Philosophy: Divine or Human? (1) Sōcratēs autem prīmus philosophiam dēvocāvit ē caelō et in urbibus conlocāvit et in domūs etiam introduxit et coēgit dē vitā et moribus rebusque bonīs et malīs quaerere.

Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, 2009

Co Herencia, 2013

En este artículo examino el problema de si la concepción socrática de la eudaimonia entraña el egoísmo. Esto es, si, según Sócrates, un hombre que actúa teniendo como criterio final su felicidad es un egoísta. Este punto de vista parece entrar en contradicción con lo que pensamos comúnmente acerca de lo que debe decir una teoría moral. Clasifico los intentos que se han hecho por resolver el problema en dos grupos: los formalistas y los sustantivistas, con base en sus objetivos generales. Argumento que la segunda clase de enfoque es más efectiva, puesto que trata de interpretar la teoría de Sócrates como un todo y la hace más coherente. Asume que Sócrates ofrece una teoría de la motivación humana para actuar en la que el agente busca su felicidad, pero otorgando también una función central a la amistad, el amor y la justicia.

Socrates' ethics (i.e., ethical doctrines that one can find in the so called Plato's earlier dialogues) sometimes is characterized by two doctrines commonly known as the Socratic paradoxes. The first of these is that no one desires bad things and that all who pursue bad things do so involuntarily, the second doctrine is that virtue is knowledge. It is assumed, further, that by saying that virtue is knowledge Socrates meant that virtue is a craft or art (technē). In the scholarly discussions on whether the thesis is philosophically sound or not it is seldom noticed that the treatment of 'technē' in Plato varies from dialogue to dialogue. In some places it seems that 'technai' are treated as a value-neutral body of knowledge that can be used for whatever possible ends, on the other hand, there are passages where the connection between 'technē' and the good is particularly stressed. Thus in the Gorgias Socrates claims that rhetoric, for example, is not a craft, but just a knack (empeiria). What are the grounds for making this distinction? Later in the dialogue Socrates mentions two reasons: (i) rhetoric is not a craft because "it has no rational account of the nature of the things it applies to whom it applies them" (465A3-5), and (ii) "it takes no thought at all of whatever is best" (464D1). The first reason may seem insufficient, as it may reasonably be said that it is just a matter of time or inventiveness of humans for rhetoric to satisfy the criterion for being scientific and explanatory. It turns out that a more important defining mark of 'technē' is its concern with the good. But why, one may ask, this criterion was – as it seems – so obvious to Plato? In the paper I suggest that this move looks reasonable in the light of Socrates' theory of desire. In the first part of the paper I discuss the Socratic conception of 'technē', then in Section 3 I give a brief sketch of the theory of desire, and in Section 4 I explain how the theory affects the treatment of 'technē' that we find in the Gorgias. I conclude with some observations on the relation between virtue and 'technē' in Socrates' moral theory.

Socratica IV. Selected papers, 2020

Selected papers on the Socratic Philosophies peer-reviews by the Editorial Committee of the International Society for Socratic Studies.

College of Dupage, 2023

This essay explores Socrates' unique involvement in Athenian politics, and we observe that Socrates' philosophical advice for politicians in the apocryphal dialogue Alcibiades I, which is grounded in the dialectic practice of "cultivation of the soul," embraces the belief that even if the entire city is blessed with having the most perfect technological/technē and scientific knowledge/epistēmē, "possessing all the sciences put together," it would still represent an impoverished state. For according to Socrates, there is no hope or "chance of getting any things well and beneficially done" if we do not have, in the first instance, the philosophical understanding/phronēsis of "good and evil" to inform and guide all of our so-called technical efforts and inspire our scientific achievements (Charmides 174d). In relation to Socrates' understanding of the philosopher and polis and what is required in order to envision and potentially establish a just and virtuously functioning city, what we find in three of Plato's dialogues might be classified as an "idealized" state and practice of politics in the Republic, a "paradigmatic" political model in the Statesman, and a "philosophical-propaedeutic" view of politics in the Alcibiades I. The problems associated with fully reconciling Socrates' practice of philosophy with politics are explored by Charles Griswold who claims that scholars searching for such a reconciliation often mistakenly do so by offering readings that suggest a legitimate "blueprint" for politics can be found in and drawn from the dialogues. There are also readings, he points out, that issue warnings against attempting to enact such a blueprint. Such approaches expose the difficulty or even impossibility of demanding that Socratic philosophy rise to the level of instituting a praxis of politikē, and so caution should be exercised when dealing with this issue, and it is essential that interpreters embrace the literary or dialogic dimension of the portrayal of Socratic philosophy in the dialogues. This so-called "dramatic-philosophical" dimension, as Griswold contends, breaks open a "horizon for reflection on ethics as well as politics," and in doing so, allows us to approach these issues in a more authentically Socratic manner, namely, "as open to question." Contrary to viewing this issue in terms of an "open question," J. A. Corlett argues that scholars seeking a consistent and cohesive view of Socratic politics often focus on the seeming inconsistency between Socrates' claims in the Apology regarding his disobeying the law insofar as it is unjust and potentially harmful to the life of a philosopher and Socrates' bold support of an individual's legal obligation in the Crito. Corlett finds no such contradiction to exist, and he argues against what he claims is the false assumption that the Crito espouses a Kantian or deontological conception of the laws and then portrays Socrates' unquestioned duty to them, whether or not the laws and the political institutions establishing them are corrupt and unjust. Corlett convincingly shows that it is Plato's creative/literary portrayal of the laws/nomoi that represents an authoritarian view, which is to say that it is the personified laws that express the conviction that it would be unethical and unjust to "disobey the legal authority of even a wrongful conviction." But this is not Socrates' position.

History of Political Thought, 1997

Typically, interpreters of Socrates and Plato stumble upon what they call "the Socratic Problem," namely what we are to associate politically, philosophically, and historically with "Socrates." Sometimes "Socrates is understood as a historical figure with distinct ethical views; at others, his name is associated with what Plato puts in the mouth of the character of Socrates in his dialogues. I argue that the historical Socrates created a deep-seated problem for Plato: how could the ethically most virtuous man of his time be condemned to death by the institutions of a polis regarded as the most virtuous political order of his time? Does that suggest that virtue is either impotent (ethically) or misguided (politically)? This dilemma is what I refer to as "Plato's Socratic Problem," one which I believed vexed Plato and still destabilizes coherent ethical and political thought today.

Phronesis, 2024

Socrates has an implicit argument for his afterlife story that concludes the Gorgias, with two key premises. One is at 527a-c, where he summarizes the ethical position he has been arguing for through most of the dialogue, regarding the intrinsic goodness of justice, the intrinsic badness of injustice, and the desirability of rehabilitative punishments. The second occurs at 507e-508a, where Socrates asserts that the universe is held together by justice. This argument explains why Socrates regards his story as a logos, not merely a muthos. It also helps us understand the nature of the rewards and punishments in his story.

Journal of African Studies and Sustainable Development,, 2020

The centre of Plato's ethical system is located in his attempt to find objective answers to some moral fundamental questions like why it is necessary for anyone to be morally virtuous, the reliable knowledge on which moral virtue should be based, the merits of a just life as against unjust life, the real meaning of justice and how man can be morally just and live a happy life. He used various moral dialogues to inquire and determine the nature of virtues and their roles in the attainment of a just and happy. He discovered that a genuine just and happy man is an enlightened and rational moral agent that has the absolute degree of harmony in his soul through constant practice of virtuous activities. The skills that such a man attained from the practice of virtues disposed him to have ardent desire for universal and immutable form of order and justice. A man or woman that has this requisite characteristics is identified by Plato as philosopher king that has a stable system of justice and balanced moral principles as foundations for his or her moral conduct. Anyone with such personality becomes a moral agent and pacesetter that can successfully govern the affairs of his life and that of the society.