…ntirely on A or AAAA records) and that those MX records be signed using DNSSEC [RFC4033]. This is mentioned here only for completeness, as the handling of inbound mail is out of scope for this document. 4.5.2. SRV Records MSPs SHOULD advertise SRV records to aid MUAs in determini…

…tirely on A or AAAA records) and that those MX records be signed using DNSSEC [ RFC4033 ]. This is mentioned here only for completeness, as the handling of inbound mail is out of scope for this document. 4.5.2 . SRV Records MSPs SHOULD advertise SRV records to aid MUAs in determi…

…ire Strict Privacy as described in [ DTLS ]. DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [ RFC4033 ] provide object integrity of DNS resource records, allowing end users (or their resolver) to verify the legitimacy of responses. However, DNSSEC does not provide privacy for DNS requests or r…

…PP TLS June 2015 identity verification (made stronger through the use of DNSSEC RFC4033 ]), but this at least enables encryption of server-to-server connections. The DNA prooftypes mentioned above are intended to mitigate the residual need for encrypted but unauthenticated connec…

…cond type of DNS64 resolver. . Background to DNS64-DNSSEC Interaction DNSSEC ([ RFC4033 ], [ RFC4034 ], [ RFC4035 ]) presents a special challenge for DNS64, because DNSSEC is designed to detect changes to DNS answers, and DNS64 may alter answers coming from an authoritative serve…

…P TLS June 2015 identity verification (made stronger through the use of DNSSEC [RFC4033]), but this at least enables encryption of server-to-server connections. The DNA prooftypes mentioned above are intended to mitigate the residual need for encrypted but unauthenticated connect…

… owner name of the CNAME is the QNAME of the query. The DNSSEC specification ([ RFC4033 RFC4034 ] [ RFC4035 ]) says that the synthesized CNAME does not have to be signed. The signed DNAME has an RRSIG, and a validating resolver can check the CNAME against the DNAME record and val…

…t, in addition to HSTS, of security facilities such as DNS Security Extensions [RFC4033], plus techniques to block email phishing and fake certificate injection. 14.9. Creative Manipulation of HSTS Policy Store Since an HSTS Host may select its own host name and subdomains thereo…

…, in addition to HSTS, of security facilities such as DNS Security Extensions [ RFC4033 ], plus techniques to block email phishing and fake certificate injection. 14.9 . Creative Manipulation of HSTS Policy Store Since an HSTS Host may select its own host name and subdomains ther…

…cond type of DNS64 resolver. . Background to DNS64-DNSSEC Interaction DNSSEC ([ RFC4033 ], [ RFC4034 ], [ RFC4035 ]) presents a special challenge for DNS64, because DNSSEC is designed to detect changes to DNS answers, and DNS64 may alter answers coming from an authoritative serve…

…, in addition to HSTS, of security facilities such as DNS Security Extensions [ RFC4033 ], plus techniques to block email phishing and fake certificate injection. 14.9 . Creative Manipulation of HSTS Policy Store Since an HSTS Host may select its own host name and subdomains ther…

…ovide data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS, as described in RFC4033 ], [ RFC4034 ], and [ RFC4035 ]. OPT records are not signed. Use of this option, however, does imply increased DNS traffic between any given Recursive Resolver and Authoritative Nameserver, wh…

…PP TLS June 2015 identity verification (made stronger through the use of DNSSEC RFC4033 ]), but this at least enables encryption of server-to-server connections. The DNA prooftypes mentioned above are intended to mitigate the residual need for encrypted but unauthenticated connec…

… on privacy between a DNS client and server. DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [ RFC4033 ] provide _response integrity_ by defining mechanisms to cryptographically sign zones, allowing end users (or their first-hop resolver) to verify replies are correct. By intention, DNSSEC does…

…, in addition to HSTS, of security facilities such as DNS Security Extensions [ RFC4033 ], plus techniques to block email phishing and fake certificate injection. 14.9 . Creative Manipulation of HSTS Policy Store Since an HSTS Host may select its own host name and subdomains ther…