Philosophy, Politics, and Economics | Princeton University Press

Philosophy, Politics, and Economics | Princeton University Press
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Gerald Gaus
and
John Thrasher
An updated and expanded edition of the classic introduction to PPE
philosophy, politics, and economics
—coauthored by one of the field’s pioneers
Hardcover
Price:
$38.00/£32.00
ISBN:
Published (US):
Nov 16, 2021
Published (UK):
Dec 7, 2021
Copyright:
2021
Pages:
336
Size:
6.13 x 9.25 in.
Illus:
30 b/w illus. 86 tables.
Paperback
Price:
$38.00/£32.00
ISBN:
Published (US):
Nov 16, 2021
Published (UK):
Dec 7, 2021
Copyright:
2021
Pages:
336
Size:
6.13 x 9.25 in.
Illus:
30 b/w illus. 86 tables.
ebook (EPUB via app)
Price:
$38.00/£32.00
ISBN:
Published (US):
Nov 16, 2021
Published (UK):
Dec 7, 2021
Copyright:
2021
Pages:
336
Size:
6.13 x 9.25 in.
Illus:
30 b/w illus. 86 tables.
ebook (PDF via app)
Price:
$38.00/£32.00
ISBN:
Published (US):
Nov 16, 2021
Published (UK):
Dec 7, 2021
Copyright:
2021
Pages:
336
Size:
6.13 x 9.25 in.
Illus:
30 b/w illus. 86 tables.
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Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
offers a complete introduction to the fundamental tools and concepts of analysis that PPE students need to study social and political issues. This fully updated and expanded edition examines the core methodologies of rational choice, strategic analysis, norms, and collective choice that serve as the bedrocks of political philosophy and the social sciences. The textbook is ideal for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and nonspecialists looking to familiarize themselves with PPE’s approaches.
Starting with individual choice, the book develops an account of rationality to introduce readers to decision theory, utility theory, and concepts of welfare economics and consumer choice theory. It moves to strategic choice in game theory to explore such issues as bargaining theory, repeated games, and evolutionary game theory. The text also considers how social norms can be understood, observed, and measured. Concluding chapters address collective choice, social choice theory and democracy, and public choice theory’s connections to voters, representatives, and institutions.
Rigorous and comprehensive,
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
continues to be an essential text for this popular and burgeoning field.
The only book that covers the entirety of PPE methods
A rigorous, nontechnical introduction to decision theory, game theory, and positive political theory
A philosophical introduction to rational choice theory in the social sciences
Gerald Gaus
(1952–2020) was the James E. Rogers Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. His books include
The Tyranny of the Ideal
(Princeton).
John Thrasher
is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy at Chapman University. He is the coauthor of
The Ethics of Capitalism
Preface
Introduction
1 Rationality
Rationality and Choice
What Is Rationality?
Rationality as Effectiveness
Subjective Rationality
Rationality and Sound Belief
Rational Belief and Choice
Rationality and Goals
Actions and Goals
From Rational Choice to Homo Economicus
Optimizing—More Is Better than Less
Decreasing Marginal Value
The Law of Demand—Downward Sloping Demand Curves
Self-Interest
Constrained Maximization
Conclusion
Discussion Questions
2 Ordinal Utility Theory
Building Blocks
Preferences
Preferences as Tastes or Desires
Revealed Preferences: The Behavioral Interpretation
Deliberation, Actions, and Outcomes
Actions and Outcomes
Preferences Over Actions
Ordinal Utility Theory
Why Accept the Axioms?
Conclusion
Discussion Questions
3 Cardinal Utility
Cardinal Utility
Generating Cardinal Utilities
Representation of Utility
Interpersonal Comparisons
Expected Utility
Questioning the Axioms
Continuity
Better Prizes
The Allais Paradox
The Ellsberg Paradox
Prospect Theory
Psychology and Expected Utility Theory
Errors in Probability Judgments
Framing Effects
Endowment Effects
Do These Findings Undermine Expected Utility Theory?
The Relation Between Utility Theory and Rationality
Rationality and Maximizing Utility
Conclusion
Discussion Questions
4 Efficiency and Contract
Rationality and Efficiency
Exchange and the Edgeworth Box
Problems with Pareto Efficiency
Indeterminacy
Path-Dependence
Conflicts Between Efficiency and Rationality
Efficiency and Welfare
Markets and Efficiency
Externalities
Compensation and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
Welfare, Rights, and the Liberal Paradox
Property Rights
Using Rights to Define Externalities
The Coase Theorem
Public Goods
Non-Excludability and the Free-Rider Problem
Non-Rival Consumption
Public Goods and State Action
Homo Economicus or Voluntary Cooperation?
Conclusion
Discussion Questions
5 Foundations of Game Theory
Strategic Rationality
Zero-Sum Games
Extensive Form Zero-Sum Games
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Rationality and Efficiency
Public Goods and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Coordination Games
Chicken
Stag Hunt
Battle of the Sexes
Dominance and Rationalizability
Mixed Strategies
The Nash Existence Theorem
Mixed Strategies in a Coordination Game
Do People Play Nash?
Subgame Perfection and Backwards Induction
The Farmer’s Game
Two Kidnappers
Backwards Induction
Gauthier’s Solution
Nuclear Deterrence
Commitment
Conclusion
Discussion Questions
6 Advanced Topics in Game Theory
Repeated Games
Tit-for-Tat and the Evolution of Cooperation
The Folk Theorem
The Evolution of Direct Reciprocity
Evolutionary Games
Hawk-Dove Game
Evolutionary Stable Strategies
Asymmetries and the Origin of Property Rights
Polymorphic Equilibria
ESS and Nash
Evolutionary Game Theory and Rationality
Signaling
Bargaining Theory
Conclusion
Discussion Questions
7 Conventions, Norms, and Institutions
Conventions
Conventions and Coordination
How Do Conventions Emerge?
Common Knowledge
Conventions and Arbitrariness
Convention and Contract
Social Norms
What Norms Do
Norms and Cooperation
Norms and Nash
Bad Norms
Institutions
Two Types of Institutions
Institutions and Transaction Costs
Conclusion
Discussion Questions
8 Social Choice Theory
The Problem of Social Choice
Social Choice Theory
Collective Rationality
May’s Theorem and Majority Rule
May’s Conditions
May’s Argument
Arrow’s Theorem
Condorcet Voting and Its Paradox
Arrow’s Conditions
The First Stage of the Theorem: From Local Semi-Decisiveness to Global Decisiveness
The Second Stage of the Theorem: Finding the Dictator
Representation and Coherence
The Importance of Arrow’s Theorem
Does Arrow’s Theorem Challenge Democracy?
Dimensionality
Collective Choice Rules
Problems of Collective Choice Rules
Extending Social Choice Rules
Condorcet Method
A Weakly Positional Method: Plurality
A Strongly Positional Method: Borda Count
Cardinal Methods
Elimination Methods
What to Choose?
Path Dependency and Agenda Manipulation
Path Dependency in Legislation
Agenda Control in the Flying Club
Strategic Voting
Other Examples of Strategic Voting
Logrolling: Vote Trading in Legislatures
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Conclusion
Discussion Questions
9 Public Choice and Democracy
Basic Spatial Model of Democracy
Uncertainty and Ideology
The Simple Spatial Model
Complicating the Basic Spatial Model
The Plurality Rule and the Two-Party System
Choosing the Rules
Unanimity
Bicameralism
Logrolling and Making Everyone Worse Off
Intertemporal Coalitions
Homo Economicus and the Symmetry Assumption
Voting and Rationality
Non-Electoral Utility
The Act and Expression of Voting
Conclusion
Discussion Questions
Bibliography
Index
"Gerald Gaus was an internationally renowned leading figure in the newly emerging field of PPE and one of the top contemporary political philosophers. This book is testimony to both. What is most impressive is how it combines sustained philosophical argument with an overview of important ideas in PPE."—Fabienne Peter, University of Warwick
"Concise, clear, and accessible,
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
would work very well in an introduction to PPE gateway course and as a companion text to a philosophy of economics or philosophy of the social sciences course. There isn’t a comparable book on the market."—Ryan Muldoon, University at Buffalo
"I have used the previous edition of
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
extensively in my PPE program for nearly a decade. It has worked wonderfully, including for students with no background in game theory or social choice theory, or even basic rational choice theory. But the new edition is somehow far better, with clearer examples, simpler writing, and useful new material on norms and conventions. I will use this textbook in my PPE courses for years to come."—Kevin Vallier, Bowling Green State University
“Given the number of PPE undergrads who go on to become leading politicians around the world, this really is a book that might over time make the world a better place, by introducing rigor with depth to the undergraduate curriculum.”—Paul Tucker, president of the National Institute for Economic and Social Research
Truth and Truthfulness
Bernard Williams
States of Injury
Wendy Brown
The Moral Nexus
R. Jay Wallace
A Commonwealth of Hope
Michael Lamb
Adam Smith Reconsidered
Paul Sagar
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