This article was downloaded by: [University of Wollongong] On: 29 May 2013, At: 20:53 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpic20 Terrorist lifecycles: a case study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan a b Khuram Iqbal & Sara De Silva a Center for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT) , Macquarie University , Sydney , Australia b Center for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) , University of Wollongong , New South Wales , Australia Published online: 29 May 2013. To cite this article: Khuram Iqbal & Sara De Silva (2013): Terrorist lifecycles: a case study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 8:1, 72-86 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2013.789599 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and- conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 2013 Vol. 8, No. 1, 7286, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2013.789599 FORUM Terrorist lifecycles: a case study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Khuram Iqbala* and Sara De Silvab a Center for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia; bCenter for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia The spillover effects of the war in Afghanistan gave birth to a new breed of terrorist groups in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology, Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is at the pinnacle of this list. Through the application of theories available on the terrorist lifecycle, this paper analyses the factors that led to the emergence, rise, and downfall of the TTP. The paper argues that the organisation conforms to the general trends of a terrorist lifecycle and, having lost critical elements of support and survival, the TTP’s demise in the near future is predictable. Keywords: terrorist lifecycle; Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan; war on terror The ‘lifecycle’ of a terrorist group: a theoretical overview Since their birth, terrorist groups continue to develop and evolve until they reach the last phase of their campaign, ultimately leading to their demise. Over the years, terrorism studies has witnessed an increase in the amount of research which focuses on the evolution of terrorist groups, including how and why groups emerge, evolve, and eventually come to an end. Based on the literature available (Crenshaw, 2007; Weinberg, 1973; Gupta, 2008), it is possible to deduce that a full ‘lifecycle’ of a terrorist group generally comprises four distinct phases: Emergence; Rise; Downfall; and Demise. The metamorphosis of a terrorist movement occurs as a result of interplay between several factors which influence the trajectory and the dynamics of the campaign. Emergence This phase is commonly defined as the birth of a group and the onset of their campaign, which is usually a protracted phase. Terrorist organisations undergo a formative stage which mainly consists of identifying and accepting a common ideology, galvanising public support and recruitment, and training of the cohorts for future operations. Dahrendorf asserts that the following factors are necessary to create a militant group and an armed campaign: a) leaders committed to the conflict; b) an ideology driving the conflict; c) ability to organise for conflict; and d) members who can communicate with each other. An ideology is deemed futile if it is unrepresented or unrelated to a certain constituency where it looks for potential supporters (Crenshaw, 2007; Della Porta, 2007). A clear identification of the ideology *Corresponding author. Email:
[email protected]# 2013 Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Terrorist lifecycles 73 facilitates groups to launch a campaign, and to justify and rationalise their cause (Deutsch, 1973, p. 94; Weinberg, 1973, p. 94). Furthermore, this also serves members with an exaggerated sense of their own importance in fighting for a cause (Weinberg, 1973, p. 195), which consolidates their commitment in the movement. Therefore, an ideology serves as a mobilisation tool at both organisational and individual levels, as it gives strength to organise members for violent actions against the prevailing order (O’Neill, 1980). Garnering public support is equally vital in the creation of a terrorist group. When necessary conditions are met, it can instigate both active and passive support and increase membership of the movement, locally and internationally. Securing the support of a substantial portion of the population comprises the following elements: indoctrination; establishment of an infrastructure in a controlled base area; and further demonstrating the group’s significance by accomplishing successful armed Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 actions that reflect the government’s vulnerability, or by providing a better alternative to the existing government and system (O’Neill, 1980, p. 15). Increased activities and recognition of the group lead to establishing the political legitimacy of the movement, which is paramount in launching and sustaining the campaign in the long run, as well as to induce further support among its constituencies. Based on the above elements, the emergence phase of a terrorist group will witness the identification, acceptance, and spread of an ideology, along with garnering public support to instigate a campaign. Rise The rise of a movement entails the escalation in the operational and strategic aspects of the campaign. The violent activities and the characteristics demonstrated in the nascent stages of the group are also strengthened during this phase, thus some elements may overlap between the two phases. As the campaign progresses, groups opt to expand and escalate the frequency and the lethality of their attacks. The rise of the movement is characterised by increasing popular support leading to more funding and logistical support, and sufficient political legitimacy, which induces more recruitment (Gupta, 2008, p. 82). These factors determine the extent and the capability of a group to escalate its campaign to confront the adversary. The escalation of a campaign is to demonstrate the government’s weakness compared to their strength. The other intended effect is to isolate people from the government and to obtain a wide base of popular support for the longevity of the campaign (O’Neill, 1980, p. 15). As violence escalates during this phase, government retaliation intensifies. Govern- ment operations against the group tend to have adverse effects in mitigating a terrorist campaign, as it may provoke a backlash of violence, hence creating a more destructive campaign as an outcome (Robert, 1969, p. 112). This holds true when the government acts brutally against the group or towards the population which the movement claims to represent, thereby provoking the desire for revenge and providing further justification for violence (Bartos & Wehr, 2007). Consequently, most organisations tend to drastically increase their attacks in the months after the government’s counter-terrorism opera- tions. Moreover, escalation as a strategic choice is also employed in instances when groups face the possibility of disintegration. Leaders may escalate violence in the hope of appearing more powerful and that the government response will infuriate their group’s members and thus increase their group solidarity as a result (Bartos & Wehr, 2007, p. 113; Sirseloudi, 2005). Another reason for the escalation of a campaign is not 74 K. Iqbal and S. De Silva just to fight against the government, but to out-fight and win against rival movements. Della Porta (2007, p. 110) claims that, in any collective movement, there is always more than one organisation that is active, and multiple movements cohabit in the same social movement. To this end, there may be networks of cooperative, but more likely antagonistic, relationships among these movements (Sirseloudi, 2005). Consequently, groups attempt to wield their influence in order to stress their relevance and legitimacy over other groups in the same environment. This process will also have a spillover effect in securing more public support, coerced or otherwise. Given the nature of this particular phase, securing sources of funding becomes vital in order to develop and sustain the intensification of the campaign dynamics. Terrorist groups will resort to various methods in securing and expanding their source of income, as it is the key to enhancing innovation of their tactics, continuing propaganda work, and financing the miscellaneous tasks necessary to uphold the escalating activities. Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 In essence, this stage will witness an increased frequency and lethality of attacks. The reasons for this escalation are many, depending on the strategic options of the particular organisation. During this phase, terrorist groups will galvanise more public support for logistics, recruitment, and political legitimacy. As funding will assume more significance at this stage, the groups will also focus on expanding their sources of income to match the intensification of their activities. Downfall This phase generally marks the decline in the frequency of attacks and the group’s activities. Once the group reaches a peak in their escalation, the campaign dynamics start to trend downwards. Roberts (2003) suggests that, by this point, the purpose and the frequency of attacks are determined by how the organisation views its achievement of its overall strategic objectives. The downfall of the movement usually occurs when it loses its direction and its operational capacity due to loss of focus on violence and attack against a clearly defined enemy. Debray (as cited in Horgan, 2003) also defines this phase as terrorist organisations ceasing to have political objectives; thus they continue to exist but drift towards other activities that are not of a terroristic nature. Movements can lose their political objective and hence their military actions due to various socio-political factors which they face in their particular environment. This can include: the realisation that terrorism alone is insufficient in achieving the movements’ aspirations; change in government response that allows for other opportunities through which other alternatives to violence could be addressed; decline of public support; or any combination of the above. When the conflict drags on, it experiences significant loss of lives, a widening gap of inequality, and even a loss of hope in continuing the fight for the cause (Bartos & Wehr, 2007). This consequently enables the spread of dissatisfaction and disillusionment among the public and/or the members of the movement. The downfall of the group could also be marked by the stagnation of a group’s retaliation against the government actions, leading to the gradual decline of military confrontation. Moreover, internal rivalry and disputes among the members would inevitably create instability within the movement, possibly leading to the splitting of members. As a result, this would affect the movement’s morale, and even result in a loss of public support, along with a loss in logistical and strategic functions of the group. In sum, this phase will commonly witness a drastic or gradual decline in the frequency or the lethality in the attacks, decline in public support and recruitment, and a loss in territorial strongholds. Terrorist lifecycles 75 Demise The final stage of the lifecycle is the demise, which signals the complete cessation of violence, and ultimately the end of the terrorist group’s campaign. It is rare for a group to abandon its campaign as a result of achieving its political and military goals. Generally speaking, the demise of a campaign occurs when political goals become no longer relevant in the face of a changed political environment. Hypotheses on how groups end are associated with the broader study on how groups emerge, but Cronin (2002/2003) asserts that such assumptions are over- simplified. This phase can be underpinned by several factors. The capturing and the killing of a leader could at times lead to a direct downfall of a group (Cronin, 2009). This is especially the case with organisations that are characterised by a strict hierarchical structure with a charismatic leader (Gupta, 2008). Mass arrests and capture of other members could also catalyse the demise of a Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 movement as it serves to undermine the organisational morale, and thus the campaign trajectory shifts to defending the internal cohesion of the group to prevent its demise. Some campaigns are terminated by groups abandoning violence through the involvement of negotiations, and transitioning into a legitimate political process (Cronin, 2009, p. 60). In contrast, some movements suffer a heavy military defeat at the hands of the government forces, which leads to the termination of the campaign. In some cases, the ideology or the cause of the movement is not passed on successfully to the next generation, due to changes in the socio-political environment of that particular context (Gupta, 2008, p. 98; Cronin, 2009, p. 58). Lockett suggests that terrorism comes to an end when bonds between members of the group weaken, or where justification of violence is demolished (Lockett, 1994). Loss of popular base is another factor contributing to the demise of an organisation, when the supporters and sympathisers become disillusioned with the significance of the campaign (Cronin, 2009). Finally, the demise of the group can be catalysed when splinter groups start new campaigns (Roberts, 2003) which tend to be more violent and radical than their ‘parent’ organisation. The demise of an organisation will, therefore, be characterised by a complete halt in violent activities. A case study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) The following sections examine the evolution of TTP within the broader theoretical framework of a terrorist lifecycle. An attempt has been made to outline the factors that led to the emergence, rise, and downfall of this organisation. The paper endeavours to draw a future trajectory of this group by examining TTP’s patterns of behaviour in the past. The emergence The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 prompted the US to intervene in Afghanistan, with a core mandate of dismantling al-Qaeda, the group responsible for a number of high-profile terrorist attacks around the world, including the suicide attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon. The Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) was launched in October 2001. The Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar, the then de facto ruler of Afghanistan, could not resist the US- led international forces in conventional warfare. Hence, they opted for a tactical 76 K. Iqbal and S. De Silva retreat to prepare for sustained guerilla warfare against the coalition forces and their local allies. The majority of the Afghan Taliban’s foot soldiers and leadership retreated into their tribes and villages in Afghanistan and across the border into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan and Afghanistan share a poorly marked border, approximately 2640 kilometres long. Due to the nature of the terrain, the tribal bonds of Pashtuns living on both sides of the border, and the lack of resources, most parts of the border remain porous and unmanageable. The geographic and cultural proximity inspired many Afghan Taliban and foreign fighters to sneak into FATA to evade the initial phase of an international military campaign in Afghanistan. The FATA region subsequently emerged as the hotbed of militancy aimed at driving the foreign forces out of neighbouring Afghanistan. Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan, as well as its knowledge of the war-ravaged country, was crucial to rid Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 Afghanistan of the Taliban, the regime that hosted the perpetrators of 9/11. Prior to launching the OEF-A in Afghanistan, Pakistan was asked by the US to: (1) Close the PakistanAfghanistan border and to cut off all activities and transits of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda group members in and around Pakistan; (2) freeze the assets in Pakistan of Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers; (3) halt the supply of fuel to the Taliban; (4) provide intelligence collected by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban; (5) allow the use of air space for offensive military operations against Afghanistan; (6) permit the stationing of US forces in Pakistan in order to capture Osama bin Laden; and (7) respond positively to further US requests for assistance (Rauf, 2012). Pakistan chose to cooperate with the US in Afghanistan in intelligence, logistical support, and border vigilance. Subsequently, it remained the only country that opened two-thirds of its airspace, diverted its commercial traffic, provided airbases and seaports for large amphibious operations, and developed a close cooperation with the Pentagon and the US intelligence community. Apart from the ‘vital’ intelligence cooperation that Pakistan extended to the US to dismantle the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s two forward operational air bases were handed over to the coalition forces. From these two bases, one in Jacobabad and the other at Dalbandin located in Balochistan on the PakistanAfghan border, the US launched more than 57,000 military sorties against Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Pakistan spent a large portion of its logistical reserves on supporting the coalition. Nonetheless, the state’s decision to side with the international community in the fight against terrorism bode ill with the majority of Pakistanis that continued to regard American intervention in Afghanistan as an act of aggression against a brotherly Islamic country. Even after a decade, the US war efforts were not approved by a majority of Pakistanis. A public opinion survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2010 demonstrated the US-led war in neighbouring Afghanistan was widely opposed by Pakistanis. Nearly two-thirds (65 per cent) wanted US and NATO troops removed as soon as possible (Pew Research Centre Publications, 2010). The Pashtun tribes inhabiting the borderlands neighbouring Afghanistan also perceived Terrorist lifecycles 77 the United Nation’s authorised international intervention as a repetition of the events in 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded the country under the pretext of curbing the local militias fighting against the pro-Soviet Marxist regime. Strong public opposition to the international intervention in Afghanistan, tribal bonds, and a shared religious outlook facilitated the sanctuaries of Afghan Taliban and al- Qaeda across Pakistan. A number of tribal militias, initially referred to as the ‘Pakistani Taliban’ emerged in FATA to challenge the government’s anti-terror policies by providing protection to their ‘guests’. With the passage of time, a handful of tribal militias were merged into an umbrella group in December 2007, which came be to known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The backdrop to the creation of the TTP demonstrates the necessary factors in giving birth to a terrorist campaign. The nascent stage of the organisation was characterised by the identification of a common ideology which was stirred by the Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 US-led intervention in Afghanistan. This incident fostered the moral obligation of certain segments within FATA to protect and liberate their brethren across the border from the perceived Western invasion. The cause championed by the TTP garnered robust public support and legitimacy through its association with religion. Furthermore, the gradual recruitment to the group further legitimised and popularised the campaign. The rise The emergence of TTP can be attributed to the spillover effects of international intervention in Afghanistan. However, a number of indigenous social, political, and religious factors multiplied the rise of a tribal group into a formidable entity. In the formative stages, TTP tactfully manipulated the widely popular cause to liberate Afghanistan from foreign occupation. Prevalent anti-Americanism in Pakistan and the state’s unpopular decision to support international war efforts in Afghanistan provided the organisation with a wide pool of potential recruits in the tribal and settled areas of Pakistan. At one point in early 2008, the human strength of TTP surpassed 10,000 fighters (Gunaratna & Iqbal, 2010). Although TTP’s former spokesman Maulvi Omar boasted of maintaining 100,000 fighting soldiers only in tribal areas, such numbers, however, are usually exaggerated for propaganda purposes. The TTP benefited from the deep-rooted traditions of providing protection to its seekers by the local tribes. Elements within the Pashtun tribes of the Pakistani side of the border were convinced that protecting their guests is their cultural-cum-religious duty. It was a repetition of the events during the Jihad against the Soviet forces in 1980s, when tribesmen of FATA were held in high esteem by the locals and outsiders for waging a heroic struggle against the ‘Godless Soviet’ invaders. The leadership of these scattered armed groups mainly consisted of Mujahedeen from FATA who took part in the anti-Soviet multi-national Afghan Jihad in the 1980s. The presence of allied forces in Afghanistan was manipulated by clerics sympathetic to the Taliban, in order to rally support for their cause. The cause to fight against the infidel forces in Afghanistan also entailed much-needed religious legitimacy for the group. Religious legitimacy for their cause also enabled the TTP to generate finances through illegal means to support the group’s activities. Although Islam strictly prohibits the use of illegal means to wage Jihad (Holy War), the group managed to acquire a religious decree from handpicked scholars to justify criminal 78 K. Iqbal and S. De Silva acts such as bank robberies, forced taxes, smuggling, kidnappings for ransom, and drug money to finance its ‘holy war’. For instance, in August 2008, the Crime Investigation Department (CID) of Sindh arrested three financiers of the TTP from Karachi (Bin Perwaiz, 2008). During the investigations, the financiers disclosed that they had sought a fatwa (religious decree) that funding Jihad through ransom money is justified. The fatwa sought by the group to justify drug money in order to wage Jihad states that the ‘‘sale of drugs for serving the cause of ‘jihad’ is not haram (forbidden): this cash crop is God’s gift to fight the infidels’’ (Shah, 2008). Rampant confusion over the discourse of Jihad in Pakistani society enabled the TTP to win over local populations and to build a strong intelligence system based on informally recruited individuals. Children and women inspired by the radio sermons of the TTP leaders, and nostalgic about the gun-wielding men patrolling the villages, formed the core of TTP’s intelligence network. The organisation penetrated so deep Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 into the tribal society that people were afraid of expressing their grudges against the Mujahideen even within their own families (M. Nawab, personal communication, December 1, 2010). In Swat, children were paid Rs. 50 (50 cents) a day to spy on their family members (F. Zafar, personal communication, December 1, 2010). Both sound and timely flow of intelligence and information enabled the Taliban to undertake a multi-faceted campaign against a stronger enemy: the Pakistani state. Breakaway factions of mainland Jihadi outfits such as Lashkar-e-Tayeba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), which have tradi- tionally concentrated their operations in the Indian-held Kashmir, also proved to be another source of strength for TTP. Pakistan’s decision to become part of an international coalition in Afghanistan displeased a number of hardcore militants linked with the Kashmir-focused Pakistani militant outfits. Prominent Jihadi leaders such as Maulana Masood Azhar of JeM, Hafiz Saeed of LeT, and Fazlur Rehman Khalil of HuM lost appeal to their cadres, who blamed the Jihadi pundits for siding with the government that was alleged to be an American stooge. Resultantly, JeM, LeT, and HuM, which have been traditionally known as well-organised and under- controlled state proxies, suffered substantial fractionalisation as a number of foot soldiers deserted and joined the TTP in FATA. In August 2007, the Pakistani intelligence source confirmed that the dissidents of the three militant groups*JeM, Lashkar-e-Jangvi (LeJ), and Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP)*joined the anti-Pakistan groups, including al-Qaeda, to increase terrorist activities targeting the Pakistan Army, government personalities, and installations (Anjum, 2007). The mainland militants were instrumental in imparting explosives training and urban warfare techniques to the tribal fighters of the TTP. Apart from cultural and religious factors, the TTP also maintained some tactical advantages which helped the group to emerge as a formidable force. For instance, the TTP fighters had a great knowledge of the terrain, which is essential to wage effective and sustained guerilla warfare. The TTP militants would attack the Pakistani security forces and go into hiding in the rugged mountains of FATA, leaving the Pakistani forces clueless. The Pakistani Army, traditionally trained as a conventional force to fight against India in the plains of Punjab, found itself disadvantaged in FATA. Military operations against the outfit proved ineffective initially for two major reasons. First, the army lacked sufficient knowledge of the terrain, due to which it had to rely on the extensive use of air strikes, ultimately resulting in high collateral damage. The TTP and the foreign fighters in FATA took advantage of heavy civilian casualties. The offensives were also unpopular within Pakistan’s officer Terrorist lifecycles 79 corps, who did not like fighting against their own countrymen (Gunaratna & Bukhari, 2009). The anti-government and anti-security force sentiments in the area laid the foundation for the Pakistani Taliban to recruit, raise funds, gather intelligence, procure supplies, and to grow from strength to strength. Second, an adverse public opinion and an equally lethal media badly impacted the army’s capabilities to take decisive military action against the rising strength of the TTP. Despite the deadly terrorist attacks carried out by the Pakistani Taliban across the country, the popular media was reluctant to call them ‘terrorists’ because of the fear of retaliation and rampant confusion over the issue of Jihad in Pakistani society. A number of political factors were also in play to strengthen the newly emerged terrorist outfit founded by Baitullah Mehsud. The Pakistan government’s failure to take swift and decisive action led the Pakistani Taliban to emerge as an organised fighting force. The initial target of the Pakistani Taliban was the US-led coalition Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 forces as well as the Afghan military and police forces in Afghanistan. As they did not challenge the Pakistani authorities, the latter did not generally interfere with their activities unless they were involved in local feuds and the disturbance of law and order. Initial military operations against the Pakistani Taliban were more often used to obtain leverage rather than to defeat them once and for all (Franco, 2009). The Pakistani Taliban’s ability to establish law and order in FATA, where the federal government had failed to do so, also added to their popularity. The Pakistani Taliban provides Salweshti (protection) to the locals in an area that has typically been lawless. The militants were able to provide an expeditious justice system, which was perceived as less corrupt and more effective than the Pakistani judicial system. In December 2005, the militants in Miramshah in North Waziristan, who fashioned themselves on the legacy of the ousted Taliban regime in Afghanistan, killed some two dozen alleged criminals and left their bodies hanging for days in the centre of the town (Hussain, 2006). The message was simple: the Taliban maintains the capability to bring order and ensure quick justice in the region. Consequently, the Pakistani Taliban garnered public support. In the formative stages, the group led by Baitullah Mehsud employed a very careful strategy to extend their strongholds. The strategy was initially based on establishing networks in the region. They would recruit locals for their cause before initiating vigilante activities justified by attacking the so-called un-Islamic activities (S.A.A. Shah, personal communication, January 15, 2009). Gradually, they targeted law enforcement when the latter tried to limit the activities of the Taliban. Once the terrorists attacked law enforcement, the district administration was forced into submission. Thereafter, the Taliban would move ahead with their strategy of eliminating the last vestiges of resistance coming from local politicians, elders, rival religious sects, and clerics. This paved the way for the Taliban to establish parallel governing structures. Through the exploitation of such loopholes, the Pakistani Taliban emerged as an effective fighting force over approximately three years. Initially, their basic objective was to fight against the foreign forces established in Afghanistan. Eventually, they turned inwards and diverted their attention towards Pakistan. In association with al- Qaeda and localised Jihadi groups, the Pakistani Taliban carried out sporadic terrorist attacks across Pakistan. With popular support and the belief that God was on its side, superior knowledge of the terrain, and the heavy influx of battle-hardened militants largely from Punjab, Sindh and Azad Kashmir, the TTP took the upper hand over the Pakistani military. 80 K. Iqbal and S. De Silva Within a few months of its inception, the group was able to consolidate its foothold in South Waziristan and adjacent areas. The tribal areas of FATA steadily fell to the Taliban groups and the ‘Waziristan Shura’ came into being. The tribal belt of Pakistan became a safe haven for al-Qaeda’s fugitives and served as a launch pad for the warfare against the US, NATO, and other foreign forces stationed in Afghanistan. Having captured FATA, the TTP started extending its influence to the adjacent settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (formerly known as North West Frontier Province). In the beginning of 2008, the region around Peshawar (the capital of KPK), including Shabqadar, Charsadda, and Mattni, became a battleground between the security forces and the TTP-linked militants. Initially restricted to the tribal areas of Pakistan, the TTP proved itself to be expansionist. Though it was implausible, the outfit also vowed to take over Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 Pakistan’s financial hub Karachi in August 2008 (Khan, 2008a). The TTP spokes- man Maulvi Omar stated that the Taliban had the capability to gain control over Karachi. While criticising Altaf Hussain, the head of Karachi’s largest political force Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Maulvi Omar stated, ‘‘Hussain considers himself as the ‘king of Karachi’ but will soon realise the power of the Taliban in the near future when his illusion would be shattered after the Taliban take Karachi over’’ (Khan, 2008a). In September 2008, following a month of TTP’s warning to take over Karachi, Baitullah Mehsud, the defunct LeJ, and other outlawed Jihadi organisations including Jundullah joined hands to pursue terrorist acts in Karachi (Khan, 2008b). It was reported that the TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud was in contact with various groups in Karachi. The TTP’s timely move to forge an operational partnership with LeJ and HuM demonstrated that there was an element of truth to Maulvi Omar’s intention to take over Karachi. Therefore, Karachi came under constant threat from the TTP and its allies. By continuously extending (or attempting to extend) its areas of operation from FATA to KPK, and with the intention of reaching Karachi, the TTP proved that its objectives are not only limited to waging a Jihad against the foreign forces present in Afghanistan, but also to capturing Pakistan. The TTP’s shift to the escalation stage of the campaign is characterised by several factors. The organisation successfully capitalised on the growing anti-US and anti- Pakistani government sentiments in order to consolidate popular public support. The popular support not only provided political legitimacy to the movement, but also stirred a surge in recruitment. With systematic propaganda and intimidation tactics, the TTP transformed itself from a loosely organised group to that of a formidable entity during the escalation phase of the campaign. Another indication of its rising power was that it increased collaboration with other militant outfits, as well as exploiting dissension of other militant groups to lure members in to join the TTP cause instead. This not only served to destabilise the strength of other organisations; it further added to the legitimacy of the TTP movement. As with most terrorist organisations, the knowledge of the terrain over the security forces always serves as an added advantage to the militants. TTP similarly capitalised on this advantage to expand its stronghold and at the same time, it restored the justice system under its area of control. This resultantly boosted their political legitimacy and support among its constituents. As the group hit the escalation phase though consolidating its support and increasing the frequency of the Terrorist lifecycles 81 attacks, it also started to widen its target selection and its operational theatre. Initially, the TTP systematically targeted the security establishments, which fell very much in line with their ideological orientation. However, the target selection gradually widened to include dissidents and innocent Pakistani civilians. Not only was this a display of the rise in the campaign, but also the expansionist ambition of the group. This was a clear indication that their ideology shifted from a localised liberation struggle to that of an expansionist one by waging a nation-wide Jihad. The downfall Despite unprecedented waves of terrorist attacks launched by the group, public sentiments in Pakistan remained largely favourable towards the TTP. Moreover, the state’s counter-measures against the anti-state insurgents along the country’s Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 northwest border with Afghanistan attracted little or no appreciation by a large segment of the Pakistani populace. Public sympathy and an apologetic attitude towards the new breed of Islamist militants in Pakistan and their ideology, gave rise to the fears that the TTP might transform into a socio-political movement like Hizbullah in Lebanon. However, in view of the events that unfolded since the Talibanisation in 2004, it became evident that the TTP were not able to maintain public support, which is essential to launch a mass movement. Within three years of its inception, the TTP’s public image suffered. A public survey conducted in 2010 by Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP), a Pakistan-based non-governmental organi- sation, showed that only 4.5 per cent of the tribesmen in FATA, the stronghold of Pakistani Taliban, viewed the TTP as a trusted authority (Ahmad Shinwari, 2010). This loss in public support significantly reduced the possibility of the Pakistani Taliban transforming into a socio-political movement. The above begs the question, what caused this shift? There is no one reason for the failure of Talibanisation in Pakistan, and the shift can be attributed to a series of interrelated issues and events that have changed public opinion. The transformation of the political climate eventually created a hostile environment for the Pakistani Taliban to advance their ideological and political agendas. Pakistan, with the help of the international community, has been battling the Taliban on both operational and ideological fronts since early 2004. A comprehen- sive strategy has been implemented by the Pakistani government to eliminate the effective fighting force, as well as to address the material grievances in the Taliban areas. But, more than anything, the Taliban’s own tactical and strategic blunders cost them the vital public support. They have resorted to the use of brutal tactics including beheadings and suicide bombings, which were an anathema in Pakistani society. This allowed mainstream religious scholars to attack the religious legitimacy of such tactics. The frequent use and the public display of these tactics demonstrated their commitment to adopting radical positions of the international Jihad, but never took into consideration the religious and social realities of Pakistan, and the possible sources of opposition to such tactics. Additionally, the shift in the target selection of suicide attacks, from security forces to the general public, turned supporters into angry opponents. Initially, suicide attacks against the security forces were largely viewed as ‘justified’ by a large segment of Pakistani society because the army and other law enforcement agencies were misperceived by the masses as mercenaries fighting the unpopular US war on 82 K. Iqbal and S. De Silva Pakistani soil. That substantially changed when the Islamist death squads started targeting public places, funerals, and mosques. Even when the attacks were against ‘legitimate’ targets, the bombings caused considerable ‘collateral damage’ which wore down public support. It resulted in a huge strategic failure for the Taliban and their associates as they lost public sympathy to their cause. Other incidents reinforced the strategic miscalculation mentioned above. The assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team and the Marriott Hotel, the flogging of a 16-year-old girl in Swat, and the assassinations of leading religious scholars like Maualana Hasan Jan (a leading cleric representing the Deobandi school of thought in Pakistan) and Mufti Sarfaraz Naeemi (a prominent voice of Barelwi-Islam in Pakistan) also served to undermine the Taliban’s public support. Pakistani Taliban and their associates have been strategically unwise to claim such attacks, as they occurred in Pakistan and laid false Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 their claims to be fighting against the ‘foreign occupation’ of Afghanistan. The public understood that these men want nothing less than the capture of the whole of Pakistan in order to create a cloak of darkness and religiously couched zealotry. People have seen the savagery with which the Taliban have treated innocent Pakistanis. It is worth mentioning here that during the period between 2003 and 2011, the casualties in Taliban-related violence numbered more than 30,000, including civilians and security personnel (Pakistan Security Reports, 20062011). Interestingly, in the 1965 war with its traditional rival India, Pakistani casualties stood at 4000. For these reasons, there is an emerging consensus in Pakistan that the internal threat posed by the Taliban is far greater than any other external threat. What inspired the TTP to give away its basic strategy of targeted violence? Credible evidence suggests that the close proximity to al-Qaeda’s fighters in FATA influenced the Pakistani groups to resort to indiscriminate terrorist attacks. The Takfiri school of thought introduced in the tribal region by the al-Qaeda-linked Arab ideologues justified the killings of non-combatants and the use of gruesome tactics such as beheadings and suicide bombings. Baitullah Mehsud, the deceased TTP chief, strongly endorsed al-Qaeda’s ideology including threatening attacks on the White House, New York, and London. In his first ever television interview aired on 28 January 2008, Baitullah told Al Jazeera television network: ‘‘Our main aim is to finish Britain, the US and to crush the pride of the non-Muslims. We pray to God to give us the ability to destroy the White House, New York and London. And we have trust in God. Very soon, we shall be witnessing jihad’s miracles’’ (CBS News, 2012). Similarly, in October 2008, the TTP deputy chief Faquir Mohammed insisted in a video interview that the TTP closely supports al-Qaeda activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan because these Jihadi operations represent the ‘‘will of all Muslims’’ (The NEFA Foundation, 2008). At a time when the Afghan Taliban were increasingly trying to project the nationalist character of their movement, the TTP vociferously endorsed al-Qaeda’s agenda of global Jihad and closely collaborated in various acts of international terrorism. The TTP facilitated al-Qaeda’s global operations and demonstrated its capabilities to launch attacks in the West. The failed bombing attempt in New York’s Time Square by Faisal Shahzad*a US citizen of Pakistani descent*and his alleged links with the TTP came as a stark reminder of the global threat posed by this group based in FATA. It was not for the first time that the TTP or its constituent organisations were found to be involved in an act of international terrorism. The 7/7 bombings in London, one of the most devastating terrorist attacks since 9/11, were Terrorist lifecycles 83 planned from Bajaur Agency in FATA, as acknowledged by the top TTP spokesman Maulvi Umer (Maulana, 2008). Similarly, the foiled terrorist attacks in Barcelona, Spain in January 2008 were also attributed to the al-QaedaTTP nexus in FATA. Some members of a terrorist cell in Spain are thought to have travelled to Pakistan to attend an intensive al-Qaeda training camp (Martin, 2010). It is believed that senior al-Qaeda leaders sent a points man to activate this cell to prompt it to launch terrorist attacks in Spain. The TTP was quick to claim responsibility for the thwarted attacks on Barcelona when around a dozen terrorists were arrested on 19 January 2008. In a video interview recorded in August 2008, Maulvi Umer, the TTP spokesman, claimed that the organisation was responsible for the foiled suicide bombing plot. When asked whether the TTP could ever carry out an attack against the West, Umer replied: ‘‘The one in Barcelona was conducted by twelve of our men. They were under pledge to Baitullah Mehsud and Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 the TTP has already claimed responsibility, because [of] Spain’s military presence in Afghanistan’’ (Global Security, 2010). Affiliation with the regional and global terrorist outfits not only cost TTP local support, but also provoked the ire of coalition forces stationed in neighbouring Afghanistan. Until 2009, US drone strikes in FATA were largely targeting the non- TTP militant groups which were involved in cross-border attacks inside Afghanistan against the coalition forces and the Afghan government. But the TTP’s increasing global rhetoric coupled with extra-territorial attacks compelled the regional counter- terrorism forces to decapitate the leadership and dismantle the organisational infrastructure of this group in FATA through an increased number of drone strikes. The shift in popular support at home and abroad enabled the Pakistani government to launch decisive military operations in FATA and adjacent areas captured by the TTP. Pakistan military launched a major counter-terrorism operation with a clear political mandate and public support in April 2009 in Swat, and established the writ of the government within three months. Similarly, Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Salvation) was launched by the Pakistani military against the Taliban in South Waziristan Agency on 19 June 2009. The aim of the operation was to eliminate the militants by dislodging them from their fortifications, sanctuaries, and hideouts. After a three-month blockade of South Waziristan and intermittent skirmishes with the militants, the Pakistani civilian and military leadership finally gave the go ahead on 16 October to launch a ground offensive in South Waziristan to eliminate terrorism and extremism. By 12 December 2009 the operation was over and the army retook most of South Waziristan. Although the TTP suffered major losses of training infrastructure and thousands of foot soldiers, most of the militants’ top leadership managed to survive by shifting to Kunar and Nuristan provinces of neighbouring Afghanistan. The cross-border sanctuaries helped the group to reorganise and recuperate. The group launched more than dozen major attacks from Afghanistan against the Pakistani security forces and civilian targets between June and August 2011. A premature departure of international troops from Afghanistan may provide the group with an opportunity to fortify her newly found sanctuaries in the country. Although it is premature to declare that the TTP has shifted to its de-escalation stage of the campaign, the recent developments of the campaign display a few classic indications of a terrorist campaign that is facing its downfall. In contrast to the growing Talibanisation circa 2004, the drastic decline in public opinion in recent years is an alarming threat to the survival of the TTP in the long run. Given that 84 K. Iqbal and S. De Silva public support is oxygen for organisational survival, the TTP is facing a strategic defeat by losing the level of public support it once enjoyed due to its tactical and strategic blunders. Moreover, a shift in the organisational ideology during its escalation stage was further reinforced by publicising the TTP’s affiliation to al- Qaeda and the global Jihadist movement. Not only did this undermine the initial cause of the TTP campaign, but it also attracted further counter-terrorist operations from Pakistan and its allies. The US drastically increased its drone strikes against the TTP, while the Pakistani government launched several successful counter-terrorist operations which were unprecedented in the past. All of these elements are indications of the downfall of a terrorist campaign, and it is possible to conclude that the TTP campaign is well on its way to demise. Conclusion Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 The overall evolution of the TTP campaign demonstrates that the organisation conforms to the general trends of a terrorist lifecycle. In the nascent phase of the TTP, the US-led intervention in Afghanistan was perceived as an act of aggression and occupation by a large segment of the Pakistani population. This ideology was underpinned by a moral obligation to protect and liberate their brethren across the border from the ‘Western invasion’, and to challenge their own government which was perceived as a ‘US puppet’. The delineation of a common ideology led to the birth of a new generation of fighters in Pakistan that was more lethal and adaptive. The cause championed by the TTP gained political legitimacy and justification through its association with religion. Moreover, the fact that several members from other militant groups joined the TTP voluntarily mustered more appeal to the cause. Popular support was consolidated through propaganda, incentive-oriented recruit- ment, and various forms of intimidation. In this manner, the TTP conformed to a common trend which is widely observed in many terrorist organisations that seek to garner a wider support base. The restoration of law and order in FATA, and a provision of quick justice not only rendered more popularity, but also enabled the territorial expansion of the group*another classic feature observed during the escalation of a terrorist campaign. One of the successes of the TTP as it rose to power was its ability to mould public support to the extent that it hindered the government forces from taking decisive action against the TTP. This in effect enabled the organisation to further escalate its campaign and develop itself within a short span of three years. Another noteworthy feature of the TTP was the transformation of their strategic options during their rise. As it rose to power, their ambitions broadened from fighting against the interventionist forces in Afghanistan to capturing Pakistan and waging global Jihad. This was clearly illustrated in the shift in their target selection and their tactical preference over time. The initial targets were the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and the Pakistani law enforcement agents, while the second phase of the conflict (precisely after the Operation Silence in July 2007) witnessed a drastic increase in the number of civilian casualties. Beheadings and suicide terrorism were adopted as a preference to project their power. However, these ideological, strategic, and tactical shifts proved fatal for the group in the long run. The TTP significantly digressed from its original strategic objectives and began to detach itself from the socio-religious realities of its own constituencies. The organisation began openly to endorse and associate itself with the al-Qaeda ideology which focuses on launching Terrorist lifecycles 85 global Jihad. The shift in TTP’s strategic objectives and tactical preference greatly undermined the public support which they once enjoyed, and thus enabled the government forces to launch effective counter-terrorism operations against the TTP, dislodging the group from most of the territories it held before 2009. However, the heavy-handed military operations against the militants provoked a series of reprisal attacks against civilians in 2011. As with many other terrorist groups, this phenomenon is commonplace in the aftermath of heavy government retaliation. Based on the evolution of the TTP’s campaign over time and the theoretical framework presented earlier in the paper, it is possible to deduce the future trajectory of the group. More than its operational capability, the longevity of a terrorist organisation is attributed to several other factors including popular support, sufficient funding, organisational cohesion and a robust leadership, political legitimacy/lobby groups, and state sponsorship. Having lost these critical elements Downloaded by [University of Wollongong] at 20:53 29 May 2013 of support and survival, the TTP’s demise as an organisation in the near future is predictable. However, this is not to suggest that Pakistan and the international community have gained a total victory over the post-9/11 breed of Jihadis in FATA. The breakdown of TTP’s organisational structure has already given birth to a number of offshoot groups with a loose command and control system. 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