(PDF) The EU — A Capable Security Actor? Developing Administrative Capabilities

This article was downloaded by: [informa internal users] On: 6 December 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 755239602] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of European Integration Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713393849 The EU — A Capable Security Actor? Developing Administrative Capabilities Pernille Riekera a Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway To cite this Article Rieker, Pernille(2009) 'The EU — A Capable Security Actor? Developing Administrative Capabilities', Journal of European Integration, 31: 6, 703 — 719 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/07036330903274599 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036330903274599 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. European Integration Vol. 31, No. 6, 703–719, November 2009 ARTICLE The EU — A Capable Security Actor? Developing Administrative Capabilities Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 PERNILLE RIEKER Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway PernilleRieker

31 Taylor 60Original 2009 000002009 &ofArticle GEUI_A_427633.sgm Journal 10.1080/07036330903274599 0703-6337 and Francis European (print)/1477-2280 Francis Integration (online) ABSTRACT There is a large literature claiming that the EU has become an important international security actor. While this literature focuses on the political will and the ambitions of the EU, there has been less attention paid to the actual capabilities at the disposal for the EU. Any political organization needs some kind of relationship between aspirations and capabilities. If the EU is to be considered as an important security actor, we should also expect a certain degree of administrative capability in this policy area. Increased importance of the EU as a security actor would also imply increased capabil- ities. This article makes three contributions. First, by drawing upon insights from insti- tutional theory I present a conceptual scheme for analyzing the dynamics of capabilities and assessing distinct configurations of capabilities. Secondly, I make an empirical account of the development of capabilities in the EU in the field of security policy. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion on the relationship between this specific capability configuration in the EU and its role as a security actor. KEY WORDS: Security actor, capabilities, ESDP, CFSP, institutional theory Introduction There is a large literature claiming that the European Union has become an important international actor and even an important security actor (see for instance Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Deighton 2002; Duke 2000; Ginsberg 2001; Hill 2007; Hoffmann 2000; Howorth 2007; Manners 2002; Rieker 2006; Sjursen 2003, 2006; Smith 2002, 2003, 2004; White 2001; Whitmann 1998; Wæver 2000). While much of this literature has focused on the political will and the ambitions of the EU in this field, there has been much less atten- tion paid to the extent to which the EU has developed into a capable actor. Correspondence Address: Pernille Rieker, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Department of International Politics, C.J. Hambros plass 2D, Pb 8159 Dep, 0033 Oslo, Norway. E-mail:

ISSN 0703–6337 Print/ISSN 1477–2280 Online/09/060703-17 © 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/07036330903274599 704 Pernille Rieker In order to improve our understanding of the dynamics of capabilities and the implications of distinct configurations, we need to ‘unpack’ the concept of capabilities. In the field of institutional theory and organizational studies there is a rich discussion on the different aspects of capabilities. Drawing on works by James March and Johan P. Olsen (1995) I present a conceptual scheme for analyzing the dynamics of capabilities and for assessing distinct configurations of capabilities, and I will show how these classifications might be relevant also for students of International Relations and for EU governance. I distinguish between four kinds of capabilities, they are, rights and authorities, resources, competencies and organizational skills. If the EU is to be considered an increasingly important security actor, we should expect increase in some (and possibly all) of these four kinds of capabilities when it comes to security policy. In the empirical section of the paper, I analyze the development of these different elements of capabilities in the EU in the field of security policy. Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 I focus primarily on the capabilities related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and parts of the Commission. Since the CFSP/ESDP can be regarded as a specific policy area, with a separate set of legal rules and treaty basis, a specific budget line, distinct set of institutions and equipments, as well as a staff with competences, know-how and experiences, it makes sense to conduct such an analysis. However, it is important to note that CFSP and ESDP do not cover the full range of EU security policy. For instance, it leaves out important parts such as enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy, development policy as well as the parts of Justice and Home Affairs that account for the Union’s counter terrorism policy. Although there is a large literature on the development and content of the CFSP and the ESDP, there are, to my knowledge, few studies of the develop- ment and existence of administrative capabilities in relation to the CFSP and ESDP. Some studies briefly touch upon these issues (see for instance Aggestam, et al. 2008; Chiti 2007; Duke 2006b; Gourlay 2006; Howorth 2007; Missiroli 2006; Smith 2004), but there are few or none that have this as the main focus. The aim of this article is therefore to fill this gap. The empirical analysis builds upon primary sources and official documents. But since it tries to cover all the administrative capabilities, it cannot go into depth on each of them. Still, such a broader overview might provide insights that otherwise have a tendency to get lost in more detailed empirical studies. Recognizing that there is a relationship between goals and aspirations and actual capabilities to act and to realize these goals, there is no reason to assume that there is a simple or linear relationship. On the one hand, the character of the security context might affect the capability configuration. In fact, if one applies a broad approach to security, the set of capabilities that will be considered as important and relevant will differ from an approach that applies a narrow concept of security. The evaluation of capabilities is therefore dependent on the concept of security that is applied. In this article, I take as a point of departure the security concept that is used by the EU itself and referred to in important EU documents such as the European Security The EU — A Capable Security Actor? 705 Strategy, implying that the main focus is on the CFSP and the ESDP, but also other parts of the Commission’s External Relations activities. On the other hand, the existing capability configuration is also likely to affect what kind of security actor the EU is, and a distinct set of capabilities is likely to impact on the range of possible actions and activities it can engage in. I will discuss this in more detail towards the end of the article. The Importance of Administrative Capabilities Actorness and Capabilities There are various ways of understanding actorness in international politics. In both international law and conventional international relations, statehood has traditionally been seen as a requirement for being treated as an actor in the international system. More recently, however, other criteria have been Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 emphasized — such as autonomy and the ability to perform. This makes it possible for multilateral institutions in general and the EU in particular to be considered as ‘actors’. Gunnar Sjöstedt defined actor capability as a ‘capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Sjöstedt 1977, 16). While he viewed this capacity primarily as a function of internal resources and internal cohesion, Bretherton and Vogler have argued that actorness is constructed through the interplay of both internal and external factors (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 2). They hold that an actor is an entity capable of formulating and acting upon decisions, but also that the capacity to act reflects the interaction between understandings about internal character and capabilities and external opportunities. While this is an impressive and comprehensive approach, it lacks a focus on governance and administrative capabilities. According to March and Olsen, the craft of democratic governance is organized around four tasks: the development of identities of citizens and groups in the political environ- ment; the development of capabilities for appropriate political action; the development of accounts for political events; and the development of an adaptive political system that copes with changing demands and changing environments (March and Olsen 1995, 45–6). Even though the EU cannot be characterized as a democratic state, it is possible to apply some of their insights to a unity like the EU — especially as regards the development of administrative capabilities. March and Olsen argue that ‘developing appro- priate identities and acting accordance with them require resources and capabilities’. They further maintain that ‘the tending of capabilities — creating, sustaining, mobilizing, and regulating them — is the task of gover- nance [and that without] such a structure of capabilities, little in the way of individual or collective purpose can be accomplished’ (March and Olsen 1995, 91). According to this understanding, it can be argued that if the EU is to be characterized as a capable actor, it needs to have certain administra- tive capabilities. This means that Sjöstedt’s focus on internal factors is still important, but by using a typology developed by March and Olsen (1995), 706 Pernille Rieker we may single out more precisely what kinds of internal factors that are required. Types and Dynamics of Administrative Capabilities March and Olsen distinguish between four broad types of capabilities rele- vant to governance (March and Olsen 1995, 92–5). The first type is what they refer to as rights and authorities. Rights and authorities are capabilities that typically would be enshrined in formal rules. These are protected, inter- preted, and enforced by a structure of norms and institutions. By exercising valid authority and having that exercise certified by political institutions and culture, officials establish their existence as officials, and the EU establishes itself as a legitimate actor. Some of the formal rights and authorities regulat- ing the CFSP are to be found in treaties. Since treaty revisions do not take place daily, and since these texts often are results of incomplete drafting, the Council will also contribute to the interpretation and specification of the Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 regulation of this policy area. Second, March and Olsen emphasize the need for resources. By resources, they mean the assets that make it possible to do things or to make others do things. Such assets may include money, property, time, information, facilities and equipment, and have both individual and institutional attributes. By looking at the evolution in budgets and staffs in the period between 2002 and 2007, as well as the development of civilian and military assets, we may get an idea of the extent to which the EU has the resources necessary for being a capable actor in this policy area. The third type of capability is, according to March and Olsen, competen- cies and knowledge on the part of individuals, professions and institutions. Individuals have competencies from their education and training. Institutions encode knowledge in traditions and rules. Competence and know-how is therefore a result of a combination of recruitment policy, leadership, skills, training programs and the extent to which it draws upon policy analysis provided by institutes and think tanks. Even though the EU is a relatively young security actor, I argue that its competence is dependent on its capabil- ity to draw on its member states experiences as well as developing its own programs for training and lessons learned. In order to evaluate this, I study the Union’s use of national security experts and the extent to which the Union has taken measures in order to develop its own training programs to strengthen its competence. Finally, March and Olsen point to the need for organizing capacity. While this capacity is dependent on the availability of the other capabilities, it is also a condition for making effective use of them. As March and Olsen argue, ‘[w]ithout organizational talents, experience, and understanding, the other capabilities are likely to be lost in problems of coordination and control …’ (March and Olsen 1995, 95). Several institutions at different levels influence the development of CFSP and ESDP. The Commission, the Council, together with some important agencies, as well as the member states, all contribute to the development and implementation of the CFSP. While there are rules that regulate the different institutions’ competences, these are often of a very The EU — A Capable Security Actor? 707 general nature. In this part of the article I will try to describe the main orga- nizational challenges and the measures undertaken so far. In addition to the actual capability configuration, we also need to under- stand how these capabilities develop and change. While capabilities often are created by deliberate action, capabilities also have a dynamic of their own. In fact, the four types of capabilities presented above differ in the sense that some are limited resources that will come to an end, whereas others can be said to increase if applied properly (March and Olsen 1995, 96–8). First, many capabilities are expendable. Capabilities that are used at one time or in one place are unavailable for use at another time and place. This is the case for most resources. In fact, if budgets, staff and equipment are used for one purpose, they cannot be used for another — at least not at the same time. Most political systems also have difficulties in seeing costs and benefits that are distant in time and space. In fact, there is a tendency to respond to current and local pressure more easily than to future or distant ones. This Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 may have important consequences for governance. Some capabilities require investments of time and resources significantly prior to the realization of their benefits. This means that the necessities of immediate problems have a tendency to overwhelm the capabilities of political institutions to sustain a longer-term perspective. While a democratic political system based on bargaining and exchange among self-interested actors is poorly equipped to deal with such problems, an institutionalization of political action — both in terms of establishing rules that regulate activities or creating institutions or agency with certain responsibilities — may be better at having a long-term perspective (March and Olsen 1995, 98–103). Such nearsightedness may also prevent an actor from making the necessary decisions about long-term invest- ments in capabilities that take time to develop, and which are necessary for a capable actor to develop. Second, there are capabilities that are augmented by use. This is the case for capabilities such as competencies and organizational skills. As a general rule, it may be argued that the more frequently a task is performed, the more competently it is done. Similarly, the more often an organization faces a problem, the more effectively it deals with it. This is the result of a ‘learning- by-doing’ process. This dynamic suggests that political capabilities profit from exercise, that a minimum of rights and resources is needed, but also that there are processes that may lead to a more efficient use of even rather limited rights and resources (March and Olsen 1995, 97). While March and Olsen argue that an actor needs these capabilities in order to be an actor, I will argue that they are important but not necessarily sufficient. In addition to these administrative capabilities, an actor also needs to have political will and a capacity to formulate policy. However, political and administrative capabilities are closely linked and it may be argued that a certain level of administrative capability may facilitate politi- cal will, or that political will may create the necessary basis for the develop- ment of the required capabilities. In the case of the EU, the political will to become an actor is clearly expressed in the European Security Strategy. This means that the current challenge is more related to the development of the 708 Pernille Rieker necessary administrative capabilities that will make it capable of fulfilling its ambitions. This is why I have chosen to focus primarily on the development of administrative capabilities in this article. Identifying the Existing Administrative Capabilities in EU’s Security Policy If the EU is becoming an increasingly more important security actor, we expect to find that these capabilities exist, that they are of a certain size and that they increase over time. In addition to simply identifying the existence and character of these capabilities, I will also discuss how they develop and whether it is possible to improve the institutional processes by which the political capacities are distributed and organized for use. Increased Rights and Authorities Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 The competencies of the EU are more limited in the area of foreign and secu- rity policy than in Community matters. The legal framework for the CFSP is clarified under Title V in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), estab- lished in 1992 and later revised in 1997 and in 2001. The Lisbon Treaty (under ratification) also proposes some important new elements. The TEU both presents the overall objectives and principles for the conduct of the Union’s external action (that it shall be in accordance with the principles in the UN charter and international law etc), but it also clarifies in detail the competencies of the different institutions. The Treaty revision of 1997, for instance, introduced the new office of a High Representative (HR) for the CFSP, fusing it with that of the Council Secretary General. This change made the EU-level more important in a policy area otherwise charac- terized by intergovernmentalism. It stipulates that the HR: shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular through contribut- ing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy deci- sions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties. (TEU, Title V, Article 26) Even though the Amsterdam Treaty indicated a relatively modest role for the HR/CFSP, the appointment of Javier Solana to this post came to shape the office in ways that have given him a unique stature in the diplomatic world. For many, he has become the face of the EU’s external relations (Duke 2006b, 12). Since the CFSP is an intergovernmental policy area, the legal competencies of the Commission are limited. Still, Article 27 of the Treaty confirms that ‘the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security field’. This means that Commission officials are involved at every level of the CFSP, with the overall objective of ensuring consistency in the external relations of the EU as a whole, safeguarding the The EU — A Capable Security Actor? 709 acquis communautaire and the EC Treaties. Under Article 22 of the TEU, the Commission shares the right, alongside the member states, to refer to the Council any questions relating to the CFSP and to submit proposals. In the case of CFSP Joint Actions, for instance, the involvement of Community funding would normally give the Commission a role in implementing the instrument (Duke 2006b, 8). The Council and the Commission are thus jointly responsible for ensuring consistency in the EU’s external activities as a whole. If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, however, the Commission will become even more important in relation to CFSP.1 As seen, the formal rights, institutions and rules regulating this policy area have continuously evolved since 1992. The legal basis for this policy area has gradually been strengthened even though the intergovernmental character of this policy still put important limits to the EU autonomy. Although the permanent institutions at the EU-level — such as the High Representative for CFSP and his staff — have an important role in the preparation of decisions, Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 it does not give them a say in the actual decision-making process. However, sometimes influence over the shaping of the decisions is just as important. Thus, it may be argued that this policy area has, to some extent, moved beyond intergovernmentalism — at least in its pure form — and that it is better characterized by complexity or some form of multi-level governance, which can be defined as a ‘polity-creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government — subnational, national and supranational’ (Marks and Hooghe 2001, 2). Formal rights are not depleted by use. Rather the development of some rights will often create the need for further regulations. When changes happen gradually and over a long period of time it is primarily because there is a certain reluctance towards supranational regulation in this policy area. Instead, radical changes are often linked to critical junctures in international politics. Sometimes historical events facilitate the establishment of more supranational regulation. For instance, the CFSP was established at the end of the Cold War. The ESDP was formulated and established as a conse- quence of the Balkan Wars and a recognition of a need to strengthen the Union’s collective action capacity in this policy area. The Union’s counter terrorism policy was strengthened after 9/11, the Iraq War led to the adap- tation of the European Security Strategy, and finally, the big bang enlarge- ment of the EU in 2004 triggered a process towards important institutional reforms, also in the area of security and defence. In this sense, it seems like changes in this capability take place primarily as a response to important external events. While the existing rights and authorities define the EU’s security identity and put concrete limits on what kind of security actor the EU may be, important changes in the security context seem to provoke further regulations. Limited but Increasing Resources This section briefly examines the EU resources, in terms of budgets, staff and equipment, in the sphere of foreign and security policy. 710 Pernille Rieker A small, but growing CFSP budget. The CFSP budget covers the civilian parts of crisis management and various conflict prevention activities. In 2008 the CFSP budget represented 0.2 percent of the Community budget as such. If we include the totality of the money allocated for the Union’s inter- national activities — or what is referred to as ‘the EU as a global actor’ (including pre-accession, European neighborhood policy, development, humanitarian aid, democracy and human rights, CFSP and the stability instrument) — the number increases to 5.7 percent of the EU budget. 2 This means that a relatively small part of the budget is used for security policy even if we apply a relatively broad approach to security. Still, it is interest- ing to note that the CFSP budget has increased considerably since 2002 (from €30 to 200 million), and that the financial framework for the period 2007–2013 also stipulates continued increase (from €200 to 340 million euros).3 Funding of military operations is not included in the budget and depends Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 largely on national contributions. However, in order to make the EU more capable in this area also, the General Affairs Council of 17 May 2002 reached a preliminary agreement on the funding of military operations. A distinction was introduced between ‘common’ costs (head quarters, infra- structure and medical care) financed through a new financing mechanism (ATHENA) and individual costs (troops, arms, equipment) to be borne by each member state. But since ATHENA only represents 10 percent of the total cost of a military operation, most operations will still be dependent on the participation of one or several of the larger member states. A remaining challenge is therefore a lack of emergency funds available to tackle unforeseen crises. The limited financial resources at the EU level indicates that the mismatch between the ambitions expressed by the EU in the European Security Strategy and the funds available for this policy area remains. Concerning the dynamics, the most obvious factor is that it is depleted by use. In order to have an increase, a change in priorities or an increase in the political will at the national level is required. The nearsightedness of the member states and the prevailing reluctance to take decisions on long-term investments in this area, however, make the prospects for important changes slim. Still, there has been a relatively important increase in the current finan- cial framework. This must be understood as a result of the enlargement process, but also the internal dispute in relations to the Iraq war. While the former automatically led to an increase in the budgets, the latter made it obvious that a stronger coherence in European foreign and security policy was needed. This led to the adoption of a European Security Strategy in December 2003, but it also had some influence on the fact that CFSP became one of the four main policy objectives in the Commission’s proposal for a new financial framework. Many institutions and few people. The Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring the consistency of EU external activities as a whole. These activities cover all aspects of external relations, security, The EU — A Capable Security Actor? 711 economic and developments policies. While Directorate General for External Relations is subdivided into 12 Directorates and has a staff of 661 people, the staff that deals with CFSP and ESDP-related issues is roughly 60. This means that 3 percent of the staff in the Commission as a whole is working in DG Relex and only 0.3 percent work directly with CFSP and ESDP related issues. Still, the Commission’s role in civilian crisis management cannot be reduced to these activities alone. But even if we include the staff working in the DG for Humanitarian Aid and Development (263), the EuropAid Co- operation Office (589) as well as the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) (158), the staff that one way or the other contribute to this policy area still does not exceed 6 percent. The growth of CFSP has led to the development of new and significant institutions under the Council. The Council secretariat is supposed to assist the Council and the Presidency and plays a particularly important role in relations to CFSP and ESDP through the High Representative for CFSP (HR/ Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 CFSP), the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit as well as the Military Staff. The total number of staff working with CFSP and ESDP at the General Secretariat of the European Union is 3224, which represents 9.5 percent of the total staff in the Council. This means that even if one includes all of the staff working with security relevant issues in the Commission (3–6 percent), the Council (9.5 percent) as well as the agencies, the overall conclusion still is that there are many insti- tutions and relatively few people dealing with this policy area at the EU level. This argument becomes even more convincing if we compare these numbers to similar numbers from a small country like Norway. In Norway 36 percent of the government’s staff works for the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whether or not a limited number of staff is alarming depends on the importance of having a staff of a certain size working with a specific policy area. While the size of a bureaucracy is not the most important factor when evaluating whether or not an actor is capable, it still gives an indication of the extent to which this policy area is given priority. It is also important to note that an increase in this capability is not automatic and that it is one that is depleted by use. This means that an increase either requires that personnel are taken from other parts of the bureaucracy or that the total number of staff is increased, which again requires an increase in the budget. An increase in civilian and military capabilities. In addition to budget and staff, it is also important to have the necessary equipment in order to be able to implement policy. In relation to this capability March and Olsen use the example of the governance of hospitals and libraries and argue that ‘hospitals without bandages cannot function as proper hospitals [and] libraries without books cannot function as proper libraries’ (March and Olsen 1995, 93). Likewise, a security actor cannot function properly without civilian and military capabilities. The EU, as such, has very limited access to civilian and military equipment for crisis management activities. However, the member states have made 712 Pernille Rieker binding commitments to the EU in this area. In fact, since the beginning of the decade several Headline Goals have been identified and capability commitment conferences have been organized. The former has established some specific objectives and the latter have forced the member states to identify civilian and military capabilities that can be made available for EU operations. The European Council at Laeken, 14–15 December 2001 adopted a declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP, officially recognizing that the Union is now capable of conducting at least some crisis management operations. Since then, the EU has developed and improved both its military and civil- ian capabilities for crisis management. On the military side, for instance, the European Defence Agency was established in 2004 to support the member states and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabili- ties in the field of crisis management. But important shortcomings remain in particular in relation to pre-determined headquarters for military opera- Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 tions, extraction forces and joint training and interoperability (Howorth 2007). On the civilian side, however, the initial commitments have been met. But also here there are shortcomings. This is linked to the fact that the commitments in reality do not represent the actual capabilities available for the EU. The reason for this is that the same capabilities also are made avail- able for also other organizations such as the OSCE and the UN (Jakobsen 2006, 309). Still, the fact that the EU has been capable of undertaking sixteen civilian or civil–military operations of various kinds as well as five military crisis management operations show that it cannot be dismissed as an unimportant security actor — at least in the civilian field.5 In spite of these shortcomings, it may be argued that the EU has established it self as the world premier civil- ian crisis manager. Equipment is also a resource that is depleted by use — meaning that when the already committed equipment is used for one purpose, it cannot be used for another. An increase, however, is dependent on larger national commit- ments. The European Defence Agency was established in order to facilitate such a development on the military side, but an increase is first and foremost dependent on national factors — and thus the willingness to provide equip- ment for strengthening the EU’s actorness perhaps on the expense of other national tasks. The problem of nearsightedness may also here prevent that the necessary decisions on long-term investments are made. To summarize, the overall conclusion must be that the EU has limited but increasing resources, and that it is primarily oriented towards civilian crisis management and conflict prevention activities. The fact that all these resources are depleted by use also makes any changes in the short term difficult and dependent on political will and public support. While limited resources put important constraints on the EU’s capacity to act, it is more important how these resources used. It is therefore more interesting to look at the two remaining capabilities, competencies and organizing skills — capabilities that may augment by use and even compensate for complex rules and scarce resources. The EU — A Capable Security Actor? 713 An Ongoing Learning Process It is often argued that the EU is a young and inexperienced security actor (Hoffmann 2000; Kagan 2003). But it is important to note that its various member states have lengthy experience, both from their individual security policies and through participation in other multilateral frameworks such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). Some of this expertise is also channelled through national participa- tion in various expert groups (under the Commission) and working groups (under the Council). Moreover, even though the EU did not start developing a security policy until the end of the Cold War, it has proven surprisingly adaptive to the new security context. The EU actively draws on the competence available in its member states. One concrete example is the Commission’s use of ‘expert groups’ composed of members from national governments, academia and various interest Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 groups. While expert groups do not formally make political decisions, they provide advice and scientific knowledge that are taken into consideration in the actual decision-making process (Gornitzska and Sverdrup 2007, 6). Since the role of expert groups is so central in the European multi-level governance system, it would appear relevant to examine the use of such groups in the sphere of External Relations and the CFSP. Oddly enough, there are very few expert groups in this policy area (5 percent in 2007) and contrary to the trend in other policy areas these have also decreased consid- erably since 2000 (Gornitzska and Sverdrup 2007, 14–22). One explanation might be that few countries have more experience than the Commission in the sphere of comprehensive security and civilian crisis management. Thus, in this particular area it may be that it is the member states that learn from the EU (Rieker 2006). While the Commission’s use of expert groups varies according to the policy area in question, all the work of the Council is prepared or coordi- nated by the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), made up of the permanent representatives of the member states working in Brussels and their assistants. The work of this Committee is itself prepared by some 250 committees and working groups consisting of delegates from the member states. Also here there are good opportunities to draw on the knowl- edge and experience of member states. Concerning the CFSP, the work is prepared in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of the member states permanent representatives. In turn, the PSC gets advice and recommendations from the Military Committee, composed of the member states chiefs of defence, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, composed of civilian representatives from the member states, and from various other CFSP working groups, depending on the issue (Juncos and Pomorska 2006, 5). The EU has also taken several initiatives in order to upgrade its own exper- tise in security and defence. First of all, there are several think tanks that provide the High Representative with policy analysis in order strengthen the Union’s competence in this area. The most widely used is the EU Institute for 714 Pernille Rieker Security Studies in Paris, but also the European Policy Centre in Brussels. In addition, the EU established a European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in 2005. This college is organized as a network between national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues. It ‘provides training in the field of the ESDP at the strategic level in order to develop and promote a common under- standing of ESDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, best practice in relation to various ESDP issues.’6 There are also two training programmes that deal with Civil Military Coordination — one that has been run by the Commission since 2001 and one led by the Council since 2004. Both have been directed towards diplomatic, civilian and military personnel from the member states (Khol 2006, 132). Finally, the EU has undertaken five crisis management and military exercises — CME 02, CME/CMX 03, CME 04, MILEX 07 and MILEX 08. At the EU military exercise in June 2007, Javier Solana empha- Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 sized the importance of this learning process, and stated: ‘we will continue to test and learn each year … we will also continue to strengthen our capacity by learning from the actual operations we are running.’7 As a recent report from Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) shows, however, this learning process is hampered by the fact that the EU has no lessons learned unit of feed back mechanism (Aggestam et al. 2008, 163). The dynamics of this capability is that it may augment by use. It is charac- terized by what we may call, learning by doing, and, as we have seen, some learning structures have been established at the EU level. The fact that the EU has no established institutions for systematically evaluate previous experi- ences, however, means that there is room for improvement also here. Lack of Organizational Skills While competence and know how is important, organizational talent is perhaps the most important capability in order to be a more capable actor. If an actor does not have sufficient organizational skills, the other capabilities are likely to be lost in problems of coordination and control (March and Olsen 1995, 95). There are many levels and institutions that have a role to play in relation to the different capabilities in this particular policy area and coordination is an important challenge. Problems of coordination can be found within the Commission (between the DG’s), within the Council (between the member states and between the civilian and military units/ personnel), and last but not least between the Commission and the Council. The coordination problem within the Commission is first and foremost linked to the fact that there are several DG’s and underlying services respon- sible for external relations and security policy. Internal communication problems have prevented the Commission from acting as a coherent force, and the result has sometimes been contradictory politics towards third parties (Duke 2006b, 10). Several reform attempts have been initiated in order to cope with this problem. With the Amsterdam Treaty, for instance, the Commission’s external relations structures were simplified with the The EU — A Capable Security Actor? 715 creation of a DG responsible for the planning and policy aspects of the Community’s external relations (DG Relex). The adoption of a program for conflict prevention in 2001 as well as the establishment of a more flexible funding mechanisms such as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (2001) or the more recent Instrument for Stability (2007) also aim at streamlining the Commission’s activities. Other attempts at streamlining the Commission’s efforts in international crisis management are the establishment of the so- called Civil Protection Structures and the Advanced Planning Teams. While the former aim at coordinating interventions of national civil protection teams inside and outside the EU in case of a natural or technical disaster, the latter are intended to coordinate the external crisis management missions of the Commission (Gourlay 2006, 119). The coordination problems within the Council have a different character and have a political and an institutional dimension. On the political level, there are the traditional coordination problems between the member states Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 that are likely to remain as long as the intergovernmental character of this policy area is dominant. However, as already mentioned, the establishment of EU institutions in this policy area has moved this policy area somewhat beyond intergovernmentalism. On the institutional level, there are coordina- tion problems between civilian and military units/personnel. This has led to a need for structures to promote civil–military coordination. The establish- ment of a Civil–Military Cell within the Military Staff in 2005 must be seen as the Union’s first institutional innovation designed to provide a more inte- grated response to crisis management planning. As we have seen, some of the coordination problems in the Commission and in the Council are solved, but the coordination challenges between these two institutions remain. For instance, it has been difficult to give substance to the Commission’s ‘full association’ with the CFSP. This is primarily due to the differences in bureaucratic cultures between the Commission and the Council (Duke 2006a, 22; Gourlay 2006). Moreover, the growing number of cross-cutting issues has increased the potential for disputes over compe- tence. The inter-institutional disputes involve several of the tools for preven- tion, management and resolution of crisis and there is often an unclear division of labour. While these coordination challenges were identified in the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003, 19), it has proven difficult to find a solution to this problem. The extent of the problem caused by the institutional infighting in Brussels was illustrated in May 2005 when the Commission took the Council to court arguing that its actions to strengthen the capacity of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to deal with small arms and light weapons were an infringement of its powers and hence illegal under the EC Treaty (Jakobsen 2006, 306). According to Gourlay (2004, 404), the EU’s approach to crisis manage- ment has been ‘a self-limiting one, largely conducted within the intergovern- mental framework of the ESDP, and institutionally divorced from EU activities that use European Community instruments’. She argues that the development of short-term crisis management instruments has not built on the external relations acquis of the Commission, but instead followed a 716 Pernille Rieker distinctly intergovernmental approach. The shortfalls in relation to coordi- nation between the Council and the Commission in crisis management have led to an inefficient and fragmented approach to planning, deployment, mission support, training and recruitment for civilian crisis management operations (Gourlay 2004, 420). In addition, the fact that there is no unified chain of command with regard to EU instruments for crisis response means that neither the Council nor the Commission has the necessary strategic over- sight concerning all EU instruments (Gourlay 2006, 112). There have been few institutional innovations to promote coordination between the Council and the Commission. When such coordination has been achieved, this has often been in spite of rather than because of the EU’s struc- tures. It has been characterized by informal working-level cooperation and cross-representation of the Commission in CFSP structures and of member states in EC policy and programming processes (Gourlay 2006, 119). One exception, however, is the establishment of so-called crisis response coordi- Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 nation teams (CRCT) in 2003. These teams are composed of representatives from both the Commission and the Council and are supposed to discuss the development of crisis management concepts. In reality, however, these teams have had limited influence since they have been convened at a stage in the planning process when the decision to launch a mission is imminent (Gourlay 2006, 117). With the establishment of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy that will both have the position as High Representative for CFSP and as the Vice President of the Commission, the Lisbon Treaty provides for an institutional change that, if the treaty is ratified, may improve the coher- ence of the EU’s external action and security policy. The new financial frame- work for 2007–2013 has also opened the way for a more flexible funding system. It remains to be seen, however, whether these changes are sufficient to solve the problems related to the EU’s coherence as a security actor. The challenge of coordinating EU crisis management policies is a grave one, characterized by the broad range of activities involving various actors from the decision-making processes to the implementation of policies. While the proposed changes may have a positive impact the EU’s strategic coherence, the improvement of policy coherence may also require far more significant institutional changes. What Does this Tell Us about the EU as a Security Actor? This article argues that administrative capabilities are necessary in order to be a capable actor. Based the work of March and Olsen (1995), I have presented a conceptual scheme for analyzing the dynamics of capabilities and assessing distinct configurations of capabilities by drawing on institutional theory and organizational studies. I argue that it is useful to separate between four types of capabilities: rights and authorities; resources (budget, staff, and equipment); competencies and knowledge and organizational skills. These different aspects of organizational capabilities are driven by different dynam- ics and they serve different purposes in constituting the EU as a security The EU — A Capable Security Actor? 717 actor. In addition, I have made an empirical account for the development of each of these four types of capabilities in the EU in the field of security policy. The main conclusion of this empirical study can be summarized as follows: First, we have observed the gradual development of legal rules and rights which have enabled the EU to become a security actor. Although the rights and authorities are complex and have been subjected to revisions and changes, we observe a gradual process of institutionalization, which also entails an ongoing process of interpretation and specification of the initial formal legal rights. Second, the EU has limited resources. It has a small budget, a limited staff and has relatively little equipment available for conducting crisis manage- ment activities. The lack of resources is a serious challenge for the EU as a security actor, and it certainly constrains the scope, duration, intensity and type of activities by the EU in this field. However, we should note that there has been a slight increase in EU’s own resources across time, and that the EU Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 has gradually developed financial mechanisms and networks that enable it to build-upon and make use of resources at the national level. Third, the EU has a certain degree of knowledge and competence in the security field, particularly if one takes into account a wide security concept. Also in regards to knowledge and competence we observe that the EU is to a large extent making use of the knowledge and experience of its member states. However, as knowledge is something that increases with use, we still observe that increased action and experience in operating in the field of security policy has triggered processes of ‘learning by doing’ and there has more recently been put in place structures and mechanisms for training at the EU-level, which is likely to increase the knowledge base for EU security policies further. Finally, this empirical study shows that the EU has a major deficit when it comes to organizational skills. Since organizational skills are a necessary capability in order to get the most out of the rights, resources and competen- cies available, the EU is dependent on this capability in order to become a capable security actor. The main reason for this deficit is related to the special character of the EU — being something in between an international organi- zation and a federal state. This has led to a complicated institutional structure with fuzzy borders between the legal competencies of the different institutions and levels. There are overlapping competencies between the Council and the Commission in relation to civilian crisis management, as well as between the national and the European level. Without a common chain of command, the Commission and the Council might suffer from a lack of necessary stra- tegic oversight of all EU instruments. In some way or an other the EU has to cope with this coordination challenge in order to strengthen its organizational skills and make use of the resources already at its disposal. While the estab- lishment of coordination offices and positions may be one solution, the creation of better feedback mechanisms that will improve the Union’s capac- ity to learn from experiences may be another. Establishing a double-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as proposed in the Lisbon Treaty, and the increased coordination of the diplo- matic and military services for instance, might be a step in the right direction. 718 Pernille Rieker Even though the EU does not score highly on administrative capabilities, it can still be argued that he EU is a security actor. It has the necessary political will to become an actor, and there is a continuous increase in the rule basis, the resources and the competences. The deficit in organizing skills, however, means that the EU is not exploiting its potential. The complexity of the EU adds difficulties in augmenting its organizing skills. Since the EU is a multi- level governance system, it is likely that insights from the institutional and organizational literature might be useful for understanding the functioning of the system. Until recently, EU security policy has mainly been analysed from an inter- national relations (IR) perspective. This has provided interesting, but perhaps limited understanding of how the EU functions as a security actor since this literature has a tendency to disregard institutional factors. Understanding the institutional set up and its dynamics is crucial since the multi-level character of the EU seems to have important consequences for how it works as a secu- Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:49 6 December 2010 rity actor. For instance, there is no point in increasing resources if knowledge on how to solve the organizational skill-problem is not sufficiently devel- oped. While the IR literature has dominated this field up until now, institu- tional theory and organizational studies might have more to offer in relation to these questions. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Ulf Sverdrup, Kjell Engelbrekt and Knud Erik Jørgensen for their constructive comments. 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