingly, scientific knowledge is universal rather than particular. The middle term of the scientific syllogism signifies an attribute essential to the class picked out by the subject term, and for this reason the predicate joined to the subject by means of this middle itself belongs essentially to the class or individual qua member of a class signified by the subject term. In short, the scientific syllogism demonstrates that its subject is the ontological ground of the predicate’s inherence, and because the subject itself is this ground, the conclusion is necessary. Moreover, as scientific knowledge is of classes rather than mutable individuals, scientific knowledge is fixed and generalizable. Treating its subject’s nature as an ontological ground, the scientific syllogism expresses what belongs to the subject through itself or per se * Save where noted, the Latin translations of the Posterior Analytics and Aquinas’s commentary are taken from the Leonine edition, and I use the following English translations: For Aquinas’s Sententia super Posteriora analytica [In PA], and the Latin Aristotle, I use Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, trans. by F. R. Larcher, with a preface by James A. Weisheipl (Albany, New York: Magi Books, 1970). This edition does not furnish all of Aristotle’s text, when such translations are missing I provide my own. For Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics [An.Post], I use Jonathan Barnes’s translation in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). On occasion, I modify these translations in the interest of preserving a technical vocabulary. 6 Aquinas, Scientia and a Medieval Misconstruction of Posterior Analytics (καθ’ ἁυτό). In I 4, Aristotle discusses various uses of the phrase ‘per se’, two of which are relevant to scientific knowledge. However, his ambiguous phrasing can leave the reader uncertain about which two uses of the phrase he has in mind. Some, such as Sir David Ross and Hugh Tredennick, believe that Aristotle selects the first and second uses of the phrase ‘per se’,1 others, notably Aquinas, believe that Aristotle intends the second and fourth.2 In this paper, I argue that Aristotle’s phraseology is sufficiently vague as to allow either assignation, but that other considerations favor Ross’s and Tredennick’s thesis; and I consider the extent to which Aquinas’s reading of Aristotle may be influenced by a misconstruction of the Greek in the Latin translation with which Aquinas worked. For the Greek, I use Ross’s critical edition, which is compiled from the five oldest Greek manuscripts of the Posterior Analytics: Urbinas 35 (A) (9th-early 10thc.), Marcianus 201 (B) (955), Coislinianus 330 (C) (11thc.), Laurentianus 72.5 (d) (11thc.), and Ambrosianus 400 (olim L 93) (n) (9thc.). For the Latin, I rely on the 1989 Leonine edition, and Minio- Paluello’s and Dod’s critical editions of the thirteenth century’s three Greek to Latin translations. The first and most widely read translation was produced sometime in the second quarter of the twelfth century by James of Venice (Iacobus Veneticus), of whom little is known.3 The second translation came out some time before 1159, when it is cited in John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon, and is likely a recensio of James’s. Less still is known of its translator, whose name may have been John (Ioannes).4 Finally, there is the translation of William of Moerbeke (Guillelmum de Moerbeka), which was produced around 1269, and adopted by Aquinas around 1271.5 Before getting a hold of Moerbeke’s translation, Aquinas 1 See W. D. Ross, in Aristotle, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, with intro. and commentary by W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949), 521-522; and Hugh Tredennick, in Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, ed. and trans. by Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 44, n. d. 2 In PA I.10, 144-146. 3 See L. Minio-Paluello, in L. Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dod, eds., Aristoteles Latinus, (Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Brouwer), IV. 1-4, Analytica posteriora, preface, II.1; and Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 54-55. 4 See, Minio-Paluello, preface, III; and Dod, in Kretzmann, et al., 56-57. 5 Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), vol. 1, The Person and His Work, trans. Robert Royal, 226-227. Alexander W. Hall 7 works with James’s. Specifically, Aquinas comments on James’s translation through to I 27 and then switches to Moerbeke’s.6 Comparing these translations with surviving editions of the Greek, Minio-Paluello concludes that at I 4 James’s text is nearest to the Marcianus edition, while both John’s and Moerbeke’s Greek editions bear a close resemblance to the Coislinianus manuscript.7 Aristotle assigns the phrase ‘per se’ a technical sense, whereby it describes certain specific ways that one thing can belong to another. In addition, he uses the phrase ‘per se’ to describe what belongs in this way, thus, e.g., when we speak of per se attributes, this is shorthand for describing an attribute that belongs per se to a subject. At I 4, 73b16-18, having surveyed various uses of the phrase ‘per se’, Aristotle selects two as relevant to scientific knowledge: τὰ ἄρα λεγόµενα ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς ἐπιστητῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ οὕτως ὡς ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς κατηγορουµένοις ἢ ἐνυπάρχεσθαι δι’ αὑτά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Therefore, in the case of what is absolutely scientifically knowable, the things called ‘per se’—in the following manner, viz., as belonging to the predicates or as belonged to—are [per se] on account of themselves and by necessity (trans. mine). The Leonine edition has the following translation of the Greek: Que ergo dicuntur in simpliciter scibilibus per se sic sunt, sicut inesse predicantibus aut inesse propter ipsa. Que sunt ex necessitate. . . . Therefore, in the case of what is absolutely scientifically knowable, the things called ‘per se’ are [per se] in this way, namely they belong to predicates or belong on account of themselves. These things are by necessity (trans. mine). The Latin of the Leonine misconstrues the Greek and possibly James’s translation. The editor is aware of this and other misconstructions, but incorporates them into the Latin insofar as the Leonine commission is not seeking to improve upon Minio-Paluello’s critical edition but rather to reproduce the text with which Aquinas worked; and, at I.4 73b16-18, Aquinas’s commentary calls for the misconstruction. There are several 6 Ibid. 7 For James, John and Moerbeke, respectively, see Minio-Paluello, preface, XLIII, LI, and LXXXII. 8 Aquinas, Scientia and a Medieval Misconstruction of Posterior Analytics differences between the Leonine text and Ross’s critical edition of the Greek. The first grows out of the ambiguity of ‘κατηγορουµένοις’, a passive participle of ‘κατηγορεῖν’, meaning ‘to speak against’ or ‘accuse’. ‘κατηγορουµένοις’, literally ‘the things accused’, can refer either to the subjects of predication, which are accused of possessing certain predicates, or to the predicates themselves, which are accused of these subjects.8 Modern translations reflect this ambiguity. For example, Mure, Ross, and Tredennick choose ‘subjects’, while Barnes uses ‘predicates’. For its part, the Latin ‘predicantibus’, an active participle of ‘predicare’ meaning ‘to describe’, is unambiguous; ‘predicantibus’ are ‘the things that are describing’, i.e., ‘predicates’. Second, the Latin is not faithful to Aristotle’s ‘τε . . . και’ construction. ‘τε’ alone means ‘and’ or ‘but’. However, ‘τε’ is more commonly used as a correlative in combination with ‘και’ (‘and’ or ‘even’) to unite similar and opposite complements.9 United, ‘τε’ and ‘και’ can be translated with ‘both . . . and’, or, colloquially, simply with an ‘and’ that functions to unite the complements.10 Respectively, ‘τε’ and ‘και’ follow and precede the terms that they modify. In addition, ‘τε’ is postpositive, meaning that it usually comes right after the first word in its sentence or clause. In our passage, ‘τε’ modifies ‘δι’ αὑτά (on account of themselves)’. This phrase ‘on account of themselves’ complements what follows ‘καὶ’, viz., ‘ἐξ ἀνάγκης (by necessity)’. Thus, the presence of Arisotle’s ‘τε . . . και’ construction shows that ‘on account of themselves’ complements ‘by necessity’, and not ‘ἐνυπάρχεσθαι (to be belonged to)’. Moreover, since ‘τε’ is postpositive, the phrase that it modifies forms a new clause, specifically, it picks up the main clause that is interrupted by Aristotle’s parenthetical description of the two applications of the phrase ‘per se’ that are relevant to scientia. Yet, the Leonine edition does not reflect Aristotle’s construction. Translating ‘δι’ αὑτά’ with ‘propter ipsa (on account of themselves)’, and the middle-passive infinitive ‘ἐνυπάρχεσθαι (to be belonged to)’ with the active infinitive ‘inesse (to belong)’, the Latin links ‘inesse’ with ‘propter ipsa’. As a consequence, Aristotle’s parenthetical description is expanded at the expense of his main clause: the 8 See Ross, 522. 9 See Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar, rev. Gordon M. Messing (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1956), 666-669. 10 Ibid. Alexander W. Hall 9 second use of ‘per se’ becomes one wherein things are not simply “belonged to” but rather one wherein they “belong on account of themselves,” and the phrase ‘on account of themselves’ no longer modifies the subject of the main clause, viz., whatever a demonstrator terms ‘per se’, but rather, it now modifies only the second relevant use of the phrase. In addition, the Latin introduces a verb that is not present in the Greek. Aristotle’s sentence is governed by the verb ‘ἐστι’. Greek often uses this singular form of the verb ‘to be’ with a plural subject, accordingly the Latin translates it with ‘sunt (they are)’. Yet, the Latin has ‘sunt’ twice. This is so not only in the Leonine, but in the critical reconstruction of James’s edition as well, which reads: Que ergo dicuntur in simpliciter scibilibus per se sic sunt, sicut inesse predicantibus aut inesse propter ipsaque sunt et ex necessitate. Were we to remove the first ‘sunt’, this passage would capture the meaning of the Greek, reproducing as it does Aristotle’s ‘τε . . . και’ construction by means of the Latin conjunctive, enclitic particle ‘-que’ along with ‘et’. Yet, in medieval Latin, ‘que’ is also used in place of ‘quae (these things)’, the neuter plural of the relative pronoun ‘qui’. Following Aquinas’s commentary, the Leonine edition draws on this second use of ‘que’ for its translation. Now, Minio-Paluello’s apparatus does not give us any reason to take ‘que’ as a relative pronoun. It does, however, note that ‘et’ is missing in several manuscripts. This may provide a clue as to the reason that Aquinas’s text misconstrues the Greek. The double presence of ‘sunt’ in James’s translation represents Aristotle’s one sentence as if it were two. Moreover, in the manuscripts where ‘et’ is missing, that omission leaves ‘que’ without a correlative. Faced with such a manuscript, the decision to look on James’s ‘que’ as a relative pronoun serving as the subject of a new sentence rather than a correlative conjunction would make sense. As for the double ‘sunt’, though Ross’s apparatus does not indicate a double ‘ἐστι’, Minio-Paluello’s shows no indication of a manuscript that has but one ‘sunt’, so it is difficult to determine the cause of this difference, though we may note in passing that neither John’s nor Moerbeke’s recensiones have the extra ‘sunt’. Commenting on this passage Aquinas notes: Then when he says “Therefore, . . . the things called”, etc, he indicates how the demonstrator uses the aforementioned modes. But first it should be noted that, since science bears on conclusions, and understanding bears on 10 Aquinas, Scientia and a Medieval Misconstruction of Posterior Analytics principles, the scientifically knowable are, properly speaking, the conclusions of a demonstration wherein proper attributes are predicated of their appropriate subjects. Now the appropriate subjects are not only placed in the definition of attributes, but they are also their causes. Hence the conclusions of demonstrations involve two modes of predicating per se, namely, the second and the fourth. And this is what he means when he says that the predications “in the case of what is absolutely scientifically knowable,” i.e., in the conclusions of demonstrations, “are per se in this way, namely they belong to predicates,” i.e., in the way that subjects are contained in the definition of accidents which are predicated of the former; “or belong on account of them,” i.e., in the way that predicates are in a subject by reason of the subject itself, which is the cause of the predicate. Then he shows that such scientifically knowable things are necessary, because it is impossible for a proper accident not to be predicated of its subject. But this can occur in two ways (In PA I.10, 136-158).11 Aquinas believes that the passage under consideration has to do with the conclusions of scientific demonstrations, and that Aristotle asserts that such conclusions “involve two modes of predicating per se,” i.e., assert two different types of per se belonging, viz., the second and the fourth. In later discussions of the scientific syllogism, Aquinas omits mention of the fourth mode in the conclusion, e.g: It should be noted that, since in a demonstration a proper attribute is proved of a subject through a middle which is the definition, it is required that the first proposition (whose predicate is the proper attribute, and whose subject is the definition which contains the principles of the proper 11 “Deinde cum dicit: ‘Que ergo dicuntur’, etc., ostendit qualiter utatur predicatis modis demonstrator. Ubi notandum quod, cum sciencia proprie sit conclusionum, intellectus autem principiorum, proprie scibilia dicuntur conclusiones demonstrationis, in quibus passiones predicanur de propriis subiectis; propria autem subiecta non solum ponuntur in diffinitione accidentium, set etiam sunt cause eorum; unde conclusiones demonstrationum includunt duplicem modum dicendi per se, scilicet secundum et quartum. Et hoc est quod dicit quod illa ‘que’ predicantur ‘in simpliciter scibilibus’, hoc est in conclusionibus demonstrationum, ‘sic sunt per se, sicut inesse predicantibus’, scilicet sicut quando subiecta insunt in diffinitione accidentium que de eis predicantur, ‘aut inesse propter ipsa’, id est quando predicata insunt subiecto propter ipsum subiectum, quod est causa predicati. Et consequenter ostendit quod huiusmodi scibilia sunt necesaria, quia ‘non contingit’ quin proprium accidens predicetur de subiecto, set hoc est duobus modis. . . . ” Alexander W. Hall 11 attribute) be per se in the fourth mode, and that the second proposition (whose subject is the subject itself and the predicate its definition) must be in the first mode. But the conclusion, in which the proper attribute is predicated of the subject, must be per se in the second mode (In PA I.13, 60-69).12 The reason that Aquinas feels no need to repeat his assertion about the twofold mode of per se predication in the conclusion of scientific syllogisms is likely his belief that the fourth mode of per se belonging takes in the second, though the converse does not hold. Hence, an assertion of the latter is simultaneously an assertion of the former. Aquinas’s own characterization of the modes of per se belonging is given in his commentary on I 4, 73a34-b16, wherein Aristotle’s discussion of per se belonging focuses on four applications of the phrase ‘per se (καθ’ ἁυτό)’, three of which Aquinas believes are relevant to scientific demonstration, viz., the first, second, and fourth.13 Here are Aristotle’s descriptions of these three modes, translated from the Leonine: (1) Per se attributes are such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature, as line is in triangle and point is in line.14 12 “Sciendum autem est quod, cum in demonstratione probetur passio de subiecto per medium quod est difinitio, oportet quod prima propositio, cuius predicatum est passio et subiectum diffinitio que continet principia passionis, sit per se in quarto modo; secunda autem, cuius subiectum est ipsum subiectum et predicatum ipsa diffinitio, [in] primo modo; conclusio vero, in qua predicatur passio de subiecto, est per se in secundo modo.” 13 Aquinas dismisses the relevance to scientia of the third type of per se belonging—described by Aristotle as “what is not said of some other underlying subject (ὃ µὴ καθ’ὑποκειµένου λέγεται ἄλλου τινός)” (An.Post I 4, 73b5-6)—on the grounds that “this mode is not a mode of predicating, but a mode of existing (iste modus non est modus predicandi, set modus existendi)” (In PA I.10, 118-119). Aquinas’s comment seems correct. Aristotle is speaking of the manner in which a subject exists, viz., as not depending on another for its existence in a manner analogous to the way in which accidents themselves depend on subjects for theirs. Viewed in this light, subjects can be understood to exist through themselves or per se. 14 “Per se . . . sunt quecunque sunt in eo quod quid est, ut triangulo inest linea et punctum linee.” 12 Aquinas, Scientia and a Medieval Misconstruction of Posterior Analytics (2) Per se attributes are . . . . those such that while they belong to certain subjects, the subjects to which they belong are contained in the attribute’s own defining formula, . . . thus straight and curved belong to line per se.15 (4) Again, in another way, what is in anything on account of itelf is per se, while what is not in another on account of itself is an accident. . . . For example, if something dies, having been slaughtered, because of the slaughter (since it is on account of it it has been slaughtered, but not because it happens to perish when it is slaughtered) (trans. mine).16 Aquinas identifies each of the types of per se belonging that are relevant to scientific knowledge with one or more of Aristotle’s four causes. The first type of per se belonging is that wherein a definition belongs per se to its subject, and this type is labeled an instance of formal causality. The second type is an instance of material causality, “in the sense that that to which something is attributed is its proper matter and subject (prout scilicet id cui aliquid attribuitur est propria materia et proprium subiectum ipsius)” (In PA I.10. 53-54), and it is the type of per se belonging in which a proper or per se accident belongs to its subject whose definition does not include that accident.17 Rather, the subject to which this accident belongs is a part of this accident’s definition,18 e.g., the definition of ‘aquilinity’ incorporates ‘nose’, as aquilinity is nothing other than a property of noses, though the definition of ‘nose’ need not mention ‘aquilinity’, as noses are not necessarily aquiline. The fourth type comprises all four Aristotelian causes and is that type of belonging in which a subject acts through its nature to cause properties to belong to itself, accordingly it should take in the first and second types. Aquinas 15 “Per se . . . sunt quecunque sunt in . . . quibuscunque eorum que insunt subiectis, ipsa in ratione insunt quid est demonstranti. . . . ut rectum inest linee et circulare.” 16 “Item alio modo quod quidem propter ipsum inest unicuique per se, quod vero non propter ipsum accidens est. . . . Ut si aliquod interfectum interiit, secundum interfectionem, quoniam propter id quod interfectum est, set non quod accidat interfectum interire.” 17 For its part, the subject can also be said to belong to its proper accident, insofar as the former belongs in the definition of the latter. As we shall see, Aquinas draws on this alternate understanding of the second type of per se belonging in his commentary on I 4, 73b16-18. 18 “It is the second mode of saying per se, when the subject is mentioned in the definition of a predicate which is a proper accident of the subject (secundus modus dicendi per se est quando subiectum ponitur in diffinitione predicati quod est proprium accidens eius)” (In PA I.10.4, 64-72 = An.Post 73a37-b5). Alexander W. Hall 13 uses Aristotle’s example, “slaughtered, it died (interfectum interiit),” to illustrate this causality (In PA I.10, 132-133). Owing to the fact that the fourth type of per se belonging encompasses all four Aristotelian causes, assertions of the second type of per se belonging are also assertions of the fourth. As a consequence, Aquinas may feel that he need not mention the fourth every time that he mentions the second. Let us now consider some various ways in which I 4 73b16-18 may be read: τὰ ἄρα λεγόµενα ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς ἐπιστητῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ οὕτως ὡς ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς κατηγορουµένοις ἢ ἐνυπάρχεσθαι δι’ αὑτά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Therefore, in the case of what is absolutely scientifically knowable the things called ‘per se’—in the following manner, viz., as belonging to the predicates or as belonged to—are [per se] on account of themselves and by necessity. Both Ross and Tredennick claim that this passage concerns the first and second types of per se belonging, and that the preceding discussion of four different types of per se belonging is intended only in order to give a complete accounting of the phrase’s use. Crucial to their thesis is the idea that at I 4, 73b16-18 Aristotle’s discussion takes in the premises of scientific demonstrations. For, as we saw Aquinas himself acknowledge, assertions of the first type of per se belonging are present in the premises of scientific demonstrations.19 One clear role for such assertions is as formulations of first principles. First principles, described variously as ‘axioms (ἀξιῶµατα)’, ‘common opinions (κοιναὶ δόξαι)’, or ‘common things (τὰ κοινά)’,20 are the indemonstrable assertions upon which demonstration depends: It is necessary for demonstrative scientific knowledge . . . to depend on things which are true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion. . . . For there will be deduction even without these conditions, but there will not be 19 In PA I.13, 60-69. 20 See, Sir Thomas Heath, in Euclid, The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements, trans., with introduction and commentary by Sir Thomas L. Heath, 2d ed., rev. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), vol. 1, Introduction and Books I, II, 120. 14 Aquinas, Scientia and a Medieval Misconstruction of Posterior Analytics demonstration; for it will not produce scientific knowledge (An.Post I 2, 71b19-25). 21 Axioms are of two types, the rules governing inference,22 and principles unique to one science. An example of the former is the principle of non- contradiction. The latter type of axioms, on the other hand, comprise assumptions of the existence of the science’s subject matter along with definitions of the subject matter’s manifestations.23 For example, geometry assumes the existence of magnitude along with the definitions of certain magnitudes such as triangle. These definitions, however, make no claims as to the existence of the definiendum. We may term such definitions ‘axiomatic definitions’, to indicate their role as indemonstrable first principles of demonstration. Now, the definition of triangle is an assertion of the first type of per se belonging, indeed, Aristotle employs this definition in order to illustrate such belonging.24 Since, then, such axiomatic definitions function within the premises of scientific demonstrations, if Aristotle’s comments in I 4, 73b16-18 relate in part to the premises of scientific demonstrations, we would expect his discussion to take in the first type of per se belonging. Introducing his discussion of the types of per se belonging relevant to scientia, Aristotle notes that he is speaking of things that we call per se in the sphere of what is absolutely scientifically knowable (ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς ἐπιστητῶν).” Aristotle’s ‘ἁπλῶς’, which I have rendered with ‘absolutely’, is a technical term that Aristotle uses to describe the scientific knowledge present in the conclusions of scientific demonstrations. Aristotle draws on the technical sense of ‘ἁπλῶς’ when he first defines scientific knowledge: We think we understand a thing absolutely (and not in the sophistic fashion accidentally) whenever we think we are aware both that the explanation because of which the object is is its explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise (An.Post I 2, 71b9-12).25 21 “ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήµην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ’ εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀµέσων καὶ γνωριµωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων οῦ συµπεράσµατος. . . . συλλογισµὸς µὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ τούτων, ἀπόδειξις δ’ οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήµην.” 22 See, Ross, 602; and An.Post 72a17-18. 23 See Ross, 531; and Heath, 119. 24 An.Post I 4, 34-36. 25 “Ἐπίστσθαι δὲ οἰόµεθ’ ἕκαστον ἁπλως, ἀλλὰ µὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συµβεβηκός, ὅταν τήν τ’ αἰτίαν οἰώµεθα γινώσκειν δι’ ἣν τὸ πρᾶγµά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ µὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ’ ἄλλως ἔχειν.” Alexander W. Hall 15 Here, Aristotle is speaking of the conclusions of scientific demonstrations, as is indicated by his comments at I 2, 71b16-25. The Latin of I 4, 73b16- 18 uses the standard technical rendering of ‘ἁπλῶς’, viz. ‘simpliciter’, thereby accurately reproducing Aristotle’s comment that he is discussing the types of per se belonging that are relevant in the case of what is ‘absolutely scientifically knowable’. Thus, Aquinas’s belief that Aristotle is speaking of the conclusions of scientific demonstrations has a solid foundation. Still, even though ‘simpliciter’ is a technical term used to describe the ‘scientia’ in the conclusions of scientific demonstrations, Aristotle’s comments at I 4, 73b16-18 do not force us to conclude that he is speaking of the conclusions of scientific demonstrations. For, he does not say that he is discussing the types of per se belonging with which one formulates absolutely knowable scientific propositions, but rather the types of per se belonging that are relevant in the case of such knowledge (ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς ἐπιστητῶν), i.e., when we are seeking or have acquired such knowledge. Thus we need not suppose that Aristotle is discussing the conclusions of scientific demonstrations. Indeed, on the grounds that Aristotle introduces I 4 with the comment that “we must . . . grasp on what things and what sort of things demonstrations depend (ληπτέον . . . ἐκ τίνων καὶ ποίων αἰ ἀποδειξεις εἰσίν),” Ross maintains that the comments that follow at 73b16-18 pertain solely to the premises of scientific demonstrations. Still, we need not accept Ross’s assertion in order to allow that Aristotle’s discussion at 73b16-18 relates in part to the premises of scientific demonstrations, and thus should encompass the first type of per se belonging. In fact, later in book one, Aristotle offers a discussion of per se belonging vis-à-vis scientia that clearly takes in the first use of the phrase ‘per se’: Demonstration is concerned with what belongs per se to the objects—per se in two ways: both what belongs in them, in the essence, and the things that belong to the subjects that belong to their essences [belong per se]. For example, odd belongs to number, while number itself is in definition of odd; and the other way around plurality or divisibility belongs in the definition of number (An.Post I 22, 84a11-17) (trans. mine).26 26 “ἡ µὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι τῶν ὅσα ὑπάρχει καθ’ αὑτὰ τοῖς πράγµασιν. καθ’ αὑτὰ δὲ διττῶς· ὅσα τε γὰρ [ἐν] ἐκείνοις ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, καὶ οἷς αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῖς· οἷον τῷ ἀριθµῷ τὸ περιττόν, ὃ ὑπάρχει µὲν ἀριθµῷ, ἐνυπάρχει δ’ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀριθµὸς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν πλῆθος ἢ τὸ διαιρετὸν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῳ τοῦ ἀριθµοῦ ἐνυπάρχει.” – “Demonstratio quidem enim est quecunque ipsa per se ipsa insunt rebus. Per se ipsa vero dupliciter: quecunque enim in illis insunt in eo quod quid est, et in quibus ipsa in eo quod quid est insunt 16 Aquinas, Scientia and a Medieval Misconstruction of Posterior Analytics Aristotle’s first example has to do with the definition of a proper accident, viz., ‘odd’, which is a proper accident of number. Such definitions are assertions of the second type of per se belonging. The second example, that of the way that plurality or divisibility belong to number, on the other hand, is an assertion of the first type of per se belonging, for it tells of elements that belong in the definition of a subject. For his part, Aquinas recognizes that this is a discussion of the first and second modes of per se belonging and comments that: “The other ways, which he mentioned previously, are reduced to these (alii autem modi quos supra posuit reducuntur ad hos)” (In PA I.35, 59-60), which comment the editor of the Leonine edition takes to be a reference back to Aristotle’s initial discussion of the four uses of the phrase per se. Now, if we accept that in I 4 Aristotle is speaking of demonstration in general, two alternatives emerge from our considerations. Either Aristotle first claims that it is the second and fourth senses of per se belonging that are relevant to scientific knowledge, but then proceeds by example and instruction to recommend the first and second, never again mentioning the fourth, or Aristotle’s initial discussion pertains to the second and the first modes of per se belonging. Let us determine whether the Greek supports the latter thesis: τὰ ἄρα λεγόµενα ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς ἐπιστητῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ οὕτως ὡς ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς κατηγορουµένοις ἢ ἐνυπάρχεσθαι δι’ αὑτά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. If ‘κατηγορουµένοις’ means ‘predicates’, then, when speaking of the premises and conclusions of scientific demonstrations, things are termed ‘per se’ when they belong or are belonged to by the predicates. By ‘predicates’, I understand the predicate terms of universal affirmative propositions, i.e., of the types of propositions that are used in the scientific syllogism.27 What (1) belongs to and (2) is belonged to by, i.e., possesses, these predicate terms are the subject terms of their propositions. This is possible because the assertions of scientific syllogisms are definitions,28 and Aristotle believes that the subject and predicate terms of definitions are coextensive,29 thus the subject term both belongs to and possesses the ipsis. Ut in numero inpar, quod inest quidem numero: est autem ipse numerus in ratione ipsius.” 27 An.Post I 14. 28 An.Post II 3, 90b25; & II 10. 29 An.Post II 13, 96a32-34. Alexander W. Hall 17 predicate term that is in its definition. In the former case, when we speak of something belonging to what is in its definition, we have an assertion of the second type of per se belonging, which speaks of proper accidents that belong to the subjects that are in their definitions. In the latter case, when we speak of what the subject term possesses, viz., its definition, we have an assertion of the first type of per se belonging. On the other hand, by ‘κατηγορουµένοις’ Aristotle may mean ‘subjects’. If this is the case, Ross has already shown how Aristotle’s discussion can be read as outlining the first and second types of per se belonging.30 Either translation of ‘κατηγορουµένοις’ allows us to read Aristotle as claiming that the first and second types of per se belonging are relevant to scientific knowledge; later, Aristotle himself makes this claim; moreover, Aristotle never explicitly links the fourth type of per se belonging to the scientific syllogism, not even in the passage under consideration. Why then does Aquinas, who claims that in An.Post I 22 “the other ways [of belonging per se], which he mentioned previously, are reduced to these [viz. the first and second],” believe that I 4, 73b16-18 refers to the second and fourth types of per se belonging? One reason is likely Aquinas’s conviction that Aristotle is discussing the conclusions of scientific demonstrations. A conclusion is a single statement, yet Aristotle speaks of two types of per se belonging. Given Aquinas’s belief that the fourth type of per se belonging takes in the second,31 and that the conclusion of a scientific demonstration must assert the second type of per se belonging,32 Aquinas’s selection of the second and fourth modes of per se belonging is a logical way of explaining how one statement can assert two types of per se belonging; for an assertion of the second type is simultaneously an assertion of the fourth. This is not, however, to suggest that other considerations do not motivate Aquinas. Understanding ‘predicantibus’ to mean not ‘predicate terms’ but rather the ‘proper accidents’, which are themselves predicated of subjects, Aquinas identifies cases wherein things belong to predicates as assertions of the second type of per se belonging, which describes the way that subjects belong to their proper accidents, viz., in their definitions. Next, owing to the Latin’s misconstruction of Aristotle’s correlative ‘τε . . . και’, Aquinas confronts a type of belonging wherein predicates belong “on acount of themselves.” By ‘themselves’ Aquinas understands ‘the subjects themselves’, as is evident from his commentary, and the fourth mode of per se belonging is intended to 30 Ross, 521-522. 31 In PA I.10, 122-125. 32 In PA I.13, 60-69. 18 Aquinas, Scientia and a Medieval Misconstruction of Posterior Analytics formulate what belongs to subjects on account of themselves. In fact, in James’s translation Aristotle’s description of the fourth type of per se belonging is an almost exact match to Aristotle’s later description of the second type of per se belonging that is relevant to scientia: Item alio modo quod quidem propter ipsum inest unicuique per se . . . est. Again, in another way, what is in anything on account of [the subject] itself is per se. Que . . . dicuntur . . . per se sic sunt, sicut . . . inesse [predicantibus] propter ipsa. The things called ‘per se’ are [per se] in this way, namely they belong to predicates . . . on account of [the subjects] themselves. Accordingly, the misconstruction in Aristotle’s text likely plays a role in Aquinas’s belief that at 73b16-18 Aristotle is discussing the second and fourth types of per se belonging. I have argued for two theses. The first is that Aquinas’s belief that at 73b16-18 Aristotle is speaking of the conclusions of scientific demonstrations coupled with a misconstruction of this passage in the Latin lead Aquinas to conclude that 73b16-18 discusses the second and fourth type of per se belonging, respectively. Second, since (1) Aristotle never explicitly mentions the fourth type of per se belonging in connection with scientific knowledge, (2) 73b16-18 could pertain to both the premises and the conclusions of scientific demonstrations (or indeed even just the premises), and (3) 73b16-18 can be read as an assertion that the first and second types of per se belonging are relevant to scientific demonstration, this passage likely pertains to the first and second types of per se belonging, both of which Aristotle does explicitly claim are relevant to scientific knowledge. REPRESENTATIONS, CONCEPTS AND WORDS: PETER OF AILLY ON SEMANTICS AND PSYCHOLOGY HENRIK LAGERLUND Introduction Peter of Ailly (1350-1420) was a very influential person. He had a distinguished career both within the University of Paris and in the Catholic Church. In 1411, he was named Cardinal and this got him deeply involved in papal politics.1 But he was not only politically influential, he had a profound influence on fifteenth and sixteenth century thought as well. His philosophical and theological works were frequently cited by influential thinkers. He also wrote a wide variety of works including several on geography and astronomy. The Imago mundi, for example, was supposedly read by Christopher Columbus. His works were also published and reprinted several times in the sixteenth century and in many respects he seems to have served as a transmitter of scholastic thought into modern times. Despite these well known facts about him, he has been given little attention by contemporary scholars of medieval philosophy. In the present study, I attempt, in some small ways, to remedy this by giving a unified account of his views on the semantics and psychology of mental language.2 Historically, Peter can be said to belong to an eminent Paris tradition of teachers in the so called via moderna, which includes such predecessors as John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen and Nicholas Oresme. This tradition was greatly influenced by William Ockham and, particularly in Peter’s case, Ockham’s followers in Paris, Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini. They all adhered to a nominalist metaphysics, 1 See Okley (1964), and Spade (1980), p. 1, for more details of Peter’s life. 2 Peter’s views on semantics and mental language have previously been treated in Spade (1980), Biard (1989), Spade (1996) and Bakker (1996). 20 Representations, Concepts and Words although they disagreed on the details, and they all placed great emphasis on a language of thought in their reduced ontology and in founding language and logic. Peter is, however, one of the first in the nominalist tradition to devote a separate treatise to mental language, the famous Conceptus. The philosophical treatise of foremost interest to us in the present study is, of course, the Conceptus, and it is exactly what its title suggests – a work on mental terms, that is, a work on mental language. It is believed to have been written in 1372, which would make it a very early work by Peter. It was published and reprinted several times in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century – always together with his treatise on insolubles.3 Besides these two works, we will use the Destructiones modorum significandi and the Tractatus exponibilium as sources for Peter’s treatment of the semantics of mental language. The psychological aspects of mental language are treated by Peter in the Conceptus, of course, but also in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences and in the Tractatus de anima4. The Destructiones modorum significandi seems to be the earliest of these works, followed closely by Conceptus et insolubilia and Tractatus exponibilium. They are, however, earlier than Peter’s commentary on the Sentences, which was supposedly written between 1376 and 1377, and the Tractatus de anima, which was completed between 1377 and 1381.5 Since the Tractatus de anima is the latest of these works, I will assume that it represents Peter’s most mature thoughts, but the Conceptus will otherwise be my main source. I will argue that Peter develops a highly original theory of language and thought, which in details will differ from both William Ockham’s and John Buridan’s theories. It is, of course, true that he is deeply influenced by Ockham and Buridan, but he seems to develop their views in a new direction, particularly in light of some deep problems facing their theories. I begin by considering the acquisition of concepts. To be able to put Peter’s conception of the language of thought in its proper context, I first consider his view on sensory cognition and his use of the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. This will lead me to what I 3 See Spade (1980). 4 See Pluta (1987). 5 See Chappius et al. (1986). Henrik Lagerlund 21 claim to be the most notable part of his theory of concepts, namely, that they are metaphysically simple and indistinguishable entities. He seems to think that they are individuated by their content and he thus stresses the semantics of mental language. Having drawn this conclusion, I move on to consider the semantics, and I end by treating mental supposition and the truth of mental sentences. Acquisition of concepts and the psychology of mental language In the beginning of the Conceptus, Peter states that there are three kinds of terms, namely, mental, spoken and written terms. He writes: A mental term is a concept, or an act of the intellective soul or the intellective power. A spoken term is an utterance (vox) signifying by convention (ad placitum). A written term is an inscription (scriptura) synonymous in signification with an utterance significative by convention.6 A mental term is a concept, which is the same as an intellectual act (or an act of the mind). While spoken and written terms signify by convention and are subordinate to mental terms. Mental terms, on the other hand, signify by nature. He makes a distinction, however, between mental terms properly so called and improperly so called, that is, between mental terms with natural and conventional signification, respectively.7 I can, for example, have the word ‘animal’ in English in my mind without uttering it or writing it down – I am just thinking it. Although this is a mental term it is not a proper mental term, since it signifies by convention and is subordinate to a proper mental term that signifies by nature. The division of terms discussed here is, of course, a division of language as well. In this sense there are three distinct levels of language, namely, a written, a spoken and a mental language.8 Furthermore, there is a proper 6 “Terminus mentalis est conceptus sive actus intelligendi animae vel potentiae intellectivae. Terminus vocalis est vox significans ad placitum. Terminus vero scriptus est scriptura sinonima in significando voci significativae ad placitum.” (Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. Aib.) See also Spade (1980), p. 16. All translations in this paper are my own, but quotes from the Conceptus et insolubilia are based on P.V. Spade’s excellent translation. 7 See Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. Aiiia, and, fol. Biib-Biiia, and also Spade (1980), pp. 19-20, and, pp. 36-37. 8 See Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. Biia, and Spade (1980), p. 36. 22 Representations, Concepts and Words and an improper mental language. The terms of the proper mental language are concepts with natural signification and the terms of the improper mental language are mental words with conventional signification. The difference can also be explained by saying that the terms of the improper mental language are in, what we would call, some natural language, like English or Swedish, but this is not the case with the proper mental language – its terms are not in any natural language; it is the language other languages are based on. I have mentioned ‘signification’ several times. It is a key term. Peter writes the following about it in the Conceptus: Next it must be noted that to ‘signify’ is the same as to be a sign of something. Nevertheless, a thing can be called a ‘sign’ of some thing in two senses. In one sense, because it leads to an act of knowing (notitia) the thing of which it is a sign. In another sense, because it is itself the act of knowing the thing. In the second sense, we say that a concept is a sign of a thing when such a concept is a natural likeness (similitudo) – not that it leads to an act of knowing that thing, but because it is the very act itself of knowing that thing, [an act that] naturally and properly represents that thing.9 In the first sense of ‘signify’, terms signify in the improper mental, and in spoken or written languages, and we will get back to that sense later in the present article, but for now it is the second sense that interests us. A concept signifies by being a natural likeness of whatever it stands for or, rather, represents. Peter writes earlier in the Conceptus that to ‘signify’ is to “represent something, some things, or somehow, to a cognitive power by vitally changing it.”10 For a concept to signify something is for it to be the very act of knowing (notitia) that thing. Therefore, “a mental term, a 9 “Notandum est deinde quod significare est idem quod signum rei facere hoc esse signum alicuius rei et veruntamen dupliciter aliqua res potest dici signum alicuius rei. Uno modo ut ducit in noticiam illius rei cuius est signum. Alio modo quia est ipsamet noticia rei. Secundo modo dicimus conceptum esse signum rei cuius talis conceptus est naturalis similitudo non quod ducat in noticiam illius rei, sed quia est ipsamet noticia rei naturaliter proprie representans rem.” (Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. Aiia.) See Spade (1980), p. 17. 10 “Significare autem est potentiae cognitivae eam vitaliter immutando aliquid vel aliqua vel aliqualiter representare.” (Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. Aib.) See Spade (1980), p. 16. Henrik Lagerlund 23 concept or act of understanding (actus intelligendi), and an act of knowing (notitia) that apprehends a thing are the same.”11 A concept when acquired changes the mind (or intellectual soul). Peter says a concept is a ‘vital change’ of the mind in two ways. First of all, it is caused by something acting on the mind with efficient causation, and, secondly, it inheres in the mind as an accident inheres in its subject. To get a clearer picture of this process we must look closer at Peter’s psychological writings. Peter is very much torn between Ockham and Buridan on matters of psychology. Unlike Ockham and in the footsteps of Buridan, he adheres to the species theory of perception, that is, perceptible objects cause changes in the sense organs and the qualities sensed are described as species, which are in some ways like the qualities as they are present in the objects themselves. Species are, however, dependent on their perceiver, and are not caused by the sensible objects if no perceivers are present.12 After the act of sensing (actus sentendi) there remain two qualities in the phantasia. One is the actual change of the material internal organ and the other is an act of the soul (actus phantasiandi).13 The act of the soul is created from the change in the matter by an act of imagination (actus imaginandi), and it has many names. Among others, Peter uses these to 11 “Notandum est viterius quam terminus mentalis, conceptus sive actus intellidendi et noticia rei apprehensiva idem sunt.” (Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. Aiib.) See Spade (1980), p. 18. 12 “Secundo dicendum est, quod naturaliter non possumus sensibilia non sensata intelligere in speciebus receptis a sensibilibus, quia nec in speciebus causatis ab eis, cum naturaliter a nulla re sensibili species causatur, nisi dum actualiter sensitur, nec in speciebus causatis ab aliis sensibilibus sensatis a nobis, cum naturaliter unum sensibile non possit causare speciem alterius sensibilis ut sonus speciem coloris, nec species unius sensibilis potest esse medium cognoscendi aliud sensibile ut species soni respectu coloris.” (Pluta (1987), 12:3, p. 76.) See Lagerlund (2008) for a similar reading of Buridan’s view on sense perception. 13 “Sed alii dicunt sine speciebus haec omnia posse salvari. Unde, cum certum sit in sensu interiore aliquid remanare post actum sentendi, dicunt isti, quod in eo, puta in phantasia, remanet duplex qualitas: Una ab obiecto impressa in organo, et est ipsius confortativa vel debilitativa et quandoque corruptiva, sicut patet in amentibus et furiosis, et illa est alterius rationis ab obiecto, sicut supra dictum est de sensu exteriore. Sed alia est qualitas, quae est generata per actum imaginandi, quae non est subiective in organo, ut distinguitur contra potentiam, sed e contrario sicut et ipse actus phantasiandi.” (Pluta (1987), 9:3, p. 55.) 24 Representations, Concepts and Words refer to it: similitude, image, simulacrum, idolum, idea, representation, intelligible species etc.14 This representation is pre-conceptual and it is said to have objective being (esse obiectivum) in the soul.15 In a couple of extremely detailed and interesting passages of the Tractatus de anima on cognition of sensibles, he explains that humans perceive in several different ways. First of all, sensory cognition is either simple or complex. It is complex in the sense that the representation in the soul is extremely rich and in this sense also confused. If we humans did not have the ability to focus on or attend to individual things, we would never be able to tell what we perceive. Our intellectual soul has this ability – by putting individual things in our prospect the soul produces simple acts of cognition.16 In a simple act of cognition an object can be cognized directly 14 “Ulterius dicunt, quod ista secunda qualitas non est obiectum alicuius actus, sed est habitus generatus per actum phantasiandi inclinans partialiter ad actus consimiles in absentia rei sensibilis ita, quod post primum actum etiam destructo sensibili potentia cum isto habitu potest elicere actum phantasiandi terminatum ad idem sensibile numero, quod prius est sentitum, sicut cognitione abstractiva intellectus terminatur ad idem singulare numero, quod prius intellectualiter est intuitive cognitum et non terminatur ad aliquam similitudinem vel imaginem vel simulacrum, sicut aliqui imaginantur, quia omnia illa, quae a philosophis et sanctis vocatur phantasmata, simulacra vel idola, sunt ipsamet sensibilia phantasiata, quae prius fuerunt sensata, et non species rerum sensibilium; eundem enim hominem, quem prius vidi, imaginor et non speciem eius. Et sic, quot sunt individua phantasiata, tot sunt phantasmata, sicut tot sunt ideae, quot sunt res cognitae, quia idea est ipsa res singularis cognita cognitione divina, licet hoc nomen ‘idea’ principaliter significando rem creatam connotet eam aeternitaliter a Deo fuisse cognitam, sicut hoc nomen ‘phantasma’ significat principaliter rem phantasiatam connotando actum phantasiandi.” (Ibid., p. 55.) “Sed tamen tali specie intelligibili, id est phantasiata apprehensione manente non videtur istis possibile omnem actualem intellectionem cessare, quia, ut prius est argutum, illa manente omnia remanent requisita ad formationem primarum intellectionum; bene tamen cessante intellectione manet in memoria species sensatorum et sensationum.” (Ibid., 10:4, p. 61.) 15 “Unde ulterius sequitur, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid existens in intellectu sit alicuius rei cognitio vel proprie dicta repraesentatio, non sufficit, quod sit illius similitudo vel imago sive quod exhibeat illam tamquam praesentem in esse obiectivo.” (Ibid., p. 60.) 16 “Ideo alii dicunt, quod aliquam rem singulariter percipere est sive requirit ipsam percipere per modum existentis in prospectu cognoscentis. Cum autem aliqua res a sensu sic percipitur, hoc non est nisi per repraesentationem confusam simul repraesentantem cum substantia rei eius accidentia, scilicet magnitudinem, situm et alia, secundum quam apparet in prospectu cognoscentis. Sensus autem non potest

(PDF) Knowledge, Mental Language, and Free Will