The Balochistan Insurgency

62 THE BALOCHISTAN INSURGENCY Sanchita Bhattacharya BALOCHISTAN: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT Balochistan has a complex historical background. Tracing the Baloch history is an intricate task, as not much is known about their written history. Some scholars are of the opinion that modern-day Baloch people travelled around three millennia ago from their original abodes in Central Asia and voyaged towards the northwest, the west, and the east, eventually settling in the present location of Balochistan. However, according to Baloch folklore, the people trace their roots back to the city of Aleppo in Syria. They believe the tribes migrated to this region in pre-Christian times. Baloch thought of and thanked the rugged terrain of Balochistan as their shelter through the ages. Scholastically, the origin of the Baloch people is a conundrum that is much debated among historians and theoreticians due to the dearth of sufficient logical and systematic literature on the topic. However, four dominant theories regarding the origin of the Baloch populace have been offered with varying claims and arguments. First, that they are Arab (Semitic), secondly, that they are Aryans, thirdly, that they are the aboriginal people of Balochistan, and fourthly, that the Baloch as a nation is an admixture of several racial, ethnic, and linguistic groups over a long period of time (Ahmed & Khan, 2017). The autonomous Confederacy of the Baloch Tribes ranged from the Indus River to the east, modern-day Afghanistan to the north, Iran, and the Persian Gulf to the west and southwest. After enduring various ups and downs during its existence, the Baloch state came to a final end when it gave up its sovereignty to the British Raj in 1839 (Janmahmad, 1989). The most important of the Baloch principalities was Kalat. Within a century, though, the Qajar dynasty established itself in Persia and the British in India, squeezing the Baloch. The British attacked Kalat in 1839 as part of their related invasion of Afghanistan, installing a friendly ruler. In 1854, Kalat became an associated state of the British, and in 1877, the British established the Baluchistan Agency to deal with the Baloch princely states in their Indian Empire and directly rule the northern half of Balochistan, including present-day Quetta (Pillalamarri, 2016). The erstwhile region’s territory was part of present-day Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The British ceded the western part of the territory, the Sistan-o-Balochistan Province, to Iran; the northern part to Afghanistan (present-day southern portions of Nimroz, Helmand, and Kandahar Provinces); and the remaining part became “British Balochistan.” The British portion had four principalities: the Khanate of Kalat along with Kharan, Makran, and Lasbela, which were forced to accede to either India or Pakistan during the partition process. Presently, the Baloch, who are spread in these three countries, want to carve out “Greater Balochistan,” uniting the communities of these countries. The Baloch people living on both sides of the Goldsmid Line, the border between Iran and Pakistan that passes through their ancestral homeland, have long questioned and frequently disregarded it (Kokaislova & Kokaisl, 2012: 50). On June 29, 1947, the Shahi Jirga of British Balochistan, along with the elected members of the Quetta municipal body, unanimously passed a resolution to form part of Pakistan (a few non-Muslim members, however, did not take part in the vote). Later on, the three states of Kharan, Makran, and Lasbela called off the mutual suzerainty arrangements and separately acceded to Pakistan in March 1948. In the same month, the Khan of Kalat acceded to Pakistan as well (Pildat Issue Paper, 2012: 13–14). INITIATION OF THE BALOCH CONFLICT The understanding of the series of Baloch uprisings since 1948 has had a vital impact on the subsequent formation of various insurgent groups in Balochistan. The present situation 584 in the province has an extensive history of violence and struggle, and its examination helps in better understanding the current scenario. DOI: 10.4324/9780429426063-70 The Balochistan Insurgency The accession of Kalat and the signing of the Instrument of Accession by Ahmad Yar Khan resulted in unrest and anti-Pakistan rallies throughout Balochistan. The National Party rejected accession and was behind much of the agitation. Its leaders, Mir Gaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, and others, were arrested. This first encounter between the Baloch and the forces of the Pakistani state was crucial in shaping nationalist insecurity and fear of repression at the hands of foreigners (Breseeg, 2017). Also, Prince Agha Abdul Karim started a rebellion in the Jhalawan area against his brother Yar Khan’s decision in July 1948. Along with Muhammad Rahim, Karim refused to lay down arms, and after a brief skirmish with the well-trained Pakistani army, Agha Abdul Karim and his associates fled to Afghanistan. But in July 1948, Abdul Karim and his party returned to Balochistan. After a minor clash near Harboi with the Pakistani army, the prince, along with more than one hundred of his followers, was arrested. On November 27, 1948, he was tried by a special Jirga in Mach Jail and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment (Breseeg, 2017). However, the Pakistani establishment allowed Yar Khan to retain his title until the province’s termination. The second Baloch uprising happened in 1958. In reaction to the One Unit Plan, Nauroz Khan and his followers started a guerrilla war against Pakistan. The government responded by bombing villages suspected of harbouring guerrillas and by reinforcing army units (Baluch, 1975). Khan and his followers were arrested, charged with treason, and imprisoned in Hyderabad. A few of his family members were also hanged, and he later died in captivity. After the executions, the government ordered an intensification of military operations. The leadership of the insurgency had now passed into the hands of political activists, who condemned the cruelties of the army against the people (Breseeg, 2017). The third uprising started in 1962. The General Election of 1962 brought some Baloch nationalists to the front, which the military dictator, Ayub Khan, considered dangerous. During the election, for the first time, several Baloch Sardars were elected. Sardar Khair Bakhsh Murri, Ataullah Mengal, and Ahmad Nawaz Bugti became members of parliament. Unfortunately, they were replaced by some members of the central government, with whom a fresh spate of violence started. Attaullah Mengal was the first to challenge the writ of the government in 1964, and a regular encounter started between the Pakistani forces and the Baloch people. Another reason for the worsening of the situation was the establishment of a military cantonment in Balochistan. The nationalist leaders considered it a colonisation of Balochistan and put up their resistance against it (Rizwan et al., 2014). This triggered another guerrilla movement. The movement is famously known as “Parari” (a Balochi word used to illustrate a person or persons whose afflictions cannot be addressed through negotiations). They set up a network of base camps, expanding in the south from the Jhalawan, the Mengal tribal area to the north, and the Murri and Bugti tribes. They eluded large-scale encounters with the army and tried to disperse the forces by ambushing convoys, bombing trains, and conducting raids on military camps (Hashmi, 2015). The rebellion ended after Ayub Khan was replaced by General Yahya Khan in 1969. Yahya Khan ceased the One Unit system on July 1, 1970, and Balochistan was given the status of province for the first time after 23 years (Rizwan et al., 2014). The fourth uprising took place as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the Baloch provincial government and banned the ruling National Awami Party (NAP). Furthermore, he jailed prominent Baloch personalities, including Khair Bakhsh Murri, Ataullah Mengal, and Ghaus Bukhsh Bizenjo. This led to another uprising against the federation (Weaver, 2003). 1973’s insurgency was the worst of all. The army and paramilitary forces, which numbered around 80,000 troops, were reinforced by helicopter gunships, armoured vehicles, and mortars to suppress the rebels. On their part, the Baloch could only field some 1,000 guerillas, armed with archaic rifles. However, Bhutto was overthrown before the revolt could be crushed, and the army decided to withdraw forces and accommodate the Baloch leadership. NAP leaders were released, and Mengal retreated to London (Cohen, 2004). The fifth ongoing insurgency started much later, in 2005, after a hiatus of three decades. The catalyst was the assault on Dr. Shazia Khalid by an army captain in the Pakistan Petroleum Company (PPC) in Sui, Balochistan. The company management, along with the local police, tried to quash the issue, while the central authorities ignored all pleas to intervene. Dr. Khalid was raped at PPC’s hospital. However, the government declared the officer innocent, which led to violent clashes between tribesmen and the security forces and an attack on the Sui gas facility. Members of the local Bugti clan saw the incident as a breach of their code of honour, and they attacked the gas field with rockets, mortars, and thousands of AK-47 rounds (Walsh, 2005). The insurgents mainly targeted developmental activities and infrastructure. Gas pipelines, bridges, railway tracks, power transmission lines, telephone exchanges, and military and government installations have been targeted (Bansal, 2006). Meanwhile, differences between Nawab Akbar Bugti and Pervez Musharraf also centred on royalties from natural gas mining in the resource-rich town of Dera Bugti, in northeast Balochistan. Subsequently, the building of military cantonments in Balochistan and the development of Gwadar port by China also became reasons for conflict (Jaaved, 2019). The infamous killing of Bugti in August 2006 further intensified the Baloch insurgency against the Pakistani state. Consequently, the internal dynamics in Balochistan became all the more unsafe for federal unity. In order to weaken the insurgency movement, the government has initiated the strategy of killing second- and third-tier leaders of the movement. A few such names are Fateh Qumbrani, Abdul Bari Baloch, Mannan Baloch, Zafar Bugti, etc. Another strategy devised by the Pakistani state is offering general amnesty to the insurgents under the Balochistan Peace Programme. According to this programme, 585 Sanchita Bhattacharya a general amnesty was offered to those insurgents who were willing to surrender their arms to the state. Cash rewards were given to enable their rehabilitation and ensure their return to society as lawful citizens. More than 3,000 separatists surrendered between 2015 and 2017 (Nabeel & Asif, 2019). REASONS FOR INSURGENCY Rich in largely untapped mineral and energy resources and adjoining the Arabian Sea with access routes to Afghanistan and Iran, Balochistan has chafed against centralised Pakistani control since the end of British rule in 1947. Since then, it has waged a low-level insurgency against the Punjab-dominated Pakistani government that has intermittently resulted in periods of intense armed conflict. Baloch nationalists seek greater autonomy, more control over revenues from Baloch natural resources, greater funds for development, and an end to the extrajudicial killings of Baloch people and human rights violations. Some also call for Balochistan’s complete independence from Pakistan (Heinkel & deVillafranca, 2016). The grievances of the common people of Balochistan are varied, and years of neglect and persecution have caused the formation of insurgent groups within the province, trying to put the demands of their people at the crux of the insurgency. The Baloch people are divided into several tribes and clans and are organised on the lines of the traditional semi-feudal Sardari System (Singh, 2001). The ethnic diversity of the province, with ethnic Baloch people being a bare majority, though contested by Pashtuns, adds to its political fragmentation (Pildat Issue Paper, 2012: 10). The province’s Pashtun tribes inhabit the north and north-eastern regions; Baloch and Brahvi tribes inhabit the southern ones; and Makranis inhabit the coast. The provincial capital, Quetta, also plays host to a significant Punjabi-speaking community as well as the Hazara, a Persian-speaking community that migrated from Afghanistan in the 19th century. Balochistan’s ethnic and linguistic diversity is not unusual in Pakistan, but the competition for limited resources has contributed to violence along ethnic lines (UNDP, 2011: 1). The ethnic Baloch people are therefore extremely vocal about the presence of other ethnicities in their province. Balochistan has become a province of conflicting realities, being the largest in terms of land area and rich in resources on the one hand and underdeveloped on the other. The state holds an extensive reserve of natural resources in terms of gold, copper, uranium, coal, silver, and platinum. In the sense of having a bulk of natural resources while living an economically underdeveloped life, the people of Balochistan have always been distrustful of the role of outsiders in their province, whom they consider the exploiters of their economic activities (Bukhari et al., 2015). Tensions between Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani state became intense when gold was discovered and licences for the extraction of gold and copper at the Duddar lead-zinc project in Lasbela District and the Reko Deq copper-gold projects in Chagai District were issued to French and Australian companies 586 (Wani, 2016). Moreover, about 36% of Pakistan’s total gas production occurs here (UNPO, 2014). The Balochistan coast also offers an economic zone potentially rich in oil, gas, and minerals spread over approximately 180,000 square kilometres (Pildat Issue Paper, 2012: 10). But there are problems and grievances associated with Baloch insurgents, who have frequently targeted gas pipelines as a way of demonstrating their disillusionment with the federal government. Nevertheless, Islamabad remains unwilling to negotiate with the Balochs on the very resources that cause the Balochs to remain a nuisance. The Chinese economic incursions into the region with Gwadar and Saindak have made matters worse (Fair, 2012: 6). For example, the Federal Government has excluded Balochs from the Gwadar development process. The project is run entirely by the Federal Government, and it employs few Balochs in the construction of the port, instead relying on Chinese engineers and labourers. Moreover, not only is Balochistan denied the use of its own resources, but the government has historically required Balochistan to sell gas at a lower rate than the other provinces. For example, Balochistan receives a mere $0.29 per thousand cubic feet for its gas. However, the nearby Sindh gets $1.65 and the Punjab gets $2.35 (Fair, 2012). Water shortages and the deficiency of proper irrigation are another grievance of the Baloch people, which causes droughts for them and also weakens their economic position. The province covers 43% of the land mass of the country, but large parts of the province are dry and face a continuing scarcity of water. Agriculture, comprising field crops and horticultural and vegetable produce, accounts for 42% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the province. An additional 10% is contributed by livestock activities. In fact, the livestock and crop production sectors are well combined and depend critically on rainfall. Nearly 90% of the land in Balochistan is mostly suitable for grazing and hunting (Bukhari et al., 2015). Also, persistent drought conditions in southern and southwestern areas of Balochistan since 2014 have affected more than 200,000 families due to successive crop failures and significant livestock losses (Nabeel & Asif, 2019). Gross negligence and half-hearted attempts by the government to stem the rot have led to a crisis situation. The government installed a large number of tube wells but did not build any sizable dams. Neither did they take any action against illegal boring for water, which dropped the water table further. In addition to this, the growing population has worsened the problem of water scarcity (Hali, 2018). Baloch people are of the opinion that Balochistan’s population is swollen with large numbers of Pashtun refugees from Afghanistan. Already, the northern districts of Killa The Balochistan Insurgency Abdullah, Pishin, Harnai, Ziarat, Killa Saifullah, Loralai, Musakhel, Sherani, and Zhob are overwhelmingly dominated by Pashtuns. Also, the census results suggest that the Baloch population has shrunk from 61% to 55.6% in the province over a period of 19 years in 21 districts where the Baloch form a majority (Khan, 2017). According to data from UNHCR, as of March 15, 2020, Balochistan had 23% of the total registered Pashtun refugees (European Asylum Support Office, 2020). The continual presence of refugees in Balochistan is hurting the economy and culture of the province. The government of Balochistan can ill afford to deliver suitable education, healthcare, and employment to its own people; how come it would extend such facilities to the refugees? Against this background, the refugee presence in Balochistan has serious economic implications (Babar, 2017). Also, ethnic Baloch consider the settlement of Pashtuns in their territory a move by the government to demographically dilute the province. Thus, Balochistan Senator Jehanzeb Jamaldini stated on September 8, 2015, that “the government has settled 4 million people in various parts of Balochistan in the past three decades. With broader demographic changes in the province, the government is converting the majority into a minority” (Singh, 2020). There has also been a proliferation of state-sponsored radical outfits in Balochistan. They operate with impunity and function as de facto paramilitary arms of the state. The Quetta Shura of the Taliban was also permitted to have its base in Balochistan, where it continued to flourish with the active collusion of the Pakistani military. Pakistan’s agencies have unleashed radical Islamist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other non-state actors and collaborators on the Baloch population in their bid to Islamise them. The Baloch people are known to be temperamentally secular and tolerant in their approach to religion (Mir, 2020). The existence of military installations and encampments by the army and paramilitary forces in the state has further alienated the common people. Many Baloch see the army cantonments as part of Pakistan’s colonising presence (Fair, 2012). The first deposits of natural gas in the state were discovered in Sui in 1953. But Quetta received its share of gas in 1986 only because the central government decided to extend the gas pipeline because it had decided to station a military garrison in the provincial capital. Pakistan’s interest in constructing military garrisons in the three sensitive areas of Sui, Gwadar, and Kohlu has further left the Baloch feeling dispossessed (Grare, 2006). Baloch opposition to military presence cuts across tribal and ethnic divisions, as reflected in the undisputed resolution passed in the Provincial Assembly on September 23, 2003. These cantonments are similar to “parallel governments,” functioning autonomously outside the purview of the provincial government. Perceived by locals as instruments of coercion and oppression, the army presence is seen as “pockets of Islamabad” in Balochistan, where political power remains concentrated (Wani, 2016). The ongoing CPEC projects have put Balochistan at the centre of fresh controversies. CPEC has further bolstered Pakistan’s resolve to remain in firm control of Balochistan. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that the importance of these projects to Pakistan has had any effect on Pakistan’s strategy towards its unruly province and its grievances (Heinkel & deVillafranca, 2016). The insurgents’ interest in CPEC is not just as a point of leverage against Islamabad; they also see in CPEC a pattern of outside power exploiting the province (Shams, 2015). In mid-2015, Pakistan’s military vowed to crush the insurgency. It amplified military operations in Balochistan, and a protection force for the CPEC Chinese workers was formed. However, sadly, these measures were likely attempted by Islamabad to reassure China about its investment in the province and do not address the fundamental causes of the insurgency (Heinkel & deVillafranca, 2016). Since the time of Musharraf, the Pakistani establishment has become notorious for its kill-and-dump policy in Balochistan. Security forces abduct and kill activists and journalists; their bodies are dumped outside shortly afterward. The Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances has received 360 cases from Balochistan (Nabeel & Asif, 2019). A few such dead are Jamil Ahmed, working with a daily named Azadi; Sabeen Mahmud; Muhammad Ibrahim Arman Luni; Muhammad Jaan, etc. Armed militants, activists, sympathisers, or any other potential “threat” are detained by security agencies and held incommunicado for weeks or months. Often, those incarcerated are subjected to torture and other inhuman treatment, and the bodies of those killed are dumped on the roadside or at garbage sites. Pakistan Zindabad (long live Pakistan) is often carved on many bodies, apparently to teach “anti-national” Balochs a lesson. Many a time, the Pakistani flag is found protruding from the pierced body (Hashmi, 2013). The enforced disappearance of Baloch people has unleashed a reign of terror in the province, where even a simple objection can easily result in abduction and death. Nevertheless, in 2009, the Pakistani establishment thought to “regulate” the conflict situation in Balochistan in the form of two important policy packages: a) the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-eBalochistan Package and b) the NFC Award. The Package purported to regulate ethnic conflict in Balochistan by bordering on four important areas: i) constitution-related matters, ii) political-related matters, iii) administrativerelated matters, and iv) economic-related matters. The NFC Award addressed one of the major grievances of the smaller provinces of Pakistan: that the financial distribution formula (based on population) should be revised to incorporate their financial needs and that the most populous province (Punjab) is overly privileged as a result of it. Regrettably, all such measures have become the casualties of a stalemate in which both sides are entrenched in a miserable deadlock with the continued killings of the Baloch on the part of the Pakistani state and that of the non-Baloch on the part of the Baloch, which shows no signs of reduction (Siddiqi, 2012). 587 Sanchita Bhattacharya INSURGENTS The insurgency has grown from intermittent resistance by a few Baloch leaders and tribes to a much broader, though disjointed, nationalist movement against Balochistan’s perceived “Punjabi occupiers,” representing the Pakistani establishment and Chinese encroachments. Disparate Baloch groups have differing goals and objectives that encompass multiple, often conflicting end-states, ranging from full independence to greater autonomy to redress of grievances (Lieven, 2011). Currently, there are at least 22 nationalist groups, including political parties, that are active in Balochistan. According to one estimate, currently, about 55,000 Baloch fighters are belligerent with the Pakistanistan army (Tabassum et al., 2020). The Pakistani government banned five organisations that include: Baloch Liberation Army, the Baloch Republican Army, the Baloch Liberation United Front, the Baloch Mussalah Diffa Tanzim, and the Balochistan Liberation Front. MAINLY ACTIVE ORGANISATIONS IN THE BALOCH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT Baloch Liberation Army The BLA is a Baloch militant organisation, proscribed by the Pakistani government in 2006, that seeks greater autonomy or independence for Balochistan and has been fighting against the Pakistani government to achieve its goals. It was formed in 2000 and aims to create a state of “Greater Balochistan.” Numerous accounts also suggest that the group is a resurgence of past insurgent groups, specifically the Independent Balochistan Movement of 1973–1977. It is classified as a terrorist group by Pakistan, the UK, and the US. The major difference between the BLA and the previous phases of the Baloch militancy lies in the fact that the current generation of fighters is mostly educated youth who have made a conscious decision to take on the Pakistani military, which they see as an exploitative arm that is associating with foreign countries to cart away Balochistan’s natural resources (Bhattacharjee, 2020). The “Majeed Brigade” is a constituent unit of the group, majorly involved in suicide attacks. Leadership: Hyrbyair Marri (exiled in the UK) is the leader of BLA. He is the brother of the murdered Baloch leader Balach Marri. The identity of the military commanders of the BLA remains clandestine, as the organisation refuses to announce who conducts the operations locally. Currently, both Mirak Baloch and Jeehand Baloch have been acting as spokespersons for the group. Cadre strength: The BLA is the most powerful among the various militant organisations operating out of Balochistan. Known to have at least 6,000 cadre (Shukla, 2020). Area of Influence: The organisation’s main area of influence is in the areas populated by the Marri tribe, including Kohlu, Rakni, Barkhan, Maiwand, and mountain ranges adjacent to Much and Lehri in Balochistan. Linkages: It is suspected that the BLA has a strong footprint in Afghanistan. Targets and tactics: The BLA has been targeting police personnel, non-native Baloch residents, Chinese workers, political leaders, etc. The BLA has used a variety of tactics to achieve its goal of gaining greater regional autonomy. 588 These tactics include the use of car bombs, mortar strikes, rocket strikes, IEDs, landmines, grenades, kidnappings, and small-arms attacks. Violent Attacks: On June 29, 2020, 11 people were killed when four terrorists attacked the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) on Chundrigar Road in Karachi. Majeed Brigade of the BLA claimed responsibility for the attack. May 11, 2019: The Zaver Pearl-Continental Hotel in the Gwadar area of Balochistan was targeted, and nine people were killed. At the time of the attack, the hotel had around 70 guests, including 40 Chinese nationals. The BLA’s Majeed Brigade claimed this attack as well. November 23, 2018: BLA insurgents opened fire on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi, which left four people dead. June 13, 2012: BLA militants claimed a rocket attack and raid on the summer home of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Ziarat, Balochistan. The Pakistani flag had also been replaced by a BLA flag on the property. One person was killed in the attack. July 30, 2009: BLA attackers kidnapped 19 Pakistani police personnel in Sui. In addition to the kidnapped personnel, BLA militants also killed one police officer and injured 16. December 14, 2005: The BLA attacked a federal paramilitary camp in the Kohlu region while then-President Pervez Musharraf was visiting it. July 22, 2000: The BLA claimed responsibility for a bomb that was placed in a market in Quetta, Balochistan, in which seven people were killed. Baloch Republican Army After Akbar Bugti’s death in 2006, his Jamhoori Watan Party broke into three factions; one of them, the Baloch Republican Army, is led by his grandson Brahamdagh Bugti (Ali, 2015). The Baloch Republican Army (BRA) is a Baloch nationalist armed militant group that seeks an independent homeland for the Baloch people and is based in Balochistan. The group is involved in terrorist activities against the Pakistani army. BRA’s membership is essentially The Balochistan Insurgency drawn from the Bugti tribe. The main demand of the group is independence for Balochistan. BRA was banned by the Pakistani government on September 8, 2010. Leadership: Brahamdagh Bugti is the leader of BRA. He had fled to Afghanistan after his grandfather, Nawab Akbar Bugti, was killed in a military operation in Kohlu in 2006. Later, he flew to Switzerland. Beebagr Baloch is the current spokesperson of the group. Cadre strength: There are approximately 45–50 BRA camps in Balochistan, with 20–25 individuals in each camp (Muhammad, 2014). Area of influence: The group’s area of influence includes Sui, Dera Bugti, Patfeeder Canal adjacent areas, Uch, Naseerabad, and Jaffarabad districts of Balochistan. Linkages: Since 2018, BRA has been working with the United Baloch Army and Lashkar-e-Balochistan. Targets and tactics: The BRA has targeted Pakistani security forces and manufacturing infrastructure to try and take back its province’s resources for the people of Balochistan. The BRA has also targeted public transportation and threatened to continue to attack civilians if the Pakistani government does not withdraw troops from the region. The group targets Pakistani security forces, Pakistani police, non-Baloch settlers, public buses, railways, communication systems, electricity pylons, gas pipelines, security checkpoints, and civilian offices. The BRA uses car bombs, IEDs, landmines, grenades, small-arms attacks, conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, social media, and nationalist propaganda to attain its goal of creating an independent Balochi state (Stanford University, 2015). Violent Attacks: April 23, 2015: BRA attacked a Pakistani security forces convoy in Kech, Balochistan, killing eight people. December 27, 2014: BRA claimed responsibility for an attack against a Frontier Crops convoy, killing nine people. May 14, 2012: BRA claimed responsibility for two car bombs that went off near Pakistani security forces’ vehicles in Quetta, Balochistan, injuring 58 people and killing six others. October 20, 2007: BRA planted a vehicle-borne IED on a public transportation bus in Dera Bugti, Balochistan, killing eight people. United Baloch Army It is an underground armed organisation formed in the year 2000. It emerged as a result of a reported rift between the Marri brothers and the leaders of the BLA. According to a pro-militant web portal, the BLA leadership has accused Mehran Marri and some of his companions of “stealing three million dollars from BLA funds as well as half its weapons stash worth 800 million rupees,” with which they then launched the UBA (Ali, 2015). The group was proscribed by the government of Pakistan on March 15, 2013. Leadership: Mehran Marri founded the UBA. He is the son of Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri and was appointed the chief of the Marri tribe after his father’s death in July 2014 (Shahid, 2014). He is the representative of Balochistan at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the European Union (EU). Currently, he is based in the UK. On November 9, 2017, the Swiss government put a lifetime ban on Mehran Marri, barring his entry into Switzerland (Shahid, 2017). Mureed Baloch is the current spokesman for the United Baloch Army. Linkages: Since 2018, UBA has developed linkages with BRA and the lesser-known Lashkar-e-Balochistan for conducting terror operations (Nabeel & Asif, 2019). Target and tactics: UBA targets Pakistani soldiers, symbols of Pakistani establishments, infrastructure facilities, and also non-Baloch nationals of the state. It is known for attacking civilian settlers from the provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Violent Attacks: May 18, 2020: A security convoy of an oil and gas exploration company was targeted by an IED in the Peer-Ghaib area of Bolan district of Balochistan by UBA insurgents. August 15, 2019: UBA insurgents destroyed a mobile phone tower in the Kech district of Balochistan. May 29, 2015: UBA insurgents kidnapped and killed passengers of a bus in Balochistan’s Mastung area, killing 22, all of them unarmed Pashtun. April 9, 2014: A bomb blast ripped through an Islamabad market, killing 25 and injuring dozens. UBA claimed responsibility for the attack. April 8, 2014: UBA insurgents claimed responsibility for the attack on the Jaffar Express in Sibi, Balochistan. The attack claimed the lives of 16 people and wounded 44 others. Balochistan Liberation Front The Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) is an ethnonationalist separatist organisation with the aim of creating a separate Baloch state. It was founded in 1964 by Juma Khan Marri in Damascus, Syria. Four years after the group’s establishment, it joined the Iranian Balochi Revolt. Following the end of the conflict in Iran, the BLF and other Balochi groups turned their attention to inciting an insurgency against the Pakistani state. From 1977 to 2004, the BLF’s activities were uncorroborated; however, reports seem to suggest that the group did not disband. In 2004, the group reemerged in the public eye (Stanford University, 2015). The departure of Brahamdagh Bugti from Afghanistan to Switzerland in October 2010 allowed BLF to assume the central role in the Balochistan insurgency, a role that was previously enjoyed by BLA and BRA (Nabeel, 2017). The current leader of the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Nazar, regularly cooperates with nationalist parties within the province of Balochistan to influence political negotiations with the central government over resources. The BLF is the only militant separatist organisation headed by a leader from a non-feudal background. Nazar belongs to a middle-class family from Mashkay in the district of Awaran (Haider, 2010). It was proscribed by the Pakistani government on September 8, 2010. 589 Sanchita Bhattacharya Leadership: Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch is head of the ethnic Baloch group Balochistan Liberation Front. Baloch is the only leader of a sizeable separatist group who is believed to be waging a guerrilla war from inside Balochistan. He was captured on March 25, 2005, by the Pakistani government and was interrogated and tortured until his release on June 20, 2015. Gwahram Baloch is the current spokesperson of the group. Cadre strength: Though the exact number of BLF cadres is still unknown, it developed into a plural outfit with members drawn from diverse tribes such as the Mengal, Marri, and Bugti, as well as from the educated middle class. BLF’s cadres also include large numbers of Zikris, as members of this sect are concentrated in the Makran belt (Ali, 2015). Area of Influence: The BLF operates across Balochistan but is primarily concentrated in the coastal Makran belt (PIPS, 2014). The Awaran district of Kalat is also considered to be a stronghold of the BLF (Ali, 2015). Linkages: Reportedly, BLF has cooperated with both BLA and BRA in the past; this changed, however, after Balach Marri’s death, when serious differences emerged between these organisations (Nabeel, 2017). Target and tactics: The organisation has targeted foreign workers, aid workers, Pakistani security forces, Pakistani political figures, and journalists. The BLF also attacked parts of CPEC projects in Balochistan. BLF uses rocket strikes, IEDs, small-arms attacks, social media, and nationalist press statements to struggle for its goal of an independent Baloch state. BLF fighters stage most of the attacks in the province and have borne the brunt of army operations against the insurgency. Violent Attacks: July 14, 2020: BLF insurgents ambushed a military convoy in Panjgur district, killing at least three soldiers and injuring eight others. May 19, 2020: A military convoy was hit by a roadside bomb blast near Quetta, Balochistan, killing six soldiers. The attack was claimed by the BLF. November 18, 2017: Five bullet-ridden bodies of people from Gujrat district of Punjab were recovered in Turbat district of Balochistan, killed by BLF insurgents. April 11, 2015: The BLF attacked and killed 20 labourers working on Pakistani government-sponsored dam construction. Nazar claims that the workers were members of the Frontier Works Organisation, which is a Pakistani security force affiliate. IMPACTS The activities of the various Baloch insurgent groups have caused a severe law and order problem in the province in terms of maintaining a secure environment. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), during the first 12 days of the year 2020, Pakistan has recorded a total of 22 fatalities (18 civilians, three Security Force (SF) personnel, and one militant) in five incidents of killing (data till January 12, 2020). 18 of these fatalities (17 civilians and one militant) were reported from Balochistan alone (SATP, 2020). The ethnic divide in the province is also getting worse due to the insurgents’ activities, which include attacking and killing non-Baloch Pakistanis. According to the SATP database, a total of 229 “outsiders,” including 20 in 2019, have been killed in Balochistan since the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti. Pointedly, most of the Punjabi settler killings were recorded in South Balochistan, which accounts for 156 killings out of the total of 178 (principally in Bolan, Kech, Gwadar, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Sibi, and Lasbela Districts) and 27 in North Balochistan (mostly in Nushki, Quetta, and Mustang Districts). The overwhelming concentration of such killings in the South is because of the presence and dominance of Baloch insurgent groups in this region (Mohanty, 2019). The ongoing insurgency in Balochistan has critical implications for the CPEC project, as all of the insurgents’ groupings are against the Chinese presence in their province. The government of Pakistan is well aware of the need and has taken certain steps to counter the challenge. It is building a Special Protection Unit (SPU) and Armed 590 Division to secure the corridor from any kind of threat (Jaleel & Bibi, 2017). But, in spite of the constant attacks on Chinese workers, the CPEC projects are progressing. Additionally, the insurgent attacks are unable to alter the real issue of Baloch participation in CPEC-related developmental activities. The prolonged insurgency in the province has resulted in a severe human rights crisis. In the name of curbing the “militants,” the Pakistani establishment has, in a way, overtly and covertly orchestrated rampant human rights abuse. The Pakistani state and its security agencies have routinely crushed the human rights of the Baloch people in the name of security and territorial integrity. They are often charged with treason, branded as terrorists, and killed in encounters or picked up by security forces at will, only to be added to the ever-expanding list of missing persons (Mir, 2020). Significantly, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) admitted to these crimes for the first time in its report, titled “Balochistan Still Neglected.” In the report, the Pakistani authorities have been accused of not only killing but also disposing of the bodies of alleged militants, and for years, the bodies of missing Baloch activists have turned up all over the region (Dacre, 2019). Under the pretext of solving the “Baloch Question,” the Pakistani establishment has subjugated the ethnic people of Balochistan. Strangely, neither the voice of the Baloch people was restrained nor the insurgency stopped. The insurgents also eye the economic infrastructure of the Pakistani state, as has been recently seen in the The Balochistan Insurgency Karachi Stock Exchange attack (June 2020), in which 11 people were killed. According to partial data compiled by the SATP, Baloch groups have claimed at least nine attacks on economic targets in the two provinces of Balochistan (eight) and Sindh (one, the June 29, 2020, attack) of Pakistan since March 2000, when the SATP started compiling data on the conflict in Pakistan. Claiming the June attack, BLA spokesperson Jeehand Baloch asserted that the attack was aimed at targeting Pakistan’s economy, which is built on 72 years of exploitation of Balochistan and the genocide of Baloch people (Mohanty, 2020). CONCLUSION Pakistan as a nation has failed to address the grievances and objections of the Baloch people and has fallen short of administering popular governance in the province. The task is no doubt daunting, and the undoing of tribal structure, facilitation of irrigation, accountability with respect to the utilisation of natural resources, and encouraging political participation of local leaders require an honest and sincere approach from the Pakistani government, which is still a question mark. The movement of the Baloch people is expected to endure because of the strong undercurrent of popular disaffection in the province against the Pakistan state and the continual fervour of the people to fight for liberty, freedom, autonomy, and equal rights. Balochistan today lies at the node of an evolving economic, political, military, and business strategy that includes global and regional powers, including non-state actors. The call for an independent Baloch state will continue to haunt the Pakistani political landscape until the Baloch nationalists are brought to the negotiating table. 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