Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0

This section is non-normative.

In the physical world, a credential might consist of:

• Information related to identifying the subject of the credential (for example, a photo, name, or identification number)
• Information related to the issuing authority (for example, a city government, national agency, or certification body)
• Information related to the type of credential (for example, a Dutch passport, an American driving license, or a health insurance card)
• Information related to specific properties asserted by the issuing authority about the subject (for example, nationality, date of birth, or the classes of vehicle they're qualified to drive)
• Evidence by which a subject was demonstrated to have satisfied the qualifications required for issuance of the credential (for example, a measurement, proof of citizenship, or test result)
• Information related to constraints on the credential (for example, validity period, or terms of use).

A verifiable credential can represent all the same information that a physical credential represents. Adding technologies such as digital signatures can make verifiable credentials more tamper-evident and trustworthy than their physical counterparts.

Holders of verifiable credentials can generate verifiable presentations and then share these verifiable presentations with verifiers to prove they possess verifiable credentials with specific characteristics.

Both verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations can be transmitted rapidly, making them more convenient than their physical counterparts when establishing trust at a distance.

While this specification attempts to improve the ease of expressing digital credentials, it also aims to balance this goal with several privacy-preserving goals. The persistence of digital information, and the ease with which disparate sources of digital data can be collected and correlated, comprise a privacy concern that the use of verifiable and easily machine-readable credentials threatens to make worse. This document outlines and attempts to address several of these issues in Section 8. Privacy Considerations. Examples of how to use this data model using privacy-enhancing technologies, such as zero-knowledge proofs, are also provided throughout this document.

The word "verifiable" in the terms verifiable credential and verifiable presentation refers to the characteristic of a credential or presentation as being able to be verified by a verifier, as defined in this document. Verifiability of a credential does not imply the truth of claims encoded therein. Instead, upon establishing the authenticity and currency of a verifiable credential or verifiable presentation, a verifier validates the included claims using their own business rules before relying on them. Such reliance only occurs after evaluating the issuer, the proof, the subject, and the claims against one or more verifier policies.

This section is non-normative.

This section describes the roles of the core actors and the relationships between them in an ecosystem where one expects verifiable credentials to be useful. A role is an abstraction that might be implemented in many different ways. The separation of roles suggests likely interfaces and protocols for standardization. This specification introduces the following roles:

holder

A role an entity might perform by possessing one or more verifiable credentials and generating verifiable presentations from them. A holder is often, but not always, a subject of the verifiable credentials they are holding. Holders store their credentials in credential repositories. Example holders include students, employees, and customers.

issuer

A role an entity can perform by asserting claims about one or more subjects, creating a verifiable credential from these claims, and transmitting the verifiable credential to a holder. For example, issuers include corporations, non-profit organizations, trade associations, governments, and individuals.

subject

A thing about which claims are made. Example subjects include human beings, animals, and things.

verifier

A role an entity performs by receiving one or more verifiable credentials, optionally inside a verifiable presentation for processing. Example verifiers include employers, security personnel, and websites.

verifiable data registry

A role a system might perform by mediating the creation and verification of identifiers, verification material, and other relevant data, such as verifiable credential schemas, revocation registries, and so on, which might require using verifiable credentials. Some configurations might require correlatable identifiers for subjects. Some registries, such as ones for UUIDs and verification material, might just act as namespaces for identifiers. Examples of verifiable data registries include trusted databases, decentralized databases, government ID databases, and distributed ledgers. Often, more than one type of verifiable data registry used in an ecosystem.

This ecosystem contrasts with the typical two-party or federated identity provider models. An identity provider, sometimes abbreviated as IdP, is a system for creating, maintaining, and managing identity information for holders while providing authentication services to relying party applications within a federation or distributed network. In a federated identity model, the holder is tightly bound to the identity provider. This specification avoids using "identity provider," "federated identity," or "relying party" terminology, except when comparing or mapping these concepts to other specifications. This specification decouples the identity provider concept into two distinct concepts: the issuer and the holder.

For a deeper exploration of the verifiable credentials ecosystem and a concrete lifecycle example, please refer to Verifiable Credentials Overview [VC-OVERVIEW].

As well as sections marked as non-normative, all authoring guidelines, diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.

The key words MAY, MUST, MUST NOT, OPTIONAL, RECOMMENDED, REQUIRED, SHOULD, and SHOULD NOT in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

A conforming document is a compacted JSON-LD document that complies with all of the relevant "MUST" statements in this specification. Specifically, the relevant normative "MUST" statements in Sections 4. Basic Concepts, 5. Advanced Concepts, and 6. Syntaxes of this document MUST be enforced. A conforming document MUST be either a verifiable credential with a media type of application/vc or a verifiable presentation with a media type of application/vp. A conforming document MUST be secured by at least one securing mechanism as described in Section 4.12 Securing Mechanisms.

A conforming issuer implementation produces conforming documents, MUST include all required properties in the conforming documents it produces, and MUST secure the conforming documents it produces using a securing mechanism described in Section 4.12 Securing Mechanisms.

A conforming verifier implementation consumes conforming documents, MUST perform verification on a conforming document as described in Section 4.12 Securing Mechanisms, MUST check that each required property satisfies the normative requirements for that property, and MUST produce errors when non-conforming documents are detected.

This specification includes both required and optional properties. Optional properties MAY be ignored by conforming issuer implementations and conforming verifier implementations.

This document also contains examples that contain characters that are invalid JSON, such as inline comments (//) and the use of ellipsis (...) to denote information that adds little value to the example. Implementers are cautioned to remove this content if they desire to use the information as a valid document.

This section is non-normative.

This specification is designed to ease the prototyping of new types of verifiable credentials. Developers can copy the template below and paste it into common verifiable credential tooling to start issuing, holding, and verifying prototype credentials.

A developer will change MyPrototypeCredential below to the type of credential they would like to create. Since verifiable credentials talk about subjects, each property-value pair in the credentialSubject object expresses a particular property of the credential subject. Once a developer has added a number of these property-value combinations, the modified object can be sent to a conforming issuer implementation, and a verifiable credential will be created for the developer. From a prototyping standpoint, that is all a developer needs to do.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "MyPrototypeCredential"],
  "credentialSubject": {
    "mySubjectProperty": "mySubjectValue"
  }
}

After stabilizing all credential properties, developers are advised to generate and publish vocabulary and context files at stable URLs to facilitate interoperability with other developers. The https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2 URL above would then be replaced with the URL of a use-case-specific context. This process is covered in Section 5.2 Extensibility. Alternatively, developers can reuse existing vocabulary and context files that happen to fit their use case. They can explore the Verifiable Credential Extensions for reusable resources.

When two software systems need to exchange data, they need to use terminology that both systems understand. Consider how two people communicate effectively by using the same language, where the words they use, such as "name" and "website," mean the same thing to each individual. This is sometimes referred to as the context of a conversation. This specification uses a similar concept to achieve similar results for software systems by establishing a context in which to communicate.

Software systems that process verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations identify terminology by using URLs for each term. However, those URLs can be long and not very human-friendly, while short-form, human-friendly aliases can be more helpful. This specification uses the @context property to map short-form aliases to the URLs.

Verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations MUST include a @context property. Application developers MUST understand every JSON-LD context used by their application, at least to the extent that it affects the meaning of the terms used by their application. One mechanism for doing so is described in the Section on Validating Contexts in the Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0 specification. Other specifications that build upon this specification MAY require that JSON-LD contexts be integrity protected by using the relatedResource feature described in Section 5.3 Integrity of Related Resources or any effectively equivalent mechanism.

@context

The value of the @context property MUST be an ordered set where the first item is a URL with the value https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2. Subsequent items in the ordered set MUST be composed of any combination of URLs and objects, where each is processable as a JSON-LD Context.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/58473",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleAlumniCredential"],
  "issuer": "did:example:2g55q912ec3476eba2l9812ecbfe",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "alumniOf": {
      "id": "did:example:c276e12ec21ebfeb1f712ebc6f1",
      "name": "Example University"
    }
  }
}

The example above uses the base context URL (https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2) to establish that the data exchange is about a verifiable credential. This concept is further detailed in Section 5.2 Extensibility. The data available at https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2 is a permanently cacheable static document with instructions for processing it provided in Appendix B.1 Base Context. The associated human-readable vocabulary document for the Verifiable Credentials Data Model is available at https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/.

The second URL (https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2) is used to demonstrate examples. Implementations are expected to not use this URL for any other purpose, such as in pilot or production systems.

When expressing statements about a specific thing, such as a person, product, or organization, using a globally unique identifier for that thing can be useful. Globally unique identifiers enable others to express statements about the same thing. This specification defines the optional id property for such identifiers. The id property allows for expressing statements about specific things in the verifiable credential and is set by an issuer when expressing objects in a verifiable credential or a holder when expressing objects in a verifiable presentation. The id property expresses an identifier that others are expected to use when expressing statements about the specific thing identified by that identifier. Example id values include UUIDs (urn:uuid:0c07c1ce-57cb-41af-bef2-1b932b986873), HTTP URLs (https://id.example/things#123), and DIDs (did:example:1234abcd).

id

The id property is OPTIONAL. If present, id property's value MUST be a single URL, which MAY be dereferenceable. It is RECOMMENDED that the URL in the id be one which, if dereferenceable, results in a document containing machine-readable information about the id.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaebSRtPnW6YCpxAhR5JPxJqt9UunCsBPhLEtUokUvp87nQ",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z5WHRyhjLd2H5RFcSqW3bss39zFBvVrVuXUovBpbGX2ATL8vSxwoeoiZFb1eibsdjRQK5GS1nr76RZRKBj7iH9roE"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaerJh8WwyBVVGcZKKkqRKK9iezje8ut6t9bnNChtxcWwNv",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-sd-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0AhVhAfojGD02jMuCezr87Ra8dvWa9ruscwcjDo2jYpvNEzxQthrKO3csDTuvk2A278uD7Cot6fgfm4YXddQ3eKnF91VgjgCQCpvhiT83vvn-T-PFVSUfoo51-s11TfQ39hmlIC61wy2hYINWUMbNH3sN80JcCKn-4fcaBDpSGT7KgsL07bUWUlHrJhVhAG4V_V2OV_xGWDfKU1CH_D53kF5Hy8RBi4S0551TkpUKvouKF5s5a-b1qDh2iNK1RXQyF6vdhbt4Kjo0RfnSYplhAvBoxWd2Xmpe8ERCoO3qs3el64rEmsYuPOgMyQTacrl2tuFLs3ui23JdtCnOSxmcRzVC27r4HIpubjSug4NE261hAcb7bwdJUpxP6Bqp7hiD8O_nFIMxLdzErfU522ZVy4CqLOiEERGMT2jFlgDcxlpkk5ZrMJOl9QfQSLPtjolWIy1hAbOzFKnJtBhSu3lfzmSftTWl1-FLtWu3Lt7ePxpGPbMjr6DVfS3sZL8E6M4uETdce15BsDkThGi_1ZjJ7YG9GLFhADav02TPSZdSV73AqOyZ6ryfuz3Y7pKKuu67dnqNzzXS-H-8-39I1rA759bba_lkqeo8F0lPtT_3liNamnCd-CoFnL2lzc3Vlcg"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zUC78GzFRA4TWh2mqRiKro1wwRb5KDaMJ3M1AD3qGtgEbFrwWGvWbnCzArkeTZCyzBz4Panr2hLaZxsXHiBQCwBc3fRPH6xY4u5v8ZAd3dPW1aw89Rra86CVwXr3DczANggYbMD",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQkkdBby2GbmvVh66cM6TNzNfh0hR9ePeG7dWYbHfDxK6CcA_rVoxxsRGIoWX5Gs6ZGgQNPTBeehiEHT_cj-5fjZ6ArTluARHPbaXQzWyXKrVYQGd_DaMQQsoaryttl5TvxnFT-Vm4SkVx03K9qNJ4jhArS1r7HKFDPyyrvPGqNF8bjgNELvoomOjpbD9JEvaGI1pYYJVTGbTfcflzyx41E-f9kSqmf10xYzxJrGfC7b7GPY8X7VjMT__ZKSuwdH-5jak-5gkjocsHI6oxIKlLrhW1Wh5yrDCH-QC823TS8NE9VGBzIFAfUt5qazGEcJ8CxeSPxFgg1LgUmXHTRjMrLAeoNgJipw-F81uEwauN0JK-WcohpmWBZy9pc3N1ZXI"
  }
}

{
  "kid": "ExHkBMW9fmbkvV266mRpuP2sUY_N_EWIN1lapUzO8ro",
  "alg": "ES256"
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

The example above uses two types of identifiers. The first identifier is for the verifiable credential and uses an HTTP-based URL. The second identifier is for the subject of the verifiable credential (the thing the claims are about) and uses a decentralized identifier, also known as a DID.

Software systems that process the kinds of objects specified in this document use type information to determine whether or not a provided verifiable credential or verifiable presentation is appropriate for the intended use-case. This specification defines a type property for expressing object type information. This type information can be used during validation processes, as described in Appendix A. Validation.

Verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations MUST contain a type property with an associated value.

type

The value of the type property MUST be one or more terms and absolute URL strings. If more than one value is provided, the order does not matter.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaebSRtPnW6YCpxAhR5JPxJqt9UunCsBPhLEtUokUvp87nQ",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z2F16goBUjRsg2ieNiojpaz313CN98DU4APFiokAUkUvEYESSDmokg1omwvcK7EFqLgYpdyekEoxnVHwuxt8Webwa"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaerJh8WwyBVVGcZKKkqRKK9iezje8ut6t9bnNChtxcWwNv",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-sd-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0AhVhAIC9hFSOtM2k0lFFuKclfp_cYTO5YWhZIYaMEPMcz1jloqTS0Zkww-Lc1U6FP15vJBaIa5ICMknDv16H8r0eh8VgjgCQDJUVkvejrCod7srzLsvKZEVUqzPULOZlb5-cwYdz0K8NYIJNls-gfevdbPuoczDW5TuctpSXJ7V9anf9MrkmJYP7ehVhARNoIdk_H3oT_8HxLP5Fo38e9blzlzSBmFswtxQUPzERVBXcgCU9k6c8pJz_RmjL0Y1eaW50Gl_qs_olK0u7NKlhAD3n7fkV5E-YF4KlodM7PhHP8_kB9you9XtTDVif3tyYsfWewmRysEN0A-EdLZ0WRwSwyJGBaBgGPb5erVUT-ElhAmLyoxIvE3GPC9rTc8tpfNEmTvcwBlpDGMlYkKb52XQeQeQFQwzgCPhpJowOomdMfPUq_xsHih8NsnDN0LXJtVFhArdqKKbPA-tMtA0mMQn1vIZ6mVjeTeJTsdxwZze2EspERwrMcgS25V-fVtjdEXCmNKyL7giUGy4eixjRGYowzpFhADobyi3ucf61IGgBM8_Vy1b8JkaiISFoy_i8ZldQfiqIoG00zU4-jEFuLWvsW7FGfPo0jq-2ZZBvS5H4SjaETJIFnL2lzc3Vlcg"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zUC78GzFRA4TWh2mqRiKro1wwRb5KDaMJ3M1AD3qGtgEbFrwWGvWbnCzArkeTZCyzBz4Panr2hLaZxsXHiBQCwBc3fRPH6xY4u5v8ZAd3dPW1aw89Rra86CVwXr3DczANggYbMD",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQkkdBby2GbmvVh66cM6TNzNfh0hR9ePeG7dWYbHfDxK6CcA_rVoxxsRGIoWX5Gs6ZGgQNPTBeehiEHT_cj-5fjZ6ArTluARHPbaXQzWyXKrVYQGd_DaMQQsoaryttl5TvxnFT-Vm4SkVx03K9qNJ4jhArS1r7HKFDPyyrvPGqNF8bjgNELvoomOjpbD9JEvaGI1pYYJVTGbTfcflzyx41E-f9kSqmf10xYzxJrGfC7b7GPY8X7VjMT__ZKSuwdH-5jak-5gkjocsHI6oxIKlLrhW1Wh5yrDCH-QC823TS8NE9VGBzIFAfUt5qazGEcJ8CxeSPxFgg_vwNGMCz741AWQhjph2NJJcybTTnmtmN1AZd15PefM6BZy9pc3N1ZXI"
  }
}

{
  "kid": "ExHkBMW9fmbkvV266mRpuP2sUY_N_EWIN1lapUzO8ro",
  "alg": "ES256"
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

Concerning this specification, the following table lists the objects that MUST have a type specified.

All credentials, presentations, and encapsulated objects SHOULD specify, or be associated with, additional, more narrow types (like ExampleDegreeCredential, for example) so software systems can more easily detect and process this additional information.

When processing encapsulated objects defined in this specification, such as objects associated with the credentialSubject object or deeply nested therein, software systems SHOULD use the type information specified in encapsulating objects higher in the hierarchy. Specifically, an encapsulating object, such as a credential, SHOULD convey the associated object types so that verifiers can quickly determine the contents of an associated object based on the encapsulating object type.

For example, a credential object with the type of ExampleDegreeCredential, signals to a verifier that the object associated with the credentialSubject property contains the identifier for the:

• Subject in the id property.
• Type of degree in the type property.
• Title of the degree in the name property.

This enables implementers to rely on values associated with the type property for verification. Object types and their associated values are expected to be documented in at least a human-readable specification that can be found at the URL for the type. For example, the human-readable definition for the BitstringStatusList type can be found at https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/status/#BitstringStatusList. It is also suggested that a machine-readable version be provided through HTTP content negotiation at the same URL.

When displaying a credential, it can be helpful to have text provided by the issuer that furnishes the credential with a name and a short description of its purpose. The name and description properties serve these purposes.

name

An OPTIONAL property that expresses the name of the credential. If present, the value of the name property MUST be a string or a language value object as described in 11.1 Language and Base Direction. Ideally, the name of a credential is concise, human-readable, and could enable an individual to quickly differentiate one credential from any other credentials they might hold.

description

An OPTIONAL property that conveys specific details about a credential. If present, the value of the description property MUST be a string or a language value object as described in 11.1 Language and Base Direction. Ideally, the description of a credential is no more than a few sentences in length and conveys enough information about the credential to remind an individual of its contents without having to look through the entirety of the claims.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
    "name": "Example University",
    "description": "A public university focusing on teaching examples."
  },
  "validFrom": "2015-05-10T12:30:00Z",
  "name": "Example University Degree",
  "description": "2015 Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
    "name": "Example University",
    "description": "A public university focusing on teaching examples."
  },
  "validFrom": "2015-05-10T12:30:00Z",
  "name": "Example University Degree",
  "description": "2015 Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaebSRtPnW6YCpxAhR5JPxJqt9UunCsBPhLEtUokUvp87nQ",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z2LeuoNi3yR1b6c3fkRsEvXJ5ex8X4RdutyK7L6HAo2bJQwr21w85Y5KWy3DptXR8ke52Assqik6wKTy9DKqkEZ2r"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
    "name": "Example University",
    "description": "A public university focusing on teaching examples."
  },
  "validFrom": "2015-05-10T12:30:00Z",
  "name": "Example University Degree",
  "description": "2015 Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaerJh8WwyBVVGcZKKkqRKK9iezje8ut6t9bnNChtxcWwNv",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-sd-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0AhVhA5A-VvZ6RF2KlLjsYsx1DosYuzhbD7hn6N6gTF5yv22oTPKcqHyElGQn3TcerwktEbNrRiuWMvmfuw1XmwhCk-lgjgCQCHC44msX1XnfID2VfkUX1j1PHUzfjdORSePcGUhVB3KxYIBeo1lJt0Rp-So7_Ch6hiCE36oR-r6WyVaT6r-o0Nf1nh1hATMKDPXogkIVw6n-pqlDoJMti8cCVJvle_IWSAqv5vShtqt5E6NEJ3PTiK7NwSMSGMVE0XdJXZlEj3xck6UL0vlhAa7ltjeSjPD1TD52OkPPjuQrhADwoTsDXERr-UCuNICq-uxKiFsxebXjys1SeHIFzT0TQA5TlTl-J55vFL90q-lhAi8EKNrgQiKdl_EAlgv3aS15FLuIpUmfROB6srPRpHI4cz-kC8xlarcp9XMqHIpL5hncUJd2EoGTmMpm3nzs3PVhAr4sC2Lin-35yxMSvWXrq7cEGw4IomJnayfWsxmXencGOmXQzZxJbsUHmLCAprm51apFj19BZED6G-82Ilx0ZvlhADRiBGvSKeF3hYkihvS7kkZDnySRU4Q4yfNm_Hwe6kysHhtP5rnbu3LYfU-hI_0P6FbZJrPQ7uifIMg2QMHxARFhAxjQMayCxmcOVGlo5ICU5zQxx6qTgjgpNl1GC1dGjnA1J3xhFALceL5DHxJbSvcRsRVwRjBybMkZurUWhPgzpwVhAhbwrQWJSLLhyXqFcQef_-eKnNE3F5oBq2phORFJ16m3uRU-R-vSoXJlSpyLBZrNGU7gwCHVv0b_e2ZC13MiFR4FnL2lzc3Vlcg"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
    "name": "Example University",
    "description": "A public university focusing on teaching examples."
  },
  "validFrom": "2015-05-10T12:30:00Z",
  "name": "Example University Degree",
  "description": "2015 Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zUC78GzFRA4TWh2mqRiKro1wwRb5KDaMJ3M1AD3qGtgEbFrwWGvWbnCzArkeTZCyzBz4Panr2hLaZxsXHiBQCwBc3fRPH6xY4u5v8ZAd3dPW1aw89Rra86CVwXr3DczANggYbMD",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQkS0mcHTu9KLuuY8_DlU_2lj8Su_EXxWyY0xMPZuCGQMRzah3DFaerG-CRDFWR1KBWkYUpPizkPDULYOU8XsXoC3a8_00GgHfKuoiNCLnSNBYQGd_DaMQQsoaryttl5TvxnFT-Vm4SkVx03K9qNJ4jhArXFDE8ZX70eeJX1DawHuw0sW9CBV3sa68IaRGcnZiiQpYYJVTGbTfcflzyx41E-f9kSqmf10xYzxJrGfC7b7GPY8X7VjMT__ZKSuwdH-5jak-5gkjocsHI6oxIKlLrhW1Wh5yrDCH-QC823TS8NE9VGBzIFAfUt5qazGEcJ8CxeSPxFggbCn9jbv1yUPTocre_YTgvXiebb8lJMqxhmAnw4MiFbWBZy9pc3N1ZXI"
  }
}

{
  "kid": "ExHkBMW9fmbkvV266mRpuP2sUY_N_EWIN1lapUzO8ro",
  "alg": "ES256"
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
    "name": "Example University",
    "description": "A public university focusing on teaching examples."
  },
  "validFrom": "2015-05-10T12:30:00Z",
  "name": "Example University Degree",
  "description": "2015 Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
    "name": "Example University",
    "description": "A public university focusing on teaching examples."
  },
  "validFrom": "2015-05-10T12:30:00Z",
  "name": "Example University Degree",
  "description": "2015 Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

Names and descriptions also support expressing content in different languages. To express a string with language and base direction information, one can use an object that contains the @value, @language, and @direction properties to express the text value, language tag, and base direction, respectively. See 11.1 Language and Base Direction for further information.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
    "name": [{
      "@value": "Example University",
      "@language": "en"
    }, {
      "@value": "Université Exemple",
      "@language": "fr"
    }, {
      "@value": "جامعة المثال",
      "@language": "ar",
      "@direction": "rtl"
    }],
    "description": [{
      "@value": "A public university focusing on teaching examples.",
      "@language": "en"
    }, {
      "@value": "Une université publique axée sur l'enseignement d'exemples.",
      "@language": "fr"
    }, {
      "@value": ".جامعة عامة تركز على أمثلة التدريس",
      "@language": "ar",
      "@direction": "rtl"
    }]
  },
  "validFrom": "2015-05-10T12:30:00Z",
  "name": [{
    "@value": "Example University Degree",
    "@language": "en"
  }, {
    "@value": "Exemple de Diplôme Universitaire",
    "@language": "fr"
  }, {
    "@value": "مثال الشهادة الجامعية",
    "@language": "ar",
    "@direction": "rtl"
  }],
  "description": [{
    "@value": "2015 Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree",
    "@language": "en"
  }, {
    "@value": "2015 Licence de Sciences et d'Arts",
    "@language": "fr"
  }, {
    "@value": "2015 بكالوريوس العلوم والآداب",
    "@language": "ar",
    "@direction": "rtl"
  }],
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": [{
        "@value": "Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree",
        "@language": "en"
      }, {
        "@value": "Licence de Sciences et d'Arts",
        "@language": "fr"
      }, {
        "@value": "بكالوريوس العلوم والآداب",
        "@language": "ar",
        "@direction": "rtl"
      }]
    }
  }
}

This specification defines a property for expressing the issuer of a verifiable credential.

A verifiable credential MUST have an issuer property.

issuer

The value of the issuer property MUST be either a URL or an object containing an id property whose value is a URL; in either case, the issuer selects this URL to identify itself in a globally unambiguous way. It is RECOMMENDED that the URL be one which, if dereferenced, results in a controlled identifier document, as defined in the Controlled Identifiers v1.0 specification, about the issuer that can be used to verify the information expressed in the credential.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaebSRtPnW6YCpxAhR5JPxJqt9UunCsBPhLEtUokUvp87nQ",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z3sXkg3PHbK2YpbhQajunUvReW3Qn66mPsQQKvn4hwEG1DohgUqvXBF2oKT5Qb8tKSKjewNhsJCCcBoY6Rfye4ipw"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaerJh8WwyBVVGcZKKkqRKK9iezje8ut6t9bnNChtxcWwNv",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-sd-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0AhVhA91jcz-MSzf_Z-fw6VM-YN1ijTr26VBTz9H14dMiv6t5vRaGC1IKHvDtY0ZJup1pnliukZBHEXgM46Bf4EjdyIFgjgCQDMIFZRjI7aJUGGsbDYML33eEwJuub6dIF5agqeB4sTdJYIAhgKXoAudJOwmVRpO2Ab5sNIirjQdArIjp8ygMx2S5ihVhASWfZk4fYqoICvoaokYzsABtmDzpgTe8ZkI2z4MDKt1wcp0T9tBx30mk1V20Qhy2PT15nrPygrxpn8_h2Z1Jo7FhAXNmEd28tsb_VkmqckvjVBet7p8Hhq7d8DziDldJRri8-cygIdcaX0MsitDRMsclHCsO25UKSjCX96dSto_Y3FVhAeYhHIz52Lw3Fd8tO7rdPOjILauPLHFkRnmHbd8ixxKwb62gTqchavN3rv8GtKxQL9o-cLCKFm-mpQDUABuYxMVhA-vKFPcx_bNem4ufrFDr-cyjUa3r-zjLJwp9xss7XZikI3PLiiMGIBnhhGs3zCsQXvSZMX6ScPOpog6Kzl-YSj1hA7xtSv3lNDKhPKKQ-7F4WHhmfwj0F1PN_mj5jDkJcdw19eYTux4wRXgehBXRtvkuMw9iG6UFyurMFeyb-EkmQPIFnL2lzc3Vlcg"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zUC78GzFRA4TWh2mqRiKro1wwRb5KDaMJ3M1AD3qGtgEbFrwWGvWbnCzArkeTZCyzBz4Panr2hLaZxsXHiBQCwBc3fRPH6xY4u5v8ZAd3dPW1aw89Rra86CVwXr3DczANggYbMD",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQs4LnYe9N1n9fBW8t7tgXy8gZA1WksN76TfdxHLUW0cJlImiaNZZbbNwAaL86-8xnTgMJgpwaMchm_8VepMSYZKjfQReWnOfwRfwz8grbaNNYQGd_DaMQQsoaryttl5TvxnFT-Vm4SkVx03K9qNJ4jhArKnv3N5iX7nvZR0OCXS-uXH4QQ9mW65QM5qlHOfE4GQVYYJVTGbTfcflzyx41E-f9kSqmf10xYzxJrGfC7b7GPY8X7VjMT__ZKSuwdH-5jak-5gkjocsHI6oxIKlLrhW1Wh5yrDCH-QC823TS8NE9VGBzIFAfUt5qazGEcJ8CxeSPxFggO3rpYlZcra0jsUsWXIoCAXrkmj3mb1o1k8CYE2Wx9d6BZy9pc3N1ZXI"
  }
}

{
  "kid": "ExHkBMW9fmbkvV266mRpuP2sUY_N_EWIN1lapUzO8ro",
  "alg": "ES256"
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

It is also possible to express additional information about the issuer by associating an object with the issuer property:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "did:example:76e12ec712ebc6f1c221ebfeb1f",
    "name": "Example University"
  },
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "did:example:76e12ec712ebc6f1c221ebfeb1f",
    "name": "Example University"
  },
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaebSRtPnW6YCpxAhR5JPxJqt9UunCsBPhLEtUokUvp87nQ",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z35CwmxThsUQ4t79JfacmMcw4y1kCqtD4rKqUooKM2NyKwdF5jmXMRo9oGnzHerf8hfQiWkEReycSXC2NtRrdMZN4"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "did:example:76e12ec712ebc6f1c221ebfeb1f",
    "name": "Example University"
  },
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:33Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaerJh8WwyBVVGcZKKkqRKK9iezje8ut6t9bnNChtxcWwNv",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-sd-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0AhVhA48RQ19Db04U8uJwipJ51iqZLecmjhiPb4k2BXLdHox9KdauSf3Mt6Zhit65HQD3NfKoUBNIhx6u6SkQ_LRN_dlgjgCQCXiUMNh-iT7uOyLhwa_0Ol1mfx4Fhph-wJC4AzOYD8ElYIMaU9eu-pg75GhG_-_CuhoikWj9gtS-qUp4qfdnYI6XAhVhAVag3KzxQuRrStNecEjh3TVoc3hj38x-dqllLiAdbQc_9tlnMJaYIm0HzLXuvqwc7DlSTC7w5D0NX6D2M8NaNqVhAr6tGfnfX0hTJ3a-okEoAyiGTla9x_irE24vYRdi6vlLc-xz5LGVFA5Tyht7GiZaT4kqC3od7Nx57CiHakPBw4VhAGzegEDf5moH7kOGp68C6QQR3TmmVMsFSpU41XLR3-BLBLfuS1gWDQlyAJJDRh_leTFoqkDaxdkcli3NpowghY1hA4WGxUt2yMzqAreubYrAzNKMEQcQts-C0O4y3ErKH9R9UZMnBPY2FslOyagtRB5xE5keh3GGCa9TGNCypiNXVXFhAm-bNAdG37FTLQWR1bVnzRMPaTRr5iWWDMtGoFg78B0v43fkN0r4pPVOj9YcCEFxjS_eCbh9HSnDfHsMRIjnG-oFnL2lzc3Vlcg"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "did:example:76e12ec712ebc6f1c221ebfeb1f",
    "name": "Example University"
  },
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zUC78GzFRA4TWh2mqRiKro1wwRb5KDaMJ3M1AD3qGtgEbFrwWGvWbnCzArkeTZCyzBz4Panr2hLaZxsXHiBQCwBc3fRPH6xY4u5v8ZAd3dPW1aw89Rra86CVwXr3DczANggYbMD",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQswmfQ8aSdnXIildKfGdJUPQ-iT1HwBf8bShxHigrMTIGPA_mbb58NHo_tUU7P6a5AlwACoQDdbgQXIoeIZPmKu7snk3tUbaLIpfacByowWNYQGd_DaMQQsoaryttl5TvxnFT-Vm4SkVx03K9qNJ4jhArQAGpGXTZS6rwOppAPreXlDb3xQb46PJ_xcVri0glVYJYYJVTGbTfcflzyx41E-f9kSqmf10xYzxJrGfC7b7GPY8X7VjMT__ZKSuwdH-5jak-5gkjocsHI6oxIKlLrhW1Wh5yrDCH-QC823TS8NE9VGBzIFAfUt5qazGEcJ8CxeSPxFggxWA747M_eHOtg3OYnWQ7wgc8QZ4KHhjtZYNM8ac6ldiBZy9pc3N1ZXI"
  }
}

{
  "kid": "ExHkBMW9fmbkvV266mRpuP2sUY_N_EWIN1lapUzO8ro",
  "alg": "ES256"
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "did:example:76e12ec712ebc6f1c221ebfeb1f",
    "name": "Example University"
  },
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "did:example:76e12ec712ebc6f1c221ebfeb1f",
    "name": "Example University"
  },
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

A verifiable credential contains claims about one or more subjects. This specification defines a credentialSubject property for the expression of claims about one or more subjects.

A verifiable credential MUST contain a credentialSubject property.

credentialSubject

The value of the credentialSubject property is a set of objects where each object MUST be the subject of one or more claims, which MUST be serialized inside the credentialSubject property. Each object MAY also contain an id property to identify the subject, as described in Section 4.4 Identifiers.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:34Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaebSRtPnW6YCpxAhR5JPxJqt9UunCsBPhLEtUokUvp87nQ",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z36CTYymphefPFDdFakYBe7EHHX7Upev5vtRhxG3ZtKiUPXFKknW9ZTds3wxDhTz1WFCGzFUUv6DC5vifg3VCCSFL"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:34Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaerJh8WwyBVVGcZKKkqRKK9iezje8ut6t9bnNChtxcWwNv",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-sd-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0AhVhAFPsovbuHDInv8ft0M6jMPGrLrNs9j_sEfn1gdDCxFOmyjYDyblufuagmARZj9RabxfO0SkbpUi_m6dQdXIyoklgjgCQC78Ayc-2ykLAZ_NJzb5-S8dtSenHeKEHHGy469czIbhtYILJ97_OhxkzZccWMaUgCAXRO5ZCyoagriazYdV2ViFsuhVhAvGcG2tqQoB5VaC-x652sos00_94wzBOZg9wGR2mytwn_alXEbksbCMUC2lmiU_FrcFzEEAZrAdcsAfoE0J_KRlhAc71QXbdP2iKlqmgocH4qvDcv_3PT_VmSFGWISFdrQPkmv2lb2r9Mb02yZYilf20oMzCPCRsqYP--0g8ysm9doVhAIqwWkfg1pXXKaxx4_5_QpmoOoXjLPNhJ-14QSHUyxTKKCTarm33OdaIhhCjm5_e7MUCYHvA89vCSvSHMrKvKclhASFp1GivaJXYrbBcM6xNFNsXW7xBg7cZXfBeGOwcXf7fXg1GwMJILZBimOaEM5Eay38F8T6HwbeuMvBQ7b05gbFhAkLeI8-tdeQQzX6ik0xDSM4yLsHPmhG47Tu5Hm25ujoo9iVsLzskiGcIsQLsqvRK5238FvPQAeOpK04R7F2aK9IFnL2lzc3Vlcg"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zUC78GzFRA4TWh2mqRiKro1wwRb5KDaMJ3M1AD3qGtgEbFrwWGvWbnCzArkeTZCyzBz4Panr2hLaZxsXHiBQCwBc3fRPH6xY4u5v8ZAd3dPW1aw89Rra86CVwXr3DczANggYbMD",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQkkdBby2GbmvVh66cM6TNzNfh0hR9ePeG7dWYbHfDxK6CcA_rVoxxsRGIoWX5Gs6ZGgQNPTBeehiEHT_cj-5fjZ6ArTluARHPbaXQzWyXKrVYQGd_DaMQQsoaryttl5TvxnFT-Vm4SkVx03K9qNJ4jhArS1r7HKFDPyyrvPGqNF8bjgNELvoomOjpbD9JEvaGI1pYYJVTGbTfcflzyx41E-f9kSqmf10xYzxJrGfC7b7GPY8X7VjMT__ZKSuwdH-5jak-5gkjocsHI6oxIKlLrhW1Wh5yrDCH-QC823TS8NE9VGBzIFAfUt5qazGEcJ8CxeSPxFggUfIz7Xi8QhNU6pC7qIkL0HkvpKYuV2rzBuKizKrBhU6BZy9pc3N1ZXI"
  }
}

{
  "kid": "ExHkBMW9fmbkvV266mRpuP2sUY_N_EWIN1lapUzO8ro",
  "alg": "ES256"
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

Expressing information related to multiple subjects in a verifiable credential is possible. The example below specifies two subjects who are spouses. Note the use of array notation to associate multiple subjects with the credentialSubject property.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "RelationshipCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuer/123",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": [{
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "name": "Jayden Doe",
    "spouse": "did:example:c276e12ec21ebfeb1f712ebc6f1"
  }, {
    "id": "https://subject.example/subject/8675",
    "name": "Morgan Doe",
    "spouse": "https://subject.example/subject/7421"
  }]
}

This specification defines the validFrom property to help an issuer to express the date and time when a credential becomes valid and the validUntil property to express the date and time when a credential ceases to be valid.

When comparing dates and times, the calculation is done "temporally", meaning that the string value is converted to a "temporal value" which exists as a point on a timeline. Temporal comparisons are then performed by checking to see where the date and time being compared are in relation to a particular point on the timeline.

validFrom

If present, the value of the validFrom property MUST be a [XMLSCHEMA11-2] dateTimeStamp string value representing the date and time the credential becomes valid, which could be a date and time in the future or the past. Note that this value represents the earliest point in time at which the information associated with the credentialSubject property becomes valid. If a validUntil value also exists, the validFrom value MUST express a point in time that is temporally the same or earlier than the point in time expressed by the validUntil value.

validUntil

If present, the value of the validUntil property MUST be a [XMLSCHEMA11-2] dateTimeStamp string value representing the date and time the credential ceases to be valid, which could be a date and time in the past or the future. Note that this value represents the latest point in time at which the information associated with the credentialSubject property is valid. If a validFrom value also exists, the validUntil value MUST express a point in time that is temporally the same or later than the point in time expressed by the validFrom value.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "validUntil": "2020-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "validUntil": "2020-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:34Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaebSRtPnW6YCpxAhR5JPxJqt9UunCsBPhLEtUokUvp87nQ",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z65sN9W58eruTDUUXYxxwhG4cQ73zQkQuhMYvUVipeM4oEUBPbCxd3oTQTJhnfHN9juyZSzYpERYFjZcfpb2xgeto"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "validUntil": "2020-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:34Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaerJh8WwyBVVGcZKKkqRKK9iezje8ut6t9bnNChtxcWwNv",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-sd-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0AhVhAxWvPP0HD9usaRDFthqpz1zXbWtTpNr_1pRFMKY9wbt7RAh0kwkoqR9cFHY0PdBj0cPo9BXd_54Z9iLl7GsmAjlgjgCQCJ0FUx3YRbBxybCrTEtFINFNKD7UC2j8tjmvYa6EQKlNYIL-KVtIrAWQi98Ng86FB4giy2xKCqn_kNOmO75D7AQfEhlhA5pKNMOahYQbk8obEMFyLgAsmd3FGqf3FoDTojybRWUPf7F3A22Kl1822zW093-XtKum7Nfe3q16norHXUnhkWVhAvNR9By8I5ISJtylSp1fkzurbIvSXVhkaj4wsUpbTy1GnYHzeS7qhAyUoO4GkIMUfP3yLS0BIGBbJR7de1s5G4lhATnwFdztYAEXk6z93jJot3TPhlnOYk10G0e7u3uyJJF-ZrAsctOYbjF3ZcNZu3UXJZRe4_ytxr5OqwIVLnUfDqFhAkff2_b4hqpz0uK0kDHjkpMun4mAhuxVCjcmyIlJnaaTdFc2RovLnKiPx4Xnd9P_lOd3ZQoz5ThPWzMS7r_43M1hAmVVtNJ7-lpJdlc9tg5e3GpAhnXzYHpiv3WRRT3F4tH8B_zkHnyeNBT61d16TTnvlFn5mFXJ99FD4abIcQkyP_lhA8IS9pAGKqVgTDzxXSvGcGWMXQ4LEy3jfywyDpdiZodvttNhuZVBMkGKhNBo94oGjIHRfoeAFvQfZQo8_ENtBEYFnL2lzc3Vlcg"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "validUntil": "2020-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zUC78GzFRA4TWh2mqRiKro1wwRb5KDaMJ3M1AD3qGtgEbFrwWGvWbnCzArkeTZCyzBz4Panr2hLaZxsXHiBQCwBc3fRPH6xY4u5v8ZAd3dPW1aw89Rra86CVwXr3DczANggYbMD",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQjBPG4AXIRGKu6h5awRiAZHSrx5gfUdbWc2rAxdsfIzSIywzsphRnlb5rPDWwdJlBF5krx4JRYNtT7exHHAw_aZtO6AARXGfbz0eHNrcTKL5YQGd_DaMQQsoaryttl5TvxnFT-Vm4SkVx03K9qNJ4jhArKnv3N5iX7nvZR0OCXS-uXH4QQ9mW65QM5qlHOfE4GQVYYJVTGbTfcflzyx41E-f9kSqmf10xYzxJrGfC7b7GPY8X7VjMT__ZKSuwdH-5jak-5gkjocsHI6oxIKlLrhW1Wh5yrDCH-QC823TS8NE9VGBzIFAfUt5qazGEcJ8CxeSPxFggWjulaLj5whA4VZOvBqHQbwhSW7Ph0eZ2bxz7ota_qnCBZy9pc3N1ZXI"
  }
}

{
  "kid": "ExHkBMW9fmbkvV266mRpuP2sUY_N_EWIN1lapUzO8ro",
  "alg": "ES256"
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "validUntil": "2020-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "validUntil": "2020-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

This specification defines the credentialStatus property for discovering information related to the status of a verifiable credential, such as whether it is suspended or revoked.

If present, the value associated with the credentialStatus property is a single object or a set of one or more objects. The following properties are defined for every object:

id

The id property is OPTIONAL. It MAY be used to provide a unique identifier for the credential status object. If present, the normative guidance in Section 4.4 Identifiers MUST be followed.

type

The type property is REQUIRED. It is used to express the type of status information expressed by the object. The related normative guidance in Section 4.5 Types MUST be followed.

The precise content of the credential status information is determined by the specific credentialStatus type definition and varies depending on factors such as whether it is simple to implement or if it is privacy-enhancing. The value will provide enough information to determine the current status of the credential and whether machine-readable information will be retrievable from the URL. For example, the object could contain a link to an external document that notes whether the credential is suspended or revoked.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "credentialStatus": {
    "id": "https://university.example/credentials/status/3#94567",
    "type": "BitstringStatusListEntry",
    "statusPurpose": "revocation",
    "statusListIndex": "94567",
    "statusListCredential": "https://university.example/credentials/status/3"
  }
}

A credential can have more than one status associated with it, such as whether it has been revoked or suspended.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://license.example/credentials/9837",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDrivingLicenseCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://license.example/issuers/48",
  "validFrom": "2020-03-14T12:10:42Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:f1c276e12ec21ebfeb1f712ebc6",
    "license": {
      "type": "ExampleDrivingLicense",
      "name": "License to Drive a Car"
    }
  },
  "credentialStatus": [{
    "id": "https://license.example/credentials/status/84#14278",
    "type": "BitstringStatusListEntry",
    "statusPurpose": "revocation",
    "statusListIndex": "14278",
    "statusListCredential": "https://license.example/credentials/status/84"
  }, {
    "id": "https://license.example/credentials/status/84#82938",
    "type": "BitstringStatusListEntry",
    "statusPurpose": "suspension",
    "statusListIndex": "82938",
    "statusListCredential": "https://license.example/credentials/status/84"
  }]
}

Implementers are cautioned that credentials with multiple status entries might contain conflicting information. Reconciling such conflicts is a part of the validation process, hence part of the verifier's business logic, and therefore out of scope for this specification.

Defining the data model, formats, and protocols for status schemes is out of the scope of this specification. The Verifiable Credential Extensions document contains available status schemes for implementers who want to implement verifiable credential status checking.

Credential status specifications MUST NOT enable tracking of individuals, such as an issuer being notified (either directly or indirectly) when a verifier is interested in a specific holder or subject. Unacceptable approaches include "phoning home," such that every use of a credential contacts the issuer of the credential to check the status for a specific individual, or "pseudonymity reduction," such that every use of the credential causes a request for information from the issuer that the issuer can use to deduce verifier interest in a specific individual.

Data schemas are useful when enforcing a specific structure on a given data collection. There are at least two types of data schemas that this specification considers:

• Data verification schemas, which are used to establish that the structure and contents of a credential or verifiable credential conform to a published schema.
• Data encoding schemas, which are used to map the contents of a verifiable credential to an alternative representation format, such as a format used in a zero-knowledge proof.

It is important to understand that data schemas serve a different purpose from the @context property, which neither enforces data structure or data syntax nor enables the definition of arbitrary encodings to alternate representation formats.

This specification defines the following property for expressing a data schema, which an issuer can include in the verifiable credentials that it issues:

credentialSchema

The value of the credentialSchema property MUST be one or more data schemas that provide verifiers with enough information to determine whether the provided data conforms to the provided schema(s). Each credentialSchema MUST specify its type (for example, JsonSchema) and an id property that MUST be a URL identifying the schema file. The specific type definition determines the precise contents of each data schema.

If multiple schemas are present, validity is determined according to the processing rules outlined by each associated type property.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential", "ExamplePersonCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    },
    "alumniOf": {
      "name": "Example University"
    }
  },
  "credentialSchema": [{
    "id": "https://example.org/examples/degree.json",
    "type": "JsonSchema"
  },
  {
    "id": "https://example.org/examples/alumni.json",
    "type": "JsonSchema"
  }]
}

In the example above, the issuer is specifying two credentialSchema objects, each of which point to a JSON Schema [VC-JSON-SCHEMA] file that a verifier can use to determine whether the verifiable credential is well-formed.

This specification recognizes two classes of securing mechanisms: those that use enveloping proofs and those that use embedded proofs.

An enveloping proof wraps a serialization of this data model. One such RECOMMENDED enveloping proof mechanism is defined in Securing Verifiable Credentials using JOSE and COSE [VC-JOSE-COSE].

An embedded proof is a mechanism where the proof is included in the serialization of the data model. One such RECOMMENDED embedded proof mechanism is defined in Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0 [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY].

These two classes of securing mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Additional securing mechanism specifications might also be defined according to the rules in Section 5.13 Securing Mechanism Specifications.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://example.gov/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": "did:example:6fb1f712ebe12c27cc26eebfe11",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "https://subject.example/subject/3921",
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
    "created": "2021-11-13T18:19:39Z",
    "verificationMethod": "https://university.example/issuers/14#key-1",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z58DAdFfa9SkqZMVPxAQp...jQCrfFPP2oumHKtz"
  }
}

The embedded proof above secures the original credential by decorating the original data with a digital signature via the proof property. This results in a verifiable credential that is easy to manage in modern programming environments and database systems.

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.
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~
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~
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~
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~
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The enveloping proof above secures the original credential by encapsulating the original data in a digital signature envelope, resulting in a verifiable credential that can be processed using tooling that understands the SD-JWT format.

Verifiable presentations MAY be used to aggregate information from multiple verifiable credentials.

Verifiable presentations SHOULD be extremely short-lived and bound to a challenge provided by a verifier. Details for accomplishing this depend on the securing mechanism, the transport protocol, and verifier policies. Unless additional requirements are defined by the particular securing mechanism or embedding protocol, a verifier cannot generally assume that the verifiable presentation correlates with the presented verifiable credentials.

The default graph of a verifiable presentation is also referred to as the verifiable presentation graph.

The following properties are defined for a verifiable presentation:

id

The id property is optional. It MAY be used to provide a unique identifier for the verifiable presentation. If present, the normative guidance in Section 4.4 Identifiers MUST be followed.

type

The type property MUST be present. It is used to express the type of verifiable presentation. One value of this property MUST be VerifiablePresentation, but additional types MAY be included. The related normative guidance in Section 4.5 Types MUST be followed.

verifiableCredential

The verifiableCredential property MAY be present. The value MUST be one or more verifiable credential and/or enveloped verifiable credential objects (the values MUST NOT be non-object values such as numbers, strings, or URLs). These objects are called verifiable credential graphs and MUST express information that is secured using a securing mechanism. See Section 5.12 Verifiable Credential Graphs for further details.

holder

The verifiable presentation MAY include a holder property. If present, the value MUST be either a URL or an object containing an id property. It is RECOMMENDED that the URL in the holder or its id be one which, if dereferenced, results in a document containing machine-readable information about the holder that can be used to verify the information expressed in the verifiable presentation. If the holder property is absent, information about the holder is obtained either via the securing mechanism or does not pertain to the validation of the verifiable presentation.

The example below shows a verifiable presentation:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "urn:uuid:3978344f-8596-4c3a-a978-8fcaba3903c5",
  "type": ["VerifiablePresentation", "ExamplePresentation"],
  "verifiableCredential": [{  }]
}

The contents of the verifiableCredential property shown above are verifiable credential graphs, as described by this specification.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": ["VerifiablePresentation", "ExamplePresentation"],
  "verifiableCredential": [{
    "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "id": "data:application/vc+sd-jwt,QzVjV...RMjU",
    "type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"
  }]
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": ["VerifiablePresentation", "ExamplePresentation"],
  "holder": "did:example:12345678",
  "verifiableCredential": [{
    "@context": [
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
    ],
    "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleFoodPreferenceCredential"],
    "issuer": "did:example:12345678",
    "credentialSubject": {
      "favoriteCheese": "Gouda"
    },
    {  }
  }],
  "proof": [{  }]
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": ["VerifiablePresentation", "ExamplePresentation"],
  "id": "urn:uuid:313801ba-24b7-11ee-be02-ff560265cf9b",
  "holder": "did:example:12345678",
  "verifiableCredential": [{
    "@context": [
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
    ],
    "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleAssertCredential"],
    "issuer": "did:example:12345678",
    "credentialSubject": {
      "id": "urn:uuid:313801ba-24b7-11ee-be02-ff560265cf9b",
      "assertion": "This VP is submitted by the subject as evidence of a legal right to drive"
    },
    "proof": {  }
  }],
  "proof": {  }
}

This section is non-normative.

The verifiable credentials trust model is based on the following expectations:

• The verifier expects the issuer to verifiably issue the credential that it receives. This can be established by satisfying either of the following:
• All entities expect the verifiable data registry to be tamper-evident and to be a correct record of which data is controlled by which entities. This is typically achieved by the method of its publication. This could be via a peer-to-peer protocol from a trusted publisher, a publicly accessible and well known web site (with a content hash), a blockchain, etc. When entities publish metadata about themselves, the publication can be integrity-protected by being secured using with the entity's private key.
• The holder and verifier expect the issuer to stand by claims it makes in credentials about the subject, and to revoke credentials quickly if and when they no longer stand by those claims.
• The holder might trust the issuer's claims because the holder has a pre-existing trust relationship with the issuer. For example, an employer might provide an employee with an employment verifiable credential, or a government might issue an electronic passport to a citizen.

  Where no pre-existing trust relationship exists, the holder might have some out-of-band means of determining whether the issuer is qualified to issue the verifiable credential being provided.

  Note: It is not always necessary for the holder to trust the issuer, since the issued verifiable credential might be an assertion about a subject who is not the holder, or about no-one, and the holder might be willing to relay this information to a verifier without being held accountable for its veracity.

• The holder expects the credential repository to store credentials securely, to not release credentials to anyone other than the holder (which may subsequently present them to a verifier), and to not corrupt nor lose credentials while they are in its care.

This trust model differentiates itself from other trust models by ensuring the following:

How verifiers decide which issuers to trust, and for what data or purposes, is out of scope for this recommendation. Some issuers, such as well-known organizations, might be trusted by many verifiers simply because of their reputation. Some issuers and verifiers might be members of a community in which all members trust each other due to the rules of membership. Some verifiers might trust a specific trust-service provider whose responsibility is to vet issuers and list them in a trust list such as those specified in Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trusted Lists [ETSI-TRUST-LISTS] or the Adobe Approved Trust List.

By decoupling the expectations between the issuer and the verifier, a more flexible and dynamic trust model is created, such that market competition and customer choice is increased.

For more information about how this trust model interacts with various threat models studied by the Working Group, see the Verifiable Credentials Use Cases [VC-USE-CASES].

One of the goals of the Verifiable Credentials Data Model is to enable permissionless innovation. To achieve this, the data model needs to be extensible in a number of different ways. The data model is required to:

This approach to data modeling is often called an open world assumption, meaning that any entity can say anything about any other entity. While this approach seems to conflict with building simple and predictable software systems, balancing extensibility with program correctness is always more challenging with an open world assumption than with closed software systems.

The rest of this section describes, through a series of examples, how both extensibility and program correctness are achieved.

Let us assume we start with the credential shown below.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://vc.example/credentials/4643",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2018-02-24T05:28:04Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdef1234567",
    "name": "Jane Doe"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://vc.example/credentials/4643",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2018-02-24T05:28:04Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdef1234567",
    "name": "Jane Doe"
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:34Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaebSRtPnW6YCpxAhR5JPxJqt9UunCsBPhLEtUokUvp87nQ",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z3FfiNeGUGhy8ApiRsv42y5VUPFgbieFbUJebkKhkZ6tNASNv6MkiJwNGWczfmrdYdmLZa6r3rtJ4BSF9BjnwrSo8"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://vc.example/credentials/4643",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2018-02-24T05:28:04Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdef1234567",
    "name": "Jane Doe"
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:34Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaerJh8WwyBVVGcZKKkqRKK9iezje8ut6t9bnNChtxcWwNv",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-sd-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0AhVhA8DUmqMDGQOAZ8hIuyi_X-LbT_fD_guDAKeRkRbAwk8aXyQeTRQErpRbOMQiYhWHKelW9XSZSIU3_dk8s-SLLIVgjgCQCEJqTiBGYPxkutgRjtMH-_iViqDBvJl4I9XVBXrsRRBhYIC2fjWyVwswq0oXkkyYFTxwdT5k-XZWMJx7JdwFPfALfg1hApuvVmqTlFFKpI79s8M8CND3arkiGE6talSgE8n2iT9NxbWYgiqH0s3Zxo_eXGCbBoxibB3_VMt9huvsz51yhxVhAj55Js6Ka1i7-mfjrszFmD1W0Lc81XKCtAqHvF-qY2XWd6cpHIwWlSvU3NxSoYpcAdxUrgAu17iEmHMLvpdyllFhAo4kADpzjQ_AeB0nvp-IzeawelLeusg8t2M2yZLPzcN3R4alEKnbWofwSflHD2Yx_QQW3U9Ck9YALaKZbO_KIRYFnL2lzc3Vlcg"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://vc.example/credentials/4643",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2018-02-24T05:28:04Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdef1234567",
    "name": "Jane Doe"
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zUC78GzFRA4TWh2mqRiKro1wwRb5KDaMJ3M1AD3qGtgEbFrwWGvWbnCzArkeTZCyzBz4Panr2hLaZxsXHiBQCwBc3fRPH6xY4u5v8ZAd3dPW1aw89Rra86CVwXr3DczANggYbMD",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQtDW_taTeCBSwoqWX3rzUAFmrR8_TAfE8027nlDX8x4Eiquv_i6S7XU_4mnGV-ODaZYnVuh47RBcLtkevGmEDr_0aXc7ujmM6icKfQgg88cRYQGd_DaMQQsoaryttl5TvxnFT-Vm4SkVx03K9qNJ4jhArvqENcCm8D2khyMGr7-FGFdx818_ufbFmo8hKn_2FgMpYYJVTGbTfcflzyx41E-f9kSqmf10xYzxJrGfC7b7GPY8X7VjMT__ZKSuwdH-5jak-5gkjocsHI6oxIKlLrhW1Wh5yrDCH-QC823TS8NE9VGBzIFAfUt5qazGEcJ8CxeSPxFggPmXI3YCyx-_cwMML4xSJvv9xy0Xvrw9Qb6s21_i5rHiBZy9pc3N1ZXI"
  }
}

{
  "kid": "ExHkBMW9fmbkvV266mRpuP2sUY_N_EWIN1lapUzO8ro",
  "alg": "ES256"
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://vc.example/credentials/4643",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2018-02-24T05:28:04Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdef1234567",
    "name": "Jane Doe"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://vc.example/credentials/4643",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2018-02-24T05:28:04Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdef1234567",
    "name": "Jane Doe"
  }
}

This verifiable credential states that the entity associated with did:example:abcdef1234567 has a name with a value of Jane Doe.

Now let us assume a developer wants to extend the verifiable credential to store two additional pieces of information: an internal corporate reference number, and Jane's favorite food.

The first thing to do is to create a JSON-LD context containing two new terms, as shown below.

{
  "@context": {
    "referenceNumber": "https://extension.example/vocab#referenceNumber",
    "favoriteFood": "https://extension.example/vocab#favoriteFood"
  }
}

After this JSON-LD context is created, the developer publishes it somewhere so it is accessible to verifiers who will be processing the verifiable credential. Assuming the above JSON-LD context is published at https://extension.example/my-contexts/v1, we can extend this example by including the context and adding the new properties and credential type to the verifiable credential.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2",
    "https://extension.example/my-contexts/v1"
  ],
  "id": "http://vc.example/credentials/4643",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "CustomExt12"],
  "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2018-02-24T05:28:04Z",
  "referenceNumber": 83294847,
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:abcdef1234567",
    "name": "Jane Doe",
    "favoriteFood": "Papaya"
  }
}

This example demonstrates extending the Verifiable Credentials Data Model in a permissionless and decentralized way. The mechanism shown also ensures that verifiable credentials created in this way provide a way to prevent namespace conflicts and semantic ambiguity.

A dynamic extensibility model such as this does increase the implementation burden. Software written for such a system has to determine whether verifiable credentials with extensions are acceptable based on the risk profile of the application. Some applications might accept only certain extensions while highly secure environments might not accept any extensions. These decisions are up to the developers of these applications and are specifically not the domain of this specification.

Extension specification authors are urged to ensure that their documents, such as JSON-LD Contexts, are highly available. Developers using these documents might use software that produces errors when these documents cannot be retrieved. Strategies for ensuring that extension JSON-LD contexts are always available include bundling these documents with implementations, content distribution networks with long caching timeframes, or using content-addressed URLs for contexts. These approaches are covered in further detail in Appendix B. Contexts, Vocabularies, Types, and Credential Schemas.

Implementers are advised to pay close attention to the extension points in this specification, such as in Sections 4.10 Status, 4.11 Data Schemas, 4.12 Securing Mechanisms, 5.4 Refreshing, 5.5 Terms of Use, and 5.6 Evidence. While this specification does not define concrete implementations for those extension points, the Verifiable Credential Extensions document provides an unofficial, curated list of extensions that developers can use from these extension points.

It is useful for systems to enable the manual or automatic refresh of an expired verifiable credential. For more information about validity periods for verifiable credentials, see Section A.7 Validity Periods. This specification defines a refreshService property, which enables an issuer to include a link to a refresh service.

The issuer can include the refresh service as an element inside the verifiable credential if it is intended for either the verifier or the holder (or both), or inside the verifiable presentation if it is intended for the holder only. In the latter case, this enables the holder to refresh the verifiable credential before creating a verifiable presentation to share with a verifier. In the former case, including the refresh service inside the verifiable credential enables either the holder or the verifier to perform future updates of the credential.

The refresh service is only expected to be used when either the credential has expired or the issuer does not publish credential status information. Issuers are advised not to put the refreshService property in a verifiable credential that does not contain public information or whose refresh service is not protected in some way.

refreshService

The value of the refreshService property MUST be one or more refresh services that provides enough information to the recipient's software such that the recipient can refresh the verifiable credential. Each refreshService value MUST specify its type. The precise content of each refresh service is determined by the specific refreshService type definition.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://w3id.org/age/v1"
  ],
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "AgeVerificationCredential"],
  "issuer": "did:key:z6MksFxi8wnHkNq4zgEskSZF45SuWQ4HndWSAVYRRGe9qDks",
  "validFrom": "2024-04-03T00:00:00.000Z",
  "validUntil": "2024-12-15T00:00:00.000Z",
  "name": "Age Verification Credential",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "overAge": 21
  },
  "refreshService": {
    "type": "VerifiableCredentialRefreshService2021",
    "url": "https://registration.provider.example/flows/reissue-age-token",
    "refreshToken": "z2BJYfNtmWRiouWhDrbDQmC2zicUPBxsPg"
  }
}

In the example above, the issuer specifies an automatic refreshService that can be used by POSTing the verifiable credential to the refresh service url. Note that this particular verifiable credential is not intended to be shared with anyone except for the original issuer.

Terms of use can be used by an issuer or a holder to communicate the terms under which a verifiable credential or verifiable presentation was issued. The issuer places their terms of use inside the verifiable credential. The holder places their terms of use inside a verifiable presentation. This specification defines a termsOfUse property for expressing terms of use information.

The value of the termsOfUse property might be used to tell the verifier any or all of the following, among other things:

• the procedures or policies that were used in issuing the verifiable credential, by providing, for example, a pointer to a public location (to avoid "phone home" privacy issues) where these procedures or policies can be found, or the name of the standard that defines them
• the rules and policies of the issuer that apply to the presentation of this verifiable credential to a verifier, by providing, for example, a pointer to a public location (to avoid "phone home" privacy issues) where these rules or policies can be found
• the identity of the entity under whose authority the issuer issued this particular verifiable credential

termsOfUse

The value of the termsOfUse property MUST specify one or more terms of use policies under which the creator issued the credential or presentation. If the recipient (a holder or verifier) is not willing to adhere to the specified terms of use, then they do so on their own responsibility and might incur legal liability if they violate the stated terms of use. Each termsOfUse value MUST specify its type, for example, TrustFrameworkPolicy, and MAY specify its instance id. The precise contents of each term of use is determined by the specific termsOfUse type definition.

{
  {
    "@context": [
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/undefined-terms/v2"
    ],
    "id": "urn:uuid:08e26d22-8dca-4558-9c14-6e7aa7275b9b",
    "type": [
      "VerifiableCredential",
      "VerifiableAttestation",
      "VerifiableTrustModel",
      "VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain"
    ],
    "issuer": "did:ebsi:zZeKyEJfUTGwajhNyNX928z",
    "validFrom": "2021-11-01T00:00:00Z",
    "validUntil": "2024-06-22T14:11:44Z",
    "credentialSubject": {
      "id": "did:ebsi:zvHWX359A3CvfJnCYaAiAde",
      "reservedAttributeId": "60ae46e4fe9adffe0bc83c5e5be825aafe6b5246676398cd1ac36b8999e088a8",
      "permissionFor": [{
        "schemaId": "https://api-test.ebsi.eu/trusted-schemas-registry/v3/schemas/zHgbyz9ajVuSProgyMhsiwpcp8g8aVLFRNARm51yyYZp6",
        "types": [
          "VerifiableCredential",
          "VerifiableAttestation",
          "WorkCertificate"
        ],
        "jurisdiction": "https://publications.europa.eu/resource/authority/atu/EUR"
      }]
    },
    "termsOfUse": {
      "type": "TrustFrameworkPolicy",
      "trustFramework": "Employment&Life",
      "policyId": "https://policy.example/policies/125",
      "legalBasis": "professional qualifications directive"
    },
    "credentialStatus": {
      "id": "https://api-test.ebsi.eu/trusted-issuers-registry/v5/issuers/did:ebsi:zvHWX359A3CvfJnCYaAiAde/attributes/60ae46e4fe9adffe0bc83c5e5be825aafe6b5246676398cd1ac36b8999e088a8",
      "type": "EbsiAccreditationEntry"
    },
    "credentialSchema": {
      "id": "https://api-test.ebsi.eu/trusted-schemas-registry/v3/schemas/zCSHSDwrkkd32eNjQsMCc1h8cnFaxyTXP5ByozyVQXZoH",
      "type": "JsonSchema"
    }
  }
}

In the example above, the issuer is asserting that the legal basis under which the verifiable credential has been issued is the "professional qualifications directive" using the "Employment&Life" trust framework, with a specific link to the policy.

This feature is expected to be used by government-issued verifiable credentials to instruct digital wallets to limit their use to similar government organizations in an attempt to protect citizens from unexpected use of sensitive data. Similarly, some verifiable credentials issued by private industry are expected to limit use to within departments inside the organization, or during business hours. Implementers are urged to read more about this evolving feature in the appropriate section of the Verifiable Credentials Implementation Guidelines [VC-IMP-GUIDE] document.

Evidence can be included by an issuer to provide the verifier with additional supporting information in a verifiable credential. This could be used by the verifier to establish the confidence with which it relies on the claims in the verifiable credential. For example, an issuer could check physical documentation provided by the subject or perform a set of background checks before issuing the credential. In certain scenarios, this information is useful to the verifier when determining the risk associated with relying on a given credential.

This specification defines the evidence property for expressing evidence information.

evidence

If present, the value of the evidence property MUST be either a single object or a set of one or more objects. The following properties are defined for every evidence object:

id

The id property is OPTIONAL. It MAY be used to provide a unique identifier for the evidence object. If present, the normative guidance in Section 4.4 Identifiers MUST be followed.

type

The type property is REQUIRED. It is used to express the type of evidence information expressed by the object. The related normative guidance in Section 4.5 Types MUST be followed.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://purl.imsglobal.org/spec/ob/v3p0/context-3.0.3.json"
  ],
  "id": "http://1edtech.edu/credentials/3732",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "OpenBadgeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://1edtech.edu/issuers/565049",
    "type": "Profile"
  },
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "type": "AchievementSubject",
    "name": "Alice Smith",
    "activityEndDate": "2023-12-02T00:00:00Z",
    "activityStartDate": "2023-12-01T00:00:00Z",
    "awardedDate": "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z",
    "achievement": [{
      "id": "urn:uuid:d46e8ef1-c647-419b-be18-5e045d1c4e64",
      "type": ["Achievement"],
      "name": "Basic Barista Training",
      "criteria": {
        "narrative": "Team members are nominated for this badge by their supervisors, after passing the Basic Barista Training course."
      },
      "description": "This achievement certifies that the bearer is proficient in basic barista skills."
    }]
  },
  "evidence": [{
      
      "id": "https://videos.example/training/alice-espresso.mp4",
      "type": ["Evidence"],
      "name": "Talk-aloud video of double espresso preparation",
      "description": "This is a talk-aloud video of Alice demonstrating preparation of a double espresso drink.",
      
      "digestMultibase": "uELq9FnJ5YLa5iAszyJ518bXcnlc5P7xp1u-5uJRDYKvc"
    }
  ]
}

In the evidence example above, the issuer is asserting that they have video of the subject of the credential demonstrating the achievement.

Zero-knowledge proofs are securing mechanisms which enable a holder to prove that they hold a verifiable credential containing a value without disclosing the actual value such as being able to prove that an individual is over the age of 25 without revealing their birthday. This data model supports being secured using zero-knowledge proofs.

Some capabilities that are compatible with verifiable credentials which are made possible by zero-knowledge proof mechanisms include:

Specification authors that create securing mechanisms MUST NOT design them in such a way that they leak information that would enable the verifier to correlate a holder across multiple verifiable presentations to different verifiers.

Not all capabilities are supported in all zero-knowledge proof mechanisms. Specific details about the capabilities and techniques provided by a particular zero knowledge proof mechanism, along with any normative requirements for using them with verifiable credentials, would be found in a specification for securing verifiable credentials with that zero-knowledge proof mechanism. For an example of such a specification, refer to the Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuites v1.0.

We note that in most instances, for the holder to make use of zero knowledge mechanisms with verifiable credentials, the issuer is required to secure the verifiable credential in a manner that supports these capabilities.

The diagram below highlights how the data model might be used to issue and present verifiable credentials in zero-knowledge.

An example of a verifiable credential and a verifiable presentation using the Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuites v1.0 unlinkable selective disclosure securing mechanism is shown below.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://w3id.org/citizenship/v3"
  ],
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "PermanentResidentCard"],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "did:web:credentials.utopia.example",
    "image": "...YII="
  },
  "identifier": "83627465",
  "name": "Permanent Resident Card",
  "description": "Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.",
  "validFrom": "2024-08-01T00:00:00Z",
  "validUntil": "2029-12-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "type": ["PermanentResident", "Person"],
    "givenName": "JANE",
    "familyName": "SMITH",
    "gender": "Female",
    "image": "...Jggg==",
    "residentSince": "2015-01-01",
    "lprCategory": "C09",
    "lprNumber": "999-999-999",
    "commuterClassification": "C1",
    "birthCountry": "Arcadia",
    "birthDate": "1978-07-17"
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:web:playground.alpha.chapi.io#zUC75LjjCLGKRxSissX1nAebRDmY4Bv4T6MAbzgaap9Q8rAGf6SEjc2Hf4nH6bUPDwky3GWoYcUjMCcEqRRQfXEiNwfeDwNYLoeqk1J1W2Ye8vCdwv4fSd8AZ1yS6UoNzcsQoPS",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQjYs9O7wUb3KRSMaIRX7jmafVHYDPYBLD4ta85_qmuXTBU_t2Ir7pNujwRE6fERsBUEZRSjJjtI-hqOqDs3VvBvH6gd3o2KeUS2V_zpuphPpYQEkapOeQgRTak9lHKSTqEQqa4j2lyHqekEeGvzPlqcHQGFccGifvLUXtP59jCuGJ86HDA9HL5kDzUT6n4Gi50HlYYIzNqhbjIxlqOuxO2IgIppSTWjQGeer34-PmKnOzKX8m_9DHPhif7TUf5uTV4OQWdhb0SxHnJ-CPu_z9FJ5ACekBQhz6YWS0_CY6j_ibucXzeVfZwLv1W47pjbt-l1Vl5VggSn2xVt69Q0GD9mPKpOhkKV_hyOL7i6haf7bq-gOKAwWDZy9pc3N1ZXJtL2lzc3VhbmNlRGF0ZW8vZXhwaXJhdGlvbkRhdGU"
  }
}

The example above is a verifiable credential where the issuer has enabled a BBS-based unlinkable disclosure scheme to create a base proof that can then be used by the holder to create a derived proof that reveals only particular pieces of information from the original verifiable credential.

{
  @context: "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"
  type: "VerifiablePresentation",
  verifiableCredential: {
    "@context": [
      "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
      "https://w3id.org/citizenship/v3"
    ],
    "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "PermanentResidentCard"],
    "issuer": {
      "id": "did:web:issuer.utopia.example",
      "image": "...YII="
    },
    "name": "Permanent Resident Card",
    "description": "Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.",
    "validFrom": "2024-08-01T00:00:00Z",
    "validUntil": "2029-12-01T00:00:00Z",
    "credentialSubject": {
      "type": ["PermanentResident", "Person"],
      "birthCountry": "Arcadia"
    },
    "proof": {
      type: "DataIntegrityProof",
      verificationMethod: "did:web:issuer.utopia.example#zUC75LjjCLGKRxSissX1nAebRDmY4Bv4T6MAbzgaap9Q8rAGf6SEjc2Hf4nH6bUPDwky3GWoYcUjMCcEqRRQfXEiNwfeDwNYLoeqk1J1W2Ye8vCdwv4fSd8AZ1yS6UoNzcsQoPS",
      cryptosuite: "bbs-2023",
      proofPurpose: "assertionMethod",
      proofValue: "u2V0DhVkCkLdnshxHtgeHJBBUGPBqcEooPp9ahgqs08RsoqW5EJFmsi70jqf2X368VcmfdJdYcYJwObPIg5dlyaoBm34N9BqcZ4RlTZvgwX79ivGnqLALC0EqKn2wOj5hRO76xUakfLGIcT4mE-G7CxA1FTs8sRCWy5p6FozelBYiZU2YlhUpJ7pBwelZ9wnlcbj4q-KyxAj5GU2iWp7-FxU-E624DmdT-yvCkAGRRrYej6lMwg7jB9uCHypOXXH2dVZ-jpf74YBaE4rMTxPFh60GN4o3S65F1fMsJbEMLdrXa8Vs6ZSlmveUcY1X7oPr1UIxo17ehVTCjOxWunYqrtLi9cVkYOD2s9XMk1oFVWBB3UY29axXQQXlZVfvTIUsfVc667mnlYbF7a-ko_SUfeY2n3s1DOAap5keeNU0v2KVPCbxA2WGz7UJy4xJv2a8olMOWPKjAEUruCx_dsbyicd-9KGwhYoUEO3HoAzmtI6qXVhMbJKxPrhtcp8hOdD9izVS5ed4CxHNaDGPSopF_MBwjxwPcpUufNNNdQwesrbtFJo0-P-1CrX_jSxKFMle2b3t24UbHRbZw7QnX4OG-SSVucem5jpMXTDFZ8PLFCqXX0zncJ_MQ-_u-liE-MwJu3ZemsXBp1JoB2twS0TqDVzSWR7bpFZKI9_07fKUAmQNSV_no9iAgYRLuPrnnsW1gQgCV-nNqzbcCOpzkHdCqro6nPSATq5Od3Einfc683gm5VGWxIldM0aBPytOymNz7PIZ6wkgcMABMe5Vw46B54ftW-TN5YZPDmCJ_kt7Mturn0OeQr9KJCu7S0I-SN14mL9KtGE1XDnIeR-C_YZhSA3vX4923v1l3vNFsKasqy9iEPHKM0hcogABAQCGAAECBAUGhAMJCgtYUnsiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiNGd2OFJyaERPdi1OSHByYlZNQlM1IiwiZG9tYWluIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9wbGF5Z3JvdW5kLmFscGhhLmNoYXBpLmlvIn0"
    }
  }
}

The verifiable presentation above includes a verifiable credential that contains an unlinkable subset of the information from the previous example and a derived proof that the verifier can use to verify that the information originated from the expected issuer and is bound to this particular exchange of information.

Implementers are urged to understand that representing and processing time values is not as straight-forward as it might seem and have a variety of idiosyncrasies that are not immediately obvious nor uniformly observed in different regions of the world. For example:

• Calendaring systems other than the Gregorian calendar are actively used by various regions.
• When processing Daylight Saving/Summer Time, it is important to understand that 1) it is not observed in all regions, 2) it does not necessarily begin or end on the same day or at the same time of day, and 3) the amount or direction of the adjustment does not always match other similar regions.
• Leap seconds might not be taken into account in all software systems, especially for dates and times that precede the introduction of the leap second. Leap seconds can affect highly sensitive systems that depend on the exact millisecond offset from the epoch. However, note that for most applications the only moment in time that is affected is the one second period of the leap second itself. That is, the moment after the most recent leap second can always be represented as the first moment of the next day (for example, 2023-01-01T00:00:00Z), regardless of whether the system in question understands leap seconds.

These are just a few examples that illustrate that the actual time of day, as would be seen on a clock on the wall, can exist in one region but not exist in another region. For this reason, implementers are urged to use time values that are more universal, such as values anchored to the Z time zone over values that are affected by Daylight Saving/Summer Time.

This specification attempts to increase the number of universally recognized combinations of dates and times, and reduce the potential for misinterpretation of time values, by using the dateTimeStamp construction first established by the [XMLSCHEMA11-2] specification. In order to reduce misinterpretations between different time zones, all time values expressed in conforming documents SHOULD be specified in dateTimeStamp format, either in Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), denoted by a Z at the end of the value, or with a time zone offset relative to UTC. Time values that are incorrectly serialized without an offset MUST be interpreted as UTC. Examples of valid time zone offsets relative to UTC include Z, +01:00, -08:00, and +14:00. See the regular expression at the end of this section for a formal definition of all acceptable values.

Time zone definitions are occasionally changed by their governing body. When replacing or issuing new verifiable credentials, implementers are advised to ensure that changes to local time zone rules do not result in unexpected gaps in validity. For example, consider the zone America/Los_Angeles, which has a raw offset of UTC-8 and had voted to stop observing daylight savings time in the year 2024. A given verifiable credential that had a validUtil value of 2024-07-12T12:00:00-07:00, might be re-issued to have a validFrom value of 2024-07-12T12:00:00-08:00, which would create a gap of an hour where the verifiable credential would not be valid.

Implementers that desire to check dateTimeStamp values for validity can use the regular expression provided below, which is reproduced from the [XMLSCHEMA11-2] specification for convenience. To avoid doubt, the regular expression in [XMLSCHEMA11-2] is the normative definition. Implementers are advised that not all dateTimeStamp values that pass the regular expression below are valid moments in time. For example, the regular expression below allows for 31 days in every month, which allows for leap years, and leap seconds, as well as days in places where they do not exist. That said, modern system libraries that generate dateTimeStamp values are often error-free in their generation of valid dateTimeStamp values. The regular expression shown below (minus the whitespace included here for readability), is often adequate when processing library-generated dates and times on modern systems.

-?([1-9][0-9]{3,}|0[0-9]{3})
-(0[1-9]|1[0-2])
-(0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])
T(([01][0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9](\.[0-9]+)?|(24:00:00(\.0+)?))
(Z|(\+|-)((0[0-9]|1[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]|14:00))

This section is non-normative.

Verifiable credentials are intended as a means of reliably identifying subjects. While it is recognized that Role Based Access Controls (RBACs) and Attribute Based Access Controls (ABACs) rely on this identification as a means of authorizing subjects to access resources, this specification does not provide a complete solution for RBAC or ABAC. Authorization is not an appropriate use for this specification without an accompanying authorization framework.

The Working Group did consider authorization use cases during the creation of this specification and is pursuing that work as an architectural layer built on top of this specification.

This specification reserves a number of properties to serve as possible extension points. While some implementers signaled interest in these properties, their inclusion in this specification was considered to be premature. It is important to note that none of these properties are defined by this specification. Consequently, implementers are cautioned that use of these properties is considered experimental.

Implementers MAY use these properties, but SHOULD expect them and/or their meanings to change during the process of normatively specifying them. Implementers SHOULD NOT use these properties without a publicly disclosed specification describing their implementation.

In order to avoid collisions regarding how the following properties are used, implementations MUST specify a type property in the value associated with the reserved property. For more information related to adding type information, see Section 4.5 Types.

An unofficial list of specifications that are associated with the extension points defined in this specification, as well as the reserved extension points defined in this section, can be found in the Verifiable Credential Extensions. Items in the directory that refer to reserved extension points SHOULD be treated as experimental.

There are a number of digital credential formats that do not natively use the data model provided in this document, but are aligned with a number of concepts in this specification. At the time of publication, examples of these digital credential formats include JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs), JSON Advanced Electronic Signature (JAdES), ISO-18013-5:2021 (mDLs), AnonCreds, Gordian Envelopes, and Authentic Chained Data Containers (ACDCs).

If conceptually aligned digital credential formats can be transformed into a conforming document according to the rules provided in this section, they are considered "compatible with the W3C Verifiable Credentials ecosystem". Specification authors are advised to adhere to the following rules when documenting transformations that enable compatibility with the Verifiable Credentials ecosystem. The transformation specification —

• MUST identify whether the transformation to this data model is one-way-only or round-trippable.
• MUST preserve the @context values when performing round-trippable transformation.
• MUST result in a conforming document when transforming to the data model described by this specification.
• MUST specify a registered media type for the input document.
• SHOULD provide a test suite that demonstrates that the specified transformation algorithm to the data model in this specification results in a conforming document.
• SHOULD ensure that all semantics used in the transformed conforming document follow best practices for Linked Data. See Section 4.1 Getting Started, Section 5.2 Extensibility, and Linked Data Best Practices [LD-BP] for additional guidance.

When expressing verifiable credentials (for example in a presentation), it is important to ensure that data in one verifiable credential is not mistaken to be the same data in another verifiable credential. For example, if one has two verifiable credentials, each containing an object of the following form: {"type": "Person", "name": "Jane Doe"}, it is not possible to tell if one object is describing the same person as the other object. In other words, merging data between two verifiable credentials without confirming that they are discussing the same entities and/or properties, can lead to a corrupted data set.

To ensure that data from different verifiable credentials are not accidentally co-mingled, the concept of a verifiable credential graph is used to encapsulate each verifiable credential. For simple verifiable credentials, that is, when the JSON-LD document contains a single credential with, possibly, associated proofs, this graph is the default graph. For presentations, each value associated with the verifiableCredential property of the presentation is a separate named graph of type VerifiableCredentialGraph which contains a single verifiable credential or an enveloped verifiable credential.

Using these graphs has a concrete effect when performing JSON-LD processing, which properly separates graph node identifiers in one graph from those in another graph. Implementers that limit their inputs to application-specific JSON-LD documents will also need to keep this in mind if they merge data from one verifiable credential with data from another, such as when the credentialSubject.id is the same in both verifiable credentials, but the object might contain objects of the "Jane Doe" form described in the previous paragraph. It is important to not merge objects that seem to have similar properties but do not contain an id property that uses a global identifier, such as a URL.

As described in Section 4.12 Securing Mechanisms, there are multiple strategies that an implementer can use when securing a conforming document. In order to maximize utility and interoperability, specification authors that desire to author new ways of securing conforming documents are provided with the guidance in this section.

Securing mechanism specifications MUST document normative algorithms that provide content integrity protection for conforming documents. The algorithms MAY be general in nature and MAY be used to secure data other than conforming documents.

Securing mechanism specifications MUST provide a verification algorithm that returns the information in the conforming document that has been secured, in isolation, without including any securing mechanism information, such as proof or JOSE/COSE header parameters and signatures. Verification algorithms MAY return additional information that might be helpful (for example, during validation or for debugging purposes), such as details of the securing mechanism. A verification algorithm MUST provide an interface that receives a media type (string inputMediaType) and input data (byte sequence or map inputData). Securing mechanism specifications MAY provide algorithms and interfaces in addition to the ones specified in this document. The verification algorithm returns a verification result with at least the following items:

boolean verified

A verification status whose value is true if the verification succeeded and false if it did not.

map verifiedDocument

A document that only contains information that was successfully secured.

string mediaType

A media type as defined in [RFC6838].

Securing mechanism specifications SHOULD provide integrity protection for any information referenced by a URL that is critical to validation. Mechanisms that can achieve this protection are discussed in Section 5.3 Integrity of Related Resources and Section B.1 Base Context.

A securing mechanism specification that creates a new type of embedded proof MUST specify a property that relates the verifiable credential or verifiable presentation to a proof graph. The requirements on the securing mechanism are as follow:

The proof property as defined in [VC-DATA-INTEGRITY] MAY be used by the embedded securing mechanism.

Securing mechanism specifications SHOULD register the securing mechanism in the Securing Mechanisms section of the Verifiable Credential Extensions document.

This specification uses JSON-LD 1.1 to serialize the data model described in this specification. JSON-LD is useful because it enables the expression of the graph-based data model on which verifiable credentials are based, machine-readable semantics, and is also useful when extending the data model (see Sections 3. Core Data Model and 5.2 Extensibility).

JSON-LD is a JSON-based format used to serialize Linked Data. Linked Data is modeled using Resource Description Framework (RDF) [RDF11-CONCEPTS]. RDF is a technology for modeling graphs of statements. Each statement is a single subject→property→value (also known as entity→attribute→value) relationship, which is referred to as a claim in this specification. JSON-LD is a technology that enables the expression of RDF using idiomatic JSON, enabling developers familiar with JSON to write applications that consume RDF as JSON. See Relationship of JSON-LD to RDF for more details.

{
  "@context":
    {
      "matrix": {
        "@id": "https://website.example/vocabulary#matrix",
        "@type": "@json"
      }
    }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2",
    "https://website.example/matrix/v1"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/1872",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleMatrixCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "matrix": [
      [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12],
      [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0],
      [0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0]
    ]
  }
}

This section is non-normative.

As JSON can be used to express different kinds of information, a consumer of a particular JSON document can only properly interpret the author's intent if they possess information that contextualizes and disambiguates it from other possible expressions. Information to assist with this interpretation can either be wholly external to the JSON document or linked from within it. Compacted JSON-LD documents include a @context property that internally expresses or links to contextual information to express claims. These features enable generalized processors to be written to convert JSON-LD documents from one context to another, but this is not needed when consumers receive JSON-LD documents that already use the context and shape that they expect. Authors of JSON-LD documents, such as issuers of verifiable credentials, are required to provide proper JSON-LD contexts and follow these rules in order to facilitate interoperability.

The text below helps consumers understand how to ensure a JSON-LD document is expressed in a context and shape that their application already understands such that they do not need to transform it in order to consume its contents. Notably, this does not mean that consumers do not need to understand any context at all; rather, consuming applications only need to understand a chosen set of contexts and document shapes to work with and not others. Issuers can publish contexts and information about their verifiable credentials to aid consumers who do not use generalized processors, just as can be done with any other JSON-formatted data.

General JSON-LD processing is defined as a mechanism that uses a JSON-LD software library to process a conforming document by performing various transformations. Type-specific credential processing is defined as a lighter-weight mechanism for processing conforming documents, that doesn't require a JSON-LD software library. Some consumers of verifiable credentials only need to consume credentials with specific types. These consumers can use type-specific credential processing instead of generalized processing. Scenarios where type-specific credential processing can be desirable include, but are not limited to, the following:

That is, type-specific credential processing is allowed as long as the document being consumed or produced is a conforming document.

If type-specific credential processing is desired, an implementer is advised to follow this rule:

Ensure that all values associated with a @context property are in the expected order, the contents of the context files match known good cryptographic hashes for each file, and domain experts have deemed that the contents are appropriate for the intended use case.

Using static context files with a JSON Schema is one acceptable approach to implementing the rule above. This can ensure proper term identification, typing, and order, when performing type-specific credential processing.

The rule above guarantees semantic interoperability between the two processing mechanisms for mapping literal JSON keys to URIs via the @context mechanism. While general JSON-LD processing can use previously unseen @context values provided in its algorithms to verify that all terms are correctly specified, implementations that perform type-specific credential processing only accept specific @context values which the implementation is engineered ahead of time to understand, resulting in the same semantics without invoking any JSON-LD APIs. In other words, the context in which the data exchange happens is explicitly stated for both processing mechanisms by using @context in a way that leads to the same conforming document semantics.

This section is non-normative.

It is important to recognize there is a spectrum of privacy ranging from pseudonymous to strongly identified. Depending on the use case, people have different comfort levels about the information they are willing to provide and the information that can be derived from it.

Privacy solutions are use case specific. For example, many people would prefer to remain anonymous when purchasing alcohol because the regulation is only to verify whether a purchaser is above a specific age. In contrast, when filling prescriptions written by a medical professional for a patient, the pharmacy is legally required to more strongly identify both the prescriber and the patient. No single approach to privacy works for all use cases.

The Verifiable Credentials Data Model strives to support the full privacy spectrum and does not take philosophical positions on the correct level of anonymity for any specific transaction. The following sections will guide implementers who want to avoid specific scenarios that are hostile to privacy.

This section is non-normative.

A variety of trust relationships exist in the ecosystem described by this specification. An individual using a web browser trusts the web browser, also known as a user agent, to preserve that trust by not uploading their personal information to a data broker; similarly, entities filling the roles in the ecosystem described by this specification trust the software that operates on behalf of each of those roles. Examples include the following:

The examples above are not exhaustive, and the users in these roles can also expect various other things from the software they use to achieve their goals. In short, the user expects the software to operate in the user's best interests; any violations of this expectation breach trust and can lead to the software's replacement with a more trustworthy alternative. Implementers are strongly encouraged to create software that preserves user trust. Additionally, they are encouraged to include auditing features that enable users or trusted third parties to verify that the software is operating in alignment with their best interests.

Readers are advised that some software, like a website providing services to a single verifier and multiple holders, might operate as a user agent to both roles but might not always be able to operate simultaneously in the best interests of all parties. For example, suppose a website detects an attempt at fraudulent verifiable credential use among multiple holders. In that case, it might report such an anomaly to the verifier, which might be considered not to be in all holders' best interest, but would be in the best interest of the verifier and any holders not committing such a violation. It is imperative that when software operates in this manner, it is made clear in whose best interest(s) the software is operating, through mechanisms such as a website use policy.

This section is non-normative.

Data associated with verifiable credentials stored in the credential.credentialSubject property is susceptible to privacy violations when shared with verifiers. Personally identifying data, such as a government-issued identifier, shipping address, or full name, can be easily used to determine, track, and correlate an entity. Even information that does not seem personally identifiable, such as the combination of a birthdate and a postal code, has powerful correlation and de-anonymization capabilities.

Implementers of software used by holders are strongly advised to warn holders when they share data with these kinds of characteristics. Issuers are strongly advised to provide privacy-protecting verifiable credentials when possible — for example, by issuing ageOver verifiable credentials instead of dateOfBirth verifiable credentials for use when a verifier wants to determine whether an entity is at least 18 years of age.

Because a verifiable credential often contains personally identifiable information (PII), implementers are strongly advised to use mechanisms while storing and transporting verifiable credentials that protect the data from those who ought not have access to it. Mechanisms that could be considered include Transport Layer Security (TLS) or other means of encrypting the data while in transit, as well as encryption or access control mechanisms to protect the data in a verifiable credential when at rest.

Generally, individuals are advised to assume that a verifiable credential, like most physical credentials, will leak personally identifiable information when shared. To combat such leakage, verifiable credentials and their securing mechanisms need to be carefully designed to prevent correlation. Verifiable credentials specifically designed to protect against leakage of personally identifiable information are available. Individuals and implementers are encouraged to choose these credential types over those not designed to protect personally identifiable information.

This section is non-normative.

Verifiable credentials might contain long-lived identifiers that could be used to correlate individuals. These identifiers include subject identifiers, email addresses, government-issued identifiers, organization-issued identifiers, addresses, healthcare vitals, and many other long-lived identifiers. Implementers of software for holders are encouraged to detect identifiers in verifiable credentials that could be used to correlate individuals and to warn holders before they share this information. The rest of this section elaborates on guidance related to using long-lived identifiers.

Subjects of verifiable credentials are identified using the id property, as defined in Section 4.4 Identifiers and used in places such as the credentialSubject.id property. The identifiers used to identify a subject create a greater correlation risk when the identifiers are long-lived or used across more than one web domain. Other types of identifiers that fall into this category are email addresses, government-issued identifiers, and organization-issued identifiers.

Similarly, disclosing the credential identifier (as in Example 3) can lead to situations where multiple verifiers, or an issuer and a verifier, can collude to correlate the holder.

Holders aiming to reduce correlation are encouraged to use verifiable credentials from issuers that support selectively disclosing correlating identifiers in a verifiable presentation. Such approaches expect the holder to generate the identifier and might even allow hiding the identifier from the issuer through techniques like blind signatures, while still keeping the identifier embedded and signed in the verifiable credential.

Securing mechanism specification authors are advised to avoid enabling identifier-based correlation by designing their technologies to avoid the use of correlating identifiers that cannot be selectively disclosed.

If strong anti-correlation properties are required in a verifiable credentials system, it is essential that identifiers meet one or more of the following criteria:

• Selectively disclosable
• Bound to a single origin
• Single-use
• Not used and instead replaced by short-lived, single-use bearer tokens.

This section is non-normative.

The contents of a verifiable credential are secured using a securing mechanism. Values representing the securing mechanism pose a greater risk of correlation when they remain the same across multiple sessions or domains. Examples of these include the following values:

• the binary value of the digital signature
• timestamp information associated with the creation of the digital signature
• cryptographic material associated with the digital signature, such as a public key identifier

When strong anti-correlation properties are required, issuers are encouraged to produce verifiable credentials where signature values and metadata can be regenerated for each verifiable presentation. This can be achieved using technologies that support unlinkable disclosure, such as the Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuites v1.0 specification. When possible, verifiers are encouraged to prefer verifiable presentations that use this technology in order to enhance privacy for holders and subjects.

This section is non-normative.

There are mechanisms external to verifiable credentials that track and correlate individuals on the Internet and the Web. These mechanisms include Internet protocol (IP) address tracking, web browser fingerprinting, evercookies, advertising network trackers, mobile network position information, and in-application Global Positioning System (GPS) APIs. Using verifiable credentials cannot prevent the use of these other tracking technologies; rather, using these technologies alongside verifiable credentials can reveal new correlatable information. For instance, a birthdate combined with a GPS position can strongly correlate an individual across multiple websites.

Privacy-respecting systems ought to aim to prevent the combination of other tracking technologies with verifiable credentials. In some instances, tracking technologies might need to be disabled on devices that transmit verifiable credentials on behalf of a holder.

The Oblivious HTTP protocol [RFC9458] is one mechanism implementers might consider using when fetching external resources associated with a verifiable credential or a verifiable presentation. Oblivious HTTP allows a client to make multiple requests to an origin server without that server being able to link those requests to that client or even to identify those requests as having come from a single client, while placing only limited trust in the nodes used to forward the messages. Oblivious HTTP is one privacy-preserving mechanism that can reduce the possibility of device tracking and fingerprinting. Below are some concrete examples of ways that Oblivious HTTP can benefit ecosystem participants.

• A holder using a digital wallet can reduce the chances that they will be tracked by a 3rd party when accessing external links within a verifiable credential stored in their digital wallet. For example, a digital wallet might fetch and render linked images, or it might check the validity of a verifiable credential by fetching an externally linked revocation list.
• A verifier can reduce its likelihood of signaling to an issuer that the verifier has received a specific verifiable credential. For example, a verifier might fetch an externally linked revocation list while performing status checks on a verifiable credential.

This section is non-normative.

Issuers are encouraged to limit the information included in a verifiable credential to the smallest set required for the intended purposes, so as to allow recipients to use them in various situations without disclosing more personally identifiable information (PII) than necessary. One way to avoid placing PII in a verifiable credential is to use an abstract property that meets the needs of verifiers without providing overly specific information about a subject.

For example, this document uses the ageOver property instead of a specific birthdate, which would represent more sensitive PII. If retailers in a particular market commonly require purchasers to be older than a certain age, an issuer trusted in that market might choose to offer verifiable credentials that claim that subjects have met that requirement rather than offering verifiable credentials that contain claims about the customers' birthdays. This practice enables individual customers to make purchases without disclosing more PII than necessary.

This section is non-normative.

Privacy violations occur when information divulged in one context leaks into another. One accepted best practice for preventing such a violation is for verifiers to limit the information requested and received, to the absolute minimum necessary for a particular transaction. Regulations in multiple jurisdictions, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the United States and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union, mandate this data minimization approach.

With verifiable credentials, data minimization for issuers means limiting the content of a verifiable credential to the minimum required by potential verifiers for expected use. For verifiers, data minimization means restricting the scope of information requested or required for accessing services.

For example, a driver's license containing a driver's ID number, height, weight, birthday, and home address expressed as a verifiable credential contains more information than is necessary to establish that the person is above a certain age.

It is considered best practice for issuers to atomize information or use a securing mechanism that allows for selective disclosure. For example, an issuer of driver's licenses could issue a verifiable credential containing every property that appears on a driver's license, and allow the holder to disclose each property selectively. It could also issue more abstract verifiable credentials (for example, a verifiable credential containing only an ageOver property). One possible adaptation would be for issuers to provide secure HTTP endpoints for retrieving single-use bearer credentials that promote the pseudonymous use of verifiable credentials. Implementers that find this impractical or unsafe might consider using selective disclosure schemes that eliminate dependence on issuers at proving time and reduce the risk of temporal correlation by issuers.

Verifiers are urged to only request information that is strictly necessary for a specific transaction to occur. This is important for at least two reasons:

• It reduces the liability on the verifier for handling highly sensitive information that it does not need to handle.
• It enhances the subject's and/or holder's privacy by only asking for information that is necessary for a specific transaction.

Implementers of software used by holders are encouraged to disclose the information being requested by a verifier, allowing the holder to decline to share specific information that is unnecessary for the transaction. Implementers of software used by holders are also advised to give holders access to logs of information shared with verifiers, enabling the holders to provide this information to authorities if they believe that they have been subjected to information overreach or coerced to share more information than necessary for a particular transaction.

This section is non-normative.

A bearer credential is a privacy-enhancing piece of information, such as a concert ticket, that entitles its holder to a specific resource without requiring the holder to divulge sensitive information. In low-risk scenarios, entities often use bearer credentials where multiple holders presenting the same verifiable credential is not a concern or would not result in large economic or reputational losses.

Verifiable credentials that are bearer credentials are made possible by not specifying the subject identifier, expressed using the id property, which is nested in the credentialSubject property. For example, the following verifiable credential is a bearer credential:

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/temporary/28934792387492384",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2017-10-22T12:23:48Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/temporary/28934792387492384",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2017-10-22T12:23:48Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:34Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaebSRtPnW6YCpxAhR5JPxJqt9UunCsBPhLEtUokUvp87nQ",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-rdfc-2019",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "z5gCBzvpHbsJoeuuy5Z54rKQwkGzBZkmapRZZAKKW4ervhBGGTaygnh4sBG6vV8MHGD8eKhXEmkXr487JwVhZ2WHQ"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/temporary/28934792387492384",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2017-10-22T12:23:48Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "created": "2025-04-27T17:58:34Z",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zDnaerJh8WwyBVVGcZKKkqRKK9iezje8ut6t9bnNChtxcWwNv",
    "cryptosuite": "ecdsa-sd-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0AhVhAOEMucTcwHIY19VxghifeZjhZGFI9buw5OmEiWzSpbStoG5arWcYX6NB2-ftSiNc_CMh-CemG3peCu8ZOrSCHVFgjgCQC1zlBPjThDb-LSIbpc3uzcrjmKdC3xyuQAM8DoT5zv3FYIP13m1SOplZJx47EsonA19WEGnwABCA4hlMlQS96LIQMhVhADxlyJM3iqf_jn__vvJ0KgjL5uKLmVSsOxTFUsIHJ82mS8DAo_WZUmDxMnCAjrrxPQXLaNdfcmqehQOLT4_oiiVhA74UxSBi3EedkNnN5F2WV_Hd1Pr1vPWA_Qx52meKAa0_FhKu-Gm8uk2fFxK28flIbUv5HVQgGT0nrSuSprE4JslhAGl8hwCBGr5KxrUVAcMZE3vW26KrrI6jMTDLPGb81b9-ILrXLIJKb_ZOcmLggwzgbyxE_hUDLL9b88aZ7tE4dOVhACerSusVIq25s-hjms5Ws4Uw3wmgRQp1lp228deojpcavN-n3FNe3AIBgHFbpK2SzdOzvraj-HVkMpQptXrGEhVhAujmfdq6faQbfYn4LUQCy_sDUr1WNbklcyg2XTDQKscMF0VAUU38d50UrmprSKbhrnZpgWMBFg4ibUco_HO4UToFnL2lzc3Vlcg"
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/temporary/28934792387492384",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2017-10-22T12:23:48Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "verificationMethod": "did:key:zUC78GzFRA4TWh2mqRiKro1wwRb5KDaMJ3M1AD3qGtgEbFrwWGvWbnCzArkeTZCyzBz4Panr2hLaZxsXHiBQCwBc3fRPH6xY4u5v8ZAd3dPW1aw89Rra86CVwXr3DczANggYbMD",
    "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
    "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
    "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQhlm-IXSzQAaXH0xW-NU1t3ikH2xt--sFY-DtoL44DiWf3qv-nuhCc36deovk3t1GLy9JeN-vdeth8XWKMGUcyA4eWD21lxYdvK5Qdzw07ytYQGd_DaMQQsoaryttl5TvxnFT-Vm4SkVx03K9qNJ4jhArdrHmhnEXifHmmlKM3zCnc0pq4l3ZkBkIESZ4DrQomVNYYJVTGbTfcflzyx41E-f9kSqmf10xYzxJrGfC7b7GPY8X7VjMT__ZKSuwdH-5jak-5gkjocsHI6oxIKlLrhW1Wh5yrDCH-QC823TS8NE9VGBzIFAfUt5qazGEcJ8CxeSPxFggOkuR5x7VvZAB-RbcqkcwxkQ7or0tsVOUTPlebfxRUQCBZy9pc3N1ZXI"
  }
}

{
  "kid": "ExHkBMW9fmbkvV266mRpuP2sUY_N_EWIN1lapUzO8ro",
  "alg": "ES256"
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/temporary/28934792387492384",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2017-10-22T12:23:48Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/temporary/28934792387492384",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleDegreeCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
  "validFrom": "2017-10-22T12:23:48Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "degree": {
      "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}

While bearer credentials are privacy-enhancing, issuers still need to take care in their design to avoid unintentionally divulging more information than the holder of the bearer credential expects. For example, repeated use of the same bearer credential across multiple sites can enable these sites to collude in illicitly tracking or correlating the holder. Similarly, information that might seem non-identifying, such as a birthdate and postal code, can be used together to statistically identify an individual when used in the same bearer credential or session.

Issuers of bearer credentials should ensure that the bearer credentials provide privacy-enhancing benefits that:

• Are single-use, where possible.
• Do not contain personally identifying information.
• Are not unduly correlatable.

Holders ought to be warned by their software if it detects that bearer credentials containing sensitive information have been issued or requested, or that a correlation risk is posed by the combination of two or more bearer credentials across one or more sessions. While detecting all correlation risks might be impossible, some might certainly be detectable.

Verifiers ought not request bearer credentials known to carry information which can be used to illicitly correlate the holder.

This section is non-normative.

When processing verifiable credentials, verifiers evaluate relevant claims before relying upon them. This evaluation might be done in any manner desired as long as it satisfies the requirements of the verifier doing the validation. Many verifiers will perform the checks listed in Appendix A. Validation as well as a variety of specific business process checks such as:

• The professional licensure status of the holder.
• A date of license renewal or revocation.
• The sub-qualifications of an individual.
• If a relationship exists between the holder and the entity with whom the holder is attempting to interact.
• The geolocation information associated with the holder.

The process of performing these checks might result in information leakage that leads to a privacy violation of the holder. For example, a simple operation, such as checking an improperly configured revocation list, can notify the issuer that a specific business is likely interacting with the holder. This could enable issuers to collude to correlate individuals without their knowledge.

Issuers are urged to not use mechanisms, such as credential revocation lists that are unique per credential, during the verification process, which could lead to privacy violations. Organizations providing software to holders ought to warn when credentials include information that could lead to privacy violations during the verification process. Verifiers are urged to consider rejecting credentials that produce privacy violations or that enable substandard privacy practices.

This section is non-normative.

When a holder receives a verifiable credential from an issuer, the verifiable credential needs to be stored somewhere (for example, in a credential repository). Holders need to be aware that the information in a verifiable credential can be sensitive and highly individualized, making it a prime target for data mining. Services offering "free of charge" storage of verifiable credentials might mine personal data and sell it to organizations interesting in building individualized profiles on people and organizations.

Holders need to be aware of the terms of service for their credential repository, specifically the correlation and data mining protections in place for those who store their verifiable credentials with the service provider.

Some effective mitigations for data mining and profiling include using:

• Service providers that do not sell your information to third parties.
• Software that encrypts verifiable credentials such that a service provider cannot view the contents of the credential.
• Software that stores verifiable credentials locally on a device that you control and that does not upload or analyze your information beyond your expectations.

In addition to the mitigations above, civil society and regulatory participation in vendor analysis and auditing can help ensure that legal protections are enacted and enforced for individuals affected by practices that are not aligned with their best interests.

This section is non-normative.

Having two pieces of information about the same subject often reveals more about the subject than the combination of those two pieces, even when the pieces are delivered through different channels. Aggregating verifiable credentials poses a privacy risk, and all participants in the ecosystem need to be aware of the risks of data aggregation.

For example, suppose two bearer credentials, one for an email address and one stating the holder is over 21, are provided to the same verifier across multiple sessions. The verifier of the information now has a unique identifier (the email address) along with age-related ("over 21") information for that individual. It is now easy to create a profile for the holder, building it by adding more and more information as it leaks over time. Aggregation of such credentials can also be performed by multiple sites in collusion with each other, leading to privacy violations.

From a technological perspective, preventing information aggregation is a challenging privacy problem. While new cryptographic techniques, such as zero-knowledge proofs, are being proposed as solutions to aggregation and correlation issues, the existence of long-lived identifiers and browser-tracking techniques defeats even the most modern cryptographic techniques.

The solution to the privacy implications of correlation or aggregation tends not to be technological in nature, but policy-driven instead. Therefore, if a holder wishes to avoid the aggregation of their information, they need to express this in the verifiable presentations they transmit, and by the holders and verifiers to whom they transmit their verifiable presentations.

This section is non-normative.

Despite best efforts by all involved to assure privacy, using verifiable credentials can potentially lead to de-anonymization and a loss of privacy. This correlation can occur when any of the following occurs:

• The same verifiable credential is presented to the same verifier more than once. The verifier could infer that the holder is the same individual.
• The same verifiable credential is presented to different verifiers, and either those verifiers collude, or a third party has access to transaction records from both verifiers. An observant party could infer that the individual presenting the verifiable credential is the same person at both services. That is, the same person controls both accounts.
• A subject identifier of a credential refers to the same subject across multiple presentations or verifiers. Even when different credentials are presented, if the subject identifier is the same, verifiers (and those with access to verifier logs) could infer that the credentials' subjects are the same entity.
• The underlying information in a credential can be used to identify an individual across services. In this case, using information from other sources (including information provided directly by the holder), verifiers can use information inside the credential to correlate the individual with an existing profile. For example, if a holder presents credentials that include postal code, age, and gender, a verifier can potentially correlate the subject of that credential with an established profile. For more information, see [DEMOGRAPHICS].
• Passing the identifier of a credential to a centralized revocation server. The centralized server can correlate uses of the credential across interactions. For example, if a credential is used to prove age in this manner, the centralized service could know everywhere that credential was presented (all liquor stores, bars, adult stores, lottery sellers, and so on).

In part, it is possible to mitigate this de-anonymization and loss of privacy by:

• The holder software providing a globally-unique identifier as the subject for any given verifiable credential and never reusing that verifiable credential.
• The issuer using a globally-distributed service for revocation such that it is not contacted when revocation checks are performed.
• Specification authors designing revocation mechanisms that do not depend on submitting a unique identifier for a verifiable credential to a query API, and instead use, for example, a privacy-preserving revocation list.
• Issuers avoiding the association of personally identifiable information with any specific long-lived subject identifier.

Unfortunately, these mitigation techniques are only sometimes practical or even compatible with necessary use. Sometimes, correlation is a requirement.

For example, in some prescription drug monitoring programs, monitoring prescription use is a requirement. Enforcement entities need to be able to confirm that individuals are not cheating the system to get multiple prescriptions for controlled substances. This statutory or regulatory need to correlate prescription use overrides individual privacy concerns.

Verifiable credentials will also be used to intentionally correlate individuals across services. For example, when using a common persona to log in to multiple services, all activity on each of those services is intentionally linked to the same individual. This is not a privacy issue as long as each of those services uses the correlation in the expected manner.

Privacy violations related to the use of verifiable credentials occur when unintended or unexpected correlation arises from the presentation of those verifiable credentials.

This section is non-normative.

Legal processes can compel issuers, holders, and verifiers to disclose private information to authorities, such as law enforcement. It is also possible for the same private information to be accidentally disclosed to an unauthorized party through a software bug or security failure. Authors of legal processes and compliance regimes are advised to draft guidelines that require notifying the subjects involved when their private information is intentionally or accidentally disclosed to a third party. Providers of software services are advised to be transparent about known circumstances that might cause such private information to be shared with a third party, as well as the identity of any such third party.

This section is non-normative.

When a holder chooses to share information with a verifier, it might be the case that the verifier is acting in bad faith and requests information that could harm the holder. For example, a verifier might ask for a bank account number, which could then be used with other information to defraud the holder or the bank.

Issuers ought to strive to tokenize as much information as possible so that if a holder accidentally transmits credentials to the wrong verifier, the situation is not catastrophic.

For example, instead of including a bank account number to check an individual's bank balance, provide a token that enables the verifier to check if the balance is above a certain amount. In this case, the bank could issue a verifiable credential containing a balance checking token to a holder. The holder would then include the verifiable credential in a verifiable presentation and bind the token to a credit checking agency using a digital signature. The verifier could then wrap the verifiable presentation in their digital signature and hand it back to the issuer to check the account balance dynamically.

Using this approach, even if a holder shares the account balance token with the wrong party, an attacker cannot discover the bank account number or the exact value of the account. Also, given the validity period of the counter-signature, the attacker gains access to the token for only a few minutes.

This section is non-normative.

The data expressed in verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations are valuable since they contain authentic statements made by trusted third parties (such as issuers) or individuals (such as holders or subjects). The storage and accessibility of this data can inadvertently create honeypots of sensitive data for malicious actors. These adversaries often seek to exploit such reservoirs of sensitive information, aiming to acquire and exchange that data for financial gain.

Issuers are advised to retain the minimum amount of data necessary to issue verifiable credentials to holders and to manage the status and revocation of those credentials. Similarly, issuers are advised to avoid creating publicly accessible credentials that include personally identifiable information (PII) or other sensitive data. Software implementers are advised to safeguard verifiable credentials using robust consent and access control measures, ensuring that they remain inaccessible to unauthorized entities.

Holders are advised to use implementations that appropriately encrypt their data in transit and at rest and protect sensitive material (such as cryptographic secrets) in ways that cannot be easily extracted from hardware or other devices. It is further suggested that holders store and manipulate their data only on devices they control, away from centralized systems, to reduce the likelihood of an attack on their data or inclusion in a large-scale theft if an attack is successful. Furthermore, holders are encouraged to rigorously control access to their credentials and presentations, allowing access only to those with explicit authorization.

Verifiers are advised to ask only for data necessary for a particular transaction and to retain no data beyond the needs of any particular transaction.

Regulators are advised to reconsider existing audit requirements such that mechanisms that better preserve privacy can be used to achieve similar enforcement and audit capabilities. For example, audit-focused regulations that insist on the collection and long-term retention of personally identifiable information can cause harm to individuals and organizations if that same information is later compromised and accessed by an attacker. The technologies described by this specification enable holders to prove properties about themselves and others more readily, reducing the need for long-term data retention by verifiers. Alternatives include keeping logs that the information was collected and checked, as well as random tests to ensure that compliance regimes are operating as expected.

This section is non-normative.

As detailed in Section 8.14 Patterns of Use, patterns of use can be correlated with certain types of behavior. This correlation is partially mitigated when a holder uses a verifiable credential without the knowledge of the issuer. Issuers can defeat this protection however, by making their verifiable credentials short lived and renewal automatic.

For example, an ageOver verifiable credential is helpful in gaining access to a bar. If an issuer issues such a verifiable credential with a very short validity period and an automatic renewal mechanism, then the issuer could correlate the holder's behavior in a way that negatively impacts the holder.

Organizations providing software to holders ought to warn them if they repeatedly use credentials with short lifespans, which could result in behavior correlation. Issuers ought to avoid issuing credentials that enable them to correlate patterns of use.

This section is non-normative.

An ideal privacy-respecting system would require only the information necessary for interaction with the verifier to be disclosed by the holder. The verifier then records that the disclosure requirement has been met and discards any sensitive information disclosed. In many cases, competing priorities, such as regulatory burden, prevent this ideal system from being employed. In other instances, long-lived identifiers prevent single use. The designer of any verifiable credentials ecosystem ought to strive to make it as privacy-respecting as possible by preferring single-use verifiable credentials whenever possible.

Using single-use verifiable credentials provides several benefits. The first benefit is to verifiers who can be sure that the data in a verifiable credential is fresh. The second benefit is to holders, who know that if there are no long-lived identifiers in the verifiable credential, the verifiable credential itself cannot be used to track or correlate them online. Finally, there is nothing for attackers to steal, making the entire ecosystem safer to operate within.

This section is non-normative.

In an ideal private browsing scenario, no PII will be revealed. Because many credentials include PII, organizations providing software to holders ought to warn them about the possibility of this information being revealed if they use credentials and presentations while in private browsing mode. As each browser vendor handles private browsing differently, and some browsers might not have this feature, it is important that implementers not depend on private browsing mode to provide any privacy protections. Instead, implementers are advised to rely on tooling that directly usable by their software to provide privacy guarantees.

This section is non-normative.

Verifiable credentials rely on a high degree of trust in issuers. The degree to which a holder might take advantage of possible privacy protections often depends strongly on the support an issuer provides for such features. In many cases, privacy protections which make use of zero-knowledge proofs, data minimization techniques, bearer credentials, abstract claims, and protections against signature-based correlation require active support by the issuer, who need to incorporate those capabilities into the verifiable credentials they issue.

It is crucial to note that holders not only depend on issuer participation to provide verifiable credential capabilities that help preserve holder and subject privacy, but also rely on issuers to not deliberately subvert these privacy protections. For example, an issuer might sign verifiable credentials using a signature scheme that protects against signature-based correlation. This would protect the holder from being correlated by the signature value as it is shared among verifiers. However, if the issuer creates a unique key for each issued credential, it might be possible for the issuer to track presentations of the credential, regardless of a verifier's inability to do so.

In addition to previously described privacy protections an issuer might offer, issuers need to be aware of data they leak that is associated with identifiers and claim types they use when issuing credentials. One example of this would be an issuer issuing driver's licenses which reveal both the location(s) in which they have jurisdiction and the location of the subject's residence. Verifiers might take advantage of this by requesting a credential to check that the subject is licensed to drive when, in fact, they are interested in metadata about the credential, such as which issuer issued the credential, and tangential information that might have been leaked by the issuer, such as the subject's home address. To mitigate such leakage, issuers might use common identifiers to mask specific location information or other sensitive metadata; for example, a shared issuer identifier at a state or national level instead of at the level of a county, city, town, or other smaller municipality. Further, verifiers can use holder attestation mechanisms to preserve privacy, by providing proof that an issuer exists in a set of trusted entities without needing to disclose the exact issuer.

This section is non-normative.

Cryptography can protect some aspects of the data model described in this specification. It is important for implementers to understand the cryptography suites and libraries used to create and process credentials and presentations. Implementing and auditing cryptography systems generally requires substantial experience. Effective red teaming can also help remove bias from security reviews.

Cryptography suites and libraries have a shelf life and eventually succumb to new attacks and technological advances. Production quality systems need to take this into account and ensure mechanisms exist to easily and proactively upgrade expired or broken cryptography suites and libraries, and to invalidate and replace existing credentials. Regular monitoring is important to ensure the long term viability of systems processing credentials.

This section is non-normative.

The security of most digital signature algorithms, used to secure verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations, depends on the quality and protection of their private signing keys. The management of cryptographic keys encompasses a vast and complex field. For comprehensive recommendations and in-depth discussion, readers are directed to [NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]. As strongly recommended in both [FIPS-186-5] and [NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1], a private signing key is not to be used for multiple purposes; for example, a private signing key is not to be used for encryption as well as signing.

[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1] strongly advises that private signing keys and public verification keys have limited cryptoperiods, where a cryptoperiod is "the time span during which a specific key is authorized for use by legitimate entities or the keys for a given system will remain in effect." [NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1] gives extensive guidance on cryptoperiods for different key types under various conditions and recommends a one to three year cryptoperiod for a private signing key.

To deal with potential private key compromises, [NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1] provides recommendations for protective measures, harm reduction, and revocation. Although this section focuses primarily on the security of the private signing key, [NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1] also highly recommends confirmation of the validity of all verification material before using it.

This section is non-normative.

Verifiable credentials often contain URLs to data that resides outside the verifiable credential. Linked content that exists outside a verifiable credential — such as images, JSON-LD extension contexts, JSON Schemas, and other machine-readable data — is not protected against tampering because the data resides outside of the protection of the securing mechanism on the verifiable credential.

Section 5.3 Integrity of Related Resources of this specification provides an optional mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the content of external resources. This mechanism is not necessary for external resources that do not impact the verifiable credential's security. However, its implementation is crucial for external resources where content changes could potentially introduce security vulnerabilities.

Implementers need to recognize the potential security risks associated with unprotected URLs of external machine-readable content. Such vulnerabilities could lead to successful attacks on their applications. Where changes to external resources might compromise security, implementers will benefit by employing the content integrity protection mechanism outlined in this specification.

This section is non-normative.

This specification enables the creation of credentials without signatures or proofs. These credential classes are often useful for intermediate storage or self-asserted information, analogous to filling out a form on a web page. Implementers ought to be aware that these credential types are not verifiable because the authorship either is unknown or cannot be trusted.

This section is non-normative.

The data model does not inherently prevent Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), replay, and spoofing attacks. Both online and offline use cases might be susceptible to these attacks, where an adversary intercepts, modifies, re-uses, and/or replicates the verifiable credential data during transmission or storage.

This section is non-normative.

It is considered best practice for issuers to atomize information in a credential or use a signature scheme that allows for selective disclosure. When atomizing information, if it is not done securely by the issuers, the holders might bundle together claims from different credentials in ways that the issuers did not intend.

Consider a university issuing two verifiable credentials to an individual. Each credential contains two properties that, when combined, indicate the person's "role" in a specific "department." For instance, one credential pair might designate "Staff Member" in the "Department of Computing," while another could signify "Post Graduate Student" in the "Department of Economics." Atomizing these verifiable credentials results in the university issuing four separate credentials to the individual. Each credential contains a single designation: "Staff Member", "Post Graduate Student", "Department of Computing", or "Department of Economics". The holder might then present the "Staff Member" and "Department of Economics" verifiable credentials to a verifier, which, together, would comprise a false claim.

This section is non-normative.

When verifiable credentials contain highly dynamic information, careful consideration of validity periods becomes crucial. Issuing verifiable credentials with validity periods that extend beyond their intended use creates potential security vulnerabilities that malicious actors could exploit. Validity periods shorter than the timeframe where the information expressed by the verifiable credential is expected to be used creates a burden on holders and verifiers. It is, therefore, important to set validity periods for verifiable credentials appropriate to the use case and the expected lifetime of the information contained in the verifiable credential.

This section is non-normative.

Storing verifiable credentials on a device poses risks if the device is lost or stolen. An attacker gaining possession of such a device potentially acquires unauthorized access to systems using the victim's verifiable credentials. Ways to mitigate this type of attack include:

• Enabling password, pin, pattern, or biometric screen unlock protection on the device.
• Enabling password, biometric, or multi-factor authentication for the credential repository.
• Enabling password, biometric, or multi-factor authentication when accessing cryptographic keys.
• Using a separate hardware-based signature device.
• All or any combination of the above.

Furthermore, instances of impersonation can manifest in various forms, including situations where an entity attempts to disavow its actions. Elevating trust and security within the realm of verifiable credentials entails more than averting impersonation; it also involves implementing non-repudiation mechanisms. These mechanisms solidify an entity's responsibility for its actions or transactions, reinforcing accountability and deterring malicious behavior. Attainment of non-repudiation is a multifaceted endeavor, encompassing an array of techniques including securing mechanisms, proofs of possession, and authentication schemes in various protocols designed to foster trust and reliability.

This section is non-normative.

Ensuring alignment between an entity's actions — such as presentation, and the intended purpose of those actions — is essential. It involves having the authorization to use verifiable credentials and using credentials in a manner that adheres to their designated scope(s) and objective(s). Two critical aspects in this context are Unauthorized Use and Inappropriate Use.

This section is non-normative.

Data in verifiable credentials can include injectable code or code from scripting languages. Authors of verifiable credentials benefit from avoiding such inclusions unless necessary and only after mitigating associated risks to the fullest extent possible.

For example, a single natural language string containing multiple languages or annotations often requires additional structure or markup for correct presentation. Markup languages, such as HTML, can label text spans in different languages or supply string-internal markup needed to display bidirectional text properly. It is also possible to use the rdf:HTML datatype to encode such values accurately in JSON-LD.

Despite the ability to encode information as HTML, implementers are strongly discouraged from doing so for the following reasons:

• It requires some version of an HTML processor, which increases the burden of processing language and base direction information.
• It increases the security attack surface when using this data model, because naively processing HTML could result in the execution of a script tag that an attacker injected at some point during the data production process.

If implementers feel they need to use HTML, or other markup languages capable of containing executable scripts, to address a specific use case, they are advised to analyze how an attacker could use the markup to mount injection attacks against a consumer of the markup. This analysis should be followed by the proactive deployment of mitigations against the identified attacks, such as running the HTML rendering engine in a sandbox with no ability to access the network.

This section is non-normative.

The value associated with the issuer property identifies an issuer to the verifier.

Metadata related to the issuer property is available to the verifier through the verification algorithm as defined in Section 7.1 Verification. This metadata includes identification of the verified controller of the verification method used by the securing mechanism to secure each verifiable credential or verifiable presentation, of which the controller is typically the respective issuer or holder.

Some ecosystems might have more complex relationships between issuers and controllers of verification methods and might use lists of verified issuers in addition to, or instead of, the mapping described above.

This section is non-normative.

The value associated with the holder property is used to identify the holder to the verifier.

Often relevant metadata about the holder, as identified by the value of the holder property, is available to, or retrievable by, the verifier. For example, a holder can publish information containing the verification material used to secure verifiable presentations. This metadata is used when checking proofs on verifiable presentations. Some cryptographic identifiers contain all necessary metadata in the identifier itself. In those cases, no additional metadata is required. Other identifiers use verifiable data registries where such metadata is automatically published for use by verifiers, without any additional action by the holder.

See the Verifiable Credentials Implementation Guidelines 1.0 and Verifiable Credentials Use Cases for additional examples related to subject and holder.

A verifier might need to validate a given verifiable presentation against complex business rules; for example, the verifier might need confidence that the holder is the same entity as a subject of a verifiable credential. In such a situation, the following factors can provide a verifier with reasonable confidence that the claims expressed regarding that identifier, in included verifiable credentials, are, in fact, about the current presenter:

This section is non-normative.

The validFrom is expected to be within an expected range for the verifier. For example, a verifier can check that the start of the validity period for a verifiable credential is not in the future.

This section is non-normative.

The securing mechanism used to prove that the information in a verifiable credential or verifiable presentation was not tampered with is called a cryptographic proof. There are many types of cryptographic proofs including, but not limited to, digital signatures and zero-knowledge proofs. In general, when verifying cryptographic proofs, implementations are expected to ensure:

• The cryptographic proof is available in a form defined by a known cryptographic suite.
• All required cryptographic proof properties are present.
• The cryptographic proof verification algorithm, when applied to the data, results in an accepted cryptographic proof.

In general, when verifying digital signatures, implementations are expected to ensure:

• Acceptably recent metadata regarding the verification material associated with the signature is available. For example, if the verification material is a cryptographic public key, the metadata might include properties related to the validity period, the controller, or the authorized purpose, such as authentication or encryption, of the cryptographic public key.
• The public key is not suspended, revoked, or expired.
• The digital signature verifies.
• Any additional requirements defined by the securing mechanism are satisfied.

This section is non-normative.

The verifier expects that the validFrom and validUntil properties will be within a certain range. For example, a verifier can check that the end of the validity period of a verifiable credential is not in the past. Because some credentials can be useful for secondary purposes even if their original validity period has expired, validity period, as expressed using the validFrom and validUntil properties, is always considered a component of validation, which is performed after verification.

This section is non-normative.

If the credentialSchema property is available, the schema of a verifiable credential is expected to be evaluated by the verifier according to the credentialSchema type definition for the verifiable credential and the verifier's own schema evaluation criteria. For example, if the credentialSchema's type value is [VC-JSON-SCHEMA], then a verifier can ensure a credential's data is valid against the given JSON Schema.

This section is non-normative.

Fitness for purpose is about whether the custom properties in the verifiable credential are appropriate for the verifier's purpose. For example, if a verifier needs to determine whether a subject is older than 21 years of age, they might rely on a specific birthdate property, or on more abstract properties, such as ageOver.

The issuer is trusted by the verifier to make the claims at hand. For example, a franchised fast food restaurant location trusts the discount coupon claims made by the corporate headquarters of the franchise. Policy information expressed by the issuer in the verifiable credential should be respected by holders and verifiers unless they accept the liability of ignoring the policy.

This section is non-normative.

Systems using what is today commonly referred to as "artificial intelligence" and/or "machine learning" might be capable of performing complex tasks at a level that meets or exceeds human performance. This might include tasks such as the acquisition and use of verifiable credentials. Using such tasks to distinguish between human and automated "bot" activity, as is commonly done today with a CAPTCHA, for instance, might thereby cease to provide adequate or acceptable protection.

Implementers of security architectures that use verifiable credentials and/or perform validation on their content are urged to consider the existence of machine-based actors, such as those which are today commonly referred to as "artificial intelligence", that might legitimately hold verifiable credentials for use in interactions with other systems. Implementers might also consider how threat actors could couple such "artificial intelligence" systems with verifiable credentials to pose as humans when interacting with their systems. Such systems might include, but not be limited to, global infrastructure such as social media, election, energy distribution, supply chain, and autonomous vehicle systems.

Implementations MUST treat the base context value, located at https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2, as already retrieved; the following value is the hexadecimal encoded SHA2-256 digest value of the base context file: 59955ced6697d61e03f2b2556febe5308ab16842846f5b586d7f1f7adec92734. It is possible to confirm the cryptographic digest above by running the following command from a modern Unix command interface line: curl -s https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2 | openssl dgst -sha256.

It is strongly advised that all JSON-LD Context URLs used by an application use the same mechanism, or a functionally equivalent mechanism, to ensure end-to-end security. Implementations are expected to throw errors if a cryptographic hash value for a resource does not match the expected hash value.

Implementations that apply the base context above, as well as other contexts and values in any @context property, during operations such as JSON-LD Expansion or transformation to RDF, are expected to do so without experiencing any errors. If such operations are performed and result in an error, the verifiable credential or verifiable presentation MUST result in a verification failure.

This section serves as a reminder of the importance of ensuring that, when verifying verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations, the verifier has information that is consistent with what the issuer or holder had when securing the credential or presentation. This information might include at least:

1. The contents of the credential itself, which are secured in verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations by using securing mechanisms. See Section 4.12 Securing Mechanisms for further information.
2. The content in a credential whose meaning depends on a link to an external URL, such as a JSON-LD Context, which can be secured by using a local static copy or a cryptographic digest of the file. See Section 5.3 Integrity of Related Resources for more details.

Verifiers are warned that other data that is referenced from within a credential, such as resources that are linked to via URLs, are not cryptographically protected by default. It is considered a best practice to ensure that the same sorts of protections are provided for any URL that is critical to the security of the verifiable credential through the use of permanently cached files and/or cryptographic hashes. Ultimately, knowing the cryptographic digest of any linked external content enables a verifier to confirm that the content is the same as what the issuer or holder intended.

Implementations that depend on RDF vocabulary processing MUST ensure that the following vocabulary URLs used in the base context ultimately resolve to the following files when loading the JSON-LD serializations, which are normative. Other semantically equivalent serializations of the vocabulary files MAY be used by implementations. A cryptographic hash is provided for each JSON-LD document to ensure that developers can verify that the content of each file is correct.

It is possible to confirm the cryptographic digests listed above by running a command like the following, replacing <DOCUMENT_URL> with the appropriate value, through a modern UNIX-like OS command line interface: curl -sL -H "Accept: application/ld+json" <DOCUMENT_URL> | openssl dgst -sha256

The following base classes are defined in this specification for processors and other specifications that benefit from such definitions:

This section defines datatypes that are used by this specification.

This section is non-normative.

The verifiable credential and verifiable presentation data models leverage a variety of underlying technologies including [JSON-LD11] and [VC-JSON-SCHEMA]. This section will provide a comparison of the @context, type, and credentialSchema properties, and cover some of the more specific use cases where it is possible to use these features of the data model.

The type property is used to uniquely identify the type of the verifiable credential in which it appears, that is, to indicate which set of claims the verifiable credential contains. This property, and the value VerifiableCredential within the set of its values, are mandatory. Whilst it is good practice to include one additional value depicting the unique subtype of this verifiable credential, it is permitted to either omit or include additional type values in the array. Many verifiers will request a verifiable credential of a specific subtype, then omitting the subtype value could make it more difficult for verifiers to inform the holder which verifiable credential they require. When a verifiable credential has multiple subtypes, listing all of them in the type property is sensible. The use of the type property in a [JSON-LD11] representation of a verifiable credential enables to enforce the semantics of the verifiable credential because the machine is able to check the semantics. With [JSON-LD11], the technology is not only describing the categorization of the set of claims, the technology is also conveying the structure and semantics of the sub-graph of the properties in the graph. In [JSON-LD11], this represents the type of the node in the graph which is why some [JSON-LD11] representations of a verifiable credential will use the type property on many objects in the verifiable credential.

The primary purpose of the @context property, from a [JSON-LD11] perspective, is to convey the meaning of the data and term definitions of the data in a verifiable credential, in a machine-readable way. The @context property is used to map the globally unique URLs for properties in verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations into short-form alias names, making [JSON-LD11] representations more human-friendly to read. From a [JSON-LD11] perspective, this mapping also allows the data in a credential to be modeled in a network of machine-readable data, by enhancing how the data in the verifiable credential or verifiable presentation relates to a larger machine-readable data graph. This is useful for telling machines how to relate the meaning of data to other data in an ecosystem where parties are unable to coordinate. This property, with the first value in the set being https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2, is mandatory.

Since the @context property is used to map data to a graph data model, and the type property in [JSON-LD11] is used to describe nodes within the graph, the type property becomes even more important when using the two properties in combination. For example, if the type property is not included within the resolved @context resource using [JSON-LD11], it could lead to claims being dropped and/or their integrity no longer being protected during production and consumption of the verifiable credential. Alternatively, it could lead to errors being raised during production or consumption of a verifiable credential. This will depend on the design choices of the implementation and both paths are used in implementations today, so it's important to pay attention to these properties when using a [JSON-LD11] representation of a verifiable credential or verifiable presentation.

The primary purpose of the credentialSchema property is to define the structure of the verifiable credential, and the datatypes for the values of each property that appears. A credentialSchema is useful for defining the contents and structure of a set of claims in a verifiable credential, whereas [JSON-LD11] and a @context in a verifiable credential are best used only for conveying the semantics and term definitions of the data, and can be used to define the structure of the verifiable credential as well.

While it is possible to use some [JSON-LD11] features to allude to the contents of the verifiable credential, it's not generally suggested to use @context to constrain the data types of the data model. For example, "@type": "@json" is useful for leaving the semantics open-ended and not strictly defined. This can be dangerous if the implementer is looking to constrain the data type of the claims in the credential, and is expected not to be used.

When the credentialSchema and @context properties are used in combination, both producers and consumers can be more confident about the expected contents and data types of the verifiable credential and verifiable presentation.