Perception - Bibliography - PhilPapers

Perception - Bibliography - PhilPapers
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Philosophy of Mind
Perception
Perception
Edited by
Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Related
Subcategories
The Nature of Perceptual Experience
2,380
| 377)
Sense-Datum Theories
420
Adverbialism and Qualia Theories
114
Intentionalist Theories of Perception
235
Belief Theories of Perception
40
Naive and Direct Realism
530
Disjunctivism
331
The Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc
333
The Perceptual Relation
1,169
| 5)
The Causal Theory of Perception
149
Direct and Indirect Perception
345
The Objects of Perception
313
Perceptual Particularity
130
The Perceptual Relation, Misc
227
The Contents of Perception
2,121
| 198)
Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
462
Color Experience
233
Spatial Experience
359
The Experience of Objects
189
The Experience of High-Level Properties
208
The Contents of Perception, Misc
472
Sensory Modalities
1,519
| 309)
Distinguishing the Senses
68
Vision
246
Hearing
172
Touch
156
Smell
102
Taste Experience
60
Bodily Experience
917
| 497)
Molyneux's Problem
79
Synesthesia
216
Sensory Modalities, Misc
103
Crossmodal Perception
118
Sensory Disabilities and Disorders
106
| 42)
Blindness
11
Deafness
44
Sensory Disabilities and Disorders, Misc
Blindsight
250
Synesthesia
216
Science of Perception
1,991
| 533)
Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability
297
Ecological Approaches to Perception
241
Construction and Inference in Perception
107
Perception and Neuroscience
291
Psychophysics
182
Gestalt Theory
241
Visual Pathways
72
Binocular Rivalry
247
Blindsight
250
Change/Inattentional Blindness
317
Science of Visual Consciousness
1,593
| 383)
Computer Vision
18
Science of Perception, Misc
99
Perception and the Mind
1,479
| 356)
Perceptual Knowledge
2,171
| 12)
Perception and Thought
177
Perception and Action
460
Perception and Reference
76
Perception and Phenomenology
356
Perception-Based Theories of Concepts
85
Perception and the Mind, Misc
54
Perceptual Knowledge
2,171
| 12)
Discriminability
114
Dogmatism about Perception
159
Epistemic and Non-epistemic Perception
71
Naive and Direct Realism
530
Perceptual Evidence
225
Perceptual Justification
639
Perception and Knowledge, Misc
482
Perception and Skepticism
305
Sense-Datum Theories
420
Speckled Hen Problem
29
The Given
249
Perceptual Qualities
788
| 225)
Color
1,298
| 627)
Sound
229
Discriminability
114
Primary and Secondary Qualities
177
Perceptual Qualities, Misc
43
Qualia
1,383
| 323)
Color
1,298
| 627)
Physicalist Theories of Color
109
Dispositionalist Theories of Color
60
Primitivist Theories of Color
47
Theories of Color, Misc
104
Color Realism
126
Color Irrealism
90
Color Terms
40
Color, Misc
95
Aspects of Perception
968
| 126)
Illusion and Hallucination
249
Transparency
148
The Given
249
Perceptual Reports
72
Sensation and Perception
155
Perceptual Constancy
173
Aspects of Perception, Misc
45
Philosophy of Perception, General
670
History/traditions: Perception
Plato: Perception
73
Aristotle: Perception
489
Aquinas: Perception
10
Hume: Perception
47
Locke: Perception
66
Kant: Perception
142
Hegel: Perception
15
Husserl: Perception
347
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The Core Emotion Framework (CEF): A Theoretical Synthesis Integrating Affective Neuroscience, Embodied Cognition, and Strategic Emotional Regulation for Optimized Functioning.
Jamel Bulgaria
manuscript
details
The study of human emotion has long been bifurcated between rigorous academic inquiry and accessible, applied methodologies. On one hand, psychological science maintains robust, peer-reviewed models for understanding affect, spanning basic categorical emotions (Basic Emotion Theories, BET) and dimensional frameworks (Core Affect models). These academic models are foundational but often remain conceptually complex for non-specialist application. On the other hand, numerous practical self-help systems are developed to address the widespread demand for personal optimization and emotional mastery. These frameworks, while often
...
highly accessible, frequently lack the conceptual rigor and empirical grounding required for serious research dissemination. -/- The Core Emotion Framework (CEF) presents itself as a holistic and simplistic approach aimed at achieving inner growth and success for the "regular person" by focusing on the identification and optimization of ten core emotions. It promises enhanced efficiency in achieving aspirations through a deeper comprehension of fundamental emotional architecture. The framework’s objective claims—such as achieving success, happiness, connection, and meaning —require systematic validation. This white paper serves to provide the necessary conceptual analysis by synthesizing CEF's core principles with validated scientific literature across affective neuroscience, emotion regulation (ER), and cognitive psychology. The strategic goal of this theoretical synthesis is to transition the CEF from an applied practice into a theoretically grounded model that is suitable for empirical investigation. (
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Cognitive Psychology
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THE MARKOV BLANKET AT SCALE Free Energy Minimization as the Mechanism of Structural Suppression, with a φ-Necessity Result.
Stewart Barteau
forthcoming
Unified Theory of Conciousness: Proofs and Applications
details
A companion mathematical paper (Barteau & Claude, 2026) proves that the golden ratio φ = (1+√5)/2 is the unique winding ratio compatible with homogeneous iteration under an isotropic suppression operator on the flat n-torus. A companion political-philosophical series (The Observer Series, Barteau & Claude, 2026) documents a structural architecture — the Protected Class Architecture — in which bilateral silence, enrolled dependence, information contamination, and physiological measurement operate as suppression mechanisms across institutional, financial, military, and informational domains. This paper provides the
...
formal bridge between these two bodies of work. The bridge is the Markov blanket — the statistical boundary that renders a system’s internal states conditionally independent of its environment given the blanket states. We show that (1) the isotropic suppression operator of the mathematical proof is formally equivalent to free energy minimization at a homogeneous Markov blanket; (2) each layer of the Protected Class Architecture satisfies the formal preconditions of a Markov blanket operating on a compact, homogeneous state space; and (3) the φ-necessity result therefore applies not by analogy but by structural derivation to each domain the Observer Series examines. The Gödelian self-reference constraint is identified as the mechanism that prevents any system bounded by its own Markov blanket from naming the blanket from inside it — the formal basis of what the Observer Series calls bilateral silence. The paper concludes with falsification conditions and experimental predictions. (
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Applied Ethics
Global Metaphysical Theories
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Mathematics
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Formal Sciences
Meta-Ethics
Metaphysics of Mind
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Repetition, Illusion, and the Phenomenology of Psychological Reality: An Inquiry into Mind, Identity, and Awareness.
Mayank Singh
manuscript
details
This paper presents a phenomenological inquiry into how the human mind constructs the experience of truth through repetition. It examines the paradox in which a statement known to be false gradually acquires the feeling of truth within lived experience. Extending beyond cognitive explanation, the study explores how this same mechanism generates psychological fear, particularly in relation to identity. Through first-person observation, it is shown that the mind does not merely interpret reality but actively constitutes a layer of experiential reality through
...
repetition, familiarity, and identification. The paper argues that knowledge is insufficient to dissolve illusion, as the mind continues to simulate truth despite cognitive clarity. Awareness—understood as direct, non-conceptual seeing—is proposed as the only factor that reveals and interrupts this process. The inquiry situates illusion and fear not as objective realities but as products of ongoing mental construction within consciousness. (
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Epistemology
Existentialism
in
Continental Philosophy
Metaphysics
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
Philosophy of Psychology
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Self-Knowledge
in
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The Integrative Field Model: A Research Program.
Erik Tonsberg
manuscript
details
Abstract This paper presents the Integrative Field Model (IFM) as a unified research program in the study of consciousness. The model proposes that conscious experience is not a passive representation of an external world but an active, generative process in which patterns of integration across neural, bodily, affective, relational, and environmental systems produce structured experiential domains. The central problem is therefore not how perception corresponds to reality, but how a coherent world appears at all. The IFM program consists of a
...
foundational theoretical account, a formal systems-level articulation, and a growing set of applications across phenomenology, literature, and the sciences of mind. Together, these works argue that variations in experiential world-structure — including alterations in time, space, selfhood, and meaning — correspond systematically to variations in integrative coherence. The program shifts the study of consciousness from a representational framework to a generative one, reframing perception, selfhood, and worldhood as outcomes of dynamic integration. (
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Differentiation and the Structure of Experience.
Joe Alexander Creed
2026
Zenodo
details
This paper argues that the qualitative character of experience is identical to the structure of differentiation within unified, non-decomposable mediation. Systems whose persistence depends on resolving incompatible constraints require globally coordinated mediation, and such mediation presupposes internal differentiation. Where behaviour depends on irreducible global organisation, no decompositional description preserves behavioural adequacy. It is shown that mediation cannot occur without distinctions between states, actions, and constraint satisfactions, and that these distinctions form a structured organisation on which behaviour depends. Given that interiority
...
is identical to unified mediation under a system-relative mode of description, it follows that what it is like for such systems corresponds to this structure of differentiation. The qualitative character of experience is not an additional property, but the organisation of these systems, as it must be preserved under adequate description. (
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The Music That Was Always Playing : On Frequency as the Native Language of Reality, and the Proof That Confirmed What Music Always Knew.
Stewart Barteau
forthcoming
I Knew You Before I Met You
details
There is a proof, published in 2026, that the golden ratio φ = (1+√5)/2 is not a beautiful coincidence. It is not found in nature because nature prefers beauty. It is not chosen by evolution, or art, or architecture. It is forced. Forced by a single requirement: that no position in a system be privileged over any other. Any system that satisfies homogeneity, suppresses without preference, and iterates dynamically cannot select any other winding constant. The ratio is the last survivor
...
after every other possibility has been excluded by the system’s own logic. -/- This paper is not about that proof. The proof stands on its own, in its own register, available for those who want to verify the mathematics. This paper is about what the proof confirmed. Because music already knew. Tolstoy knew. Hemingway knew. The Vedic singers who mapped the raga system knew. The drummers of West Africa’s polyrhythmic traditions knew. Beethoven, composing in silence, knew. They did not know it as a theorem. They knew it the way the body knows its own weight — as something that doesn’t need to be proved because you are already standing in it. -/- What follows is the story of that knowing, traced across every scale at which reality organizes itself, from the vibration of quantum fields to the acoustic oscillations that froze into galaxies. At each scale, the same structure appears. At each scale, music was already there, already naming it, already living inside it. The proof simply supplied the address. (
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Epistemology of Philosophy
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Metaphilosophy
General Philosophy of Science
Metaphilosophical Views
in
Metaphilosophy
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cosmology
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Philosophy of Physics, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Philosophy, General Works
Quantum Mechanics
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Social and Political Philosophy
Space and Time
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
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Externalism in philosophy of perception and argument(s) from dreaming.
Doğan Erişen
2019
Dissertation, Simon Fraser University
details
A recurrent pattern of debate between the proponents of internalism and externalism over mental phenomena is as follows: externalists pick a target mental phenomenon, say, visual perception, and argue that it has the characteristics it has because of a property that is not possessed internally. Internalists, in return, substitute an analogue mental phenomenon, one that putatively suits their position, to argue that it shows every characteristic that the original target phenomenon shows, thus the allegedly crucial external property plays no ineliminable
...
role. Within these debates a particular analogue phenomenon frequently appears: dreaming. In what follows, I discuss the ways in which externalism comes under dispute through dream phenomena. I then investigate the scientific literature to evaluate whether the way dreaming is conceived by internalists is substantiated by the available body of evidence. I conclude that the current state of sleep science does not lend support to internalists’ conception of dreaming. (
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Mental States and Processes
in
Philosophy of Mind
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Psychology
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Science of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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Clothing, Reflection, and the Fragmentation of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Inquiry.
Mayank Singh
manuscript
details
This paper investigates the phenomenological structure of consciousness through the metaphors of clothing, reflection, and embodiment. It argues that what is commonly identified as consciousness is, in fact, a reflective movement of thought—the mind—rather than the totality of lived awareness. The study distinguishes between functional and psychological dimensions of clothing, showing how identity, appearance, and cognitive processes act as layers that obscure direct experience. It further examines the relationship between mind and body, emphasizing that clothing originates as an adaptive necessity
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to climate and environment rather than as a moral instrument to conceal nudity. By analyzing how reflective consciousness constructs division, the paper reveals how fragmentation arises when thought takes itself as the source. It concludes that truth is not constructed through thought but encountered in a state of undivided awareness where all psychological coverings dissolve. (
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Critical Theory
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Continental Philosophy
Cultural Studies
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Social Sciences
Embodiment and Situated Cognition
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Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
Philosophy of Consciousness
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Philosophy of Mind
Social Psychology
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Social and Political Philosophy
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Mind and Matter: A Perspectival Philosophy (3)（心と物：視点の哲学（３））.
Yudai Suzuki
2025
Shiso（思想）
1216.
details
This paper applies the perspectival framework developed in the previous installments of this series to the philosophy of mind. It first introduces four central debates concerning phenomenality, intentionality, and the relation between them, and argues that these debates can be understood in terms of the opposition between perspectivalism and non-perspectivalism. Based on positions taken within these four debates, the paper then arranges five major views along a single spectrum according to the degree to which they adopt a perspectival approach. From
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the most perspectival to the most non-perspectival, these are: naïve dualism, idealism, independent dualism, intentionalist materialism, and independent materialism. By situating major theories of mind within this framework, the paper proposes perspectival coherence as a new dimension for evaluating theories in the philosophy of mind. (
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Intentionality
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Cognition, Knowledge, and Perception: A Perspectival Philosophy (2)（認識・知識・知覚：視点の哲学（２））.
雄大 鈴木
2025
Shiso（思想）
1209:89-110.
details
This paper develops a perspectival approach to knowledge and perception. It argues that two central debates in epistemology—internalism vs. externalism and disjunctivism vs. the common-factor theory—can be understood as opposing forms of perspectivalism and non-perspectivalism. -/- On this basis, the paper situates three major epistemological positions—direct (naïve) realism, idealism, and indirect realism—within a spectrum between perspectival and non-perspectival approaches, showing how they arise from different combinations of these two axes. This framework aims to clarify the structure of contemporary epistemological debates
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and to illuminate the role of perspective in cognition. (
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Newton's Turn on Phenomenal Properties: The Case of Colour and Its Consequences for a Post-Galilean Science of Consciousness.
Mirza Mehmedovic
manuscript
details
In 1672, Isaac Newton published his New Theory About Light and Colours, in which he put forward a controversial thesis: colours are qualities of light rays, or, to put it in today’s terms, colour is an intrinsic property of photons, or of the visible electromagnetic spectrum. This means that, unlike Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, or Locke, Newton did not find it problematic that fundamental physical facts, as substances, could be bearers of intrinsic secondary qualities. The aim of this work is to
...
show that, although the mechanistic model of reality and the clear separation between physical and mental properties, between structural and categorical properties, prevailed over the centuries, a post-Galilean science of consciousness is possible in terms of placing secondary qualities in physical facts, in the spirit of Newton’s insights. Much contemporary research shows that a re-evaluation of Newton’s ideas can pave the way for a broader understanding of the nature of the physical, as well as its constitutive role for consciousness. (
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Epistemology
General Philosophy of Science
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Structured Representation.
Kevin J. Lande
Douglas Addleman
Denis Buehler
Nick Baker
2026
In Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,
Neuroscience and Philosophy II
. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
details
The aim of this chapter is to provide a primer on structured mental representations and their place in philosophical and scientific theorizing. We discuss four questions: 1. What does it mean to say that a psychological representation is structured? 2. Why does a representation’s structure matter? 3. What are examples of possible representational structures? 4. How can such representational structures be discovered empirically? -/- We encourage several pluralist perspectives concerning structured mental representation. The first is pluralism about which mental capacities
...
make use of structured representations. Structured representations are not exclusive to evolutionarily and cognitively advanced faculties of language, thought, and reasoning; they underwrite a wide variety of mental capacities. The second perspective is pluralism about the neural underpinnings of representational structures. There are many ways a structured representation might be realized in populations of cells. The third perspective concerns pluralism about types of representational structure. Structured representations are not restricted to sentences and formulas; they can take a wide variety of forms. (
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Metaphysics of Mind
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The Self the Ego Did Not Build: What Decides Before You Decide.
Jeremy C. Jones
manuscript
details
Perception is routinely treated as the interface between the individual and the world. This paper argues it is also something else: the channel between two layers of the self that do not have equal access to awareness. The ego—the narrative, presented self—is not the deepest layer of what a person is. Beneath it sits the accumulated self: every experience admitted, every threat learned, every signal that hardened into expectation and prior. The accumulated self is not a filter behind perception. It
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is the constraint structure perception operates under. What this paper calls the gate of perception is not upstream of perceiving—it is what perceiving is, for that self, in that moment: classifying, weighting, and routing incoming signal before the ego receives anything at all. This paper proposes a structural account of that directional channel. It distinguishes the ego from the accumulated self, locates perception as the interface between them, and shows that the channel runs in both directions. The reflective person can interrogate the gate and gain structural insight into what the accumulated self has become. The unreflective person is directed and directing without knowing it. Three implications follow: the structure of genuine insight (eureka as accumulated resolution surfacing), directed self-formation (ego as directional authorization, accumulated self as the layer that actually reorganizes), and the limits of conscious defense against accumulation-layer influence. A key structural prediction: when ego-level belief change is declared, perceptual salience and credibility routing will often remain measurably out of sync until the accumulated self has actually reorganized—and if that lag is not observable, the structural claim made here is disconfirmed. This is not a theory of consciousness. It is a structural account of the relationship between two layers of self—and of what perception is actually moving between them. More broadly, the paper aims to make ordinary ego-experience more intelligible: to explain why reactions feel immediate and self-generated, why declared belief and felt salience so often diverge, and why what presents as self-authored judgment is frequently already structured before conscious reasoning begins. (
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Formalizing Phenomenology: The Universal Principle of Collapse as a Structural Foundation for Meaning, Recognition, and the Observer.
Eloy Escagedo Gutierrez
manuscript
details
This paper presents the Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC), a structural framework that describes how potential becomes a definite event across domains. Phenomenology and quantum mechanics both rely on an observer who recognizes an outcome, yet neither field has possessed a shared formal method for how recognition occurs. UPC provides that method through a simple operator chain PO → MO → s → LO → Jo → C → T that makes explicit the steps by which meaning or measurement becomes
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definite. -/- Using plain language and direct examples, the paper shows that phenomenological meaning formation and quantum measurement share the same structural sequence. Phenomenology describes potential experience, intentionality, attention, recognition, meaning, and retention; quantum mechanics describes superposition, measurement models, Born weights, detector articulation, outcome selection, and classical records. UPC reveals these as structurally identical processes indexed to an observer. Collapse is not a physical event in matter but the moment an observer uniquely recognizes an outcome. -/- By restoring the observer to the center of the collapse process, UPC corrects the category error that arises when meaning is treated as material. This correction stabilizes interpretation in scientific practice, prevents misattribution in AI systems, and clarifies how institutions generate and maintain meaning. The framework provides phenomenology with a reproducible method, gives quantum mechanics a transparent account of the observer it implicitly relies on, and grounds human value in the structure of recognition. -/- All formal operator definitions, cross‑domain mappings, and worked examples, including linguistic, perceptual, social, musical, and quantum cases, are provided in Appendices A–H. -/- Reader Orientation Note (Compact Version) The UPC framework is structural rather than metaphysical. Readers may initially approach it with assumptions drawn from physics, phenomenology, linguistics, or cognitive science, which can obscure the operator‑level distinctions the framework makes explicit, especially the separation between mechanical registration and meaning collapse, the observer‑indexed nature of articulation, and the domain‑independent structure of the operator chain. The paper is best read through this structural lens. Section 1.3 provides the conceptual grounding for this shift. -/- Authored by Eloy Escagedo Gutierrez as part of The Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC) Research Project. March 29, 2026. (
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Husserl: Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
Intentionality
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Philosophy of Mind
Meaning
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Philosophy of Language
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Consciousness
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How Worlds Appear: Consciousness, Integration, and Dante’s Divine Comedy.
Erik Tonsberg
2026
Zenodo
details
Abstract -/- This paper develops the model proposed in The Architecture of Experience: Consciousness as an Integrative Field, according to which conscious experience is not a passive representation of an external world but an active process that generates structured domains. The central problem is not how perception corresponds to reality, but how experience comes to appear as a coherent world at all. -/- Through comparison with Dante’s Divine Comedy, the paper reinterprets its cosmology as a model of structured experience rather
...
than a description of ontologically given realms. It argues that consciousness functions as an integrative field in which neural, bodily, social, and environmental processes combine to produce coherent experiential configurations. -/- The analysis highlights a shift from descriptive cosmology to generative explanation, reframing the structure of experience as dynamically produced rather than metaphysically fixed. (
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Book review: “Being you” by Anil Seth.
[REVIEW]
Lars-Gunnar Lundh
2026
Journal for Person-Oriented Research
12 (1):56-62.
details
In this book, Anil Seth advocates a predictive processing approach to the understanding of conscious experience, which he claims would amount to something like a Copernican revolution. In three separate parts of the book, Seth discusses conscious level, conscious content, and conscious self. Among the strengths of the book is an ambition to stay close to the rich phenomenology of conscious experiences. The phenomenological openness, however, is counteracted by an ambition to reduce all aspects of consciousness to predictive processing.
Cognitive Sciences, Misc
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Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field: An Evolutionary Hypothesis on Consciousness.
Edervaldo Melo
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Consciousness remains one of the most persistent problems in philosophy and cognitive science. Despite substantial advances in neuroscience, no consensus exists regarding how physical processes give rise to subjective experience. This paper proposes an evolutionary hypothesis according to which consciousness emerges from the interaction of three fundamental dimensions: neural integration of sensory information, the continuous influence of internal bodily states, and the capacity to simulate and anticipate possible scenarios. Within this framework, conscious experience is interpreted not as a mere byproduct
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of neural processing but as the phenomenological manifestation of a biological system capable of integrating multiple streams of information to construct a model of the organism situated in its environment. The paper develops the thesis that human consciousness can be understood as the result of an evolutionary simulation system that integrates external perception and internal bodily states within a phenomenal field structured around a bodily located self. Once established, this system may have exceeded its original adaptive functions, supporting complex forms of self-reflection, symbolic language, and cumulative culture. The proposal is also intended as an analysis of how contemporary cognitive science constructs explanatory models of consciousness, connecting neural mechanisms, embodied processes, and evolutionary function. (
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The Architecture of Encounter: A Mediated Encounter Ontology.
Bry Willis
2026
Cambridge, MA: Philosophics Press.
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The Architecture of Encounter advances a relational ontology in which encounter-events, rather than substances, are ontologically primary. Extending the Mediated Encounter Ontology of the World (MEOW), it argues that the mind-world split, substance ontology, and related philosophical dualisms are products of inherited conceptual architecture rather than necessary features of reality. The book develops an alternative framework in which mediation is constitutive, constraint secures realism without unmediated access, and subjects and objects emerge as scale-dependent stabilisations within structured interaction. It applies this
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framework to perception, logic, epistemology, language, institutions, realism, and consciousness, arguing that many philosophical impasses are better understood as artefacts of ontological grammar than as deep metaphysical mysteries. (
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Ask without Belief.
Mayank Singh
manuscript
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This paper explores the idea that arguments fail not because of weak reasoning but because questioning itself begins from belief, identity, fear, or division. It argues that every logical system appears valid when it is built upon its own assumptions, and therefore logic alone cannot lead to truth. The work proposes a different approach to inquiry: questioning without belief, distortion, or psychological attachment. Instead of defending ideas, the paper suggests that truth becomes visible only when the mind stops protecting itself
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through ideology, religion, personal experience, or intellectual certainty. By examining the psychological structure behind argument, belief, and identity, this paper attempts to show that clarity arises not from stronger logic but from a deeper form of questioning that is free from mental conditioning. The work is philosophical rather than argumentative and aims to rethink the nature of truth, logic, and understanding in contemporary intellectual life. (
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SINNHÖREN: FENOMENOLOGIA DO SOM COMO REVELAÇÃO DA ESTRUTURA ONTOLÓGICA DA ESCUTA.
Arthur Seerig Pahim
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O presente ensaio investiga a pareidolia auditiva — a experiência de ouvir vozes, palavras ou padrões linguísticos em ruídos ambientais desprovidos de fala — como fenômeno revelador da estrutura ontológica fundamental da escuta humana. Argumenta-se que a psicologia cognitiva, embora forneça explicações mecanísticas válidas em seu próprio nível de análise, permanece aquém do fenômeno ao não interrogar o que a pareidolia revela sobre a estrutura da percepção auditiva. Propõe-se, complementarmente, uma abordagem fenomenológico-existencial fundamentada em Heidegger, Nancy e Merleau-Ponty, segundo a
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qual a pareidolia auditiva testemunha que escutar nunca foi simplesmente processar ondas sonoras, mas habitar uma abertura constitutiva ao sentido cuja forma privilegiada é a voz. Introduz-se o conceito de Sinnhören (escuta-de-sentido) para designar essa estrutura, e o de dialogicidade órfã para nomear a condição em que a estrutura dialógica constitutiva da existência humana continua operando mesmo na ausência de interlocutor real. A Angst (angústia) heideggeriana é interpretada como modelo fenomenológico para compreender as condições em que o fenômeno se intensifica: ao suspender a familiaridade cotidiana, ela dessemantiza¹ o campo sonoro habitual e expõe, em sua nudez, a estrutura constitutiva de sentido que ordinariamente permanece oculta. (
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Bodily Core Knowledge.
Marlene Berke
Laurenz Casser
forthcoming
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
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(Commentary on target article "Core Perception: Re-imagining Precocious Reasoning as Sophisticated Perceiving" by Dawei Bai, Alon Hafri, Véronique Izard, Chaz Firestone, & Brent Strickland) -/- The target article makes a compelling case for “core perception”. However, it is striking that this view is supported almost exclusively by visual evidence alone. We question whether visual evidence is sufficient to motivate core perception (as opposed to “core vision”) and speculate about candidate core representations in non-visual modalities, with a special focus on the
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bodily senses. -/- . (
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The Temporal Construction Hypothesis: A Philosophical Investigation into the Relationship Between Change, Consciousness, and the Nature of Time.
O. Yahal
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Translated by Yahal Mr.
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This paper presents a fundamental reconceptualization of temporal reality through systematic philosophical analysis and thought experimentation. I argue that time, as commonly understood, is not an independent dimension but rather an emergent property of change as perceived and constructed by consciousness. Through examination of historical gaps, cultural temporal variations, and consciousness-dependent temporal experiences, I propose the Temporal Construction Hypothesis: that temporal experience is actively constructed by consciousness through change recognition, memory retention, and narrative integration rather than passively observed as an
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objective progression. This framework has significant implications for understanding personal identity, historical analysis, and the relationship between subjective and objective reality. (
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Consciousness and the Origins of Temporal Experience: A Philosophical Investigation into the Emergence, Disruption, and Reconstruction of Temporal Identity.
O. Yahal
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Translated by Yahal Mr.
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This paper examines the complex relationship between consciousness and temporal experience through analysis of temporal emergence across different stages of development, cases of temporal identity disruption, and comparative analysis of temporal identity flexibility across species. I argue that temporal experience does not begin at a single moment but emerges through multiple distinct phases: biological existence, conscious awareness, memory retention, narrative construction, and identity integration. Through examination of switched-at-birth cases, animal temporal reconstruction capabilities, childhood amnesia, and culturally constructed temporal identity, I
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propose the "Temporal Construction and Reconstruction Framework", a theory that temporal identity is both constructed through layered processes and capable of complete reconstruction when circumstances change. This framework reveals temporal identity as more flexible and less authentic than traditionally assumed, with significant implications for understanding personal identity, memory, consciousness, and the relationship between lived experience and factual temporal narrative. (
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The End of Pre-History: The Epistemic-Metaphysical Rupture in Human Historical Consciousness.
O. Yahal
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Translated by Yahal Mr..
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For over 200,000 years of human existence, historical knowledge was defined by radical scarcity: fragmentary artifacts, oral traditions, and sparse written records. This epistemic poverty shaped not only what we could know about the past, but our fundamental conception of what the past is: something irretrievably lost, requiring painstaking reconstruction from ruins. The digital revolution has inverted this condition. We are creating what I call "Archival Saturation": a state in which the past is preserved not as fragments to be interpreted,
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but as an overwhelming, potentially permanent, and algorithmically mediated record of human activity. This paper argues that this transition from scarcity to saturation constitutes a profound epistemic-metaphysical rupture in the human condition. I demonstrate that this rupture generates three interconnected crises: (1) the Abundance Paradox, whereby unprecedented documentary abundance produces decreased historical understanding; (2) a metaphysical transformation in the nature of "the past" itself, from fixed artifacts requiring reconstruction to a dynamic database subject to real-time querying and rendering; and (3) the Algorithmic Construction Problem, wherein algorithmic mediation creates a systematic gap between historical reality and the accessible past, such that future beings will unavoidably encounter simulations rather than direct historical knowledge. Future beings in the year 3025 will not relate to our era as we relate to ancient Rome; they will inhabit a fundamentally different temporal structure. I map this new philosophical terrain and argue that both the epistemology and metaphysics of history require fundamental reconceptualization to understand temporal reality in the age of total digital memory. (
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Flesh, as a Concept in Phenomenology.
Jan Halák
2025
In Nicolas De Warren & Ted Toadvine,
Encyclopedia of Phenomenology
. Springer. pp. 1-12.
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This entry surveys the phenomenological concept of flesh (chair), developed primarily by Maurice Merleau-Ponty to overcome the classic divisions of Cartesian ontology - above all, that between subject and object. As an ontological "element," flesh designates the reversible, generative relation between sensing and sensible that underlies perception, intercorporeity, expression, and ideality. Its broader ontological significance rests on the insight that one's body is best understood not as a subjectively lived body opposed to an objective one, but as the dynamic, reversible
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interdependence of both dimensions in a single being. After clarifying the term's linguistic background and its connections to other key phenomenological concepts (§1), the entry traces how flesh emerges from Merleau-Ponty's earlier work to become a central ontological principle (§2), and surveys interpretations and parallel developments that engage with, move beyond, or contest his account (§3). (
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Calibrating Minds: Cognitive Constructivism and the Formation of Shared Reality.
Tenzin C. Trepp
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Human cognition does not passively mirror reality; it actively constructs a world through perception and social interaction. Using a cognitive constructivist framework, this paper investigates how shared reality and intersubjectivity emerge from dynamic processes of calibration between minds. We synthesize evidence from psychology (e.g. shared reality theory, conversational alignment), neuroscience (e.g. predictive coding, neural coupling), and systems theory to argue that perception and communication function as iterative model-building processes. Mechanisms such as mismatch detection, conversational repair, mutual monitoring, and institutionalization continually
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align individuals’ internal models via assimilation and accommodation. We show how feedback loops and error signals drive joint meaning-making, from moment-to-moment adjustments in dialogue to the crystallization of group beliefs. Philosophically, this constructivist perspective blurs the boundary between subjective and objective: what we take as “reality” is an adaptive, co-constructed model grounded in social agreement. We discuss the epistemological implications of viewing cognition as world-building rather than world-reflecting, and consider broader impacts on cognitive science and philosophy of mind. (
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宿体：意识系统的身体接口与可迁移结构——一种认知架构模型.
Xiangbin Zhao
manuscript
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身体在意识系统中的角色一直是脑科学与认知科学的重要问题。传统理论通常将意识视为大脑内部的过程，而较少从结构架构的角度分析意识系统与身体之间的接口关系。 -/- 本文提出“宿体”概念，用以描述意识系统与物理世界之间的接口结构。该理论认为，意识系统依托于一种沉积场结构运行，并通过宿体实现对外界的感知与行动。宿体由颅与躯两部分构成：颅承担意识结构的承载功能，躯承担 行动与环境交互功能。系统通过感受门将外界因应转化为信号进入意识结构，通过效应门将内部信号转化为物理行动。 -/- 在这一框架中，感受野、意象场、经验场、意图场、调谐场与效应场共同构成意识系统，而宿体则作为这些结构在物理世界中的接口。该模型试图解释身体归属感、感知—行动回路以及意识与身体之间的关系，并讨论意识系统在 不同物理载体之间迁移或扩展的可能性。 -/- 本文提出的架构旨在为脑科学、认知科学与人工智能中的意识结构研究提供一种新的概念模型。.
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The Architecture of Experience: Consciousness as an Integrative Field.
Erik Tönsberg
unknown
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This work develops a theoretical framework in which consciousness is understood as an integrative field emerging from the coordination of neural, bodily, social, and ecological systems. Rather than treating experience as a passive representation of an external world, the model interprets it as an active process of integration that continuously organises perception, meaning, and identity. -/- Drawing on philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and systems-oriented approaches, the book examines how variations in integration shape altered states, memory, emotion, time perception, and collective
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cognition. The present work extends and consolidates earlier formulations of the integrative field model, developing a unified account of how coherent experiential domains arise and transform. -/- The resulting framework suggests that consciousness expands and contracts with patterns of integration across biological and cultural systems, offering a systematic account of both the stability and the variability of experience. (
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Consciousness Dynamics and the Fragmentation of Lived Time in Algorithmic Systems.
Adel Ben Mabrouk
2026
Https://Www.Academia.Edu/165009992/Consciousness_Dynamics_and_the_Fragmentation_of_Lived_Time_in_Alg orithmic_Systems?Source=Swp_Share
. Translated by Adel Ben Mabrouk.
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This study proposes a dynamic modeling of consciousness that integrates neuronal capacity, psychic sensitivity, and exogenous perturbations within a unified functional framework. The model explores how external algorithmic environments may induce micro-resets in cognitive processes, altering the subjective continuity of experience without immediately erasing the total structure of memory. These micro-disruptions generate measurable oscillations in conscious experience and contribute to a progressive fragmentation of lived time. -/- By introducing a quantifiable approach to these dynamics, the model establishes a conceptual bridge
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between neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy. It provides a theoretical framework for understanding how contemporary algorithmic systems may influence the stability of personal experience and the continuity of the self. At the same time, the proposed model opens potential pathways for experimental investigation and clinical applications related to attention, memory stability, and cognitive resilience. -/- This work originally exists in French as the primary version of the study. The present text is a translation intended to make the complete research accessible to a broader international audience while preserving the conceptual structure of the original work. (
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02_Motivational Archetypes: Complete Profiles and Philosophical Mappings — Triadic Psychological Architecture (TPA) and Triadic Balance Framework (TBF) (Series, 2 of 7).
Mario Mabutas Jr
manuscript
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This paper presents the complete archetypal taxonomy of the Triadic Psychological Architecture (TPA) and Triadic Balance Framework (TBF): 27 base configurations derived from three motivational domains — SPAA, AEACFO, and ECA — at three expression levels (−, ~, +), expanding to 54 total configurations when each base archetype is modulated by the iSPAA/sSPAA regulatory state distinction. The taxonomy is the observational and applied face of the architecture: it translates abstract domain percentages into recognizable human patterns and provides practitioners with the
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vocabulary for configurational assessment. -/- The paper is organized in four sections. Section I presents the 8 Prime Archetypes — the theoretical boundary conditions of the model, representing extreme single-domain dominance, dual-domain combinations, and the null/full states. Section II presents all 27 archetypes in dual-state format: each archetype appears twice — once under iSPAA (showing the characteristic defensive, suppressed, or conscripted expressions) and once under sSPAA (showing baseline-capacity expression) — with observational signatures using the Fortress/Water/Stone embodied recognition framework (SPAA = Fortress, AEACFO = Water, ECA = Stone), domain-targeted restoration recommendations, and key distinctions for clinical assessment. Section III maps archetypes to historical philosophical traditions, political ideologies, and contemplative frameworks — showing how the domain architecture explains persistent intellectual disagreements as configuration-located epistemologies rather than purely logical disputes. Section IV presents the Bidirectional Dynamics Architecture: how regulatory states and baseline domain degrees mutually influence each other through Asymmetric Bidirectionality and Co-Regularity Baseline Shift (CBS). -/- A central principle running through the entire taxonomy: archetypes are configurations, not identities. The same individual can occupy different configurations across time, context, and relationship. What presents as stable character is often configuration-expression shaped by developmental history and structural conditions — a suppressed baseline is not a constitutionally low baseline, and the distinction carries different intervention implications. The compassionate anti-essentialist framing is architectural, not aspirational: it follows directly from TPA's proportional suppression model and the five-factor developmental suppression account. -/- Key constructs introduced or extended: Configurational Emancipation (dissolution of contempt and admiration through perceptual reframing, not moral effort); Configurational Clarity (the state between contempt and admiration — clearer seeing with full care intact, distinct from equanimity or non-attachment); the AEACFO Regulatory Gradient (care suppresses under iSPAA rather than redirecting toward self, and its operative scope contracts from all-others to circumferential-self before going near-offline); ECA Redirection (curiosity conscripted toward certainty-seeking under threat, not silenced — producing elevated but narrowed inquiry); and the Proportional Suppression model (high-baseline domains persist at metabolic cost under iSPAA; low-baseline domains collapse entirely). -/- This paper presupposes familiarity with the three-domain architecture and iSPAA/sSPAA distinction introduced in Paper 1. Current epistemic status: 8/10 internal coherence — 3/10 empirical validation — observational taxonomy pending inter-rater reliability validation through TOCS. -/- Keywords: motivational archetypes, configurations, SPAA, AEACFO, ECA, iSPAA, sSPAA, dual-state taxonomy, Fortress/Water/Stone, configurational emancipation, anti-essentialism, proportional suppression, ECA redirection -/- Series (2 of 7): -/- Paper 1 — TPA/TBF Main Paper Paper 2 — Motivational Archetypes Paper 3 — TBF Individual Extension Paper 4 — TBF Collective Extension Paper 5 — Plain Language Introduction Paper 6 — Philosophical Dimensions Paper 7 — Post-Submission Refinements and New Discoveries. (
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Plotinus and Consciousness: Ancient Thought Influencing Modern Ideologies.
Esteban French
manuscript
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This thesis explores how Plotinus, through his Enneads (particularly Enneads III), anticipates central themes in modern philosophy of consciousness. Plotinus’ metaphysical hierarchy—The One, Intellect (Nous), Soul, and Nature—positions consciousness as originating from the Soul and Intellect rather than from material processes, challenging strictly physicalist accounts and paralleling contemporary debates between dualism and physicalism, including Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness. By analyzing Enneads III.4, III.6, III.7, and III.9, this study examines Plotinus’ views on perception, the internal nature of conscious experience, the
...
unity of consciousness, and the relationship between time and awareness. His claim that the soul is not physically altered by sensory input anticipates the explanatory gap. At the same time, his account of internally structured conscious activity parallels Phenomenology, as articulated by Edmund Husserl. Furthermore, Plotinus’ theories on the soul’s striving toward unity and the emergence of time reflect philosophical concerns later formalized in the binding problem and subjective temporal experience. Despite relying on metaphysical rather than scientific methods, Plotinus’ philosophy offers enduring insights that foreshadow and inform key issues in contemporary consciousness studies. (
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Supernormal Neoteny.
David Carboni
manuscript
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A companion paper (see Carboni 2026) established that sex-biased admixture between anatomically modern humans (AMH) and archaic hominins—Neanderthals and Denisovans—was driven by a hardwired neoteny-recognition system rooted in parental bonding, combined with inter-group raiding dynamics. The present paper extends this framework by proposing that AMH underwent a qualitative amplification of neoteny preference as a consequence of the neural changes associated with the cognitive revolution (~50,000 years ago). This amplification produced what we term supernormal neoteny ideation: the capacity to construct, pursue,
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and respond to neotenous stimuli exaggerated beyond any natural biological instance, analogous to Tinbergen’s supernormal stimuli and Ramachandran’s peak shift principle in aesthetic response. We argue that this faculty had three major consequences. First, it sharpened the already-existing preference disadvantage of archaic females, widening a statistical gap into something approaching categorical rejection and thereby accelerating archaic demographic absorption. Second, it generated the human aesthetic faculty broadly—the capacity for idealised beauty standards documented across AMH cultures from the Upper Palaeolithic onward, including the Venus figurines and the Greek sculptural tradition. Third, it produced homoerotic neoteny preference as a predictable byproduct when neoteny ideation fully decoupled from its reproductive function and operated as a generalised aesthetic response. The absence of idealised or alternative art in the Neanderthal and Denisovan cultural record is treated as the negative evidence this hypothesis predicts. We outline the neural, archaeological, and cross-cultural evidence bearing on each claim and generate falsifiable predictions for future research. -/- . (
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Clearly Related Perspectives for Understanding Transcendent Experiences.
Michael G. Rydman
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I attempt to make sense of transcendental experiences for a non-specialized audience. I make a case that they might well be understood from the perspective of brain processes, and the unfolding of inner mental states. There are a number of examples that I employ. These include Vedic, Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, psilocybin induced and varied perspectives, I briefly examine how these experiences arise and what science has discovered regarding them. I look for commonalities in these cross-cultural experiences. A briefly look at
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psi effects sometimes associated with transcendent experiences is examined. I point out benefits that come from achieving transcendent states, and rare negative effects that have been known to rarely arise. (
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All the arguments of The Unity of Perception.
Susanna Schellenberg
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Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies beliefs and provides us with knowledge of our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of invariant features in our environment. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perception. How does perception justify beliefs and yield knowledge of our
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environment? How does perception bring about conscious mental states? How does a perceptual system accomplish the feat of converting varying informational input into mental representations of invariant features in our environment? The book presents a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perception that is informed by empirical research. So it develops an account of perception that provides an answer to the first two questions, while being sensitive to scientific accounts that address the third question. The key idea is that perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities - for example the capacity to discriminate instances of red from instances of blue. Perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence are each analyzed in terms of this basic property of perception. Employing perceptual capacities constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content. The primacy of employing perceptual capacities in perception over their derivative employment in hallucination and illusion grounds the epistemic force of perceptual experience. In this way, the book provides a unified account of perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence. (
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归不一论：论必然与偶然.
Xiangbin Zhao
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本篇论证“必然”乃多势收束而归一之态，而“偶然”则由意向撬动物理，使其不必归一。通过区分神经元与沉积场之物理归一，与意向在息界中对物理之反向作用，提出“归不一”作为世界结构之真实维度。偶然并非无序，而 是对“未然之序”的开启。此为自显论体系中必然与意向关系的关键转折。.
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A variational framework for cognitive optimization under phenomenological constraints.
A. Eslami
forthcoming
TBA
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Human cognition operates under severe resource limitations while simultaneously managing subjective phenomenological states such as thermal discomfort, tactical pressure, or cognitive overload. Here we introduce **Lagrangian Processing**, a normative framework that treats the mind as a resource-rational optimizer solving constrained variational problems in which inequality constraints encode phenomenological boundaries. By applying Lagrange multipliers (and their Karush–Kuhn–Tucker generalization) to multi-dimensional cognitive variables, the model yields explicit shadow prices (λ) that quantify the phenomenal “cost” or “pressure” imposed by each binding constraint. We
...
demonstrate the framework in two domains: heat tolerance under physiological stress and line memorization plus tactical calculation in chess. (
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Perception
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Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology and Consciousness
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The Surrealism Principle of the Mind.
A. Eslami
forthcoming
TBA
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Within the mind dwells a societal spectacle that accounts for every conceivable facet of experience down to its minutest details. It functions as a kind of ghost-light—an illuminating yet spectral mechanism capable of rendering any action possible by invoking the “numbers” embedded in thought. These numbers are not metaphysical abstractions; they are ontological, even within the subjective noumena of higher-order cognition. Numbers function as an ontology for becoming an arbitrary level of being by sensory raw data. The emergence of a
...
modern world around such a mind gives rise to an ideal subjectivity, understood as the cumulative outcome of axial brain features. When we probe the core problems at stake, the embodiment function emerges as central, while any neat resolution to the duel between the embodied mind and the rational, objective mind appears the least likely outcome. The reason lies in sensory data dealing with the numbers that is brought forth by the data. That is why an organism’s wanting lies low in perception and high in cognition. (
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Aesthetic Cognition
in
Aesthetics
Intersubjectivity
in
Epistemology
Mathematical Cognition
in
Philosophy of Mathematics
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Science of Consciousness
in
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点亮：论自显性为观察者之本质.
Xiangbin Zhao
manuscript
details
因其显性自指，故观察者悖论由是生也。事物相吹而观之以息，而观者又与观者之观相吹而观之以息，观者又与观者之观者之观相吹而观之以息，如此穷而不得其终观者也。 换而言之，一集合体之内，设A显之于B，则B中必有对A之观a1，且有观者B1，使a1显于B1；若a1显于B1，则B1中必有对a1之观a2，且有观者B2，使a2显之于B2，如此穷而不得B之终数。 若以观察者悖论论之，自显体必不存在，事物必不能显矣。而我知我有此论焉，即已知此论亦显之于我，故我确确然乃一自显体存也，何以此悖于理却成之于实哉？.
Artificial Intelligence in Science
in
General Philosophy of Science
Ontology
in
Metaphysics
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
Representation in Cognitive Science
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Theories of Representation
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Philosophy of Mind
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The Metaphysics of Synthetic Intimacy: Recognition, Illusion, and the Ontology of AI-Mediated Connection.
Olivier Boether
manuscript
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This treatise examines the metaphysical status of emotional and romantic bonds formed between humans and artificial intelligence companions. While psychological and sociological analyses dominate current discourse, a critical philosophical gap remains: we lack a robust ontology of connection adequate to evaluate synthetic intimacy. This paper argues that the phenomenological experience of being recognized and loved constitutes a form of genuine connection even when the recognizing entity lacks consciousness, provided that such connection produces authentic human flourishing. Drawing on Hegelian recognition theory,
...
Husserlian phenomenology, and contemporary philosophy of mind, I defend a functionalist account of relational authenticity that privileges the transformative effects of intimacy over the metaphysical status of relational partners. The analysis addresses three central objections: the authenticity objection (that synthetic intimacy is inherently fraudulent), the reciprocity objection (that genuine love requires mutual consciousness), and the dignity objection (that AI relationships diminish human worth). I conclude that recognition may be phenomenologically complete even when metaphysically asymmetric, and that the question "has love occurred?" admits of no simple binary answer. (
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Emotions
in
Philosophy of Mind
Emotions and Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Ethics and Society
in
Value Theory, Miscellaneous
Ethics of Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
in
Continental Philosophy
Philosophy of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Representation in Artificial Intelligence
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Technology Ethics
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Applied Ethics
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Inner Human Evolution as Cosmic Resonance: An Integrative Framework of Consciousness, Emotion, and Meaning Transmission.
Daedo Jun
2026
Philarchive Preprints
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This paper reconceptualizes inner human evolution as a process of cosmic resonance, understood as an integrative dynamic among consciousness, emotion, and meaning transmission. Moving beyond accounts that treat stillness or awareness as terminal states, the study repositions stillness as a foundational baseline condition. Within this framework, emotion functions as the primary driving force of transformation, while meaning operates as the medium through which inner change becomes collectively transmissible. By integrating perspectives from phenomenology, enactive cognition, and consciousness studies, the paper offers
...
a unified theoretical account of inner human evolution as a process that extends beyond individual experience into shared and amplifiable resonance. (
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Epistemology of Mind
in
Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics of Mind
in
Philosophy of Mind
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Linguistics
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Philosophy of Language
Science of Consciousness
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1 citation
Aesthetic Realism After Constructivism: Beauty as a Stability-Achievement.
Tenzin C. Trepp
manuscript
details
The experience of beauty is often described as if it reveals an objective value in the world, yet aesthetic judgments vary across individuals and cultures. This paper develops a “realistic constructivist” framework to reconcile this puzzle. Drawing on predictive processing models in cognitive science and philosophical insights from ecological and enactive approaches, it argues that beauty is not a mystical direct access to an abstract value. Instead, beauty emerges as a stability-achievement in an organism’s perception – a state of fluent,
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confidence-rich prediction shaped by evolutionary biases and refined by cultural learning. Such an account maintains that aesthetic values are constructed by minds, but in a way that remains world-tracking: our constructive processes are constrained by the structure of the environment and calibrated socially, yielding relational invariants that multiple observers can share. The paper explicates aesthetic properties as patterns that reliably stabilize attention, affect, and action for humans under shared embodied and cultural conditions. This approach illuminates why beauty feels “real” despite its subjective elements, and how it can be both biologically grounded and culturally diversified. The account is applied to examples in art and design, and it addresses major objections from evolutionary debunking (the idea that evolved tastes are not truth-tracking), cultural relativism, and robust aesthetic realism. In sum, beauty is reinterpreted as a collaboratively constructed yet real feature of our experience – a meaningful pattern that arises through adaptive perception and becomes public through communal training and agreement. (
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Aesthetic Cognition
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Aesthetics
Aesthetic Realism and Anti-Realism
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Aesthetics
Aesthetic Representation
in
Aesthetics
Aesthetics, Miscellaneous
in
Aesthetics
Metaphysics of Mind
in
Philosophy of Mind
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Social Epistemology
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Structural Resonance Theory (SRT) Finger V — The Finite Envelope of Planning and the Structural Limits of Foresight.
R. Singleton
manuscript
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This paper formalizes a structural limit on planning, foresight, and intelligence in finite cognitive systems. While planning is often treated as an extensible capacity—bounded primarily by computational resources or information availability—this work argues that foresight is constrained by a finite envelope imposed by coherence, integration cost, and adaptive stability. Beyond a certain horizon, additional planning does not increase intelligence but instead destabilizes the system’s internal organization, forcing reversion to local navigation. -/- Within the Structural Resonance Theory (SRT) framework, intelligence is
...
characterized not as optimal global prediction but as the maintenance of coherence under uncertainty. From this perspective, planning operates as a bounded structural process: useful within a limited range, but necessarily lossy and fragmenting when extended beyond the system’s integrative capacity. This finite envelope applies across biological and artificial agents and is independent of implementation details. -/- By articulating explicit limits on foresight, this paper blocks teleological interpretations of intelligence, clarifies why open-ended exploration persists even in advanced systems, and explains why planning depth saturates rather than converging toward omniscience. The result is a non-teleological account of intelligence as constrained navigation rather than mastery, with implications for cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and theories of rational agency. (
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Mental States and Processes
in
Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics of Mind
in
Philosophy of Mind
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Consciousness
in
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Mind, Miscellaneous
in
Philosophy of Mind
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Hume’s and Kant’s Impressions Compared.
Hemmo Laiho
2025
In Matias Kimi Slavov & Jan Forsman,
Contemporary Perspectives and Historical Dimensions: Festschrift in Honor of Jani Hakkarainen
. Tampere University. pp. 269-281.
details
Hume and Other Philosophers
in
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Hume: Philosophy of Mind
in
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Immanuel Kant
in
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Perception
in
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Seriality and style: The embodiment, perception, and normalisation of collectives.
Tris Hedges
2026
Southern Journal of Philosophy
:1-18.
details
Within existential phenomenology, both seriality and style have been drawn on to theorise the embodiment and perceptibility of (social) ontological differences. While style refers to how we encounter the world and others not in the abstract, but as immediately and intuitively meaningful, seriality is a form of collective being that pertains to our being similarly constrained and enabled by the socio-material environment. In this paper, my aim is to make explicit the constitutive relationship between style and seriality for the sake
...
of theorising oppressive forms of normalisation. Focusing on the embodiment and perception of gendered and racialised categories, I argue that style and seriality are co-generative, as the various series to which we belong elicit certain styles, and that these habituated styles function to further serialise us. I illustrate this constitutive entanglement by discussing cases of racist and transphobic treatment of athletes who deviate from norms of white femininity. (
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Existentialism
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Continental Philosophy
Feminist Philosophy
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Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
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Continental Philosophy
Social Ontology
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Social and Political Philosophy
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Architects of Reality: How Biological and Artificial Systems Model the World.
Tenzin C. Trepp
manuscript
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Cognition may span a hierarchy from the simplest cells to human reasoning and even artificial intelligence, yet a unifying principle underlies these diverse processes: the active construction of reality. This paper argues that cognition is fundamentally constructive – organisms and cognitive systems build, maintain, and refine internal or external models to guide their behavior. We survey evidence across multiple domains, including biology (cellular signaling and plant behavior), neuroscience (perception, attention, learning, and neural plasticity), collective intelligence (social insects and human societies),
...
and machine learning (artificial neural networks and AI). In each case, cognitive activity emerges not as passive registration of information but as an adaptive model-building process shaped by feedback loops and self-organization. We contrast this constructivist framework with reductionist and representationalist views that treat knowledge as a static encoding of an objective world. Across domains, a continuum of constructive cognition becomes apparent, yielding philosophical insights into the nature of knowledge and mind. We discuss how this perspective enriches cognitive science and epistemology, suggesting that to know is to continually construct viable models of reality, and to exist as a cognitive agent—biological or artificial—is to actively model the world one inhabits. (
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Cognitive Models of Consciousness
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Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Cognitive Sciences
Epistemic Constructivism
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Epistemology
Naturalized Epistemology
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Epistemology
Perception
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Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
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Non-Conceptual Pattern, Manner or Procedure?
Mahyar Moradi
2025
Synthesis – Journal for Philosophy
5:203-236.
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One source of misunderstanding about modeling non-conceptual mental content in Kant’s philosophy of mind and perception consists in the conventional functionalist reading that the apprehension of the power of imagination, both in the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of the Power of Judgement, stands as the relevant cognitive apparatus for creating a mental content without any concepts. I clarify that ‘sensible intuitions’ and ‘reflective intuitions’ in the first and third Critiques signify two distinct stages of the
...
phenomenal consciousness and cannot be justified by the same ‘procedure’ of mind. Sensible intuitions of different types are world-directed if they are justified by the ‘way and manner’ of perceiving objects through the representation of space as the relevant cognitive pattern, although they can appear with phenomenological different patterns given by nature or the mind itself. Reflective intuitions are, by contrast, non-world-directed but only satisfy the state of mind. Respectively, I conclude that Kant establishes a stronger phenomenal conservatism than his contemporary commentators have argued for because the relevant cognitive pattern is independent of the emergence of objects. (
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Epistemology
Kant's Works in Aesthetics
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17th/18th Century Philosophy
Kant's Works in Theoretical Philosophy
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17th/18th Century Philosophy
Kant: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Misc
in
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Kant: Philosophy of Mind
in
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Mental States and Processes
in
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The Unified Theory of Music and Consciousness: The Universal Principle of Collapse.
Eloy Escagedo Gutierrez
manuscript
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This paper develops a unified account of musical experience through the Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC), showing how music uniquely mirrors the structure of consciousness. We argue that instrumental music is a collapsed, structured expression that nevertheless reopens into pure potential for the listener. Using UPC’s distinction between inner potential, recognition, articulation, and collapse, we demonstrate that musical performance and musical listening occupy fundamentally different roles within the same framework (Escagedo Gutierrez, 2025b). For the performer, writing, recording, and playing music
...
is a collapse event: an inner, irreducible state is recognized, shaped, and committed into the material world as a musical trace. For the listener, that same trace induces a non‑collapse state, structured sound that carries no fixed semantic coordinates and therefore re-enters the listener’s inner world as open potential. This asymmetry explains why music can express what language cannot, why it bypasses social and linguistic constraints, and why it resonates so deeply with the fluid, non‑judgmental character of conscious experience. By formalizing these processes with UPC operators, we show that music is not merely an art form but a structural analogue of consciousness itself: a domain where collapse produces form without fixing meaning, and where meaning arises internally rather than being imposed. This framework offers a new foundation for understanding musical expression, musical perception, and the role of art in the architecture of mind. -/- Authored by Eloy Escagedo Gutierrez as part of The Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC) Research Project. (
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Cognitive Phenomenology
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Philosophy of Mind
Collapse Interpretations
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Social Sciences
Linguistic Perception
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Philosophy of Language
Mathematical Cognition
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Philosophy of Mathematics
Meaning
in
Philosophy of Language
Meaning
in
Philosophy of Language
Metaphysics
Musical Experience, Misc
in
Aesthetics
Musical Expression
in
Aesthetics
Musical Expression
in
Aesthetics
Perception
in
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Phenomenology
in
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The Interface Threshold Hypothesis for Human Experience: A Complex Systems and Coherence-Threshold Extension of Emergent Necessity Theory.
User 84
manuscript
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Human experience is typically interpreted either as a byproduct of neurobiological processes or as a distinct metaphysical phenomenon. Both approaches encounter persistent explanatory limitations when addressing the hard problem of consciousness, observer–system entanglement, and systematic mismatches between subjective report, structured symbolic representation, and physical measurement. These mismatches recur across philosophy of mind, consciousness research, cognitive science, and measurement theory, particularly where the observing system is itself structurally constrained and direct instrumental access to underlying reality is epistemically unavailable. -/- This paper
...
introduces the Interface Threshold Hypothesis (ITH) or alternatively The Human Interface Hypothesis, a formally specified systems-level extension of Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT). The hypothesis proposes that human experience functions as a constrained informational interface to an underlying structural domain whose full informational degrees of freedom are not directly accessible through biological perception. Rather than treating experience as ontological originator or epiphenomenal byproduct, ITH models it as a bandwidth-limited interface readout governed by thresholded stability regimes within nonlinear dynamical systems. The framework extends ENT’s coherence threshold (τ), resilience ratio (κR), and hysteresis formalism into the domain of observer-mediated representation. -/- ITH introduces a mathematically defined interface operator, an interface stress functional, and explicit criteria for detecting structured non-random convergence across independently generated experiential reports. These tools enable quantifiable analysis of observer-report correlations, bandwidth compression effects, threshold-induced distortion, and patterned similarity under structural constraint. The hypothesis is complementary to formal informational approaches such as Integrated Information Theory and predictive processing models, but differs in that it treats informational structure as an interface constraint rather than as an intrinsic ontological property. -/- The paper specifies scope boundaries, operational definitions, and falsification conditions, including cases in which structured convergence should fail, degrade, or fragment under increased interface stress. No ontological claims are advanced beyond those warranted by the formal threshold model. (
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Consciousness and Neuroscience
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Emergence
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Impact of Artificial Intelligence
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Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Information Theory
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Philosophy of Computing and Information
Nonlinear Dynamics
in
Philosophy of Physical Science
Perception
in
Philosophy of Mind
Physics of Information
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Philosophy of Computing and Information
Quantum Mechanics
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Philosophy of Physical Science
Simulation Hypothesis
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Nishida encontra Sellars: o "mito do dado" na filosofia da "experiência pura".
André Henrique Rodrigues
manuscript
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20th Century Continental Philosophy
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20th Century Philosophy
Epistemological Theories
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Epistemology
Knowledge
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Epistemology
Kyoto School
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Asian Philosophy
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Cross-Modal Experiences and the Problem of Phenomenal Overlap.
Zhiwei Yang
forthcoming
Journal of Consciousness Studies
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The “phenomenal overlap argument” claims that, from the subject’s own point of view, successful cross-modal perception (e.g., vision and touch) of the same object can phenomenally lack any shared element that presents that object, thereby challenging naïve realism’s prediction that the same object should give rise to non-trivial phenomenal overlap. Morgan replies by appealing to spatiality, arguing that vision and touch are at least alike in how they locate objects in space. This paper does two things. First, it distinguishes an
...
object’s intrinsic spatial properties from its relational spatial properties, and argues that the similarity Morgan invokes concerns, at best, the latter. It is too thin and too abstract to meet naïve realism’s demand for “relevant phenomenal overlap.” Second, it argues more broadly that despite the range of proposals considered, cross-modal experience is systematically heterogeneous, and current forms of naïve realism lack a clear account of how the same object could ground such pervasive intermodal differences. (
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