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The
Kissinger Telcons
National
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 123
Edited
by Thomas Blanton and Dr. William Burr
Posted
May 26, 2004
Archive
director discusses Kissinger telcons on NPR's
All Things Considered, 27 May 2004
New
Kissinger Telcons Released 26 May 2004
The
Dobrynin File: "Happy Birthday" Henry Kissinger
Kissinger
Telcons on Chile
Telcons
Previously Released in Other Nixon Presidential Files
Side-by-Side Comparison of a Kissinger Telcon and a Nixon Tape of
the Same Conversation
Legal
Documents
Washington, D.C., May 26, 2004
- Five years after the
National Security Archive initiated legal action to compel the State
Department and the National Archives to recover the transcripts
of Henry Kissinger's telephone calls from his "private"
collection at the Library of Congress, the National Archives today
released approximately 20,000 declassified pages (10 cubic feet)
of these historic records, spanning Kissinger's tenure under President
Nixon from 1969 to August 1974 as national security adviser and
also as secretary of state beginning in September 1973.
To celebrate the public recovery of this previously sequestered
history, the National Security Archive today posted "The Kissinger
Telcons," the 123rd Electronic Briefing Book in the Archive's
award-winning series. Highlights of the posting include
ten
of the telcons released today
The defense secretary wishes he could sweep under the rug
the atrocity photographs. The national security adviser agrees,
but the newspapers already have the photos. So they decide to
blame the low-level officer, who must have been insane.
Iraqi prisons? No, it's Melvin Laird and Henry Kissinger, trying
to spin the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. This 21 November 1969
telephone
call transcript
is one of the highlights of the newly-released
Kissinger telcons posted today by the National Security Archive.
Others include President
Nixon
ordering the massive bombing of Cambodia
one night
in December 1970, followed by
Kissinger
laughing with aide Alexander Haig
about Nixon's bluster
and agreeing to send a few B-52s instead. The posting also includes
the Associated Press lead item, in which Kissinger puts off the
British prime minister's phone call to President Nixon because
Nixon
was "loaded."
Today's posting also includes
special section including a key Kissinger
telcon on Chile
with more to come tomorrow.
The posting also includes
ten Kissinger
telcons
previously obtained by Archive senior analyst
Dr. William Burr. The latter were among the thousands of pages officially
released today, but we found copies in other, previously released,
Nixon administration files and are providing them here as a sampler
of things to come in the new release. These records feature conversations
with President Nixon, Motion Picture Association president Jack
Valenti, and Chase Manhattan Bank chairman David Rockefeller, among
others.
Today's posting also includes the full text of the
finding
aid to the Kissinger telcons
collection, created by
the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff of the National Archives
and Records Administration. The finding aid describes the checkered
history of the telcons as follows:
In the late 1970s, a reporter
[William Safire]
and
two organizations
[the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press and the Military Audit Project]
sued to gain access
to the telcons under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The
federal district court and the US court of appeals both ruled
that the documents were government records becuase they were prepared
on government time by government employees. These lower courts
stated that the State Department telcons should be returned to
the State Department and reviewed for release under FOIA. In 1980,
the Supreme Court, in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980), reversed the decision, ruling
that the FOIA did not apply to the telcons because they were outside
of the Executive branch. The Court noted, however, that the Federal
Records Act (FRA) provided authority for the Archivist of the
United States, the agency head, and the Attorney General to recover
improperly removed records. Accordingly, at the National Archive's
behest, then Secretary of State Edmund Muskie agreed in 1980 to
re-review the telcons at the LC for possible return to State,
However, that review never took place. In 2001, Dr. Kissinger,
upon request from NARA and the State Department following inquiries
from researchers
[that is, the
legal
complaint
about to be filed in court by the National
Security Archive]
, gave both agencies copies of the transcripts
held at LC. NARA photocopied the collection held at LC and began
processing it for public release. The State Department is reviewing
its collection and will release it at a later time.
Also included in today's posting are:
The
legal complaint
written by pro bono counsel Lee Rubin and Craig Isenberg (of the
Mayer Brown law firm) for the National Security Archive, that
persuaded the State Department and NARA finally to recover the
Kissinger telcons.
Henry Kissinger's
Deed
of Gift agreements
with the United States Library
of Congress from 1976.
The
correspondence between the National
Security Archive and the government
, starting in
1999, about the legal necessity for the government to recover
the telcons.
The
8 August
2001 statement by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
crediting the National Security Archive for having prompted the
telcon recovery.
side-by-side comparison
of a Kissinger telcon and a Nixon tape of the same conversation
(see also Tom Blanton,
"Kissinger's
Revenge: While Nixon was bugging Kissinger, guess who was bugging
Nixon,"
Slate
, posted Monday, Feb.
18, 2002).
I.
New Kissinger Telcons Released 26 May 2004
Note:
The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free
Adobe
Acrobat Reader
to view.
Document
: Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 21 November
1969, 3:50 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 3, File 3, 083-084
A week after Seymour Hersh had broken the story of the My Lai massacre
in the
New York Times
, Kissinger wanted to make sure that
Laird had a "game plane" so that the Pentagon was on "top"
of the story. Laird had known about My Lai since the spring but
a witness had gruesome photographs that were appearing in the press.
Plainly appalled by the massacre but anxious to avoid having the
Pentagon tarred by an atrocity, Laird did not know what to do. While
he was inclined to sweep it "under the rug", Laird did
not dissent when Kissinger warned him that could not be done.
Document
: Kissinger and President Richard M. Nixon, 9 December 1970,
8:45 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Home File, Box 29, File 2
Anxious about the Cambodian situation, Nixon ordered Kissinger
to direct bombing attacks on North Vietnamese forces there "tomorrow."
He wanted to "hit everything there", using the "big
planes" and the "small planes." "I don't want
any screwing around." The discussion raised an interesting
issue--the Cold War U.S. Air Force was geared to waging nuclear
war against the Soviet Union but not for "this war"--conventional
bombing operations in Southeast Asia. As Kissinger noted the U.S.
Air Force is not "designed for any war that we are likely to
have to fight." Nixon agreed: "There isn't going to be
any air battle against the Soviet Union"--that would mean a
catastrophic nuclear war.
Document
: Kissinger and General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 9 December
1970, 8:50 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Home File, Box 29, File 2, 106-10
A few minutes later after receiving Nixon's call on Cambodia,
Kissinger telephoned his military assistant Alexander Haig about
the orders from "our friend." After he described Nixon's
instructions for a "massive bombing campaign" involving
"anything that flys [or] anything that moves", the notetaker
apparently heard Haig "laughing." Both Haig and Kissinger
knew that what Nixon had ordered was logistically and politically
impossible so they translated it into a plan for massive bombing
in a particular district (not identifiable because the text is incomplete).
These two phone calls illustrate an important feature of the Nixon-Kissinger
relationship: while Nixon would, from time to time, make preposterous
suggestions (no doubt depending on his mood), Kissinger would later
decide whether there was a rational kernel in what Nixon had said
and whether or how to follow up on it. (
Note 1
Document
: Kissinger and President Richard M. Nixon, 15 April 1972,
10:25 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Home File, Box 29, File 8
Two weeks after the North Vietnamese launch their spring offensive
on 31 March 1972, Nixon ordered bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, including
mining operations at the latter's harbor. When Nixon ordered the
bombing campaign he realized there was some chance that it could
jeopardize the Moscow summit with Brezhnev scheduled for Moscow
later in May. As this discussion shows, a meeting that Kissinger
had with Ambassador Dobrynin earlier in the day indicated that there
would be no problem. Employing language that Nixon liked to use,
Kissinger disdainfully reported that "Dobrynin was in slobbering
over me." Kissinger observed that the Soviets were not following
the "peacenik" textbook by "yelling and screaming"
about the bombing; instead, they found it more expedient to cultivate
their relationship with the other superpower. Unless the Soviets
"screw us," Kissinger's secret visit, slated for the following
week, and the summit would go ahead.
Document
: Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoli Dobrynin,
15 December 1972, 5:41 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Anatoly Dobrynin File, Box 27, File 7,
09
In late 1972, the Paris negotiations on the Vietnam War entered
an intense and frustrating stage where the North Vietnamese were
unwilling to accept conditions proposed by the U.S. on behalf of
its South Vietnamese ally. In the first two weeks of December, the
talks reached an impasse and were suspended, slated for resumption
in early January. Kissinger returned to Washington and North Vietnam's
chief negotiator Le Duc Tho headed to Moscow to convince the Soviets
to put pressure on Washington. Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed
Tho's visit to Moscow in condescending terms, with the former suggesting
that Le Duc Tho was coming to Moscow "crying on your shoulder."
Once Tho was in Moscow, Dobrynin joked, the Soviets would find out
how "nice" he was. While Dobrynin shared a laugh with
his U.S.partner at the expense of an ally, he did not realize that
his American interlocutor did not hold the Ambassador's position
on Vietnam in high esteem and had laughed with Nixon at a "slobbering"
Dobrynin (See Document 4). The Soviet ambassador might not have
been quite so joking if he had known that Nixon and Kissinger were
making decisions to launch a bombing campaign against North Vietnam.
Through bombing the North, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to persuade
the recalcitrant Saigon regime that it could rely on the Nixon administration
to punish Hanoi in the event of future violations of the peace agreement.
Document
: Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 3 January
1973, 4:00 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 17, 1973 2-6
During the December 1972 Christmas bombing," the Nixon White
House sought to destroy military targets in North Vietnam. Yet,
some of the targets were in Hanoi and precision bombing by high-flying
B-52s was impossible. In a notorious incident, bombs aimed at another
target struck Bach Mai hospital in central Hanoi killing 30 people.
As is evident from this conversation with Secretary of Defense Laird,
the accidental bombing of civilian facilities in North Vietnam triggered
international protests. On his way out of the Pentagon, Laird had
not supported the bombing strategy recommending diplomatic compromise
instead but had been responsible for overseeing the bombing operations.
Thus, he was unhappy to see his agency associated with "lousy
stories" about "hospitals and schools" publicized
by "leftwing Joan Baez" and other anti-war critics. Laird
hoped that Kissinger would bring the problem to Nixon's attention
so that a "positive" story about the bombing of military
targets could be spun.
Document
: Kissinger and World Bank President Robert McNamara, 3 January
1973, 5:45 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 17, 1973 2-6
Long before he was ready to acknowledge that he had been "terribly
wrong" on Vietnam, Robert McNamara privately offered his support
for Kissinger's Vietnam War endgame. Apparently a fan, McNamara
told Kissinger that he was "the man who finally got us out
of there." Not questioning the Christmas bombing, McNamara
observed that "not everybody is as critical as some of those
damn columnists." Both agreed that ending the U.S. fighting
role in Vietnam required a "conscious ambiguity"; in other
words, an unambiguous U.S. diplomatic victory was impossible (for
example, the U.S. would have to accept the presence of North Vietnamese
forces in the South). That McNamara referred to the war as "the
damn thing" suggested a deeper level of discomfort that he
would not discuss in public for many years.
Document
: Kissinger and John Crewdson (
New York Times
), 22
September 1973, 6:15 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, File 5
The day after the U.S. Senate voted to confirm Kissinger Secretary
of State, a
New York Times
reporter reminded him of an
unpleasant subject--the wiretaps that Nixon and Kissinger had approved
in 1969 to plumb the source of press leaks on the secret bombing
of Cambodia. Crewdson had a new angle from an undisclosed source--
Kissinger's own telephones may have been wiretapped; apparently
someone else in the White House had suspected (not unreasonably)
that Kissinger had been involved in press leaks. Crewdson had been
working on the story for some time and wanted to speak with Kissinger
before reporting on it. Kissinger responded that he had never been
officially told that he had been wiretapped, but he wanted the story
to go away: "as far as I'm concerned, I'd just as soon not
have any more wiretap stories." Nevertheless, Crewdson pursued
the story and on 25 November 1973 the
Times
ran this headline:
"Kissinger Is Said to Cite Taps on Him." Not long before
his confirmation hearings, Crewdson reported, Kissinger had told
an aid that he was "virtually certain" that he had been
wiretapped. While Nixon had certainly put Kissinger on tape, White
House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman and his assistant Lawrence Higby
later denied that any wiretapping operation had been aimed at Kissinger.
Note 2
Document
: Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, 11 October 1973, 5:55 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, File 10,
089
On Wednesday 10 October, a financial scandal forced Vice President
Spiro Agnew to resign; kickbacks that he had taken years earlier
when he was involved in Maryland politics had come to light. Nixon
was already preoccupied by the Watergate scandal and this latest
political crisis came only days into the Middle East war. Apparently
such developments led Nixon to take comfort in drinking; not a heavy
drinker, he did not hold alcohol well. When British Prime Minister
Edward Heath called to discuss the Middle East with Nixon, Kissinger
told Scowcroft that this was impossible because the president was
"loaded." Apparently, Scowcroft was not surprised; this
problem had long been the subject of banter among Kissinger and
the NSC staff. In any event, Kissinger and Scowcroft agreed that
Heath's office should be told the president is not "available"
and that the conversation should take place in the morning.
Document
10
: Kissinger and Norm Kempster (
Washington Star
),
2 January 1974, 12:25 p.m.
Source:
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone
Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, File 4, 094
Even the smallest incident would be recorded in the transcripts,
such as this brief discussion with a startled reporter who found
himself speaking with the Secretary of State.
Notes
1.
See Walter Isaacson's Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon &
Shuster, 1992) for considerable discussion of this point.
2.
Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 233-233.
Telcons Previously Released in Other Nixon Presidential Files
Document
: Nixon and Kissinger, 11 March 1969, c. 10:00 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project,
National Security Council Files. Box 489. Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969
(Part I)
Not long after the White House and Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
had established a secret "back channel" to the Soviet
Union (excluding the State Department), Kissinger and Nixon discussed
a recent meeting with Dobrynin, as well as Vietnam war negotiations,
other developments in Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet border clash, and
anti-ballistic missile issues. At the close of thediscussion, Nixon
observed that Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird wanted to "get
out" of Vietnam and would "pay a big price" to do
so. As the following months would show, Laird would play a key role
in forcing troop withdrawals from Vietnam.
Document
: Nixon and Kissinger, 14 January 1970, 5:40 p.m., Excised
Copy
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger/Scowcroft
West Wing Office File, Vietnam War, Secret Peace Talks [Mr. "S"
File] (7) 1/1/70-12/31/70
Nixon and Kissinger discussed Vietnam negotiations, World War II,
French diplomacy, Middle East, the government budget, the Nigerian
crisis, and a Nixon foreign policy statement. As with most of these
conversations, much contextual information is needed to make sense
of them; moreover, sometimes the transcriber could not even get
what the participants were saying, as is evident from occasional
blanks in the text. At the close of the call, Nixon talked about
his foreign policy innovation ("the Nixon doctrine") but
revealed his grudges against the late President Kennedy: If a recent
speech "was said by the Kennedys the papers would have emoted
all over the place."
Document
: Nixon and Kissinger, 10 March 1970, 10:40 a.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project.
National Security Council Files. Box 612. Israeli Aid
Kissinger and Nixon discussed how to tell the Israelis the good
news (economic aid up to $8 million, a message the White House would
deliver) and the bad news (no new military aid except to replace
losses in fighting with Egyptians, a message left to the State Department).
At the very end of the call, Kissinger raised the issue of the investigation
of the My Lai massacre, and advises Nixon to let Secretary of Defense
Laird handle it.
Document
: Nixon and Kissinger 17 March 1970, 8:07 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National
Security Council Files. Box 612. Israeli Aid
After briefly discussing the aid packages to Israel, Nixon and
Kissinger turned to the My Lai investigation. While Kissinger was
a little queasy ("some of the stories are awful" with
"400 people were killed there and it [went] on for days"),
Nixon was more hardnosed("these boys [US soldiers] being killed
by women carrying that stuff in their satchels"). They go on
to discuss the next bombing campaign against North Vietnam if a
"provocation" occurred.
Document
: Nixon and Kissinger, 24 September 1970, 11:30 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National
Security Council Files. HAK Office Files. Box 128. Chronology of
Cuban Submarine Base Episode 1970-1971
Soviet plans to develop a nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos,
Cuba caused a mini-U.S-Soviet crisis in the fall of 1970. A developing
crisis in Jordan also threatened East-West tensions. Here Nixon
discussed with Kissinger tactics for talking about Cienfuegos with
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, as well as Nixon's presentation to wealthy
Republicans, and the Jordanian crisis. As was customary, Kissinger
laid it on thick in complimenting Nixon ("you certainly laid
it on them", "if not you or this Administration, who?").
Document 6
: Nixon and Kissinger 24 September 1970, 6:40 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National
Security Council Files. HAK Office Files. Box 128. Chronology of
Cuban Submarine Base Episode 1970-1971
This call featured more discussion of tactics in dealing with Dobrynin
over Cienfuegos. While Dobrynin wanted to deliver a Kremlin message
on a summit to Nixon, the latter is reluctant to take it unless
the message was positive: "I don't think we want to appear
that everytime he comes back [from Moscow], I'm going to slobber
over him." During the brief discussion of the Jordanian crisis,
Kissinger stated that Iraqi soldiers were providing aid and "changing
into Fedayeen uniforms."
Document
: Kissinger and Christian Science Monitor Washington Bureau
Chief Saville Davis, 17 December 1970, 3:04 p.m.
Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State.
Summaries of the Undersecretary's Meetings with the National Security
Advisor. Box 1. Irwin/KissingerLunches 1970-71
This call demonstrated a classic Kissinger interaction with the
press. After the Monitor published a story critical of Kissinger's
NSC staff and NSC-State relations, Davis called up to apologize
stating that the writer was out of his "depth." Whether
the story was accurate or not, undoubtedly doubt Davis believed
that Kissinger had to be accommodated if the Monitor was going to
preserve its access to him.
Document
: Conversation with Madame Jean Sainteny, 13 May 1971, 8:15
a.m.
Source: Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger/Scowcroft
West Wing Office File, Vietnam War, Secret Peace Talks [Mr. "S"
File] (8) 1/1/71-6/30/71
Jean Sainteny, who had served in the French colonial administration
in Vietnam in the 1940s had close contacts with the North Vietnamese
and, as "Mr. S", cooperated with Kissinger as a secret
intermediary. Kissinger wanted Sainteny to meet with him in Washington
later in the month but found that this would involve taking on duties
as a "tourist agency" to make sure that the visit couldtake
place.
Document
: Kissinger and Motion Picture Association President Jack Valenti,
15 October 1971 9:05 a.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National
Security Council Files. HAK Office Files. Box 87. PRC Personal Requests
1971-73
Kissinger's key role in pulling off the U.S.-China rapprochement
meant that he would receive requests for favors and advice from
friends in high plaes. Not long before his second trip to Beijing,
Kissinger received a phone call from Jack Valenti. Wanting to develop
exports of movies to China, Valenti hoped that he could bring some
movie stars to Beijing to promote film, "a common link between
people."
Document
10
: Kissinger and Chase Manhattan Bank chairman David Rockefeller,
13 March 1972, 11:12 a.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National
Security Council Files. HAK Office Files. Box 87. PRC Personal Requests
1971-73
After congratulating Kissinger on some undisclosed triumph and
offering him a plane ride to the next Bilderberg meeting, Rockefellerasked
how he could get a visa to visit China. Kissinger was not too surprised
(the president of American Express was also trying to get one) and
said he would try to find out through "various channels."
He assured Rockefeller that the Chinese were "less hung up
on the name Rockefeller than the Russians. They don't think they're
running the country."
side-by-side comparison of a Kissinger telcon and a Nixon tape of
the same conversation
When Kissinger was in office he would sometimes circulate "telcons"
to staffers when they needed them for their work and occasionally
the documents, such as the one below, would remain in the files.
One of the more fascinating aspects of this transcript of a telephone
conversation between President Richard Nixon and Kissinger is that
while Kissinger's secretary was listening in and transcribing the
conversation, Nixon had a tape recorder that simultaneously taped
the call. Neither realized that the other was making a record of
the conversation.
The "telcon" is very close to the tape in content although
not in all of the wording (no doubt it was difficult for the transcriber
to keep up with every word). The tape (number 2-52 in the Nixon
tapes), however, is not available in its entirety; several portions
were excised when the tape was released in 1999. Nevertheless, the
"telcon" in the Nixon presidential materials was released
in full last spring, and it immediately becomes evident that two
of the deletions, withdrawn on privacy grounds, are Kissinger's
critical comments on U.S. representative to the United Nations George
H.W. Bush. The other excision made on "national security"
grounds was Kissinger's reference to the secret Pakistani channel
that Nixon and Zhou Enlai used to exchange messages. That the secrecy
censors deleted the reference to Pakistan is astonishing given that
information on the Pakistani channel has been available for years,
not least in Henry Kissinger's memoirs, White House Years (1979),
and has been declassified in numerous documents in the Nixon Presidential
Materials Project at the National Archives.
The substance of the Kissinger-Nixon phone conversation concerned
a message that Kissinger had received at 6:15 p.m. that day from
Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. Zhou's message set the stage for Kissinger's
secret visit to Beijing on 9 July, the subsequent Nixon trip to
China, and the beginning of normalization of relations with China.
Zhou's message was delivered through the secret Pakistani channel
between Beijing and Washington that had been established during
1969. Confirming earlier messages, Zhou wrote that the People's
Republic of China was willing to receive a "special envoy of
the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) ... or even the President
of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions." Kissinger
immediately walked the message over to the Oval Office and an hour
or so later, Nixon discussed it on the telephone with Kissinger.
Zhou had suggested Kissinger as a "special envoy," but
in his phone call to Kissinger, Nixon discussed anybody else as
envoy--New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Vietnam negotiator
Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, U.S. representative to the United
Nation ambassador George H.W. Bush, Secretary of Health Education
and Welfare Elliot Richardson, and even the recently deceased GOP
presidential candidate Thomas Dewey. Nixon was toying with Kissinger,
who wanted to go to Beijing. The next day, Nixon settled the suspense
and told Kissinger that he would be going to Beijing.
[See also Tom Blanton,
"Kissinger's
Revenge: While Nixon was bugging Kissinger, guess who was bugging
Nixon,"
Slate
, posted Monday, Feb. 18,
2002)]
TELCON,
"The President/Mr. Kissinger," 8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National
Archives and Records Administration, National Security Files, Box
1031, Exchanges Leading Up to HAK Trip to China, December 1969-July
1971 (1)
Audio
clip
: Conversation 2-52, President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger,
8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971. (
Full
clip
is 9.38 MB - MP3 format)
Above clip divided into four parts: (
Part 1
Part 2
) (
Part 3
Part 4
Source: White House Tapes, Nixon Presidential
Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration
Legal
Documents
Henry
Kissinger, Deed of Gift and Agreement with United States Library
of Congress, November 12, 1976, 6 pp.
Henry
Kissinger, Second Deed of Gift and Agreement with United States
Library of Congress, December 24, 1976, 1 p.
National
Security Archive to Archivist of the United States John W. Carlin,
January 15, 1999, 1 p.
Archivist
of the United States John W. Carlin to National Security Archive,
January 21, 1999, 1 p.
Attorneys
for National Security Archive to National Archives and Records Administration
and Department of State, January 25, 2001, 2 pp.
[Encloses letter
from State Department Spokesman James P. Rubin to Archivist of the
United States John W. Carlin, 2 pp.]
Complaint
by National Security Archive presented to the Archivist of the United
States and the Secretary of State, January 25, 2001, 10 pp.
[Attachment to previous letter]
Attorneys
for National Security Archive to Department of State, National Archives
and Records Administration, and Department of Justice, April 25,
2001, 3 pp.
United
States Department of State Press Release, "Former Secretary
of State Kissinger Provides Department with Documents," August
8, 2001
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