The Star Gate Operational Remote Viewing Program A Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Platform

Marwaha, S. B., & May, E. C. (2019). The Star Gate Operational Remote Viewing Program: A Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Platform. (pp. 5–58). In E. C. May, and S. B. Marwaha (eds.), The Star Gate Archives: Reports of the United States Government Sponsored Psi Program, 1972–1995. Volume 4: Operational Remote Viewing: Memorandums and Reports. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. The Star Gate Operational Remote Viewing Program A Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Platform SONALI BHATT MARWAHA and EDWIN C. MAY Introduction The U.S. government’s military and intelligence communities funded informational psi (a.k.a. anomalous cognition, remote viewing, extrasensory perception) and causal psi (a.k.a. psychokinesis) applications and research from 1972 to 1995 at a total level of support of US $19.933 million. In the early years, it was known as a “psychoenergetics” program, in keeping with the Soviet term for psi phenomena. While small in terms of what is usually budgeted for traditional programs within these organizations, such funding represented the largest support in the history of the field of parapsychology. Volumes 1 and 2 of these archives contain the entire research reports in remote viewing from 1972– 1995; the psychokinesis research (Volume 3), found insufficient evidence in support of the mind-over-matter hypothesis. Informational psi (IΨ) is defined as the transfer of information, which is based on entropic considerations, arising from a distant point in spacetime leading to the local acquisition of non-inferential information by an atypical perceptual ability. The raison d’être of the Star Gate program was primarily to determine the degree to which IΨ could assist in intelligence collection and whether the intelligence alluding to Soviet Bloc research in this field posed a national security threat. If so, to determine this, the first and foremost question was: were such capabilities real and implementable? All aspects of the research and applied program were in support of this primary mission. Did the Star Gate program satisfy this objective? Yes, and here is why.  Between the SRI and the remote viewing (RV) operations group at Ft. Meade, a total of 504 separate missions were tasked by a variety of agencies that required 2865 individual remote viewings to accomplish the stated missions.  Of the 19 client agencies from 1973-1995, 17 were returning customers for the remote viewing human intelligence (RV-HUMINT) collection product—an 89.5% customer return rate. It seems highly unlikely that there would be such a high customer return rate if the RV-HUMINT information were not worthy of such attention. Another way to answer the question of the utility of IΨ would be to query each tasking agency as to the mission-by-mission assessment. These data are not available. A third way to answer this question would be to provide such an assessment by outcome measures that might be contained in the CIA declassified data release. But only a small number of such assessments are available. Perhaps this is so because, in the intelligence tasking agency → collector → analyst → tasking agency cycle it is rare, indeed, that the information collector receives any direct feedback as to the success or failure of any given task. THE OPERATIONS The application of remote viewing to concerns of national security was accomplished under various Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) programs at Ft. Meade, Maryland. From 1973 to 1978, the SRI team conducted all operations and undertook 54 operational projects, with a total of 127 remote viewing sessions. In 1978, with the establishment of the DIA- Army INSCOM Grill Flame project, an in-house effort for operational remote viewing was established at Ft. Meade. Of the 251 personnel considered for Grill Flame, 117 were interviewed, from which six individuals were selected for training in the remote viewing method. From the first operational session on 4th September 1979—a missing A6E aircraft was located within a 15-nautical mile radius of its downed location—to its end in 1995, the Ft. Meade RV unit was tasked on 450 operational projects, with a total of 2738 remote viewing sessions, by various agencies. Figure 1 illustrates the number of projects assigned by various intelligence agencies (tasking agencies) to the Ft. Meade RV unit. As is evident from this figure, there were many repeat customers for the RV-HUMINT effort. (Cancelled projects have not been included in this count. Projects divided into segments, such as a, b, c, have either been included under the main project number, or separated, depending on the year. These issues, along with the availability of listings of all projects leads to a discrepancy between the totals presented in Figures 1 and 5.) While critiques of the program can be found in the memorandums and reports in this volume, Figure 2 and Figure 3, are typical of the letters in support of this activity. Excerpts from customer evaluations (1981) can be seen in Figure 4. Ft. Meade Tasking Agencies/Year (1979-1985) Total Projects: 100; Total Sessions: 729 18 17 16 15 14 ~ 12 '5' 10 if. 10 9 II 15 8 :;; 8 II iz 6 4 5 4 4 I I• I I 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 ••• ~ 1 (fJ 1 "- <( I (fJ I I 0 "- •z 1 <( ••I •• 1 (fJ 1 "- z 1 (fJ 1 <( <( 1 (fJ <( <( I <( <( 1 •u'i 0 Q <( (fJ ::, f u Q (fJ z <( (fJ ::, (fJ ::, f u Q <( (fJ ::, (fJ ::, (fJ (fJ ::, f u (fJ z (fJ (fJ ::, f u (fJ z u (fJ z 0 1979 (3) 1980 (40) 1981 (25) 1982 (11) 1983 (14) 1984 (6) 1985(1) Taskina Aoencies 1979 -1985 Ft. Meade Tasking Agencies/Year (1986-1995) Tota l Projects: 350; Total Sessions: 2009 120 111 100 u 80 <I) ·e CL 15 60 :;; D 39 § 40 I- z 24 21 17 -• I • 20 15 14 13 14 12 13 -I ■ I 9 8 0 ■ <( I<( z I <( I 5 >- 7 <( 7 3 >- I <( "- I 2 4 <( <( <( z 2 <( 5 "- • z ~ ~ "- "- "- (!) iii (!) (!) § 0 0 (fJ 0 0 ~ 0 "- 0 ~ 0 t:; 0 0 0 t:; 0 0 t:; 0 0 t:; >- 0 ~ ::, ~ <( (fJ (fJ (fJ "- <( ::, 0 ::, 0 ::, (fJ 0 ::, 1986 (10) 1987 (1 6) 1988 (31) 1989 (44) 1990 (127) 1991 (16) 1992 (25) 1993 1994 (59) 1995 (10) (12) Tasking Agencies 1986 - 1995 Figure 1. Tasking agency distribution from (a) 1979–1985, and (b) 1986–1995 at Ft. Meade. The number in parentheses represent the total projects in the stated year. ,, ·. , -. ; Approved For Release 2003/09/09 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060003-0 ,. Approved For Release 20QQIJ J;i96Nof"+AI.J.100230001-9 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNIT ED 9TATIE9 AR MY INTElLIGEMCE AN O THREA T AN,.LYSII CENTER A~LINOTON HALL IT,t.TION FORTGEORGEG. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755- 6000 ARLINGTON , VIRGIN IA 22212 serial: N/ 17 22 JAX-TI\- R 12 October 1984 SUllJECT: Spec i a 1 Analytic Report SG1A SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation (U) LTC Watt TO: Commander Chief, Spec i a l Actions U.S. Army Intelligence and AOC SOPS , HUMJN T Security Command Headquarter s , USA lNSCOM ATTN : Chief , security Systems Fort Me ade, MO 20755 Planninq Division Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755 SG1A 1, ( U) Hefe r ence. Letter from Majo r reyereisen, Chi ef, - Ground Order of Batt l e Task Force to Con,na nder, !TAC, Subject: Speci a ~ t i c Rep ort 1. (C) We wish to express our thanks and appr eciation for your outstanding support At our SG1A request, you were able to proviae 1mmea1ate, specific toilllllllllilll , 4 December 1980 (Incl 1) . information, some of which was later confirmed or comple- SG1A SG1A mented by information from othe r sources. Overall , your 2. (S) The reference forwards an eva l uation of l■■■iiiiiil■■ l am support considerably enhanced the scope of the project and please. d with the results and fully su onort Major reyere1sen s reco mmendation resulted in tangible success and genuine impact on U.S. that the i nfo r mation be used in the Ground Order of Batt le supplement national security. SG 1A on Expedi t ion ary Forces . SG1A SG1A 3. (C ) I would I 1ke to express niy appreciation for the support you have 2. (C) lll■l■lllllhas received attention at the hi ghest levels or ~n e u .D. uovernment . Your contribution is prov i ded to t he - Ground Orde r of Battle Task Force . Your part ici pa tion considered s i gnificant , a a wi ll be used for future consid- in this if!l)ortant O!A/INSCOM pr oject will add to the overall significance of e r ations as it has been the past . Thank you aqai n for an ana lys is which has national leve l interest. I would also like to your outsta nding supper comp li me nt you an d your pe rs onne l on a chievi ng a n intelligence co,nnunity "first. 11 SG1I 4. (U) I look f on,a rd to continued close cooperation between you r organi zati on and the In t ell igence and Threat Analysis Center. or I In c l 6¼~,~ ~ ARION N. PATTAKOS" Communications Security COLONEL, Ml NSA review(s) completed. Clarslfled 81 NSA/ CSSM ln-2 Command ing D1classify On: Orlzinalh:c tlf:.:i1,;y's Pclcrm:n:rt!on R:!:ij_'.!in:1 Approved For Release 2003/09/09 ·: CIA-RDP96-00.188R00040006000.3,0 Approved For Relea€ : 0 N A [!)IEff?fA\~~001700230001-9 Figure 2. Letter of appreciation from Figure 3. Letter of appreciation from the National Security Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center Agency (1984). (ITAC) (1980). Approved Fo_r Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788ROOIE T ~ FROM CUSTD1'£R EVALUATIONS: ITAC : There were a few. spectacular reports ••• the project confir med with uncanny a ccuracy the pr esence of a recently constructed major ditch array and the nunber and type· of elite units in a remote garrison area. ill= In sum, O\!~experience with GF, t hus f a r, tends to strengthen the validity of the techniques involved and also indicates that i ts greatest utility as an operational tool may be in the CI field . JCS: I n 16 out of 18 cases GF sources described the facili t y i n s ufficie nt detail to allow posi t ive identifica tion . ITAC : I woul d a l s o like to CC>fll)liment you and your personnel on achi eving an intelligence 'c'o'innunity "First." SG1H ~ : Therefore , it i s t he j udgement of this analyst tha t extensive testing and development of control procedures be accomplished before any final assess rr.e nt of the value of GF materi a l can be made • Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96_-00788R001,1~1.r Figure 4. Excerpts from customer evaluations (1981). The released declassified documents do not contain evaluation data for all the years; in many of the annual reports, several pages have been exempt from release — at times 17-20 pages at a stretch. Nevertheless, we could find several summary reports either as part of a document, or as standalone pages. In the following, we reproduce some examples which give clear indicators for the efficacy of remote viewing as a HUMINT collection capability; the data contained within them is sufficient to draw conclusions on the utility of remote viewing. Figure 5 provides a summary analysis of operations from 1979 to 1984. Over the years we find that there are many projects that were not evaluated by the customer; Figure 6 lists some of these reasons for operational projects in 1990. Figure 7 lists the success rate for projects from January to August 1990. Figure 8 is a descriptive analysis of the evaluation of 59 cases by the Joint Task Force engaged in counternarcotic efforts. Approved For Re lease S e G R ~ ' +6-00788R001500040003-0 INFORMATION PAPER !AGPA- F -S0 10 Oc .t 84 SUF\JECT : CENTER LANJ; Operat i onal Accomplis hments (U) ISSUE : (U) To provide th_e Ui rector, DI A with statist i cal and narrative info r mation on CENTER LANE operat i ons . FACTS, 1. {S/CL-3/NOFORN) Total number of projects from 1 September 1979 to 28 September 1984 : 106 2. (S/CL-3/NOPORN) f\ nmbcr of projects rated by sponsor as having intellige n ce value: 53 3. (S/Cl.-3/KOFORN) Number of projec t s rated by spo n sor as having no i ntelligence va l ue : 26 4. (S/C L -3/NOFORN) Number of projects reporting info r mation not verifiable by the sponsor: S. (S/CL-3/NO FORN) Numher of projects without evaluations from the sponso r: 6. S/CL-3/NO FORN) Numbe r ~f projects cance ll ed: 12 7. (S/CL - 3/NO f ORN ) t,;umbcr of ongoing projects : (S/CL-3/NOFORN) Attached i s a summa r y of al l ope r at i on.al projects l isted by project number , task , nnd value of informat i on ohta i ned . LTC Orian Uuzby/AVN 923 - 2656 WARN I NG NO T ICE: CE NTER LAN E SPEC1AL ACCESS PROGRAM RESTR I CT DISSEMINATlON TO T lillSE Wl TH Vi=lUfIE D ACCESS TO CATEGORY THREE ( 3 ) SRNS!TIVE TNTELLIGENCE SOURCES A~D METHODS I NVOLVED NO T RELf:ASAl3LE TD FORE I GN NAT IONAL S CLASSIFIED BY: CDR, I NS COM DECLASSIFY ON : OADR :i... Approved For Release -StC RE COPY / Of COPIES rs.J0 /88R0015"0ffinlffl0"3-0 Figure 5. Center Lane operational accomplishments (1 September 1979 to 28 September 1984). [The 10-page attachment to this document has been exempted from release.] OPERATIONAL PROJECTS Operational Projects 1 JAN 90 - 10 AUG 90 1 January 1990 - 10 August 1990 104 TOTAL PROJECTS There were 72 projects not eva luated by 28.1'11, 395 SESSIONS the customer for the following reasons : The customer lacked the resources 31.2'11, Weather 40.6'11, Prioritization of leads Prioritization of customer comm itments Fleeting target CORRELATION FACTORS OF THE 32 71 8% Success Rate CUSTOMER-EVALUATED PROJECTS CEP too large to search Approved Fo r Release 2000/08/08 : CIA•RDP96-00789R0011 0001 0001-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001100010001-li Figure 7. Success rate for customer evaluated Figure 6. Reasons for customers not projects (1 January to 10 August 1990). evaluating projects. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP96-00789R003600130003-6 HlfilH NOFORN STATISTICAL EVALUATION TOTAL CASES: 59 Search only cases: 1 Detail only cases: 31 Search and detail cases: 27 CASE BREAKDOWN: 39 UNABLE TO CORRELATE : Defined as a case in which JTF4 could nol task assets to respond to information in the report provided. 6 NEGATIVE ; NO CORRELATION: Defined as a case in which JTF4 (o r other) assets were tasked as a direct result of the report provided, and the information provided was proven to be incorrect. 9 SOME CORRELATION : Defined as a case in which there was at least one data element provided in the report that correlated to known true information wl1ich was received by JTF4 after the case report was completed. This does not include correct responses on known ope rational data. 5 STRONG CORRELATION : Defi ned as a case in which there are several data elements in the report which correlate to known true information received by JTF4 after the report was completed. NOTE: The correlations were all on details provided in the case ; no correlations in cases in which primary objective was to locate a vessel. Of cases in which a correlation was possible due to JTF4 asset tasking or reported information received after the case report was completed (34% of cases, 20): 30% had no correlation to known data. 45% had some correlation. 25% had strong correlation to known data. 81!81 ii! I IJOFORN Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP96-00789R0036001 30003-6 Figure 8. Details of evaluation of a Joint Task Force (JTF) project, date not known. To reiterate, the 1979–1984 (Figure 5) analysis shows that of the 81 projects evaluated by the tasking analysts, 53 (65.4%) projects were rated as having intelligence value, and in 1990 (Figure 7) of the 32 projects evaluated by the tasking analysts 23 demonstrated having intelligence value (71.8%). Thus, it is appropriate to state that there is strong evidence for the utility of informational psi (IΨ) as an additional tool in the arsenal of intelligence collection methods. In the analysis of 1989 Sun Streak data (DIA, 1989, see p. 476, this volume), the author cautions on the averaging of data: If all Sun Streak projects are averaged together … data correlation would range from about 20 percent for small scale aspects to about 40 percent for large scale aspects. While “averaging” such data may indicate overall results in the long run, such averaging tends to washout those results that have singular high merit, such as the identification several months in advance of a specific area in the US where a fugitive was later found. THE SCIENCE Right from its inception, the Stanford Research Institute (SRI, later known as SRI International), and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) research programs had taken a physicalist position in the exploration of informational psi (IΨ)––remote viewing (real- time/precognition), and causal psi (CΨ)––psychokinesis (PK)—primarily a physics, engineering, and cognitive science approach. (See Annex I for a brief background on the nature of IΨ (p. 48). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the first of the intelligence community sponsors, and the SRI team started with the assumption that psi is real, and worked on how best it can be applied to problems of national security and intelligence collection. The basic question for the intelligence community was, if it is true that the Russians have advanced psi technology how can we best develop it at home and develop countermeasures to protect against it. Questions of basic research—how does it work?—were addressed nearly 8 to 10 years after the inception of the program, and was realized with a basic research charter by the US Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC). This permitted focus on basic research in addition to the applied effort. A signal-based approach, which is the basis for all the other sensory systems, was at the core of this activity right from the inception of this program. The main thrust of the research program was using the method of remote viewing (RV) for precognition and real-time IΨ. Telepathy was never considered due to the inherent problem of determining its validity. Although telepathy is mentioned as a process in some of the operational remote viewing sessions, the protocols in place were essentially for precognitive/future RV and real-time RV; there were no specific telepathy protocols in place to investigate this assumption. In a recent analysis, Marwaha and May (2016, 2019) have concluded that IΨ (precognition, real-time) is most likely the only form of psi, subsuming within it clairvoyance, telepathy, causal psi (psychokinesis), and the survival hypothesis. Other areas such as out-of-body (OBE), near-death-experience (NDE), effect of psychedelic drugs, distance healing, “mind control,” astral travel and UFOs, were not part of the research charter. It was simply a rigorous science program examining and applying IΨ (precognition, real-time) using the remote viewing methodology, and investigating the causal psi (CΨ) hypothesis. The term “psychoenergetic phenomena” was used in the government program, in keeping with the Russian terminology, and is also used here to refer to psi phenomena. Based on the requirements of the sponsoring agencies, the trajectory of the research shifted from applied to basic research and continued at the Laboratories for Fundamental Research (LFR), where consolidation of the empirical data has led to theoretical advances. Figure 9 illustrates an overview of what has been accomplished in this extensive research program for the understanding of psi. The complex set of questions that this phenomenon raises, makes this a science in progress. At the end of 1995, not all goals of the Star Gate program were met, but many were. A few (among many) successes include: (1) a research methodology (remote viewing) to elicit high quality psi nearly on demand, (2) a host of practical applications of psi, (3) a thermodynamic model that might lead to an understanding of IΨ, and (4) development of a fundamental testable model of experimenter psi (decision augmentation theory), leading to the analysis that apparent micro-, bio-PK (CΨ) is essentially an expression of IΨ. A few examples that were not met include: (1) developing a valid psi training methodology, (2) developing a successful confidence calling procedure, and (3) methods to identify personality factors that were predictive of psi performance. The results and analysis of the Star Gate program served as a basis for the development of the multiphasic model of precognition/informational psi (MMIΨ) at the Laboratories for Fundamental Research (LFR). 1970s at SRI 1980s at SRI 1990s at SAIC • Applications • Applications • Selection/Training ·Applications •Selection of psi gifted persons • Target Characteristics • Assessment Methods •Training • Assessment Methods • Target Characteristics • Decision Augmentation Theory • Entropy Hypothesis • No Support for PK Hypothesis • Decision Augmentation Theory Focus: Person-centric Focus: Pers on-centric Focus: Person- & Information-centric _ _A_P_P_L-IE_D_ R_E_S_E_A_R_C_H_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _A _ P_ PL_I_ ED_ R_E_S_E_A_R_ C_H_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _B _A_S _I_ C_&_ A _ P_ PL_I_ ED_ R _ ES _E_A_R_C_H_ __ _ , , )~ OVERVIEW OF PSI RESEARCH: FROM 1970s - A SIGNAL-BASED APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING PSI ✓ 2000s at LFR 2010s at LFR • No Support for Pre-stimulus Response •Precognition Only Form of Psi Hypothesis • Rejection of QM Hypothesis • Decision Augmentation Theory • Development of Signal-based Multiphasic Model of Precognition/Informational Psi •Nature of Psi Focus: Person-centric (Physiology) Focus: Physics & Neuroscience Domains BAS IC RESEARCH T HEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS Figure 9. An overview of the advances in psi research from the SRI-SAIC-LFR effort. The overall conclusion reached by the Star Gate program is: In a total of 504 separate missions from 1972-1995, remote viewing produced actionable intelligence prompting 89% of the customers to return with additional missions. The Star Gate data indicate that informational psi (IΨ) is a scientifically valid phenomenon. These data have led to the development of a physics and neuroscience based testable model for the underlying mechanism, which considers informational psi as a normal, albeit atypical, phenomenon. Further, there was insufficient evidence to support the validity and applicability of causal psi (CΨ). In the following, we present an overview of the Star Gate archives, which includes that of the CIA released declassified documents, followed by a brief history of the program, including the funding, and synopsis of the early reviews. This is followed by a discussion on operational remote viewing as a human intelligence (HUMINT) platform, the operational remote viewing program, concluding with the implications of the Star Gate applied and basic psi research program. To complete this overview of such a vast program that stands on a complex methodology and science, in conclusion we discuss the implications of the SRI, SAIC and Ft. Meade applied remote viewing program. The Star Gate Archives In 2000–2003, the CIA released the declassified Star Gate documents, including those from SRI International and SAIC, and the various government departments involved in the program. These were provided on 15 disks, in tiff format, and in no particular order. Thus, unless one was familiar with the program, knew what to look for, or had systematically gone through the documents it would be quite a difficult task to make sense of all this material. The Star Gate Archives are comprised of four volumes: Volume 1: Remote Viewing, 1972-1984, Volume 2: Remote Viewing, 1985-1995, Volume 3: Psychokinesis, and Volume 4: Operational Remote Viewing: Government Memorandums and Reports. For preparing these four volumes, we have gone through the complete CIA released declassified documents, including a systematic review of the operational remote viewing projects. Additionally, unclassified documents in the possession of the Laboratories for Fundamental Research—the keeper of the keys of Star Gate—and other principals, have also been included in these volumes. The exercise of preparing Volumes 1 to 4 has given us a complete picture of the Star Gate program––administrative, operational, and research––leading to the conclusions we have already spelled out. The classified nature of the program limited the number of documents that were available for early reviewers to access, thus making all previous reviews of the program incomplete. THE CIA RELEASED DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS The CIA declassified about 11067 documents, covering the period 1972 to 1995, comprising about 82518 pages. The varieties of documents released included multiple copies of (1) SRI/SAIC proposals and statements-of-work for multiple tasks submitted to and received from different contracting agencies reflected in individual reports, (2) SRI/SAIC quarterly/monthly interims reports, drafts, and presentations to the Scientific Oversight Committees, (3) SRI/SAIC final reports, (4) SRI and Ft. Meade operational and training sessions, including tasking, response, and analysis (where available), (5) memorandums and letters exchanged within and between contracting agencies and the government, including transmittal slips, handwritten notes, and miscellaneous administrative documents; (6) English and non-English articles/publications from external sources on the subject matter. At several places the content of memorandums, letters, and operational documents are redacted. However, since the copies of several documents have not been uniformly redacted, we have been able to fill in some of the redactions in some of the documents. Table 1 presents an approximate count of the released documents; Figure 10 illustrates the number of SRI/SAIC documents per year regardless of type. (See Appendix V, pp. 705–707 of this volume.) Table 1. CIA-Released Document Set Document Type  # of Documents  SRI/SAIC Proposals  35  SRI/SAIC Interim Reports  189  SRI/SAIC Final Reports  163  Memos and Letters  2556  Operations/Training Sessions: Data and Reports  7114  Government Reports  147  Open Source Articles  863  Total Documents  11067  Total SRI-SAIC Documents 1972-1995: 334 40 36 ~ 35 33 ~ Q) ~ 30 c., 26 E ~ 25 23 0 0 21 () :t: 20 19 CJ) 17 ~ 16 16 15 ~ 15 14 1·: _ iIi i i Ii11 Year of Publication 1.1 I Figure 10. Number of SRI/SAIC documents per year, from 1972–1995. The minimum at 1990 represents the contract shift from SRI to SAIC. The data released for the operational RV program includes nearly all session reports including remote viewing responses, tasking sheets, working notes, associated memorandums, and evaluation feedback in a few cases. In many cases, documents that may reveal specifics of a case and evaluation reports are redacted, making that information unavailable for review. For this volume, we have examined all the available session reports, classifying them according to the various projects/tasks. In reviewing this database, we notice that there are several project and session reports that are not available, although they are listed elsewhere; chances are that these operational reports have not been released probably due to the sensitive nature of the information contained therein, or, more likely, that the reports have not been sent back to Ft. Meade––the base of remote viewing operations––from the tasking agency, or not pooled into the CIA Star Gate records. (The CIA is the keeper of these records). One must remember that this was not a priority program, functioning without a timeframe, and with multiple agencies involved in it over a period of 23 years. That so much data is available is remarkable indeed. In this volume, details of the application of remote viewing––the operations aspect of the Star Gate program––are presented, along with the documents produced by the government agencies supporting the program. A 23-year program with multiple activities, participants and overseers, no doubt, has tremendous amount of correspondence—routine and specific—during the duration of the program. Additionally, the sponsoring agencies, mostly the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), produced several internal reports and briefings for the top echelons of the government. From this vast database, the most important and relevant memorandums and reports (a balance of support for the program or not) have been selected for this volume. These documents have been organized chronologically permitting us to view the behind the scenes activities of this vast program. The documents presented in this volume, and those contained in the CIA released set, are comprehensive, with no critical breaks in the narrative. These documents have not been edited for content, except for typographical errors. Single page memorandums/letters have been presented in their original form; multiple page memorandums/letters and documents have been reformatted, however, the original form at the beginning and end have been retained where appropriate. A Brief History of the Star Gate Program THE FIRST DECADE (1972–1984) With the early operational successes of the psi-gifted Ingo Swann and Pat Price in 1973–1974, the first decade of the Star Gate program started with the basic assumption that IΨ exists, and it is an inherent ability of some “gifted” persons. This was later established by the 1973– 1988 meta-analysis of the SRI research (May, Utts, Trask et al., 1989). Thus, the program focused on identifying psi-gifted persons from among the army and civilian ranks, as well as from the general population. Additionally, the program developed structured “training” programs to increase the efficacy of operational remote viewing; applied research was the focus of attention. Much of what is contained in Volume 1 is geared towards that goal. As long as remote viewing provided actionable information on some of the most difficult intelligence problems, to be used along with data from other intelligence sources, the clients were satisfied. This activity occurred under the nicknames Gondola Wish, Grill Flame, Center Lane, Sun Streak, under the charge of Army INSCOM and the DIA. This period also saw basic research in causal psi (CΨ; psychokinesis). However, by the mid-1980s the SRI team was beginning to shift to the view that the evidence for CΨ as a valid phenomenon had not yet been obtained, based, in part, on the understanding that the statistical results obtained in CΨ experiments may be due to an informational process rather than a causal one. This eventually gave rise to the intuitive data sorting model, now known as decision augmentation theory. (See Volume 3). On 23 August 1984, the Secretary of the Army approved the discontinuance of the special access program Center Lane as an Army INSCOM project, and authorized negotiations for transfer of the project to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) or another suitable agency. By October 1984, the program was transferred to DIA, and in March 1985, the special access program Sun Streak was established. It was not until January 1986, that the INSCOM Center Lane project was formerly transferred to the DIA, to become the DIA project Sun Streak. INSCOM’s greatest contribution was that their operational nature provided a proving ground for the ongoing research. They were also able to pose questions and identify problems they encountered in their operational sessions that could then guide research that could aid applications efforts (DIA, 1989). THE SECOND DECADE (1985–1995) By the beginning of the second decade, several changes had occurred in the structure and content of the program. At SRI, Russell Targ had left the program in 1982, and Dr. Harold Puthoff left the program in August 1985. The remote viewing research at SRI was now designated as the Cognitive Sciences Program. In late 1990, that program was shut down at SRI International, and was eventually transferred to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), where it continued till the end of the overall program in 1995. In 1985–1986, under the directorship of Dr. Edwin May, and with substantial involvement of the US Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC) the focus of the research effort shifted to examining fundamental aspects of psi phenomena. Thus, in addition to operational remote viewing, and applied research, basic research came into focus. The various basic research tasks were developed by the SRI team with active participation of the sponsors and members of the expert panels of the oversight committees (see Appendix III, pp. 697–699, this volume). As stated in a DIA (1989, p. 444, this volume) report on government sponsored research in psychoenergetics, in FY (fiscal year) 1986 a five-year psi research program was launched at SRI using USAMRDC funds. The five-year program had three major objectives (p. 460–461): a. Document that psychoenergetic [psi] phenomena are real and reproducible. b. Determine the mechanism underlying psychoenergetic phenomena. c. Bring psychoenergetics into the mainstream of human performance research. The categories of research interest formed a hierarchy ranging from basic research on fundamental mechanisms to methodologies for applications. These included: a. Identifying explanatory mechanisms (e.g., electromagnetic effects, neurophysiological mechanisms). b. Specifying phenomenological properties (e.g., effects of distance and shielding). c. Determining physical, physiological and psychological correlates (e.g., geophysical environment, EEG, and GSR measures). d. Develop optimal strategies for use in applications (e.g., statistical averaging). These objectives and interests served as a guideline for the SRI/SAIC research from 1985 to 1995. PROJECT NICKNAMES Following is an overview of the project nicknames under the US government sponsored psi research and applications program. Project Gondola Wish Established: September 1977. Main Sponsor/s: Army INSCOM. Goal: A program designed to integrate the Soviet and East European parapsychology intelligence collection threat into the all-source OPSEC (Operations Security) support mission to mimic HOIS (Hostile Intelligence Service) remote viewers to determine U.S. vulnerability. Research Focus: (1) Training for increasing the strength of in-house remote viewers, (2) utilize these trained personnel to perform the OPSEC cycle (i.e. demonstrate the threat, identify EEFI (Essential Elements of Friendly Information) exploitable by parapsychological means, determine vulnerabilities, and recommend countermeasures) in support of selected installations/projects. Project Grill Flame Established: 13 July 1978. Main Sponsor/s: DIA-INSCOM Joint Program. Goal: A program designed to integrate the Soviet and East European parapsychology intelligence collection threat into the all-source OPSEC (Operations Security) support mission to mimic HOIS (Hostile Intelligence Service) remote viewers to determine U.S. vulnerability. Research Focus: Training for remote viewing, remote perturbation (CΨ/PK) investigations, and countermeasures. Project Center Lane Established: 1 March 1983. Project Grill Flame name changed to Project Center Lane. Main Sponsor/s: INSCOM. Goal: RV operations. Research Focus: Same as for Grill Flame. Special Access Program (SAP) Sun Streak (for a brief period, a.k.a. Dragoon Absorb). Established: 30 March 1985. 31 January 1986: INSCOM Project Center Lane formally transferred to DIA. Main Sponsor/s: DIA, USAMRDC. Goal: Operational RV, improve RV skills. Research Focus: USAMRDC focus on examining fundamental aspects of psi phenomena, especially as it relates to medical or biological factors. Pertinent findings from this effort to be applied to the operational RV. Terminated: 23 October 1990. Project Star Gate at Science Applications International Corporation Established: 31 January 1991. Main Sponsor: DIA. Research Focus: Basic Research. Terminated: September 1995.   THE FUNDING The $19.933M funding for the Star Gate program came from a variety of executive branch agencies and the military and intelligence communities. Although this sounds like a substantial amount of funding, in terms of the usual government military projects, this was a small amount, especially on a year to year basis. Another consideration is what is called overhead required by both SRI International (SRI) and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), which sharply reduced the actual funding available for project use. The overhead differed slightly over the course of the program and between the two contracting organizations. Figure 11 shows the total funding on a year by year basis. This funding is independent of the cost for the operational aspects of the program at Ft. Meade, the cost of which would be part of the normal activities of the DIA and Army INSCOM. SRI-SA1C Funding 1972-1995 Total: $19.933 million uso 2500 2300 2000 2000 2000 1900 1833 ~ C ~ 1500 1450 1l. w ~ .a' "g> 1000 933 890 890 l 719 665 811 650 575 575 600 lll 0 500 273 50 70 75 74 100 ■ -.-.-)i111J1JI 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Year of Star Gate Funding Figure 11. Star Gate funding from all government sources from 1972-1995. Total amount: $19.933 M USD. The government funding sources included: Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA), Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Army Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Foreign Technology Division (FTD) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Missile Research and Development Command (MIRADCOM), National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA), Naval Electronic Systems Command, and Congress itself funding for Star Gate via one or more of the above agencies. Although popularly considered a CIA program, the fact is that DIA and USAMRDC contributed the largest amount for this research program. Figure 12 shows the approximate contributions of various agencies for the Star Gate program over the years. USAMRDC played a pivotal role in funding and guiding the basic research program from 1985 onwards. Their support has led to several advances in understanding psi phenomena, as indicated in this introduction and evident in Volumes 2 and 3 of these archives. SRI-SAIC Funding 1972-1995 Total: $19.933 million USD 12000 10075 10000 8000 ~ e g, 6000 ~ L1. 4000 2000 105 74 0 .p"'~ _,__Qr <,_'<> ,P0~ '<. ~<ii' Supporting Agency Figure 12. Star Gate funding agencies from 1973–1995. REVIEWS OF THE PROGRAM Aside from the periodic evaluation by the contracting agencies, and a meta-analysis of the SRI data from 1973–1988 (see 1989 Review of the Psychoenergetic Research Conducted at SRI International, Volumes 1, 2, and 3), the Star Gate program was scrutinized by several reviews of the research. These include: (1) 1979, The Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee Report (a.k.a. The Gale Committee Report); (2) 1984, The Science Panel Report on SRI Studies in Remote Viewing; (3) 1987, The Enhanced Human Performance Project: An Assessment of the Effort to Date; (4) 1988, The National Research Council Study on Enhancing Human Performance; (5) 1995, An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications (a.k.a. The American Institutes for Research (AIR) Report). The difference between the Science Panel and the in-house DIA reports and the external reviews is that DIA had access to all classified material, whereas the NRC and other external reviewers had no or limited access to the classified material of these special access programs, and in the case of the AIR reviewers they apparently chose to ignore the classified material, selecting only ten reports from the SAIC era for their evaluation; much of the SAIC research was geared to exploring various aspects of IΨ. 1979. The Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee Report (a.k.a. The Gale Committee Report) Endorsing the sincerity and dedication of the research team, the Gale Committee ruled out fraud and deception in the research. They offered some contradictory conclusions and recommendations: (1) No meaningful theoretical explanation exists. (2) Support research for proof- of-principle only if a credible approach is formulated; (3) Do not support scientific understanding until phenomena existence is established; (4) Intelligence community can pursue operational investigations if: (a) monitored, (b) human use requirements observed, (c) adequate controls established, and (d) SRI dependence phased-out; (5) Exploratory work in DoD laboratories should be phased out; (6) Private sector research should be monitored and periodically reviewed; (7) Central DoD authority should be established; (8) Intelligence Community should continue collection efforts to avoid surprise (p. 214). The full report and the ensuing discussions can be found in this volume (pp. 187–214). 1984. The Science Panel Report: SRI Studies in Remote Viewing—A Program Review An independent Science Panel was constituted to review the Grill Flame SRI studies in remote viewing. With appropriate caveats they state: (1) The lack of a physical model should not be taken to preclude the existence of the capability to view a remote location; (2) The evidence shown is too impressive to dismiss as mere coincidence; (3) On the basis of the brief exposure to the SRI program, the Panel found no obvious evidence of cueing or collusion between the viewer and the experiment monitors; (4) Dr. Puthoff’s team warrants cautious continued fiscal support, and the research should be conducted as much as possible in an open unclassified mode so that its reproducibility and accuracy can be independently verified by others. The full report can be found in this volume (pp. 345–346). 1987. The Enhanced Human Performance Project: An Assessment of the Effort to Date In a unanimous agreement, members of the DIA and Scientific Oversight Committee Project Review Group determined to its satisfaction that the work of the Enhanced Human Performance Project is scientifically sound, appropriately managed and monitored, and is providing valuable insight into the nature of an anomaly which could have a significant impact on the DoD. The full report can be found in this volume (pp. 425–428). 1988. The National Research Council Study on Parapsychology In summarizing the remote viewing research at SRI, the NRC committee stated: … after approximately 15 years of claims and sometimes bitter controversy, the literature on remote viewing has managed to produce only one possibly successful experiment that is not seriously flawed in its methodology––and that one experiment provides only marginal evidence for the existence of ESP. By both scientific and parapsychological standards, then, the case for remote viewing is not just very weak, but virtually nonexistent. It seems that the preeminent position that remote viewing occupies in the minds of many proponents results from the highly exaggerated claims made for the early experiments, as well as the subjectively compelling, but illusory, correspondences that experimenters and participants find between components of the descriptions and the target sites. Druckman and Swets (1988, p. 184) The NRC committee was not privy to the classified documents. As this is an external report, it is not published in this volume. A special report of a reply to the NRC study on parapsychology was prepared by John Palmer, Charles Honorton and Jessica Utts (1988) for the Board of Directors of the Parapsychological Association. While pointing out the several shortcomings of the NRC report, Palmer, Honorton and Utts (1988, p. 19) stated: As we have seen, the Committee’s primary conclusion regarding parapsychology is not merely unjustified by their report, it is directly contradicted by the Committee’s admission that it can offer no plausible alternatives. This concession, coming as it does from a Committee whose principal evaluators of parapsychology were publicly committed to a negative verdict at the outset of their investigation, actually constitutes a strong source of support for the conclusion that parapsychology has identified genuine scientific anomalies. They further stated: The scientific and defense communities are entitled to a rigorous and unbiased assessment of this research area. A strong prima facie case has been made for the existence of psi anomalies, and meaningful relationships between such events and psychological variables have been reported in the literature. Further efforts and resources should be expended toward the identification of underlying mechanisms and the development of theoretical models, either conventional or “paranormal,” that can provide adequate understanding. 1995. An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications (a.k.a. The AIR Report) In early 1995, a Congressionally Directed Action required the DIA to transfer the Star Gate program to the CIA. The directive included a retrospective review and technical analysis of the programs’ data since its inception. In June 1995, the CIA’s Office of Research and Development (ORD) contracted with the American Institutes for Research (AIR) to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the Star Gate program with a focus on the validity of the technical approaches according to acceptable scientific standards, and an evaluation of the overall program utility or usefulness to the government. In association with Drs. Michael Mumford, Andrew Rose, and David A. Goslin of the American Institutes of Research, the well-known skeptic Ray Hyman, professor of psychology, and professor of statistics Jessica Utts (President of the American Statistical Association, 2016) were appointed members of the Blue Ribbon Panel, contracted to conduct a retrospective review of the Star Gate research. The questions posed to the AIR panel were: (1) Does the evidence indicate the presence of a statistically significant effect? (2) Can the effects be attributed to paranormal [emphasis added] phenomena? (3) Is there an adequate understanding of the phenomenon? (4) Does the research provide support for intelligence gathering operations? While excerpts from this 183-page report can be found in this volume (pp. 656–684), some salient points of Hyman and Utts’ comments are presented here. Ray Hyman states: … Although, I cannot point to any obvious flaws in the experiments, the experimental program is too recent and insufficiently evaluated to be sure that flaws and biases have been eliminated … 4. The statistical departures from chance appear to be too large and consistent to attribute to statistical flukes of any sort. Although I cannot dismiss the possibility that these rejections of the null hypothesis might reflect limitations in the statistical model as an approximation of the experimental situation, I tend to agree with Professor Utts that real effects are occurring in these experiments. Something other than chance departures from the null hypothesis has occurred in these experiments. 5. However, the occurrence of statistical effects does not warrant the conclusion that psychic functioning has been demonstrated. (p. 681) Based on her review of the data, Utts stated: Using the standards applied to any other area of science, it is concluded that psychic functioning has been well established. The statistical results of the studies examined are far beyond what is expected by chance. Arguments that these results could be due to methodological flaws in the experiments are soundly refuted. Effects of similar magnitude to those found in government-sponsored research at SRI and SAIC have been replicated at a number of laboratories across the world. Such consistency cannot be readily explained by claims of flaws or fraud. The magnitude of psychic functioning exhibited appears to be in the range between what social scientists call a small and medium effect. That means that it is reliable enough to be replicated in properly conducted experiments, with sufficient trials to achieve the long-run statistical results needed for replicability. (p. 657) Utts concluded: It is clear to this author that anomalous cognition is possible and has been demonstrated. This conclusion is not based on belief, but rather on commonly accepted scientific criteria. The phenomenon has been replicated in a number of forms across laboratories and cultures. The various experiments in which it has been observed have been different enough that if some subtle methodological problems can explain the results, then there would have to be a different explanation for each type of experiment, yet the impact would have to be similar across experiments and laboratories. If fraud were responsible, similarly, it would require an equivalent amount of fraud on the part of a large number of experimenters or an even larger number of subjects. (p. 666) The difference between Hyman and Utts’ review arises from the fact that Utts, as a visiting scientist at SRI and a co-author on the 1989 meta-analysis of the SRI research—Review of the Psychoenergetic Research Conducted at SRI International (1973–1988), was familiar with the research. This was not the case for Hyman. In a fax dated 14 June 1995, the CIA had instructed Dr. Edwin May to: Provide as soon as possible a list of the 10 primary [emphasis original] studies or reports (unclassified or classified) developed under the subject program, i.e., Star Gate or its predecessor, that make the best case for establishing the validity of the paranormal phenomena known as Remote Viewing. The list should not [emphasis original] include secondary studies/reports or meta analyses. (p. 635) Summarizing the expert reviews, the AIR committee concluded (p. 684) (1) The laboratory research conducted as part of the present program has identified a statistically significant “anomaly.” (2) However, the experiments have not provided a convincing demonstration that a paranormal [emphasis added] ability is involved. (3) The research studies have not identified the nature and source of the effect. (4) There is no evidence that the phenomenon would prove useful in intelligence gathering. In addition to excerpts from this lengthy report, correspondence leading up to and after the contracting of the AIR Blue Ribbon Panel is published in this volume. Operational Remote Viewing: A HUMINT Platform The primary reason for the U.S. government’s involvement in psi research (psychoenergetics) was the application of informational psi (IΨ)––precognition and real-time RV––to matters of national security. Based on successful examples of long-distance RV in 1972-1973 at SRI (see 1973, Perceptual Augmentation Techniques: Technical Proposal, Volume 1, pp. 67-79), the CIA-Army INSCOM-SRI team saw merit in putting remote viewing to operational use. THE RV-HUMINT CYCLE Within the context of the Star Gate program, remote viewing may be considered as a type of HUMINT, an intelligence information collection procedure. (See Annex III, p. 57, this volume). This aspect has been clearly stated in the 1987 Sun Streak Annual Report: The mission of the SUN STREAK Prototype Operational Group (POG) remained dedicated to the application of the psychoenergetic process of Remote Viewing (RV) as a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection methodology to unilaterally collect foreign intelligence information or, through appropriate cueing, provide a basis for a sister discipline to prompt a specific collection effort on behalf of the Department of Defense (DOD) and other US intelligence community agencies when all other systems have failed [emphasis added]. (p. 430) While we are used to looking at the “psychic spying” effort from the perspective of the remote viewer, it will help to view this process in the larger context of intelligence collection. In this context, the remote viewer is an information source or a RV-HUMINT asset. Based on a review of the operational RV documents, we can lay out the step-by-step process of RV-HUMINT collection as illustrated in Figure 13. It is important to note here that once the RV assets and their program managers return the information data, it is not often that an evaluation/feedback was received to enable the RV-HUMINT asset––the remote viewer––to determine the value of their information. While efforts were made at Ft. Meade to receive a structured feedback from the tasking agency, it is evident from the CIA released documents that most often, feedback/evaluation was not provided to the Ft. Meade RV unit. Although there are some documents with the feedback/evaluation provided to the unit, particularly in the early years, most of them were heavily redacted, making it difficult to determine the evaluation; one clue to success or failure of the information acquired is that if the remote viewing produced no accurate or actionable intelligence, the evaluation was not redacted. However, there are several government reports and memorandums that point to the success of various RV operational projects that enable us to make an assessment of the validity and utility of remote viewing. Additionally, the number of repeat customers for this intelligence collection method further points to the value of RV-HUMINT. (See Annex III, pp. 57–58). Decision Maker CD An intelligence agency mission {the tasking agency) requires some information for which they have exhausted all other sources of information. i@ ® They contact the intelligence agency point of contact (POC) for CD t determining a possible source. Intelligence Agency Mission @ The POC contacts the DIA RV-HUMINT POC. {DIA was in charge of the program for the most part of the program), who hands the tasking over to i@ ~ 0t © The Ft. Meade program manager; (4) At this point, the intelligence Intelligence I @1 Intelligence Agency I agency POC and the intelligence analyst(s) may also come in contact with the Ft. Meade program manager, and sit in with the RV-HUMINT Analysts Point of Contact I I I asset (with or without his awareness), to either get immediate t • I I I i® t® information, or by means of a microphone be in touch with the monitor of the session to provide immediate feedback to the monitor to guide him in • DIA .--- asking questions to the asset. :4 I I I 14 •- - - I I I RV-HUMINT Point of Contact ,_ - - I V @ The task is handed to the RV-HUMINT asset. ® v ' T® 0 RV-HUM INT asset(s) initiate the remote viewing process. J: @t J: The RV information is provided to the program manager, who then gives it to the Ft. Meade Program Manager @ DIA RV-HUMINT POC, who forwards it to the !: 4 '' V' L-- rev I®t ® Tasking agency's POC. From this point it follows the general intelligence cycle, and the information goes to the ! f® ®l ®t @) Analysts RV-HUMINT RV-HU MINT RV-HU MINT @ Mission Commander, and to the Asset 1 Asset 2 Asset 3 @ Decision maker. Figure 13. RV-HUMINT collection cycle. SRI AND FT. MEADE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY From 1973 to 1984, 54 operational projects with 127 remote viewing sessions were conducted at SRI (see Figure 14). Following the first operational remote viewing session of the Grill Flame program at Ft. Meade in September 1979, a total of 450 projects with 2738 RV sessions were undertaken from 1979 to 1995 (see Figure 15). SRI Operational Projects: 54 SRI Operational Sessions: 127 50 45 45 ~ 40 Q C/) C/) Q) 35 f!2 30 C/) 29 ti 26 -~ 25 - ct 0 Q) 20 15 14 ,I~I .0 11 11~ I E ::i z 10 6 4 4 5 5 5 0 ~I ! I 0 0 ~I 2 2 ■■ 0 0 I I 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Year ■# SRI Operations Projects ■ #SR I Operations Sessions Figure 14. SRI operational projects and sessions (1973–1984). Ft Meade 1979-1995 Operational Projects: 450 Operationa l Sessions: 2738 *1993 - Insufficient data 450 425 412 399 400 352 "'0 C: 350 iii "' 300 !/2" .vi (.) 250 216 " ·e a. 200 178 0 131 " .0 150 125 12 115 128 I E ::, 100 z I 56 61 44 42 59 -I - 34 -• 50 40 25 30 31 25 29 - I 11 14 6 10 16 16 12 10 0 -=- I ■ 1 5 • I • ■ 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993' 1994 1995 Year • Projects • Sessions Figure 15. Ft. Meade operational projects and sessions (1979–1995). THE TASKING AGENCIES: THE END-USERS In October 1978, the ADCSOPS-HUMINT, US Army INSCOM, Ft. Meade MD, was tasked by the Commander of INSCOM to establish a program using the remote viewing method for intelligence application, as part of the Grill Flame project. The program started out with six remote viewers who were inducted into the program at the Ft. Meade RV unit. As mentioned, in September 1979 the first operational remote viewing session of the Grill Flame program took place, where a missing aircraft (A6E) was located within a 15-nautical mile radius of its downed location. The program at Ft. Meade continued till 1995, when the entire psi research program was closed. The Ft. Meade RV unit management and the SRI team presented several briefings to various intelligence agencies to introduce them to this new HUMINT method. Over the course of the 16 years of its existence, several agencies referred to the SRI-Ft. Meade RV-HUMINT platform to address their intelligence needs, as shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17. As is clearly evident from these figures, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Joint Task Force (JTF)—a drug interdiction task force—were the most frequent clients. The client base over the years also indicates the changing focus of attention of the intelligence agencies (Figure 1). SRI International 1972-1995 Tasking Agencies: 3 Projects: 54 Sessions: 127 50 43 1/) 40 tiQ) ·e- 0. 30 0... Q) .Q 20 E :, - - z 10 7 4 0 CIA DIA FTD Tasking Agency Figure 16. Client base for the SRI RV-HUMINT program (1973 – 1984). Ft. Meade 1979-1 995 Tasking Agenc ies: 18 Projects: 450 Sessio ns: 2738 200 180 172 160 .l!J 140 (.) 122 e 120 Q) Q_ o 100 Qi .0 80 E :::, z 60 40 31 34 - -- 23 20 0 I ~ f 8 I- 7 «~ , 5 ,<< 8 ~x ■ 17 2 3 ~ - 4 - - 5 I 5 2 0~ {::',:,_, {<_,"<' <),"<' 00 s0 00 ~0 ~ c}' u"<' ~o <) ~"(- ') ~0"<' ~ '00 ~ 0"<' .J-3 vs~ '00 ci' '00 Tasking Agencies Figure 17. Client base for the Ft. Meade RV-HUMINT program (1979 – 1995). CIA INVOLVEMENT AND CLOSE OF PROGRAM Although the CIA played a marginal role in funding, it played a pivotal role in that it initiated the program in 1973, and as a frequent end user of the IΨ intelligence product. In 1994-1995, under Congressional direction, the program was transferred from the DIA to the CIA; the Agency chose to close the program due to administrative reasons. The misconception that the SRI-SAIC remote viewing program was a CIA program may have come about because they initiated the program and eventually became the keepers of the program’s documents. It is popularly believed that the program closed because key players started to leave their military/intelligence careers behind them, and there was no evidence for remote viewing. Although the CIA claimed that remote viewing is not a valid phenomenon based on the AIR report, it is interesting to note that the CIA tasked the RV-HUMINT group for 41 projects at SRI and Ft. Meade, from 1973 to 1995 (See Figures 1, 16, 17. Also see Figure 4). This prompts us to consider the reasons behind the CIA’s decision to close the program. During the 1990s, due to several factors the new DIA management was not keen on the program, leading to disarray in their in-house program at Ft. Meade. In February 1995, this led to a Congressionally Directed Action that called for a transfer of the Star Gate program to the CIA. However, during this timeframe, the CIA was under great pressure. The 1994 Ames scandal –– one of the most damaging in the CIA’s history –– was still taking its toll on the organization. “Together with the radically altered international environment of the post-Cold War era, the Ames scandal prompted the most thorough review of U.S. intelligence needs since the CIA’s founding. Alternatives being considered by the Brown commission and congressional committees range from abolishing the CIA altogether to giving it greater powers than it has enjoyed since the CIA’s heyday” (Cooper, 1996).  Additionally, there were budget cuts and requirements for downsizing. As stated by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI, 2002) to a Joint Inquiry Committee: The last decade [1990s] saw a number of conflicting and competing trends: military forces deployed to more locations than ever in our nation’s history; a growing counterproliferation and counterterrorism threat; constant tensions in the Mid East and, to deal with these and a host of other issues, far fewer intelligence dollars and manpower. At the end of the Cold War, the Intelligence Community, like much of the National Security Community, was asked by both Congress and successive Administrations to pay the price of the “peace dividend.” The cost of the “peace dividend” was that during the 1990s our Intelligence community funding declined in real terms –– reducing our buying power by tens of billions of dollars over the decade. We lost nearly one in four of our positions. This loss of manpower was devastating, particularly in our two most manpower intensive activities: all-source analysis and human source collection. By the mid-1990s, recruitment of new CIA analysts and case officers had come to a virtual halt. NSA was hiring no new technologists during the greatest information technology change in our lifetimes. It is absolutely essential that we understand that both Congress and the Executive Branch for most of the decade embraced the idea that we could “surge” our resources to deal with emerging intelligence challenges, including threats from terrorism. And surge we did. (DCI, 2002). Adopting the Star Gate program at a time when CIA was under great scrutiny and pressure, would have added another layer of burden that they could do without. This is especially so since the program would have been sensationalized and misrepresented in the media. This concern has borne out as we have seen such accounts from the 1990s to the present. Thus, we can state that budget cuts and downsizing were the main reasons for the closure of the Star Gate program, as stated in a memorandum from the Director of Intelligence (see p. 606, this volume). One can speculate that the AIR review report was geared towards this end, affording the CIA a valid reason to terminate the program, despite the support, validity, and utility of remote viewing as a human intelligence collection method, and the scientific merits of the program. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AT FT. MEADE The first real use of psi for intelligence collection was a remote viewing attempt at SRI in August 1974. The results were described as valid messages being transmitted over noisy channels. These reports can be found in Volume 1 of this archive. Until 1978, operational remote viewings were conducted only at SRI. Subsequently, with the establishment of the unclassified program Grill Flame, the bulk of operations shifted to Ft. Meade, till the end of the program in 1995. The operations effort (September 1979 – May 1995) at Ft. Meade was overseen by several INSCOM and DIA appointed project managers over the course of the program, who served as intermediaries between the remote viewers and SRI/SAIC and the relevant government agencies. (See Appendix III, pp. 697). Their role included setting up the operational remote viewings, preparing reports, and at times serving as monitors and beacons for RV training. The SRI/SAIC work was also overseen by FTD, DIA and USAMRDC Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR), Dale Graff, Jim Salyer and Peter McNelis, respectively, at various times during the course of the program. THE RV-HUMINT ASSETS: THE REMOTE VIEWERS Over the 16 years of the operations effort at Ft. Meade, the total number of remote viewers never exceeded 25. At any given time, there were no more than 3 to 5 viewers available for operational remote viewing. While some remote viewers were part of the team for a year or so, most others were at Ft. Meade for about 3 to 5 years, whereas a few served for about 8 to 10 years. The viewers were assigned arbitrary numbers, some of which were shared across several viewers over the span of the program. Thus, in a retrospective review, it is difficult to collate any data from the project sessions reports regarding the viewers and the methods they used. We respectfully acknowledge their effort for their contribution to intelligence collection and towards our understanding of psi. Although some have voluntarily disclosed their names, in keeping with the confidentiality code, in this volume we have decided not to name any of the viewers. (See Appendix III). Selection and Training for Remote Viewing Right from the inception of the program it was recognized that psi is a natural ability. As stated in a November 1973 report on Position on Parapsychological Research (see p. 87, this volume): Basic Research Aspect––The goal is to find, if possible, the underlying mechanism of “giftedness” or to at least identify areas of communality between “gifted” subjects so that they can be sufficiently characterized to formulate a “profile” or incipient screening system. To accomplish this the following elements should be included in the program: Sensory Evaluation––The classical sensory pathways in the “gifted” (and matched control) subjects must be studied. Testing must go beyond the “normal” range and include discriminatory measures as well as threshold evaluations for each modality and include some testing (with barriers interposed) focused on the “special” abilities of the subject. This is reiterated in a December 1973 memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence (see p. 88, this volume) from Carl E. Duckett, Deputy Director for Science and Technology CIA, recommending that a research and development investigation of paranormal perception phenomena be initiated with Stanford Research Institute: The objectives of the proposed effort are four-fold. Approximately 50% of the effort will be directed towards the investigation of the opportunities for the operational use of “gifted” individuals; twenty percent will be directed towards establishing those characteristics which will enable us to identify “gifted” subjects; twenty percent will be directed towards investigation of the neurophysiological correlates of paranormal activities; ten percent will be directed towards validation of paranormal experiments. As the meta-analysis of the SRI remote viewing studies concludes: (1) approximately 1% of the general population possesses a natural remote viewing ability [In recent writings, we have amended this to mean selected populations.], (2) experienced viewers are significantly better than the general population, (3) remote viewing ability does not degrade over time, and (4) at this time, there is no quantitative evidence to support a training hypothesis (May, Utts, Trask, Luke et al., 1989; see Volumes 1 and 2). An analogy will serve us well here. As we are well aware, not everyone has a musical ability; while some are tone deaf, most are listeners of music, some are connoisseurs, and a few are musically gifted. An ordinary listener of music may not understand the nuances of British Parsi composer Kaikhosru Shapurji Sorabji’s four and a half hours long piano composition Opus Clavicembalisticum, listed as one of five most complex piano compositions; the aficionado will understand the music, and if trained in playing the piano, may be able to reproduce it a bit inelegantly. However, a gifted musician will be able to reproduce it in its most sublime form and be able to create a new symphony. Similarly, a remote viewer must have an inherent ability to be able to perform at some degree of proficiency. Despite the several attempts within the SRI-SAIC research effort, and that of research from other laboratories, no specific method has been found that holds promise as a selection tool for identifying psi-gifted persons. The best method appears to be testing the potential remote viewer by a standard remote viewing method. In the 1994 document Application-oriented receiver certification (Volume 2, pp. 473–477), Edwin May has described a certification program for identifying potential remote viewers. This approach may be effective, as psi ability appears to be statistically stationary over the life-span within a given individual, although, like other human activities, there is considerable variability across individuals during periods of physical/psychological stress, effects of medication, inattention due to various factors; not all of these factors are completely known at this time. (See Volumes 1 and 2 for personnel selection and training reports.) Thus, while the Ft. Meade remote viewers underwent training in the methods of remote viewing, discussed in the following section, their performance was limited by their inherent ability. Figure 18 illustrates a close approximation of the number of training sessions conducted over the years. (See Annex II for Defense Intelligence Agency Sun Streak Project Manual for details of the training program, pp. 50–56, this volume.) The following is an example of a summary analysis from a remote viewing training session: Summary Analysis: Remote Viewing (RV) Session XII 1. (S) This report provides documentation of a remote viewing session conducted for the purpose of orienting a remote viewer to the protocol which will be used in the remote viewing training program at Stanford Research Institute (SRI), Menlo Park, California. 2. (S) There was a high degree of target correlation in this session. Many of the viewer’s impressions matched the designated target. Post-viewing on site analysis provided the viewer with positive feedback. The remote viewer was extremely tense prior to the session. He paced nervously prior to the relaxation period. Once he began the relaxation period he was able to calm down. He stated that he was able to set aside the problems of the day and concentrate on the session. He had a very positive feeling about the whole experience and this positive feeling is reflected in the favorable results of the exercise. 3. (S) The protocol used for this session and which will be used in later training is detailed in the document, Standard Remote- Viewing Protocol (Local Targets) by Harold E. Puthoff and Russell Targ, November 1978. [See Volume 1 of the Star Gate Archives.] In addition to training sessions, several “utility assessment” sessions were conducted using simulated operational tasks. As the name suggests, these sessions were initiated to assess the viewer’s remote viewing reliability. As stated in Sun Streak operations/training objectives (1986-1988): The RV Intelligence Utility Assessment is not an attempt to scientifically prove or disprove RV through the use of statistical methodology. It is, as stated earlier, an attempt to identify those categories of intelligence targets which would best be serviced by RV. Therefore, each of the 720 RV examinations will be rated for accuracy and overall intelligence value. The 0 to 3 point accuracy rating scale developed by SRI International for GRILL FLAME will be used in conjunction with a 0 to 3 point intelligence value rating: Accuracy Scale 0 – Little correspondence 1 – Site contact with mixed results 2 – Good 3 – Excellent Value Scale 0 – No intelligence value 1 – Minimal intelligence value 2 – Moderate intelligence value 3 – High intelligence value The reason for this dual rating is based on the experience of CENTER LANE. Often a RV session will yield very “accurate” data, but that data will be of little “value” to the intelligence community. The RV Intelligence Utility Assessment will identify those categories of intelligence targets for which both accurate and valuable information can be provided. In 1990–1991, the DIA conducted proficiency enhancement sessions (see 1991 Star Gate: Procedures for Special Proficiency Targets, pp. 514–516; 1991 Proficiency Enhancement Projects: Basic Approach, pp. 525–529, in this volume). Special Proficiency Targets will be conducted as a practice activity in remote viewing to enhance individual proficiency. Targets will be chosen at random by the branch chief and given a numerical designator. All remote viewers will be required to conduct a session and provide the results to the branch chief. Feedback will not be given until all participants have submitted written summaries. Evaluations will be done by the branch chief or his designee. Outside evaluators will also be called upon to provide occasional independent appraisals to insure that objectivity is maintained. Session records will be maintained in the office central files. (See p. 514, this volume) In our view, the confusion over remote viewing being a trainable ability probably emerges from the meaning of ‘training’ itself. As we see in the Star Gate program, the remote viewers were first selected from a large personnel pool, and then sent for training to utilize the method of remote viewing, essentially a natural, spontaneous ability. The training involved learning the specific methodology rather than developing the ability itself by the learning of certain procedures. A natural consequence of psi as an untrainable inherent ability is that the efficacy of training methods is also limited, to the extent that a good viewer will adopt a method that works best for him naturally. The implication of this is that psi can essentially be “harnessed” or produced on demand, provided the viewer is not under psychological or health stress. As is well known, psychological and health stressors interfere with the performance on any cognitive task. Ft. Meade Approximate #Training/Practice/Proficiency Sessions Total= 1375 300 250 V, 250 C 0 V, V, Q) 200 190 - CJ) 0 ,._ Q) ..a 150 175 130 E 115 115 ::J z 100 x 100 ,._ 0 a. a. <( 50 0 0 0 -10 0 - 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Year 15 0 0 0 Figure 18. Approximate number of training/practice/proficiency sessions. REMOTE VIEWING METHODS Spontaneous psi is experienced in the form of dreams, “intuitive” feelings, hunches, decision making at an unconscious and/or sub- conscious level. In the method of remote viewing, these intuitive, subconscious ideas are concretized, or expressed, in the form of speech, writing, drawing, sculpting, or any other method that is unique to the individual. This is no different than the manners in which we express information that we receive through our other sensory systems. This is similar to the individual differences in cognitive and learning styles. Cognitive style refers to an individual’s way of processing information (Sternberg and Zhang, 2014). Individuals differ in the way they learn, for example, visual presentations, when they hear or read the matter. These individual differences, idiosyncrasies, will also influence the ways in which they process and express psi information, similar to information to other senses. As defined in a 1993 DIA report on Personnel Selection and Training Procedures (see pp. 576–581, this volume): Remote viewing is a highly controlled and formally established unique intelligence collection capability which has the following characteristics: 1. It is passive. To the extent of our knowledge, collection by remote viewing is totally passive, that is to say, it cannot be detected when used. 2. It is inexpensive. The principal cost of remote viewing collection is the people involved. There is little expensive hardware. 3. There is no known defense. Time, distance, target, size or degree of difficulty all have no apparent effect on collection by remote viewing. (p. 578) The method of remote viewing is essentially the working term for the phenomenon of IΨ, whether it is acquisition of information from the present (real-time), or future (precognition), whether in an awake, meditative, or dream state. Within this method, viewers adopted several methods by which they express the information acquired. As stated, the methods are individual specific, depending on what the viewer finds comfortable or that which comes naturally to him. In the Star Gate program, remote viewers were cross-trained in the different evolving remote viewing methodologies. To accomplish the task, the remote viewers used these methods either in the presence of a session monitor or solo. The following is a brief description of the methods cited from the DIA report on personnel selection and training procedures (1993; see pp. 576–581, this volume. Also see, 1988.01.19 (INSCOM) Memorandum: Sun Streak Annual Report 1987, pp. 430–436, this volume). Coordinate Remote Viewing (CRV) CRV was developed by SRI consultant Ingo Swann in the early 1980s to satisfy the contracting organizations’ demands on SRI to enhance the reliability and scientific replicability of remote viewing. (See this Archive, Volume 1, Swann 1983, pp. 385-392). - A final report on the procedure was not submitted by Swann; however, a draft report is available in the government released documents. There was a copyright issue between Swann and the sponsors; Swann was unwilling to handover the CRV methodology to the sponsors. (See this volume 1981.08.07 (SRI) Letter to Redacted: Training Program, Harold E. Puthoff, Program Director and Ingo Swann, Consultant (p. 277); and 1981.08.10 (INSCOM) Memorandum for the Record: Army/INSCOM Contractual Position as Regards SRI-I, FY 82 LTC Murray B. Watt, INSCOM Grill Flame Project Manager (p. 278). In our view, this is possibly the reason why the later open source documents on the CRV method are named “Controlled Remote Viewing”, instead of the original “coordinate” remote viewing. Swann’s approach to improving the reliability of remote viewing was to focus on the control of those factors that, in his view, tend to introduce “noise” into the remote viewing product which are identified as imaginative, environmental and monitor overlays. CRV subdivides the detection and decoding of psychic impressions into discrete achievable skills known as stages one to six. In addition to sketching, Swann’s approach also incorporated making 3-D clay models. Considering that Swann was an accomplished artist, this approach may be idiosyncratic to his natural abilities. As stated in the 1993 Personnel Selection and Training Procedures report (p. 579, this volume): “The CRV procedure is fully documented in booklet form which was published by SRI. Copies of this booklet are maintained by this Activity for training purposes. Of special note is the fact that this booklet is governed by corporate laws of propriety and as such may not be reproduced or disseminated without permission by the originator” (emphasis added). Extended Remote Viewing (ERV) The ERV approach has as its goal the subjective temporal extension of subliminally brief psychic impressions. The trained ERV percipient can control, observe and report perceptions which would otherwise be ignored or neglected fleeting images. This extension of the perceptual window is accomplished through the achievement of a discrete state of consciousness defined by identified state dependent behaviors. These behaviors are regarded as skills which the trainee must master. The basic components of the ERV training procedure involve the trainee learning the following skills: (1) the ability to physically relax; (2) the ability to reduce level of physical arousal; (3) the ability to attenuate sensory input; (4) the ability to increase awareness of internal feelings and images; (5) the ability to engage receptive mode/right hemispheric functioning; (6) the ability to achieve an altered view of reality; (7) the ability to communicate remote viewing perceptions. Each one of these skills is trained over a period of several weeks. When the trainee demonstrates independent mastery of each skill, he then learns to combine the skills. The goal is to simultaneously exhibit all of the learned skills thereby achieving specified discrete state of consciousness in which the trainee is able to remote view. Once the trainee can become a remote viewer by engaging these learned skills, he or she is then challenged to perform under controlled conditions. This is done by presenting the trainee with progressively complex remote viewing tasks coupled with a reinforcement strategy designed to develop self-confidence and to internalize ego state stabilizing factors. Object Remote Viewing (ORV) ORV is the faculty of receiving information concerning an object or person associated with it, by contact with or proximity to the object. (In earlier times, this technique was called psychometry—token-object reading.) ORV exercises differ only in the context that the designated target to be described by the remote viewer is a concealed object as opposed to a geographic site. The procedures of basic RV training programs remain the same. Written Remote Viewing (WRV) In WRV, the remote viewer can perceive direct, detailed information. WRV is phonetically and verbally oriented and can be used in both the predictive and search modes. The WRV process consists of utilizing a pen or pencil and writing on paper information perceived. The writing is a rapid and flowing movement initiated by impulses to the autonomic nervous system. Dowsing Dowsing traditionally was used to search for underground supplies of water, metal etc. by the use of a forked stick or other devices known as divining rods. This approach was conceptually used in the context of remote viewing by applying the same principle in location tasks which required the identification of the target in a specified geographical location using a map of the region. These methods essentially aid in bringing unconscious or subconscious percepts to the conscious level, and subsequently express as speech, illustration, writing, sculpture. From 1979–1983, the Ft. Meade remote viewers employed the AMSAA applied remote viewing protocol, which was based on the SRI RV protocol. From 1983–1984, five INSCOM Center Lane personnel were trained in coordinate remote viewing (CRV), and used this method during their assignment at Ft. Meade. Over the years, the new personnel used methods such as the SRI protocol, ERV, or WRV; at times mixed methods were used. As the aim of the program was operational RV, the viewers used methods that they were comfortable with. For instance, highly gifted personnel used their idiosyncratic methods of RV to achieve the desired result. Since there is insufficient data for the RV outcomes per project/session, an analysis of the success rate for each method is not possible. However, as Figure 19 illustrates, the methods used were governed by the personnel present during the period. Personnel trained in CRV left the program by 1990, which accounts for the drop in the use of CRV for the rest of the program. The data for Figure 19 includes all 2738 operational sessions from 1979 to 1995, as released by the CIA. Ft. Meade RV Operations Methods 1979-1995 450 AMSAA ■ CRV ■ RV DOW 400 Session Totals· 689 968 1070 11 350 ~ 300 N M <O 0 ;;; N N !:I N > > ;!; "'. iG 250 a: <O a: ... > 1/) u ~a: ~ 0 ~ .._ 200 .8 ~ <I !'.? ...~ ii: 0 0 ...... N E IJ) :;;; > a: ~ 150 ~ 0 M 0 > > i ~. <: a: a: "' Cl) N <O ~ ~ "' i 0 <O ~1 M > i~ ~>· h 100 U) ON a: ,,, ... ~ .... .... :!: <( U) :;; <: M ..,. > gi, ,-N N I II') :; M;> a: ~ >> N> rli 50 >O:: :\! ~- 0 l 1979 1980 1981 < 1982 1983 !I 1984 0~ 1985 1986 I 1987 1988 1989 8 1990 0 - 0 1991 ?; 0 0 1992 a: a: 01 1993 1994 > a: 1995 Year Figure 19. Ft. Meade operational remote viewing methods used by remote viewers. AMSAA – AMSAA applied remote viewing protocol; CRV – coordinate remote viewing protocol; RV – remote viewing protocols using various methods such as SRI protocol, extended RV and written RV approach; DOW – dowsing. PROTOCOLS FOR REMOTE VIEWING Currently, in laboratory investigations of remote viewing an automated double-blind procedure is used. While this method has evolved over the duration of the Star Gate program, the double-blind aspect was adopted at its very beginning. In the SRI standard remote viewing procedure, the remote viewer sits with the interviewer and the response is registered before the target is randomly generated (precognition condition); for a real-time viewing, a beacon (experimenters’ aide) is sent to a randomly generated location, and the response is generated before or after the beacon reaches the location. Both the remote viewer and the interviewer are blind to the target (a double-blind condition); the response analyst is always blind to the actual target. This basic procedure is followed even in the operational setting, using the different remote viewing methods as discussed above. In the operational setting, the protocol may also include initiating the response without the presence of an interviewer (i.e., in a solo format.) No specific conditions of set and setting are required, as the viewing can be conducted in any environmental setting. As in other cognitive tasks, a less chaotic environment enables better focus and attention on the task at hand; it is important to note that remote viewings have been conducted even in the most chaotic situations. However, as for other tasks, the emotional and health status of the viewer, including fatigue and effect of medications will impact the performance. Thus, if the viewer is indisposed due to these factors, it is recommended that the viewing is deferred. Details of the standard remote viewing protocols can be found in Volume 1 and 2 of this archives. In this volume, you can find the 1979 AMSAA Applied Remote Viewing Protocol (pp. 166–168), 1981 INSCOM Grill Flame Project Protocol (pp. 270–273), and 1990 Protocol for Beacon Person Targeting (pp. 496–497). Based on the SRI protocol, May, Marwaha, and Chaganti (2014/2011) provide two protocols for the free-response method of remote viewing; the abstract of the paper states: … in the free-form method, a blind monitor may ask structured questions of the participant to elicit as much psi information about the randomly selected target as possible; in the stimulus-response method, psi information retrieval is obtained immediately after a trigger word such as ‘target.’ This is analogous to a word association test in traditional psychological counselling. [In this paper] the most common form of analysis using rank-order, in which an analyst (not the participant) is presented with a single anomalous cognition response and five photographs, of which one is the intended target for the session. The analyst’s task is to pick which photograph best matches the response, second-best match, and so on. This matching procedure is independent of the quality of the putative match. We explain how the quality of the match — sometimes referred to as an assessment or rating — is obtained by a fuzzy set technique. In this approach, all the targets in the pool should have previously been consensus encoded with regard to their cognitive content. The analyst, who is blind to the encoding of the intended target for the session, encapsulates the response with same set of potential cognitive elements that was used in the coding of the target pool. From these data, a simple calculation constructs the accuracy (i.e. how much of the intended target was described correctly) and the reliability (i.e. how much of the response was correct). The assessment for the trial is the product of accuracy and reliability — called Figure of Merit. While there may be some deviation from the above methods and analyses depending upon the research question, we hope that those described here will serve as templates in order to conduct valid anomalous cognition experiments with this form of free-response methodologies. RV PROCEDURE IN OPERATIONAL SETTINGS In a 1983 DIA–SRI report on Project Grill Flame (see Volume 1, p. 352), the setting for an operational session at Ft. Meade is: To carry out a remote viewing (RV) session, a “remote viewer” and an “interviewer” begin by seating themselves at the opposite ends of a table in a special remote viewing room equipped with paper and pens, a tape recorder, and an overhead TV camera to permit recording for documentation, or monitoring by individuals outside the room. The room is homogeneously-colored, acoustic-tiled, and featureless, with light controlled by a dimmer, so that environmental distractions can be minimized. [In 2018, modern research may question whether there is such a thing as a ‘psi-conducive state,’ as remote viewings during the course of an experiment have been carried out in noisy settings such as a café, without any preparations such as a relaxation exercise.] The session is begun by the interviewer providing to the remote viewer whatever targeting information is appropriate to the task at hand, such as the coordinates [geographical or encrypted] of a military site, or a picture of an individual. Under normal testing or operational conditions, the interviewer is typically kept blind as to the site, etc., so as to prevent inadvertent cueing or leading. The session then proceeds with the interviewer repeating the targeting information at intervals, posing questions, etc., and the remote viewer providing quick-reaction responses, both verbally and by means of notes and sketches, until a coherent response to the overall task requirement emerges. (The use of the quick-reaction-response procedure has been found useful in minimizing imaginative embellishment of basic raw-data signals.) There is no use of drugs or technology [emphasis added] to produce an “altered state of consciousness.” Session time at a single setting rarely exceeds an hour, and the ambience of the session is kept as natural and stress-free as possible. Further, as stated in a 1982 briefing to the Senate Appropriations Committee: The remote viewer is asked to focus his attention, physically relax and concentrate on the target which has been designated. Once this is accomplished, he is then asked to describe his perceptions of the target. During the course of the session, the interviewer questions the remote viewer about his perceptions, and directs the remote viewer in the target area. At times, an outside analyst may monitor the session from a control room. The remote viewer and interviewer are both aware of the monitoring. The analyst may wish to [focus] certain areas of the remote viewer towards the goal of the analyst [sic.] At no time are the analyst’s questions heard by the remote viewer [emphasis added]. After the session, which usually lasts about 30 minutes, the remote viewer is asked to draw the perceptions he had during session. This is very important. The drawings may be more accurate or show a different perspective than the verbal descriptions about the target. After the drawing is done and the remote viewer talks about them, the remote viewing session is completed. The tape is then transcribed, and a transcript furnished to the project requester. After the project is completed the requestor provides an evaluation. As in any other task, feedback is essential. The remote viewer wishes to know if he did well in his efforts. He needs to know that his descriptions were accurate. This helps him in future projects, as well as establishing a sense of worth in his efforts to remote view. The project manager requires feedback to evaluate the collection method. (p. 298). In a briefing given to the Senate Appropriations Committee on 29 June 1982, the Grill Flame Project Manager, Robert J. Jachim reported: The collection of intelligence through remote viewing has demonstrated it is of value and has a high rate of success. Remote viewing should never stand alone, but should be used in conjunction with information from other intelligence sources. We do not evaluate our product. All evaluations are done by the professional intelligence analysts who assign the project. Collection of intelligence through remote viewing is not an experiment. It is a successful collection method [emphasis added]. The Army effort is not research and development, it is operational collection. Remote viewing is passive, inexpensive, there is no defense and there is no risk of collection compromise. (p. 299). The Operational Remote Viewing Program: Data Evaluation and Analysis Based on the Star Gate data, several recent theoretical advances have been made in the understanding of the process of remote viewing. This impacts our analysis of the operational remote viewing data. Thus, before we proceed, we first lay out the theoretical underpinnings of the remote viewing process. FROM PERCEPTION TO COGNITION At the outset, it must be emphasized that the psi experience is not a multimedia extravaganza. In a sense, it is like having a conversation across a noisy crowded room, picking up some words, and then subconsciously filling in the context and content of the information based on the vast information already stored in memory. Based on the analysis of the SRI-SAIC and Ft. Meade data, we have proposed the process- oriented signal-based multiphasic model of precognition, now renamed as the multiphasic model of informational psi (MMIΨ; Marwaha, 2018; See Annex I, p. 48). Taking a parsimonious approach, we chose to address the precognition problem as it is the extreme aspect of IΨ, all other forms of which can be subsumed within it (Marwaha and May, 2016, 2019). Thus, whether the RV-HUMINT assets are tasked on a real-time target or a target in the future, the process for transfer of information from a distant space-time point and the perception of the signal would be the same. Briefly, the MMIΨ divides the IΨ problem space into the physics and neuroscience domains. The physics domain is an information-centric perspective that addresses everything about the nature of psi, and how information gets from there/then to here/now. That is, we propose that the physics domain encompasses all aspects of psi occurring external to the percipient. The neuroscience domain encompasses all aspects of psi that happens internal to the percipient; the transition of the psi informational signal from the external to internal world via an interface—like the retina in the visual system. Figure 20 illustrates the process of cognition of putative psi signals once the information is on board. Briefly, the perception of sensory signals is an implicit process. Once the information is processed by the hypothesized cortical hyperassociative mechanism, the process of cognition begins. This subconscious stage is greatly influenced by the prior knowledge that the individual possesses and its adequate memory, in addition to other factors that influence cognition. Based on these, the individual may recognize the “pure” information contained in the signals, and make inferences from it, creating the larger picture based on past experience, following which a decision is made, and a response generated at a conscious level. This process—from perception to cognition—is the same as for any other sensory system. Just as for other sensory inputs, there can be several error points that influence the accuracy of the cognitions. Within the context of psi perceptions, these error points will determine whether the remote viewer has made an accurate, partially accurate, or totally inaccurate assessment of the information from a distant spacetime point. These are particularly important for the assessment of operational tasks. While these errors are relevant even in the laboratory setting, their applicability to the experimental data assessment is not considered, as comparison with control conditions is more relevant and important. Seven error points have been identified that influence the accuracy of the remote viewing. These errors may occur at one or several points. In the following we discuss these briefly. Physics Domain Informational Signals from Environment ,. D il D il il ;:: Error Point 1. Narrow psi- in:fo:rm ::at:io:n: c:h:a:n:ne: l:b:a:nd: w : i:dt:::::: h Neuroscience Domain , .,, ifHII Error Point 2. Detector Implicit Senso_ry Perception efficiency :::::::::::::::::::::::::; t Error Point 3: lnattentional ifHii blindness ,,..--,--·<·-··)----·-\... .,Cortical Hyperconnectivity • +,-1- : t ~ \ : .. ___ j .___ j····)o c: 0 IHI• Sub-conscious Cognition Error Point 4: No prior • t knowledge or memory of target , ..: -: -,- - Pf ior Knowledge • ........ Memory / ' ~ I,·, Error Point 5: Error in target ' , , \., :--' recognition and/or inference from perceived signal Error Point 6: Error in response decision making response expression Response in form of speech , writing , drawing, sculpture Figure 20. From perception to cognition. Error Point 1: Narrow Psi Information Channel Bandwidth. A crude estimate of what in information theory is called channel capacity — how much information the channel can accommodate — is a few fractions of millibits per second. Our sensory systems are bandwidth limited at the transducer, which is the point of entry for external signals. For example, we cannot directly experience x-rays or infrared in the EM spectrum because our retinal cells cannot accommodate these frequencies. Similarly, our auditory and olfactory systems are also limited, say, compared to that of a dog, at their detection frontends. It is therefore not an unreasonable guess to assume that the psi bandwidth limitation will reside in the neurostructure that constitutes the transducer — that which converts the psi signal carrier into electrochemical signals that the central nervous system (CNS) can interpret. Based on a computation of the bit rates for SRI/SAIC experiments, the weighted average of information transfer bit rate is approximately 0.043±0.026 bits/symbol leading to a 1-tailed 95% confidence interval of [0.0, 0.086]. The reason for not computing the channel capacity in bits/second resides in the fact that in a session lasting 10 seconds for example, we have no idea how much of that time was associated with the psi data collection. The channel capacity is far too small to enable the detection of psi-in-process in an fMRI scanner for example, especially considering the amount of ‘noise’ from other sensory systems and internal processes. The bit rate limitation can emerge from three possible sources: In the physics domain, (1) the transfer rate from source to percipient, (2) the nature of the putative psi signal in the neuroscience domain, and (3) the nature of the transducer that may limit the amount of information available for further processing. Considering the low bit rate, how do we account for the elaborate remote viewings that are mentioned in these volumes? Two of the biggest challenges of IΨ research, that also influence replicability, are when and where does psi happen? Experiment participants tell us that they do not have control over when they are ‘psychic.’ The process of assimilating psi data may start when notified of the impending remote viewing session (or even before), during/after fixing the date for the session, or before the start of the session itself. (Most sessions are of 15 minutes duration.) As viewers have reported, they find it very difficult to pinpoint a specific time when the perception of the data actually took place. Thus, by the time the viewer starts the session, he may have unconsciously assimilated several bits of information and processed it––as is other sensory information––such that it enables him to express the information during the session in the form of drawing, writing, narrating, or as dreams (Marwaha and May, 2016). Thus, once the information has been implicitly received, it is stored and retrieved from memory in the same way as information to the other sensory systems (Tyrell, 1946; Roll, 1966; Feinberg, 1975; Irwin, 1979; Broughton, 2006; Marwaha and May, 2015a, b). Once the psi information is on board, it would be difficult to distinguish it from other stored information; although, once it comes to the conscious level, a psi-adept can distinguish newly acquired psi information from that which is previously known. Error Point 2. Detector Efficiency. According to the MMIΨ hypothesis, psi is an atypical ability that is determined by the presence of an atypical transducer – the signal detector system. This contributes to a differentiation between a psi-gifted and non-gifted person. Detector efficiency refers to the putative psi signal detector, analogous to visual acuity, and is also linked to error point 1. Thus, a person without a psi signal sensitive transducer will be unable to perceive the psi signals. This hypothesis emphasizes the necessity of engaging persons with this atypical ability rather than those without for any psi task. The implications for psi-tests with the general population for proof-of-principle and proof-of-process research is evident. Thus, a psi-adept will have an efficient transducer, by definition, and errors may occur due to the other points of error listed. Error Point 3: Inattentional Blindness. Inattentional blindness usually happens when we fail to notice the appearance of something we were not expecting to see (Chabris and Simons, 2010, p. 55). This may occur in stage 1 (Figure 20), wherein the percipient simply does not “see” the informational signal. Thus, even if one is a psi-adept, inattention to informational signals from a target will make the remote viewer miss the target. McMoneagle and May have discussed this in “The Possible Role of Intention, Attention and Expectation in Remote Viewing” (2014/2004.) Error Point 4: No Prior Knowledge or Memory of Target. Assuming the information is on board the CNS and being processed, the individual may not know or recall that something like the target exists and may thus not pay attention to the information or misrepresent it. As illustrated in Figure 21, the percipient may “see” a gray body floating in water. Suppose he is from the rural hinterlands, familiar with gray buffalos resting in the village ponds, but has never been to the seaside or seen a submarine. His interpretation of the submarine target image will be that of a gray buffalo in the pond. The following example from a remote viewing session will illustrate this further. In a RV operational session at SRI, the viewer was tasked to describe the site and activities at a specified geographical coordinate. Present at the site was a static rocket engine test that was being cooled by a water spraying system. A rocket engine cooling system is used to bring down the temperature, and appears as if there is a spray of water (Figure 22a). The viewer was not at all familiar with rockets or static tests, and interpreted the test setup as a steam railway locomotive and a “rain making” machine (Figure 22b). The lack of prior knowledge led the viewer to misinterpret or to analogically describe the target. Errors such as these prove to be challenging for the analyst as, on the one hand, the viewer is unable to accurately state what the target is, but on the other hand, accurately describes the target. The fuzzy set technique for RV analysis takes into account these type of issues in the evaluation method. (See Volume 2, pp. 274–279; May et al., 1990, 2014.) Error Point 5: Error in Recognition and/or Inference from Perceived Signal. While in the previous error the viewer did not know the existence or description of a rocket motor engine, in the error of recognition and/or inference the viewer has correctly identified the target, as a gray ‘something’ in water, he is unable to recognize whether it is a buffalo or a submarine, as stated earlier. Contextually he may be able to infer that it is a submarine, as that is the task setting, however, there can be an error in inference here, leading to an inaccurate response. For example, as illustrated in Figure 23, the viewer may correctly identify the target as a manmade object in a large body of water, but fails to recognize that the desired target is an aircraft rather than a submarine. Figure 21. Error Point 4: No prior knowledge or memory of target. (a) Partial response of target site (b) Static rocket motor engine Figure 22. Remote viewing example: Static rocket motor engine. Figure 23. Error Point 5: Error in recognition and/or inference regarding manmade object in body of water. Error Point 6: Error in Decision Making. The point of decision making regarding the response can also be a source of error. Factors such as attention, emotions, beliefs, memory, creativity, uncontrolled random thoughts, intellectual decisions, linguistic influences etc. will interfere during the decision making process prior to the expression of the response, as they do for the other senses. Forced-choice remote viewing perception is susceptible to massive overlay by memory (e.g., from earlier trials) and/or expectations (e.g., the target was number one ten times in a row, this time it must be number two). (May and Trask, 1988, see Volume 2, pp. 280-289, also see Volume 1, 1984, Track I Training R&D, pp. 432-440; 1984, Special Orientation Techniques, Stages I-III, pp. 441-447). In the parlance of remote viewing protocols, they are referred to as cognitive or “analytical” overlays. Thus, in a normal protocol in a RV laboratory session, a participant is asked to first note down/illustrate the thoughts/images that are on the top of his or her mind before the session begins. In this manner, the cognitive overlays—the personal memories—are brought to the conscious level, and psi cognitions can be recognized by the percipient as being distinct from what is his ‘own.’ An experienced psi-abled individual is able to distinguish between information that is emerging from his/her own frame of reference as compared to that which is from newly acquired psi information. Error Point 7: Error in Response. An error in response is simply that – an error in noting the response, or failing to note down or report a particular percept –– an “oh, I forgot to mention that” error. Thus, while the viewer may have the information that there is an aircraft with people standing on the wings in the middle of the sea, he may fail to report that there are people standing on the wings. This may happen for several reasons such as distraction during the response process and then failing to record his response. In a sense, this is a failure to completely record a valid experience. This would influence the analysis of the session, leading to an intelligence collection error or analysis of a response in a laboratory setting affecting the experimental results. EVALUATION OF RV DATA While the research component of the Star Gate program addressed both informational and causal psi, the applied program utilized IΨ only. All the operational taskings were based mainly on real-time and precognitive viewing along with a few that were aimed at considering the past; all precognitive tasks had a real-time component as well. Figure 24 illustrates the distribution of precognitive and real-time taskings at the Ft. Meade operational remote viewing program. Although an evaluation procedure was set in place, it is important to note that, unlike in laboratory remote viewing sessions, all evaluations are done by the professional intelligence analysts who assign the projects. Thus, any biases of the monitors or participants do not interfere with the analysis of the sessions; however, biases against remote viewing by the analyst may interfere with the analysis. That said, analysts generally reviewed the remote viewing data as is done for data from other HUMINT sources. However, as we will see in the types of taskings section, it appears that there were unrealistic expectations from the RV data, probably based on a misunderstanding of the nature and limitations of psi perceptions. Ft. Meade Projects 1979-1995 Projects: 450 Sessions: 2738 120 100 96 2 u Q) 80 ·e -CL 0 Q) .0 60 39 E 40 :::J 31 z I !i 1ii~ - rf-4 26 :I IIii !I 20 9 2 1 0 0 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Year ■ Precognition Tasking 128 ■ Real Time Tasking 335 Figure 24. Ft. Meade precognition and real-time project tasking distribution (1979–1995). As stated in the 1986 Project Sun Streak Annual Report (see p. 412–417, this volume) prepared by the DIA: (S/NF/SS-2) Evaluation Procedures 1. (S/NF/SS-2) Operational Phase (S/NF/SS-2) The Project Manager will assess the value of the operational phase of the SUN STREAK program by requiring all data consumers (i.e., operational task originators) to furnish him with data accuracy and data utility assessments. Table 1 illustrates the general format and assessment scale (0-3) for this evaluation. Specific data categories may vary depending on the nature of the task or on specific objectives; however, the overall approach will remain the same. (S/NF/SS-2) The Project Manager will enter results of the accuracy and utility assessment into the project database. He will make periodic reviews (quarterly) of this data to assess overall effectiveness. (S/NF/SS-2) The Project Manager, in coordination with the task originators and the Intelligence Community Task Coordinating Group, will develop an additional measure of program value. This measurement (overall program value) is designed to measure the net worth or total contribution of the task in relation to other tasks and to the overall intelligence mission. Data accuracy and utility may be high for a particular consumer, but the results may not have a significant overall impact. This program value scale is similar to the utility scale; however, it is based on specific measures of over-all benefit. This value scale is as follows: Table 1. Program Value Scale 0 = Little or no over-all program value, 1 = Some program value (e.g., helped refine estimates), 2 = Moderate value (e.g., identified new data, narrowed down possibilities), 3 = High value (e.g., led to significant cost savings, identified critical high priority S&T or operational activities), 4 = Exceptional value (e.g., predicted major events/activities, located lost/missing resources or personnel).  This evaluation will be used in conjunction with other program evaluation parameters (accuracy, utility) for determining program accomplishments and for defining future program directions. (p. 413) While evaluations of the RV data are mostly not available from the tasking agencies, the operational project related memorandums indicate that data were useful, matched with ground-truth or what was known about the event/region, were useful as a database, or, unrelated to the task. The unavailability of evaluations is probably due to the classified nature of the tasking provided by the tasking agency. However, some evaluations are available either in the annual reports or as stand-alone pages in the released dataset. OPERATIONAL TASKS AND ANALYSIS The declassified documents include most all of the project and session details, including transcripts and session responses. However, the evaluation from the tasking agencies is not available for most cases. One of the prime reasons for this is that intelligence agencies seldom report back to the HUMINT sources, to confirm or not the accuracy of the information obtained. As listed in Figure 6, some of the reasons for customers not evaluating projects include: the customer lacked the resources, prioritization of leads, prioritization of customer commitments, and fleeting targets. At times, the tasking agency refused to send back evaluation for the remote viewing effort; one can only speculate on the probable reasons for this refusal (see Figure 25). Due to these factors, we were unable to perform an analysis of the success/failure rates for each project. Nevertheless, in this section we provide several examples as part of the discussion on the types of tasking. Types of Tasking Analyzing 450 Ft. Meade projects has been a daunting task, especially since they were not released in a systematic order. There are obvious changes in the style of documentation across the years with changing management; and of course, lessons learned from early years have been incorporated into the documentation process. However, no consistency on this count was observed, probably reflecting the level of interest of project managers. A variety of tasking methods were used over the years, which included beacons, call signs, grid matrix, information about target, maps, name/photo of target with some details, coordinates – geographical, time, UTM, as indicated in Table 2. Since about 1986, encrypted coordinates were used as tasking; this was to address the critique that the viewers probably know the coordinates across the world— a cognitive feat in itself—and hence can provide appropriate responses. For several projects multiple targets per project were used, the target differing over sessions, building on information obtained from earlier sessions. In complex projects, we notice that the project had been spilt into sub-projects, beginning with location and description of target to describing details of the activities, and then future activities at the site. One takeaway from this is that the accuracy of the preliminary task enabled re-tasking on the same site for further details. This is another piece of circumstantial evidence for the validity of the RV-HUMINT information collection method. In the database we find that until 1984, full transcripts with sketches of the remote viewing data have been released, along with summary data (where available) as shown in Figure 25. From 1986 onwards, we find that instead of transcripts, summary reports of each session, with the sketches prepared by the viewers, are available in the database. Assessing these does not yield much, as the final evaluations are not available. As stated earlier, there are several reasons for the unavailability of this information. Figure 26 illustrates a sample sheet of a transcript and response sketch from that session; Figure 27 is a sample of a session summary report, with its associated sketch. As you will note, the sketching style in these samples are very different from each other because they are produced by two different remote viewers, highlighting the individualized nature of the response style. For some projects we found that there were several viewers and sessions at times conducted over several days, with request for greater detail based on earlier information. Not all viewers have the same ability or particular area of expertise; for instance, some are better with people tasks, some with details, and some with locations; on some days one viewer was having a “good” day and another was quite off the mark. Thus, while all sessions were evaluated the analysis of a project in terms of intelligence utility was based on the sessions that provided accurate data. As stated earlier, the assessment of this RV-HUMINT data was done by professional intelligence analysts from the tasking agency. Unlike laboratory experiments where there are control targets and statistical analyses, in operational remote viewing even if one session of five provided useful data, it is considered a successful project. The data for accuracy and intelligence utility of some projects and sessions are available in memorandums and statistics drawn up by the program managers, examples of which are shown in Figure 5, and Figure 7. Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000500760001-4 rnTRY DATE: 19 Dec 80 PROJECT NUfiBER : 8041 SECRET TARGETING KMM.EDGE PROVIOEil Til FEECBACK TO SOURCE DATES m RESULTS PROVIDED Ar{~LYST MATERIAL UTILIZED INTEAVIE!/ER r:n 5ESSION . FOLLO\Hf,1.; SESSJO~ SESSION f0R\IAR0£D BY THE SOIIRC[ cc~~-.E,\TS DC -5 15_ Dec 80 , 0910 GMT earth 's surface and c. Scan from 0930 10,000 feet altitude . t~ 1000 GMT c. Move back in time to lS Dec 80 at 0947:39 GMT . SG1B CLASSIFIED BY $)l63~Z JUL 78 MSG, HQDA (iJAM! .. lS~) RC1JIE\/ 0~: Apr 2001 DATE PROJlCT NUMBER CLOSED: --------- - 19 Feb 81 TASKING AGENCY : Approved For Release 2000108/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000500760001-4 SECRET GRILLFLAME Figure 25. Sample analysis sheet (1980). Table 2. Tasking Targets at SRI and Ft. Meade Year Tasking Targets SRI Years beacon, geographical coordinates, photos in target pool Ft. Meade Years 1979 information 1980 geographical coordinates, grid matrix, name and details of target, photo of target, space-time coordinates, time coordinates, UTM coordinates 1981 geographical coordinates, map, photo, sealed envelope with photo/letter 1982 map, photo, sealed envelope with photo/letter 1983 geographical coordinates, map, photograph, sealed envelope with letter/schematic drawing 1984 abstract targeting, map, photo 1985 sealed envelope 1986 encrypted coordinates, photo, sealed envelope 1987 encrypted coordinates, geographical coordinates, sealed enveloped 1988 encrypted coordinates, geographical coordinates 1989 encrypted coordinates, photo 1990 call sign, encrypted coordinates, map, matrix, photo 1991 call sign, encrypted coordinates, map, matrix, photo 1992 call sign, encrypted coordinates, map, matrix, photo 1993 call sign, encrypted coordinates, geographical coordinates, map 1994 call sign, geographical coordinates, map 1995 call sign, geographical coordinates, map TRANSCRIPT: REMOTE VIEWING (RV) SESS ION DC-88 "A pproved For Re leue 20001: e EGCR[fROD0600070001-9 It is as if he is not TIME . Ior, b Ut h'IS D1rec xon . 1'5 A S. '19 H e . ~ ~"7 -rM£ 1 , > ~ ~ ....T h,,;, )(.,C _- s-.,....ee" 1 f_.. #66: This wi ll be a remote viewing session for 1400 hours, 20 \"R,'INSCCUPT - someone who sits 1.,.>\..o sin .., ....n•D~ , h , a,ito!'C.,·o£ S. o.f~,ce February 1981 . This wi ll be a pre-session briefing to the remote tU::MOH: VIOH N!i (~VJ ~ CS S I □ 'I 0-:-8·3 outside e directors viewer. office . 4S6: Thio will bo u ren:<1h:• 111.,'Jillg SC!ltJ:i.on fm· j 400 hooro, 20 robru::iry 1981. We do not have a picture of his at the present time, but I do have SG1B photographs of the offices where he is known to visit At this ti me I'd People come like to show you , uh. One of the offices the he spends most of his time at This is in a building in - And you'l l notice down here in in and walk SG1B the lower left there's a man standing there. I have been informed past into rear. that th is is the entranceway, where the man is standing , a control Sitting reading ':1 .~.,..~ point or stopping point where you have to go to get into the building. "plans" in. form ~of.c.....,.....,.,.,...,_ '-".._ __!,::n" ~:~~~- Cv And there's a doorway there for that man to go in . that's the way in ',le t:10 not. M~'D s picture ur hii:. at th1;1 pi,nsu.,t tir,1e, b11L r m hlets. to the bu ilding there. And this is wh e r e -works, in th is building. ::lo h1111c 1-1hotogrsiphn of the offictia "'11cL·c ht' t:i k11111Pn to 11i~lt . M. t:hie ti.me J ' d liko ta i:h:,., you, uh , one nl" ltw l #31 Okay. SG1B officee th.. t he epenU5 ;110ot of hiw t1rr;:l Qt. l h~ ls in ~o:; 1:r~ ie~~re le 1 t h1ot thi!l 11 ~n ~~~~~l~h:~~~cl! l~~:eh~~~n i ~n;.~~mcrl t h01 m, t r011cevay , whu•·c the man is 11tsndi mJ , ., Door Bare room -J "window #66: Now, he has also an office or also is known to work in. . controlpul11.:oret.oppi19p':)intwher eyavha11el.ogt•loqet 'into thu bui:l:diog. Aod there', e dou r ,..ay there- for thal ir.~n ,1}'1-i~l _; headquarters, and I'm now showing you a picture of ~~ :.,!~· T\11:,t •c the l 'elr .b ~o the buildir,g th~~~kt1 , ,l.~~ ~~t~ ·Q headquarters Now I'm going to point to an area in the - build ing . SG 1B l headquarters where hi s office is suspected to be localed. Right here &·J l : Oktiy , SG18 SG1B in this middle wing , down this way in the midd le wing, on the fourth or fifth floor, right down in there. /!(,(,; "-'" • hf hafi abo en of"l'jc~ OJ.' ~~!~G~~~~-r~;,. ~?rn I ~~j~ t:~~t~ ro;;:: ~~~:u~~ ~~s cad- a bo i ~ km:i"'n to 1110 r k in- heariq,_,E.l'lur!l ,here hie urrfoc Le ::.uspe<:~cd tc ~e lo~,.l~U, SG18 fU f} it h!!re :i.n this ,nidclle ,..1n9 , dooo ~h i e 1111y 1r:i bi: m,M.la 'l'ir .<;1, ,.,,. Lhl: fourth u1· fifth flc1;1r 1 l'l yhL Ql)\/fl in l:.twrro. #31 : Okay. IJl: 1Jka}' · #66: Okay. That's where his suspected location of the office is there. lt::6 : 'lkt1~ . flw. t 'a .,h(;r c llio , u:,11nctcd loc;:.t i uri or the otTic;, 1, Door Now he sometimes will go, uh, to this office later in the day to t.hoi:o . NOii he s'-"!Oli111ca will IJU , uh, to thie urr.i<.:~ late!.' 1n the day to roybe turn in oom<J 1·epnrta or catch up 01"1 aor11e- ~h.in<;i, but ll<19 .. uf l,is '<iOtk , a& J U'lcier~to.,,d J.l, lo clooe ".;/d' . tJ.. maybe turn in some reports or catch up on something , but most of "Bigger" guys ff ice ,' " "'" ., his work, as I understand it, is done V •~ ' Appro11ed For R elease 2000 g [ ; 0 R . Q t Ru006-00070001--8 Approved For Rei. 2000l0lll07 : CIA~96-40788ROOD(;,00070001 -I Figure 26. Sample of partial session transcript (A) and sketch (B) — 1981. 5& /.-"' "l'-t'~~.,,oowHo,,c""'"'""""'"''oo"ooo,/J'.Jf ag'~ S Approved For Release 2003/01/09: CIA-RDP96--00789R000800120003-8 0 AL C-Z 7 T 1/N_ 11/S /ll; SPECIAL ACCESS STIPPLED NOFORN REQU IRE □ - - :-- -· I / , Location of contraband on ship Brown hashish packed /.ffiluit;i1 /iw/rt.,-;, :'..&•.• ,;J,,6:i-1··- •{ :1~hJ.1.lli..rW.. t i-, d,-.. -t p · in aluminum foil //fJ._d:,,yJ! '-'--, '(Fl(./:rJV/U.l,3/ WORK ING PAPER bf~,u,r, Brown -ftt.f Pr•o,j ect: 9037 Da t.e : 2 6 June 90 J ;,_m1_ Shiny Ti me: 1332 - 14 26 Viewer: 052 4h(ru1 Shiny Session : 01 SUMMARY OF IN FORMAT ION: l '.J-/,, _ '.f_-' _ l',,c,, -/.- Nugget shaped ' 1'·•<y'ic.,, The target is a vesse l named ~ - - - - - ~ There is /1. ,i contraband localed two- th irds to the front. of the ship, o n ~.: ift),f2.ft;/ the right side. It is po s sibly hashish, wrapped in aluminum foil, all l ined up an d stacked together like iftc /,£ nugge t s . It seems to be surrounded by ro und shapes wh ic h Gold nuggets 6-Xb ~,:,;'lf.1; may be peaches, or other foo d items . / //c· Black tar ._ '/- :, STIPPLED NOF'ORN App,o~d ro,~leH~ wow11g9 :CIA4'!DP'i16-(10789ROOO~~J,[:"- ~r~l { - SPEC IAL ACCESS REQ UIRED Appmv..tra,Rai...sa200)101rG!l:ClA-Rr.f'!lll,.,D(l11!1ROOQHOQ12llOQ3..S Handle Via SKEET Channe l s Only Figure 27. Sample of session summary (1990). Analysis of Tasking For the analysis of tasking of the Ft. Meade RV data, we classified each project task according to the following criteria: (1) place/object, (2) person, (3) contraband, and (4) events. These are further classified into: (a) locate/search, (b) describe, (c) activities at target site, and (d) future at that site:  Locate/Search Tasks: Locate/search tasks involves finding the target (place/object, person, contraband, and events), based on information such as geographical coordinates, encrypted coordinates, photograph of place/person or other identifiers such as the call- sign of a vessel, overhead photographs, or a specific region on a map.  Describe Tasks: Describe tasks involves providing descriptions of the target site, either as independent tasks or as a follow-up on locate/search tasks. Descriptions include details of the objects, surrounding areas, packing of drugs and other such details.  Activities/Purpose Tasks: As the name indicates, this task involves providing details of the activities and/or purpose of the target.  Future Tasks: This task category involves providing the location/activity of the target at a future time. Figure 28 illustrates the distribution of types of tasking at SRI from 1973–1984; Figure 29 and Figure 30 represent the distribution of types of tasking at Ft. Meade from 1979–1989 and 1990–1995 respectively. A consolidated tasking for the Ft. Meade effort (Figure 31), provides an overall picture. Examining these figures alongside the tasking agency distribution from 1979–1985 and 1986–1995 at Ft. Meade (see Figure 1), provides us a picture on the shifting needs of the intelligence community’s use of the RV-HUMINT assets. SRI Operational Tasking (1973-1984) Projects: 54, Sessions: 127 60 49 49 50 2 40 u Q) ·e - 0.. 0 cu .0 30 E 20 z=> 10 4 4 - 3 0 0 ■ mm Fl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,----, re---, .c Q) (/) Q) ~ .c Q) (/) Q) ~ .c Q) (/) Q) ~ .c Q) (/) Q) ~ ~ .0 ~ .0 ~ .0 ~ .0 => => :,=> => ·c:: ·.;:; ·c:: :.;:; ·c:: ·.;:; ·c:: ·.;:; Cll u 5 :, Cll u 5 :, Cll u 5 Cll u 5 :, Q) ~ (/) ·-g LL Q) (/) u LL Q) ~ (/) u LL Q) (/) ·u LL ~ ~ Q) Q) Q) Q) 0 <( 0 <( 0 <( 0 <( 1ii u 1ii u 1ii u Cll u 0 0 0 0 _J _J _J _J Place/Object Person Contraband Events Type of Tasking Figure 28. Distribution of types of tasking at SRI (1973–1984). Ft. Meade Tasking (1979-1989) Projects: 201 , Sessions: 1821 45 42 40 35 34 32 30 VJ 0Q) ·e Q. 25 24 23 0 Jl 20 19 18 18 E :::, 16 16 z 15 15 13 13 13 I ~~~I 12 10 10 8 5 3 3 oooo ill! ~n ~ im 0 Place/Object Person Contraband Events Place/Object Person Con traband Even ts Place/Object Person Contraband Events 1979-1981 1982-1985 1986-1989 Type of Tasking Figure 29. Distribution of types of tasking at Ft. Meade (1979–1989). Ft. Meade Tasking (1990-1995) Projects: 249, Sessions: 917 120 105 100 1/) 88 u Q) 80 ·e a. 0 60 <ii .0 40 E 40 32 i~ ::, z 28 ~ 20 20 20 nn I n 20 13 13 16 11 12 12 12 m~ n 9 10 0 .c fl Q) n1/) 0 ~ .c ' Q) 1/) 4 n ~ .c I Q) 1/) ~ 2 .c 2 Q) 6 n n I" ;t 1/) 6 ~ ~ .c Q) 1/) n 5 ~ .c ' Q) 4 3 n ,-, 1/) ~ I .c Q) 1/) n ~ .c Q) 1/) 2 ,-, ~ ~ .0 Q) ::, ~ .0 Q) ·.;;; ::, ~ .0 Q) ::, ~ .0 Q) ::, ~ .0 Q) ·.;;; ::, ~ .0 Q) ·.;;; ::, ~ .0 Q) ::, ~ .0 Q) ::, ·c:: :;::; ·c:: ·c:: :;::; ·c:: :;::; ·c:: ·c:: ·c:: :;::; ·c:: :;::; CV Q) <.) 1/) :~ :, CV Q) <.) 1/) :~ :, CV Q) <.) 1/) :~ :, CV Q) <.) 1/) :~ :, CV Q) <.) 1/) :~ :, CV Q) <.) 1/) :~ :, CV Q) <.) 1/) :~ :, CV Q) <.) 1/) :~ :, ((2 Q) 0 Q) u <( LL ((2 Q) 0 Q) u <( LL ((2 Q) 0 Q) u <( LL ((2 Q) 0 Q) u <( LL ((2 Q) 0 Q) u <( LL ((2 Q) 0 Q) u <( LL ((2 Q) 0 Q) u <( LL ((2 Q) 0 Q) u <( LL <ii <.) <ii <.) <ii <.) <ii <.) <ii <.) <ii <.) <ii <.) <ii <.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 _J _J _J _J _J _J _J _J Place/Object Person Contraband Events Place/Object Person Contraband Events 1990-1992 1993-1995 Type ofTasking Figure 30. Distribution of types of tasking at Ft. Meade (1990–1995). Ft. Meade Tasking (1979-1995) Projects: 450, Sess ions: 2738 160 140 135 127 130 124 120 V) u 94 -~ 100 - Q. ....0Q) .0 80 58 -- 60 73 E 60 51 ~ z 38 40 n nn 27 26 26 -- - Fl n 20 17 16 0 ..c Q) -- - V) Q) ~ ..c Q) V) Q) ~ ..c Q) V) Q) ~ 4 [s,.,<<, ..c n Q) V) Q) ~ ~ .0 ·.::: ·.;:: ~ ~ .0 ·.::: :;:; ~ ~ .0 ·.::: ·.;:: ~ ~ .0 ·.::: ·.;:: ~ co <.) ·5 -s co <.) ·5 -s co <.) ·5 -s co <.) ·5 -s Q) (f) ]l 0 V) Q) ~ <( LL Q) (f) ]l 0 V) Q) n <( LL Q) (f) ]l 0 V) Q) ·<(u LL Q) (f) ]l 0 V) Q) ·u <( LL co <.) co <.) co <.) co <.) 0 0 0 0 __J __J __J __J Place/Object Person Contraband Events Type of Tasking Figure 31. Distribution of types of tasking at Ft. Meade (1979–1989). Examples of Operational Remote Viewing Tasks In the following we provide a number of diverse examples of operational remote viewing tasks that were executed at the Ft. Meade unit. Tasking and note on evaluation is drawn from several sources from the available documents. In reviewing these, it is recommended that the reader keep the following points in mind: (1) The approximate bit rate of 0.043±0.026 bits/symbol for information transfer. (b) All tasks require first the location of the target, followed by other details required; thus, tasks classified as “locate/search” are those that have locate/search as the primary tasking requirement. (c) Considering this was a new and controversial intelligence collection method, the intelligence agency requestors generally approached it as a court of last resort. That is, difficult problems that could not be resolved by traditional methods were sent to the RV-HUMINT group. (d) As some examples below indicate, the lack of understanding of the nature of psi led to over expectations from this methodology leading to quite inappropriate taskings, which would lead to failures. (e) Psi information is not a multimedia extravaganza; there are several points of error as discussed in the section on perceptual and cognitive error points. If at all there is a multimedia presentation, it is at the point of response making and is idiosyncratic to persons with a high VVIQ (vividness of visual imagery) that is unrelated to the psi information. For example, while reading a novel, some people are able to have a visual imagery—almost like a movie—as they read, whereas some are able to only comprehend the narrative, with a minimal—if at all—imagery of the narrative. (f) Intelligence agencies seldom report to the source the value of the information provided by the informant. Thus, our evaluation of the value of RV-HUMINT has to be based on the number of times the intelligence agencies resorted to using this method as a source for their information pool, and re-tasking the remote viewer for further information. Project Number: 7901. Downed Navy A6E (Sessions: 5) Task: Describe and locate at given geographical coordinates and give status of target located there. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: a. Locate/search; b. Describe Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: Remote viewer provided considerable detail describing the crash site, terrain, state of crew and aircraft, etc. Project Number: 8003. Tank Production USSR (Sessions: 24)  Task: Prior to the session the interviewer was provided the following information: (a) A slip of paper containing only: “target is in the vicinity of geographic coordinates redactedredacted.” Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: a. Locate/search; b. Describe Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: Some sessions resulted in little usable or apparently usable data. Analysts’ comments on reports indicate either no intelligence value, useful target data, or no usable data. Several portions in the report are redacted. Project Number: 8009: “Hot Spots” Korea (Sessions: 19) - Task: a. UTM coordinates (Universal Transverse Mercator coordinate system) for 3 major road junctions in redacted. b. Viewer was only provided UTM’s and was asked to target precognitively 1000 hrs., 25 May 80 (date of session 15 May). (c) What is the activity? Additional questions: Heavy military convoys through road junctions would provide an indication of possible military action imminent in nature. Can these junctions be targeted? Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: a. Locate/search; b. Describe; c. Activities, d. Future Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: Not available. - Project Number: 8022. Building in East Berlin (Europe) (Sessions 2) Task: 1. (S) The viewer was shown overhead imagery of the target area, and, at that time, the building of interest was pointed out to him. He was asked to access the building and describe its interior, its function, and to describe the type of activity that takes place there. 2. (S) During the session the viewer was provided the geographic coordinates of the compound and asked to focus on the designated target building. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: b. Describe, c. Activities Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: Initial evaluation indicates good target correlation. Project Number: 8023. Houston Texas (Sessions 14) - Task: 1. (S/NOFORN) Prior to the session the viewer was shown the attached floor diagram of the redacted redacted redacted redacted. He was also reminded of his past attempts at this target. 2. (S/NOFORN) During the session the viewer was asked to scan at two week intervals the target area. He was asked to elaborate on his description of 11 Dec 80 as this period seemed relevant. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: b. Describe, c. Activities, d. Future Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: CIA analyst rated information as highly accurate and of value for operational planning. Information collected later verified by other intelligence. Project Number: 8028. Unit BUN R 2055 Cu (Sessions 4) - - Task: (S/NOFORN) The remote viewer was asked to locate the redacteredacted and describe their location. He was told that this unit may or may not be in redacted at this time. The viewer was also asked to determine what type of unit redacted is. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: a. Locate/search; b. Describe, d. Future Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: Evaluation on file. ITAC credited as an “Intel first”. [Details not available.] ---- Project Number: 8034. Soviet Agent Alekse (Sessions 10) Task: (a). Photograph of subject. (b). redacted. (c) redacted. (d) redacted. (e) Task is to locate and describe individuals’ surroundings. (f) This is first time this individual [was] targeted on the subject. [The viewer was tasked on this target several times, across the past and future time frames. In a later session the individual was targeted in real-time]. Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate/search; b. Describe, d. Future Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: Several details correct, but key question of interest to intelligence community remained unanswered. Project Number: 8037. Search for site (Sessions 3) - Task: 1. (S/NOFORN) Remote viewer was shown classified overhead imagery of redacted, and unmarked map. 2. (S/NOFORN) During the session the remote viewer was asked to locate the redacted redacted similar to the one in the imagery shown him. He was asked to describe the site itself as well as the surrounding area. 3. (S/NOFORN) After the session the remote viewer was again shown the attached map and asked to annotate the map with the information he encountered during the session. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: a. Locate/search; b. Describe Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: CIA coordinator having trouble receiving evaluation from internal sources. Project Number: 8104. Locate person from Bank Account (Sessions 3) -- Task: 1. (S/NOFORN) Information provided the remote viewer prior to the session is documented as a pre-session briefing included as part of the transcript. 2. (S/NOFORN) At the start of the session the viewer was told the bank account number redacted redacted. He was asked to locate and identify the individual withdrawing money from this account in redacted on redacted. Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate/search; b. Describe Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: Inappropriate tasking.  Project Number: 8105. Locate Agent (Sessions 3) Task: (S/NOFORN) The remote viewer was asked to describe the present (5 Feb 81) location of the individual in the attached picture. Later in the session the viewer was asked to describe the 19 Feb 81 location of the same individual and report on his “most significant” activity of 19 Feb 81. Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate/search; b. Describe, d. Future Session Report: Transcripts and sketches Evaluation: Not available. (Impossible to determine if data is of use.) - Project Number: 8106. Activity of KGB general officer (Sessions 10)  Task: Photo of redacted. Office of interest is on 5th floor. Target is [person] redacted redacted redacted redacted (first session). Describe his activities. What is he thinking about? Note: This is the second session on this target and the second time for this source. Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate/search; c. Activities Session Report: Transcripts and sketches Evaluation: Some aspects correct. Editor’s Comments: This tasking is based on the assumption that telepathy is a valid phenomenon. There are several problems with this assumption. As this case illustrates, it is difficult to verify what the person is “thinking about” now. If a later verification for this question is obtained from the person, by phone/letter/face-to-face talk, it then serves as a future “answer book”, making this a precognitive rather than a telepathic task. Project Number: 8108. Locate person A.P. Moiseyev. (Sessions 9) Task: Photograph of person shown to viewer. During the session the viewer was asked questions pertaining redacted personality, interest, character, family relations, job, attitudes toward his job and his general situation. Possible cause of death of redacted redacted Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate/search; b. Describe, c. Activities Session Report: Transcripts and sketches Evaluation: Not available. Editor’s Comments: This is an example of a tasking that required more information than is possible with this method, especially within a limited time frame. The chances of error are likely to increase in this type of tasking as the viewer is likely to add information – much like the demand characteristics in psychology experiments where the participants respond to their interpretation of what the experimenter is looking for. - Task: Locate Carlos and describe his activities. Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate/search Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. - Project Number: 8124. Locate person in photo (Sessions 6) Evaluation: Information provided was partially verified, although subject was not located. This evaluation should not be interpreted to mean that the source and technique have no potential value. The deficiency may not lie in the accuracy and reliability of the data, but in our interpretation of the data. Project Number: 8201. Identify writer of letters (Session 1) Task: Sealed envelope with xerox copy of seven letters written by subject to be identified. Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate/search Session Report: Transcripts and sketches Evaluation: Description of individual included (a) physical description – could not be confirmed, (b) emotional description – believed to be partially correct, (c) ethnic description – believed correct. Information provided did not provide verifiable identity and location of subject, if and when subject is identified and located, the information provided may very well correlate with reality characteristics. The product did not provide specific enough leads to [identify the subject]. The deficiency may not be in the accuracy and reliability of the data, but in our interpretation of the data. Task: Describe building. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: b. Describe Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. - Project Number: 8303. Riverdale building (Sessions 8) Evaluation: The information obtained from this project has corroborated information from other sources, guided the tasking for certain collection resources, and indicated a very specific, significant threat to U.S. national security. Overall, the information obtained from this project has significantly enhanced U.S. counterintelligence efforts to contain and diminish a potent foreign threat to U.S. national security within the United States. - - Project Number: 8309. Redacted (Session 1) Task: Target redacted. Encrypted geographical coordinates. Prior to the session, source was shown the photograph provided by the sponsor. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: b. Describe, c. Activities Session Report: Transcripts and sketches. Evaluation: High intelligence value. Project Number: 8606. Energy in event (Sessions 5) Task: Describe Soviet rocket explosion over Finland, photographed 15 October 1985 and suspected as being a barium cloud experiment. Date of Sessions: May-June 1986 Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: b. Describe, c. Activities Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Useful to marginal value. Editor’s Comments: Although this is a ‘looking back to the past’ tasking, the photograph is presented in real time and is most likely to be the source of information, as is the case in experimental protocols using a series of five images as possible targets. Project Number: 8701. Structure (Sessions 12) Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: b. Describe, c. Activities, d. Future Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Not available. - Task: Provide information concerning current and projected (2 year) function of unusual structure located at redacted. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: b. Describe, c. Activities Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. - Project Number: 8704. Facility (Sessions 15) Task: Provide information concerning the purpose/role of “Facility 1” 6 km SW of redacted area. Evaluation: Originator’s comments: There was a perceptible continuum of correlation in the information provided by the five sources. There was some difficulty in sorting the information as it related to either xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. More evaluation information requested by analyst. Project Number: 8705. Future (Sessions 7) Task: Provide foreign intelligence information concerning plans and intentions of selected [unknown to viewer] world leaders against an anticipated or suspected activity of significant interest occurring within a specific period of time. Session Report: Summary reports and sketches Tasking Classification: 2. Person: c. Activities, d. Future Evaluation: Not available. Editor’s Comments: The tasking for this is too broad. Although some of the viewers report a “telepathic” contact with the person, information for this cannot be verified. Project Number: 8709. Stealth bomber (Sessions 18) Task: Determine the configurational aspects of a new stealth US bomber class vehicle (aircraft) under development and nearing completion. Determine the configuration of a potential USSR (Soviet) counterpart to the US vehicle under development and described above. F1 Vehicle — Configuration of Stealth Bomber. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: b. Describe, c. Activities Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Not available. However, the RV information on the structure of the aircraft was subsequently corroborated by media reports. Project Number: 8711. Locate structure (Sessions 20) Task: Based on encrypted coordinates determine current location of the silkworm missile launchers no longer visible from air observation. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: a. Locate Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Not available. Project Number: 8718. Missile arrival and destination (Sessions 8) Task: Access and describe the point of arrival and the ultimate destination of missiles beyond the flashing light. Obtain an overhead sketch of the target areas. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: c. Activities, d. Future Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Not available. Project Number: 8802. Structures (Sessions 10) Task: Access, describe and identify the content of the target structure at the indicated [encrypted] coordinates. Determine the function/purpose of that which is contained therein. If nothing is found, determine content in the future. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: a. Locate/search; b. Describe, c. Activities, d. Future Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Not available. Editor’s Comments: Based on open source feedback (newspaper article), the structure was confirmed to be a Russian Blackjack Bomber. Project Number: 8813. Topical Search (Sessions 17) Task: Conduct a topical search and determine if any acts of terrorism are being planned by Iran against US interest in retaliation of the shooting on the Iranian Jet Bus on 4 July 1988. Tasking Classification: 4. Events: d. Future Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Viewer was able to determine that terrorists were planning to bomb an airplane that had U.S. defense contractors on board. Viewer had everything right except the name of the carrier. DIA terrorism analysts working in Indications and Warning substantiated these findings. 8813 -- 3 Aug ’88 Mr. Redacted As per redacted (DC-5C) this date 03 1200 hrs, DC- 5C received reporting from other intel source substantiating content of summaries in project 8813. Except for the carrier (Eastern Airlines?) info on event in terms time and place etc. (?) is substantiated.     Tasking Classification: 3. Contraband: c. Activities, d. Future Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. - Project Number: 8831. Search Vessel (Sessions 2) Task: Describe cargo route of travel and destination of freighter known as "Old Salt." Evaluation: Highly successful. Rendezvous point NE Hawaii correlated with known data. Project Number: 8836. Pan Am Flight 103 (Sessions 7)  Task: Access and describe cause of the Pan Am jet crash Flight 103 over Scotland, killing about 273 persons. Trace the cause of the crash to its origin and describe your findings. Describe the person(s) or group(s) involved. And describe the origin of the cause of the crash Tasking Classification: 4. Events: b. Describe, c. Activities Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. (Only one available.) SECRET Summary of Information: Working Paper 8836 (5239), 890317 S: 01, V: 025 Summary of Information The target resembles a “tent for rent” with a symbol. See ENCLOSURE 1. It is carried in a “box car/shuttle” (baggage). The object “has a gunning effect—it wipes out” (explosion?). There are perception of a cemetery, a base, (a group of) “girls”, and “servicemen.” “This is a plane crash – shameful – terrorism – Flight 301” (Flight 103). The bomb was placed in a communication device by a little, short (even somewhat) gentle person who was aware of the consequences of placing a bomb aboard the plane. This person will be apprehended and brought into custody in England. A “picture of a witness” plays a role in this apprehension –not further described. (This is a summary prepared by the ops officer from notes taken during the session.) HANDLE VIA SKEET CHANNELS ONLY Evaluation: Confirmed Project Number: 8907. Activity inside building (Sessions 20) Task: Describe the nature [and] purpose of an activity within a building from overhead photographs. Determine and describe what is inside the target building. Describe the nature and extent of the activity therein. If developmental activity is ongoing, describe the end product (object). Estimate when the developmental product will be completed. Tasking Classification: 1. Place/Object: b. Describe, c. Activities, d. Future Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Not available Editor’s Comments: The tasking is multifaceted and complex impacting the assessment of the responses and determining intelligence utility. Five remote viewers contributed to the 20 sessions, further complicating the assessment of the tasking. Project Number: 8916. Search for Charles Frank Jordan (Sessions 19) Task: Determine and describe the location of DEA fugitive Charles Frank Jordan. Describe appearance. Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate, b. Describe • - Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. - Evaluation: Remote viewer 079 located Jordan in Lovell, Wyoming, stating he would travel 80 miles west. Jordan was arrested in Wyoming recently after being a fugitive for more than three years. - - Project Number: 8921. Vessel Big Bertha (Sessions 7) - Task: A vessel identified under the alias Big Bertha by DT-S is suspected of carrying contraband in the form of illegal drugs. Big Bertha left Costa Rica on 8 June and was believed to be enroute for California. Where and when will it unload its contraband of drugs? What is its current location (important: customer lost track of vessel). Describe vessel communications. Tasking Classification: 3. Contraband: a. Locate, d. Future Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Not available. - Project Number: 8924. Search for person (Sessions 9) Task: Determine if individual is loyal to US. Access and describe the target personality redacted. Part II Tasking: The target is a female personality of counterintelligence interest. Essential elements of information required: physical status, ethnic background, use of aliases, marital status, foreign travel, and foreign associates. Further tasking included: Access and describe the target personality. Provide a physical profile. Indicate educational level attained, professional endeavors, friends, associates and past activities. Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate, c. Activities Session Report: Summary reports and sketches Evaluation: Not available Editor’s Note: This is an example of bad tasking, requiring information that is far more than can be possible by the remote viewing method. Project Number: 8936. Kidnapped children (Session 1) Task: Determine location of two kidnapped children. Tasking Classification: 2. Person: a. Locate Session Report: Summary reports and sketches. Evaluation: Not available. Project Number: 9010. Locate and search vessel (Sessions 6) Task: Determine the current location of a target vessel described as a 45-foot trimaran and identified as the redactedredacted normal route of travel is between redactedredacted, Florida. Tasking Classification: 3. Contraband: a. Locate Session Report: Summary reports. Evaluation: One of the three locations provided was “highly accurate.” Strong correlation on a current vessel location in view of known ground truth. Project Number: 9011. Locate and search island (Sessions 7) Task: Encrypted coordinates target. Background: A quantity of illegal contraband narcotics have been hidden on a small island. Essential Elements of Information: A. Locate where on the island the contraband drugs are hidden. No maps of the island are available, so the enclosed notional template may be used by indicating in which grid square the contraband may be found. B. Describe salient, readily identifiable natural or manmade features that can help confirm the location for the contraband. Tasking Classification: 3. Contraband: a. Locate/search; b. Describe, c. Activities Session Report: Summary reports. Reply: By common agreement, a diagrammatic representation of the island was used to submit four locations. The containers were - described as smooth, metal containers 3-5 ft. long, 2-3 ft. wide equipped with a solid protective inner lining. Action: JTF-4 analysts coordinated with the redacted police who recovered twelve metal boxes bearing an estimated 300 “kilos” of cocaine. The metal containers were found to be water-proofed, branded and marked; cocaine was individually packaged, wrapped, and placed in the metal containers. Evaluation: Strong correlation to ground truth on the location of the drugs, the metal containers and the island itself. Project Number: 9091. Vessel search (Session 1) Task: Of the following six vessels due to be in port 16-17 July 1990, determine which, if any, have contraband on board and if so, where/how stored etc. Tasking Classification: 3. Contraband: a. Locate, b. Describe, d. Future Session Report: Summary reports. Evaluation: Strong correlation of description and location of contraband aboard vessel. - Project Number: 91016. Vessel search (Sessions 8) Task: Does suspect vessel redacted have contraband onboard, if so, what type? Where is vessel headed? If offload, where? If offload, what is the name of the sister ship? If offload, when? Tasking Classification: 3. Contraband: b. Describe, c. Activities, d. Future Session Report: Summary reports. Evaluation: Not available. Project Number: 94-228. Vessel location and activities (Sessions 4) Task: Access and describe target, target’s location and its possible activity. Tasking Classification: 3. Contraband: a. Locate, b. Describe, c. Activities, d. Future - Session Report: Summary reports. - Evaluation: (a) Information on redacted is right on target, as of 6 April, (b) redacted does have a sister ship. Rest cannot be confirmed. (c) Several items could be true, however, no current information to confirm. Name Gabrielle/Gabriella not associated in our database. Project Number: 94-241. Financial status (Sessions 2) Task: This is a follow-on project to two earlier projects. Describe target’s financial status. Who is paying, and for what reason? Tasking Classification: 2. Person: b. Describe, c. Activities, d. Future Session Report: Summary reports and sketches Evaluation: Possibly true. Low value. Utility of Operational Remote Viewing Assessments A 1983 DIA-SRI Project Grill Flame report on operational tasks (see Volume 1, Salyer, Puthoff, and Lavelle, 1983, pp. 361-362) has summarized the utility of RV: The investigations have shown that remote viewing, both by SRI and Army INSCOM personnel, has in many cases provided meaningful descriptions of, e.g., East-bloc targets of interest to the intelligence community. Evaluation by appropriate intelligence community specialists indicates that a remote viewer is able by this process to generate useful data corroborated by other intelligence data. As is generally true with other human sources, the information is fragmentary and imperfect, and therefore should not be relied on alone but is best utilized in conjunction with other resources. Although efforts to establish the precise degree of accuracy and reliability are not yet complete, the data generated by the RV process appears to exceed any reasonable bounds of chance correlation or acquisition by ordinary means and therefore constitutes an exploitable information source. Some of the successful operational viewings carried out by the SRI team for the DOD/Intelligence communities include:  A secret NSA facility, including code word retrieval.  Soviet R&D facility at Semipalatinsk (PNUTS).  Static tests of Minuteman and Poseidon solid-propellant missile firings in the Western United States.  Soviet R&D airfield at Ramenskoye, including unexpected new construction.  Soviet rocket motor development facility at Voronezh.  Suspected BW storage facility at Aschersleben, East Germany.  Chinese nuclear test facilities at Lop Nor and Wushitala, including an active test.  Circumstances surrounding release of Iranian hostage, Queen (obtained prior to release).  Suspected Soviet BW production facilities at Severodvinsk and elsewhere.  Pushkino, USSR, radar site for Moscow area ABM defense system.  Noshahr Airfield in the Caspian Sea, Iran  Lyantor Oilfield complex, USSR An approximate 50% success rate is sufficient to support the efficacy of RV as a valuable intelligence collection tool. In a briefing given to the Senate Appropriation Committee on 29 June 1982 (see pp. 296–299, this volume), Grill Flame Project Manager Robert Jachim states: …you may ask about projects which were unsuccessful. Our only determinant of success or failure is whether or not the information provided is of intelligence value. It is possible that the information collected is accurate and of high quality. But, [if] it is of “no intelligence value”, it would be considered a failure. However, because of the unique way the information is presented, the analysts are required to review the data in a non-traditional manner. For example, in six projects information forwarded was initially considered inaccurate. However, on later review it was determined to be correct. In one case, the tasker even admitted error in his control data. (p. 299) As stated in the April 1993 “Star Gate Project: An Overview” (see p. 562–566, this volume) prepared by the Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence Defense Intelligence Agency. Overall, STAR GATE activity is based on both a concurrent research and application philosophy. It is recognized that formal scientific proof of this phenomena may yet be available, even though “anomaly demonstration” may be granted in some academic areas. Although formal scientific acceptance could be helpful, the history of application investigations in this field demonstrates that at least some level of application reliability can be achieved for some types of projects. (p. 565) Following are summaries of some successful operational projects sourced from DIA–Cognitive Sciences Project SRI internal documents. Presentation slides from the government, and open source material related to several of these projects can be found in 1995 (DIA) – Project Star Gate, and other reports in this volume. 1. PROJECT: POSSIBLE NUCLEAR UNDERGROUND TEST FACILITY. (P.NUTS), USSR Time Period: 1975 Task Originator: CIA Information Provided to Source [Remote Viewer]: Earth coordinates Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Very large crane described and drawn.  Crane as drawn was nearly identical to crane at remote site in  Gore segments were drawn; their purpose to form a USSR. 30–35 diameter sphere.  Gores as drawn were nearly identical to those on ground at site, intelligence assessments confirmed gores to be welded into large 35’ diameter spheres for low-yield nuclear tests. 2. PROJECT: PLANNED NUCLEAR EVENT (CHINA) Time Period: September Task Originator: AFTAC Information Provided to Source: Earth coordinates plus planned 1979 date. Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Unusual “fireworks”; non-nuclear event.  Later ground truth indicated nuclear air drop test was a failure.  Sketches of ground zero showing shallow depression. Sources description was similar to what would be expected for such a failure i.e.., non-nuclear event.) 3. PROJECT: AIRCRAFT SEARCH (AFRICA). Time Period: May 1978 Task Originator: HQUSA Information Provided to Source: Phase I: Similar aircraft photo /ACSI (TU-22) and continent search. Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Phase I: Sketches of crash area with prominent  Sketches were consistent with suspect crash region though 60- landmarks. 80 miles West of search area. Source information was sent to the  Phase II: Specific mark was made on supplied map field search team; search coordinator then requested more based upon previous sketch match with prominent map precise data. features.  Specific coordinates (from marked position on supplied map) were sent to search team, approximately one to two days later. TU-22 was found within 3 miles, of sources’ data. Actual location due primarily from field-derived leads available at same time sources’ data received. Chief-of-station indicated sources’ data would have led to aircraft discovery had field data not become available. 4A. PROJECT: SUBMARINE PREDICTION (SEVERODVINSK BLDG. 402, USSR). Time Period: September Task Originator: NSC Information Provided to Source: Earth coordinates of specific 1979 Staff building of interest; building photo. Summary of Sources Data Assessment  New USSR submarine described as very large and with  Later intelligence data confirmed building had two new approximately 18-20 canted missile launch tubes. Aft submarines; Oscar and Typhoon. Oscar had 24 canted launch end described as a “large flat area.” tubes; Typhoon had 20 launch tubes and large flat aft deck.  Large new submarine to be launched in 100 days (from  In late January 1980, approximately 120 days after sources data, session date). the new Typhoon was sighted in harbor. 4B. PROJECT: SUBMARINE PREDICTION (SEVERODVINSK BLDG. 402, USSR). Time Period: March 1989 Task Originator: Asst. to Information Provided to Source: Encrypted coordinates Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Policy Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Modified submarine is in development that has  No firm intelligence available to confirm or deny; however, improved performance, improved electronics, and has source data is plausible from a technological point of view. new signature (EM, acoustic) reducing features to  One of these names was later consistent with sensitive include active cancellation techniques. compartmented information.  Two specific “system” names were provided.  Plausible.  Submarines to be ready for sea trials in 1 to 1½ years. 5. PROJECT: FOREIGN CONSULATE FACILITY. Time Period: 1980 Task Originator: CIA Information Provided to Source: Photo of buildings Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Source indicated a specific room had clandestine  Later, that room was checked and found to have equipment as communication equipment. indicated by source.  Surveillance bug was described as being in a specific  Subsequent search location bug described by source. location. 6. PROJECT: MESSAGE CODING METHOD (S. AFRICA) Time Period: 1980 Task Originator: CIA Information Provided to Source: Name and photo of target individual (suspect KGB agent). Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Details developed included identification of a handheld  Initially, response from field indicated the apprehended target calculator that the foreign personality used for coding personality did not have a calculator. Later query of local law and decoding messages. officials revealed one of them had secretly retained the target personality’s calculator, though not proven, it was considered highly likely that this calculator did have the code/decode keys. 7. PROJECT: IRAN HOSTAGE (QUEEN) Time Period: September Task Originator: NSC Staff Information Provided to Source: None, other than “describe 1980 target personality”. Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Sources described an extremely ill personality and cited  This information was sent to the field, it helped prepare for the specific ailments (e.g., disabled side, great nausea). release of hostage Queen that in fact occurred approximately 2  Source perceived that the target personality would be days after sessions with the source. Physical situation described on an airplane in 2 or 3 days. by source was proven to be highly accurate; medical data was in fact confirmed by Queen (and examining medics). Queen was so struck by the data the he suspected clandestine source was actually in the Embassy along with the hostages. 8. PROJECT: GENERAL DOZIER SEARCH Time Period: January 1982 Task Originator: DIA Information Provided to Source: All available open information. /DT Army Spec. Ops. Summary of Sources Data Assessment NOTE: Numerous DOD and non-DOD sources  One week after sources’ data, Dozier was rescued in Padua as a attempted to describe Dozier’s location early on. These result of an informer’s tip. initial inputs were highly diverse and not sufficiently specific  Many of the later specifics proved to be correct. Had an informer for search use. However, later information from project not surfaced, it is conceivable that project data could have sources did in fact become quite specific. significantly narrowed down search possibilities and led to  “Padua” was identified as the city where Dozier was Dozier’s location. held.  Other data included city area sketches and some specifics (e.g., in a second floor apartment above a store). 9. PROJECT: LTC HIGGINS SEARCH AND OTHER HOSTAGES Time Period: February Task Originator: DIA Information Provided to Source: All open available information. 1988 and later. Counterintelligence Branch Summary of Sources Data Assessment NOTE: Numerous sessions were performed; however,  Source data proved to be consistent with later intelligence data feedback is only available in a few instances, mainly from and assessments. the early period of the search. This early data included:  Subsequent photo coverage of area revealed presence of a new  Descriptions of holding areas, escape vehicles, and building where source had previously indicated. Later debrief of route taken. a released French hostage indicated Higgins was probably in that  Location is a specific S. Lebanon village and in a building at time of sources’ data. specific building.  Source data on stat-of-health and groupings is generally correct.  Numerous details on state-of-health, association/ Locations in Beirut cannot be evaluated, though they are groupings of hostages, and locations in Beirut. consistent with regions associated with the responsible terrorists. 10A. PROJECT: PREDICTIONS – US SHIP ATTACK Time Period: 15 May 1987 Task Originator: DT Information Provided to Source: None Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Some type of missile attack (from aircraft) against a US  Two days after sources’ data, an Iraqi aircraft fired two Exocet naval vessel: missiles that struck the USS Stark in Persian Gulf. Damage was extensive; 37 crewmen were killed. The Stark almost sank. - Extensive damage - Loss of life  Intelligence data not available to confirm or deny. - In a large body of water near a desert country. [Note: In a now well-known incident, on 17 May, an Iraqi aircraft fired two Exocet missiles that struck the USS Stark in the Persian  Not intentional; like a warning shot that went awry. Gulf; 37 crewmen were killed.] 10B. PROJECT: POSSIBLE LIBYAN RESPONSE TO THE CHARGE RABTA WAS MAKING CW PRODUCTS Time Period: January 1989 Task Originator: DT Information Provided to Source: None Summary of Sources Data Assessment  A ship (Patua/Potua) will arrive at W. Coast Libyan  Search of maritime records indicated a ship (Batato) was enroute Port of Tripoli to transport CW chemicals to an E. to Tripoli and arrived 4 days after session with source. It then Coast Libyan port (Ras Lanuf). loaded cargo (undetermined) and moved to E. Coast of Libya to Benghazi (next major port E. of Ras Lanuf). Collection was directed toward the Batato. However, its role as a possible mode of moving CW material could not be confirmed or denied. 11A. PROJECT: SHIP LOCATIONS –PACIFIC AREA Time Period: November- Task Originator: U.S.C.G. Information Provided to Source: Name/last known location December 1988 (PAC Ocean/Hong) of suspect ship. Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Area of Pacific Ocean N.E. of Hawaii (30o N./150o W)  HUMINT data received after sources’ data was in close was indicated by source as a rendezvous point for off- agreement (rendezvous to occur at 30o N./148o W., on 7 loading a very large amount of illegal drugs. December 1988.)  Ship would then sail to US West Coast (California N.W.  USCG air search failed to locate ship. Later, on 7 December Coast). 1988, sea search located ship at 30o -9 minutes N./140o -37  Follow-up query on rendezvous data supported minutes W. Ship’s crew set ship on fire and abandoned ship. It HUMINT derived date 7 December 1988. later sank while being under … 11B. PROJECT: N. ATLANTIC AREA Time Period: November- Task Originator: U.S.C.G. Information Provided to Source: December 1988 Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Area of Atlantic N. of Jersey Coast was indicated as  USCG air search located suspect ship off Jersey Coast, moving current location (ship moving to N.E. toward New to N. to N.E. subsequent sightings not successful due to poor England). weather. This location was outside of area expected to return to  Ship has large amounts of illegal drugs. Caribbean.  USCG believed suspect ship did in fact have a large drug load. 12. PROJECT: FUGITIVE LOCATION Time Period: April-June Task Originator: Customs Information Provided to Source: Name of target personality. 1989 Dept. Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Target personality is in N. Wyoming near a small town  On 15 June 1989, fugitive was apprehended when leaving Yellow (Lovell). Stone National Park, Wyoming. Though customs had sources’ data since April, they had not acted on it; fugitive spotted by alert - In follow-up, source indicated fugitive is or is about park official. to move out of area, traveling N. and West along Wyoming/Montana border.  Data concerning these locations (Caribbean in general) correlate  Other sources indicated fugitive was in S. Florida to previous work/living locations. Caribbean area, and possible Panama. 13. PROJECT: *N.S.* CASE Time Period: September Task Originator: DIO Information Provided to Source: Photo of target personality 1989 (Defense Intelligence Officer) Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Source provided various details, including a staged  Source data is plausible though some aspects are inconsistent kidnapping, current location, and contacts. with recent defector information. This data has in fact provided  Data provided by sources indicated concealment/ new leads; consequently new collection activities are now transport activity involving drugs/arms, and possibly possible. some type of clandestine political activity.  Consistent with known data about target areas, although not verifiable at this time. 14. PROJECT: SPECIAL PROJECT (CENTRAL AMERICA) Time Period: September Task Originator: CACIT Information Provided to Source: Encrypted coordinates 1989 Team  Summary of Sources Data  Assessment  Data provided by sources indicated concealment/  Consistent with known data about target areas, although not transport activity involving drugs/arms, and possibly verifiable at this time. some clandestine political activity. 15. PROJECT: LIBYAN PLO BUILDING Time Period: February Task Originator: DIA/JS Information Provided to Source: Encrypted coordinates 1989 Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Several sources identified building as having a terrorist  A major function of target building is probably for terrorist association, and served as a major planning/training planning. This building could be a target for attack by other location. One source indicated this building was a countries. bombing target. 16. PROJECT: IRANIAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT Time Period: April Task Originator: DIA/JS Information Provided to Source: Encrypted coordinates 1989 Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Most sources indicated target area served in  Target area was the new Iranian Embassy building in Beirut. One administration and planning activities. of the buildings in this complex has been known to have held  One source indicated area played a role in holding one (or more) of the hostages. prisoners or hostages.  Another source described area as an embassy or consulate. Time Period: April 1987 Task Originator: DIA/DT - 17. PROJECT: DUSHANBE, USSR Information Provided to Source: Encrypted coordinates   Summary of Sources Data Several sources indicated a radar/laser function. One source indicated presence of mirror-like objects, large radars (associated with transmitting blue light), and future appearance (in 8-9 months) of large igloo type structure or domes.   - Assessment Latest assessment of Dushanbe is that is has a space- track/identification role using multiple lasers. It may also have a limited directed energy weapon role. At time of session, large domes were not present. They were first noted 6 months later. 18. PROJECT: KAMENOGORSK FACILITY-2, USSR Time Period: February Task Originator: DIA/DT Information Provided to Source: Encrypted coordinates, and for 1988 some sources, facility photo. Summary of Sources Data Assessment  Several sources indicated key function of area is  Latest intelligence data indicates this facility is developing associated with lasers and/or optics. One source Beryllium mirrors, possibly for space-based applications. sketched a round spherical honeycomb structure. Other sources described material production/fabrication involving reflective non-malleable material, material formed from a powder base, and advanced systems for space applications. Time Period: December 1987 Task Originator: DIA/DT - 19. PROJECT: GOMEL, USSR Information Provided to Source: Encrypted coordinates.  Summary of Sources Data Several sources indicated electronic/missile (possible ABM) associations sketches of missile-like objects were drawn.  - Assessment One of Gomel’s functions as an electronics T/D facility may be in support of ABM electronics or ABM system development. Implications of the Star Gate Applied and Basic Psi Research Program What we have reviewed so far should put to rest questions such as “Does psi exist?” “Does ESP mean ‘error some place?’” This conclusion was reached in 1987 by the Project Review Group in the assessment of the enhanced human performance project (see p. 425–428, this volume). The Review Group was tasked to address four questions: Is the science underlying this research effort essentially sound? Does the evidence to date support the existence of an anomaly? What is the potential value of this effort to the DOD? Is the research focus and level of effort appropriate? There was unanimity among the members of the Review Group with regard to these responses. They concluded: In summary, the Project Review Group has determined to its satisfaction that the work of the Enhanced Human Performance Project is scientifically sound, appropriately managed and monitored, and is providing valuable insight into the nature of an anomaly which could have a significant impact on the DOD. (p. 428) A detailed review of the remote viewing (Volumes 1 and 2), psychokinesis research program (Volume 3), review of the operational remote viewing program presented here, and the government memorandums and reports in this volume lead to several conclusions:  Informational psi (IΨ) is a valid phenomenon that can be put to use by psi-gifted persons using remote viewing protocols. It can be put to operational intelligence use, both tactical and strategic, with limitations that are defined by the nature of the phenomenon and the problem being addressed.  There is insufficient evidence to support the validity and applicability of psychokinesis.  Continued research at the Laboratories for Fundamental Research, following the close of the Star Gate program, has led to a testable process-oriented signal-based multiphasic model of informational psi (MMIΨ) that incorporates both the physics and neuroscience domains. Understanding the process is a science in progress. Conclusions To conclude, after reviewing the entire Star Gate database, we address the same questions posed to the American Institutes for Research (AIR) Blue Ribbon Panel reviewers of the Star Gate research. 1. Does the evidence indicate the presence of a statistically significant effect? The AIR report concluded: “The laboratory research conducted as part of the present program has identified a statistically significant ‘anomaly.’” In agreement, we add that the qualitative and quantitative evidence from operational remote viewing further supports the validity of informational psi (IΨ). 2. Can the effects be attributed to paranormal phenomena? We agree with the AIR panel that “the experiments have not provided a convincing demonstration that a paranormal [emphasis added] ability is involved.” The Cambridge dictionary defines paranormal as “all the things that are impossible to explain by known natural forces or by science.” The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines it as “not scientifically explainable.” That parapsychology has its origins in Spiritualism has influenced the definition of the phenomenon and the explanatory approaches. The common understanding among lay persons and academics is that the term psi implies paranormality, and most approaches to and evaluations of the psi literature are based on a demonstration of the “paranormal”, rather than addressing the anomaly seen in the data and pursuing the course of providing explanations for such anomalies. As John Palmer (1985, p. 10) has stated in his report on parapsychology to the Army Research Institute: The term psi is defined negatively as some process that transcends currently accepted physical principles. It is not surprising, therefore, that the approach to its verification or validation has also been negative… psi is considered to have been demonstrated if, and only if, all conventional processes, i.e., processes subsumed under the basic limiting principle, has been eliminated. As he further states (p. 13): … no clear distinction is made between the [psi] phenomena under study and the quasi-theoretical principle [paranormality] proposed to account for them, between the explanandum and the explanans. One illustration of this conflation is the accepted definition of parapsychology: “the scientific study of paranormal phenomena” (Thalbourne, 1982, p. 51), which can be translated as “the scientific study of psi.” Note that the definition assumes that the paranormality of the phenomena under investigation is granted a priori. This of course does not adequately describe most parapsychological research, which does not assume paranormality a priori but rather is undertaken to verify paranormality a posteriori, empirically. The definition, however, defines the subject matter of parapsychology in terms of parapsychologists’ preferred explanatory framework.” Since from its inception the SRI-SAIC team had not considered “paranormal” as an explanation, in the 1990s they coined the term “anomalous mental phenomena” (anomalous cognition and anomalous perturbation) to address the phenomena under investigation. The physicalist model emerging from the Star Gate database indicates that it might be addressed from known physics and known neuroscience, and the advances made within these disciplines. Thus, it is premature to assert that psi is a paranormal/supernatural phenomenon. 3. Is there an adequate understanding of the phenomena? The AIR report concluded that “The research studies have not identified the nature and source of the effect.” As stated, the Star Gate database has led to a physics and neuroscience based model for the understanding of psi phenomenon within the context of known physical laws, without the need, so far, to invent new laws; the hypotheses put forth suggest that psi- adeptness can be understood as an atypical ability that about 1% of selected populations possesses. It is a science in progress. The psi experience is an expression of far more fundamental questions; in its essence, it addresses the fundamental problems of the nature of time, causality, and information flow. A theory of psi raises four fundamental issues:  Causality violation: From a person-centric view, is it possible that something can happen before what caused this to happen happens first? As the data presented in these volumes indicate, there is nothing impossible about IΨ. From an information-centric perspective, determining causality violation is an empirical physics domain question.  Information transfer from a distant space-time point: How does psi information transfer occur, and what is the carrier of such information?  Perception of information emerging from distant space-time point: Considering we do not know the nature of the information carrier, we assume it is an outlier within the range of human perception. In which case, what is the mechanism for the perception of this information carrier? Much of the information that we have on the “normality” of any aspect of human ability is based on averaged data. While this gives us population norms, and we can identify persons who are at the lower end of the normality curve (for developing treatment and rehabilitation programs, and for research), we rarely pay attention to and examine the outliers on the higher end of the bell curve. Similarly, even within the ranges of what is termed “normal” human perceptual limits, there are outliers on both sides of the curve, whereby those individuals may have the ability to perceive ranges that are beyond the normative ranges but within the species specific limitations (Marwaha and May, 2015b, p. 9).  Individual differences: What are the individual differences that account for the presence of psi-ability in only about one percent of selected populations? 4. Does the research provide support for intelligence gathering operations? Contrary to the conclusions of the AIR report which stated that “There is no evidence that the phenomenon would prove useful in intelligence gathering,” this review of the Star Gate database concludes that within the limitations of the HUMINT platform and the nature of psi, the RV-HUMINT product produced actionable intelligence prompting 89.5% of the customers to return with additional missions. REFERENCES Broughton, R. S. (2006). Memory, emotion, and the receptive psi process. Journal of Parapsychology, 70(2), 255–274. Chabris, C., & Simons, D. (2010). The invisible gorilla: And other ways our intuitions deceive us. New York: Crown. - Cooper, M. H. (1996, February 2). Reforming the CIA. CQ Researcher, 6, 97-120. Retrieved from http://library.cqpress.com/. DIA, Author Redacted. (1989). Government-sponsored research in psychoenergetics. February 1989. Washington D. C.: DIA. DIA/DS-T (1989). Special Report: Sun Streak Evaluation (U). 2 November 1989. Washington D. C.: DIA. SECRET-NOFORN-WNINTEL-SAP. DIA. (1993). Star Gate: Personnel selection and training procedures. 18 October 1993. (SECRET/NOFORN). DCI (2002). Written statement for the record of the Director of Central Intelligence before the Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2002/dci_testimony_10172002.html Druckman, D., Swets, J. A., & National Research Council (U.S.). (1989). Enhancing human performance: Issues, theories, and techniques. Washington, D.C: National Academy Press. Feinberg, G. (1975). Precognition: A memory of things future. pp. 54–64. In L. Oteri (ed.). Quantum physics and parapsychology. New York: Parapsychology Foundation. Irwin, H. J. (1979). Psi and the mind. Metuchen: NJ: Scarecrow Press. Marwaha, S. B., & May, E. C. (2015a). Rethinking extrasensory perception: Towards a multiphasic model of precognition. SAGE Open, January-March 2015, 1–17. DOI: 10.1177/2158244015576056. Marwaha, S. B., & May, E. C. (2015b). The multiphasic model of precognition: The rationale. Journal of Parapsychology, 79(1), 5–19. Marwaha, S. B., & May, E. C. (2016). Precognition: The only form of ESP? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(3–4), 76–100. Marwaha, S. B. (2018). Multiphasic model of informational psi: A signal-based process-oriented model. Mindfield, 10(3), 91–97. Marwaha, S. B., & May, E. C. (2019). Informational psi: Collapsing the problem space of psi phenomena. Zeitschrift für Anomalistik, 19. May, E. C. (1994). Application-oriented receiver certification. Menlo Park, CA: SAIC. May, E. C. & Marwaha, S. B. (2015). Extrasensory perception: Support, skepticism, and science, Volume II — Theories of psi. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publications. May, E. C., Hawley, L., Chaganti, V. K., & Ratra, N. (2014). Natural anomalous cognition targets: A fuzzy set application. Journal of Parapsychology, 78(2), 195–208. May, E. C., & Marwaha, S. B. (2018). The Star Gate Archives: Reports of the United States Government Sponsored Psi Program, 1972–1995. Volume 2: Remote Viewing, 1985–1995. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. May, E. C., Marwaha, S. B., & Chaganti, V. (2014/2011). Anomalous cognition: Two protocols for data collection and analyses, pp. 18–37. In E.C. May, & S.B. Marwaha, (Eds.). Anomalous cognition: Remote viewing research and theory. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. May, E. C., & Spottiswoode, S. J. P. (2014/1990). Managing the target-pool bandwidth: Possible noise reduction for anomalous cognition experiments. In E.C. May, & S.B. Marwaha, (Eds.). Anomalous cognition: Remote viewing research and theory, pp. 48–56. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. May, E. C., Utts, J. M., Trask, V. V., Luke, W. W., Frivold, T. J., & Humphrey, B. S. (1989). Review of the psychoenergetic research conducted at SRI International. (1973–1988). Final Report, Task 6.0.1, Covering the Period 1 October to 15 February 1989, SRI Project 1291. Menlo Park, CA: SRI International. McMoneagle, J. W., & May, E. C. (2014/2004). The possible role of intention, attention and expectation in remote viewing, pp. 368–376. In E.C. May, & S.B. Marwaha, (Eds.). Anomalous cognition: Remote viewing research and theory. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. Mumford, M. D., Rose, A. H., & Goslin, D. A. (1995). An evaluation of remote viewing: Research and applications. American Institutes for Research. Palmer, J. (1985). An evaluative report on the current status of parapsychology. Final Report. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Palmer, J., Honorton, C., & Utts, J. (1988). Reply to the National Research Council Study on parapsychology. A special report prepared the Board of Directors of the Parapsychological Association, Inc. NC: Parapsychological Association. Roll, W. G. (1966). ESP and memory. International Journal of Neuropsychiatry, 2(5), 505–521. Salyer, J. A., Puthoff, H. E., & Lavelle, L. A. (1983). Project Grill Flame: Operational Tasks. (U). SRI/GF-0236. January 1983. Washington D.C.: DIA. SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL Sternberg, R. J., & Zhang, L. (2014). Perspectives on thinking, learning, and cognitive styles. Florence: Taylor and Francis. Swann, I. (1983). Coordinate remote viewing (CRV) technology (1981-1983). Three-Year Project Draft. Project 4028, New York, NY. Menlo Park, CA: SRI International. SECRET. Tyrell, G. N. M. (1946). The modus operandi of paranormal cognition. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 48, 65–120. Annex I The Nature of Informational Psi (IΨ) WHAT IS INFORMATIONAL PSI (IΨ)? Informational psi (a.k.a., anomalous cognition, precognition, clairvoyance, real-time psi) is a process rather than a singular event. Multiple theoretical frameworks ranging from hyperdimensional models to entropic and quantum mechanical considerations to neuroscientific and psychological considerations have been put forth to examine various points in the process (see May and Marwaha, 2015, for detailed theories). Based on the Star Gate data—both experimental and operational—Marwaha and May (2015a, b) have put forth a signal-based multiphasic model of informational psi (MMIΨ), also known as the multiphasic model of precognition. The MMIΨ divides the problem space into the physics domain and the neuroscience domain to address the process of how information from the external world is perceived and processed by an individual, leading to the experience and expression of psi based information. The physics domain addresses the question of how it is possible that information that can be used can go between two space-time points, especially if the two points are acausally separated. It is related to how information is carried from an external source, which is distant in time and space, to the percipient; this is an information-centric perspective. The neuroscience domain (ND) addresses the experiential part of the problem, that is, how is the information acquired by a putative sensory system, how is this information processed in the brain, and how is it expressed? This domain addresses the problem of precognition, which is a person-centric perspective (Figure 1.1). PRECOGNITION AND REAL-TIME PSI Informational psi (IΨ) generally refers to information perceived about future/real-time events, where the information could not be inferred by ordinary means. Real-time psi generally refers to information received from a distance, beyond the reach of the ordinary senses. It refers to the cognition of objects and events as distinguished from cognition of thoughts and mental states of individuals. Procedurally it means that the target stimuli in experiments are occurring in real time, and are randomly generated before data collection is initiated. In contrast, in a precognition protocol, the target is generated after data collection is complete. Using a double-blind protocol is mandatory for all such experiments. When a target stimulus is generated post-response, it is a case of a future separated point in space-time and is the formal definition of precognition. When a target stimulus is generated pre-response it is available in real time—the time of the session. Despite these two differing conditions, we still cannot control when the percipient obtains the information. In all real-time cases we know of there are always two possible open channels through which the psi information may be obtained—the present and the future. Remote viewing protocols are the method of choice for both operational and experimental work. In operational/applied situations, the temporal location of the event determines whether it is a precognition or real-time task. Telepathy generally refers to the acquisition of information concerning the thoughts, feelings, or activity of another conscious being. Procedurally, it is difficult to determine exactly what the target is, as one has to either rely on a prerecorded note of the target stimulus (a real- time condition) or rely on a post-session narration of the target stimulus (a precognition condition). As far as current neuroscience is concerned, there are no unique CNS signatures of a thought. A thought is significantly different than even an encrypted image contained in the inner workings of a computer hard drive, which could serve as a target stimulus. Telepathy studies suffer from the same problems that real-time ones do; that is, we are unable to block access to information eventually generated in the percipients’ future. There is insufficient evidence to support the telepathy hypothesis. Marwaha and May (2016, 2019) have argued that precognition may be the only form of IΨ. Real-time psi, telepathy, and micro-PK can be subsumed within precognition, as it appears impossible to close the future door for the experimenter/percipient, as we do not know when and where the psi information is acquired. In the absence of evidence for distinctive mechanisms differentiating between precognition, telepathy, real-time psi, survival hypothesis, or micro-PK, we can state that precognition, which can be explained by the mechanism of a putative psi signal, can adequately address these phenomena. From the perspective of the neuroscience domain, once distant-in-space-time informational signals—whether emerging in real-time or from the future—have been received by the transducer, the likelihood of cortical mechanisms being able to differentiate between the temporal origins of the signal are quite unlikely, unless we are willing to posit at this stage of the evidence that the nature/properties of signals varies depending on its temporal origins. This implies that, from the person-centric perspective, all perception, regardless of its temporal origin, is local. That is, information from there/then has come to here/now, which is within the perceptual range of the percipient. EXPERIENCE OF PSI While IΨ, that is, precognition (or predictive psi, as used in operational taskings) and real-time psi, is the phenomenon under consideration, its experience and expressions can be varied. As stated, remote viewing (CRV, ERV, WRV) is one of the methodologies of IΨ. Other methods that aid in focusing attention on the distant in space-time information include dowsing, dreams, meditation. Since IΨ is an atypical perceptual ability possessed by only about 1% of the population, the choice of method is individual specific, in that a viewer uses a method that he/she is most comfortable with or comes naturally to him/her. Thus, information so gathered is expressed in various forms such as dreams, drawings, writing, and speech. As stated in the MMIΨ, one is never sure when the information is acquired; it can occur before the day of the session or may be even on the way to the session. The methods and expressions are simply idiosyncratic ways of bringing information stored in the unconscious to the fore. Phase I Phase II ~ PHYSICS NEUROSCIENCE DOMAIN DOMAIN :PERCEPTION AND COGNITION RESPONSE I I Cl) Sight ):I I a:: --' <( z ('.) Attention Emotions ii) Beliefs Hearini: ~ Feelings u. Cl) --' I I en 5 0 Memory <( z ('.) Imagination Emotions ('.) Touch : ~ z Illusions ldeational ii) ) , I- u'.i --' <( I-'~ ~ u~ Creative Additions ~ Visual z Smell I~ Random Uncontrolled Thoughts Verbal a:: )I(!) 0 a:: w I- I - I (I) a.. Idea Making • w X Taste I ~ )IO --' <( Intellectual Decisions • . . I en I ffi u i= Valid Psi Information • • Psi Signals ■ (I) a:: ··········:>: 0 (_) • I I • Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Figure 1.1. The multiphasic model of precognition – informational psi. LIMITS OF PSI Two limitations that influence the psi process must be kept in mind while assessing the operational/applied remote viewing program, both from the point of the project tasking as well as analysis of remote viewing responses. Individual limitations: While IΨ is not encumbered by limits of distance in space and time, there are several factors that influence the accessibility to psi informational signals. A review of the psi research conducted at SRI International (1973–1988) (See pp. 317-325, Volume 2) states that experienced viewers are significantly better than the general population, approximately 1% of the general population possesses a natural remote viewing ability, and there is no quantitative evidence to support a training hypothesis. While remote viewing ability does not degrade over time, like other cognitive abilities, it is affected by the health and emotional status of the remote viewer, including effects of medication and other environmental inclemencies. As discussed earlier, there can be several points of error from perception to cognition: (1) a restricted psi information channel, (2) detector efficiency, (3) inattentional blindness, (4) no prior knowledge or memory of target, (5) error in recognition and/or inference from perceived signal, (6) error in decision making, and (7) error in response. Bandwidth limitations: A crude estimate of what in information theory is called channel capacity — how much information the channel can accommodate — is a few millibits per second. Signal models entail a source, transmission channel, and a detector system. However, our other sensory systems are bandwidth limited at the transducer, which is the point of entry for external signals. For example, we cannot directly experience x-rays or infrared in the EM spectrum because our retina cells cannot accommodate these frequencies. Similarly, our auditory and olfactory systems are also limited, say, compared to that of a dog, at their detection frontends. It is, therefore, not an unreasonable guess to assume that the psi bandwidth limitation will reside in the neurostructure that constitutes the transducer — that which converts the psi signal carrier into electrochemical signals that the CNS can interpret. Based on a computation of the bit rates for SRI/SAIC experiments, the weighted average of information transfer bit rate per symbol is approximately 0.043±0.026 bits/symbol leading to a 1-tailed 95% confidence interval of [0.0, 0.086]. This bit rate is far too small, in that it determines the amount of information that can be acquired by a psi process in a given period of time. The bit rate is far too small to enable the detection of psi-in-process during an fMRI, considering the amount of ‘noise’ from other sensory systems and internal processes. The bit rate limitation can emerge from three possible sources: In the physics domain, (1) the transfer rate from source to percipient, (2) the nature of the putative psi signal; in the neuroscience domain (3) the nature of the transducer that may limit the amount of information available for further processing; in the neuroscience domain. Considering the low bit rate, how do we account for the elaborate remote viewings that are mentioned in these volumes? Two of the biggest challenges of IΨ research, that also influence replicability, are when and where does psi happen? Experiment participants tell us that they do not have control over when they are ‘psychic.’ The process of assimilating psi data may start when notified of the impending remote viewing session (or even before), during/after fixing the date for the session, or before the start of the session itself. (Most sessions are of 15 minutes duration.) This essentially makes an apparently real-time task a precognitive one. As viewers have reported, they find it very difficult to pinpoint a specific time when the perception of the data actually took place. Thus, by the time the viewer starts the session, he may have unconsciously assimilated several bits of information and processed it––as is other sensory information––such that it enables him to express the information during the session in the form of a narration, writing, drawing or any other expressive art form. Thus, once the information has been implicitly received, it is stored and retrieved from the memory in the same way as information from the other sensory systems (Tyrell, 1946; Roll, 1966; Feinberg, 1975; Irwin, 1979; Broughton, 2006; Marwaha and May, 2015a, b). Once the psi information is on board, it would be difficult to distinguish that from other stored information; although, once it comes to the conscious level, a psi-adept can distinguish newly acquired psi information from that which is previously known. REFERENCES Broughton, R. S. (2006). Memory, emotion, and the receptive psi process. Journal of Parapsychology, 70(2), 255–274. Feinberg, G. (1975). Precognition: A memory of things future. pp. 54–64. In L. Oteri (ed.). Quantum physics and parapsychology. New York: Parapsychology Foundation. Irwin, H. J. (1979). Psi and the mind. Metuchen: NJ: Scarecrow Press. Marwaha, S. B., & May, E. C. (2015a). Rethinking extrasensory perception: Towards a multiphasic model of precognition. SAGE Open, January-March 2015, 1–17. DOI: 10.1177/2158244015576056. Marwaha, S. B., & May, E. C. (2015b). The multiphasic model of precognition: The rationale. Journal of Parapsychology, 79(1), 5–19. Marwaha, S. B., & May, E. C. (2016). Precognition: The only form of ESP? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(3–4), 76–100. Marwaha, S. B., & May, E. C. (2019). Informational psi: Collapsing the problem space of psi phenomena. Zeitschrift für Anomalistik, 19. May, E. C. & Marwaha, S. B. (2015). Extrasensory perception: Support, skepticism, and science, Volume II — Theories of psi. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publications. May, E. C., & Marwaha, S. B. (2018). The Star Gate Archives: Reports of the United States Government Sponsored Psi Program, 1972–1995. Volume 2: Remote Viewing, 1985–1995. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. Roll, W. G. (1966). ESP and memory. International Journal of Neuropsychiatry, 2(5), 505–521. Tyrell, G. N. M. (1946). The modus operandi of paranormal cognition. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 48, 65–120. Annex II Defense Intelligence Agency: Sun Streak Project Manual 16 December 1985 1. (S/NOFORN) General: This manual describes procedures and activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Special Access Program (SAP) SUN STREAK. The mission of SUN STREAK is to develop an operational psychoenergetics capability (i.e. remote viewing) for the U.S. Intelligence Community. SUN STREAK is conducted within approved “human use” guidelines and does not involve any practices which expose participants to harmful circumstances or substances such as drugs [emphasis added]. 2. (S/NOFORN) Definitions: a. (U) Psychoenergetics: A mental process by which an individual perceives, communicates with, and/or perturbs characteristics of a designated target, person, or event remote in space and/or time from that individual. It does not involve any electronic devices located or focused at the target, nor does it involve classical photo interpretation of photographs obtained from overhead or oblique means. b. (U) Psychoenergetic Source: A person who perceives, communicates with, and/or perturbs characteristics of a designated target, person, or event. c. (U) Psychoenergetic Trainee: A person being trained to be a psychoenergetic source. d. (U) Psychoenergetic Session: A single attempt by a psychoenergetic source and an interviewer/monitor to perceive, communicate with, and/or perturb characteristics of a designated target, person, or event. e. (U) Interviewer/Monitor: The individual who interacts directly with the psychoenergetic source before, during, and after the session. f. (U) Remote Viewing: The name of a method of psychoenergetic perception. A term coined by SRI-International (SRI-I) and defined as “the acquisition and description, by mental means, of information blocked from ordinary perception by distance, shielding, or time.” g. (U) Coordinate Remote Viewing (CRV): A Remote Viewing technique that requires the use of coordinates as targeting technique. h. (U) Targeting Information: An abstract referent which represents the target of interest. i. (U) Target/Site: A specific area, person or event at a specific time. j. (U) Discrete State: A type of psychoenergetic activity in which the source perceives his consciousness to be located at the target. 3. (S/NOFORN) Objective: It is the objective of this manual to document psychoenergetic training and applications procedures so as to maintain reasonable uniformity and consistency in present and future SUN STREAK training and operations. 4. (S/NOFORN) Applications: SUN STREAK applications of psychoenergetics include but are not limited to: (1) targeting of key enemy personnel from covert agents to key military commanders, (2) monitoring hostile military movements, lines of communication, and specific technologies, (3) detecting changes in the state of military units, (4) detecting and assessing hostile intelligence efforts targeted against friendly units/missions, and (5) detecting and assessing hostile technological capabilities in specific locations. Since US Department of Defense personnel, command and control locations and systems, units, materiel, and operations are subject to a similar hostile intelligence service threat, SUN STREAK can assist in devising countermeasures to eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities. 5. (U) Selection of Personnel: a. (S/NOFORN) Current Selection Criteria: After over a year of participation within the psychoenergetic project, original source personnel were tested by the INSCOM Staff Psychologist in an attempt to determine a suitable profile by which further participants could be identified. The specific tests administered were (see Section B for test descriptions): (1) The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) (2) Gordon Personal Profile Inventory (GPI). (3) Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behavior (FIRO-B). (4) California Psychological Inventory (CPI). (5) Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS). (6) Personal Orientation Inventory (POI). For the most part, the group presented itself as emotionally stable with no marked trends. There did appear to be an interesting similarity in defensive style, a tending toward artistic, aesthetic, and cultural interests, and an introversive style of emotional expression. From these test results the INSCOM Staff Psychologist constructed a test that may be used as an initial screening tool in the selection of new psychoenergetic participants. This new test is called the INSCOM Factor Questionnaire. This instrument is used to compare the personality profiles of prospective Project candidates with successful psychoenergetic operatives. A high score suggests that individuals have similar characteristics to operational psychoenergetic personnel and may be potential selectees for the project. A score of 20 or higher is considered to indicate significant similarity to successful psychoenergetic personnel. Individuals who score within the parameters specified by the INSCOM psychologist would then receive personal interviews with SUN STREAK Project personnel. From these interviews new project participants would be selected and trained. b. (S/NOFORN) Projected Selection Criteria: SRI-I has completed a contract to investigate and report on a particular aspect of psychoenergetics relating to operational management of personnel; that is, to determine if a personality testing technique can be created which, when applied to a general population, would delineate specific individuals who exhibit a higher degree of talent for psychoenergetic abilities. Though the results provided by SRI-I came far short of providing either a thorough list of dependable selection criteria or a reliable selection system, they did establish a valuable data base and a promising point of departure for a future project that should be able to significantly improve the selection process. c. (S/NOFORN) Voluntary Consent: As required under the regulations governing “Human Use” (see para 2, Appendix A, [not included here]), all personnel operate on a strictly voluntary basis, and may withdraw at any time without any form of prejudicial action or consideration directed against them. Further, participants are informed of any known or potential risks that might be inherent in program participation. This is accomplished through the use of a verbal briefing from a knowledgeable SUN STREAK official, and the execution of a personalized Statement of Consent form outlining all pertinent information and considerations. The voluntary consent requirement pertains to individuals assigned to the SUN STREAK Project and contractors/consultants. A sample of the voluntary consent form is attached as enclosure 5, Section A. 6. (S/NOFORN) Training Procedures: To provide a framework for the standardizing of the task of psychoenergetic learning, a number of methodologies are being utilized and conducted within the SUN STREAK Project. These are as follows: a. (S/NOFORN) Orientation Testing/Training: (1) Purpose: To provide new personnel with an introduction to training and applications procedures. (2) Administered by: SUN STREAK Project personnel and selected contractor and subcontractors. (3) Location: Fort George G. Meade, Maryland and other designated locations. (4) Duration: One to six months. (5) Description of Procedures: Orientation testing/training is developed from the practical application of state-of-the-art psychoenergetic technology drawn from academic institutions, scientific laboratories, and research establishments around the world. It is an eclectic approach, using those methods which have applications potential. Orientation testing is designed to determine if new personnel have aptitudes which would be of operational value and could be developed through training. This orientation testing consists of a series of controlled exercises in psychoenergetic functioning. New personnel may be asked to attempt to perceive, communicate with, and/or perturb characteristics of a designated target, person, or event remote in space and/or time from that individual. Orientation training is composed of practical exercises in Remote Viewing, lectures, literature review, and observation of others. It includes the use of locally significant sites, as well as more remote geographical locations as targets. A target pool consists of a controlled group of sites or targets and their associated targeting information. Prior to the beginning of a training session, a target is randomly selected from this target pool. Information available concerning the target is kept from the trainee until after the session. (6) Training Session Preliminaries: Before a first training session is scheduled, the person being trained is oriented fully to the procedure to be followed by the monitor. The trainee is instructed that he or she should state only raw perceptions, since experience has shown that specific definitions are quite often wrong while initial raw perception tends to be correct. Personnel being trained are always encouraged to express their feelings and ideas for enhancing all aspects of the psychoenergetics collection process. (7) Training Session Dynamics: During the 30-60 minutes prior to the agreed-upon time of a training session, the monitor offers some encouragement to the trainee in the same manner that a coach might give a pep talk to his team. During the 15 minutes immediately before the session the trainee and monitor are generally silent. Experience has shown (unpublished data) that this quiet time enhances the training process. The training room is homogeneously colored, acoustic-tiled, and featureless, with light controlled by a dimmer, so that environmental distractions can be minimized. During the entire process the trainee and monitor function as a team. The monitor provides encouragement with words of reassurance that the task is, in fact, possible. At no time is the session conducted by the trainee in the absence of all other persons. If the trainee does not have any immediate sensory impressions, the monitor applies no pressure. Rather, the monitor reassures the trainee that there is no time limit for the training session. If it appears to the monitor that the impressions are in some way contradictory or inconsistent, the monitor may then attempt clarification by asking questions in order to verify what the trainee first describes. All sessions are tape-recorded, and pen and paper are available for the trainee to sketch his or her perceptions. Experience has shown that some trainees prefer to combine written and oral descriptions, while some prefer to work sequentially. The average training session for orientation is approximately 15 minutes of actual perception. Trainees generally are not permitted to go beyond 30 minutes as this leads to perceptual confusion and eventual loss of the training affect. (8) Post Session Dynamics: After the training session is over, the trainee and monitor obtain specific information about the target, either in picture descriptive form for remote geographic sites, or—as in the case of local sites—by actually visiting the target site. The trainee and monitor then discuss the session results. The purpose of this post-session activity is to provide the trainee with the satisfaction of knowing how well he or she did while mental perceptions of the targeted site are still fresh in mind. b. (S/NOFORN) CRV Training: (l) Purpose: To provide trainees with the requisite skills necessary to perform certain psychoenergetic applications. (2) Administered by: In-house, contractor and subcontractor personnel. (3) Location: Ft. Meade, MD; SRI-I Menlo Park, CA/New York, NY; and other mutually agreed locations as required. (4) Duration: 12 to 18 months. (5) Description of Procedure: External CRV training was a contracted service provided by SRI-I. The training itself involves lectures on theory coupled with practical exercises and drills. Particularly effective instructional procedures include active participation wherein the trainee interacts with the curriculum materials by responding; practicing, and testing each step of the material to be mastered; information feedback, wherein the trainee finds out with minimal delay whether the response is correct; and individualized instruction, wherein the trainee moves ahead at his or her own rate. The training procedures have been broken down into several stages representing various elements of CRV phenomena. These stages both facilitate training and actually follow the predictable course of increasing perception which builds itself in specific increments and impact. Stages 1 through 3 appertain to general site features, which become increasingly refined as individual competency with Stage 3 techniques develops. Stage 4 involves perception of specific site elements, a good portion of which may not be available to any other intelligence techniques, save for actual penetration of the site. Stage 5 allows the trainee in a sense to reverse the procedure and “interrogate” his perceptions, allowing clarification of various specific or subtle features of the site. Stage 6 permits the construction of 3-dimensional models of major site characteristics, with increasing refinements, in detail. Experience and theory extension indicates that additional increments exist beyond Stage 6. Research is underway to develop and define the parameters and potentials of these additional fields. (6) Session Dynamics: In conducting a CRV session, a remote viewer or trainee and a monitor begin by seating themselves at the opposite ends of a table in a special remote viewing room equipped with paper and pens, a tape recorder, and an overhead TV camera which allows either recording for documentation, or monitoring by individuals outside the room. The room is homogeneously colored, acoustic-tiled, and featureless, with light controlled by a dimmer, so that environmental distractions can be minimized. The session begins when the monitor provides targeting information, in the form of specific site coordinates, to the trainee. For training purposes the monitor is allowed to know enough about the site to enable him to determine when accurate versus inaccurate information is being provided. The session then proceeds with the monitor repeating the targeting information at appropriate intervals and providing necessary feedback. The feedback procedure was designed to reinforce the trainee’s contact with the site but not to assist him by random cuing. The remote viewer generates verbal responses and sketches, until a coherent response to the overall task requirement emerges. The use of the quick reaction-response procedure has been found useful in minimizing imaginative embellishment. (7) Post Session Dynamics: After the training session is over, the trainee and monitor obtain specific information about the target. As in the case of orientation training, this is presented in picture descriptive form for remote geographic sites, or in the case of local sites, may involve actually visiting the target site. The trainee and monitor then discuss the session results, again with the purpose of providing the trainee with the satisfaction of knowing how well he or she did while mental perceptions of the targeted site are still fresh. c. (S/NOFORN) Applications Training: (1) Purpose: To enable advanced trainees to integrate and expand acquired skills for psychoenergetic applications. (2) Administered by: SUN STREAK Project personnel. (3) Location: Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. (4) Duration: Continuous. (5) Description of Procedure: Procedures for applications training are essentially identical as those previously presented except in the style of target presented. Applications targets are actual targets of military interest, such as US facilities or USSR sites from which data are available or can eventually be obtained. Targets of this type provide a basis for judgements regarding utility, accuracy, calibration, and depth of detail for any given trainee in a real-world environment. 7. (S/NOFORN) Operating Procedures: SUN STREAK sources can be used to perform psychoenergetic applications in support of intelligence and counter intelligence requirements (see paragraph 4 above). The dynamics of applications sessions parallel those of training sessions. The sequence of events consists of the following: (1) tasking; (2) development of a collection plan; (3) conduct of psychoenergetic session(s); (4) reporting; (5) evaluation. Applications sessions are always conducted under the control and management of SUN STREAK personnel. Sessions may be conducted at Fort Meade or other locations as deemed necessary. Psychoenergetic consultants/contractors may be employed when required to meet applications requirements. 8. (S/NOFORN) Additional Procedures: a. Sources and trainees may be monitored using appropriate non-intrusive biological monitoring equipment. b. The maximum number of applications sessions for each source will not exceed ten per week. c. The maximum number of training sessions for each source will not exceed 20 per week. d. (U) SUN STREAK procedures do not involve the use of drugs, substances, or circumstances harmful to participants. Facilities at Kimbrough Army Hospital, Fort Meade, MD, are available if required. 9. (S/NOFORN) Confidentiality: Individuals performing as psychoenergetic trainees, sources, and monitors under the SUN STREAK Project will not have their roles identified outside of their parent organization without their specific prior consent, and they will be referred to in project reports only by an alpha-numeric designator. Products of SUN STREAK such as tapes, drawings, transcripts, rosters, or other materials which might reveal the identity of the source will be coded to assure the protection of their identity. 10. (S/NOFORN) Physical Environment: Psychoenergetic sessions will be conducted in an ordinary room at ambient temperature and humidity during the normal waking hours of the participants. The only limitations on these parameters will be for security from electronic eavesdropping and elimination of ordinary distractions, such as radio, office machinery, and outside noises. SECTION A: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (S/NOFORN) Concept Approval: Commander, US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command approved in principle the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) involvement in the GRILL FLAME (GF) project, which began in April 1978 (GF was the predecessor to the SUN STREAK Project). In May 1978, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) accepted lead responsibility for GF applications. Effective 14 January 1981, by approval of the Under Secretary of the Army, INSCOM became the only operational GF element in the Army. Program management for GF was transferred to Commander, INSCOM effective 11 February 1981. OACSI, DAMI- ISH remained the Army focal point for policy matters and interface at the national level. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) maintained overall DoD responsibility. Also in 1981, a joint services GF Committee consisting of DIA, Air Force and Army was formed. Later the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that the Air Force withdraw from the committee and all psychoenergetic programs. A comprehensive program was designed to determine the operational parameters and usefulness of psychoenergetics and assess the threat these phenomena posed to national security. At that time DIA was R&D oriented and INSCOM’s portion of GF was applications oriented. In the FY83 DoD budget review the Budget Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence curtailed all psychoenergetic activities funded by the Army in the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), but directed that DIA could complete the third year of their effort and that all future Army funding be budgeted outside the NFIP. INSCOM terminated formal involvement with GF at the end of FY 82; in the fall of 1982, in keeping with congressional desires, the Commanding General INSCOM provided funding from Security and Investigative Activities (S&IA) monies, and continued its efforts under a provisional compartmented SAP nicknamed CENTER LANE (CL). On 1 September 1983, the Secretary of the Army approved continued Army participation in CL activities within INSCOM and with appropriate contractors in a cooperative effort with DIA. In July 1984, CG, INSCOM determined that the CL technology and intelligence collection methodology would have greater potential and could be better utilized at a higher echelon in DoD. Accordingly, CG INSCOM offered to transfer CENTER LANE’s assets and personnel to DIA. On 7 March 1985, a memorandum of agreement was concluded between DIA and INSCOM providing for the interim operational control of CL by DIA, and for the ultimate assimilation of CL assets and personnel into DIA’s new SUN STREAK psychoenergetics program. CL personnel were transferred to DIA in FY 1986 to form the nucleus of the SUN STREAK effort. SECTION B: HUMAN USE ISSUES 1. (S/NOFORN) In February 1979, the Army General Counsel determined that GRILL FLAME (GF) activities involved testing on human subjects redacted redacted redacted redactedredacted redacted redacted redacted redactedredacted redacted redacted redacted redacted In March 1979, The Surgeon General’s Human Subjects Research Review Board reviewed the GF protocol and concluded that it represented technology transfer and validation of the technology transfer, rather than research or clinical investigation, and as such, GF activities did not require approval for human use. However, the Board expressed concerns that future Army follow-on work might be classified as research, and as such, plans should be considered to establish credible human use review procedures to oversee GF redacted redacted redacted redacted redactedredacted redacted redacted redacted redactedredacted redacted redacted redacted redacted In April 1980, the Under Secretary of the Army approved the continuation of GF activities. In October 1980, the DoD, DIA, and Army General Counsel jointly agreed that it would be prudent to obtain written approval from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to conduct GF activities. ACSI, DA concurrently initiated action to obtain Secretary of the Army approval to conduct GF activities. In September 1982, INSCOM GRILL FLAME activities ceased because of NFIP restrictions; INSCOM psychoenergetic activities were reinitiated in December 1982, under the INSCOM CENTER LANE Project (ICLP), an S&IA activity. Secretary or Under Secretary approval for GRILL FLAME/ICLP activities has been granted on 14 January 1981, 1 February 1982 and 1 September 1983, which were generally valid for one year. With the pending transfer of ICLP resources to DIA to become the new SUN STREAK Program, a DIA General Counsel decision in February 1985 designated SUN STREAK a “Human Use” program, determining that the Project involved “Experimentation on Human Subjects,” and that relevant Human Use protocols did indeed apply to Project procedures and technologies. Conduct of the Project under Human Use regulations was subsequently approved on 13 March 1985 by the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense. 2. (U) Regulations governing “Experimentation on Human Subjects” are as follows: a. (U) 45 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46, “Protection of Human Subjects” (Incl. 1). b. (U) Procedure 13, DOD Directive 5240.1-R (Incl. 2). SECTION C: PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST DESCRIPTIONS 1. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI): Developed by S.R. Hathaway, Ph.D., and J.C. McKinley, M.D., The Psychological Corporation. The MMPI is designed to provide an objective assessment of some of the major personality characteristics that affect personal and social adjustment. The point of view determining the importance of a trait in this case is that of the clinical or personnel worker who wishes to assay those traits that are commonly characteristic of disabling psychological abnormality. The carefully constructed and cross-validated scales provide a means for measuring the personality status of literate adolescents and adults together with a basis for evaluating the acceptability and dependability of each test record. Nine scales were originally developed for clinical use of the inventory and were named for the abnormal conditions on which their construction was based. The scales were not expected to measure pure traits nor to represent discrete etiological or prognostic entities. Since they have been shown to have meaning within the normal range of behavior, these scales are now commonly referred to by their abbreviations—Hs (hypochondriasis), D (depression), Hy (Hysteria), Pd (psychopathic deviate), Mf (masculinity-femininity), Pa (paranoia), Pt (psychasthenia), Sc (schizophrenia), and Ma (hypomania)—or by their code numbers to avoid possibly misleading connotations. Many other scales have subsequently been developed from the same items; Si (social introversion) is one that is commonly scored. There are also three validating scales: L (lie), F (validity), and K (correction). 2. Gordon Personal Profile Inventory (GPI): Developed by Leonard V. Gordon, Ph.D., The Psychological Corporation. The GPI is companion instrument to the Gordon Personal Profile (GPP). It measures four additional traits, namely Cautiousness (C), Original Thinking (O), Personal Relations (P), and Vigor (V). The two instruments used together provide an economical coverage of eight important factors in the personality domain. Both have been found to be appropriate for use with high school, college, industrial, and general adult groups. 3. Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation – Behavior (FIRO B): Developed by Will Schutz, Ph.D., Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. The fundamental interpersonal dimensions of the FIRO Theory are; Inclusion (I), Control (C), and Affection (A) and are defined behaviorally as follows: I – The interpersonal need for inclusion is the need to establish and maintain a satisfactory relationship with people with respect to interaction and association (both positive or negative). C – The interpersonal need for control is the need to establish and maintain a satisfactory relationship with people with respect to control and power. A – The interpersonal need for affection is the need to establish and maintain a satisfactory relationship with others with respect to love and affection. 4. California Psychological Inventory (CPI): Developed by Harrison G. Gough, Ph.D., Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. The CPI is intended primarily for use with “normal” (non-psychiatrically disturbed) subjects. Its scales are addressed to personality characteristics important for social living and social interaction, i.e., to variables that are woven into the fabric of everyday life. “Folk concepts” such as these are hypothesized to be relevant to the prediction and understanding of interpersonal behavior in any setting, culture, or circumstance. Thus, although the inventory has been found to have special utility in work with particular kinds of problems, e.g., delinquent and asocial behavior, it can also provide information of value in regard to educational, vocational, familial, and many other issues. 5. Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS): Developed by Allen L. Edwards, Ph.D., University of Washington. The EPPS was designed primarily as an instrument for research and counseling purposes, to provide quick and convenient measures of a number of relatively independent normal personality variables. The statements in the EPPS and the variables that these statements purport to measure have their origin in a list of manifest needs presented by H. A. Murray and other noted psychologists. The names that have been assigned to the variables are those used by Murray. These 15 measurable personality variables are: achievement (ach), deference (def), order (ord), exhibition (exh), autonomy (aut), affiliation (aff), intraception (int), succorance (sue), dominance (dom), abasement (aba), nurturance (nur), change (chg), endurance (end), heterosexuality (het), and aggression (agg). In addition to the above 15 personality variables, the EPPS provides a measure of test consistency and a measure of profile stability. 6. Personal Orientation Inventory (POI): Developed by Everett L. Shostrom, Ph.D., Educational and Industrial Testing Service, San Diego, California. The profile on the POI shows the degree to which the subject’s attitudes and values compare with those of self-actualizing people. A self-actualizing person is one who is more fully functioning and who lives a more enriched life than does the average person. Such a person is developing and utilizing his unique talents to the fullest extent. SECTION D: EVALUATION PROCEDURES 1. (S/NF/SS-2) Operational Phase: (S/NF/SS-2) The Program Manager will assess the value of the operational phase of the DRAGOON ABSORB/SUN STREAK program by requiring all data consumers (i.e., operational task originators) to furnish him with data accuracy and data utility assessments. Table l illustrates the general format and assessment scale (0-3) for this evaluation. Specific data categories may vary depending on the nature of the task or on specific objectives however, the overall approach will remain the same. (S/NF/SS-2) The Program Manager will enter results of the accuracy and utility assessment into the project data base. He will make periodic reviews (quarterly) of this data to assess overall effectiveness. (S/NF/SS-2) The Program Manager, in coordination with the task originators and the Intelligence Community Task Coordinating Group, will develop an additional measure of program value. This measurement (overall program value) is designed to measure the net worth or total contribution of the task in relation to other tasks and to the overall intelligence mission. Data accuracy and utility may be high for a particular consumer, but the results may not have a significant overall impact. This program value scale is similar to the utility scale; however, it is based on specific measures of overall benefit. This value scale is as follows: Program Value Scale 0 – Little or no overall program value 1 – Some program value (i.e., helped refine estimates) 2 – Moderate value (i.e., identified new data, narrowed down possibilities) 3 – High value (i.e., led to significant cost savings, identified critical high priority S&T or operational activities) 4 – Exceptional value (i.e., predicted major events/activities, located lost/missing resources or personnel). The value evaluation will be used in conjunction with other program evaluation parameters (accuracy, utility) for determining program accomplishments and for defining future program directions. 2. (S/NF/SS-2) Training and Operational Qualifying Phase: (C) There are two other aspects of this program that will require evaluation by the Program Manager or by his representative; the basic training phase and the operational qualifying (or operational training) phase. (S/NF/SS-2) The basic training phase consists of a large variety of easy-to-verify training tasks that are designed for various stages of proficiency. Overall evaluations will be based on the accuracy scale used for operational projects and on an additional quantitative procedure. The accuracy scale will permit assessment of an individual’s progress through the six training stages. The quantitative procedure (i.e., concept/element analysis) will allow assessments of degree of accuracy and will provide the basis for determining what general classes of operational projects a viewer can best perform. (S/NF/SS-2) The operational qualifying phase follows satisfactory completion of the training phase. This phase consists of tasks that simulate operational projects but differ in that ground truth can be readily determined, and there are no operational consumers. The main purpose of this phase is to systematically quantify the operational readiness of each viewer for a wide variety of potential operational projects. Data from this phase will also help identify the best types of operational tasks for remote viewing (RV) applications. (S/NF/SS-2) Each RV source will perform several hundred operational qualifying tasks per year. These tasks will include representative examples from DIA’s intelligence production codes and from other potential operational requirements. Evaluation will be performed by the Program Manager or his representative and will be based on the accuracy scale used for operational projects. In addition, accurate estimates of operational reliability and utility will be made using quantitative methods (i.e., concept/element analysis, pattern evaluation). These evaluation procedures will require extensive use of a dedicated data base management system for storing large amounts of information and for performing appropriate analyses. (S/NF/SS-2) It is anticipated that a limited operational capability will be achieved by early to mid-1987. Some operational projects will be initiated in FY 1986; however, the type of task accepted will depend on the nature of the proposed task and on capability levels of available RV sources. SECTION E: TRAINING TARGETS, CLASSES AND DEFINITIONS 1. (S/SK/WNINTEL) There are three classes of Remote Viewing (RV) training used in that portion of the in-house training, which was modeled after the SRI-I subcontractor program. These classes deal with feedback requirements during the RV session, control of interviewer patter, trainee skill development, and motivation. These three classes (A, B, and C) are discussed below. (*NOTE: The use herein of the terms Class A, B, or C differs from the definition applied and published by SRI-I for Class A, B, or C Coordinate Remote Viewing (CRV).) 2. (S/SK/WNINTEL) CLASS C: The majority of the training sessions for novice trainees are class C. During this phase, the source trainee must learn to differentiate between emerging target relevant perceptions and imaginative overlay. To assist the trainee in this learning, immediate feedback is provided during the session. The interviewer is provided with a feedback package which may contain a map, photographs, and/or a narrative description of the target. During Class C sessions, the interviewer provides the trainee with immediate feedback for each element of data he provides, with the exception that negative feedback is not given. Should the trainee state an element of information that appears incorrect, the interviewer remains silent. Feedback, in order to prevent inadvertent cuing (interviewer overlay), is in the form of very specific statements made by the interviewer. These statements and their definitions are as follows:  Correct (C) – This indicates that the information is correct in context with the site location, but is not sufficient to end the session.  Probably Correct (PC) – This statement means that the interviewer, having limited information about the target, though he cannot be absolutely sure, believes that the information provided is correct.  Near (N) – This indicates that the information provided is not an element of the specific site, but is correct for the immediate surrounding area.  Can’t Feedback (CFB) – This statement indicates that, due to limited information about the target, the interviewer cannot make a judgment as to the correctness of the data. It means neither correct nor incorrect.  Site (S) – This indicates the site has been correctly named for the specific stage being trained (manmade structure for Stage 1, bridge for Stage III etc.). “Site” indicates that the session is completed. (S) :;uMMARY EVALUATION Sf!EET {11) (U) For the summary evaluation, please check the fo llowing boxes as to the accuracy of the submitted mat e rial. ACCURACY* Site Contact, Little with Not Correspondence Mixed Results Good Excellent Unknown Applicable 0 1 2 3 (S) Geographical locale descrip- tion (terrain, wat e r , e tc.) D D D D D D (S ) Large- scale manmade elements (cities , buildings, silos, docks, railroad lines, D D D D D D airfields , etc. ) (S) Small- sca l e manmade e l ements (antennas, computers, tanks, D D D D D D missiles, offices, etc . ) {S) General targe t ambience (re- search, production, adminis - tration, storage, troop move- D D D D D D ments, naval activity, air activity, weapons testing, etc. ) {S) Relevant specific activities (nuclear testing, missil~ firing, CBW s torage, ELINT D D D D D D monitoring, e tc.) (S) Perso n ality informa t ion (physical d escri ptions, actions, respon sibili ties, D D D D D D plans, etc.) Cannot be de- -- - - - (S) Overa l l utility None D Ma r ginal D Useful D Very Useful D termined a t this time D -- - --- ----- - - ---------- - --- *cu) Defin itions for the accur acy scale: 0 - Littl e correspondence Self explanatory. V, 1 - Site contact with Mixture of correct and incorrect e l ements, but e nou gh of the f ormer to mixed results i n dicate source has probably accessed the target s ite. m n 2-Good • 3 - Excellent • • Good correspondence with several e l ements matching, but some incorrect information . Good correspondence with unambiguous uniqu e matchable elements and r elative ly :::a l i t t l e incorrect information. m -I Table 1. Summary Evaluation Sheet. During the session the trainee writes the abbreviation (see above) of the feedback next to the data. This allows the trainee to review the correct elements and produce a summary which describes the site. The training session continues until the interviewer responds with the feedback of Site. 3. (S/SK/WNINTEL) CLASS B: Once a trainee begins to demonstrate his ability to reliably distinguish imaginative overlay and report target relevant data elements, feedback is withdrawn. In Class B training sessions, the interviewer knows what target he desires the trainee to describe but does not provide the trainee with any direct feedback during the course of the session. This process develops the trainee’s ability to internalize his awareness of relevant (correct) versus extraneous (incorrect) cognitive structures (mental perceptions). During Class B sessions, the interview may ask the trainee to elaborate on specific elements of data provided, thereby guiding the trainee to describe specific areas of the target. The interviewer is only permitted to ask the trainee to elaborate on specific elements already reported by the trainee. The interviewer may not introduce new elements into the session (cue the source) in an attempt to encourage the trainee to properly describe the site. Class B sessions are especially helpful in developing refined skills in the trainee. For example, when the interviewer knows that a particular target area within a site may be of interest (i.e., a specific room in a building), he can guide the trainee’s attention to that area by asking the trainee to elaborate on specific elements of data which the interviewer knows to pertain to the area of interest. With practice in Class B, the trainee soon learns to control his own perceptual faculties, a necessary step for further training and operational intelligence collection. 4. (S/SK/WNINTEL) CLASS A: Class A training is similar to what the R&D community refers to as a “double blind” experiment. The purposes for Class A training and for R&D double blind experiments differ however. The R&D community uses double-blind experimental protocols to test a variable under controlled conditions. Class A training is not a test for the trainee, but a process whereby the source learns to function with the interviewer in a team effort to acquire and describe information concerning a target of interest. In Class A, both the trainee and the interviewer are provided no information (double blind) concerning the site to be described during the session. Rather than trying to please the interviewer with his descriptions, the trainee is motivated to work with the interviewer in producing valid information about the site of interest. This motivational difference is crucial in forcing the trainee to use his RV ability to acquire and describe site dependent information as opposed to interviewer dependent telepathic data (in an attempt to please the interviewer) or data remote viewed from the feedback package (in an attempt to receive external positive reinforcement from the interviewer, i.e., Correct, Probably Correct, and/or Site). Working as a team in a Class A session, the interviewer and source trainee combine their aptitudes (the interviewer with his directive, analytic skill and the trainee with his exploratory, perceptual ability) to report information of interest about the designated target. 5. (S/SK/WNINTEL) The three classes of RV training (A, B, and C) are interdependent. Each is designed to deal with separate learning requirements in the acquisition of RV skills. It must be remembered that the concept of classes herein applies to training. Operational application of RV requires its own unique, specifically designed feedback requirements and task dependent control of interviewer/source interaction. Trainee sources also require operational training beyond the narrow confines of the SRI-I subcontractor modeled training program before they can be expected to produce dependable, timely intelligence information. Annex III Intelligence Collection and Analysis WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? Classic espionage, according to Cilluffo, Marks, and Salmoiraghi (2001, p. 61), is defined as an “intelligence activity directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine means and proscribed by the laws of the country against which it is committed.” Intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us that allows civilian leaders and military commanders to consider alternative options and outcomes in making decision (Bruce, 2008, p. 171). Johnston (2005, pp. 24-26) defines several interrelated aspects of intelligence collection and analysis: Definition 1: Intelligence is secret state or group activity to understand or influence foreign or domestic entities. Definition 2: Intelligence analysis is the application of individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a secret socio-cultural context. Definition 3: Intelligence errors are factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting from poor or missing data; intelligence failure is systemic organizational surprise resulting from incorrect, missing, discarded, or inadequate hypotheses. TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE Margolis (2013, pp. 45-50) has enumerated the various types of intelligence. Human intelligence (HUMINT) involves information gathered by intelligence officers by contact with various persons/events and other sources such as open source intelligence (OSINT), i.e., newspapers, internet, media. Other types of methods are based on technology (TECHINT). The incorporation of science and technology in to the loosely termed “Technical Intelligence” (TECHINT) has become a major contributor to both data and strategy (Crosston and Valli, 2017, p. 68). The various types of TECHINT include the following: Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the interception and decoding of foreign electronic communications. It is made up of communication intelligence, electronic intelligence, and telemetry intelligence. Communications intelligence (COMINT) is the monitoring of communications in whatever form they can be conveyed. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is the interception of electronic emissions, and telemetry intelligence (TELINT) detects signals given off from weapons. Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), formerly referred to as imagery intelligence, is “derived from images collected by electro-optical, infrared, and radar sensors. It is defined by the National Geospatial Agency as “information about any object – natural or man-made – that can be observed or referenced to the Earth, and has national security implications” (Lowenthal, 2012, p. 88). Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is a “compendium of techniques rather than an identifiable intelligence collection method” (Turner, 2006, p. 121). Clark (2013, p. 50) has illustrated these sources, which are reproduced here in Figure 3.1. As stated in a featured story on the CIA (2013) website, human intelligence (HUMINT) is defined as any information that can be gathered from human sources. HUMINT is collected through: (1) Clandestine acquisition of photography, documents, and other material; (2) Overt collection by people overseas; (3) Debriefing of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who travel abroad; (4) Official contacts with foreign governments. To be successful, National Clandestine Service (NCS) officers must understand one of the most complex aspects of running assets — human nature. Emotions, intentions and motivations differ from person-to-person and change overtime. Understanding people, with all of their complexities, is crucial to the business of running assets to collect HUMINT. Collection methods can take place in a variety of ways, including in-person meetings. Some HUMINT operations are short in duration, while others take years. Through it all, NCS officers must understand and assess the intentions and motivations of their assets, as well as the authenticity of the intelligence they provide. The most successful HUMINT sources provide volumes of intelligence responsive to Intelligence Community requirements. Although SIGINT (and other types of TECHINTs), have enormous value in collecting information about such things as the location of tanks or some telephone conversations, these methods are unable to provide any insight into what a particular cell was planning. That type of information requires a person. Thus, although HUMINT is the weakest choice in the intelligence community’s current toolbox, it should always be considered first among equals (Cilluffo, et.al, 2001, p. 62-68; Crosston and Valli, 2017, p. 68). r- ·- ·-·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·-·- ·- ·-; Cyber Communications : Open Source : Collection Intelligence r·- ·- · - ·-·- · - · - · - ·-. Magnetic :__ ??.!i~~I- _: Acoustic Spectral No-EM Signatures Nuclear Materials Foreign Instrumentation Exploitation Systems Figure 3.1. Intelligence collection methods. Analysts process view. (From: Clark, 2013, p. 50.) THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE The Intelligence Cycle is customarily illustrated as a repeating process consisting of five steps (Figure 3.2). Planning and direction encompasses the management of the entire effort and involves, in particular, determining collection requirements based on customer requests. Collection refers to the gathering of raw data to meet the collection requirements. These data can be derived from any number and type of open and secret sources. Processing refers to the conversion of raw data into a format analysts can use. Analysis and production describes the process of evaluating data for reliability, validity, and relevance; integrating and analyzing it; and converting the product of this effort into a meaningful whole, which includes assessments of events and implications of the information collected. Finally, the product is disseminated to its intended audience (Johnston, 2005, pp. 45-46). Unfortunately, as Cilluffo, Marks, and Salmoiraghi, (2001, p. 70) state, these parties do not always get what they need when they need it; nor do they always get it in a useful format. No one has any use for intelligence that is gathered and not processed— that is, teased out for the most relevant and timely pieces of information. Success and failure of the mission are dependent on each element of the intelligence cycle. While national intelligence collection organizations perform what is called single source analysis, they often make use of material from other INTs, and refer to such material as collateral intelligence. So if an imagery analyst makes use of COMINT, she would refer to the COMINT as ‘collateral.’ And a COMINT analyst making use of imagery would call the imagery ‘collateral’ (Margolis, 2013, p. 50). As Bruce (2008, p. 172) points out, “There are only a finite number of ways to produce knowledge. This is as true for intelligence as for any other discipline. …. the principal and distinct ways can be reduced to four: authority (knowledge based on authority of the source), habit of thought (prejudice in individuals and conventional wisdom in groups), rationalism (knowledge derived from reason), and empiricism (based on observation, experience, and experimentation). A fifth way, science, combines important features of rationalism and empiricism.” Citing the faulty analysis of the October 2002 on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), Bruce (p. 179) illustrates how flaws in all the four ways of knowing contributed to the NIE’s (National Intelligence Estimate) flawed analysis. This brief overview of the process of intelligence collection and analysis brings to fore the complexity involved in obtaining accurate actionable intelligence. The intelligence community has to be lauded for their many successes despite the many difficulties involved in making sense of raw data irrespective of their source. Planning and Direction / Dissemination Collection Mission \ J Analysis and - Processing Production Figure 3.2. The intelligence cycle. REFERENCES Bruce, J. B. (2008). Making analysis more reliable: Why epistemology matters to intelligence. pp. 171-190. In R. Z. George, J. B. Bruce, & Georgetown University. (2008). 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The lack of HUMINT: A recurring intelligence problem. Global Security Studies, 4(2), 46–47. Turner, M. A. (2006). Historical dictionary of United States intelligence. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press.