Southeast European and Black Sea Studies ISSN: 1468-3857 (Print) 1743-9639 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fbss20 Ukrainian volunteer fighters in the eastern front: ideas, political-social norms and emotions as mobilization mechanisms Emmanuel Karagiannis To cite this article: Emmanuel Karagiannis (2016): Ukrainian volunteer fighters in the eastern front: ideas, political-social norms and emotions as mobilization mechanisms, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2016.1148413 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1148413 Published online: 25 Feb 2016. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 2 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fbss20 Download by: [King's College London] Date: 28 February 2016, At: 14:08  SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES, 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1148413 Ukrainian volunteer ighters in the eastern front: ideas, political-social norms and emotions as mobilization mechanisms Emmanuel Karagiannis Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London, Shrivenham, UK Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY Following the outbreak of the insurgency in eastern Ukraine, Received 30 June 2015 thousands of volunteers joined pro-Kiev battalions. Although they Accepted 20 November 2015 have iercely fought against pro-Kremlin forces, very little is known KEYWORDS about them. The article will investigate why individuals have engaged Eastern Ukraine; Russia; in such a risky endeavour for no obvious material reward. It will claim insurgents; volunteer that ideas, political-social norms and emotions have functioned as fighters; ideas; norms; mobilization mechanisms that can explain individual decisions. Based emotions on interviews, the article will argue that the mobilization of Ukrainian volunteer ighters has a strong cognitive-normative-emotional dimension that cannot be ignored and should be further explored. Introduction he trigger event of the Ukrainian crisis was the announcement made by President Viktor Yanukovych, on 21 November 2013, that his government would cease negotiations for an association agreement with the European Union and strengthen relations with Russia. As a result, thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in Kiev and other Ukrainian cit- ies denouncing his decision to align with Russia. he demonstrations became known as Euromaidan. Two months later, the departure of Yanukovych led to the Russian interven- tion in the autonomous republic of Crimea. On 27 February 2014, troops without insignia occupied the local parliament and seized Simferopol airport. On 18 March 2014, Moscow oicially annexed the peninsula. he conlict in eastern Ukraine started in early April 2014 when pro-Kremlin protesters occupied government buildings. Violence was soon unleashed, with each side claiming that the other initiated the hostilities. he ighting continued throughout the summer of 2014. On 5 September 2014, the Minsk Protocol established a ceaseire between the Russian- backing insurgents and the Ukrainian forces. hat was followed by the Minsk II agreement in February 2015. Nevertheless, both sides have violated the agreement. Since April 2014, thousands of individuals throughout the country have joined pro-Kiev armed groups. Interestingly, they are neither conscripts nor professional soldiers. hey are CONTACT Emmanuel Karagiannis [email protected] © 2016 Taylor & Francis  2 E. KArAgIAnnIs volunteer ighters with little or no previous military training.1 hey have let their homes to ight against Kremlin-backed insurgents in the eastern front. Yet, there is very little information about them. he Russian media outlets depict them as ‘neo-Nazi’ criminals (Russia Today 2015), while the western press is usually sceptical about whether they rep- resent a healthy phenomenon or menace for the Ukrainian state (Paritt 2014). Amnesty International and other human rights NGOs have accused them of committing war crimes; members of the pro-Kiev battalions have allegedly tortured POWs and pro-Kremlin sympa- thizers in eastern Ukraine (Amnesty International 2015, 21–28). Moreover, some volunteers have been involved in criminal activities like kidnappings and smuggling (Yankov 2015). his article will attempt to answer some important questions. What has motivated indi- viduals to give up their civilian life and join armed groups which have engaged in combat in eastern Ukraine? How do these volunteers perceive the Russian people and leadership? How do they understand modern Ukrainian identity? In short, who are the Ukrainian Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 volunteers and why do they ight against pro-Kremlin forces? his research is based on ieldwork conducted in Ukraine during July–August 2015. More speciically, I interviewed 21 volunteers and individuals who are close to them in Kiev and Vinnytsia; 18 men and 3 women. Interviews were open-ended and were conducted in English, Russian or Ukrainian. Although there are volunteers from Georgia, Russia, the United States, Canada and other countries who have joined pro-Kiev battalions (Allen 2015), this research will focus only on Ukrainian citizens. Apart from one interviewee, the rest of them were residents of central or western Ukraine. he names of the interviewees were changed to assure anonymity. Most interviewees were identiied on the basis of local knowledge and snowballing in which one respondent suggested other individuals who might be useful to interview. Access to them was not easy. Indeed, the establishment of trust was pivotal to obtain interviews. While the sample of interviewees is not large enough to draw general conclusions, it provides a rare insight into their micro-world. Indeed, data gathered from interviews with them can be a valuable and useful source of information for their motivations and perceptions. he irst section will examine the existing research literature on militias. It will briely present the main theoretical approaches regarding collective action and armed groups. Moreover, it will describe the puzzle of Ukrainian volunteer ighters and will outline an alternative theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. he second section will describe the Ukrainian context and will provide information about pro-Kiev volunteers and their battalions. he third section presents an analysis of three mechanisms that can facilitate mobilization: ideas, political-social norms and emotions. he inal section concludes. Militias and paramilitaries in the research literature here is an extensive literature on militias and paramilitary groups that covers many aspects of the phenomenon (Gott 1973; Scobell and Hammitt 1998; Beckett 2001; Davis and Pereira 2003; Rooney 2004; Fowler 2005; Schultz and Dew 2009; Manwaring 2010; Berti 2013; Scheipers 2015; Jentzsch et al. 2015). Many analyses have attempted to address the collective action question, namely, to explain why individuals are willing to undertake risky activities by joining armed groups. Given that security is a public good, individuals can beneit from it regardless of their participation. herefore, they can free-ride on the efort of others.  soUThEAsT EUropEAn And BlAcK sEA sTUdIEs 3 Some scholars believe that individuals seek to maximize self-interest in the pursuit of collective goods. Mancur Olson in the Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the heory of Groups argued that groups must provide selective incentives to encourage participation unless there is coercion (1965). His analysis was based on the rational choice theory. he latter has viewed individuals as rational decision-makers who have weighted costs and beneits of participation. Other social scientists have built on his research. Jean-Paul Azam claimed that militiamen and insurgents usually receive inancial rewards (2006). Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher noted that free-riding is not always an option in the context of a civil war; participation in an armed formation can maximize the chances of survival (2007). Nonetheless, rational choice explanations tend to be tautological: if individuals are involved in something, it must be in their self-interest (McCauley 2001, 345). his approach cannot be falsiied. Another school of thought has focused on social pressure in the form of sanctions and Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 expectations of reciprocity as an alternative explanation of collective action (Taylor 1988; Koos 2014). In this case, the main argument is that strong networks and a shared collective identity can impose high costs to those who do not participate in collective action. Under certain conditions, close-knit communities can restrict individual choices. Members of such communities adhere to strong values, while they have direct relationships with each other. As a result, they can enjoy generalized reciprocity (Taylor 1988, 63–91). hese theoretical approaches have largely ignored the cognitive, normative and emo- tional dimensions of mobilization and recruitment. his is partly due to methodological diiculties in quantifying them, but it also relects a reluctance to engage with any factors that do not ofer rigid predictability. he notable exception is Elisabeth Jean Wood’s work on the insurgency in El Salvador during the 1980s (2003). She maintains that individuals participated in the let-wing insurgency in order to gain moral and emotional beneits. he case of Ukrainian volunteer ighters is particularly complex. To begin with, partic- ipation in a pro-Kiev armed group does not ofer signiicant material rewards. Although ighters may receive inancial compensation and rewards from the Ukraine government if they get injured, this factor alone cannot account for the mobilization of most individuals.2 In addition, they have not been coerced into action. Many of them do not come from the eastern part of the country which means that maximizing chances of survival is not really an issue for them. In fact, most of them used to live a safe distance from the conlict zone. Moreover, they are members of a very large ethnic group. Consequently, social pressure cannot easily be exercised on them and generalized reciprocity is not obvious. here is a missing aspect to contemporary theorizations of collective actions and militias. he power of ideas can explain why thousands of volunteers from all around the world joined the republican army during the Spanish civil war (1936–1939) (Baxell 2004, 25–46). Apparently, ideas and norms have played an important role in the decision of many indi- viduals to ight on the side of the Syrian rebel forces against the Assad regime (Mironova et al. 2014). Besides, many Western volunteers have decided to join Syrian Kurdish militias by acting on their emotions of anger and rage against atrocities by the Islamic State (Percy 2015). herefore, this analysis will focus on the role of ideas, norms and emotions as mechanisms that can explain the decision of thousands of Ukrainians to join pro-Kiev battalions. It will claim that individuals have made such a decision through a cognitive-normative-emotional process. In this way, they were able to act beyond their self-interest and get involved in the  4 E. KArAgIAnnIs conlict. he article will now turn to the Ukrainian volunteer ighters who were mobilized from April 2014 to June 2015. The Ukrainian armed forces and the formation of volunteer battalions During the communist rule, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine was heavily militarized. here are a few reasons that can explain the stationing of large nuclear and conventional forces in this part of the Soviet Union. First, Ukraine was not far from Central Europe where the United States and its allies had a strong military presence. It was also close to Turkey which has maintained the second largest army in the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, Soviet Ukraine had a big population and vast territory; naturally, the Red Army had more units and military bases there than in smaller republics. Finally, the anti-Soviet insurgency in western Ukraine that ended only in 1955 could have been a factor compelling the Kremlin Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 to keep large forces in the republic. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the newly independent republic of Ukraine faced a serious challenge. While the country inherited hundreds of thousands of soldiers and large quantities of Soviet military hardware (including ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons), it had to organize a new national army (Olynyk 2000, 69–70). In spite of the initial enthusiasm, the Ukrainian armed forces remained poorly organized and equipped. For many years, successive governments neglected defence policy and focused on internal security (Malyarenko and Galbreath 2016). herefore, the police and other internal security forces received the lion’s share of government budget (Malyarenko and Galbreath 2016). In contrast, the defence budget remained small and mostly covered salaries and maintenance. he country’s army did not intervene in the political crisis that took place in Kiev during the winter of 2013. Despite some speculation, army oicers and soldiers remained neutral in the confrontation between Yanukovych and the opposition. he political vacuum in Kiev paved the way for the events in the autonomous republic of Crimea. It is clear that the deployment of Russian forces in the peninsula in March 2014 took the Ukrainian interim government by surprise, judged by the lack of any preventive military measures for self-de- fence. he local Ukrainian troops were ordered not to ight the invading forces. Ater a brief stand-of, Russian troops managed to control Crimea without any casualties. he bloodless takeover of Ukrainian territory greatly damaged the image of the Ukrainian military. To make matters worse, a number of senior military oicers defected to the Russian/Crimean forces (BBC News 2014). he annexation of Crimea led to further tensions in the Russian-Ukrainian relations. On April 7, 2014, pro-Kremlin protesters occupied government buildings in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk demanding a referendum for autonomy in eastern Ukraine. his time, the Ukrainian armed forces were mobilized to defend the country. In mid-April, Kiev launched an ‘anti-terrorist operation’ to regain control of public buildings in the area. On May 11, however, the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics were established fol- lowing the organization of referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In mid-June, the newly elected President Petro Poroshenko proposed a 14-point peace plan, which included a unilateral ceaseire and a halt of the army’s anti-terrorist operations in eastern Ukraine, decentralization of the Ukrainian state and the sealing of Ukraine’s border with Russia (Herszenhorn 2014, 1). Nevertheless, the Ukrainian initiative failed to cease hostilities.  soUThEAsT EUropEAn And BlAcK sEA sTUdIEs 5 While the Russian intervention in Crimea did not provoke an armed response from the Ukrainian side, the recurrence of similar events in the eastern part of the country resulted in the mobilization of volunteer ighters. Individuals from all around Ukraine joined mili- tias to ight against separatist forces. It is diicult to estimate with accuracy the number of the volunteer ighters. he nationalist Svoboda Party (i.e. Party of Freedom) claims that more than 1000 of its members are currently serving in the pro-Kiev battalions (Syrotyuk 2015). Likewise, the far-right Right Sector has mobilized hundreds of its members to ight against the pro-Kremlin forces (Skoropadskiy 2015). Simultaneously, tens of independent battalions were formed with the help of Ukrainian oligarchs and businessmen. Based on my interviews, the total number of volunteer ighters must be around 10,000. he irst battalions were formed around April-May 2014 when it became obvious that pro-Moscow separatists were about to take control of most eastern provinces. he pro-Kiev armed groups can be classiied into four diferent types: battalions organized by local author- Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 ities (e.g. the 3rd Territorial Defense Battalion from Lviv); battalions organized by private citizens (e.g. Donbas Battalion); special police patrol battalions (e.g. Battalion Kharkiv); and battalions ailiated with far-right parties (e.g. Azov Battalion). hese militias lacked a clear chain of command. Although they sufered from poor discipline and code of conduct, their performance in the battleield is assessed as more than satisfactory: these militias have managed to keep territory and stop the advance of the pro-Kremlin forces. he battalions took part in several battles, including the battle of Mariupol (May–June 2014) and the second battle of Donetsk Airport (September 2014–January 2015). As a result, they have enjoyed high popularity among Ukrainian citizens (Klein 2015). A special note must be made on the far-right battalions. One of the most active is the Azov Battalion. It is based in the city of Mariupol and largely consists of local Russian speakers. he battalion was initially led by Andriy Biletsky who currently serves as an independent member of the parliament. Biletsky has a long history of involvement in the Ukrainian far- right. In 2008, he established the Social-National Assembly of Ukraine (SNA) which later joined Right Sector along with other neo-Nazi groups. Far-right parties and battalions have claimed that they do not have a Ukrainian-only recruitment policy. For instance, Right Sector accepts non-Ukrainian volunteers who are of Russian, Belarusian, Polish and Georgian origin. Independent battalions have also followed a non-ethnically exclusive policy of recruitment. According to Andrey who is the founder and commander of the 500-strong Kievan Rus Battalion, there are two criteria for mem- bership: irst, someone willingly to join the unit and, second, not to have a criminal record (Andrey 2015). He maintained that knowledge of the Ukrainian language is not a factor to be taken into account for the recruitment of ighters. Indeed, during his interview, Andrey was accompanied by two volunteers who spoke only Russian. In contrast, the Svoboda Party has identiied language as the primary cultural marker of the Ukrainian national identity. herefore, only those who speak Ukrainian can join the party and its battalions (Syrotyuk 2015). Despite some resistance, the Ukrainian government has managed to integrate the bat- talions into the structures of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and the National Guard (Karatnycky 2015). It is not known, yet, how the integration of militias into the national army will afect their military performance. he US Army has provided low-level training to members of the battalions (Babb 2015). he gradual professionaliza- tion of the battalions is likely to attract a diferent group of volunteers in the near future.  6 E. KArAgIAnnIs he prospect of an army career can be appealing to young unemployed men who need job security given the economic situation in the country. The power of ideas, norms and emotions Under conditions of conlict, a successful mobilization and recruitment of volunteers is not easily achievable. Fear of death could prevent individuals from joining an armed group and ighting against opponents. In addition to all other possible motivations, they need to be emotionally and intellectually encouraged. In his Politics, Aristotle argued that the man is a political animal who ‘alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust’ (Lear 1988, 201). Indeed, individuals must come to the conclusion that participation is the right thing and non-participation is wrong. For this purpose, armed groups could utilize three mechanisms to achieve mobilization: Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 ideas, political-social norms and emotions. David Snow and Robert Benford observed that the researchers have ignored ‘mobilizing beliefs and ideas, in large part because of their presumed ubiquity and constancy, which makes them, in turn, relatively nonproblematic and uninteresting factors in the movement equation’ (Snow and Benford 1992, 135). Indeed, these intangible factors have been neglected within mainstream political science; yet, they can explain the decision of some individuals to join militias. Ideas as a mobilization mechanism he history of humanity has shown that ideas can play an important role in generating collective action. Isaiah Berlin, the famous British philosopher, wrote extensively about the power of ideas in political and social life (Berlin 2002). Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane deined ideas as ‘beliefs held by individuals’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 3/20). heir meaning is oten contextual because they are socio-politico-cultural constructs. For example, the idea of self-determination has constantly changed within Europe to it the new political realities (Fisch 2015). Ideas do not always stand alone. When they come together and are systematized, ideas can form an ideology. John Wilson deines ideology as: a set of beliefs about the social world and how it operates, containing statements about the rightness of certain social arrangements and what action would be undertaken in light of those statements … an ideology is both a cognitive map of sets of expectations and a scale of values in which standards and imperatives are proclaimed. Ideology thus serves both as a clue to understanding and as a guide to action, developing in the mind of its adherents an image of the process by which desired changes can best be achieved (Wilson 1973, 91–92). he Euromaidan events brought ideas back to the political lexicon of Ukrainians. he main political parties were split over the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine. Yanukovych and his allies largely supported closer relations with Russia, whereas the opposition pursued a pro-EU and pro-US agenda. he diferent foreign policy strategies soon took the shape of an ideological struggle that divided the society (Oleinik 2015). Public discourses focused heav- ily on human rights, democracy, justice, national independence, sovereignty and stability. While the opposition accused President Yanukovych of authoritarian rule, it came to include a strong far-right component. Indeed, the Ukrainian far-right had a crucial role in the overthrow of Yanukovych in the winter of 2013 (Luhn 2014). he roots of the Ukrainian far-right movement lie in the late 1920s, when the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists  soUThEAsT EUropEAn And BlAcK sEA sTUdIEs 7 (Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins’kykh Natsionalistiv – hereater OUN) was established in Vienna by a group of former Ukrainian oicers and students. he pre-war Ukrainian nationalists shared the ideology of anti-Russianism that was promoted by intellectuals such as Yuri Lypa (1900–1944).3 he OUN remained a marginal force until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Under the charismatic leadership of Stepan Bandera, the OUN entered western Ukraine and attempted to form an independent pro-German state in June 1941. Ater the defeat of Germany, Ukrainian nationalists set up the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and fought against Soviet rule until the mid-1950s. Ukrainian far-right parties like Svoboda and Right Sector have viewed themselves as the ideological successors of OUN and UPA (Marples 2006). Bandera’s vision of a Ukrainian-only state remains attractive to many nationalists today. Andre Liebich and Oksana Myshlovska have documented the memorialization and commemoration of Bandera in the western parts of the country (Liebich and Myshlovska 2014). In fact, his name came up a number Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 of times during interviews with members of the two parties. Apart from Bandera’s legacy, the Ukrainian modern nationalism is based on the historical myths of the medieval state of Kievan Rus, the Cossacks, and the 1917–1921 independence struggle against both sides of the Russian civil war, namely the Whites and the Red Army (Kuzio 1996, 597). Not surprisingly, members of far-right parties have depicted the conlict in eastern Ukraine as a battle of ideas. In the words of Yuriy Syrotyuk, former deputy Chairman of Svoboda and former MP, the ‘enemy is the ideology of Russian imperialism because Moscow views Ukraine as its colony’ (Syrotyuk 2015). He mentioned the 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav as a tragic event in the country’s history because it ‘subjected Ukraine to Russian control’. Nonetheless, he failed to mention that the autonomous republic of Crimea was transferred from the SSR Russia to the SSR Ukraine on the 300th anniversary of the treaty. Against this background, Svoboda has viewed the war against Russia as a political necessity. In the words of Syrotyuk, it is ‘a holy war comparable to the nineteenth century European wars of liberation because resistance brings about patriotism’ (Syrotyuk 2015). Similarly, Right Sector has portrayed the war in eastern Ukraine as a positive develop- ment for the country’s future. Alexander Tumanov, a Right Sector commentator, argued that ‘today, during the war with Russia, we have an opportunity to gain real freedom and a real state. his is why anyone who speaks about the necessity of solving the conlict diplomati- cally is an enemy’ (Tumanov 2015, 7). Right Sector has sought the radical transformation of the country. Artem Skoropadsliy, head of Right Sector’s press centre, claimed that the future of Ukraine lies in autarky and self-eiciency. In Skoropadsliy’s view, the new Ukrainian state must have two important pillars: Christianity and the Ukrainian language (Skoropadsliy 2015). Moreover, Right Sector has advocated the establishment of a ‘National Democracy’, deined as a political system with social justice. Like Svoboda, Right Sector has favoured a cultural revolution in order to ‘Ukrainianize the state and the society’ (Skoropadsliy 2015). here is evidence that some volunteers have been motivated by radical nationalist ideas. For instance, Alexander who served as an oicer in the Azov Battalion claimed that ‘only the Ukrainians are true Slavs because the Russians are the descendants of Tatars’. From his point of view, ‘ighting against this Mongolic nation is a just cause for every Ukrainian patriot’ (Alexander 2015). His co-ighter Serhiy, who participated in the battle of Ilovaisk, maintained that ‘Ukrainians have war in their blood’ because they are the original Slavs. He dismissed the use of neo-Nazi symbols by the Azov Battalion as ‘a joke done by the volunteers to attract attention’ (Serhiy 2015). Maxim, who came to Kiev from the northern  8 E. KArAgIAnnIs town of Zhytomyr, felt that he had ‘an obligation to ight [pro-Moscow] Chechen-Muslim mercenaries and Russian low-lives who want to split the country and destroy the Ukrainian people’ (Maxim 2015). Sergey is a former convict who has joined one of Right Sector- controlled battalions. He participated in the so-called Shyrokyne Standof (February–July 2015). He decided to ight because he wanted his children to ‘live in a free white nation without minorities’ (Sergey 2015). Yet, this is not always the case. Although they stressed the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian identity, most interviewees rejected nationalist ideas. Consequently, they diferentiated between ‘the Putin regime’ and the ‘Russian people’. For instance, a member of Right Sector Igor, who fought in the battle of the Donetsk airport, expressed the view that ‘only Putin and the Kremlin are enemies’ because the ‘Russians are brothers’. He argued that ‘being Ukrainian is to be human’ implying that the enemy used inhuman tactics (Igor 2015). Female volunteer ighters expressed similar views. For example, Valentina from Vinnytsia, Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 who participated in the battle of Sloviansk, holds the view that ‘Putin and the separatists is the enemy, not the peaceful people of Russia’. She argued that the Ukrainian identity does not relate to language or religion; ‘to be a patriot depends on where you were born and how you were raised’ (Valentina 2015). To sum up, nationalist ideas are a relatively powerful mechanism because they can shape an individual’s approach to a situation. he far-right has portrayed the conlict in the east- ern part of the country as existential. In this way, some individuals have volunteered to participate in a armed struggle that seems to involve the whole nation. Political-social norms as a mobilization mechanism Political-social norms are deined as ‘implicit prescriptions accepted as valid by a particu- lar society to govern relationships within’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). hey relate to national or collective identity beyond the state (Geis and Muller 2013, 16). Norms can be transmitted locally, nationally or internationally through various formal (e.g. education) and informal (e.g. social media networks) channels. Norbert Kerr has argued that indi- viduals can participate in collective action if they believe that their contribution is neces- sary for the achievement of a group goal (Kerr 1996). Apart from their pure self-interest, individuals follow what is socially acceptable and expected. Indeed, political-social norms oten function as a mechanism for mobilization because they can inluence behaviour and perceptions (Diez et al. 2011, 101). Norms enjoy social acceptance and create an ethos that values collective action. hey incorporate a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that facilitates an internalization process; thus, the individual accepts certain norms without questions (March and Olsen 2006, 689–708). A growing number of political scientists have investigated the inluence of norms in political involvement such as voting behaviour (Karpowitz et al. 2011; Shulman and Levine 2012). However, less attention has been paid to political-social norms as a mobilization mechanism in times of conlict. Political-social norms are inluenced by cultural determinants and derive from a selective interpretation of collective historical experiences (Cialdini and Tros 1998, 152). In this way, Stephen Shulman noticed that Ukrainian nationalists believe that Ukrainians difer cultur- ally from Russians by at least ive traits. First, the deep-rooted individualism of Ukrainians which incorporates respect for rights and human dignity, as opposed to the collectivism of Russians which prioritizes the group over the individual. Second, the love of freedom and  soUThEAsT EUropEAn And BlAcK sEA sTUdIEs 9 democracy that descends from the political tradition of the Kievan Rus and the assembly of citizens (viche), as well as the Cossack culture and history; the argument goes that there were never equivalent institutions and traditions among Russians. hird, the love of land and folk culture which preserve the distinct Ukrainian identity despite the Russiication and Polonization of Ukrainian elites in urban centres. Fourth, emotionalism and romanticism have been identiied as cultural traits that diferentiate Ukrainians from Russians who are supposedly less spiritual and more materialistic. Fith, tolerance toward diferent languages and religions has been claimed to be an important trait of the Ukrainian culture; in contrast, the Russian culture is intolerant and despotic (Shulman 1999, 1017–1019). Irrespective of whether they exist or are imagined constructs, these cultural traits have provided the framework for the development of certain political-social norms that prescribe behaviour and assign identities. Consequently, some Ukrainians may have felt obliged to participate in this collective efort because militias have utilized powerful political-social Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 norms to encourage such an action. In particular, interviewees mentioned the norms of ‘patriotic duty’ (patrioticheskiy dolg) and ‘social responsibility’ (sotsial’naya otvetstvennost). he former dictates self-sacriice and bravery, while the latter encourages volunteering and a sense of belonging. While both are widely used by militants around the world, their connota- tions within the Ukrainian context relect particular historical and cultural experiences that have shaped the country. Being a member of a (political) community entails the acceptance of certain shared viewpoints and practices that bind individuals together as a social entity. Indeed, some volunteers stressed the importance of political-social norms for their deci- sion to join pro-Kiev battalions. For example, the founder and commander of the Kievan Rus Battalion Andrey replied to the question of why he decided to organize a militia by saying ‘if not us then who?’ He felt that protecting the homeland is ‘the single most important duty of a Ukrainian citizen’ (Andrey 2015). Besides, Viktor claimed that ‘serving in the Donbass battalion was about defending democracy from tyranny’. In his opinion, ‘Ukraine can only be a democracy because the local culture is deeply democratic’. He blamed the Tatar yoke for Russia’s authoritarian tradition and he contrasted this with Ukraine’s ‘spirit of liberty’. (Viktor 2015). When he was asked to elaborate, he mentioned the 1710 Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk which established a Cossack assembly and limited the powers of the ruler (Pritsak 1998). For Leonid, who fought in the battle of Sloviansk, ‘every good Ukrainian has a responsibility to defend compatriots whose life is threatened by the enemy’. his is an obligation that he has to fulill as ‘a member of this great nation because life without dignity is no life’ (Leonid 2015). Similarly, Anatoli argued that ‘the motherland needs her able men to do something against those who kill women and children. Patriotism is not only love of country but also the willingness to sacriice your life for an honorable cause’ (Anatoli 2015). Other interviewees also expressed their commitment to these political-social norms. But, while political-social norms can provide an explanation about individuals joining armed groups, they cannot fully explain why only some of them have decided to do so. To put it simply, a small number of those who have endorsed relevant norms decided to participate in the campaign against pro-Kremlin separatists. Hence it is crucial to take into account the role of emotions in mobilization and recruitment. hey can partly explain the timing of their decision.  10 E. KArAgIAnnIs Emotions as a mobilization mechanism Ancient Greek philosopher Plato viewed emotions as irrational because they undermine reason (Carroll 2001, 219). However, social psychologists have ofered a diferent perspec- tive. Richard Lazarus has claimed that emotions such as love, hate, fear, jealousy and anger are the outcomes of cognitive appraisal of an event or a situation and is followed by what is deemed to be the appropriate response (Lazarus 1991). Guobin Yang has argued that emotions, despite somatic signs (e.g. facial expression, gestures), are not easily observable (2006, 1391). Yet, the use of certain words (sometimes together with gestures) can reveal emotions (Labov and Fanshel 1977). Emotions can contribute to mobilization and recruit- ment because they can inluence decisions. Although they are experienced individually, emotions partly relect societal values and realities. hey run high during times of conlict. Indeed, Carl von Clausewitz acknowledged the connection between war and the ‘passion of hatred’ (1989, 64). In short, emotions are part of the human experience and should be Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 brought into the analysis. Elisabeth Jean Wood has maintained that emotional in-process beneits can explain the mobilization of peasants during the Salvadoran civil war in favour of the let-wing insur- gency (Wood 2003). She argued that participation elicited expression of moral outrage and enabled them to experience the pleasure of agency, deined as ‘the satisfying power to take meaningful action and to see the results of our decisions and choices’ (Murray 1997, 126). In other words, emotions can play a role in mobilization and recruitment of volunteer ighters. here are two types of emotions generated within a movement: reciprocal emotions involving participants’ feelings towards each other and shared emotions producing anger against outsiders (Goodwin et al. 2001, 20). Many interviewees expressed positive emotions such as love for the homeland, soli- darity for fellow Ukrainians living in the conlict zone, and pride for being a Ukrainian. hey mentioned a sense of obligation to ‘do something’ about the situation in the country. Consequently, they decided to join a battalion in order to defend the homeland against the invading forces. heir reciprocal emotions generated the need to demonstrate solidarity towards the embattled compatriots living in the eastern provinces. For instance, female volunteer Valentina, who participated in the battle of Sloviansk, decided to join a battalion because she ‘wanted to help her brothers who sufered from hunger’ (Valentina 2015). Alona followed her husband when the latter decided to join a battalion. She did not plan to stay long with her husband’s battalion but ‘felt emotionally close to the ighters and decided to stay for months with them’ (Alona 2015). She cried as she told her story. Sasha from Vinnytsia is a Soviet-trained marine who fought in the second battle of the Donetsk Airport. During the interview, he mentioned that he ‘would not forgive himself if he did not ight for his country’. Obviously, participation ofered him the pleasure of agency. In addition, he viewed his battalion as a ‘large family where individual members can die for each other’ (Sasha K. 2015). Volunteers’ positive emotions are conirmed by Oresta who has established an NGO to help injured volunteer ighters. In her opinion, most individuals have joined battalions due to their ‘love for the homeland’ (Oresta 2015). But during the interviews it became clear that these volunteers also felt a thrill of adventure. Simultaneously, many of the interviewees harboured negative emotions such as guilt, fear and anger. Nikolai from Luhansk oblast explained with anger in his voice that he joined the Tornado Battalion to ‘liberate his home from double occupation since Moscow is conquering  soUThEAsT EUropEAn And BlAcK sEA sTUdIEs 11 and Kiev is betraying’ (Nikolai Tornado 2015). Sasha who is serving in Kievan Rus Battalion as a soldier claimed that ‘restoring the pride of Ukraine against the foreign invaders’ was his main incentive to join (Sasha B. 2015). Sasha from Vinnytsia expressed his anger against the separatists because ‘they lack professional military attitude and they do not respects their opponents’ (Sasha K. 2015). While discussing their personal opinions on the conlict, these volunteers raised their voices, used strong language, and made gestures. Anton who runs a hospital clinic in Vinnytsia argued that many of those who joined the battalions felt ‘guilty’ ater the takeover of Crimea because there was no armed resistance (Anton 2015). In summary, emotions are oten a driver of human action that can overtake rational calculations. Indeed, some volunteer ighters justiied their decision to join a battalion on the basis of their positive and/or negative emotions. herefore, their emotions should be accepted at face value because they correlated with public perceptions about who is the victim and who is the perpetrator. Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016 Conclusions he article claimed that individuals’ decisions to join the pro-Kiev battalions cannot be explained by rational choice and the social sanctions approaches. If cost-beneit calcula- tions had been conducted, most volunteer ighters would not have participated in such a risky activity. Instead, the article focused on mobilization mechanisms which have received less attention. Ideas, political-social norms and emotions have played a signiicant role in militias’ recruitment in eastern Ukraine. Some individuals have been encouraged by nationalist ideas about the past, present and future of Ukraine to participate in an ideological-driven struggle to protect national independence against an archaic enemy. Political-social norms have also played a role for those who value duties and responsibilities; some felt obliged to fulil their patriotic duty of defending the country and assume the responsibility of protecting fellow Ukrainians. Finally, others joined battalions for emotional reasons such as love for the homeland and anger against the pro-Kremlin insurgents. Although they are distinct, the three mechanisms can function simultaneously. Indeed, it is possible that more than one mechanism may have contributed to someone’s participation in an armed group. For instance, the adoption of ideas and norms could produce powerful emotions. Alternatively, the outburst of emotions could make an individual more susceptible to certain ideas and norms. herefore, the mobilization of Ukrainian volunteer ighters has a strong cognitive-normative-emotional dimension that cannot be ignored. Notes 1. Only a small number of volunteer ighters had combat experience in Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia (Yankov 2015). 2. All Ukrainian ighters (volunteers, conscripts and professionals) will receive 120,000 hryvni (5000 USD) if they get injured in the ‘anti-terrorist operation’ (ATO) areas and their families will receive 600,000 hryvni (25,000 USD) if they get killed. hose who are injured can enter Ukrainian universities without exams (Sergey 2015). 3. Lypa claimed that Ukraine and Russia have mutually exclusive interests and therefore they can only be geopolitical rivals (Wilson 2002, 294–295).  12 E. KArAgIAnnIs Acknowledgements he author would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for her/his insightful comments. he author is also grateful to Tracey German, Rod hornton and Sophia Moskalenko for their feedback and criticism. Disclosure statement No potential conlict of interest was reported by the author. 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Interview with Krasimir Yankov, Amnesty International, Kiev, 15 July 2015. Interview with Anton, head of a hospital clinic, Vinnytsia, 16 July 2015. Interview with Sergey, lawyer representing veterans, Vinnytsia, 16 July 2015. Interview with Alona, member of the local battalion, Vinnytsia, 17 July 2015. Interview with Igor, member of the local battalion, Vinnytsia, 17 July 2015. Interview with Valentina, member of the local battalion, Vinnytsia 19 July 2015. Interview with Sasha K., member of the local battalion, Vinnytsia, 19 July 2015.  soUThEAsT EUropEAn And BlAcK sEA sTUdIEs 15 Interview with Igor, member of a Right Sector-ailiated battalion, Kiev, 21 July 2015. Interview with Sergey, member of a Right Sector-ailiated battalion, Kiev, 21 July 2015. Interview with Andrey, founder and commander of Kievan Rus Battalion, Kiev, 22 July 2015. Interview with Sasha B., member of Kievan Rus Battalion, Kiev, 22 July 2015. Interview with Nikolai, oicer of the Turnado Battalion, Kiev, 25 July 2015. Interview with Viktor, member of the Donbas Battalion, 5 August July 2015. Interview with Leonid, member of the Donbas Battalion, 10 August 2015. Interview with Anatoli, member of the Donbas Battalion, 12 August 2015. Downloaded by [King's College London] at 14:08 28 February 2016