Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, Sub-technique T1021.001 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, Sub-technique T1021.001 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
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Techniques
Enterprise
Remote Services
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote Services:
Remote Desktop Protocol
Other sub-techniques of Remote Services (8)
ID
Name
T1021.001
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.003
Distributed Component Object Model
T1021.004
SSH
T1021.005
VNC
T1021.006
Windows Remote Management
T1021.007
Cloud Services
T1021.008
Direct Cloud VM Connections
Adversaries may use
Valid Accounts
to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).
[1]
Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the
Accessibility Features
or
Terminal Services DLL
for Persistence.
[2]
ID:
T1021.001
Sub-technique of:
T1021
Tactic:
Lateral Movement
Platforms:
Windows
Contributors:
Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Version:
1.3
Created:
11 February 2020
Last Modified:
15 April 2025
Version Permalink
Live Version
Procedure Examples
ID
Name
Description
G1030
Agrius
Agrius
tunnels RDP traffic through deployed web shells to access victim environments via compromised accounts.
[3]
Agrius
used the Plink tool to tunnel RDP connections for remote access and lateral movement in victim environments.
[4]
G1024
Akira
Akira
has used RDP for lateral movement.
[5]
G0006
APT1
The
APT1
group is known to have used RDP during operations.
[6]
C0051
APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign
During
APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign
APT28
used RDP for lateral movement.
[7]
G0022
APT3
APT3
enables the Remote Desktop Protocol for persistence.
[8]
APT3
has also interacted with compromised systems to browse and copy files through RDP sessions.
[9]
G0087
APT39
APT39
has been seen using RDP for lateral movement and persistence, in some cases employing the rdpwinst tool for mangement of multiple sessions.
[10]
[11]
G0096
APT41
APT41
used RDP for lateral movement.
[12]
[13]
APT41
used NATBypass to expose local RDP ports on compromised systems to the Internet.
[14]
G1023
APT5
APT5
has moved laterally throughout victim environments using RDP.
[15]
G0143
Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda
leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally via RDP in victim environments.
[16]
G0001
Axiom
Axiom
has used RDP during operations.
[17]
G1043
BlackByte
BlackByte
has used RDP to access other hosts within victim networks.
[18]
[19]
G0108
Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird
has used Remote Desktop to log on to servers interactively and manually copy files to remote hosts.
[20]
C0015
C0015
During
C0015
, the threat actors used RDP to access specific network hosts of interest.
[21]
C0018
C0018
During
C0018
, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.
[22]
C0032
C0032
During the
C0032
campaign,
TEMP.Veles
utilized RDP throughout an operation.
[23]
S0030
Carbanak
Carbanak
enables concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions.
[24]
G0114
Chimera
Chimera
has used RDP to access targeted systems.
[25]
G0080
Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group
has used Remote Desktop Protocol to conduct lateral movement.
[26]
S0154
Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike
can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.
[27]
[28]
C0029
Cutting Edge
During
Cutting Edge
, threat actors used RDP with compromised credentials for lateral movement.
[29]
S0334
DarkComet
DarkComet
can open an active screen of the victim’s machine and take control of the mouse and keyboard.
[30]
G0035
Dragonfly
Dragonfly
has moved laterally via RDP.
[31]
G0051
FIN10
FIN10
has used RDP to move laterally to systems in the victim environment.
[32]
G1016
FIN13
FIN13
has remotely accessed compromised environments via Remote Desktop Services (RDS) for lateral movement.
[33]
G0037
FIN6
FIN6
used RDP to move laterally in victim networks.
[34]
[35]
G0046
FIN7
FIN7
has used RDP to move laterally in victim environments.
[36]
G0061
FIN8
FIN8
has used RDP for lateral movement.
[37]
G0117
Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten
has used RDP to log in and move laterally in the target environment.
[38]
[39]
G1001
HEXANE
HEXANE
has used remote desktop sessions for lateral movement.
[40]
C0038
HomeLand Justice
During
HomeLand Justice
, threat actors primarily used RDP for lateral movement in the victim environment.
[41]
[42]
S0434
Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor
has a module for performing remote desktop access.
[43]
G1032
INC Ransom
INC Ransom
has used RDP to move laterally.
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
G0119
Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider
has used RDP for lateral movement.
[48]
S0283
jRAT
jRAT
can support RDP control.
[49]
G0094
Kimsuky
Kimsuky
has used RDP for direct remote point-and-click access.
[50]
S0250
Koadic
Koadic
can enable remote desktop on the victim's machine.
[51]
G0032
Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group
malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.
[52]
[53]
G0065
Leviathan
Leviathan
has targeted RDP credentials and used it to move through the victim environment.
[54]
G0059
Magic Hound
Magic Hound
has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.
[55]
[56]
G0045
menuPass
menuPass
has used RDP connections to move across the victim network.
[57]
[58]
S0385
njRAT
njRAT
has a module for performing remote desktop access.
[59]
G0049
OilRig
OilRig
has used Remote Desktop Protocol for lateral movement. The group has also used tunneling tools to tunnel RDP into the environment.
[60]
[61]
[13]
[62]
[62]
G0040
Patchwork
Patchwork
attempted to use RDP to move laterally.
[63]
S0192
Pupy
Pupy
can enable/disable RDP connection and can start a remote desktop session using a browser web socket client.
[64]
S0583
Pysa
Pysa
has laterally moved using RDP connections.
[65]
S0262
QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT
has a module for performing remote desktop access.
[66]
[67]
S1187
reGeorg
reGeorg
can be used to tunnel RDP connections.
[68]
S0379
Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT
has a plugin to perform RDP access.
[69]
S0461
SDBbot
SDBbot
has the ability to use RDP to connect to victim's machines.
[70]
S0382
ServHelper
ServHelper
has commands for adding a remote desktop user and sending RDP traffic to the attacker through a reverse SSH tunnel.
[71]
G0091
Silence
Silence
has used RDP for lateral movement.
[72]
C0024
SolarWinds Compromise
During the
SolarWinds Compromise
APT29
used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers.
[73]
G1017
Volt Typhoon
Volt Typhoon
has moved laterally to the Domain Controller via RDP using a compromised account with domain administrator privileges.
[74]
S0670
WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT
has the ability to control an infected PC using RDP.
[75]
G0102
Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider
has used RDP for lateral movement and to deploy ransomware interactively.
[76]
[77]
[78]
[79]
S0350
zwShell
zwShell
has used RDP for lateral movement.
[80]
S0412
ZxShell
ZxShell
has remote desktop functionality.
[81]
Mitigations
ID
Mitigation
Description
M1047
Audit
Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups.
M1042
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary.
M1035
Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Use remote desktop gateways.
M1032
Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for remote logins.
[82]
M1030
Network Segmentation
Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network.
M1028
Operating System Configuration
Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server.
[83]
M1026
Privileged Account Management
Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP.
M1018
User Account Management
Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary.
Detection
ID
Data Source
Data Component
Detects
DS0028
Logon Session
Logon Session Creation
Monitor for user accounts logged into systems associated with RDP (ex: Windows EID 4624 Logon Type 10). Other factors, such as access patterns (ex: multiple systems over a relatively short period of time) and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP.
Monitoring logon and logoff events for hosts on the network is very important for situational awareness. This information can be used as an indicator of unusual activity as well as to corroborate activity seen elsewhere.
Could be applied to a number of different types of monitoring depending on what information is desired. Some use cases include monitoring for all remote connections and building login timelines for users. Logon events are Windows Event Code 4624 for Windows Vista and above, 518 for pre-Vista. Logoff events are 4634 for Windows Vista and above, 538 for pre-Vista.
Note: This analytic looks for user logon events and filters out the top 30 account names to reduce the occurrence of noisy service accounts and the like. It is meant as a starting point for situational awareness around such events. This is liable to be quite noisy and will need tweaking, especially in terms of the number of top users filtered out.
Analytic 1
sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode IN (4624, 4634, 4647, 4778, 4779)| search LogonType=10 // RDP Interactive Logon| eval is_suspicious=if((user!="expected_users") AND (dest_ip!="expected_servers"), "True", "False")| where is_suspicious="True"
Logon Session Metadata
Monitor authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns. A remote desktop logon, through RDP, may be typical of a system administrator or IT support, but only from select workstations. Monitoring remote desktop logons and comparing to known/approved originating systems can detect lateral movement of an adversary.
Analytic 1
sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4624" AND LogonType="10" AND AuthenticationPackageName="Negotiate" AND TargetUserName="Admin*")
DS0029
Network Traffic
Network Connection Creation
Monitor for newly constructed network connections (typically over port 3389) that may use
Valid Accounts
to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP.
Analytic 1 - Abnormal RDP Network Connections
sourcetype=zeek | search dest_port=3389 // Default RDP port| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port| where src_ip!="trusted_ips" AND dest_ip!="internal_servers"
Network Traffic Flow
Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows that may use
Valid Accounts
to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).
The Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), built in to Microsoft operating systems, allows a user to remotely log in to the desktop of another host. It allows for interactive access of the running windows, and forwards key presses, mouse clicks, etc. Network administrators, power users, and end-users may use RDP for day-to-day operations. From an adversary’s perspective, RDP provides a means to laterally move to a new host. Determining which RDP connections correspond to adversary activity can be a difficult problem in highly dynamic environments, but will be useful in identifying the scope of a compromise.Remote Desktop can be detected in several ways
Network connections to port 3389/tcp (assuming use of the default port)
Packet capture analysis
Detecting network connections from
mstsc.exe
Execution of the process
rdpclip.exe
Runs as the clipboard manager on the RDP target if clipboard sharing is enabled
Analytic 1 - Suspicious RDP
sourcetype=netflow LogonType="10"| search dest_port=3389 // Default RDP port| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port| where src_ip!="trusted_ips" AND dest_ip!="internal_servers"
DS0009
Process
Process Creation
Monitor for newly executed processes (such as
mstsc.exe
) that may use
Valid Accounts
to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions that spawn additional processes as the logged-on user.
Analytic 1 - Unusual processes associated with RDP sessions
sourcetype=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode=1 | search (parent_process="mstsc.exe" OR parent_process="rdpclip.exe")| table _time, host, user, process_name, parent_process, command_line| where process_name!="expected_processes"
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