(PDF) Posthuman Phenomenologies: Performance Philosophy, Non-Human Animals, and the Landscape

836694 research-article2019 QIXXXX10.1177/1077800419836694Qualitative InquiryLewis and Owen Research Article Qualitative Inquiry 1–7 Posthuman Phenomenologies: Performance © The Author(s) 2019 Article reuse guidelines: Philosophy, Non-Human Animals, and the sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/1077800419836694 https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800419836694 Landscape journals.sagepub.com/home/qix Tyson E. Lewis1 and James Owen2 Abstract Western philosophical traditions have been haunted by an intellectualist thesis supported by two foundational assumptions: first, that humans can be defined in virtue of their minds, and second, that having a mind separates humans from non-human animals. Many phenomenologists have complicated this thesis, but there is nevertheless a tendency in phenomenology to remain fully within a human-centric research paradigm. This article will explore the possibilities of a posthuman phenomenology for unsettling this human-centeredness and suggest that certain forms of performance philosophy are the most effective methods for investigating this new terrain. Keywords posthumanism, performance philosophy, phenomenology Badgers are philosophers. exceptionalism in the tradition of phenomenology through its —Charles Foster, Being a Beast emphasis on a lived practice of philosophy that is embodied, and entangled with other non-human animals. Jokob von Uexküll (2010) and Vilém Flusser and Louis Unsettling the Human-Centeredness Bec (2012) offer provocative suggestions for a new, specula- of Phenomenology tive biology, but their methods remain largely imaginative— indeed Flusser and Bec refer to their work as a “fable.” Western philosophical traditions from Descartes on have Although many insights can be gleaned from this approach, been haunted by an intellectualist thesis which centers the we will refer to some examples of posthuman phenomenol- unique capacities of the human in an interior mental life. This ogy, and in particular the work of Charles Foster (2016), particular feature of the human separates it in kind (rather which shift from imagining alternative, non-human ways of than degree) from non-human, purely mechanistic lifeforms. being, to performing them. Researchers such as Foster begin Thus, the intellectualist thesis is supported by two founda- with the recognition that to understand what it is like to be a tional assumptions: first, that humans can be defined in virtue non-human animal, the human body itself must be trans- of their minds, and second, that having a mind separates formed. They explore their curiosity by attempting to “be” a humans from non-human animals. Phenomenologists have non-human animal—to inhabit the world of the non-human complicated the first assumption by emphasizing the embod- other by augmenting their own bodies, habits, and ways of ied and embedded nature of existence: Husserl revealed the being in the world. Moving beyond mere mental speculation, importance of the lifeworld, Heidegger added equipment and Foster performs the human body differently, and in the pro- das Man, Levinas added the other, de Beauvoir added gender, cess, touches upon a non-human excess that is not reducible and Merleau-Ponty added the body. Although these thinkers to mere anthropocentric projection. have complicated the Cartesian sanctity of the mind, there is nevertheless a tendency in phenomenology to remain fully within a human-centric research paradigm. Phenomenological 1 University of North Texas, Denton, USA research seems to suggest that animals do not have a world, 2 Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, USA or if they do, it is deficient.1 This article will explore the pos- Corresponding Author: sibilities of a posthuman phenomenology for unsettling this James Owen, Department of Philosophy & Religion Studies, Bunce Hall, deficiency and suggest that certain forms of performance phi- 3rd floor Rowan University, 201 Mullica Hill Road, Glassboro, NJ 08028, losophy are the most effective methods for investigating this USA. new terrain.2 Performance is effective in overcoming human Email:

2 Qualitative Inquiry 00(0) We would like to argue that this phenomenological illustrate this basic point, Uexküll notes how the same approach is essentially a branch of the newly emerging field object in different Umwelten will take on radically different of performance philosophy.3 To press the phenomenologi- perceptual “tones” (p. 129). A logger might see an oak tree cal tradition beyond its humanist roots, one must commit a as “needing to be cut down,” whereas a young child might radical reorganization of the body and of sensation, and the perceive an ominous face in its bark, conveying a sense of best way to accomplish this is through the esthetic reinven- danger. To introduce a non-human perspective, Uexküll tion of one’s own bodily apparatus. In this article, we will cites the example of a fox living in a hollow at the base of move from (a) imaginative speculation to (b) embodied the old oak. He summarizes, “The oak possesses neither the imitation to (c) stepping into what we will call the land- use tone from the forester’s environment nor the danger scape, which is the precondition for such imitation. tone from the little girl’s environment, but only a protection tone” (p. 129). These tones lie at the interface between sub- From Imaginative Speculation to jects and their environments, forming a holistic and func- tional Umwelt of knitted-together perceptual-marks and Embodied Entanglements effect-marks. Thus, Uexküll argues, “In accordance with Although his writings date from the first half of the 20th the different effect tones, the perception images of the century, Jakob von Uexküll remains a hotly debated figure numerous inhabitants of the oak are configured differently” within fields such as posthumanism and biopolitics.4 Of (p. 130). No single animal completely perceives the tree or particular importance is his insight that animals are not the others’ perspectives on the tree, although all of the per- simply machines that function within a universal, homo- ceptions form a shared Umwelt. geneous, causal environment. Instead, Uexküll argued that Uexküll’s approach is a provocative one, but it runs up animals are indeed subjects who actively participate in against a serious limitation. As Geoffrey Winthrop-Young particular Umwelten (environments) or perceptual worlds points out in the afterward to Uexküll’s book A Foray into of significance. The human Umwelt is therefore not excep- the Worlds of Animals and Humans, speculative biology tional, it is just one more perceptual bubble among many. always runs the risk of reifying the Umwelten of non-human Within this framework, the goal of biology thus shifts animals. Winthrop-Young seems to suggest a possible from the analysis of mechanical responses to stimuli, to workaround to be found in Uexküll’s unusual combination descriptions of the species-specific, lived Umwelten of of biological description and poetic musing. Indeed, the animals. esthetic side of Uexküll’s experiment promises to reach out To do so, Uexküll employs a speculative biology that at beyond the human through imaginary leaps and metaphoric its best, carefully suspends human significance to delve into connections. The use of the concept “tone” is important that which is significant for non-human animals. In this here because tonality is not a strictly biological category so alien phenomenology of ticks, hermit crabs, bees, and jack- much an extension of the musical metaphor of a tone within daws, Uexküll finds environments saturated with signs and a tonality—offering the possibility for getting “in tune” moods. As Uexküll (2010) summarizes, “environments with another Umwelt, to a degree. themselves represent only subjective realities” (p. 126). For But Winthrop-Young’s workaround is insufficient to instance, there is no stable environment that has objective overcome Uexküll’s limitations. Indeed, Uexküll himself spatial and temporal properties. Uexküll argues that there laments, “The environments [Umwelten] . . . are revealed are only functional systems integrating subjects and objects. only to our mind’s eye and not to our body’s” (p. 42). This means that space and time are relative features of the Biologists have their own Umwelt which has its internal coordinated perceptions and effectual possibilities of organ- structure, space/time, tone, and mood. At best, one can isms within their environments. Uexküll thus highlights imagine what it might be like to extend perception beyond how animals simultaneously exist within effect spaces, tac- the bubble, as Uexküll might call it, of such an Umwelt, but tile spaces, and visual spaces as well as unique temporali- this extension will only appear in one’s imagination. Absent ties that are attuned to their environmental stimuli to achieve here is the possibility that one might experience new tones a functional feedback loop. For instance, although a snail beyond the speculative imagination through a more embod- appears to move slowly for a human observer, within the ied form of phenomenological entanglement. spatio-temporality of its unique Umwelt, the snail has the One possible extension of Uexküll’s imaginative same sense of motion occurring that we do—like the move- approach is through fabulation. Flusser and Bec (2012) the- ment of the earth or the flicker of a screen, anything which matize this imaginative turn in animal phenomenology by moves too fast or too slow does not appear to move at all. describing their work as neither detached science nor mere Furthermore, objective realities only become perceptual fiction. Instead, they opt for writing fabulations that elements of a lived Umwelt when they take on certain tonal “attempt to cross from out our world into its [the vampire qualities relative to an animal’s particular goals, coupled squid]” (p. 38). These fables are not an attempt to exit the with the “plan” laid out by an environment (p. 50). To world but to relocate the self within the unfamiliar bubble Lewis and Owen 3 of the non-human through imaginative speculation. Based Although differing in the details, we can make some on a careful understanding of the biology of the vampire general claims about the posthuman phenomenologies out- squid, they conjure up what it might be like to live in a squid lined above. First, they all take an esthetic turn to speculate culture and engage in squid thinking. Such speculation is about the nature of non-human animal experience. enabled through the phenomenological assumption that Metaphors, fables, and finally mimetic performance are uti- Geist (spirit) is “both human and vampyroteuthic, and it is lized to move beyond third person, detached, objective sci- not difficult to find” (p. 60). The assumption here is that entific views. Second, although some might emphasize this worldly bubbles saturate the environment. World is not the more than others, there is some notion that we must move exception, it is the rule. And because of this, all creatures out into the field to interact with animals if we are to under- get absorbed into worlds, orient themselves through worldly stand their ways of being. Despret has some doubts about solicitations, and influence the cultural development of the various uses of Uexküll’s Umwelt, which has been taken worlds. Even the most radically opposing worlds share up by many over the last century, from philosophers to sci- these features, enabling Flusser and Bec to create fables entific researchers, with the latter, she argues, often missing wherein the human and the vampire squid sometimes cross the point of the theory. She writes, “In terms of experimen- paths and even touch one another. tation, the politeness with regard to strange ways of being For Uexküll and Flusser and Bec, worldhood is distrib- soon encountered its limits. In this case, it’s probably not uted across species. Although these worlds differ dramati- the fault of the theory but rather the experimental routines cally, their worldhood enables the possibility for crossovers. that the theory obviously couldn’t defuse” (Despret, 2016, Interestingly, Vinciane Despret offers another entry point p. 163). Doing experiments where animals are put in strange for us to think about communication between human and artificial situations, like attempting to get some monkeys to nonhuman animals which more directly emphasizes how compete over a bottle of milk, does very little to get a han- humans and nonhuman animals contaminate one another dle on the monkeys’ Umwelt. She concludes that “In order across these worlds. In Uexküll’s work, reification means a that the theory of the Umwelt keeps to its promises, it will loss of how humans not only have access to non-human no doubt need to be displaced from its usual locations” worldly bubbles but also how humans in turn are trans- (Despret, 2016, p. 164). Research into the world of animals formed by this border crossing (and vice versa). To counter and humans must get “out there” into the field to get a better this, Despret argues that there is a long line of performative sense of animals and their lives. Third, following from the exchanges between species. Returning to The Odyssey, last two points, through speculation and through engage- Despret (2015) highlights how Odysseus is called an “octo- ment, we can not only cross world bubbles, but we can also pus,” because of his cunningness. Despret writes that this delve into these new worlds through intercapture. extends naturally from accounts of ancient octopus hunt- In the next section of this article, we want to highlight ers, who lived on the margins of the world of the octopus— the work of researchers who push these basic ideas past reconfiguring themselves and becoming octopus-like. imagination and into performance. Like the ancients described Through imitative performance of the octopus, something by Despret, they mimetically approximate and discover the crosses the isolation of Umwelten, contaminating the signs and effects of another non-human animal.5 In short, sealed bubbles which animals of all shapes and sizes live they do not try to imagine what the other feels so much as within. This most ancient form of inter-species transmis- feel what the other feels. Instead of stretching the imagina- sion speaks to that which is not reducible to a world, but tion, they stretch the human body. Such a move is an attempt rather to an interspecies intelligence that entangles worlds. to shift from detached speculation to embodied entangle- This cross pollination of worlds is a kind of intercapture ments. This means that the esthetic approach in Uexküll and [entre-capture], which, for Despret (2016), happens in Flusser and Bec ceases to be a metaphor and instead places becomes a method—a method for doing posthuman phe- nomenological research. at the heart of which new Umwelten are created and overlapped. They are places that make perceptible the porosity of worlds and the flexibility of those who people them. To make two Performing the Posthuman worlds live together in an intelligent way not only means thinking and connecting with what is required in this A possible entry point for an esthetic, embodied and per- cohabitation but just as much in taking an interest in what it formative approach to posthuman phenomenology might invents and metamorphoses into. (pp. 166-167) be found in Ron Broglio’s (2011) book Surface Encounters: Thinking with Animals and Art. At first blush, Broglio’s For Despret, overemphasis on differences between book seems promising. The introduction frames his analy- worlds misses (a) how humans and non-human animals sis of contemporary art with references to phenomenology share overlapping forms of intelligence and (b) how new and the need for a new, posthuman phenomenological worlds can be created through entanglements. approach to the non-human animal. Indeed, he states that 4 Qualitative Inquiry 00(0) the book will “. . . take seriously the problem of an animal audience or “authors.” Indeed, if we are open to the idea that phenomenology” (p. xx). Broglio does deal with the prob- performance itself thinks—without us yet alongside us, lematicity of animal phenomenology, but in a way which independently of us yet not in a way that transcends us always keeps the Umwelt at arm’s length. In an attempt to altogether—then this thinking in fact demands the transformation of our thinking habits. (p. 16) avoid anthropocentric projection or essentialization of non-human animals, Broglio focuses on surface encoun- ters, which we would like to argue, cannot escape the inev- In short, Ó Maoilearca argues that performance thinks, and itable return to human concerns and human values. This this thought is not reducible to a thinking subject or even to becomes most evident in Broglio’s assessment of the work human actors. Indeed, Ó Maoilearca (2015) maintains a of the English contemporary artist, Marcus Coates. Broglio certain ambiguity with the word “performance” so that it praises Coates for staying away from any attempt to be a can embrace the imitative and iterative actions of non- non-human animal, as such a move for Broglio is impossi- human animals. Performative philosophy challenges the ble and politically questionable (as it inevitably results in modes of extension, sensorial ratios, and habituated behav- reification). He writes, iors of all bodies, opening up different ways of thinking that are “without us yet alongside us” (p. 16). Through embod- It [becoming-animal] can overlook massive differences ied imitation of non-human animals, the body can begin to between humans and animals, which result in not giving think differently. Performance philosophy, contra Broglio, animals their due in being different from us; it can evoke a thus opens the possibility—even if it is slight and fleeting— psychological unconscious, which then moves the conversation that an animal phenomenology is not an impossibility. from surface interactions to the privileged interiority of the An example of performance philosophy as an animal human subject as the animal with greatest depth of conscious phenomenology, although not presented as such in the text, and unconscious . . . (Broglio, 2011, p. 127) is the work of the naturalist Charles Foster. Yet both of these charges are reductive at best. First, charac- terizing the possibility of a posthuman phenomenology as Posthuman Performance: A Case impossible is an exaggeration which, as we will demon- Study strate below, is easy to refute. The second criticism is per- From a very early age, Foster found himself fascinated with haps more serious. Although Broglio highlights Coates’ animals—he would follow birds around attempting to under- courage at taking certain risks (e.g., the risk of being called stupid), he warns Coates and others against taking other stand their environments—to live with them and see how kinds of risks (e.g., the risk of being a non-human animal). they lived. His world was often touched by them and with The latter is perhaps too risky for those who want to remain each caress from a bird, Foster was drawn into the mystery on the surface of things, for it produces a very real ethical of those animals. Later in life, Foster became an outdoors- problem: The threat of essentialism, and by extension, the man, occupying much of his time with tracking animals, but colonization of another’s lifeworld by a more dominant spe- this did not give him enough of the world of animals. For cies. But we would argue that if such problems are present, this, he would have to suspend much of his previous knowl- so too are certain possibilities for a new approach to eco- edge and habits of being an outdoorsman to “be a beast,” logical co-belonging within a landscape (a point which we shunning the human definition of “beastly” in favor of the will return to in the conclusion). The risk of staying on sur- beasts’ own kind of beastliness. His earlier pursuits of hunt- faces is that such a move will be superficial, thus missing ing animals and preserving them with glass eyes has been how humans and non-human animals can exist in a kind of replaced by eating worms and rifling through garbage. ecological chiasma or crossing point of intercapture, which The first and most Uexküllian experiment in the book is both touches and withdraws simultaneously (not a grasping Foster’s attempt to become a badger. His approach was which dominates). twofold—learning about the scientific corpus on badgers, A more efficacious starting point for a posthuman phe- and then doing his best to occupy their world (a badger nomenology of the non-human animal can be found in per- bubble). formance philosophy. Performance philosophy is not a This attempt can seem to be misguided or superficial, philosophy about performance but rather how performance until one confronts the lengths to which Foster (and his son) itself does philosophy—how performance itself thinks. went in their quest. Research began with detailed consider- Laura Cull Ó Maoilearca (2015) summarizes the stakes of ation of the physiology and especially the sensory apparatus performance philosophy as follows: of the badger, which is mostly blind and lives in a world of scent. Foster (2016) drew somatotopic pictures (comparing What we call human thinking might well be open to forms of the relative size of body parts based on sensitivity) of the becoming non-human, to transformative imitation in attempts badger and the human. He also studied how neurological to think like a robot, like a horse, like mist—whether as signals are sent through the bodies of badgers and humans, Lewis and Owen 5 to get some appreciation of the differences and similarities. This is a normal blindfolded crawl out of the sett. The He concludes the following: description is not really poetic—the world of the badger is no longer ideal and beyond description, Foster’s under- I take it that there are many neurological sequences that it is standing is performative, existing under his nose as he possible meaningfully to say that I share with an animal. If a moves about in the brush. The badger’s perceptual-marks wind blows down the valley in which we are laying, we both and effect-marks become significant to Foster, thus indicat- feel it similarly. It may (it will) import different things for us. ing a momentary glimpse of the permeability of world (p. 16) bubbles. We should note that Foster is not simply attempting to This obsession with understanding the badger’s percep- delve into the badger’s world in spite of his senses or tion (although not a complete understanding), is the founda- directly through them, but through a reconfiguration. A tion of Foster’s process, and he intends to fulfill this quite amazing example comes when Foster attempts to be understanding through animal performance in the field, “I an otter, and grapples with his inability to sense with whis- share a lot of physiology with my animals, and what I don’t kers (his face is no use here) the delicate image of the flow share I can have a reasonable go at probing” (p. 24). The of water. He discovers that by using his fingertips, he can “reasonable go” occurs in the badger’s world, where get something of the same “sense” of the water—the shape of the currents (p. 108). Upon reflection Foster writes that the same rain falls on us; we’re pricked by the same gorse; we using his fingers makes more sense than using his face, as feel the same shudders through the ground . . . They mean the somatotopic map shows a rough correspondence different things to us, of course . . . the rain will mean between human fingers and otter whiskers. What we would earthworms on the surface, which will be more interesting to a badger than to me. But we still share something real and like to point out as important here is that this was discov- objective, the badger and I. (p. 25) ered while Foster was in the water, searching for little bits of neurological stimulation and some meaning in the flow So, Foster went with his son into an area of England where of a river. He experiences the shifting boundaries discussed badgers live, and dug out, with the help of a friend, a make- in Despret (2016), “With the cohabitation of beings’ shift badger sett. Umwelten associated to worlds that invent modes of coexis- In the wild, Foster grappled with his humanness, imme- tence, one finds oneself dealing with a mobile and variable world, with permeable and shifting boundaries” (p. 165). diately realizing that his ideas about badgers did very little Through a reconfiguration of his senses, habits, and bodily to make it easier to live in a dirt cave. But Foster stuck with orientations Foster finds his own world (Umwelt) becoming it. He marked his changes along a threefold path, with appe- more porous, to open toward the world of the otter and the tites, fears, and views (p. 46). It was important to learn not badger, even if only in fleeting glances. just about the sett and the lives of badgers, but to begin to Foster therefore demonstrates how performance reveals appreciate or even enjoy it. There is an important esthetic an overlapping space wherein human sensorial distributions dimension to joining another’s world, and Foster did this by and bodily extension can be altered in decisively posthu- training his nose. man ways. The result of performing how another might The badger can sense with its nose much better and feel, in intercapture, is not reducible to either world. differently than a human. For starters, the badger lives with its nose near the ground. It is attuned to the changes in the landscape that come from weather and the inva- Conclusion: Toward the Landscape sions of humans or other creatures. If a human crosses There are dangers here, which is why the ethics of posthu- the path of a badger this creates a kind of “scent wall,” to man phenomenology is important to consider. Foster is be avoided, Foster writes (p. 63). This should be under- careful to ground his phenomenology in detailed research stood from within the context of a meaningful web of of physiology and understanding of the landscape. This is relations, not simply as understood in human terms, but an informed, patient, and humble approach which is not as meaningful for the badger. Foster describes his own about colonizing the other so much as exposing the human- scent map: centered self to a process of de-centering. His claims are also limited. He never succeeded in becoming an animal, Out of the tunnel, turn right. Fifteen yards; raw tobacco, mostly rather he touched the limit of the human, and by touching Turkish; straight on. After half a minute, wall of limes and sick in front. Resolves into oranges rubbed on leather to your left, that limit, revealed an excess that is not reducible to human- and mushroom risotto with too much parmesan to your right. centric ways of being or thinking. Touching the membrane Head gently downhill. Flaking saddles with neatsfoot oil of a bubble also touches that which the bubble obscures (no somewhere on the shelf. Bear on down for cobwebs and garlic matter how obliquely), offering a momentary and partial paste. (p. 64) glimpse of another Umwelt. As Merleau-Ponty (1968) once 6 Qualitative Inquiry 00(0) argued, there is always already a chiasmic intertwining of Declaration of Conflicting Interests self and other in all forms of touching (p. 143). In this The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect touching, the human cannot remain untouched, producing to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. an intercapture through mimetic performance. But this leaves us with a question. Although Despret Funding argues that intercapture exists and enables the creation of The author(s) received no financial support for the research, new worlds, what is it that enables such intercapture to hap- authorship, and/or publication of this article. pen in the first place? Is it enough, as Flusser and Bec argue that there are overlapping structures informing our worlds Notes or, as Despret suggests, that there are certain forms of intel- 1. Exceptions might include David B. Dillard-Wright’s (2009) ligence that are not world specific? posthuman reading of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh and Here, we would like to conclude by suggesting that wild being in relation to the theme of interanimality. something unique is revealed through a performative 2. We will use the term posthuman and posthumanism broadly method of posthuman phenomenology.6 Esthetic altera- as a philosophical movement which seeks to trouble anthro- tion of the human body’s sensorial organization through pocentric claims concerning the exceptional nature of the performance exposes the human to a supplement that is human animal. As Francesca Ferrando (2013) aptly summa- not reducible to any given world. Here, we can return to rizes, posthumanism could be broken down into postexclu- Uexküll’s theory of the Umwelt, and in particular his sionism, postexceptionalism, and postcentralizing. poetic image of the Umwelt as a bubble. Pushing this 3. See Ó Maoilearca (2015). image furthermore, we would like to suggest that there is 4. See, for instance, the resurgence of interest in Uexküll in the recent work of Giorgio Agamben (2003), Roberto Esposito an interface that enables bubbles to cohabitate and poten- (2008), Frans de Waal (2016), and Daniel Dennett (2017). tially touch one another. What is revealed through perfor- 5. For an approach similar to ours, see Corry Shores (2017) who mance, as we see with Foster, is not merely another world writes, “what we are looking for is something that increases or a new world, but rather the necessary, shared common- our access into animal experience even if it does not do so wealth between worlds that make such touching possible. entirely” (p. 219). Shores, however, although acknowledging Drawing on Foster’s own language, we would like to call the importance of the performative turn, does not offer any this shared interface the landscape. The landscape is not real world examples nor does he account for what we will call reducible to any given world (any given bubble) or to a below the shared landscape. form of subjective intelligence but is, to use phenomeno- 6. Despret (2016) cites examples of farming and hunting. logical language, the clearing that enables bubbles to appear and potentially touch/contaminate one another. References Without the attempt to perform (rather than to merely Agamben, G. (2003). The open: Man and animal. Stanford, CA: imagine), posthuman phenomenology would not have suc- Stanford University Press. ceeded in exposing this realm that exists alongside our Broglio, R. (2011). Surface encounters: Thinking with animals worlds but is not reducible to worlds. The question of the and art. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. landscape does not arise because most theorists do not risk Dennett, D. C. (2017). 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Animal phe- James Owen is an independent scholar and teacher who lives in nomenology through Uexküll and Deleuze & Guattari. Studia New Jersey. His interests include phenomenology, posthumanism, Phænomenologica, 17, 201-221. and the relationship between conducting, music, and teaching.