…. Certain security-related terms are to be understood in the sense defined in [ RFC4949 ]. These terms include, but are not limited to, "attack", "authentication", "authorization", "certificate", "confidentiality", "credential", "encryption", "identity", "sign", "signature", "tru…

…ic key material. One side effect of this is that perfect forward secrecy (see [ RFC4949 ]) is not achievable. A static key will always be used for the receiver of the COSE object. Two variants of DH that are supported are: Ephemeral-Static (ES) DH: where the sender of the message…

…mpt to change the checksum to make it match changes made to the data object." [ RFC4949 Authentication, Message The property, given an authentication code protected checksum , that tampering with both the data and checksum, so as to introduce changes while seemingly preserving in…

…ic key material. One side effect of this is that perfect forward secrecy (see [ RFC4949 ]) is not achievable. A static key will always be used for the receiver of the COSE object. Two variants of DH that are supported are: Ephemeral-Static (ES) DH: where the sender of the message…

…mic key material. One side effect of this is that perfect forward secrecy (see [RFC4949]) is not achievable. A static key will always be used for the receiver of the COSE object. Two variants of DH that are supported are: Ephemeral-Static (ES) DH: where the sender of the message …

…mpt to change the checksum to make it match changes made to the data object." [ RFC4949 Authentication, Message The property, given an authentication code protected checksum , that tampering with both the data and checksum, so as to introduce changes while seemingly preserving in…

…ic key material. One side effect of this is that perfect forward secrecy (see [ RFC4949 ]) is not achievable. A static key will always be used for the receiver of the COSE object. Two variants of DH that are supported are: Ephemeral-Static (ES) DH: where the sender of the message…