Saving the Macroscopic

DRAFT Please quote from published version Saving the Macroscopic William M. R. Simpson & Simon A. R. Horsley Abstract We seek to challenge the view that modern physics is inconsistent with theological doc- trines in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition that assume the existence of macroscopic entities which act according to certain ends. Such doctrines have often been understood in terms of Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphism, which carves nature into substances com- posed of ‘matter’ and ‘form’. Whilst the existence of macroscopic substances has some- times been defended by appealing to scientific evidence for holism, we consider a case in which holism is taken to an extreme: some notable philosophers seek to make sense of quantum physics by adopting Cosmic Holism, in which the world is a single substance, arguing that ‘folk theories’ like hylomorphism involve ‘a benighted teleological view of nature’. The aim of this paper is to alleviate the appearance of tension between these theo- logical doctrines and modern physics by considering practices in which physicists engage in implicitly teleological forms of explanation and by exploring a recent ‘contextual’ in- terpretation of quantum physics that is inconsistent with Cosmic Holism. We suggest this interpretation may be best understood in terms of an updated version of hylomor- phism which can ‘save’ macroscopic substances. We also briefly consider some possible theological implications of this theory for ecotheology, the incarnation, and miracles. 1 Teleology in Theology A number of theological doctrines within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition are ontolog- ically committed to the existence of macroscopic entities whose temporal development is shaped by an intrinsic teleology. Consider the Natural Law Theory, for example, in which a human action is morally evaluated according to whether that action is good-for- a-human-being (Angier, 2019). Natural Law Theory traditionally deploys a teleological conception of human nature according to which human beings are oriented toward certain goods, in order to attribute human action with moral value independently of social and political conventions. Or again, consider the doctrine of theosis, which claims that human beings and created things in general are endowed with a natural affinity that (potentially) draws them to God. According to this theory, divine likeness is a ‘perfection’ to which they are oriented, however far short they may fall in practice (Jacobs, 2009). Both of these theological doctrines assume the existence of composite macroscopic entities with teleological natures as proper subjects of theological discourse. Both have 1 2 been understood within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition in terms of a hylomorphic ac- count of composition, in which the world is carved into individual substances composed of both matter and form.1 According to this theory, a composite entity counts as a substance just in case its matter is in-formed by a substantial form, which determines the causal powers that this substance exercises in achieving its natural end. Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory seems to rely upon the intuition that composition occurs in those restricted circum- stances in which the parts play a functional or teleological role within the whole (Rose & Schaffer, 2017), whilst limiting the category of substance to natural entities.2 It is widely believed, however, that scientists shun teleological forms of explanation, and that our best scientific theories have explained the appearance of teleology in nature. In that case, we have good reason to doubt folk intuitions about the existence of macro- scopic composites, or at least our ability to discern macroscopic entities within nature whose actions are directed toward certain ends. According to a common understanding of physics, (the probability of) what happens at some time t is determined by the micro- physical properties instantiated at some prior time t0 < t, and by physical laws which hold everywhere and for all time. On this view, the properties of macroscopic objects are reducible to (or supervene upon) the properties of microscopic constituents which are governed by laws; there is no ‘goal’ in view in their temporal development. For the philosopher of science and atheist activist Alex Rosenberg the lesson of science is “abso- lutely clear: no teleology, no purposes, goals, or ends” (Rosenberg, 2012, p.43). Yet this kind of reductionism no longer commands a wide consensus among philoso- phers of science. It is increasingly recognised that the properties of physical and chemical constituents have to be understood in relation to the larger systems and processes of which they are part. A defender of substances and hylomorphism might seek to appeal to evi- dence of holism in biology, for example, locating teleology in the self-organisational and self-preserving activity of organic systems (Leidenhag, 2021). Nonetheless, appeals to holism in biology are not sufficient to thwart physics-based scepticism about the exis- tence of macroscopic substances which have irreducible causal powers. In this paper, we wish to consider a challenge raised by taking holism to an ex- treme: some notable philosophers, such as Jonathan Schaffer, have tried to make sense of the phenomenon of quantum entanglement by adopting a Cosmic Holism (or ‘prior- ity monism’) in which nature is conceived as a single whole which is ontologically prior to its parts (Schaffer, 2010; Simpson, 2021a). We can explain holism in nature with- out teleology, on this view, by regarding Nature as a single, fundamental substance in which everything else is metaphysically grounded. This cosmic whole and its parts are governed by physical laws which leave no room for ends or goals. According to Schaf- fer, a fundamental ontology which includes macroscopic things is the product of a ‘folk mereology’ that is ‘based on a crude teleologically-laden conception of when composition occurs’ (Rose & Schaffer, 2017, p.263). Such an ontology is ‘fit for debunking’ (p.239). The primary aim of this paper is to mitigate the appearance of tension between modern 1 The concept of theosis could be applied to the cosmos as a whole rather than individual substances. 2 Since artifacts derive their ends from us, they lack the intrinsic unity bestowed on a natural substance by a substantial form. Unlike natural substances, they can also be composed of substances (for example, a garden swing that is made from living vines). So they do not count as substances in the strictest sense. 3 physics and certain theological doctrines which are committed to teleology in nature: first, by highlighting scientific practices which implicitly affirm teleology; secondly, by drawing attention to a contextual interpretation of quantum physics which is logically inconsistent with the claims of Cosmic Holism. We suggest that this contextual approach may in fact require a hylomorphic ontology in which there are macroscopic ‘Thermal Substances’ which have irreducible causal powers.3 This neo-Aristotelian hylomorphic theory departs from Aristotle’s original theory in certain ways, however, and we briefly note how these innovations may provide insight into other theological doctrines. The discussion is divided as follows. In Section 2, we pose a theological puzzle for doctrines which presuppose the existence of an immanent teleology within nature, and which depend upon the classical theory of hylomorphism to carve nature into substances. This puzzle builds upon Schaffer’s notable argument for Cosmic Holism. In Section 3, we call into question whether teleology has in fact been banished by physics, noting scientific practices which implicitly affirm teleological forms of explanation. In Section 4, we dis- cuss a solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics that is incompatible with Cosmic Holism, and which admits a hylomorphic interpretation in terms of macro- scopic substances. In Section 5, we note some possible theological implications for this updated version of hylomorphism for ecotheology, revisionary accounts of the doctrine of the incarnation, and our understanding of certain miracles in the lives of saints. 2 The challenge from modern physics Modern physics has long been a touchstone for sceptics intent on overturning traditional beliefs about reality or undermining ‘folk intuitions’ about the basic composition of the world. For example, we seem to live in a world in which macroscopic entities have a causal role to play in settling how nature unfolds. According to Aristotle, human beings and other animals engage in a variety of activities, such as nutrition and locomotion, which are inexplicable without appealing to their goals or purposes. Since the Scientific Revo- lution, however, philosophers have sought to construct a conception of reality based upon what the physical sciences tell us about nature, and such schemes have often downplayed the reality of macroscopic entities and denied them any irreducible causal powers. 2.1 The challenge from below According to the doctrine of microphysicalism, for instance, the whole course of nature, including the domain of macroscopic biological entities, is determined from the bottom- up by the microscopic properties of their basic constituents and the laws governing their temporal development. This philosophical doctrine exerted a powerful influence over the philosophy of the last century. In Oppenheim’s and Putnam’s influential paper, “The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis” (Oppenheim & Putnam, 1958), for exam- ple, nature is conceived as a hierarchy in which organisms are reducible to cells, cells to 3 This account is timely, given the renewed interest in powers in analytic philosophy: eg. (Groff & Greco, 2017; Jacobs, 2017; Lagerlund, Hill, & Psillos, 2021; Simpson, Koons, & Teh, 2017; Williams, 2019). 4 molecules, molecules to atoms, and atoms to whatever microscopic constituents are (sup- posedly) picked our by our best physics at some ‘unique lower level’ (p.9). The influential analytic philosopher of mind, Jaegwon Kim, claimed that the world is as it is ‘because the micro-world is the way it is’ (Kim, 1984, p.100), and famously argued that the ‘mental properties’ of humans (or animals) must be reduced to microphysical properties if they are to be considered causally efficacious (Kim, 1997). Microphysicalism gives us good reason for doubting whether there are macroscopic entities (at least, in any fundamental sense) (Gillett, 2016, pp.113-124). There may be macroscopic collectives, but they represent no addition to being over and above their ba- sic microscopic components: they have no causal powers which cannot be accounted for in terms of the microphysical properties of and fundamental relations between their component parts. Neither macroscopic collectives nor their collective properties are de- terminative, in the sense of having intrinsic capacities to bring about change. Rather, it is their component entities and their microphysical properties which are determinative of what takes place. If microphysicalism is true, then it is a mistake to believe, as certain theological doctrines have taught, that there are macroscopic entities – such as plants and animals – which are endowed with their own teleological natures. Microphysicalism can take a number of different forms (Hüttemann, 2015). Accord- ing to micro-determinists, ‘the behaviour or the properties of compound systems are de- termined by the behaviour or the properties of their constituents and the relations among them but not vice versa’ [p.7]. For philosophers who uphold micro-government, ‘the laws of the micro-level govern the systems on the macro-levels’ [p.7]. Among those who are micro-causalists, it is claimed that ‘all causation takes place in virtue of the causation on the level of the (ultimate) parts – or the micro-level. Macro-causation, on this view, is entirely derivative and piggybacks on the causation of the microconstituents’ [pp. 7–8]. There are good reasons for doubting whether modern physics provides strong sup- port for microphysicalism, however, as the philosophers Andrea Hütteman and Jonathan Schaffer have noted (Hüttemann, 2015; Schaffer, 2008). Against micro-determinists, Schaffer agrees with Hütteman that ‘the properties of subsystems are determined by the properties of systems and not vice versa’, appealing to the ‘argument from quantum en- tanglement’ (p.4); against the concept of micro-government, he observes that ‘the laws of the macro-physical govern the microphysical systems’, appealing to the ‘argument from the universe being the only isolated system’ (ibid.); against micro-causation, he urges that ‘all causation takes place in virtue of the causation on the macro-physical level’, invoking the idea of ‘macro-government’ and the concept of a ‘cause-law connection’ (ibid.).4 As Schaffer points out, these difficulties with microphysicalism do not automatically count in favour of a world in which composite entities of different scales are equally fundamen- tal. They also count as evidence in favour of a kind of Cosmic Holism (or for Schaffer, ‘priority monism’), in which the only fundamental substance in existence is the cosmos and everything else is grounded in the cosmic whole (Schaffer, 2010). 4 We do not have space to examine each of these arguments here, but focus in what follows on the argument from quantum entanglement. 5 2.2 The challenge from above A key part of the apologetic for Cosmic Holism is the argument from quantum entan- glement. Let us briefly consider the phenomenon of entanglement before attempting to reconstruct the argument. In the famous EPR experiment involving two microscopic par- ticles originally proposed by Einstein and his collaborators (Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen, 1935) in which the possibility of entanglement was first touted, one particle is constrained to be ‘spin-up’ |↑i when another is measured to be ‘spin-down’ |↓i, and vice versa, how- ever far apart the two particles may be separated from one another in space.5 The two- particle system is said to be in a ‘quantum superposition’ described by the singlet state: 1 |ψi1,2 = √ (|↑i1 |↓i2 − |↓i1 |↑i2 ). (1) 2 This equation tell us that when a system comprised of two particles (labelled ‘1’ and ‘2’) is in the singlet state |ψi1,2 , and we are measuring the vertical spin of the two particles: there is a probability of 1/2 that we will observe particle 1 to be ‘spin up’ |↑i1 , and particle 2 to be ‘spin down’ |↓i2 ; there is also a probability of 1/2 that we will observe particle 1 to be ‘spin down’ |↓i1 , and particle 2 to be ‘spin up’ |↑i2 . The measuring apparatus in each case is a Stern-Gerlach device and each device has a pointer which will be deflected up or down according to the spin of the particle that it is measuring. This anti-correlation, by itself, does not prove that there is any unusual connection between the two particles which prevents their physical properties from being analysed separately. Suppose there is some group of individuals who persistently wear odd socks – either red on their left feet and blue on their right, or vice versa – and that an unfortunate explosion takes place in which their feet are suddenly separated by several miles before their socks can be removed and the colours noted. Whilst the results will be perfectly anti-correlated for left and right sock-colours, we have no cause to attribute the redness of one sock and the blueness of the other to some kind of connection spanning the gaps between their feet. So why do quantum physicists view the case of our two microscopic particles as involving something essentially different? There is an important empirical distinction between these two cases. Once the mea- suring devices being used to detect the spin of the two particles are rotated in relation to their axes of polarisation, the probabilities of their pointers being deflected up or down will fall somewhere between one or zero. The challenge that such systems pose to micro- physical reductionism is the fact that we cannot explain the measurement statistics which emerge in terms of the local properties of their constituent parts. To see this, it is useful to adopt the following formalism. Suppose the two particles fly off in opposite direc- tions and two experimenters – traditionally, ‘Alice’ (A) and ‘Bob’ (B) – measure the spins of each of them using different measuring devices, once the two particles are separated from one another by some arbitrarily large distance. Let φA specify the configuration of Alice’s apparatus, and A the outcome of her experiment; likewise, φB for Bob’s appa- ratus, and B for his outcome. These parameters represent the two angles of polarisation of each device, which can be set at an appropriate angle for measuring vertical spin (that 5 In Einstein’s original version of the EPR experiment, the measurements were of the particles’ positions and momenta. Bohm modified the thought-experiment to focus on spin (Bohm, 1951). 6 is, ‘spin-up’, or ‘spin-down’), but can also be adjusted separately to produce a range of measurement outcomes. We shall denote whatever in the past may have influenced the behaviour of the system being measured by λ, which in this case includes the physical state of the two-particle system prior to measurement, and will assume that such causal influences are limited by the speed of light in accordance with Relativity. The problem posed by quantum entanglement can be specified as follows. Classical physics assumes that the behaviour of two particles can be explained in terms of local properties which they possess independently of one another, which are simply waiting to be revealed by the experiment. This is known as the principle of locality. More formally, according to the physicist John Bell (Bell, 1964), the principle of locality requires: Pφa ,φb (A|B, λ) = Pφa (A|λ), (2) Pφa ,φb (B|A, λ) = Pφb (B|λ). (3) The first equation tell us that: if the principle of locality is true, then the probability P for Alice obtaining outcome A can be fixed by conditionalising on the configuration of her apparatus φA , and whatever in the past influenced its behaviour λ, such as the local properties of the particle she measures. In other words, conditionalising on the configuration of Bob’s apparatus φB and outcome B of Bob’s experiment does not change the probabilities for Alice’s outcome, in a world in which the principle of locality is true. (The two measurements, we may suppose, are conducted simultaneously, so that the two wings of the experiment have no time to interact with one another.) This is also the case for Bob’s outcome with respect to Alice’s apparatus, according to the second equation. However, Bell’s theorem demonstrates that the principle of locality is violated by the correlations between the two measurement outcomes that are predicted by quantum mechanics. According to quantum mechanics, the probabilities for obtaining a measure- ment outcome in one part of the experiment depend on the outcome obtained in the other part of the experiment, in spite of the fact that they are conducted simultaneously within the frame of reference of the experiment. Specifically, quantum mechanics predicts that the measurement statistics will depend on the relative angle between the two devices, φA − φB ; a fact that neither particle, considered separately, is in a position to ‘know’. This correlation is inconsistent with the principle of locality. Whilst the EPR experiment was originally considered a reductio ad absurdum of quantum mechanics, subsequent ex- periments – in particular, those of Alain Aspect (Aspect, Dalibard, & Roger, 1982) – are now widely regarded as having confirmed the statistics predicted by quantum mechanics and established non-locality as an empirical fact.6 One way to understand these results is to abandon microphysical reductionism and treat the two particles in this experiment as integral parts of a larger physical whole which has properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of its microscopic parts. Schaffer seeks to generalise this lesson in ontology into an argument for Cosmic Holism (Schaffer, 2010; Schaffer & Ismael, 2016). His argument might be reconstructed as follows: 1. All quantum entangled systems which evolve according to quantum mechanical 6 For three recent experiments that close two ‘loopholes’ in Bell’s theorem, see (Giustina et al., 2015; Hensen et al., 2015; Shalm et al., 2015). 7 laws are fundamental physical wholes. 2. The cosmos is a quantum entangled system that evolves according to quantum me- chanical laws. 3. Therefore, the cosmos is a fundamental physical whole. Suppose we accept the first premise of the argument, embracing the way of holism. Re- garding the second premise, Schaffer claims that ‘one gets initial entanglement from the assumption that the world begins in one explosion (the Big Bang) in which everything interacts. This initial entanglement is preserved on the assumption that the world evolves via Schrödinger’s equation’ (Schaffer, 2010, p.52). In other words, to get from the empir- ical fact that some particles can be shown to be quantum entangled in some situations to the spectacular inference that everything in the physical world is mutually entangled, the cosmos itself must have begun in a quantum state which evolves everywhere according to the same set of physical laws, and nothing should have happened in the course of cosmic history to collapse that quantum state or modify those physical laws. According to Cosmic Holists like Schaffer, the lesson of quantum entanglement is that there is only one substance in existence, which is the cosmos itself, of which everything else is a dependent part. Although Schaffer admits that the cosmos can be carved into macroscopic objects, such objects are not fundamental substances, which act according to their own natures and persist through time, since the physical properties of such objects, taken together, are reducible to the properties of the cosmic whole. The reduction in this case is understood in terms of Schaffer’s influential theory of metaphysical grounding, which is a non-causal relation of ontological dependence (Schaffer, 2009). 2.3 An argument against classical hylomorphism As we noted, a number of theological doctrines within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradi- tion have been understood in terms of a hylomorphic account of composition, in which the world is carved into a plurality of substances. These substances are characterised by causal powers which they exercise in the course of achieving some end or goal. Accord- ing to Schaffer and Rose, however, such ontologies are ‘based on a crude teleologically- laden conception of when composition occurs’ (Rose & Schaffer, 2017). Neither of these philosophers specify exactly why modern physics is supposed to exclude teleology in na- ture. Armed with the argument from quantum entanglement, however, we suggest that Cosmic Holists might pitch the following hypothetical challenge against hylomorphists: 1. If the theory of classical hylomorphism is true, then the constituents of the cosmos have an intrinsic teleology. 2. If the temporal development of a composite entity is determined by universal phys- ical laws, then that entity and its constituents lack an intrinsic teleology. 3. The cosmos is a composite entity whose temporal development is determined by universal physical laws. 8 4. Therefore, the cosmos and its constituents lack an intrinsic teleology. 5. Therefore, the theory of classical hylomorphism is false. The first premise is unavoidable for classical hylomorphists: if there are macroscopic substances which act according to their own natures, having their own principles of mo- tion and rest, then the temporal development of such substances is shaped by an intrinsic teleology, since the behaviour of such substances cannot be (fully) understood apart from their ends or goals. The second premise presumes a mechanical conception of physical laws: on this view, if the temporal evolution of a physical system is causally closed under some set of physical laws, then any physical properties of the system instantiated at time t are nomologically related to other properties instantiated at some prior time t0 < t, where the physical laws which connect these two sets of properties are specified by simple math- ematical rules that make no reference to anything’s ends or goals. (We take the second premise to quantify over both simple and composite entities governed by laws.) The third premise amplifies the conclusion of the previous argument from quantum entanglement: if everything in the cosmos is mutually entangled, then the cosmos as a whole is a single composite entity which is subject to the laws which govern quantum- entangled systems. Any division of the cosmos into macroscopic entities with their own principles of motion and rest cannot be said to carve nature at its joints. The conclusion of this argument logically follows the premises. This conclusion is inconsistent, how- ever, with the claim that the cosmos is fundamentally carved into macroscopic substances which have intrinsic causal powers, and hence it is inconsistent with any theological doc- trines that depend upon the theory of classical hylomorphism to carve nature. Yet the soundness of this philosophical argument against classical hylomorphism can be called into question. In what follows, we wish to raise doubts about premise 2, which pits physical laws against teleology, and premise 3, which treats the cosmos as a single system that evolves according to the laws of quantum mechanics. Does quantum mechan- ics straightforwardly support Cosmic Holism, and thus rule against theological doctrines which rely upon the theory of classical hylomorphism? In raising these doubts, we are not seeking to challenge holism per se, or to negate a realist approach to quantum theories by denying that there is anything in nature which quantum theories are about. Rather, we are seeking an alternative ontological interpretation which can avoid Global Holism. 3 Scientific Practices The Cosmic Holist’s argument against classical hylomorphism pits modern physics against folk intuitions about composition and the presence of teleology in nature. But is it right to assume, as the second premise asserts, that if a system evolves according to physical laws, then we have good reason to think that this system is not teleological? And is it correct to say that scientists in general – and physicists in particular – have cast aside teleological forms of explanation in favour of mechanistic explanations? In what follows, we shall argue that a closer look at the actual scientific practices of physicists suggests a more nuanced picture of the relationship between physics and teleology. 9 3.1 A mechanical views of physics It is true that physical processes are often described by physicists and philosophers of physics as causally evolving from an initial state according to blind physical laws. In engaging in such a description, the physicist or philosopher of physics imagines a system to be ‘set up’ in some configuration, and then ‘let go’. The mechanism of the system operates from this point on without any end in view. Nature has often been described as one gigantic mechanism, whose evolution proceeds sequentially through time, with the configuration of the system at every point in time acting as the (efficient) cause of its configuration at the next. Teleology has no place in this mechanistic understanding of the world, as everything that happens is a consequence of its past configuration. This point of view is implicit throughout physics teaching, as well as a good deal of academic writing about physics.7 One of the first examples that students encounter is the motion of a single particle of mass m. Newtonian physics states that the rate of change of a particle’s position x is proportional to the particle momentum p, and the rate of change of the particle momentum is minus the slope of the potential energy V , i.e. dx p = , dt m (4) dp = −∇V (x). dt We needn’t be mathematicians to understand what is required to solve Eq. (4). The momentum and position of the particle are ‘set up’ at a time t = 0, as p(0) and x(0) respectively (its initial conditions). The equation tells us the rate of change of the position and momentum at the initial time. This information can be used to linearly extrapolate the value of x and p in the future for an infinitesimal time, t = δt. Performing the same calculation a second time, using our updated values of position and momentum, we find the position and momentum of the particle slightly further in the future, and so on, until we have determined its trajectory up to whatever final time t = T we desire. The structure of this imagined calculation reflects both what is practically done in computer simulations, and the common mechanistic explanation of motion and collision where, for example: ‘object A collided with object B because at earlier time t = 0, object A had such and such position and velocity’ (think balls on a billiard table). In some simple cases Eq. (4) can be solved exactly and we can see the mathematical expression of this point of view. For instance, a particle in empty space – where the potential V is zero – follows a linear trajectory which can be expressed in terms of a simple rule that connects the future momentum and position of the particle with its initial momentum and position: p(t) = p(0), p(0) (5) x(t) = x(0) + t. m 7 For example, in their first volume, Landau and Lifshitz set up classical mechanics as the theory of comput- ing outcomes from an initial state “If all the co–ordinates and velocities are simultaneously specified, it is known from experience that...subsequent motion can, in principle, be calculated” (Landau & Lifshitz, 1976). Laplace’s famous work on probability (de Laplace, 2003) also begins with the point of view that “we may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future.” 10 Equations of exactly the same form as Newton’s laws (4) form the core of nearly all estab- lished theories of physics, and the mechanistic view described above offers an attractive, unifying narrative of how the world unfolds over time. Maxwell’s equations for the elec- tromagnetic field in free space consist of a similar pair of coupled differential equations that are first order in time (Jackson, 1998): ∂E = c2 ∇ × B, ∂t (6) ∂B = −∇ × E. ∂t Even though the electric E and magnetic B fields extend over all space and time, their evolution can be found in exactly the same way as for Newton’s equations (4). We again specify both fields, E(t = 0) and B(t = 0), over all space at t = 0, and iteratively find the electric and magnetic fields over all space at later times. Again, this characterizes the method used for computer simulations of the electromagnetic field, and seems to support the view that the spatial distribution of the field at each time is the (efficient) cause of the field at the next time. Even the theory of quantum mechanics, discussed in the previous section, takes a similar form to Newton’s equations (4). Here the Schrödinger equation is a differential equation that is first order in time, which governs the evolution of the state vector |ψi of a quantum system (Griffiths & Schroeter, 2018): ∂|ψi i = − Ĥ|ψi, (7) ∂t ~ where Ĥ is the Hamiltonian (energy) operator, and ~ is the reduced Planck’s constant. In spite of continuing debate over the interpretation of |ψi and the probabilistic nature of the predictions of quantum mechanics (Norsen, 2017), the Schrödinger equation (7) is nevertheless a ‘causal’ or mechanistic equation describing how the wave function de- velops within the high-dimensional space in which it is defined (rather than the three or four-dimensional physical space in which a classical field is defined). After specifying the initial state |ψ(t = 0)i, the equation can be integrated forwards in time. 3.2 A teleological view of physics Although this mechanistic perspective is a common view among philosophers, it is not implied by the equations of physics. After all, the logic of the above can also be applied backwards in time, starting from a final position and momentum of the particle. However, a mixed viewpoint is also possible – and of greater interest to our discussion here – in which the motion of a particle, for example, is specified in terms of both its initial and final positions, and where its momentum does not feature at all. The mechanistic viewpoint, it may be argued, reflects a bias in the way we conduct experiments, rather than an insight into the mechanical nature of the laws of physics. Physics is perfectly consistent with the view that the evolution of any system can be specified in terms of a pair of configurations, one at an initial time t = 0, and another at a final time t = T . Yet this interpretation admits quite a different conception of the time 11 evolution of a system. Rather than each previous configuration being the sole cause of the next, the system’s telos – in this case, its final configuration – guides it to the next state. Let us return to the simple case of the particle in empty space whose trajectory is described by Eq. (5). Suppose we take the position of the particle to be fixed as x(T ) at some time T > 0. We can use equation (5) to calculate the initial momentum p(0) in terms of the initial and final positions, x(0) and x(T ): m p(0) = [x(T ) − x(0)]. (8) T We can then use this equation to eliminate the momentum from (5) and write the trajectory of the particle in the following alternative form: t t x(t) = 1 − x(0) + x(T ) . (9) T T Equation (9) is equivalent to our earlier description of particle motion. However, written as (9) the particle can be understood to be identified by its initial position, with its mo- tion guided by its telos (its final position). It is only because we cannot freely control the future position of objects that physicists do not use equations like (9). Yet passive observers noting the positions of freely moving, distinguishable particles can use (9) to predict the particle configuration at intermediate times. As a corollary, our need to spec- ify the abstract quantity of momentum p can be seen to have arisen from our mechanical perspective. In a teleological interpretation of the equations, however, the momentum variable is not required. Eq. (9) contains only the particle position at the initial time x(0) along with the guiding final position x(T ). While the example given here is trivial, exactly the same viewpoint holds for more complicated field theories, such as Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism (6), and even the Schrödinger equation (Aharonov, Bergmann, & Lebowitz, 1964). Instead of specifying the initial configuration of the electric and magnetic fields and progressing forwards in time, we could use just one set of fields (e.g. the electric fields) and specify the initial and final configuration. Surprisingly, many quantities in physics – such as momentum, magnetic field, electric current, and so on – are solely introduced based on our practical need to use initial conditions. Beyond this curious ambiguity in the equations of motion, however, there is a for- mulation of physics that is both ‘deeper’ than the equations of motion and unavoidably teleological: this is the principle of least action.8 Rather than trying to piece together the laws of motion to find the set of differential equations governing each system that we might happen to be interested in – like Eq. (4) or (6) – the equations themselves are derived from an overarching principle. To achieve this derivation, the system must be taken to evolve between known initial (t = 0) and final (t = T ) configurations, i.e. we are obliged to take the teleological viewpoint. Given these fixed end points, what time evolution does the system follow? The action S is an integral of the Lagrangian L over time, which is a function of the particle positions and velocities: Z T S[x] = L(x, ẋ)dt. (10) 0 8 Also known as the principle of extremal action, since the action can be maximised or minimised. 12 The trajectory followed by the system is that which makes the action take an extreme value (either maximum or minimum). We must thus imagine that every part of the system is evolving between immutable initial and final states, and the evolution between these points is such that the action is at an extreme. For example, (4) can be derived from the general expression for the Lagrangian of a mechanical system, L = T − V , where T and V are the kinetic and potential energies respectively. For a single particle the kinetic energy is T = 21 mẋ2 , and therefore we must find an extreme value for Z T 1 S[x] = mẋ2 − V (x) dt. (11) 0 2 An extreme value is defined by there being no change in the value of S for a small varia- tion in the trajectory x → x δx between the fixed end points of the motion. Making this change in the trajectory (11), and taking only first order terms in δx, we obtain: Z T 1 S[x] = mẋ2 − V (x) + mδ ẋ · ẋ − δx · ∇V (x) dt 0 2 Z T 1 = mẋ2 − V (x) − δx · (mẍ + ∇V (x)) dt, (12) 0 2 where the second line follows from integration by parts and the important condition that the state of the system at the end points of the motion is fixed (δx(0) = δx(T ) = 0). If the action is at an extreme point then it must not be changed from (11) by any such small variation of the trajectory. Therefore, the particle follows the trajectory: mẍ = −∇V (x), (13) which is identical to Eq. (4), after elimination of the momentum variable. The action principle may be taken as a fundamental principle of physics from which all equations of motion can be derived. It also has a quantum extension known as the ‘path integral formalism’, where quantum systems are understood to take all possible trajectories between fixed initial and final configurations. There is very little left of a mechanical description of nature in this theory, yet the path integral forms the foundation of quantum field theory (Ryder, 1996), which is the most advanced quantum physical theory that is currently available. We thus have reason to question the claim that, if a system evolves according to physical laws, it cannot be a teleological system, and hence to doubt premise two of the Cosmic Holist’s argument against classical hylomorphism. On the contrary, if the world is a single system governed by physical laws, we have reason to think its temporal evolution may be determined by a telos (Simpson, 2021a). 4 Contextual approach to quantum mechanics The Cosmic Holist’s argument against hylomorphism is not only meant to expunge tele- ology from the cosmos. It also rules out the possibility of macroscopic entities exercising irreducible causal powers that make a difference to how nature unfolds. The temporal de- velopment of the whole cosmos, on this view, is supposed to be determined by universal 13 laws specified by our ‘best physics’. But is it right to assume, as the third premise asserts, that the cosmos and everything within it evolves according to universal laws regardless of the macroscopic context of the systems which scientists investigate? In what follows, we shall argue that quantum mechanics is in fact open to the possibility of ‘top-down’ causal influences – from the macroscopic to the microscopic level – and that the phenomenon of ‘contextual’ wave function collapse in quantum mechanics places a limit on the extent of quantum entanglement in nature, thus undermining the argument for Cosmic Holism. 4.1 Universal vs contextual It is widely supposed among philosophers of science that our ‘best physics’ specifies a set of universal laws which govern everything that happens at all times (or, at least, governs all of the probabilities), and that to offer an interpretation of a physical theory is to identify the set of worlds that are possible according to that theory. On this view, a possible world is a complete and internally consistent possible state of affairs, and a physical theory contributes to our knowledge of nature by declaring some of these states permissible whilst excluding others. In short, the universal laws which are specified by this physical theory determine the set of physically possible worlds. According to standard post-Quinean metaphysics, the task of interpreting a physical theory involves identifying some set of fundamental physical constituents to which this theory refers, and elucidating their possible arrangements according to this theory’s laws. The basic constituents described by our best physics may be conceived as a set of micro- scopic entities or as modifications of one underlying substance. Either way, the total set of possible arrangements of the world’s basic constituents determines the state space within which the total state of the cosmos evolves. Having identified these basic constituents, propositions about the physical world may be evaluated as true or false just in case they can be understood as referring to their possible arrangements. Ruetsche calls this the uni- modal conception of possibility: on this view, ‘everything that is physically possible must be possible in the same way’ (Ruetsche, 2011, p.3). It is important to note that a certain indifference to macroscopic entities is built into this standard recipe for generating a fundamental ontology. The unimodal conception of physical possibility is affirmed by microphysicalists, who favour the ontological priority of the microscopic, and by Cosmic Holists, who believe microscopic reality is grounded in the cosmos as a whole. Microphysicalists and Cosmic Holists are divided concerning whether the fundamental reality to which our ‘best physics’ refers is the cosmos itself or some set of physical constituents, but are united in excluding from their fundamental ontologies any entities that exist between the microscopic or the cosmic scale. In their hierarchical conception of the sciences, higher levels are supposed to be related to lower levels in such a way that the physical content of a higher-level theory can be derived from the physical content of a lower-level theory (Leggett, 1992), and the causal powers of higher-level entities supervene upon the causal powers of lower-level entities. One might wonder, however, whether this orthodox interpretive framework, however deeply ingrained within the practice of analytic philosophers, is an imposition upon the theory of quantum mechanics. After all, the notorious measurement problem of quan- 14 tum mechanics is an open problem in the interpretation of quantum mechanics precisely because of the role that macroscopic measurements play in modifying the microscopic be- haviour of physical systems (Schlosshauer, 2005). Prior to any measurement of a system, the wave function evolves according to the time-dependent Schrödinger equation: ∂|ψi Ĥ|ψi = i~ , (14) ∂t where Ĥ is the Hamiltonian of the system, which represents its energy. Equation (14) admits a formal solution in terms of a unitary operator Û , |ψ(t)i = Û (t)|ψ(0)i, (15) i.e. the wave function at some arbitrary time t can be obtained from the wave function at time t = 0 through the action of this unitary ‘time evolution operator’ Û . (By calling it a unitary operator, physicists mean that the probabilities computed from |ψi always sum to unity, and that the operator Û merely re-distributes the probabilities between different physical possibilities as time goes on.) The theory tells us how to start from a given state of a system – perhaps a configuration of electrons, say, or an electromagnetic field – and evolve the probability amplitudes for all the possible configurations of the system in time. But suppose we perform what is called a ‘non-demolition’ measurement on the sys- tem, which does not destroy the quantum system being measured. For example, suppose we try to measure the number of photons in an electromagnetic wave (Dong et al., 2008). After this measurement, we will have learned more about the physical state of this system than the information contained in the wave function (15): the measurement outcome of the experiment may, with certainty, have ruled out some of the states to which |ψi as- signs non–zero probability. To obtain the correct results for future experiments, we must therefore update the wave function with the empirical knowledge that we have gained. The difficulty that quantum theory presents to a universalist conception of physical laws, which are supposed to apply to everything for all time, is that this updating is not automatically performed by the time evolution operator Û that embodies the Schrödinger equation. For instance, suppose at time t we find an electromagnetic field has n photons in it, |ψi = |ni. The wave function has to undergo the following discontinuous modification: |ψ(t − δt)i = Û (t − δt)|ψ(0)i, (16) |ψ(t + δt)i = |ni. This discontinuous change of the wave function (from Û (t − δt)|ψ(0)i, to |ni) is known as the ‘collapse of the wave function’, and it is necessary to accept this change in order to account for any non-demolition experiment. Unfortunately, there is no agreed understand- ing of this process (Omnès, 1994). Even if a physical process known as ‘decoherence’ is taken into account (as suggested in e.g. (Omnès, 1994)), the time evolution operator must still be supplemented with a discontinuous change of state. According to Bell, any realist approach to quantum mechanics that seeks to reconcile the existence of determinate measurement outcomes with quantum mechanics must come to terms with a physical dilemma: either the dynamics of standard quantum mechanics 15 is wrong, and the wave function evolves according to a non-linear Schrödinger equation that permits the wave function to collapse, or standard quantum mechanics is incomplete, and there are ‘hidden variables’ that evolve according to some non-linear dynamics of their own (Bell, 1987). Maudlin has argued that, all things considered, the choice comes down to two possibilities: either we should adopt something like the GRW theory of the collapse of the wave function, or something like Bohmian mechanics (Maudlin, 1995). The GRW theory seizes the first horn of Bell’s dilemma by supplementing standard quantum mechanics with a stochastic mechanism which produces random ‘hittings’ on the wave function that occur universally for microscopic particles and which result in an objective collapse of the wave function (Ghirardi, Rimini, & Weber, 1986). The ef- fects of this modification to the Schrödinger equation become significant when a large number of quantum-entangled particles are involved, such as the particles that compose a macroscopic instrument of measurement. The theory of Bohmian mechanics, on the other hand, seizes the second horn of the dilemma by positing a global configuration of particles whose trajectories are choreographed according to a supplementary guiding equation (Bohm, 1951, 1952; de Broglie, 1928). This guiding equation depends upon a ‘universal wave function’ which evolves according to the standard Schrödinger equation and does not collapse. In both cases, the standard textbook theory is adjusted in significant ways to produce a theory that specifies universal laws of nature which apply everywhere and for all time, and which do not depend upon the existence of a macroscopic ‘observer’. An alternative contextual model of the quantum dynamics is available, however, which drops the assumption that the temporal development of every microscopic system must be causally closed under exactly the same microscopic dynamics. According to the CWC (contextual wave function collapse) model proposed by Drossel and Ellis, quantum sys- tems are open to their ‘classical’ environments, and it is the interaction of a quantum sys- tem with the intrinsic heat bath of a finite-temperature macroscopic system within its en- vironment that explains the collapse of the wave function (Drossel & Ellis, 2018). Whilst CWC theory maintains that quantum theory does not require the existence of a mysterious ‘observer’ to explain the existence of determinate outcomes, in common with GRW theory and Bohmian mechanics, its solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics departs from both GRW theory and Bohmian mehanics in significant ways. Like GRW theory, CWC theory seizes the first horn of Bell’s dilemma, allowing the wave function of a microscopic system to become localised with respect to position. Un- like GRW theory, however, the stochastic corrections that achieve these localisations de- pend upon the macroscopic context of the system. In short, the CWC model incorporates a feedback loop – from a particle, via the intrinsic heat bath of the measuring device, back to the particle – which introduces non-linear terms in the Schrödinger equation governing the evolution of the system that are specific to the system’s context. CWC theory thus avoids the theoretical cost of introducing an ad hoc collapse mechanism in order to ex- plain the localisation of the wave function, since these extra terms can be accounted for in terms of thermodynamics and solid-state physics (Drossel & Ellis, 2018, pp.13-19). Like Bohmian mechanics, CWC theory appeals to the effects of the environment upon the measuring process to explain why the outcomes of quantum experiments conform to standard quantum statistics. Unlike Bohmian mechanics, however, CWC theory does not 16 conceive any part of the environment that is relevant to the measuring process as a many- particle quantum system that is subject to unitary and reversible time evolution. Rather, the heat bath of an instrument is characterised as having only a limited memory, since it radiates irreversibly into the heat sink of its surroundings. According to CWC theory, we can think of the heat bath of a finite-temperature macroscopic system as serving a bridge between quantum systems and their classical environment, just so long as we reject ‘the untestable and implausible claim that the environmental heat bath can be described by an infinite-precision wave function that is subject to unitary time evolution’ [p.4]. CWC thus avoids the theoretical cost incurred by Bohmians who invoke the so-called ‘quantum equilibrium hypothesis’ to connect the probability density function of particles measured in an experiment with the construct of a universal wave function – an assumption which has been criticised for being ‘artificial’ (Valentini, 2019). CWC theory has immediate relevance to the argument for Cosmic Holism from quan- tum entanglement. Whilst CWC theory is empirically equivalent to other interpretations of quantum mechanics, it does not leave a quantum system entangled with any part of its environment beyond the usual time scale of decoherence. According to CWC theory, the cosmos is not a single quantum-entangled system which evolves according to quantum mechanical laws. Rather, the cosmos consists of ‘open’ quantum systems whose tempo- ral development is context-dependent: these quantum systems are embedded in ‘classi- cal’ environments, which are characterised by classical properties that are not governed by quantum laws, and which make a causal difference to the microscopic dynamics of quantum systems. These thermal, classical properties derive their causal powers from the fundamental role that they play in defining the Hilbert spaces and the time scales within which the unitary time evolution of an open quantum system takes place. If CWC theory is true, then the second premise of the argument for Cosmic Holism, and hence the third premise of the argument against classical hylomorphism, are false. 4.2 Hylomorphism and quantum mechanics Nonetheless, CWC theory does raise metaphysical questions concerning how the micro- scopic world of quantum systems and the macroscopic world of their classical environ- ment are supposed to be related to one another. For instance, how are macroscopic proper- ties like temperature and chemical entropy, which characterise an open quantum system’s environment, supposed to ‘emerge’ from simpler microscopic systems? If CWC theory is to be taken seriously by philosophers, then its commitment to macroscopic systems with top-down causal powers must come to terms with an ontological dilemma. On the one hand, suppose the causal powers of every finite-temperature macroscopic system can be explained in terms of the causal powers of its microscopic parts. In that case, the environment of a microscopic quantum system does not contain any macroscopic entities which have novel causal powers to make a difference to its temporal development. Yet CWC theory does not appear to be compatible with microphysical reductionism, since it provides the thermal properties of a macroscopic measuring device with a fundamental role to play in collapsing the wave function of a quantum system, thus endowing macro- scopic properties with top-down causal powers. On the other hand, suppose that existence 17 of a finite-temperature macroscopic system were not in any way the cause of the activity of its microscopic parts, whilst this macroscopic system had irreducible powers to act di- rectly upon microscopic constituents and cause them to change their collective behaviour. In that case, there would be good reason to count such a macroscopic system as a distinct entity that interacts with microscopic entities rather than being physically composed of them (Gillett, 2016, p.247). Yet CWC theory does not lend itself to a fundamental dual- ism of microscopic and macroscopic entities, since it only characterises the behaviour of microscopic entities within particular macroscopic contexts. Realists prefer versions of quantum mechanics which can support intelligible ontolo- gies and provide truthmakers for claims about physical reality, and various ontologies have been advanced for GRW theory and Bohmian mechanics. Is it possible to give an account of CWC theory which can specify what this theory is supposed to be about? CWC theory shuns a ‘quantum fundamentalist’ approach to quantum mechanics, which seeks to reduce classical properties to quantum properties. Is it therefore committed to splitting reality into a quantum world of microscopic objects and a classical world of measuring devices? Simpson has argued that hylomorphism, ironically, can provide an ontology for CWC theory that splits the horn of our ontological dilemma, steering a safe course between the Scylla of reductionism and the Charybdis of dualism (Simpson, 2021b). In the first place, this hylomorphic interpretation avoids positing a duality of micro- scopic quantum entities and macroscopic classical entities. According to this interpre- tation, the physical world is composed of Thermal Substances (as Koons defines them in (Koons, 2019)) which have both quantal and classical properties. Quantum systems are always dependent parts of Thermal Substances, on this view, which have classical properties like temperature and chemical entropy that do not enter into superpositions. In the second place, this hylomorphic interpretation avoids reducing the causal pow- ers of a finite-temperature macroscopic system to the causal powers of some set of mi- croscopic entities. Simpson and Koons have offered accounts of how the persistence of a Thermal Substance as a composite whole is grounded (bottom-up) in an ongoing cooper- ation between its material parts, whilst the causal powers of the parts of the substance are metaphysically grounded (top-down) in the substantial form of the whole (Koons, 2019; Simpson, 2021b).9 According to this interpretation, Thermal Substances are metaphysical composites of both matter and form, and different substances have different forms. Can hylomorphism provide an alternative explanation of quantum entanglement than the one suggested by Cosmic Holism? The Cosmic Holist relies upon an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the cosmos has a universal wave function. From this perspective, the whole world is subject to exactly the same quantum mechanical laws and every part of the world is mutually quantum-entangled. According to CWC theory, however, quantum systems are embedded in a classical environment, and we should reject ‘the untestable and implausible claim that the environmental heat bath can be described by an infinite-precision wave function that is subject to unitary time evolution’ (Drossel & Ellis, 2018, p.4). From this perspective, quantum entanglement is not a global affair but confined within distinct quantum systems. According to Simpson, two quantum- 9 This account offers an interpretation of the unitarily inequivalent representations generated by models that take the thermodynamic limit, which we have no space to discuss. 18 entangled systems are parts of the same Thermal Substance, even if they become separated from one another by arbitrary distances (as in the EPR experiment involving two spatially separated particles), and there are many Thermal Substances which have parts that are quantum entangled. Nonetheless, these substances can be individuated by their classical properties, and they act according to the end of attaining thermal equilibrium. If an ontological account of quantum theory can be given in terms of Thermal Sub- stances by using this updated version of Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphism, as one of us has argued in more detail elsewhere (Simpson, 2021b), then we have gained a reason to doubt that quantum theory implies the cosmos is a single substance, as the argument from quantum entanglement claimed (Section 2.2). Thus we have gained a reason to doubt the soundness of the Cosmic Holist’s argument against hylomorphism (Section 2.3). 5 Theological reflection In this paper, we have considered the challenge that Cosmic Holism presents to certain theological doctrines within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition which attribute ends or goals to the behaviour of macroscopic entities. In Section 1, we observed how such doc- trines carve the world into macroscopic substances using the theory of classical hylo- morphism, which depends upon a teleological conception of nature. According to the argument against hylomorphism from quantum mechanics that we constructed in Section 2, however, the cosmos is a single substance governed by non-teleological laws. This argument seeks to put modern physics at variance with these theological doctrines by undermining the classical hylomorphic theory of how substances are composed. Our goal was comparatively modest: in Section 3, we called into question the assump- tion that physics excludes teleology. We saw how systems which are governed by physical laws can admit a dual description that is both ‘causal’ and ‘teleological’. In Section 4, we considered a contextual theory of quantum mechanics which is inconsistent with Cosmic Holism. We saw how such a theory may in fact require a hylomorphic interpretation. Our object was not to argue that nature is in fact teleological, but to call into question whether physics enforces the flight from teleology which philosophers like Schaffer and Rose seem to think necessary in order to construct scientifically informed theories of na- ture’s composition. If anything, quantum physics seems more open to the existence of macroscopic entities which have causal powers to affect the microphysical domain than the mechanical physics which shaped the imaginative landscape of the philosophy of the last century. Given the renewed interest in powers and hylomorphism in philosophy, we think it worth noting that an account of quantum phenomena is available which is com- patible with the existence of teleology in nature, thus resolving our theological puzzle concerning doctrines which require an immanent teleology within nature. Yet a quantum-compatible ontology which ‘saves’ macroscopic substances also has theological implications which may be unwelcome in some quarters, cooling aspirations to deploy quantum entanglement as a theological resource in developing revisionary ac- counts of certain doctrines. For instance, Kirk Wegter-McNelly has argued that the con- cept of entanglement affords a rich resource for developing an ecological conception of 19 creation, and has suggested that we should think of creation as being ‘entangled’ in some sense with the divine because of the incarnation (Wegter-McNelly, 2011). Such proposals draw inspiration from the belief that quantum mechanics supports some kind of Cosmic Holism because it shows everything to be entangled with everything, whereas a hylo- morphic approach to CWC theory repudiates Cosmic Holism and provides a quantum- compatible ontology of substances which are distinct individuals. Of course, CWC theory may turn out to be false, but the fact that quantum phenomena can currently be understood without supposing the truth of Cosmic Holism should caution theologians in invoking the authority of quantum mechanics in support of doctrines that assume Cosmic Holism. Nevertheless, in extending Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphism to encompass quantum phenomena, Simpson and Koons depart from his original theory in ways which do invite novel theological reflection. One counterintuitive consequence of the new hylomorphism, for instance, is that substances can have spatially disjoint parts which – under certain conditions – can be separated by arbitrary distances. This was not a possibility that either Aristotle or Aquinas envisaged, but it may open the door to new explications of other theological doctrines. For example, within the Catholic tradition there are accounts of bilocation in the lives of the saints, in which the same person is reported to be in two places at once. Aquinas denied the possibility of a physical body being present in more than one place at the same time, and sought to explain reported instances of bilocation in terms of phantasmal replications. Yet perhaps such phenomena are not entirely foreign to nature, if they are understood in terms of a substance having spatially disjoint parts, being ‘scaled up’ instances of something that occurs naturally in smaller systems.10 References Aharonov, Y., Bergmann, P. G., & Lebowitz, J. L. (1964). Time Symmetry in the Quan- tum Process of Measurement. Physical Review, 134(6B), B1410. Angier, T. P. S. (Ed.). (2019). The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Ethics. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press. Aspect, A., Dalibard, J., & Roger, G. (1982). Experimental test of Bell’s inequalities using time-varying analyzers. Physical Review Letters, 49, 1804–1807. Bell, J. S. (1964). On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox. Physics Physique Fizika, 1(3), 195–200. Bell, J. S. (1987). Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bohm, D. (1951). Quantum theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Bohm, D. (1952). A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of "Hid- den" Variables. I. Physical Review, 85(2), 166–179. de Broglie, L. (1928). La nouvelle dynamique des quanta [The new dynamics of quanta] Electrons et photons. Rapports et discussions du cinquième Conseil de physique tenu à Bruxelles du 24 au 29 octobre 1927 sous les auspices de l’Institut interna- tional de physique Solvay. Paris: Gauthier-Villars. pp. 105-132. English translation. In G. Bacciagaluppi & A. Valentini (Eds.), Quantum theory at the crossroads: Re- 10 The concept of substances which have spatially disjoint parts might also shed light on theological concep- tions of the Eucharist which invoke the concept of multilocation. 20 considering the 1927 solvay conference (pp. 341–371). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Laplace, M. (2003). A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. Dover Publications. Dong, C.-H., Yang, L., Imoto, N., Gaddam, V., Xiao, Y.-F., & Özdemir, Ş. K. (2008, December). Quantum nondemolition measurement of photon number via optical Kerr effect in an ultra-high-Q microtoroid cavity. Optics Express, 16(26), 21462– 21475. Drossel, B., & Ellis, G. (2018). Contextual Wavefunction collapse: an integrated theory of quantum measurement. New Journal of Physics, 20(11), 113025. Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., & Rosen, N. (1935). Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? Physical Review, 47(10), 777–780. Ghirardi, G. C., Rimini, A., & Weber, T. (1986, July). Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems . Physical Review D, 34(2), 470–491. Gillett, C. (2016). Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Giustina, M., Versteegh, M. A. M., Wengerowsky, S., Handsteiner, J., Hochrainer, A., Phelan, K., . . . Zeilinger, A. (2015, December). Significant-Loophole-Free Test of Bell’s Theorem with Entangled Photons. Physical Review Letters, 115(25), 250401. Griffiths, D. J., & Schroeter, D. F. (2018). Introduction to Quantum Mechanics (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Groff, R., & Greco, J. (Eds.). (2017). Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. London: Routledge. Hensen, B., Bernien, H., Dréau, A. E., Reiserer, A., Kalb, N., Blok, M. S., . . . Hanson, R. (2015, October). Loophole-free Bell inequality violation using electron spins separated by 1.3 kilometres. Nature, 526(7575), 682–686. Hüttemann, A. (2015). What’s Wrong With Microphysicalism? London: Routledge. Jackson, J. D. (1998). Classical Electrodynamics. New York: Wiley. Jacobs, J. D. (2009). An Eastern Orthodox Conception of Theosis and Human Nature. Faith and Philosophy, 26(5). Jacobs, J. D. (Ed.). (2017). Causal Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kim, J. (1984). Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation. Midwest Studies In Philos- ophy, 9(1), 257–270. Kim, J. (1997). Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 97(1), 281–298. Koons, R. C. (2019, July). Thermal substances: a Neo-Aristotelian ontology of the quantum world. Synthese, 4(2), 1–22. Lagerlund, H., Hill, B., & Psillos, S. (Eds.). (2021). Reconsidering Causal Powers: Historical and Conceptual Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Landau, L. D., & Lifshitz, E. M. (1976). Course of Theoretical Physics. London: Butterworth-Heinemann. Leggett, A. J. (1992). On the nature of research in condensed-state physics. Foundations of Physics, 22(2), 221–233. Leidenhag, M. (2021, April). Purpose for and within Creation: A Theological Appraisal of Organismic Teleology. Modern Theology, 37(2), 396–409. Maudlin, T. (1995, March). Three measurement problems. Topoi, 14(1), 7–15. Norsen, T. (2017). Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Omnès, R. (1994). The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Princeton: Princeton 21 University Press. Oppenheim, P., & Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis. In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (pp. 3–36). University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Rose, D., & Schaffer, J. (2017). Folk Mereology is Teleological. Synthese, 51(2), 238– 270. Rosenberg, A. (2012). The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Ruetsche, L. (2011). Interpreting Quantum Theories. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ryder, L. H. (1996). Quantum Field Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schaffer, J. (2008). Andreas Hüttemann. What’s Wrong With Microphysicalism? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(2), 253–257. Schaffer, J. (2009). On What Grounds What. In D. Manley, D. J. Chalmers, & R. Wasser- man (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (pp. 347–383). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schaffer, J. (2010). Monism: The Priority of the Whole. Philosophical Review, 119(1), 31–76. Schaffer, J., & Ismael, J. (2016). Quantum holism: nonseparability as common ground. Synthese, 10(197), 4131-4160. Schlosshauer, M. (2005). Decoherence, the measurement problem, and interpretations of quantum mechanics. Reviews of Modern Physics, 76(4), 1267–1305. Shalm, L. K., Meyer-Scott, E., Christensen, B. G., Bierhorst, P., Wayne, M. A., Stevens, M. J., . . . Nam, S. W. (2015, December). Strong Loophole-Free Test of Local Realism. Physical Review Letters, 115(25), 250402. Simpson, W. M. R. (2021a). Cosmic hylomorphism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11(28). Simpson, W. M. R. (2021b). From Quantum Physics to Classical Metaphysics. In W. M. R. Simpson, R. C. Koons, & J. Orr (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature. New York: Routledge. Simpson, W. M. R., Koons, R. C., & Teh, N. J. (Eds.). (2017). Neo-Aristotelian Perspec- tives on Contemporary Science. New York: Routledge. Valentini, A. (2019). Foundations of statistical mechanics and the status of the Born rule in de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory. In V. Allori (Ed.), Statistical mechanics and scientific explanation (pp. 423–477). Wegter-McNelly, K. (2011). The Entangled God: Divine Relationality and Quantum Physics. New York: Routledge. Williams, N. E. (2019). The Powers Metaphysic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.